•. J

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543 A

BHOPAL SUGAR iNDUSTRIES LTD.

STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS

March 23, 1982

(V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMARENDRA NATH SBN, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958-S. 21-Levy of commission on purchase of cane from outside 'reserved area' or through Cane-growers' Cooperative Society-Whether legal?

Section 21 (I) of the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958, imposes an obligation upon an occupier of a factory to pay commission at prescribed rates on all its purchases of sugarcane. While in respect oC purchases made through fl. Cane-growers' Cooperative Society the commission is payable to that Society and the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (a), in respect of purchases made directly from the cane growers the commission is payable to the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (b).

The appellant, a company which crushes sugar cane in its factory, purchased cane directly from the cuJtivators of 'reserved area' as well as of 'non-reserved area'. Resp"ndent No. 2, the Cane J)evelopment Council, demanded commission in respect of purchases made from both 'i"eserved 1 as well as 'non-reserved' areas.

The appellant also purchased cane from Or through respondent No. 3, a Canegrowers' Cooperative Society and in respect of those purchases, the demand for commission was made by that Society.

The demands for payment of commission were challenged by the appellant by a petition under Art. 226 which was dismissed by the High Court .

In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since the Cane Development Council had been established for the 'reserved area' of the appellant's factory so declared under s. 15 of the Act and its statutory functions and duties were confined to that area under s. 6 of the Act, its demand for commission on purchases made from 'non-reserved area' was illegal, there being no quid pro quo in the shape of rendering services in respect of purchases made from' non-reserved area'. As regards the demand of the Cane-growers' Cooperative Society for commission in respect of purchases made through it, the contention was that in everything being done by it, the Society was rendCring services to its own members and since no services resulting in any special benefit to the appellant were being rendered by it in terms of the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri'1 case, (1979] 3 SCR 1217, there was no quid pro quo and therefore no commission was legally recoverabl .. y the Society.

S44 sOP!tili.le coUilt llllPoRts [1982) 3 s.t.lt

A Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : I. The levy under s. 21 of the Act though called 'commission' is really in the nature of a fee and its imposition is supportable only on the basis of quid pro quo in the shape of rendition of services to a factory in the matter of cane purchased by it. [548 C-D]

8 Jaora Sugar Milla (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. [1966] 1

SCR 523, referred to.

2. The imposition of commission by the Cane Development Council on purchases of cane from 'non-reserved area' was proper and justified as there was quid pro quo in the form of rendering services in the m:tter of bettef cane production, distribution and supply thereof. The area of operation or the 'zone' of the CounciJ could include areas outside the 'reserved area' of the factory as a Council could be established for a larger or smaller area "than the reserved area of a factory" under s. 5 of the Act, and its functions and duties under els. (a) to

(g) of s. 6(1) included functions like considering and approving development progi'ammes for the zone. devising waysand means for execution of development plan in a!J its essentials such as cane varieties, cane seed, sowing programme, fertilizers and manures, taking steps for preven.tion of diseases and pests and rendering all help in soil extension work, etc. Some of thCse functions mentioned in els. (b), (d) and (el of s. 6(1) are of general character and not confined to even the zone of the Council. Further, s. 21 of the Act does not contain any qualifying words limiting the imposition of ommission to purchases of cane made by a factory from. 1reserved area' onJy; the imposition is on every maund of cane purchased by a factory irrespective of the area from where such purchases might have been made. [549 A-Fl

3. The contention that in respect of purchases of cane made through the

CaoeMgroers' Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act and the activities undertaken by the Society in the discharge of its normal functions. The scheme of the Act, particularly in ss. 15.16 and 19, contemplated situations where the.appellant's factory might have had to purchase cane from within reserved or assigned areas, only through the Society. The Society had been .established to develop scientific methods of sugar cane growing and it bad called upon Its members to introduce modern means of implements for cultivating sugarcane w-bk.b unqueslionably made for assured bulk supply of uniformly good quality cane throllgh its members tO the appellant's factory. It could not, therefore, be said that no services conferring special benefit on the' appeUant's factory in the matter of purchases of cane were being rendered by the Society to the appellant's factory.

[S5l A-H; 552 A]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 504 (N) of 1971.

Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th Apri 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 246 ·

of 1967. •

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llltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S

R.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra

for the appellant.

Gopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff' for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TULZAPURKAR, J. Two questions were raised for our determination in this appeal by a certificate :

(a) Whether the Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore

(respondent No. 2) can charge commission under section 21 (I) of the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958 on purchases of sugarcane made by the appellantcompany from outside the "reserved area" ? and

(b) Whether the Sugar Cane-Growers Development Co- D operative Union Ltd., Sehore (respondent No. 3: the concerned Cane Growers Co-operative Society) cancharge commission under section 21 (I) (a) of the Act in respect of the purchases of sugarcane made by the appellant through the Union when there is no. quid pro quo by way of rendering any services by E Union to the appellant-company ?

The short fac(s giving rise to the above questions may be stated : The appellant-company crushes sugarcane in its factory at Sebore in Madhya Pradesh.

For its business 'it purchases sugarcane from "reserved area" as well as from outside both directly from the F cane-growers as well as through respondent No. 3, a Cane.growers Co-operative Society, Sehore. Section 21 of the Act imposes an obligation upon the !IPPellant-company to pay commission on all its purchases of cane at prescribed rates and .it bas to pay such commission in respect of purchases made through the Society to the Society and the Development Council and in . respect of purchases

G made directly from the cane-growers to the Development Council.

According to the appellant-company judicial decisions rendered by Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as this Court have settled the position that the commission chargeable under s. 21 of the Act is in H the nature of a fee the imposition of which is supported on the basis of quid pro quo in the shape of services rendered by the Development .

546 SuPRBMi! COIJRt Rl!POl!.TS (1~82) 3 s.c.a.

Council to a factory (vide : Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others.(') It appears that during" the seasons 1960-61 to 1964-65 the appellant-company purchased cane directly from the cultivators of "reserved area" as well as from the cultivators of "non-reserved area" and respondent No. 2 (Development Council, Sehore) maife a demand of commission from the appellant-company in respect of such purchases both from "reserved area" as well as from "non-reserved area." Similarly, during the crushing seasons 1963-64 to 1966-67 the appellant-company made purchases of cane from or through respondent No. 3 (Co-operative Society) in respect whereof a demand of commission was made by respondent No; 3 from the appellantcompany. By a writ petition (being Misc. Petition No. 246 of 1967) filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur the apppellant-company challenged the validity of the demand made by respondent No. 2 insofar as it related to purchases made from non-reserved area on the ground that it (Council) was established for the reserved area of the appellant-company's factory and its functions were confined to that area and as such no commission (fee) could be recovered by it in respect of purchases made by appellant-company from nonreserved area; similarly, the demand made by respondent No. 3 (Co-operative Society) was challenged on the ground that no services of any kind whatsoever were rendered by it to the appellantcompany, and the charge would be invalid in the absence of any quidpro quo. The High Court negatived both the contentions and dismissed the petition. It is this decision of the High Court that is challenged before us in the appeal and counsel for the appellant- company raised the two questions mentioned at the commencement of the judgment.

Section 21, which deals with commission on purchase of cane, runs thus:

" (I) There shall be paid by the occupier a commission for every one maund of cane purchased by the factory-·

(a) where the purchase is made through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, the commission shall be payable to the Cane• growers' Cooperative

(!) [1966) I S.C.R. 523.

" BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES v. M. l'. STATE (tulzapurkar, J.) 541

Society and the Council in such proportion as the State Government may declare ; and

(b) where the purchase is made directly from the cane-grower, the commission shall be payable to the Council.

(2) The Commission payable under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (I) shall be at such rates as may be prescribed provided, however, that the rate fixed under clause (b) shall not exceed the rate at which the commission may be payable to the Council under clause (a)."

Section 30 confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and under cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) such Rules may provider for "the rate at

which and the manner in which commission shall be paid to the

Cae-growers' Co-operative Society on the supply of cane by them." Under the aforesaid provisions certain rules called the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1959 have been framed by the State Government. Rules 45 and 46 occurring in Chapter X of the Rules are material and they are as follows:

"45. The occupier of factory shall pay a comm1ss1on for the cane purchased at the following rates namely :-

(i) Where . the purchase is made. through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, at the rate of 5 Naya Paise per maund out of which 2 Naya Paise shall be payable to the Society and 3 Naya paise to the Council;

(ii) Where the purchase is made. directly from the cane-growers, at the rate of 3 Naya Paise per maund, payable to the Council.

46. In determining the proportion to which pay :-ients out of commission shall be made to the Council and the Cane-growers' Co-operative Society of an area the State Government may take into consideration the

S4S

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SUl>R.li.Mll totJltT REl>oRts [l982J 3 s.c.lt.

financial resources the Council and Society."

and the working requirements of. the Cane-growers' Co-operative

It is thus clear from the aforesaid statutory prov1s1ons that every factory is uncler , an obligation to pay commission on all its . purchases of cane at the prescribed rates and it has to pay such commission at the rate of 2 Naya Paise per maund to the Society and 3 Naya Paise to the Cuncil in respect of purchases made through a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society and at the rate of 3 Naya Paise per maund to the Council where the purchases are made directly from the cultivators or cane-growers. It cannot be and was not disputed by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the levy under s. 21 of the Act though called "commission" is really in the nature of a fee, the imposition of which is supportable only on thebasis of quid pro quo in the shape of rendition of services to the factory in the matter ofo cane purchased by it and Counsel accepted this position as emerging from this Court's decision in Jaora Sugar Mills'. case (supra). ·

Now, turning to the first question raised before us Counsel for the appellant.company contended that respondent No. 2 Council has been established for the "reserved area" of the appellant's factory so declared under s. 15 of the Act, that respondent No. 2 Council is required to discharge its statutory functions and duties under s. 6 of the Act confined to the "reserved area" meant for the appellant's factory and as such the demand for commission (fee) in respect . of purchases of cane made by the appellant-factory from nonreserved areas (which it is entitled to make alongwith its purchases from the "reserved area") would be illegal and without any autho rity of !awe because in respect of such purchases there is no quid pro quo in the shape of renderi!lg of services by respondent No. 2 to the

appellnt-factory. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reasort. In the first place there arc no qualifying words to be found in s. 21 of the Act which limit the imposition of commission (fee) to purchases of cane made by a factory from reserved area only; the imposition is on every maund of cane purchased by factory irrespective of the area from where such purchases may have been inade.

Secondly, and this is important, if the relevant provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act are carefully examined it will appear that the functions and duties of the Development Council are not confined to the "reserved area" of a factory as

BHOPAL SUOAR INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATE (Tulzapurkar, J.) 549

urged" by the Counsel for the appellant-company. Under s. 5 "there shall be established, by notification, for the reserved area of a factory a Cane Development Council which shall be a body corporate .. . provided that where the Cane Commissioner so directs, the Council may he established for a larger or smaller area "than the reserved area of a factory" and sub-s. (2) provides that "the area for which a council is established shall be called a Zone". In other words, the Zone (area of operation) of a Council could be larger than the "reserved area" of a factory i.e. would, in elude areas outside the reserved area of the factory. Further, the func- tions and duties of the Council are indicated seriatim in els. (a) to (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 6 and these include functions like considering and approving development programmes for the Zone, devising ways and means for execution of development plan in all its essentials such as cane varieties, cane-seed, sowing rrogramme, fertilizers and manures, taking steps for the prevention of diseases and pests and rendering all help in soil extension work, etc. etc. and it will be noticed that some of these functions under cl. (b), (d) and (e) are of general cha- . racier and not confined even to the Zone of the Council.

In other words, the funcJions and duties of the Council which are in the nature of-rendering services in the matter of better cane produciion, distribution and supply thereof to the factory are not confined to the "reserved area" so declared for a factory under sec. IS of the Act.

If that be so it is difficult to accept the contention that in the matter of cane purchases made by the appellant's factory from non-reserved areas no services are rendered by. the respondent No. 2 Council to the appellant's factory. The quid pro quo being there the imposition of a fee on such purchases from non-reserved areas would be proper and justified .

As regards the demand and recovery of commission (fee) by respondent No. 3 under s. 2l(l)(a) in respect of purchases of sugarcane made by the appellant's factory through it, the contention of Coun.sel for the appellant-company has been that respondent No. 3 is the concerned Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in the area, one of the objects of which is to sell cane grown by its members to the appellant's factory, that the said Society does not render any services to the appellant's factory under the Act or otherwise and hence is not , entitled to recover any fee from the appellant-company. It is pointed out that respondent No. 3 is meant for helping its members , and in fpt renders various types of services to its cultivator-men:rber$

SUPBEME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R.

so that they are not exploited. In fact in the matter of supplies of cane made through the respondent No. 3 it is the Society which deals with its members who receive their price from the Society. Counsel pointed out that even in the return filed by respondent No. 3 to the writ petition, respondent No. 3 enumerated four types of services which it claimed was rendering to .the appellant's factory, namely, (a) it made. arrangements for Jumpsum cane supply on Jumpsum demand from the factory; apart from convenience this resulted in economy to the factory as it had to maintain Jess staff; (b) it undertook equitable distribution of quota and the factory had not to undertake this function; (c) it undertook the maintenance of the records of illdividual growers for cane supplies and the factory had not to undertake this function and (d) it made payment to the suppliers though the factory is required to make payments for supplies effected immediately and, in actual practice mostly the factory made payments late at its convenience but the Society made payments to the suppliers regularly according to the programme drawn by it; the appellant's factory thus benefited . by the existence of this Society. But according to Counsel for the appellant-company none of these items referred to above really amounts to rendering any service to the appellant's factory by way of conferring on it some special benefit having a direct, close or reasonable correlation to its transactions of purchase of cane and, if at all, all these items referred to in the Return are really for the benefit of cultivator-members of the Society and in this behalf, Counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri' s('J case where in the context of enhanced market fee levied under Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 this Court has observed tht the quid pro quo by way of rendering services must result in the conferal of some special benefits to the persons charged which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between such persons and their transactions and that any indirect or remote.' benefit to them would in no sense be such benefit.

Counsel for the appellant-company, therefore, urged that since in everything that is being done by it respondent No. 3 is rendering services to its own members and no services resulting in any special benefit to the appellant's factory are rendered, no charge by way of any fee would be legally recoverable by respondent No. 3 from the appellant's factory.

(2) (1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217.

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< , /

, .

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BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES v. M~P. STATE (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 551

In our view having regard to the scheme of the Act and the activities which respondent No. 3 has been undertaking . in the discharge of its normal functions it will be difficult to

acept the contention urged by Counsel for the appellant's factory that no services of any kind whatsoever resulting in conferal of special benefits on the appellant's factory in regard to its transactions of purchases of cane are rendered by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory. The scheme of the Act is that under sections 15 and 16 a declaration of reserved and assigned areas for purchase and supply of sugarcane is made by thlj, Cane Commissioner for every factory after consulting in the manner prescribed the occupier of the factory and the Cane-growers' Co-operl\live Society, if any, in that area and upon declaration of such areas an obligation is cast upon the occupier of the factory, in the case of "reserved area", to purchase 311 cane grown in such area which is offered for sale and in respect of "assigned area" to purchase such quantity of cane grown therein and offered for sale for te factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. Further, under s. 19 the State Government can by order regulate the distribution, sale and purchase of cane witin any "reserved and assigned area" as also from areas other than "reserved and asssigned areas" and under

cl. (b) of sub-sec. (2) such order made by the State Government may provide for the manner in which cane grown in the "reserved area" or the "assigned area" shall be purchased by the factory and .the cane grown by a cane-grower shall not be purchased except through a Cane-growers' Co-operative Soiety. In other words the scheme of Act contemplates situations where the appellant's factory may have to purchase cane from within reserved or assigned areas only through the respondent No. 3 Society.

Moreover in its Return the respondent No. 3 has averred that unc\fr its bye-laws the Society is established to develop scientific methods of sugar cane growing and calls on its me.mbers to introduce modern means of implements for cultivating sugarcane which unquestionably makes for assured bulk supplv of uniformly good quality cane through its members to the appellant's factory.

In other words this funclion undertaken by respondent No. 3 is of a nature or kind similar to that undertaken by the council and therefore it cannot be said that no services conferring special benefit on the appellant's factory in the matter of its purchases of cane are rendered by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory.

Hving regard to the aforesaid position it is not possible to accept the contention that in respect of purchases of cane made through the respondent No. 3 Society there is nQ

E •

552 SUPREME COURT REPOP..'l'S

(1982) 3 S.C.R.

element of quid pro quo in the shape of rendering services by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory.

In the result both the questions are answered against the appellant-company and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

H.L.C.

Appeal dismissed.

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...

A

BHOPAL SUGAR iNDUSTRIES LTD

STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS

V.D. TULZAPURKAR

S. 21

Section 21

Cane Development Council

s. 21

s. 21

Art. 226

s. 15

s. 6

Kewal Krishan Puri'1

(1979] 3 SCR 1217

s. 21

Jaora Sugar Milla

[1966] 1

SCR 523

s. 5

s. 6(1)

s. 6(1)

s. 21

ss. 15

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

R.P. Bhatt

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llltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S

R.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra

for the appellant.

Ashok Mehta

J.B. Dadachanjl

D.N. Misra

Gopal Subramanium

S.A. Shroff

TULZAPURKAR

Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore

section 21

section 21

Sebore

Madhya Pradesh

Section 21

Madhya Pradesh High Court

s. 21

Development Council, Sehore

Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur

Section 21

Section 30

Chapter X of the Rules

Cane-growers' Co-operative

s. 21

Jaora Sugar Mills

s. 15

s. 6

s. 21

ss. 5 and 6

s. 5

s. 6

s. 2

Kewal Krishan Puri

(1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217

sections 15 and 16

s. 19


:; J ,.,. "' ij

; f;:

DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC.

THE ADMINJSTRATOR OF GOA, DAMAN &

DIU & ANR.,

March 29, 1982

[D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL lsLAM, JJ.J

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act-Section 3-Detention order passed by Administrator of Goa-Administrator, if coTnpetent to pas1 Juch order.

Detenu-W/tetMr .haJ a right to be representd by a legal practitioner, or friend or agent IMfore the Advisory Board.

'Union Territories Act, 1963-Sectlon 46(2)-Scope o~Administrator WhetMr bound by the advice of Council of Ministers.

Iri thejr petitions under Article 32 of the Con, stitutioo the three petitioners, who were detained under sectii:>n 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smugglin's: Activities Act, 1974, contended that in the mattir of discharge of executive •functions conferred upon him, the Administrator of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman -and Diu who passed the impugned oi'ders, is in the same pqsition as a Governor of a State of the President who must act on the iid and advice of the Council of Ministers and, that in theinstant'case the orders of detention having been passed by the Administrator himself instead of by the Chief Minister io the name pf the Ad.;, iolstrator, were invalid.

Dismissing the petitions,

HELD : I, (a) Although section 46(2) of the Union Territories Act, 1963 provides that aU executive action of the AdministratOr, Whet, her takn on the advice of his Ministers or otherwise shall be expressed to be taken in the na•11e of the Administrator, the Administrator is not pureiy a constitutional functionary who is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Miqisters and could not act on his own. The language of Arts.· 74 and 163 on the one hand and the language of section 44 of the Union Territories Act 1963 on the other shows that the Administrator is siffiilarly situated with. thC Governor but not with the President when he is to act in his discretio:i; i unde( the Act. While exercising judicial or

0quasi judicial functions, the Administrator has to act on hi!i own unaided by. the Council of Ministers like the President who, while exercising power conferred.by Article 217(3), disl'harl!OS a juqiciat [unction 11!\q is not required t.o act oq IQ<;

' •

, F

\ 554 SUPREME COURT !lEPOR'rS

(1982) 3 S.C.R.

advice of the Council of Ministers. But there the analogy ends. The Administrator, even in matters where he is not required to act in his diseretion uder the Act or where he is. not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions, is not bound to act according to the advice of the Council. of Ministers. In the event of difference between him and his Ministers, he Administrator under the proviso to section 44(1) of the Act, is required to refer the matter to the President for decision and act according to that decision. Therefore in such a situation the rigb, t to give a decision on the difference of opinion between the two vests in the Union Government and the Council of Ministers of the Union Territory is bound by the view of the Union Government. There are also powers in the Administrator to act in derogation of the advice of the Council of Ministets.

[560 C-D, 561 A-HJ

- '

(b) The proviso to section 44(1) of the Act a1so envisages that when a ,--~ difference of opinion between him and the Council of Ministers is referred to the r- Pfesident, if the Administrator considers the matter urgent and necessary to take immediate action during the interregnu~, he can completely override the advice of the Council of-Ministers and act according to his own lights which power

..J.-._ neither the Governor nor the President enjoys. [562 A-Cl

Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1976] l SCR 814 held inapplicable.

2 .. The grievance that the detaining authority had no material from which to infer that the petitioners Were engaged in smuggling activities is not borne out by the material ,_on rCcord. Copies of recorded statements and ct.her relevant documents had been taken into-consideration by the deJaining athority.

These copies were supplied to the detenu. [563 A-Bl

3. It cannot be said that there was. any violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution or that the detenu was in any way handicapped in submitting his representation. A Gujarati translation of the grounds of detention was supplied to the detenu. The order of detention was a formal recital OfsectiOn 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act showing the provision of law under which the order of deten lion had been made. Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act bas not been mentioned, the grounds of detention were sufficiently clear to bring horn~ to the detenu that he was engaged in smuggling activities. ,[565 F, C-E] , ___ __,/..

The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] 2 SCR 167, held inapplicable.

4. (a) Clause (e) of <ection 8 of the COFEPOSA Act in express terms disentitles a detenu to appeaJ through a legal practitioner in any matter connec~ ted with the reference to-the Advisory Board. It is now well settled that the right t6 consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice conferred by a Article 22(1) is denied by clause 3(b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. According to the express intendment of the Constitution itself no person who is detained under any law which provides for preventive etentio~ cp l•i!D ti>• ri¥ht to consult a legal practitionef of hi&

o.v. TANDEL v .• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, 'Jo) 555

choice or be defended by him. Therefore it cannot be said that a detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. [570 F]

(b) The embargo on the appearance of legal practitioner does not apply

to a friend who in truth and substance is not a legal practitioner; but if such a B friend also happens to be a

legal practitioner he cannot as of right appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu. [574 Fl

(c) So is the case with reference to agents. If an agent is in troth and substance an agent, the detenu maY appear through him; but if the agent is a legal practitioner, appearance by him as of right would be barred. A friend or an agent of the detenu who, is essentially a c'omrade in the .Profession of the detenu for which he is detained. suh a friend or agent would also be barred from appea. ranee on behalf of the detenu. Although a person may have a common law right to appoint an agent there is no obJigatioD On the other side to deal with the agent. The other sie hits an equal right to refuse to deal with ari agent. ·

(574 G-H, 575 A]

In the instant case the sender of the telegram stated in. clear terms that he D was an advocate and was representing the detenu. He had not stated that he

wa~ a fiend or agent Of the detenu and therefore the Administrator was justified in refusing permission to he advocate to assist the detenu. [575 CE]

5. A persop detained under a Jaw providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a matter of constitutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice; nor can tie insist upon being ptoduced before a Magistrate within 24 hours or Jiis arrest. This is evident from A.rticle 22 (3) (b) which provides that nothing in clauses (I) and (2) of this Article shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive dete1;1tion.

, • (575 GfI; A-BJ

6. It is implicit in Articles 22(5) that the representation has to be a written representation communicated throllgh the jail authorities or through any other mode which the detenu thinks. fit of adopting. But the detaining au tho rity is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at the time of considering the representation. If the representation has to .be a written representation, there is no question ofhearing_anyone much less-a lawyer. Therefore; the Administra tor's rfusal to hear the advocate of the detenu while" considering the representa tion would not be deniaJ of the common Jaw right of the detenu to be represented by an agent. [577 A-CJ

Francis Coralie Mullin v. The AdNJfnislrator, Union Territory of D, el/ii Ors .. (1981] 2 SCR 516, held inapplicable,

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : 'Writ Petition (CRL ) Nos. 8070 of

19s1, z3 1111\i 79 or 19s2.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)

~' • -. • . ' • • • - - I

- • 556

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1982) 3 s.c.ll.

A Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioners.

.,.

Eduardo Falireo and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by ,

BARARUL l!LAM, J. These three .writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India involve~ common questions of facts and law. This common order of ours, therefore, will dispose of all of them. It will be sufficient .jf we refer to the facts only of Writ Petition No. 8070 .of 1~81. This petition is directed against the order dated !Ith September, 1981 made under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (the COFEPOSA) by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu (hereinafter 'the Administrator'), detaining .the petitioner "with a view to pre\'.enting him from smuggling goods".

The material facts in a nutshell as alleged in the grounds of detention in Writ Petition No. 8070 of 1981 are that the peti- . tioner along with Lallu Govan Tande! alias Lallu Malbari, Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande! (the petitioners in the ot-her two writ petitions) and Narsinghbhai Daulabhbhai (detenu since released) indulged in smuggling of foreign goods such as fabrics, speakers, cassettes, video cassettes, wrist watches, refrigerators, silver, etc. The goods in 36'packages were .recovered from House No. 12/134 of Daman Municipal Area. These goods were kept there by two persons, namely; Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande! and Mangalbhai Bh~Ia: bbai Tande! engaged by the aforesaid four detenus for lifting the said 36 packages from a vessel grounded in sea off Ghati SUeri; Nani Daman.

The contraband goods recovered were worth Rs.5,30,281.50. The aforesaid Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai made certain statements on 2nd July, 1981 implicating the aforesaid four persons including the pedtioner.

Whn the Customs squad was keeping a watch on Nani Daman coast, a vessel was found in the sea and goods were being unloaded. fo the process Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai and Manga!bhai Bhulabhai were accosted and each had a package with him and on being led by them ihe customs squad reached the house bearing.municipal No. 12/134. On being questioned, the aforementioned two labourers Tulsibhai and Mangalbhai stated that. they were engaged as laboure.rs for tran$porting packages of contraband goods from a vessel grounded in sea on Ghatisheri to the said house bearin(l No. 12/ 134. -Tulsi\>hai iind 1'4ang11l!J!iai, in the course of

' '

.i.._

b.\r. TANDEL V, ADMINISTRATOR (Baharu' fs/am, J,) 551

interrogation, admitted that they .were engaged by detenu Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! and Lallu Govan for unloading the packages containing contraband goods.

3. The impugned order of detention datei! 11th September, 1981 (Annexure 'A,') together with the grounds of detention (Annexure 'B') were served cin the petitioner on June 30,1981, which was, the date of apprehension.

The first submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, (hereinafter the Act), the order of detention can be made only by the Chief Minister and in the name of the Administrator and not by the Administrator, though it can be made in the name of the Administrator. In the instant case, the order of detention was made, and the representation dated 10th October, 1981 of the petitioner was disposed of, by the Administrator, which it is submitted, is not permissible in law.

' The argument sought to be made seems to be that the status of the Administrator is s.imilar to that of the Governor of a State and as such the Administrator had to act with the aid and advice of the. Council of Ministers. Admittedly, there is an elected Assembly with a Council of Ministers in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu .. Therefore, the argument. proceeds, the Administrator on his own cannot make an order of detention. The order can be made by the Chief Minister or any oiher persorl authorised under section 3 of the COFEPOSA in the tiame of the Administrator. ·

On the other hand in paragraph 7 of the qounteraffidavit, it has been stated by the respondent, "that the respondent has full authority to make the. order of detention under COFEPOSA in exercise of the powers conferred under the statute. In case of the Union Territories the power of detention 1s specifically conferred on the Administrator by virtue.of the definition of the "State Government" under Section 2 (fl of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 and as such the Administrator as the detaining authority, has to form his own opinion and is not bound to act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers .......... Even, then the Administator has 'considered the advice of the Chief Minister, who is' the Minister in-charge of the department dealing with COFEPOSA matters". ...

' I

.F

sui>kiiMii cobar RlliioRfs [19s2J 3 s.c.11..

5. Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 (the Administrator) has placed the entire records before us. On a perusal of the relevant papers, we find that the matter was routed through the Chief Minister. who considered the case and sent it to the Aaministrator, wjJ.o thereafter, passed the order of detention.

There is thus a substantial compliance of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA. Even so, the legal submission of learned counsel has to be answered, as he urged it with vehemence.

Section 2 (f) of the COFEPOSA provides :

"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(f) "State Government", in relation to a Union

Territory, means the administrator thereof".

In the Union 'Territories. Act, 1963 (hereinafter the 'Act'), under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, 'Administrator' has been defined as :

" 'Administrator' means the administrator of a Union Territory appointed by the President under article 239".

E Under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, "Union

Territory" has been defined as :

" 'Union Therritory' means any of the Union Territoris of ............ Goa, Daman and Din ......... ". (Material portion only)

Sub-section (I) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Provides : __ j

"The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting' in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmenta- 1'

b.v. 'r_ANDEL v. ADMiNIS'ri\A'rOR (Baharu/ lslm, J.) ss~

tion of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from

(i) smuggling goods, or

(ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or

(iii) engaging in transporting ot concaling or keeping

' smuggled_ goods; or

(iv) .dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in traqsporting o.r concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or

(v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods,

it is necessary so to do, make.an order directing that D such person be detained".

The fasciculus of Sections 44 to 46. in Part IV of the Act provides for setting up a Council of Ministers.

Section 44 reads as under:

"44. Council of Ministers '- (!) There shall be a Council of Ministers in each Union Tetritory with the Chief Minister at the head. to aid and advise the Administrator in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by or under this Act to act_in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi judicial functions :

Provided that in case of difference of opinion btween the Administrator and his Ministers on any' matter, .the Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Administrator in any case where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary forJ1iin to t!!.ke imme

' , i I \ ': I

. .

SuPREMB COUil~ REPORts (1982] 3 s.c.il._

diate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary".

x. x x x

Section 46 confers power on the President to make rules : {a) for the all(lcation of business to the Ministers; and (b) for the more convenient transaction of business with the Ministers including the procedure to be adopted in the case of difference of opinion between -the Administrator .and the Council of Ministers or a Minister. Sub-section (2) provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, all executive action of the Administrator, whether taken on the advice of his Ministers or'otherwise, shall be expressed to be

tken in the name of the Administrator. The contention is that the Administrator of the Union Territory appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution by .the President is in the same position as the Governor of a State or the President of India in the matter of discharge of executive functions conferred upon him and he must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. It was accordingly 'further submitted that the Administrator cannot act on his own and in this cas_e it is claimed on behalf of the Administrator in the affidavit that he can act _on his own as stated above. Reliance was placed on Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab(') wherein it was held that the Presideot or the Governor acts on th_e aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of a State in all matters which ves't in the executive whether those functions are executive or legislative in character. It was further held that neither the President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive functions , personally. It is _not possible to accept this submission.

Article 74 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance-With such advice. The proviso to the Article is not material.

Similrly, Article 163 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid ano advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as lie is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his

<I)

(1975] I SCR 814.

-.J.

' t>.v. TANDEL v. ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul lslam, 1.) S6i

discretion.

Once we compare the language or' Articles 74 and 163 with. the language of Section 44 of the Act, the difference between the position of the President and the Governor on the one hand and the. Ad.ministrator of the Jn-oin territory n the other becomes manifest. The first difference is that he is similarly situated with the Governor hut not 'with, the President when he is to act in his discretion under the Act.

Further, the Administrator has to act on his own unaided by the Council of Ministers when he is to exercise any judicial or quasi judicial functions. The nearest analogy to . this provision is one to. be found in Article 217 (3) when the

President has to determine the age 0£ a Judge of the High Court.· It has been held 'that while exercising the power conferred by Article 21i (3), the President discharges a judicial function and .is ot

equired to agi on the advice of the Council of Ministers, his only obligation being to decide the question about the age of the Judge

fter consulting the Chief Justice of India (see Union of Initia v. J.P.

Mitter.(1) But there the analogy ends. The Administrator even in matters where he is not required to act in his discretion under th~ Act or where he is not exercising any judicial or quasi judicial functions, is not bound to act according to the advice of the Council of Ministers. This becomes manifest from the proviso to Seciion 44 (!). It transpires from the proviso that in the event of a difference of opinion between th~ Administrator and his Ministers on any matter, the Administrator shall refer the matter to the President for decision and act accordiiig to the decision given thereon by the President. If the President

0 'in a given. situation agrees with what the Administrator opines contrary to the advice of the Council of' Ministers, the Administrator would be able to overriM the advice , of the Council of Ministers and on a reference to the President

under the proviso, obviously the. President would not according to the advice of the Council of Ministers given under. Article 74.

Virtually, therefore, in the event of a difference of opinion between the Coucil of Ministers of the Union territory and. the Administ- rator, the right t.o decide would vest in the.Union Government and the Council of Ministers of the Un ion territory would be bound by tlie view faken b} the Union Government. Further, the Administrator enjoys still some more power to act in derogation of the advice of the Council of Minisiers.

(I) [1971) 3 S.C.R. 483@ 504-SOS.

§_UPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] s.c.R.

' The second limb of the proviso to Section 44 (I) enables the Administrator that in the .event of a difference of opinion between him and the Council of Ministers not only he can refer the matter to the President but during the interregnum where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary for him to take' immediate action, he has the power to take such action or to give such directions in the matter as be deeins necessary. Jn other words, during the interregnum he can completely override the advice of the Council of Ministers and act according to his light. Neither the Governor nor the President enjoys any such power. This basic functional difference in the powers and position enjoyed by the Governor and the President on the one hand and the Administrator on the other is so glaring that it is not possible to Mid on the analogy of the deci .sion in Shamsher Singh' s case that the Administrator is purely a constitutionai functionary bonnd to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers and cannot act on his own. Therefore, for this additional reason also the submission of Mr. Jethmalani must be rejected.

7. The second submission of learned counsel was to the effect that the statements of labourers Tulsibbai and Mangalbhai of 30th June, 1981, being the earlier'statements of the two labourers were not supplied to the detenu but only the two' statements of !st • July; 1981, were supplied and, therefore, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation by which he wanted to controvert the statements of 'Tulsibhai and Mangalbbai.

The submission was that in their statements recorded on J:st July, 1981, they did not state that during the earlier interrogation on the night of 30th June, 1981, they informed the Customs authorities that they, were employed as labourers .by the detenu and Lalubhai Govan.

Consequently, it was contended, the detaining authority bad no material from which to infer that on being first accosted by the customs squad the two labourers gave out that they were engaged in this unlawful activity as wage earners by the detenu and Lallo Govan. The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given

D.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563

to the detenu. Further, the grievance made by the detenu is not warranted by the materials 9n record. For, in the penultimate paragraph of the grounds of detention, it was stated, "copies of the statements and other documents which have been taken into consideration by the detaining authority are also enclosed as per the indeJ!: attached" (underline mine).

Thereafter, no grievance appears to !}ave been made by the detenu in his representation.

Even from the grounds in the Writ J>etition, it does not appear which documents, if any, were not supplied to the detenu. The records show that there was great tension on the date at the place of apprehension and as such no statements could be and were recorded on the date of apprehension, but subsequently recorded on 2nd July, 1981.

The submission therefore has no substance. ·

8. The third submission of learned counsel is, ''that the order of detention was not properly served" .. The submission is that the Gujarati translatioµ of the.order was not supplied to the detenu.

According to the learned counsel, "the petitioner does not know and cannot speak or write in a language other than /Gujarati, and that Annexure 'A' ought to have been translated Jnto Gujarati. The petitioner was thereby deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against his detention".

The submission is not wholly correct on facts. Annexure 'A' is the 'ORDER'. exprrssed in terms of Section 3 (1) of the COFBPOSA. It is in English and. reads :

"SECRET

No. 14/3/80/HD (G) Administrator of Goa, Daman & Diu, Cabo Raj Niwas, Caranzalem (P.O.)

Goa.

ORDER

WHEREAS, I, Jagmohan, Administrator of Goa, Daman and Biu, am satisfied with respect to, the person known as Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! alias Devji Boss son of Shri Vallabhbhai Tande! residing at .H. No. 1/255,

Penta Sheri, Vadi Falia, Nani Daman, tat with a vfew to preyenting him from smugg, ling goods:

~64 SUPltEME coUkt REl'olt'ts !J 982] 3 s.c.11..

 A It is necessary to make the following order :

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 (1) of the, Ccinservation of Foreign Exchange and

Prevention. of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974;

I, Jagmoan, Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu direct that 'the said Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! be detained at the Central Jail, Aguada, and the enclosed grounds of detention be served on him.

Place :-Cabo Raj Niwas Date :-11.9.81

' Encl : As above

SEAL

Sd/- (Jagmohan) Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu.

/ Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande!

alias Oevji Boss, H. No. 1/255, Fenta Sheri, Vadi Falia, Nni Daman"

Admittedly, this 'ORDER' -as per Annexure •A' was in English but the enclosure, Annexure 'B' which contains the grounds . of detention together with the materials on which the grounds were based was in Gujarati. In paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of th.e Administrator, i~ has been stated :

"As regards Ground D it is denied that the detaining authority bas not furnished Gujarati version of the order of detention as alleged by the petitioner ................... ..

The petitioner by his own. admission kiiows Gujarati and

, o.v. TANDEL v.°AD¥1NISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 565

accordingly the grounds of detention have been communicated to the petitioner in Gujarati language. The aJlegatitm is, therefore, untenable".

The above statement of the respondent is supported by the internal evidence of Annuextre 'B' itself. For, in the penultimate paragraph of the "grounds" it has been stated :

"The Gujarati version of the grounds of detention is enclosed to enable you to understand the grounds for which detention order is passed agai!ht you".

This shows that the Gujarati version of the grounds as per Annexute 'B' was . sent to the detenu alongwi th the ORDER as per Annexure 'A'. Admittedly,, the deten.u is a Gujarati speaking person. • So far as the non-supply of the Guj; irati version of the ORpER

as per Annexure 'A' is concerned, in our opinion, there has been no D violation of Article 27 (5) or any other law.' The ORDER as per

Annexure 'A' was a mere formal recital of section 3 (I) of the COFEPOSA, showing the . provision of law under which the order of detention has beeni made.

Although, the section of the COFE- POSA has nt been nlentioned in the last but two paragraphs of the . "groun, ds", it has been stated that the detenu engaged himself"i!t E smuggling goods and that there is sufficient cause to pass detention order against you with a view to preventing you from smuggling goods", which was in Gujarati. It cannot, therefore, be said that' the detenu was in any way handicapped in submitting his representtion, or there has been any violation of Article 22 (5) of the Const.itution.

. F

9 .. The learned couns.el, in -support of his third submission, ·--... cited before us the decision of this Court in the case' of The State Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.(') The decision is beside . the point and need not be referred to.

, Learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited another decision of this Court reported in (1980) 4 SCC 427. 1n that case, it .has been held that failure to supply the grounds of detention in the language understood by the detenu violates Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. In the instant case, as we have found above the .

(I) [1951) s.C.R. 167 •

566 SUPREME COUll.T REP<)JlTS (198213 s.c.tt.

Gnjarati translation of the grounds was supplied to the detenu. The

deision cited has not held that the.. ORDER expressed in terms of Section 3 (l) of the COFEPOSA must.also be in the language understood by the detenu. Section 3 (l) as stated above merely gives power of detention to the detaining au4hority.

This submission also has no substance. .

-10. The fourth submission of learned counsel was that by a telegrari) dated lst October, 1981, the detenu requested for an immediate !hearing through his lawyer but this request was denie~. There was a delay of six days in deciding the matter.

This was contrary to Jaw. That apart, the "respondent misled the detenu by indicating to him that the only way by which the Administrator could be per-· suaded would be a representation through the jail'\ The factual part of the submission is not correct. Ori !st October, 1981, one Shri Thaku Ajwani, Advocate for the pe.titioner, sent a telegram to the Administrator. It was in the following 'terms :

ORDINARY

\ -

"JAGMOHAN

ADMINISTRATOR OF GOA

DAMAN & DIU

-CABO RAJ NIWAS

CARANZALER GOA

DETENUS DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL AND

NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL DETAINED

UNDER COFEPOSA ORDERS DATED liTH SEPTEM-

BER !981 HAVE INSTRUCTED ME TO APPEAR

BEFORE YOU AND REPRESENT THEIR CASE FOR REVOKING DETENTION ORDERS (Stop) KINDLY

INTIMATE FORTHWITH DATE, TIME AND PLACE.

THAKU AJW ANI AI'.>VOCATE 22

PANCHSHILA C ROAD CHURCHGATE •

BOMBAY 400 020

" 11"-!!l''''""l;;

i>.v. TANDEL v. ADMINi§TRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 561

There was a reply telegram by the Chief Secretary of the Union Territory in question. The post copy of the reply telegram reads thus : (material portions only) :

"STATE

TELEGRAM

ADVOCATE SHRI THAKU AJWANI

CHAMBERS C/.0 RAM JETHMALANI

ADVOCATE SUPREME COJJRT

22 PANCHSHILA C ROAD,

CHURCHGATE, BOMBAY-400 020

EXPRESS

........ No. 14/3/80/HD (G) (.) REFERENCE YOUR

LETTER DATED !ST OCTOBER 1981 REGARDING

DETENTION OF SARVASHRI DEVJI. VALLABHBHAI

TANDEL AND NARSINBHAI DURLABBHAI TANDEL

. DETAINED UNDER COFEPOSA ACT RECEIVED IN

THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR ON 5/10/1981

(.) "YOUR TEI, EGRAM DATED !ST OCTOBER 198t

REFERRED THEREIN HAD BEEN REPLIED UNDER

THIS DEPARTMENT'S TELEGRAM OF EVEN NUM-

BER DATED 6TH OCTOBER 1981 AND ITS COPIES

HA VE ALSO BEEN SENT TO THE CONCERNED

DETENUS AT (::ENTRAL JAIL AGUADA (.) CON

TENTS OF THE SAID TELEGRAM ARE REPRODUC-

ED BELOW(.) QUOTE(.) YOUR TELEGRAM DATED

!ST OCTOBER 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE ADMINI-

STRATOR GOA DAMAN AND DIU REGARDING

DETENTION OF SARY ASHRI DEV JI VALLABHBHAI

TANDEL AND NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TAN-

DEL DETAINED UNDER. COFEPOSA ACT(.) YOUR

 REQUEST FOR APPEARANCE BEFORE THE ADMI-

NISTRATOR AND REPRESENT THE CASE OF THE

AFORESAID DETENUS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY

CONSIDERED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR AND HE

HAS DECIDED THAT THE DETllNUS CAN .Mi\Ke

' E

568 '

SUPREMF COURT REPORTS [1982J 3 s.c.tt.

REPRESENTATION

TO THE

ADMINISTRATOR

THROUGH CENTRAL JAIL AGUADA WHERE THEY

ARE. DETAINED (.)

THE REPRESENTATION OF

THE AFORESAID DETENUS WILL RECEIVE HIS

DUE CONSIDERATION AS. AND WHEN THEY ARE

RECEIVED (.) UNQUOTE (.)

--CHIEF SEC--" '

It has been stated in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit as follows:

" .......................... ., it is admitted that the telegram dated !st October, 1981, purported to have been made by . the Advocate on behalf of petitioner requesting the Administrator for. grant of personal appearance' before him for'revocation of detention order was received in the office of the Administrator on 3, rCI October, 1981. This request was duly examined and it was felt that under the law, the detenu is not entitled to be represented by an Advocate and . the Detaining Authority is not legally bound to grant the prayer made on behalf of the detenu. The Advocate of the petitioner was telegraphically informed on 6th October 1981 that the request had been duly considered by the Administrator who had decided that the detenl} could m1ke a representation to the Administrator through the Superintendeqt, Central Jail, Aguada, where he was. detained and that the same would receive his due consideration as and when it was received. A copy of the said telegram sent to the Advocate was also e11dorsedto the detenu and the same was received by him on 7th October, 1981. A letter in confirmation of the Advocate' s telegram was received from. the Advocate of the petitioner in the office. of the Administra tor on 5.10.193·1 and the.same was replied to telegraphically on 7th October, 1981, reiterating the earlier position as conveyed in the said telegram of 6th October.

_ The allegation that IO days were. taken by the respondent in only deciding the .representation and in coming to the conclusio11 thiit he would not permit a lawyer to plead

I ' "j

;; Ji'

' ·~

D.V. TANDEL v. THE ADMINl>TRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 569

for revocation of the order of de1ention is, therefore, not correct. To give further details, the telegram of the petitioner's Advocate was received in the Administrator's office on 3rd October, 1981, and was sent to the Joint Secretary (Home) the same day.

It was referred to the law Department on 3rd October, 1981 itself and through usual channels reached the Law Secretary on 5th October, 1981, the 4th of October being a Sunday. The Law Secretary gave his opinion and referred the telegram to the Home Department on the same day Le. 5th October, 1981. In the Home Department 'it was sent by the Under Secretary (Home) to the Chief Secretary and by the latter to the Chief Minister the same day.

On 6th October, 1981, it was examined by the q, Governor and the reply was sent to the petitioner on the same day. The reply was received by the petitioner/detenu on 7th October, 198)". ·

In addition to the above explanation of the respondent in para 9 of the counter-affidavit, we peruied the file and we are satisfied that there was no delay in disposal. On the contrary, it may be said to the credit of the administration that it was dealing with the matter with utmost promptitude.

11. Now to examine the second part of the fourth contention of learned counsel.

His submission is that the Administrator committed an illegality not only by refusing the detenu to be heard through a lawyer, but, in addition, by misleadiog the detenu by his telegram. The detenu's counsel, Mr. Ajwani, informed the Administrator that the detenu had instructed him to represent his case before the Administrator. He made a request to 'the. Administratorto Jet him know the date, time and place of his appearance before the Administrator. The reply telegram quoted above ha~ stated that his request has been "carefully considered by the Administrator" who, by implication, rejected the request. Besides, it was furthsr stated in the telegram that the Administrator "has decided that the detenu can make representation to the Administrator through the jailor and that the representation so snt would be duly considered by the Administrator to which exception has been taken. In th'ese circumstances, the following questions arise :

(1) whether the detenu has a right to ; ippear before !he detainin~ 11u, t4oritr through a lawrer;

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.

(2) \\bether the last sentence in tte telegram has misled the detenu.

Mr. Jethmalani submits that Article 22 (3) enables the legislature to take away the common law right of acting through an agent generally or through a particular class of agents. Tbe statute does not deal with the general but with . a particular class, namely, the legal practitioners. The statute confines this legal disability to the matter connected with reference to the Advisory Board. So he submits that lawyers are not compeletely sought to be excluded.

Under Article 22 counsel submits there are two distinct and independent rights : (I) to persuade the detaiqing authority to revoke the order of detention and (2) to-persuade the Advisory Board to disapprove the detention. It is only in the second process that the agent called lawyer is excluded. The learned counsel further submits that every person has a common law right to employ an agent and do an act through him. The detenu could, therefore, send an 'agent' or a 'friend' who might have been his law.yer.

Let us first examine whether the detenu has a right to appear through a lawyer. This examination need not detain us long.

Section 8 (e) of the COFEPOS A reads: (material portion only)

"For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) of clause (7), of Article 22 of the Constitution,-(e)-a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the ..

 reference to the Advisory Board ....... " (emphasis added). ·~ ·~-

Clause (e) in express terms disent.itles the detenu to appear through a legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. It is indisputable that a detention matter which is pending before the Administrator is nndoubtedly a matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. The detenu, therefore, has no right to appear before the detaining authority or before the Advisory Board by a legal practitioner.

This Court in the case of Smt. Hemlata Kanti/4/ Shah ;:-The State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1) have held :

(1)£(1981) 3 Sqile 165?,

l---·-

·~

··~

D.V. TANDBL v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul ls/am, J.) 571

"Section 8 (e) has not barred representation of a detenu by a lawyer. It only lays down that the detenu cannot claim ropresentation by a lawyer as of right. It has given the Board a discrection tolpermit or not to permit representation of the detenu by counsel according to the necessity in a particular case".

In the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India(') relied on by .

Mr. Jethmalani, a Constitution Bench of this Court has held :

"First and foremost, we must consider whether and to what extent the detenu is entitled to exercise the trinity of rights before the Advisory Board; (i) the right of legal representation; (ii) the right of cross:examination and (iii) the right to present his evidence in rebuttal. These rights undoubtedly constitute the core of just process because without them, it would be difficult for any person to disprove the allegations made against him and to establish the truth. But there are two considerations of primary importance which must be borne in m.ind in this regard. There is no prescribed standard of reasonableness and therefore, what kind of processual rights should be made available to a person in. any proceeding depends upon the nature of the proceedings in relation to which the rights are claimed.

The kind of issues involved in the proceeding determine the kind of rights available to the persons who are parties to that proceeding. Secondly the question as to the availability of rights has to be decided not generally but on the basis of the statutory provisions which govern the proceeding, provided of course that those provisions are valid ......... "

(para 84)

'Turning first to the right of legal representation which is claimed by the petitioners, the relevant article of the Constitution to consider is Article 22 which bears the marginal note "protection against arrest and detention in certain cases". That article provides by clause (J) that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall q~ Qe <lenieq the riht to consult, an<!

(I) (1982l 1 s.c.c. 271,

SUPREME COURTi.REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R. ,

to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause

(2) requires that every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest and that no person shall be detained in.custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. Clause (3) provides that nothing in clauses (I) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the. time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. It may be recalled that clause (4) (a) of Article 22 provides that no law of preven tive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory Board has reported -before the expiry of. the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.

By clause (7) (c) of Article 22, the • Parliament is given the.power to prescribe by law the-procedure to be followed by the. Advisory Board in an inquiry under clause (4) (aJ:'. (para 85)

"On a combined reading of clauses (I) and (3) (b) of Article 22, it is clear that the .right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice, which is conferred by clause (I), is denied by clause J (b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Thus, according to the express intendment of the Co.nstitution itself, no person who is detained under any law, which provides for preventive detention, can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him. In view of this, it seems to us difficult to hold, by application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board ... ,, ...... It is indeed true to say, after the decision in the Bank Nationalisation case, that though the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in Article 22, the requirements of Article 21 have nevertheless to be satisfied. It is therefore necessary that the procedure prescribed by )aw for the proceedings before the Advisory Boards must be fair, just and reasonable. But then, the Constitutioq itself has providN a )'llr<lstiqk for

b.v. tANbEL v. ni~ ADMiN!stRATOR (fJaharui Isiam, J.) SH • the application of that standard, through the medium of the provisions contained in Article 22 (3) (b). Howsoever much we would have liked to hold otherwise, we experience serious difficulty in taking the view that the procedure of the Advisory Boards in which the detenu is denied the right of legal representation is unfair, unjust or unreasonable. If article 22 were silent on the question, of the right of legal representation, it would have been possible, indeed right. and proper, to hold that the detenu cannot be denied the right of legal representation in the proceedings before the Advisory Boards. It is unfortunate that courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Article 22 (3) (b) read with Article 22 (I)". (para 86).

"To read the riglit of legal representation in Article 22 (5) is straining the language of that article.

Clause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be ' effective, but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board merely because, by Section 10 of the National Security Act, the representation made by tlie detenu is required to be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration.

If anything, the effect of Section 11 (4) of the Act, which conforms to Article 22 (3) {b), is that the detenu cannot appear before the Advisory Board through a legal practitioner. The written representation of the detenu does not have to be expatiated upon by a legal practitioner". (para 88)

"We must therefore hold, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to uppear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board; It is, however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason behind the provisions contrained in Article 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any party ................ , ........ ". {para 93) (underlines added)

514 sbt>kEMB cotritt RBPbl!.ts fl 982] 3 s.t.lt.

What bas been said above about appearance through lawyer before the Advisory Board under the National Security Act equally apply to appearance by lawyer before the Advisory Board under

COFEPOSA.

With regard to appearance through a 'friend', the Court observed :

"Another aspect of this matter which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by, a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner. Every person whose interests are adversely affected as a result of the .proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to be heard in those proceedings . and be assisted by a friend .

.. . .. . .. . . . .. .. ". (para 94) (emphasis added).

But the Court observed :

"The appearance of the legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner." (emphasis added).

In other words, a 'friend' who, in truth and substance, is a friend of the detenu may appear for the detenu but if such a 'friend' '.l also happens to be a legal practitioner, he cannot, as of right, appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu.

12. The same reasoning will apply to appearance by an 'agent' .. In other words, if an 'agent' is in 'truth and substance' an agent, t)le detenu .may appear through h.im.

But if the 'agent' is a legal prJ1ctitioner, appearance by him as of right will be barred.

But a 'friend: or an 'agent' of the detenu who is essentially a comrade in the profession of.the detenu for which be is detained, such H a 'friend' or 'agent' will also be barred from appearance on behalf

1 of the detenu.

..,.,..__ ..

h.v. TANDEL v. THE AOMiNISTRATOR (Baharul ls/am, J.) s7s

In passing it must be stated that a man has a right to appoint an agent.. One may call it a common law right: But there is no obligation on the other side io deal with the agent. The other side has an equal right to refuse to deal with an agent. In any view of the matter, in the absence of any right to give an oral hearing in the form of making a representation under Article 22 (5), the question of hearing a legal practitioner on behalf of the detenu does not. arise.

It . cannot, therefore, be said that refllsal to hear Mr. Ajwani, advocate engaged by the detenu, by the Administrator has resulted in denial of constitutional right to make a representation .

That apart, in this case, the case, the ielegram in express terms has described the sender, Thaku Ajwani, as an advocate, who in clear terms stated that he , had been iitslr!Jcted by the detenu to appear before the detaining authority tcirepresent the case of the detenti; In other words, Mr. Ajwani cleirly told the Administrator that the detenu was his client and that Ile himself was his counsel andtbat he desired to represent the case of the detenu in his capacity as a legal practitioner. The telegram was not sent by Mr: Ajwani telling the Administrator that he wanted to appear before the Administrator as a 'friend' or an 'agent' of the detenu in order to represent hiscase. It, therefo, re, cannot be said that the Administrator refused a 'friend' or an 'agent' of the detenu to appear

before him to assist the detenu.

: 13. Article 22 (I) and (2) confer fundamental right of protection against arrest and detention in .. certain cases. Sub.Article (!) enjoins il duty on the person arfesting any person to inform the ... . \ person arrested, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest : ';'. '-.before detaining him in custody and s1ch detained person shall oot (, c • be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practit1, _ tioner, of his choice. Sub-Article (2) enjoins a duty on the person arresting and detaining any one to produce him before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary fo1 the journey from .the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. These two fundamental rights, namely, right to be informed of the grounds of detention at the time of arrest and the right to _ consult and be defended by a lawyer or his choice, and any detention beyond the period of 24 hours plus the time taken in the

siJPRilMB couRt RBi>ORTS [1982] s.c.ll.

journey, unless authorised by a magistrate to be illegal would have also been available to any one detained under the preventive deten tion laws but for sub-Article (3).

Sub-Article (3) provides that nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the iime being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person w)lo is arrested or drtained under any law providing for preventive deten tion.

As a necessary corrollary, any law providing for preventive detention would not be unconstitutional even if it contravenes Article 22 (1) and (2). In other words, a person detained under a law providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a matter of constitutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice. Nor can he insist upon being produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest.

14. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA soows as noticed above that a person against whom an order of detention has been made under the Act sha!I not be entitled . to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board.

Assuming that the right to make a representation and tbe corres ponding obligation cast on the detaining authority to consider the representation expeditiously is not a matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board and that both are independent stages, it cannot be said that the refusal of the Administrator to hear the advocate of the detenu while considering the representation would be denial of common law right of the detenu to be represented .bY an agent. Article 22 (S) which has provided a safeguard in the matter of preventive detention confers the right on the detenu and simultaneously casts an obligation on the detaining authority, as soon as may be, after the arrest to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order bas been made and to afford the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Representation is to be made by the detenu. Detenu is a person who is already deprived of his liberty. Giving the ordinary connotation to the expression 'earliest opportunity of making a representation' as set out in sub-Article (S) would only imply that the person can send his written representation through the jail. authorities. It would be open to him to send it by any other communicating media but the opportunity to make a representation does not comprehend an oral hearing. If it does, the detenu will have to be taken from the jail where he is detained to the detaining authoricy which in a given situation may not even be feasible and the delay in transit may be

!>, V, TANbEl v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (!Jaharui [s/am, J.) 511

counterproductive to the earliest opportunity to be afforded to make a representation. It is, therefore, implicit in Sub-Article (5) of Article 22 that the representation has to be a written representation communicated through the jail authorities or through any other mode which the detenu thinks fit of adopting but the detaining authority is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at the time of considering the representation. Now, if the.representation has to be a written representation, there is no question of hearing any one much less a lawyer. Reliance was, however, placed on Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.,(1) In that case the detenu challenged the validity of clause 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Condition of Detention laid down by the jail administration under an order dated 23rd August, 1975, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the COFE POSA. The relevant condition was as under :

3. The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under :

(b) Interviews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under:

(i) Interview with legal adviser :

Interview with legal adviser. in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention.

(ii) Interview with family members :

(2) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516.

51s.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982j 3 s.c:ii..

A monthly dnterview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of Wife, children or parents of the detenu ..... "

The contention was that the condition in clause 3 (b) (ii) which restricts the interview.to only• o.ne in a month in case of a deteu is unreasonable and arbitrary when contrasted with an undertrial prisoner who was entitled to the faeility of interviews with friends and relatives twice in a week and e'1en thoiigh a detenu stands on a · higher pedestal than an:under-trial prisoner or a convict, the Jimi!atioh of interview to one in a month is utterly ar&ittary. This contehlion\ i. found fav.our wi.th the.Court oil the ground that restrictions Placed on a detenu must, consistent with the effectiveness Of detention; be minimal (see Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, [1969] 3 $.C.R. 574. Proceeding further, this Court held that sµb-clause

(i) of clause 3 (b) which prescribes that the detenu can have an inter view with a legal adviser:of his choice with prior permission of the District Magistrate and the interview has to take place in the presence of a Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement officer nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise/Deputy Director of Enforcement, was unreas., nable and hence invalid.

Now, this judgment is not an authority forthe proposition that a detenu as a matter of right is entitled fo make his representation by an oral bearing before th1! detaining authority under Article 22 (5), The right to consult a lawyer was granted •by the conditions of detention prescribed under Section 5.

This right was not spelt out as an incident of Article 21 and what has been found invalid is the presence of officers at. the interview and the number of interviews.

Therefore, Francis Coralie Mullin' s case is not an authority for the proposition and frankly, cannot be one for the putpose of spelling out a right to be represented by a lawyer ..y.hile ~\)-king representa tion before th~ detaining authority.

Everfthoiign there are some observations'w!licb may imply sµch a . right, they would be comple-. tely obiter for the obvious reasd~ that a right was conferred by the Conditions of Detention and not for the first time a right was being spelt out by the expanded horizons of right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 .. The attempt to read or imply something in Article 21, which is positively reflected by Article 22 (5) would be contrary to any canon of construction because it is wen settled) th.at what is expressly reflected cannot be brought in by the back door of implication. It was not necessary to spell out these rights in the facts of that case for the obvious reason that the right was conferred

b.v. TANhEL v. TllB Ai>i.dNISTRATOR (Baharul Islam J.) 519 ,

by the conditions of detention. One need not go in search of some such right implicit in Article 21 by a process of interpreta, tion .when it was expressly granted in the Conditions of Detention under the Act. Therefore, with respect, the decision in Mullin's case cannot help the petitioner to spell out right to be represented by a fawyer before the detaining authority.

15. Now the other aspect oftbe submission, namely; whether the respondent misled the detenu by bis telegram. Objection has been taken to the following sentence of the telegram :

"He (administrator) has decided that the detenus can make representation to the adminimator through Central jail, Aguada, where they are detained".

It may be remembered that the telegram was sent to the detenus' advocate, Mr. Ajwani, and not to the detenus. The above sentence conveying an advice, albeit gratuitious, could hardly mislead a lawyer who is supposed to know bow a representation of a detenu is to b~ sent to the detaining authority. The submission of Mr. Jethmalani was that the sentence give the impression that the representation if sent through the jail only, and in no other way, would be, considered.

The submission was hypothetical.

The detenu was in jail. The_ representation, of necessity, had to be sent through the Superintendent of the jail where be was detained with the former's necessary endorsement and seal. It would be difficult for the detaining authority to immediately ascertain whether the representation sent otherwise than through the jailor was genuine.

Even so the Administrator did not say that the detenu's representa tion, unless sent through the jail would be considered. There is no merit in the submission.

16.

The sixth point raised by learned counsel for the peti tioner is that illegalities were committed in dealing with the representation of the detenu in that :

"(a) the detenu was not heard.

(b), his advocate was not heard.

(c) he was not told that be could be represented by a friend.

(d) he wa.s not permitted cross-examination. of re,

butt al evidence."

The submission of learned counsel has no substance.

(a). A perusal of the record shows that the detenu was heard in person, was questioned by the Board on several points in Gujarati which was the language of the detenu, and necessary answers elecited. He does not have any right to be heard in person by the detaining authority.

(b) It is true that the advocate of the detenu was not heard but the former's right to be heard either by the detaining authority or by the Advisory Board has been answered above.

(c) The contention has been dealt with above.

(d) This Court in A.K. Roy's case (supra) dealt with the detenu"s plea of cross-examination, and bas held ;

•• ..... It seems to us difficult to bold that a detenu can claim the right of cross; examination in the proceeding before the Advisory Board. First and foremost; cross• examination of whom? The principle that witnesses must• be. confronted and offered for cross-examination applies generally to propdings in . which witnesses are examined or docmµen(s are adduced in .evidence in order to prove a

poi9t.

Cro:ss-examination then becomes a powerful weapon for showing the untruthfulness of that evidence.

In proceedings before the Advisory Board, the question for consideration of the Board is not whether the detenu is guilty of any charge but whether there is sufficient cause for the detention of. .the person concerned.

The detention, it must be remembered, is based not onfacts. proved either G by applying the test of preponderance of probabilities or of reasonable doubt. The det, ention is based on the. subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain a particular person in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain stated objects.

H The proceeding of the Advisory Board has therefore to be

-~

o; v. TANDEL v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 581

structed differently from the. proceeding of judicial° or quasi judicial tribunals, before which there is a tis to adjudicate

upon."

Finally, the Court observed

".We are therefore ofthe opmton, that, in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detenu has no right to cross-examine either the persons on the basis of whose statement the order of detention is made or the detaining

authority."

17. Faced with the difficulty created by the above decision, learned counsel submits that he bas not used the word 'cross-examination' in the technical sense but used it loosely in the sense that the detenu would have examined as bis witneses the persons on whose statements the order of the detention has been based, to establish bis iooococe particularly before the judicially trained minds of the Members of the Advisory B ·ard. Even if the word 'cross- -examination' is taken in the loose sense as submitted by the learned counsel, the Advisory Board cannot be blamed; for, there was no request by the deteou for the production of those persons before the Advisory Board to examine them as bis defence witnesses.

The sixth submission also bas no substance.

18. The seventh point formulated by learned counsel was . .._ _,,: "that the Advisory Board was required 10 decide two issues :

(i) whether the detention was justified when made;

(ii) whether it was justified on the date of the Advisory Board's report".

Mr. Jethmalani did not press before us sub-point (i).

But he submitted that the Board ought to have found whether or not the order of detention was justified on the date of its report.

We have perused the report of the Advisory Board and find that the report covers both sub.points (i) and (ii) enumerated above.

I~. The eight point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the procedure before the Advisory Board was 'totally unjust

and discriminatory'. His submission was that although the detaining H 1111thoritr was not present in perso11 before the Advisory Board, bi~

SUPREME COURT REPORTS /198,2] 3 s.c.li.. ' '.'

representatives were present to assist the Advisory Board on issues of law and fact in support of the order of detention while there was none to assist the detenu.

The submission has been b_ased on suspicion or guess, and is not borne out by records. The record shows that the detenu - was produced before the Advisory Board and necessary questions were put to him and answers elicited by the Chairman and the Member of the Advisory Board and there was none present on behalf of the detaining authority. This submission also has no substance.

20. The last point raised by Mr. Jethmalani was that the cases of the four cletenus connected with the same incident were reviewed by the Board; after having released one co-detenu, namely; Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai, in pursuance of the Advisory Board's order, it was incumbent on the detaining authority to review the order of detention of the petitio1Jers before us namely; Devji Vallabhbhai Tande(, (petitioner in Writ Peiition No. 8070 of 1981), Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande!, (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23 of

1982) and Lallubhai Govanbbai Tande! (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 29 of 1982).

As on a perusal of the report of the Advisory Board, it was found that Narsinh Vallabhbbai Tande! was advised to be released on the ground of tender age, learned counsel did not press the submission._

21. These petitions have no merits and are dismissed.

P.B.R.

Petitions dismissed.

--- ---

DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GOA, DAMAN & DIU & ANR

D.A. DESAI

A.P. SEN

Section 3

Union Territories Act, 1963

Article 32

Activities Act, 1974

section 46(2)

Union Territories Act, 1963

section 44

Union Territories Act 1963

Article 217(3)

section 44(1)

section 44(1)

Article 22(5)

[1951] 2 SCR 167

Article 22(1)

clause 3(b)

Baharul Islam

Articles 22(5)

(1981] 2 SCR 516

Article 32

A Ram Jethmalani

Rani Jethmalani

Eduardo Falireo

A. Subhashini

BARARUL l!LAM

Article 32

Constitution of India

Section 3

Goa

Lallu Govan Tande

Lallu Malbari

Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande

Narsinghbhai Daulabhbhai

Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande

Mangalbhai Bh~Ia

bbai Tande

Ghati SUeri

Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai

2nd July, 1981

Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai

Manga!bhai Bhulabhai

Tulsibhai

Mangalbhai

Ghatisheri

TANDEL V

Lallu Govan

Ram Jethmalani

10th October, 1981

Daman

Diu

section 3

Section 2

COFEPOSA Act, 1974

Eduardo Faleiro

Section 3

Section 2

Section 2

article 239

Section 2

Section 3

Central Government

Material portion only)

Sub-section (I) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Provides :  j

"The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting' in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmenta- 1'

b.v. '

Sections 44 to 46

Part IV of the Act

Section 44

Section 46

Article 239

India

Article 74

Article 163

Articles 74 and 163

Section 44

Article 217

Article 21

Article 74

[1971) 3 S.C.R. 483

Section 44

Shamsher Singh

Jethmalani

Tulsibbai

Mangalbhai

30th June, 1981

Tulsibhai

Mangalbbai

Lalubhai Govan

Lallo Govan

Patel

Fitter

Nani Daman

D.V. TANDEL

Baharul Islam

Section 3

section 3

Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

Devji Vallabhbhai Tande

Article 27

section 3

Article 22

(1980) 4 SCC 427

Article 22

Section 3

Section 3

Thaku Ajwani

JAGMOHAN

It was in the following 'terms :

ORDINARY

\ -

"JAGMOHAN

ADMINISTRATOR OF GOA

DAMAN & DIU
CABO RAJ NIWAS

CARANZALER GOA

DETENUS DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL AND

NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL DETAINED

UNDER COFEPOSA ORDERS DATED liTH SEPTEM-

BER !

NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL

THAKU AJW ANI

STATE

TELEGRAM

6th October 1981

7th October, 1981

5th October, 1981

6th October, 1981

7th October, 198

Ajwani

Article 22

Article 22

Section 8

Article 22

Hemlata Kanti/4/

State of Maharashtra

Section 8

Article 22

Article 22

Article 22

Parliament

Article 22

Article 22

Article 21

fJaharui Isiam

Article 22

article 22

Article 22

Article 22

Article 22

Section 10

National Security Act

Section 11

Article 22

Article 22

National Security Act

Article 22

Article 22

Article 22

Section 8

Article 22

Article 22

clause 3

23rd August, 1975

Section 5

[1981] 2 S.C.R. 516

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982j 3

clause 3

clause 3

Article 22

Section 5

Article 21

Coralie Mullin

Article 21

Article 21

Article 22

Article 21

Mullin

Aguada

A.K. Roy

Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai

Devji Vallabhbhai Tande

Lallubhai Govanbbai Tande

Narsinh Vallabhbbai Tande