{"document_id": "1982_3_251_276_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "::-,>-···.\n\nL. ROBERT D'SOUZA\n\nTHE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SOUTHERN\n\nRAILWAY & ANR .\n\nFebruary 16, 1982\n\n(D.A. DESAI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 19471 sections 2(oo) and 25F, scope of-\"Termlnation of sevice for any reason whatsoever'' in the definition \"retrench.ient\"·\n\ndarified.\n\nConstruction of Section_ 9A-Casuaf labour, termination of services Qf- Railway Establishme1u Code, Rules 2501 and 2505, explained.\n\nThe appellant joined service as a gangm1-n in Southern Railway on July 1, 1948. In course of his service be was transferred to varioui places. While\n\nhe wa:s working as a Lascar at Ernakulam, he was transferred, some time in D March 1970 by way of punishment for his Union activities in the capacity of _General Secretary of the Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Eroakulam, to Podannur in Tamil Nadu. However, bis transfer was cancelled and he joined duty on 20-2-1971 at Ernakulam. The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, by its letter dated April 23, 1974 directed treatment of his entire period of absence from 8tb March, 1970 to 19th February, 1971 as duty.\n\nLater, the appellant approached the Labour Court for recovering some of his dues ll which remained pending fo[ a long time.\n\nAs the appellctnt and thoie similarly situated were likely to reach the age of superannuation and by the unfair labour practice, namely, treating them only as 'daily rated labour', of the Railway Administration, they were likely o be denied the full retirement benefits, appellant and several others filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala, praying for a direction that they should be treated at least as temporary railway servant with attendant benefits. During the pendency of the matter, in connection, with the demand for a 11 the benefits granted by the Central Pay Commission being extended to the category of employees t-0 which the appellant belonged the appellant undertook a fast. but-broke the rsame on September 28, 1974 at the intervention of [the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Taking advantage of the appellant's absence, the .respondents termina.ted his service with retrospective effect, i.e., from 18~9-1974 on the gronnd of unauthorised absence. A learned single Judge having dismissed the liame, the Jmatter was taken. in appeal before the Division Bench.\n\nIn the appe1l, it was coaten, ded that the terminatioti of service of the appellant in the circumstances wo.uld constitute retrenchment within the meaning. of section 2SF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore:, the order ()f termination was invalid. , The matter was referred to the Full Bench which held that there , was no retrencbme0t and cjismi$$ed the appeal: Hence, the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Gou.rt,\n\nHELD : 1. The expression \"termination of service for any reason whatsoever\" in the definition \"retrenchmnt\" in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in section 25F or not expressly provided ior by other pro visions of the Act such as sections 25FF and 25FFF. The excepted categories are (i) termination by way ·-or punishment inflicted pursuant to disciplinary action; (ii) voluntary retirement of the workman; (iii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of emplo}ment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a _-stipulation in that behalf;\n\n(iv) or termination of the services on the ground of continued illhealth. _ Once the case does npt fall in any of the excepted categories, the termination of service even if it be according to automatic discharge from service under agreement would nonetheless be retrenchment within the meaning of expression in -section 2(oo) of the Act. It must as a corollary follow that if the name of the workman is struck off the roll, that itself would constitute retrenchment. -\n\n[259 B-C, 206 H, 261 A-B]\n\n. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji, [1978] I 1,_ SCR 591, followed •.\n\nState Bank of India v. N. Sundera Money, [1976] 3 S.C. R. 160; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 586; Santosh Gupta v, State Bank of Patia/a, [1980] 2 S.C.R 884 at 892; Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd., [1981] 3 S.C.C. 225, referred to.\n\n1:2. There is neither apparent nor real conflict between the decision of the constitution bench in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v. A..D. Divikar, [1957] S.C.R. 121 and the later five decisions commencing from Sundera Money and ending with Mohan/al' s case.\n\nReex:amining a contention over again so as to cover the familiar ground would, apart from giving a go bye to _the doctrine of stare decisis, would be a sheer waste of time and mere lengthening of the judgment. [260 C'D]\n\n\n2:1. Notice contemplated by clause (a) of section 25F would not be dispensed with, in.view of the provision contained in proviso (b) of section 9A, which is n independent provision having no co-relation with section 25F.\n\n[264 BJ\n\n2:2. Section 9A imposes an otligation on the employer, who pro~·. ses to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the F_ourth Schedule to give notice as therein provided and the employer is precluded from effecting the change without giving to the workman likely to be effected by such change, notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected, and the change cannot be effected within 21 days of the giving of such notice. In order to attract .section 9A tbc; 1.; pange propose<; l must be.in tbe conditions of service applicable to\n\n~··\n\nL.R. D'SOUZA V. EX ENG., S; RAILWAY 253\n\nthe workman in respect of any matters specified in. the Fourth Schedule. If the proposed.change falls in any of the matters specified in the Fourth Schedule the change can be effected after giving notice in the prescribed manner and waiting for 21 days affer giving such notice. In order to attract section 9A the employer must be desirous of effecting a change in conditions of service in respect of any matter specified in Fourth Schedule. If the change proposed does not cover any matter in Fourth Schedale section 9A is not attracted and no notice is necessary.\n\n[262 E-0]\n\nWorkmen of Sur Iron & Steel Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sur Iron & Steel Comppny (P) Ltd., [1971] LLJ 570; Tata Iron & Sttel Company Ltd. v. Workmen, [1973] I SCR 594; Assam Moth Co. Ltd. v. Bijoy Loi Sen, [1974] l SCR ll6, referred to.\n\n2:3. Retrenchment to be valid must comply with three conditions set out in section 25F. They are, (a) subject to the proviSo to clause (a) one month's notice in writing specifyin.g the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu of notice: (b) compensation to l:!'e paid according to the measure provided in the clause, the payment to be simultaneous with the retrenchment; and (c) the notice in the prescribed manner to be served on the appropriate Government.\n\nIt was obligatory upon the employer, who wants to l'retrench the workmen to give notice as contemplated by clause (a) of section 25. [262 C-E]\n\n2:4. A careful reading of sections 9A and 25F makes it clear that when a workman is retrenched, no change in his conditions of service is effected. No item in Fourth Schedule which sets out the conditions of service covers the case of retrenchment. In fact retrenchtnent is specifica1ly covered by item IO of the Third Schedule. If retrenchment which connotes termination of service, cannot constitute change in conditions of service in respect of any item mentioned in Fourth Schedule saction 9A would not be attracted. If section 9A is not attracted, the question of seeking exemption from it in the case falling under the ,_proviso would hardly arise.\n\nTherfore, neither seciion 9A nor the proviso is attracted •in this case. That apart, none of the other pre-conditions to a valid retrenchment have been tomplied with, because the very letter of termination of service shows that services were deemed to have been termitiated from a back date which clearly indicates nonotice being given~\n\nno compensation being paid and no noice being given to. the prescribed authority.\n\nTherefore, termination of strvice, being retrenchment, for failttre to comply with section 25F, would be void ob initio. [263 D-11, H, 264 A, C-DJ\n\n. . 3:1: The test provided is that for the putpose of determining the eligi-\n\n, bih~ of casual labour to be treated as temporary, the criterion shoo Id be the penod of continuous work put in by each individuai labour on . the same type of work and not the period put in collectively by any particular gang or group of labourers. It is thus abundantly clea; that if a person belonging to the category of casual labour employed in construction work other than workcharge~ projects renders six months' contiriuous service without a break, by the operation of statutory rule the nerson would be treated as temporary railway servant after the expiry of six months of continuous .. employment. It is equally true of even seasonal labour. Qnce the peon acquird the statua_of temorar¥\n\nrailway servant by operatlon of ; law, the conditions of his service wout~ be governed as set out in Chapter XXIII. The serice of a temporary railway servant may be termined only as provided in Rule 2301. [266 H, 267 A-B, El\n\n3:2. The underlying intendment of the Rule 2501(~) (i) & (ii~) and note below Rule 2505 is that a casual labour who bas rendered six months conqnuous service would-be-placed in the categ'ory of temporary ra.ilway servant nless he is employed on work-charged project. Rule 250l(b) (1) clearly. provides that even where staff is paid from contingencies, they would acquire !he sttus of temporary railway servants after expiry of six months of continuous employment. [271 E-H] •\n\nIn the instant case : (i) tbe appellant acquired the status of ten1porary railway servant Jong before the termination Of his service and, therefore, his service could not have been terminated under Rule 2505; (ii) he nevet worked on projects but on a construction Unit. Construction Unit is a regular Unit anti cannot be equated to Project. Every construction work does not imply Project.\n\nProject is correlated to planned projects in wli.ich the workman is treated as\n\nwork-Charged. Persons belonging to casual Jabour category cannot be transferred but the appellant was transferred on innumerable occassions; (iii) as a result of the appellant and others filing a writ petition, three co-appellants were informed that they were treated as on regular employments and ceased to belong to the category of casual labour. But for impugned termination orders the appellant also would have been treated as temporary and therefore1 the iappellant received discriminatory treatment offending Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution; and (iv) section 25F of the Industrial Disputes- Act provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the conditions set out in Act are satisfied. The appellant would be a workman within the meaning of that ex:pression in section 2(s) of the Act. 'He has rendered continuous service for a period over twenty years. Therefore, the first condition of section 25F that appe11ant is a workman who has rendered service for not Jess than one year under the Railway administration, an employer carrying on an industry, is satisfied. His service is terminated which for the reasons hereinbefore given would .costitute etrenchment. It is immaterial that he. is a daily 1'ated worker. He ts either doing manual or technical work and hiS salary was Jess than Rs. 500 and the termination of his service does not faJJ in any of the excepte9 categories.\n\nTheefore, assuming that he was a daily ra1ed worker once he has rendered continuous uninterrupted service for a priod of one yea; or more, within the meaning of section 25B of the Act and his service is terminated for any reason whatsoever and. the case doe<; not fall in any of the excepted categories, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2505 would be attracted, it would have to be read subject to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly the termination of service in this case would constitute retrenchment and for not complying with pre-conditions to valid retrenchment the order of termination would be illegal and invalid. [271 D, 272 A, G, 275 D-G]\n\n. 3:3. Absence without leave constitutes misconduct and it is' not open to the employer to terminate service without notice and inquiry or at any rate\n\nwitout complyiµg with tile minimum principle of natural justice.\n\nFurther~\n\n-~ ' . '\n\nRule, 2302 clearly prescribes the mode, manner and 'methodology of terminating service of a temporary railway servant and admittedly the procedure therein prescribed having not been carried out, the termination is void and invalid; Accordingly, the same conclusion would Qe reached even while accepting for the purpose of the facts of this case simultaneously rejecting it in law that the termination does not constitute retrenchment yet nonetheless it would be void and inoperative. [273 A-CJ\n\nOBSERVATION: Rule 2501 which permits a man serving for 10, 20, 30 years at a stretch without break being treated as daily rated servant, is thl\"¥1ugJily opposed to the notions of socio-economic justice and it is high time that Railway administration brings this part of the provision of the Manual, antequarian and antidiluvian, in conformity with the Directive Principles of State Policy as enunciated in Part IV of the Constitution. It is high time that these utterly unfir (provisions wholly den:Ying socio-economic juStice are properly modified and brought in conformity with the modern concepi of justice and faieplay to the lowest and the lowliest in Railway administration.\n\n[273 C-D, 274 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1613 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th January, 1979 _of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 4401 of 1974.\n\nK.R.R. Pillai for the Appellant.\n\nP.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nAppellant L. Robert D'Souza joined service as a gangman at Mangalapuram in. Southern Railway on July !, 1948.\n\nIn course of his service he was transferred to various places.\n\nWhen he was last working as Lascar at Ernakulam, on October 8, 1974 the Executive Engineer (Construction), Erna:kulam intimated to him that his services were deemed to have been terminated from September 18, 1974, from which date the appellant was _said to have absented himself from duty.\n\nThis letter has an important bearing on the issues raised in this appeal, and, therefore, relevant portion may be extracted here :\n\n\"You have absented yourself unauthorisedly from 18.9.1974 and hence your se1vices are deemed to have been terminated from the day you have absented yourself.\n\nPlease note.\n\nl!l\n\nSince you are no longer on the rolls of this office yoa should vacate the quarters allotted to you i rnmediately failing which action will be taken to evict you\".\n\nAccording to the appellant, up to the date of unauthorised and illegal termination of his service he had rendered coiitinuou• service for a period of 26 years yet the Railway administration wrongfully denied him the status of a temporary and/or regular workman and treated him a daily rated casual labourer.\n\nThis treatment according to the appellant was so unfair that it prompted persons who were victims of this unfair treatment by the Railway administration to form a Union named Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Ernakulam, of which the appellant was the General Secretary.\n\nThe Union submitted a charter of demands which presumably irritated the authorities and chagrined by it, the appellant was transferred to Podannur in Tamil Nadu by way of punishment.\n\nAs the late Shri A.K. Gopalan, who was a renowned trade union leader, espoused the cause of the appellant, his transfer was cancelled and he was reposted and allowed to continue at Ernakulam after paying the arrears of wages and granting continuity of service for the period he did not join duty at the place of his transfer. This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\".\n\nThe local superiors of the appellant were annoyed by the success of the appellant and they were on a look out for settling the score with the appellant. In the meantime the appellant approached the Labour Court for rocovering some of his dues which remained pending for a long time.\n\nAs the appellant and those similarly 'ituated were likely to reach the age of suptrannuation and by the unfair labour practice of the Railway administration they were likely to be denied the full retirement benefits, appellant and several others filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala .. According\n\nto the appellant, for the various reawns stated in the petition, appellant and those similarly situated could not be treated as daily rated casual labour and under the relevant rules appellant and his\n\nco-workers would at least acquire the status of temporary railway servants and their services could not be terminated in the manner in which the appellant's service was terminated and that they woul.I be entitled to all the retiral benefits.\n\nThe petition came up before a learned single judge who dismissed the same. The matter was taken in appeal before the Division Bench.\n\nIn the appeal it was contended that the termination of service of the appellant in the circumstances as set out earlier would constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('Act' for short), and therefore, the order of termination, Inter a/ia, is invalid The Division Bench found the question raised before it of such importance and magnitude that it referred the same to the Full Bench.\n\nIn the meantime the appellant was actively pursuing his trade union activities. A demand was made that all the benefits granted by the Central Pay Commission be extended to the category of employees to which the appellant belonged and when these demands fell on deaf ears, it was resolved to give a strike notice. The matter was taken in conciliation which ultimately resulted in failure. The appellant approached the Ceritql Government to make a reference under s. IO of the Act in respect of the demands for adjudication by National Tribunal.\n\nAs the Central Government was wobbling in its approach, the appellant declared his intention to go on fast unto death for redressal of the grievances suffered for decades by the lowest category of railway employees.\n\nAt that stage the Assistant Labour Commfssioner intervened and persuaded the appellant not to precipitate the matter.\n\nThe appellant accordingly broke his fast on Sepetember 28, 1974, in the hospital where he was confined during his fast.\n\nTaking advantage of his absence during the fast immediately the order of termination of his service was served and this led to the present proceedings which ha¥e culminated in this appeal.\n\nThe appellant, inter alia, contended before the Full Bench of Kerala High Court that the termination of his service for the reasons and in the manner brought about is illegal and invalid, that it was victimisation for trade union activities; that it was unfair labour practice and that it was ma/a fide.\n\nIt was also contended that in view of his long uninterrupted srvice admittedly over twenty years\n\nhe was at the minimum a temporary railway servant and, therefore, his service cannot be terminated unless he was rendered surplus or by way of disciplinary measure after complying with Article 311 of the Crnstitution. The, legal submission put in the forefront was that in the circumstances herein mentioned the termination of service constituted 'retrenchment' within the meaning of s. 25F of the Act and as the pre-condition to valid retrenchment having not been satisfied, the termination is illegal and invalid. The Full Bench answered the point referred to it against the appellant holding that there is no retrenchment as contended for, on behalf of the appellant and finally dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\nAt the outset it must at once be pointed out that the construction put by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on the expresssion 'retrenchment' in s. 2(oo) of the Act that it means only the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever is no more good law and in fact the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in L. Robert D' Souza v.\n\nExecutive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr.,(') has been speci fica]ly overruled by this Court in Santosh Gupta v. Stare Bank of Patia/a.(2) This Court has consistently held in State Bank 'of India\n\nv. N. Sundera Money,( 3) Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court,(') and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji,(5) that the expression 'termination of service for irny reason whatsoever' now covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in s. 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of th.e Act such as ss. 25FF and\n\n25FFF.\n\nIt was attempted to be urged that in view of the decision of this Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union,(6) the ratio of which was re-affirmed by_ a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v.\n\nA.D. Divikar,(') all the later decisions run counter to the Constitution Bench and must be treated per in curium. This contention need not detain us because first in Hindustan Steel Ltd. case, then\n\n(I) [1979] llLLJ. 2111.\n\n(2) (1980] 2 S.C.R. 884]at 892\n\n\n(4) (1971] 1 S.C.R. 586.\n\n(5) (1978] I S.C.R. 591. <6l [1956J s.c.R. sn.\n\n(7) [1957) s.c.R. 121.\n\n...,_\n\n. - ~\n\n! ~\n\nin Santosh Gupta's case (Supra) and lastly In Mohan Lal v. Bharat\n\nEleotronics Ltd.,(') it was in terms held that the decision in Sundera Money's case was not at all inconsistent with the decision of the Con$titution Bench in Harip1asad Shukla's case and not only required no reconsideration but the decision in Sundera Money's case was approved in the aforementioned three cases.\n\nThis position is furtl]er butressed by the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd . . case wherein striking off th' name of a workman from the roll\n\nwas held to be retrenchment. It ls, therefore, the settled law that the expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' in the, definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in s. 2(oo) of the Act covers every kind of termination of service oxcept those not\n\nexpresly included in s. 25F or not es:pressly provided for by other provisions of the Act. such as ss. 25FF and 25FFF.\n\nTwo things thus emerge, firstly, that the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court under appeal has been specitlcally overruled by this Court in Santosh Gupta's case (Supra) and secondly, in view of the decision in Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd. case (Supra) striking off the',, name of a workman from the rolls without anything more constitutes retrenchment within the meaning of the expression 'retrenchment' ins. 2(00). This emerging legal position alone would be sufficient for us to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Kerala High Court.\n\nShet anchor of Mr. Francis's submission is that this Court should proceed on the construction of expression 'ratrenchment' as set out i1' Hariprasad Shukla's case, and ignore the construction of the exprssion 'retrenchment' put in , the decisions of this Court in Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd. ca.se, Santosh Gupta's case, Delhi C/qt~ & . General Mills Ltd. case as being per in curium.\n\nWe are not disposed to undertake this recurring futile exercise for obvious rason that. on four different occasions, in Hindustan Steel Limited <i!ise, a Division Bench of this Court consistin.g of\n\nChandracud, Goswami and Gupta, JJ. in Sundera Money's case, a Bench conisting of Chandrachud, Krishna Iyer and Gupta, JJ.; in Santosh Gpta' s case, a Bench consiiting of Krishna Iyer and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. and a Bench of two judges consisting of Gupta, J. and one of us in Mohanlal's case, have repeatedly undertaken this very detailed exercise and held that there is no incosis tency of any nature and kind nor any conflict, contradiction or repugnancy between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad fihukla's case and aforementioned later four dacisions\n\n(I) [1981} 3 s.c.c. 225.\n\n• D\n\nand they stand in harmony with each other and the later decisions take note of an amendment in the relevant provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the c0nstruction put on the expression 'retrenchment' in the aforementioned decisions pronounced the settled view of this Court.\n\nWe, therefore, consider it futile and waste of precious time of the Court to re-examine the submission of Mr. Francis negatived on four different occasions in the past.\n\nUndoubtedly, Mr. Francis pointed out that in Surendra -Kumar -Verma & Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum, Labour Court, New Delhi & Anr., (1) Pathak, J. in his concurring judgment has stated that his concurrence with the majority view propounded by Reddy, J. should not be taken to imply his agreement with the interpretation of s. 2(oo) rendered in Santosh Gupta's case It may, however, be mentioned that the majority in that case has affirmed the earlier decision. Therefore, after meticulously examining on five distinct and different occasions, it is clearly and unequivocally stated that there is neither apparent nor real conflict between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad Shukla's case and the later five decisions commencing from Sundera Money and ending with Mohama/' s case, it would be sheer waste ot'time and merely adding to the length of the judgment to re-examine this contention over again, so as to cover the familiar ground.\n\nAs we are not prepared to examine the contention over again, the submission of Mr. Francis that 'retrenchment' contemplates some overt act or.. the part of the employer, that it inheres the principle of last come first go which again requires an overt act on the part of the employer; that when retrenched workmen are required to be re-employed, first option for re-employment has to be given to the retrenched workmen, which necessitatessome overt act on the part of the employer, would be beside the point and of no relevance and significance.\n\nThe reference to Rules 76, 77-and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central Rules). 1957, docs not advance his case a step further.\n\nThe definition of expression 'retrenchment' ins. 2(oo) is so clear and unambiguous that no external aids are necessary for its proper construction. Therefore, we adopt as binding the well settled position in law that if termination of service of a workman is brought about for any reason whatsoever, it would be retrenchment except if the case falls within any of the excepted categories, i.e., (i) termination by way of punishment inflkted pursuant to disciplinary action; (ii) voluntary retirement of the work-\n\n\nman; (iii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; (iv) cir\n\ntermination of the service on the ground of continued ill-health.\n\nOnce the case does not fall in any of the excepted categories the termination of service even if it be according to automatie discharge from service under agreement would nonetheless be retrenchment within the meaning of expression in s. 2(00). It must as a corollary follow that if the iiame of the workman is struck off the roll that itself would constitute retrenchment, as held by this-Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. case. We specifically refer to. this case because the facts in the caie before us are on all fours with the facts in the aforementioned cases and on parity of reasoning and judicial comity the same conclusion must follow unless something to the contrary is indicated. In , that case respondent S. N. Mukherji who was recruited as a labourer came to be promoted in course of time to the post of Motion Setter. On October I, 1964, pursuant to some re-organisation in the establishment the post of Motion Setter was abolished.\n\nThe management offered employment to the respondent S. N. Mukherji on any other suitable post, which was indicated to be the post of Assistant Line Fixer (Assistant Grade I) without loss of wages. He was to be on probation. The management found him unsuitable for this post even after extending the period of probation by 9 months and therefore offered him post of Fitter on the same pay which he, as a Motion Setter, used t<> get. The response of S. N. Mukherji to this offer was that he should be given a further opportunity to show his efficiency in his job and if he fails to improve, he would tender his resignation voluntarily. The management did not reply to the letter with the result that the workman did not report for work at the newly offered post. On January 19, 1966, the management wrote to the workman that his nllme has been struck off from the rolls with effect from August 24, 1965, for continued absence without intimation.\n\nSuch termination of service was held to be covered by the expression 'retrenchment' and it was struck down on the ground that the pre.condition to valid retrenchment was not complied with. It would thus appear that it is consistently held by this Court that termination of service for any reason whatsoever except the excepted categories would constitute retrenchment within the meaning of the expression in the Act. And here recall the order of termination of service of the appellant wherein it is stated that \"You have absented yourself unauthorisedly from 19.8.1974 and hence your services are deemed to have been terminated from the day you have absented yourself.\" Is any other\n\n• n\n\n262 SlJPREME COURT REPoars\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\n' conclusion possible save and except the one recorded by this Court in Delhi Cloth &~General Mills Ltd case that this constitutes retrenchment and for non-compliance with pre-condition, it is invalid.\n\nBefore referring to other contentions of Mr. Francis, we may dispose of one contention based upon construction of s. 9A of the Act as in our opinion, it is utter)y untenable.\n\nMr. Francis says that if valid retrenchment presages a notiCe contemplated by s. 25F, the same would stand dispensed with in view of the proviso (b) of s. 9A of the Act and therefore even if the termination is held to be retrenchment, the same would be valid. There are two basic fallacits in this submission. Retrenchment to be valid must comply with three conditions set out in s. 25F. They are (a) subject to the provi!O to clause (a), one month's notice in writing specifying the reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu of notice; (b) compensation to be paid according to the measure provided in the clause, the payment to be simultaneous with the retrenchment; and (c) the notice in the prescribed manner to be served on the appropriate Government. If the termination in this case otherwise constitutes retrenchment admittedly clauses (b) and (c) of s .. 25F have not been complied with. That apart, the submission that in view of the provision contained in proviso (b) of s. 9A, the notice contemplated by clause (a) of s. 25F would be dispensed with, is without merits.\n\nSection 9A imposes an obligation on the employer, who proposes to effect any change in the .conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule to give notice as therein provided and the employer is precluded from effecting the change without giving to the workman likely to be affected by such change, nollce in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to\"be effected, and the change cannot be effected within 21 days of the giving of such notice. Jn order to attract s. 9A the change proposed must be in the conditions of service applicable to the workman in respect of any matters specified in the Fourth Schedule. If the proposed change falls in any of the matters specified in the Fourth Schedule the change can be effected after giving notice in the prescrib'd manner and waiting for 21 days after giving such notice.\n\nThere is a proviso to s. 9A which exempts the employer from giving the notice of change if the case falls in any of the two provisos. According to Mr. Francis the case would be covered by proviso (b). It reads as under :\n\n\"9A. No employer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in\n\n~, __\n\n-- -~ . \\\n\nL.R. D'SOUZA v. EX. ENG., s. RAI~WAY (Desai, J.) 263 ..\n\nrespect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change-\n\n(a) x x x x\n\n(b) x x x x\n\nProvided thai no notice shall be required for effecting any such change :\n\n(a) x x x x\n\n(b) where the workmen. likely to be effected by the change are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Servic.es (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Services Regulations, Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply\".\n\nIt was obligatory upon the employer, who wants to retrench the workmen to give notice as contemplated by clause (a) of s. 25.\n\nWhen a workman is retrenched it cannot be said that change in his conditions of service is e1fected. The conditions of service are set out in Fourth Schedule. No item in Fourth Schedule covers the case of retrenchment.\n\nIn fact, retrenchment is specifically covered by Item IO of the Third Schedule. Now, if retrenchment which connotes termination of service, cannot constitute change in conditions of service in respect of any item mentioned in Fourth Schedule, S. 9A would not be attracted. In order to attract s. 9A the employer must be desirous of effecting a 'change in conditions of service in respect of any .matter 'specified in Fourth Schedule. If the change proposed does not cover any matter in Fourth Schedule s. 9A is not attracted and no notice is necessary. See Workmen of Sur Iron & Steel Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sur Iron & Steel Company (P) Ltd.,(') Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. v. Workmen(') and Assam Match Co. Ltd. v. Bijoy Lal .Sen('). Thus if s. 9A is not attracted the question of seeking exemption from it in the case falling under\n\n(1>:[1971] .1 L.L.J. 570.\n\n(2) [1973] l S.C.R. 594.\n\n0) [1974] l S.C.R. 116.\n\nthe proviso would hardly arise. Therefore, neither s 9A nor the proviso•is attracted in this case.\n\nThe basic fallacy in the submission is that notice of change contemplated by s. 9A and notice for a valid retrenchment under s. 25F are two different aspects of notice, one having no co-relation with the other. It is, therefore, futile to urge that even if termination of the service of the petitioner constitutes retrenchment it would nevertheless be valid because the notice contemplated by s. 25F would be dispensed with in view of the provision contained in s. 9A, proviso (b).\n\nThat apart, it is an indisputable position that none of the other pre-conditions to a valid. retrenchment have been complied wi>h in this case because the very letter of termination of service shows that services were deemed to have been terminated from a back date which clearly indicates no notice being given, no compensation being paid and no notice being given to the.prescribed authority. Therefore, termination of service, being retrenchment, for failure to comply with s. 25F, would be void ab initio.\n\nMr. Francis next contended that as the appellant belonged to the category of casual labour as defined in rule 2501 in Chapter XXV of the Indian Railway Establishmeot Manual ('Manual' for short), no notice prior to termination of bis service is necessary or required by law in view of the pro.visions contained in Rule 2505.\n\nThe submission is that in the case of casual labour the service will be deemed to have been terminated when such employee absents himself or on the close of the day.\n\nRule 2501 reads as under:\n\n\"2501. Definition-\n\n(a) Casual labour refers to labour whose employment is seasonal,.intermittent, sporadic or extends over shorf periods.\n\nLabour of. this kind is normally recruited from the nearest available source. It is not liable to transfer, and the conditions applicable to permanent and temporary staff do not apply to such labour, ,\n\n(b) The casual labour on railway should be employed only in the following types of cases, namely :\n\n(i) Staff paid from contingencies except those retained for more than six months continuously. Such of\n\nthose persons who continue to do the same work\n\n~ -\n\nfor which they were engaged or other work of the same type for more than six months without a break will be treated as temporary after the expiry of the six months of continuous employment..\n\n(ii) Lal\\our on projects, irrespective of duration, except those transferred from other temporary or permanent employment.\n\n(iii) Seasonal labour who are sanctioned for specific works of less than six months duration. If such labour is shifted from one work to another of the same type, e.g., relaying and the total continuous period of such work at any one time is mor.e than six months' duration, they should be treated as temporary after the expiry of six months of continuous employment. For the purpose of determining the eligibility of labour to be treated as temporary, the criterion should\n\n0be the period of continuous work put in by each individual labour on the same type of work and not the period put in collectively by any particular gang or group of labourers.\n\nx x x\n\nNote:\n\n(I) x x\n\n(2) Once any individual acquires temporary status, after fulfilling the conditions indicated in (i) or (iii) above, he retains that status so Jong as he is in continuous employment on the railwayg, In other words, even if he is transferred by the administration to work of a different nature he does not lose his temporary status.\n\n(3) x x x\n\n(4) Casual labour should not be deliberately discharged .with. a view to causing an artificial break in their service aad thus prevent their attaining the temporary status,\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(5) x x x\n\nRule 2505 may as well be extracted. It reads as under :\n\n\"2505.\n\nNotice of termination of service-Except where notice is necessary under any statutory obligation, no notice is required for termination of service of the casual labour. Their service• will be deem ed to have terminated when they absent themselves or on the close of the day.\n\nNote : In the case of a casual labourer who is to be treated as temporary after completion of six months' continuous service, the period of notice will be determined by the rules applicable to temporary Railway servants\".\n\nIn order to satisfactorily establish that the applicant belonging to the category of casual labour whose service by deeming fiction enacted in Rule 2505' will stand terminated by the mere absence, it must be shown that the appellant was employed in any of the categories set out in clause (b) of role 2501.\n\nWhat has been urged on behalf of the respondent is that the appellant was employed in construction work and, therefore, labour on projects irrespective of duration would belong to the category of' casual labour. That, however, does not mean that every construction work by itself becomes a work-charged project.· On the contrary sub clause (I) of clause (b) of rule 2501 would clearly show that such of those persons belonging to the category of casual labour who continued to do the same work for which they were engaged or other work of the same type for more than six months without a break will be treated as temporary after the expiry of the six months of continuous employment.\n\nSimilarly, seasonal labour sanctioned for specific works for less than six months' duration would belong to the category of casual labour.\n\nHowever, sub clause (iii) of clause (b) of rule 2501 provides that if such seasonal labour is shifted from one work to another of the same type, as for example, 'relaying' and the '.total continuous period of such work at any one time is more than six months' duration, they should be treated as temporary after the expiry of six months of continuous employment. The test provided is that for the purpose of determining the eligibility of casual labour to be treated as temporary, the criterion should be the period of continuous work put in by each individual\n\nlabour on the same type of work and not the period put in collectively by any particular gang or group of Jabourers. It is thus abundantly clear that if a person belonging to the category of casual labour -employed in construction work other than work-charged projects renders six months' continuous service without a break, by the operation of statutory rule the person would be treated as temporary railway servant after the expiry of six months of continuous employment. It is equally true of even seasonal labour.\n\nOnce the person acquired the status of tcmp-orary railway servant by operation of law, the conditions of his service would be governed_ as. set out in Chapter XXIII.\n\nRule 2301 in Chapter XXIII defines a temporary railway servant. It reads as under :\n\n\"2301.\n\nDefinition-A 'temporary railway servant' means a railway servant without a lien on a permanent post on a Railway or any other administration or\n\noffice under the Railway Board._ The term . does n not include 'casual labour', a: 'contract' or 'part- ' time' employee or an 'apprentice'.\"\n\nThe service of a temporary rail way servant may be terminated as provided in Rule 2301. •The benefits which a temporary railway servant enjoys are set out iri the same chapter.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether the appellant who was recruited as \\casual labour continued to be the same or he had acquired the status of temporary railway servant at the time of termination of his service. In the affidavit filed irr the High Court the respondents contended that the appellant was employed in construction work on work-charged project. The High Court did not examine this contention on merits and, therefore, it has become obligatory upon us to probe it.\n\nThe appellant has stated that he joined as a Gangman on July I, 1948 at Mangalapuram and he was transferred in 1953 to Pindur in Mysore State.\n\nHe confessed that he does not have any record to show tliis employment but urged that if the pay roll of the relevant period would be produced by \"the Railway administration, the fact alleged would be completely borne out.\n\nWe would bypass this controversial period, without recording any finding on it one way or th• other. The appellant further contends that on Nov_ember\n\nIS, 1954, on transfer he joined in th~~Qffice of lns?ector of Work~\n\n268 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\nI . (19$2] 3 S.C.k. ·\n\nat Mangalore and since then he has been in continuous employment in the construction branch of the Southern Railw\"ay till the date of his illegal termination of .service on . Qctober 8, 1974.\n\nThese averments are incontrovertible and have not rightly been controverted before us, in view of unimpeachable evidence produced by the appellant. The Executive Engineer, Ernakulam, where the appellant at the relevant time, i.e. September 5, 1966, was working, addressed a letter to various Executive Engineers inquiring from them whether the surplus staff on his establishment could be absorbed by any of them. The material portion of the letter reads as under :\n\nExt. P-3 Executive Engineer's Office, Ernakulam Dated 5.9.1966\n\nSubject :- Surplus staff (Casual labour staff) absorption of\n\n\"Since the major portion of the work in this construction unit is over the list of the C.L. staff who are likely to be rendered surplus by 30.9.66 and 31.12.66 due to expiry of sanction to the post held by them, is enclosed.\n\nPlease advise whether you can absorb any of these personn~I in your construction division so that they may .be relieved in time if they are willing''.\n\nEnclosures :\n\n1) List.\n\nList of C.L. Sta.ff Working in Xen's Office/Ers.\n\nSr. No.\n\nName Presenrly working as Date of appointment x x x\n\n. JO.\n\nRobert D'Souza.\n\nPeon/Lascar. 15.l l.54 x x x\n\nThis evidence furnished from the record of the respondent and not controverted by any affidavit to the contrary would establish that the appellant was in continuous service from November 15, 1954.\n\nRecall here, the fact that his service was terminated by the impugned order contained in the letter Aunexure I dated October 8, 1974. }'herefore, apart f, r()!\" the period in controversy from 1948 to 1964\n\n'-{- ....\n\nit is unquestionably established that the appellant was in continuous _ A uninterrupted service from Nor; ember 1954 to October 1974, a period of 20 years and he was working as Peon/Lascar. Undoubtedly he has belln referred to as belonging to casual labour staff but would it be fair to _hold that after 20 years of continuous service, he would still continue to be a casual labour and therefore, his service could be terminable at will, and he would not be entitled to any of B the benefits which a temporary or a permanent railway employee would ei; ijoy ?\n\nThere is, 'however, one more aspect to Wtlich we would refer before we proceed to pronounce upon the status of the appellant.\n\nThe definition of casual labour etracted by us above clearly indicates that person belonging to casual labour is not liable to transfer.\n\nThe appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965.\n\nIt appears that he was again transferred from Ernakulam which was seriously objected and he took up the matter with the higher authorities when he was re-transferred to Ernakulam on March 19, 1971.\n\nThis appears from the letter of the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Labour addressed to the' appellant in which it is stated that the Ministry of Railways was advised that the appellant be transferred back to Ernakulam, which advice has been carried out and the. intervening period for which he did not report for duty, i.e. from March 6, 1970 to.February 19, 1971, he would be paid the wages as if he was on duty. In the face of these incontrovertible facts could it at all be said that the appellant\n\nthough transferred ad nauseum. still continued to belong to the category of casual labour ?\n\nAn additional fact which butresses this conclusion may be referred to.\n\nThe appellant and several others filed petition in the High Court of Kerala from which the present appeal arises. All the petitioners before the High Court contended that each of them having rendered continuous. service for decades they could not be said to be belonging to the category of casual labour and if anything all of them had acquired. status of temporary employees. The ttSl\\!lndent filed counter-affidavit and contended that the appellant and his co-petitioners in the High Court never acquired the status of temporary railway servant and each of them belonged 'to the category of casual labour.\n\nD\\!rin~ th~ pendency of the petition\n\nin the High Court service of the appellani was terminated but his co-petitioners continued in service.• After the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned single judge appellant and three others preferred Writ Appeal No. 218 of 1973 in the same High Court. By the time the appeal came up for hearing three co-appellants of the present appellant who were appellants before the Division Bench were informed that they were treated as on regular employment and ceased to belong to the category of casual labour.\n\nUnfortunately as the service of the appellant was already terminated' hc was not given this benefit..\n\nThis fact clearly emerges from the manner in which the Division Bench disposed of the appeal before it. The relevant observation is as under:\n\n\"In view of the letters received from the Executive j, Engineer, Southern Railway, addressed to Shri K.P.\n\nPathrosa, advocate, appearing for respondents in the writ appeal, it has bf come unnecessary to consider this writ \"D appeal on merits\".\n\nWith reference to the appellant it was stated as under :\n\n. \"As regards the first appellant, it is stated th11t he absented himself from (duty and so he had been denied employment.\n\nSince then another Writ Petition 0. P. No. 4401/74 bas been filed by the fits! appellant and is now pending before this Court.\n\nThe contention of the first appellant incluaing what has been 'raised in this petition will be considered in O.P. 4401/74\".\n\n' By the letters referred to. by the Division Bench, the Executive Engineer informed the advocate appearing for Railway administration that appellants other than the present appellant were absorbed as regular railway employees and hence .the appeal has become infructuous. - Unfortunately for the appellant he was denied this benefit as his service was already terminated.\n\nIf his service was not terminated, his case was not distinguishable from the case of his co-appellants and he would have been entitled both in Jaw and facts to the same treatment. The approach of the Railway administration to say the least is amazing.\n\nFor years they did not act according to law and confer status of temporary railway servant on the appellant and his colleagues in the High Court. , When appellant espoused ttis cause he was thrown out but his colleagues were given the\n\nl>enefit rjchly deserved in law. This discriminatory treatment cannot\n\n• -·\n\nLR.. D'souzA v. EX. ENG., s. RAILWAY (hesai, J.) 2t1\n\nhelp the respondent because appellant's case cannot be distinguished.\n\nIf the status of temporary railway employee was already acquired before the tetmination of service in the manner brought about, the same would be ipso facto invalid.\n\nAt this stage we would again revert to the annexure to the letter of Executive Engineer dated September 5, 1966, in which the name of the appellant appears at\n\nSerial No. IO, One of the co-petitioners of the appellant in the High Court, who got the benefit of regular employment pursuant to the writ petition was one Shri K.N. Balakrishna. His name appears at Serial NQ. I in the annexure to the letter of Executive Engineer referred to above.\n\nHis date of appointment is shown to be March 24, 1954. It would thus appear at a glance that the case of the appellant could not be distinguished from the case of Shri K.N. Balakrishna and if Shri Balakrishna was accorded the status of regular employee, the appellan.t coufd not be treated otherwise,. but for a singular unfortunate event of his termination of service. He . could not be singled out for such treatment, Had his service not been terminated, the Railway administration could not have denied him the status and this status he would have acquired long back.\n\nIf by operation of law, to wit, Rule 2501 the appellant had acquired the status of temporary railway servant by rendering continuous uninterrupted service for . more than six months, his service could not have been terminated under rule 2505. It, however, needed' moral force of fast and costly court proceedings by a low daily paid workman against the Railway administration in the High Court to obtain such meagre benefit. It would thus clearly appear that even 'the appeilant would have acquired the status of at least a temporary railway servant. But we would rather like to refer to the legal ' position in this behalf more accurately.\n\nTo start with, let us recall the rule 250l(b) (i) and (iii) and note below rule 2505.\n\nThe underlying intendment of the provison is that a casual labourer who has rendered six months' continuous service would be place in the category of temporary railway servant unless he is employed on work-charged project.\n\nRule 2501(b) (i) clearly provides that even where staff is paid from contingencies; they would acquire the status of temporary railway servants after expiry of six . months of continuous employment. But reliance was placed on rule 2501(b) (ii) which provides that lab our on projects, irrespective of duration, except those transferred from other temporary or permanent employment would be treated as casual. Jabour. In order to bring the case within the\n\n272 StJPllEMti COUllT llEPollTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.C.11.\n\nambit of this provision it must be shown that for 20 years appellant was employed on projects.\n\nEvery construction work does not imply project. Project is Correlated to planned projects in which the workman is treated as work-charged. The letter dated September 5, 1966, is by the Executive Engineer, Ernakulam, and he refers to the staff as belonging to construction unit. It will be doing violence to language to treat the construction unit as project. Expression 'project' is very well known in a planned development. Therefore, the assertion that the appellant was working on the project is belied by two facts : (i) that contrary to tlie provision in Rule 2501 that persons belonging to casual labour category cannot be transferred, the appellant was transferred on innumerable occasions as evidenced by orders Ext. P-1 dated January 24, 1962, and Ext. P-2 dated August 25, 1964, and the transfer was in the office of the Executive Engineer (Construction); (ii) there is absolutely no reference to project in the letter, but the department is described as construction unit.\n\nIfhe became surplus on completion of project there was nonecessity to absorb him. But the letter dated September 5, 1966, enquires from other executive engineers, not attached to projects, whether the surplus staff including appellant could be absorbed by them. This shows that. the staff concerned had acquired a status higher than. casual labour, say temporary railway servant. And again eonstruction unit is regular unit all over the Indian Railways. It is a permanent unit and cannot be equated to project. Therefore, the averment of the Railway administration that the appellant was working on project cannot be accepted.\n\nHe belonged to the construction unit. He was transferred fairly often and he worked contjnuously for 20 years and when he questii>ned the bona }ides of his transfer he had to be re-transferred and paid wages for the period he did not report for duty at the place where he was transferred.\n\nCumulative effect of these facts complettily belie the suggestion that the appellant worked on project. Having rendered continuous uninterrupted service for over six months, be acquirea the status of a temporary railway servant long before the termination of his service and, therefore, his service could not have been terminated under Rule 2505.\n\nOnce it is held that by operation of statntory rule in the . Manual, the appellant had acquired a status oftemporary railway servant and assuming, as contended by Mr. Francis, that the termination of service in the circumstances alleged does not constitute retrenchment stricto sensu, would the termination be still valid ?\n\n--~-\n\nl..k. ti1SOUZA v. llX. ENG., s. RAILWAY (Desai, J.) 273\n\nThe answer is an emphatic no. On the admission of the Railway administration, .service was terminated on account of absence during the period appellant was on fast.\n\nAbsence wjtbout leave constitutes misconduct and it is not open to the employer to terminate .service without notice and inquiry or at any rate without complying with the minimum principle of natural justice. Further, rule 2302 clearly prescribes the mode, manner and methodology of terminating service ofa temporary railway servant and admittedly the procedure therein prescribed having. not been carried out, the termination is void and invalid. Accordingly, the same conclusion would be reachep even while accepting for the purpose of the facts of this case simultaneously rejecting it in i, Iaw that the termination does not constitute retrenchment yet nonetheless it would be void and inoperative.\n\nWe would be guilty of turning a blind eye to a situation apart from being highly unethical, wholly contrary to constitutional philosophy of secio-economic justice if we fail to point out that Rule 250 I which J)ermits a man serving for 10, 20, 30 years at a str•tch without break bein.g treated as daily rated servant, is thoroughly opposed to the notion of socio-economic justice and it is high time that the Rai!Way administration brings this part of .the provision of the Manual, antequarian and antidiluvian, in conformity with the Directive Principles of State Policy as enunciated. in Part IV . of the Constitution. It may be necessary for a big employer like the railway to employ daily rated workmen but even here it is made distinctly clear that in case of casual labour, the daily wage is fixed by dividing montli.ly minimum wage by 26 so as to provide a paid holiday. Maybe, for seasonal employment, or for other intermittent work daily rated workmen may have to be employed. It may as well be that on projects workcharged staff may have to be employed because on the completion of the projects the staff may become surplus. That was at a time when planning and projects were foreign to the Indian economy. Today, Railways perspective plans spreading over decades. If one project is complete another has to be taken over. Railway administration bas miles to go and promises to keep and this becomes clear from the fact that the appellant, a daily rated workman, continued to render continuous service for twenty years which wo!ild imply that there was work for daily rated workman everyday for twenty years at a stretch without break and yet his status did not improve and continued to be treated as daily rated casual labour whose service can be terminated at the whim\n\nSUPREME COURT REPokTS (1982] .3 s.c.k. _\n\nand fanc/of the local satraps.\" .Itis high .time that theS(: µiterly unfair provisions wholly denying socio-economic justice are properly modified and brought in conformity with the modern concept of justice and fairplay to the lowest and lowliest in Railway admi11istration.\n\nNow, if appellant had become at least a temporary railway servant he is entitled to many benefits set out in Rule 23_03 onwards.\n\nWe have no doubt in our minds that the appellant whose case was on par with Shri K.N. Balakrishna who had already been offered regular employee status, would be entitled to be placed in the same category and that too from the date much earlier -to the date of termination of his service. In this situation terminatiOn of his service not being covered by any of the excepted categories and not after notice would be retrenchment within the meaning of the expression as used in the Act _and for the failure to comply with -the pre condition the termination of service would be void.\n\nAssuming we are not right in holding that the appellant had acquired the status of a temporary railway servant and that be conti. nued to belong to the category of casual labour, would the termination of the service in the circumstances mentioned by the Railway administration constitute retrenchment under the Act ?\n\nSection 25F of the Act provides that no workman employed i.n any industry who bas been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall beretrenched by that employer untill the conditions set out in Act ate satisfiecJ. The expression 'workman' is defined as nnder :\n\n\"In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subjeePor context :\n\n\"Workman\" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or ' tinskil!Cd manual, superisory, technieal or Clericl\\l work for .hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be\n\n- expresssed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industriaf dispute, includes any such person 'Who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of,\n\n- that dispute, or whose dismisa'.li discharge or retrenchment ,\n\n.,..\n\n7 .-\n\n~ I -i -~\n\n.... hi!~ Jed to tl; tat dispute, but d\\)es. nQt. uclue any., such , person,- . ,. . .\n\n (i) who. is subject tp tb'e'rmy Act, 1950, oi'the Ai.t . Force Act, 19SO or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934, or\n\n(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an'-; officer or other employee of a prison; or\n\n(iii) who is employed mainly in a.managerial or admi\n\nnistrative capacity; or\n\n(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the\n\nduties attached to the. office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a manageri!tl nature!'\n\nThere is no dispute that the ajlflellant would be a workman within the meaning of the expression in s. 2(s) of the Act. Further, it is incontrovertible that he has rendered continuous service for a period over twenty years. Therefore, the first condition of s. 25F that appellant is a workman who has rendered service for not less than one year under the Railway administration, an employer carrying on an industry, and that his service is terminated which for the reason hereinbefore given would constitute retrenchment. It is immaterial that he is a. daily rated worker. He is either doing mannual or technical work and his salary was less_ than Rs. 500/· and the termination of his service does not fall in any of the except\n\nted _catagoris. Therefore, assuming that he was. a daily rated worker, once he has rendered continuous uninterrupted service for a period of one year or more. within the meaning of s. 25F of the Act and his service is terminated for any reason. whatsoever and the\n\ncase does not fall in any of the excepted catagories. notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2505, would be attracted, it would have to be read subject to the provisions of the Aet. Accordingly the termination of service in this case would constitute retrenchment and for not complying with pre-conditiOJ!S to valid retrenchment, the ordr of termination would be illegal and invalid.\n\n27~ St1Pil!MB cotllT ll!POlts il982J !I s.C.l.\n\n'Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and declare that the termination of service of the\n\nappllant was illegal and invalid and the appellant continues to be in service and he would be entitled to full back wages and costs quantified at Rs. 2,000. ·\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n~ / .- .•", "total_entities": 184, "entities": [{"text": "L. ROBERT D'SOUZA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L. ROBERT D'SOUZA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SOUTHERN\n\nRAILWAY & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SOUTHERN RAILWAY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 2(oo) and 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While\n\nhe wa:s working as a Lascar at Ernakulam, he was transferred, some time in D March 1970 by way of punishment for his Union activities in the capacity of _General Secretary of the Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Eroakulam, to Podannur in Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Eroakulam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While\n\nhe wa:s working as a Lascar at Ernakulam, he was transferred, some time in D March 1970 by way of punishment for his Union activities in the capacity of _General Secretary of the Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Eroakulam, to Podannur in Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Podannur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 816, "end_char": 824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While\n\nhe wa:s working as a Lascar at Ernakulam, he was transferred, some time in D March 1970 by way of punishment for his Union activities in the capacity of _General Secretary of the Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Eroakulam, to Podannur in Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 828, "end_char": 838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While\n\nhe wa:s working as a Lascar at Ernakulam, he was transferred, some time in D March 1970 by way of punishment for his Union activities in the capacity of _General Secretary of the Southern Railway Construction 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, by its letter dated April 23, 1974 directed treatment of his entire period of absence from 8tb March, 1970 to 19th February, 1971 as duty."}}, {"text": "19th February, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1077, "end_char": 1096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, by its letter dated April 23, 1974 directed treatment of his entire period of absence from 8tb March, 1970 to 19th February, 1971 as duty."}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1561, "end_char": 1581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellctnt and thoie similarly situated were likely to reach the age of superannuation and by the unfair labour practice, namely, treating them only as 'daily rated labour', of the Railway Administration, they were likely o be denied the full retirement benefits, appellant and several others filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala, praying for a direction that they should be treated at least as temporary railway servant with attendant benefits."}}, {"text": "Central Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1801, "end_char": 1823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the matter, in connection, with the demand for a 11 the benefits granted by the Central Pay Commission being extended to the category of employees t-0 which the appellant belonged the appellant undertook a fast."}}, {"text": "September 28, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but-broke the rsame on September 28, 1974 at the intervention of [the Assistant Labour Commissioner."}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2478, "end_char": 2488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2497, "end_char": 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Divikar, [1957] S.C.R. 121 and the later five decisions commencing from Sundera Money and ending with Mohan/al' s case."}}, {"text": "Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is neither apparent nor real conflict between the decision of the constitution bench in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v. A..D. Divikar, [1957] S.C.R. 121 and the later five decisions commencing from Sundera Money and ending with Mohan/al' s case.", "canonical_name": "Mohanlal"}}, {"text": "al", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4583, "end_char": 4585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is neither apparent nor real conflict between the decision of the constitution bench in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v. A..D. 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Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14123, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.R.R. Pillai for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P.A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14157, "end_char": 14169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14179, "end_char": 14192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.A. Francis and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nAppellant L. Robert D'Souza joined service as a gangman at Mangalapuram in."}}, {"text": "L. Robert D'Souza", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nAppellant L. Robert D'Souza joined service as a gangman at Mangalapuram in.", "canonical_name": "L. ROBERT D'SOUZA"}}, {"text": "Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Ernakulam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15694, "end_char": 15748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This treatment according to the appellant was so unfair that it prompted persons who were victims of this unfair treatment by the Railway administration to form a Union named Southern Railway Construction Workers Union, Ernakulam, of which the appellant was the General Secretary."}}, {"text": "A.K. Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16002, "end_char": 16014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the late Shri A.K. Gopalan, who was a renowned trade union leader, espoused the cause of the appellant, his transfer was cancelled and he was reposted and allowed to continue at Ernakulam after paying the arrears of wages and granting continuity of service for the period he did not join duty at the place of his transfer."}}, {"text": "28th May, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16480, "end_char": 16494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16572, "end_char": 16592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "Southern Railway Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16602, "end_char": 16633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "Ernaku!am", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16688, "end_char": 16697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "19th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16701, "end_char": 16717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "8th March', 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16793, "end_char": 16809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "19th February,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16813, "end_char": 16833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is quite evident from the Jetter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, dated April 23, 1974, which reads as under :\n\n\"With reference to your letter dated the 28th May, 1973, on the above subject, I am directed to say that it has been reported by the Ministry of Railways that the Southern Railway Administration bas been advised that as you were transferred back to Ernaku!am on 19th March, 1971, you should be deemed to have been on duty for the intervening period from 8th March', 1970 to 19th February,\n\n1971, and your wages paid accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18215, "end_char": 18226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18234, "end_char": 18263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ceritql Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant approached the Ceritql Government to make a reference under s. IO of the Act in respect of the demands for adjudication by National Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19034, "end_char": 19052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Central Government was wobbling in its approach, the appellant declared his intention to go on fast unto death for redressal of the grievances suffered for decades by the lowest category of railway employees."}}, {"text": "Sepetember 28, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19407, "end_char": 19426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly broke his fast on Sepetember 28, 1974, in the hospital where he was confined during his fast."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19736, "end_char": 19753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, inter alia, contended before the Full Bench of Kerala High Court that the termination of his service for the reasons and in the manner brought about is illegal and invalid, that it was victimisation for trade union activities; that it was unfair labour practice and that it was ma/a fide."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20461, "end_char": 20467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20971, "end_char": 20979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21714, "end_char": 21720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22233, "end_char": 22253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention need not detain us because first in Hindustan Steel Ltd. case, then\n\n(I) [1979] llLLJ."}}, {"text": "(1980] 2 S.C.R. 884", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22295, "end_char": 22314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1971] 1 S.C.R. 586", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22328, "end_char": 22347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Santosh Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22444, "end_char": 22457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nin Santosh Gupta's case (Supra) and lastly In Mohan Lal v. Bharat\n\nEleotronics Ltd.,(') it was in terms held that the decision in Sundera Money's case was not at all inconsistent with the decision of the Con$titution Bench in Harip1asad Shukla's case and not only required no reconsideration but the decision in Sundera Money's case was approved in the aforementioned three cases.", "canonical_name": "Santosh Gupta"}}, {"text": "Harip1asad Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22667, "end_char": 22684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nin Santosh Gupta's case (Supra) and lastly In Mohan Lal v. Bharat\n\nEleotronics Ltd.,(') it was in terms held that the decision in Sundera Money's case was not at all inconsistent with the decision of the Con$titution Bench in Harip1asad Shukla's case and not only required no reconsideration but the decision in Sundera Money's case was approved in the aforementioned three cases.", "canonical_name": "Hariprasad fihukla"}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position is furtl]er butressed by the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd . ."}}, {"text": "s. 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23168, "end_char": 23176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23271, "end_char": 23277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23349, "end_char": 23356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23592, "end_char": 23622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two things thus emerge, firstly, that the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court under appeal has been specitlcally overruled by this Court in Santosh Gupta's case (Supra) and secondly, in view of the decision in Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd. case (Supra) striking off the',, name of a workman from the rolls without anything more constitutes retrenchment within the meaning of the expression 'retrenchment' ins."}}, {"text": "Francis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23955, "end_char": 23962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shet anchor of Mr. Francis's submission is that this Court should proceed on the construction of expression 'ratrenchment' as set out i1' Hariprasad Shukla's case, and ignore the construction of the exprssion 'retrenchment' put in , the decisions of this Court in Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd. ca.se, Santosh Gupta's case, Delhi C/qt~ & ."}}, {"text": "Hariprasad Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24074, "end_char": 24091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shet anchor of Mr. Francis's submission is that this Court should proceed on the construction of expression 'ratrenchment' as set out i1' Hariprasad Shukla's case, and ignore the construction of the exprssion 'retrenchment' put in , the decisions of this Court in Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd. ca.se, Santosh Gupta's case, Delhi C/qt~ & .", "canonical_name": "Hariprasad fihukla"}}, {"text": "Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24200, "end_char": 24236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shet anchor of Mr. Francis's submission is that this Court should proceed on the construction of expression 'ratrenchment' as set out i1' Hariprasad Shukla's case, and ignore the construction of the exprssion 'retrenchment' put in , the decisions of this Court in Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd. ca.se, Santosh Gupta's case, Delhi C/qt~ & ."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24266, "end_char": 24271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shet anchor of Mr. Francis's submission is that this Court should proceed on the construction of expression 'ratrenchment' as set out i1' Hariprasad Shukla's case, and ignore the construction of the exprssion 'retrenchment' put in , the decisions of this Court in Sundera Money's Hindustan Steel Ltd. ca.se, Santosh Gupta's case, Delhi C/qt~ & ."}}, {"text": "Hindustan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24451, "end_char": 24460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on four different occasions, in Hindustan Steel Limited <i!ise, a Division Bench of this Court consistin.g of\n\nChandracud, Goswami and Gupta, JJ."}}, {"text": "Chandracud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24530, "end_char": 24540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on four different occasions, in Hindustan Steel Limited <i!ise, a Division Bench of this Court consistin.g of\n\nChandracud, Goswami and Gupta, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24542, "end_char": 24549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on four different occasions, in Hindustan Steel Limited <i!ise, a Division Bench of this Court consistin.g of\n\nChandracud, Goswami and Gupta, JJ."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24554, "end_char": 24559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on four different occasions, in Hindustan Steel Limited <i!ise, a Division Bench of this Court consistin.g of\n\nChandracud, Goswami and Gupta, JJ."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24611, "end_char": 24622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Sundera Money's case, a Bench conisting of Chandrachud, Krishna Iyer and Gupta, JJ.;", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24624, "end_char": 24636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Sundera Money's case, a Bench conisting of Chandrachud, Krishna Iyer and Gupta, JJ.;"}}, {"text": "Santosh Gpta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24656, "end_char": 24668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Santosh Gpta' s case, a Bench consiiting of Krishna Iyer and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Santosh Gupta"}}, {"text": "O. Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24717, "end_char": 24735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Santosh Gpta' s case, a Bench consiiting of Krishna Iyer and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ."}}, {"text": "Mohanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24808, "end_char": 24816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and a Bench of two judges consisting of Gupta, J. and one of us in Mohanlal's case, have repeatedly undertaken this very detailed exercise and held that there is no incosis tency of any nature and kind nor any conflict, contradiction or repugnancy between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad fihukla's case and aforementioned later four dacisions\n\n(I) [1981} 3 s.c.c.", "canonical_name": "Mohanlal"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25017, "end_char": 25035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and a Bench of two judges consisting of Gupta, J. and one of us in Mohanlal's case, have repeatedly undertaken this very detailed exercise and held that there is no incosis tency of any nature and kind nor any conflict, contradiction or repugnancy between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad fihukla's case and aforementioned later four dacisions\n\n(I) [1981} 3 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "Hariprasad fihukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25039, "end_char": 25057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and a Bench of two judges consisting of Gupta, J. and one of us in Mohanlal's case, have repeatedly undertaken this very detailed exercise and held that there is no incosis tency of any nature and kind nor any conflict, contradiction or repugnancy between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad fihukla's case and aforementioned later four dacisions\n\n(I) [1981} 3 s.c.c.", "canonical_name": "Hariprasad fihukla"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25259, "end_char": 25282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25757, "end_char": 25763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Pathak, J. in his concurring judgment has stated that his concurrence with the majority view propounded by Reddy, J. should not be taken to imply his agreement with the interpretation of s. 2(oo) rendered in Santosh Gupta's case It may, however, be mentioned that the majority in that case has affirmed the earlier decision."}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25864, "end_char": 25869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Pathak, J. in his concurring judgment has stated that his concurrence with the majority view propounded by Reddy, J. should not be taken to imply his agreement with the interpretation of s. 2(oo) rendered in Santosh Gupta's case It may, however, be mentioned that the majority in that case has affirmed the earlier decision."}}, {"text": "s. 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25944, "end_char": 25952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Mohama/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26402, "end_char": 26409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, after meticulously examining on five distinct and different occasions, it is clearly and unequivocally stated that there is neither apparent nor real conflict between the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad Shukla's case and the later five decisions commencing from Sundera Money and ending with Mohama/' s case, it would be sheer waste ot'time and merely adding to the length of the judgment to re-examine this contention over again, so as to cover the familiar ground."}}, {"text": "s. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28273, "end_char": 28281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28437, "end_char": 28469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must as a corollary follow that if the iiame of the workman is struck off the roll that itself would constitute retrenchment, as held by this-Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. case."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28764, "end_char": 28778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In , that case respondent S. N. Mukherji who was recruited as a labourer came to be promoted in course of time to the post of Motion Setter.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Mukherji"}}, {"text": "October I, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28882, "end_char": 28897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October I, 1964, pursuant to some re-organisation in the establishment the post of Motion Setter was abolished."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29443, "end_char": 29457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The response of S. N. Mukherji to this offer was that he should be given a further opportunity to show his efficiency in his job and if he fails to improve, he would tender his resignation voluntarily.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Mukherji"}}, {"text": "January 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29759, "end_char": 29775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 19, 1966, the management wrote to the workman that his nllme has been struck off from the rolls with effect from August 24, 1965, for continued absence without intimation."}}, {"text": "19.8.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30500, "end_char": 30509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And here recall the order of termination of service of the appellant wherein it is stated that \"You have absented yourself unauthorisedly from 19.8.1974 and hence your services are deemed to have been terminated from the day you have absented yourself.\""}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth &~General Mills Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30747, "end_char": 30778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is any other\n\n• n\n\n262 SlJPREME COURT REPoars\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\n' conclusion possible save and except the one recorded by this Court in Delhi Cloth &~General Mills Ltd case that this constitutes retrenchment and for non-compliance with pre-condition, it is invalid."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30992, "end_char": 30997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31132, "end_char": 31138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31206, "end_char": 31211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31434, "end_char": 31440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32034, "end_char": 32039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32082, "end_char": 32088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32134, "end_char": 32144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32316, "end_char": 32331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32675, "end_char": 32680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32807, "end_char": 32822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32892, "end_char": 32907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33053, "end_char": 33058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33478, "end_char": 33493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revised Leave Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33858, "end_char": 33877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Services Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33879, "end_char": 33905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34275, "end_char": 34280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34425, "end_char": 34440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34453, "end_char": 34468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34567, "end_char": 34581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34729, "end_char": 34744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "S. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34746, "end_char": 34751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34796, "end_char": 34801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Regulations", "statute": "Civil Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34920, "end_char": 34935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34989, "end_char": 35004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35005, "end_char": 35010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35242, "end_char": 35247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35463, "end_char": 35467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35589, "end_char": 35594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35637, "end_char": 35643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35905, "end_char": 35911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35974, "end_char": 35979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36472, "end_char": 36478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39134, "end_char": 39169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a view to causing an artificial break in their service aad thus prevent their attaining the temporary status,\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "service of a temporary rail way servant may be terminated as provided in Rule 2301", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42514, "end_char": 42596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July I, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43223, "end_char": 43235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he joined as a Gangman on July I, 1948 at Mangalapuram and he was transferred in 1953 to Pindur in Mysore State."}}, {"text": "Mangalapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43239, "end_char": 43251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he joined as a Gangman on July I, 1948 at Mangalapuram and he was transferred in 1953 to Pindur in Mysore State."}}, {"text": "Pindur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43286, "end_char": 43292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he joined as a Gangman on July I, 1948 at Mangalapuram and he was transferred in 1953 to Pindur in Mysore State."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43296, "end_char": 43302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he joined as a Gangman on July I, 1948 at Mangalapuram and he was transferred in 1953 to Pindur in Mysore State."}}, {"text": "Nov_ember\n\nIS, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43675, "end_char": 43694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant further contends that on Nov_ember\n\nIS, 1954, on transfer he joined in th~~Qffice of lns?ector of Work~\n\n268 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\nI . ("}}, {"text": "Mangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43809, "end_char": 43818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at Mangalore and since then he has been in continuous employment in the construction branch of the Southern Railw\"ay till the date of his illegal termination of .service on ."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44229, "end_char": 44246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Executive Engineer, Ernakulam, where the appellant at the relevant time, i.e. September 5, 1966, was working, addressed a letter to various Executive Engineers inquiring from them whether the surplus staff on his establishment could be absorbed by any of them."}}, {"text": "31.12.66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44742, "end_char": 44750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-3 Executive Engineer's Office, Ernakulam Dated 5.9.1966\n\nSubject :- Surplus staff (Casual labour staff) absorption of\n\n\"Since the major portion of the work in this construction unit is over the list of the C.L. staff who are likely to be rendered surplus by 30.9.66 and 31.12.66 due to expiry of sanction to the post held by them, is enclosed."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46451, "end_char": 46457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Tuni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46470, "end_char": 46474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46478, "end_char": 46492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Rajahmundry", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46505, "end_char": 46516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Samalkhotan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46529, "end_char": 46540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Virudhnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46553, "end_char": 46564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "Manamadurai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46580, "end_char": 46591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has stated that he was transferred to Madras in 1957, to Tuni in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, to Rajahmundry in 1960, to Samalkhotan in 1961, to Virudhnagar in 1962 and to Manamadurai in 1965 and then to Ernakulam in August 1965."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46821, "end_char": 46835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that he was again transferred from Ernakulam which was seriously objected and he took up the matter with the higher authorities when he was re-transferred to Ernakulam on March 19, 1971."}}, {"text": "March 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47171, "end_char": 47184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "intervening period for which he did not report for duty, i.e. from March 6, 1970 to."}}, {"text": "February 19, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47188, "end_char": 47205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 19, 1971, he would be paid the wages as if he was on duty."}}, {"text": "K.P.\n\nPathrosa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49017, "end_char": 49031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant observation is as under:\n\n\"In view of the letters received from the Executive j, Engineer, Southern Railway, addressed to Shri K.P.\n\nPathrosa, advocate, appearing for respondents in the writ appeal, it has bf come unnecessary to consider this writ \"D appeal on merits\"."}}, {"text": "hesai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50574, "end_char": 50579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. RAILWAY (hesai, J.) 2t1\n\nhelp the respondent because appellant's case cannot be distinguished."}}, {"text": "K.N. Balakrishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51150, "end_char": 51166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IO, One of the co-petitioners of the appellant in the High Court, who got the benefit of regular employment pursuant to the writ petition was one Shri K.N. Balakrishna."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51446, "end_char": 51457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would thus appear at a glance that the case of the appellant could not be distinguished from the case of Shri K.N. Balakrishna and if Shri Balakrishna was accorded the status of regular employee, the appellan.t coufd not be treated otherwise,."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54136, "end_char": 54152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-1 dated January 24, 1962, and Ext."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54173, "end_char": 54188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-2 dated August 25, 1964, and the transfer was in the office of the Executive Engineer (Construction); (ii) there is absolutely no reference to project in the letter, but the department is described as construction unit."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54823, "end_char": 54838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And again eonstruction unit is regular unit all over the Indian Railways."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPokTS (1982", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 58692, "end_char": 58719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Railway administration bas miles to go and promises to keep and this becomes clear from the fact that the appellant, a daily rated workman, continued to render continuous service for twenty years which wo!ild imply that there was work for daily rated workman everyday for twenty years at a stretch without break and yet his status did not improve and continued to be treated as daily rated casual labour whose service can be terminated at the whim\n\nSUPREME COURT REPokTS (1982] .3 s.c.k. _"}}, {"text": "Section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60041, "end_char": 60052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61696, "end_char": 61703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61854, "end_char": 61860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62506, "end_char": 62512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_277_287_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "11 •I\n\n-\"\"'\n\n-.-.\n\nMOHANLAl GANGARAM GEHANI\n\nSTATE .OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 17, 1982\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, 0.A. DESAI AND\n\nA. VARADARAIAN, JJ.]\n\nEvidence Act-Section 145-Scope of-Identification parade-Accused identified by witMssfor the first time in court-Evidence-Validity of.\n\nThe prosecution case against the appellant was that on tho night of occurrence between 11 and 11.30 , the informer and two of his friends were standing on a road when suddenly the three accused emerged out of the car and tho appellant assaulted and stabbed the injured )lerson with a dagger. The prosecution alleged that there was !!Dcmity between the assailants and the injured person; that the informer lodged a F.I.R. at 00.50 hrs. and that the injured man was picked up by a Polic~ Wireless Van and adniitted in the hopital.\n\nThe trial court convicted the accused under section 326/34 l.P.C. and sentenced them variously.\n\nThe High Cdurt acquitted two of the three accused. In regard to the appellant, disbelieving the evidence of the doctor on the ground that the name 9f the assailant was first written by her as \"Tony'' but later changed.-to read as titiny\" and that secondly there was no particular .columa in the register where the name ofthe ... ailant could be written, the High Court altered the conviction to one under section 326 I.P.C. and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for three years.\n\nOn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (I) the F.I.R. was not lodged at 00.SO hrs. as claimed by the prosecution; (2) the injured did not know the. appellant fore the occurrence; (3) the version of the injured that the name of the assailant was disclosed-to him by a friend of the informer should not he accepted and (4) the discrepancy in the name of the assailant recorded by the doctor was not •uch as to completely discredit her\n\nevidence.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (a) The change of name \"Tony\" into \"Tiny\" in the hospital register might be due to mis-hearing of the name in the first instance aod correct ing it later. Much could not be made of this circumstance. The doctor had initialled the alteration. The prosecution has not \\made any attempt to declare\n\n278 SUPkBME cOUkT kBPOld's [1982) 3 s.c.il.\n\ntd'. doctor a h<;>stile witness and to cross-examine her. Therefore'tbc change in the name could be a bonafide mistake. That apart, the injured was fully conscious at the time he made the statement to the doctor, [282 A-CJ\n\n(b) The High Court was in error in. stating that there was no particular coluiiln in the hospital register in which the name of the assailcint could be mentioned. The entire part of the register where the statement had been recorded by the doctor is described as the \"RegiStrar's note\" which comprehends everything including the nature of injuries to the injured, any statement made by him or similar other matters. [281 E-F]\n\n(c) There is no-evidence on record to show that the doctor was in any way friendly with the appellant or inimical towards the injured man; she was an absolutely dis-interested and independent witness. (281 OJ\n\n~ 2 (a) The High Court had erred in holding that the doctor's evidence was inadmissible in that the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act had not been complied with. [282 F]\n\n(b) Section 145 applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements-either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding. If the maker of. a statement Is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to bis previous statements under section 145, that is to say, where the statements made by a person or a witness is contradicted not by bis own statement but by the statement of another prosecution witness the question ofapplicatioo of section 145 docs not arise. [283 A-CJ\n\n(c) The doctor's .stateme11t was an admission of a Prosecution witness.\n\nIf it was inconsistent with the statement made by another prosecuti1)n witness there .was no question of application of section 145 of the Evidence Act. [283-.C]\n\nIn the instant case the statement of the injured to the doctor being first in 'point of time it must be preferred to any subecqueot statement made by the injured.\n\nThere is much evidence to show that the injured did not know the appc} ..\n\nJant before the date of the incident. No test identification parade had been held.\n\nThe appellant was shown by the police before he identified him. If the accused was not known to the injured and his friends before the incident and was identi . fied for the first time in the court, this evidence has no value and cannot be relied , upoD. in the absence Of a test identification. parade, {285 E, C, F]\n\n V.C. Shukla v. State (Di/hi Administration), (1980] 3 S.C.R. SOO.aod Sahdeo Gosain & Anr. v. The King Emperor [1944] FCR 223, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JUklSDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 4 ofJ976. .\n\nMOHANLAL V. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 279\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th August 1975/lst Sept., 1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1639 of 1972.\n\nRam Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant.\n\nJ.L. Nain, and H R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of tile Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 29th August 1975/lst September 1975, of the Bombay High Court convicting the appellant, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (hereinafter referred to as A-1) under section 326, I.P.C. and sentencing him t.o rigorous imprisonment for three years.\n\nHe was also convicted under s. 323 read with s. 34 I.P.C. but no separate sentence was awarded.\n\nThe trial court had convicted AI under s. 326/34 I.P.C. which was altered by the High. Court to one under s. 326 simpliciter.\n\nThe details of the prosecution case are to be found in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same.\n\nWe shall, however, give a brief resume of the important facts which are germane for deciding the short points raised by Mr. Jethmalani, counsel for the appellant.\n\nThe occurrence out of which the present appeal arises appears to have taken place on April 2, 1972 at about 11-11.30 p.m.\n\nAccording to the prosecution while lshrat Malik Faqih (hereinafter referred to as 'lshraC) was returning from a movie in Paradise Cinema, situated at Lady Jamashedji Road, Mahim at aliout 12.15 a.m. he met Salim, a friend of his, alongwith Shaikh Abdul . Kalim alias Pappu (P.W. 4). He also saw another person standing with Salim and Pappu. All of them started talking to one another when suddenly they , saw a black Fiat car coming from Lady Jamashedji Road and taking a turn to Chofani Road. The car stopped near the place where the aforesaid persons were talking and\n\nA-1, A-2 (Shashi) and A-3 (Kumar) emerged from the car.\n\nAccording to the informant, Ishrat, all the three accused were known to him before. These persons were dead drunk and asked bhrat 1md party as to who amongst them was their leader. Some sor(of\n\n. 280 SUPREME COURT REPORts (198213 s.c.R .\n\nan altercation took place in the course of which A-2 caught hold of the shirt of Shanker Shetty and assaulted b im with fists.\n\nHe was joined by A-3 and the altercation culminated in a murderous assault said to have been made by A-1 who took out a dagger and stabbed Sbetty on the right side of the stomach below the chest. Sbetty fell down. Thereafter A-I ran back to bis car and sped away leaving behind A-3 who could not get into the car. Ishrat .imm<diately proceeded to the Mahim police station and lodged an F.I.R. with Sub-Inspector Sawant (P.W. 7) at 00.50 hrs. on April 3, 1972.\n\nAccording to the prosecution, the informant had rushed to the police station and lodged the F.I.R. within an hour of the occurre~~.\n\nSubsequently, it appears that a wireless police van which passed through the place of occurrence having found Shetty lying injured picked him up and removed him to K.E.M. Hospital.\n\nDr. Heena (P.W. 11) admitted Shetty and made a note of the injuries received by him in the notesheet of the hospital register and_ also mentioned the fact that the injured had named his assailant as one Tiny. It was further alleged by the prosecution that Sawant after recording the F.I.R. rushed to the hospital and contacted Shetty and recorded his statement at 1.45 a.m.\n\nAfter the usual investigation, chargesheet was submitted against A-1 to A-3 wh.o were ultimately tried and convicted for an offence under s. 326 read withs. 34 I.P.C. and A-1 was sen tenced as mentioned hereinbefore. A-2 and A-3 each was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years.\n\nA-1 pleaded innocence and his defence was that he was falsely implicated due to enmity because Ishrat and his friends were carrying on Matka business and the appellant being an informer of the Customs Department had made certain reports against the prosecution witnesses particularly Ishrat who was a smuggler. We need not refer. to the defence of A-2 or A-3 as they have been acquitted by the High Court.\n\nThe appellant raised several points before the High Court which after hearing the parties confirmed his conviction but reduced his sentence to rigorous imprisonment for three years.\n\nIn support of the appeal Mr. Jethmalani has argued three important! points relating to certain circumstances which completely demoljsh the entire prosecution case against the appellant •\n\nj--\n\n' ,. \\ ,\n\n..-A-··\n\nMOHANLAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Pazal Ali, J.) 281\n\nIn the first place, it was argued that the F.I.R. was not at all lodged at 00.50 hrs. as alleged by the prosecution but much later. Secondly, Sbetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence and thirdly, Mr. Jetbmalani argued, that his vcr.ion that the name of the appellant was disclosed to him by Salim should not be accepted.\n\nAnother important circumstance to which our attention was drawn and which bas greatly impressed us is that the hospital register (Bxt. 22) shows that when Shetty was taken to the hospital and produced before Dr. Reena (P.W. 11) be cave the name of bis assailant as one Tiny or Tony. The evidence further shows that Tiny or Tony was undoubtedly a known person who was living in a locality near the place of occurrence and was not a fictitious red .herring as the prosecution would have us believe. According to Bxt. 22 Shctty made a statement to Dr. Heena at 1.15 a.m. on April 3, 1972. Dr. Heena, who appeared as P:W. 11, fully supported the contents of Ext. 22.\n\nIt is manifest that once the statement of P. W.· 11 is accepted then the entire prosecution ase against the appellant falls.\n\nThe High Court realising the importance of this document and the evidence of P.W. 11 seems to have explained it away on three main grounds. In the first place, the High Court laid great emphasis on the fact that where Dr. Hcena bad mentioned the name of Tiny, there was no particular column where the name of assailant could be given. We have examined the original document ourselves and we find that the entire part of the register where the sta.tement bas been recorded by P.W. 11 is described as Registrar's note which comprehends everything including the nature of injuries of the injured, any statement made l?Y him or similar other matters. We are, therefore, uable to agree with the High Court that there was no particular column under which the name of the assailant could be mentioned. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence on the record to show that P.W. 11 was in ay way friendly with the appellant or\n\nhad any animus against Shetty which might impel her to make false entries in order to oblige the appellant. P.W. II was an absolutely disinterested and independent witness. After going through her evidence we find no re'ason why her evidence shoul_d not be accepted in toto.\n\nThe High Court further observed that from the hospital register it appears \\ht !h~ word 'Ton~· was first written1 then cros8'4\n\n282 SUPREME COURT RiiPORTS\n\n(1982]' 3 S.C.R.\n\nand changed into. 'Tiny'. Tb is may be 11 mistake in the pronunciation oftbe name and much signifu:ance cannot be attached to this circumstance because P.W. 11 had initialled the 'change and it is not a case of forgery at all.\n\nMoreovr. P!W. 11 was; examined as .a prpsecution witness and if the learned prosecutor had.· thought that she (P.W. 11) had given false evidence to help the appellant, he -could have declared her hostile and sought die permission of the court to cross, examine her but no such cours0 was adopted. Henee, th.e mere change of the word 'Tony' to Tiny' , can be explained on the basis of a bona fide .. mistake.\n\nThere js no .ei; asure. ,!!oth , nao;1es are decipherable. What may have happened was that the injured may have. pronounced Tiny in such a way.. that P. W. 11 thought it was Tony but on further clarific_ation the injured must have said that it was Tiny.\n\nP.W. 11 in her evidence has clearly stated .that she had examined the patient and had given the history of the assault with . . , knife by a person called Tiny and that the patient was fully conscious. There is nothing in her evidence to show that her statement could be uni.rue. · .\n\nThe High Court tlien 'sought to exclude the evidence of P.W. 11 as being inadmissible as the provisions of s. 145 of the Evidence Act were not complied with.. It was suggested tha.t Shetty had mentioned the' name of the appellant in his stafemerit in court but the statement of P. W. II shows that he had mimed Tinf as his assailant and, therefore, Dr. Heena (P.W _ i I) should have been cross examined on this point to explain the contradiction.\n\nWith great respect, the High Court has erred on this point and has misconstrued the provisions of s. 145 of the Evidence Act v.; hich may be extracted thus:\n\n\"145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing. •\n\nA witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved, but, if it is inte.nded to contradict him by the writing, his attention must; before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be nsed for the purpose of contradicting \"1im/'\n\n• \"\n\nMOHANLAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 283\n\nIt is obvious from a perusal of s1 145 that it applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding. If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statement under s. 145.\n\nIn other words, where the statement made by a person or w_itness is contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another prosecution witness, the question of the application of s. 145 does not arise. To illustrate, we might give an instance-suppose A, a prosecution witness, makes a particular statement regarding the part played by an accused but another witness B makes a statement which is inconsistent with the statement made by A, in such a case s. 145 of the'Evidence Act is not at all attracted. Indeed, if the interpretation placed by the High Court is accepted, then it will be extremely difficult for an accused or a party to rely on t~ interse\n\ncontradiction of various witnesses and every time when the contradiction is made, the previous witness would have to be recalled for the purpose of contradiction. This was neither the purport nor th<: object of s. 145 o( the Evidence Act.\n\nFor instance, in the instant ca>e, if P.W. 11 had been examined under s. 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure or before a committing court and made a particular statement which was contradictory to a statement made in the Sessions Court, thens. 145 would have applied if the accused wanted to rely on the contradiction. Such, however, is not the position because the evidence of P. W. 11 is not only consistent throughout but the earlier statement recorded by her can be taken to corroborate her. There was no question of con tradicting the statement of P.W. 11 by her previous or subsequent statement. On the other hand, Dr. Heena. was a prosecution .· witness whose statement that Shetty had named Tiny on the earliest ·\n\noccasion, was an admission by a prosecution witness which threw considerab_le doubt on the complicity of the appellant in the occurrence. If Shetty stated in his evidence that he named\" A I (Mohanlal) then that would be a statement which was contradic- ' tory to that of P. W. 11 and the question will be which of the two stateDJents should be preferred. If Dr. Heena had made twg inconsistent statements then only s. 145 would have\n\nllpplid,\n\n'UPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn Bishwanath Prasad & Ors. v. Dwarka Prasad and Ors.(') while dwelling upon a distinction between an admission and a state ment to which s. 145 would apply, this Court observed as follows:\n\n\"In the former case an admission by a party is sub stantive evidence if it fulfills the requirements of s. 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to. the party because it is evidence proprio vigore : in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by s. 145 of the Evidence Ack''\n\nThe statement made by P.W. 11 was, therefore, an admission of a prosecution witness and if it was inconsisten\\ with the statement made by another prosecution witness namely Shetty, there was no question of the application of s. 145 of the Evidence !\\ct whicb did not apply to such a case in terms.\n\nThus, the reason given by the High Court for distrusting the evidence of Dr. Heena is wholly unsustainable. Moreover, the statement of the injured to Dr. Heena being the first statement in point of time must be preferred to any subsequent statement that Shetty may have made. In fact, the admitted position is that Shetty did noi know the appellant before the occurrence nor did he know his name which was disclosed to him by one Salim. Therefore, Salim who is now dead, being the source of information of Shetty would be of doubtful admissibility as it is not covered by s. 32 of the Evidence Act. And, once we believe the evidence of P.W. 11, as we must, then the entire bottom out of the prosecution case is knocked out.\n\n Apart from this, there is another circumstance which rends the testimony of Shetty (P.W. 5) valueless.\n\nHe admits in para JO of his evidence (page 35 of the paperbook) that he had 11.ot seen the accused before the date of the incident, that he did not know him at all, and that he came to know the name of the accused on the\n\n.(I) r1974] 2 S, C,]l. 124,\n\n-Ir\n\n. MOHANLAL v. MAHARASHTRA ( Pazal Ali. J.) 285\n\ndate of the incident and that it was Salim who had given him the name of the accused while he was being taken to the hospital. The fact that Salim disclosed the name of the appellant to Shetty is falsified by the fact that he did not name the appellant to Dr. Heena when he reached the hospital but named one Tiny. It is also relevant to note that Tiny Adv.ani is not an unknown figure but is a living person as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 3, Shaikh, where he says that he knew Tiny\" Advani who is also known to lshrat, Salim and Pappu and they are on greeting terms.\n\nAnother important circumstance which discredits the testimony of P.W. 5 (Shelly) is that he admits that although he did not know the accused from before the occurrence yet the accused was shown to him by the police at the police station. The relevant statement of P.W. 5 may be extracted thus:\n\n\"I had seen the accused before coming to the Court\n\nand after the incident, I had seen the accused ten days D after I was discharged from the hospital. I was shown these accused by the Police at the Police Station.\"\n\nThus, as Shetty did not know the appellant before the occurence and no Test Identification parade was held to test his power of identification and he was also shown by the police before he identified the appellant in court, his evidence becomes absolutely valueless on the question of identification.\n\nOn this ground alone, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted It is rather surprising that this important circumstance escaped the attention of the High Court while it laid very great stress in criticising the evidence of Dr. Heena when her evidence was true and straight forward.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are unable to place any reliance on the evidence of Shetty so far as the identification of the appellant is concerned.\n\nThe other witness who knew the accused is P. W. 1 (lshrat) who is said to have lodged the F.I.R. at Mahim police station at\n\n12.50 a.m. on 3.4.1972. There is clear intrinsic evidence in the case to show that the FIR was ante-timed and could not have been lodged at 12.50 a.m. P.W. 7, Sawant had clearly admitted in his evidence at page 41 of the Paperbook that the station diary entry which has tp contain the contents 0£ the F. T.R. dos mention that Is brat had - - . '. . -·~ . ' _,, . ,. .. . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 3 s.c.11.\n\nvisited the Police station and lodged the complaint. The witness further admits that the station diary entry does not also mention anywhere that be (P. W. 7) bad left the police station for K.E.M. hospital accompanied by P.W. I, Ishrat. He also admits that he knew the accused before the incident.\n\nThe witness further admits that although be had come to know the name of the assailant at 12.50 a.m. yet he did not take any step to arrest or cause the arrest of any one of the accused. He has not given any explanation for this unusual conduct. It is extremely doubtful if P. W. I had actually named the appellant, inspector Sawant would not have arrested him immediately .after the F.I.R. was lodged or, at any rate, after he returned from the Hospital.\n\nThe evidence, however, shows that A-I was arrested on .5.4.72, that is to say, two days after the occurrence.\n\nNo explanation .for this uqusual phenomenon has been given by the prosecution.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, the statement of P.W. 1 that he lodged the F.I.R. at 12.50 a.m. on 3.4.72 and disclosed the name of the appellant becomes absolutely doubtf11I.\n\nIf we reject this part. of the .evidence of P.W. 1, then bis evidence on the question of complicity -of the appellant in the crime also becomes extremely doubtful:\n\nThe only other evidence against the appellant is that of P.Ws. 3 and 4.\n\nSo far as P. W. 3 is concerned his evidence also suffers from the same infirmity as that of Shetty.\n\nP.W. 3 (Shaikh) admits at page 22 of the Paperbook that he had not seen the accused or any of the three accused before the date of the incident and that he had seen all the three for the first time at the time of the incident.\n\nHe further admits that the names of the accused were given to\"him by the police.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, if the appellant was not known to him before the incident and was identified for the first time in the court, in the absence of a test identification parade .the evidence of P. W. 3 was valueless and could not be relied upon as held by t'.1is court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Administration)('). where this Court made the following observations:\n\n\"Moreover, the identification of Tripathi by the witness for the first time in the court without being tested by a prior test identification parade was valueless.\"\n\n(D c19so1 s.c, R. soo.\n\n- 111\n\n,•--\"\"/\n\nMOlfANLAL v. MAHARA; HTRA (Fazal Ali, J.i 281\n\nSame view was taken in a Federal Court decision in Sahdeo Gosain & Anr. v. The King Emperor.(')\n\nThis, therefore, disposes of the evidence of P.W. 3. As regards the eviden~ of P.W. 4, the High Court itself found at page 129 of the paperbook that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had disbelieved P. W: 4, Shaikh alias Pappu. Therefore, the evidence of P.W. 4 also goes out of consideration.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that there is absolutely no legal evidence on the basis of which the appellant could be . convicted.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the prosecu- ;;. tion has not been able to prove its case against the app, ellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the appellant is acquitt'd of the charges framed against him. He will now be discharged from his bailbonds and need not surrender.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed,\n\n(1) [1944) FCR 223.", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "MOHANLAl GANGARAM GEHANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHANLAl GANGARAM GEHANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE .OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 17, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 85, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHANLAl GANGARAM GEHANI\n\nSTATE .OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 17, 1982\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, 0.A. DESAI AND\n\nA. VARADARAIAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. 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MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHANLAL V. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 279\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th August 1975/lst Sept., 1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHANLAL V. MAHARASHTRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 279\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th August 1975/lst Sept., 1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5112, "end_char": 5126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5133, "end_char": 5144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.N. Karkhanis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. Srldharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C.K.\" Sucharita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. S. Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Srldharan and C.K.\" Sucharita for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J.L. Nain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Nain, and H R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "H R. Khanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5230, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Nain, and H R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5246, "end_char": 5258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Nain, and H R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5325, "end_char": 5333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tile Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 29th August 1975/lst September 1975, of the Bombay High Court convicting the appellant, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (hereinafter referred to as A-1) under section 326, I.P.C. and sentencing him t.o rigorous imprisonment for three years.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tile Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 29th August 1975/lst September 1975, of the Bombay High Court convicting the appellant, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (hereinafter referred to as A-1) under section 326, I.P.C. and sentencing him t.o rigorous imprisonment for three years.", "canonical_name": "MOHANLAl GANGARAM GEHANI"}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5569, "end_char": 5574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5684, "end_char": 5689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5690, "end_char": 5695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "AI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court had convicted AI under s. 326/34 I.P.C. which was altered by the High."}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5785, "end_char": 5790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5842, "end_char": 5848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6125, "end_char": 6135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall, however, give a brief resume of the important facts which are germane for deciding the short points raised by Mr. Jethmalani, counsel for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "April 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence out of which the present appeal arises appears to have taken place on April 2, 1972 at about 11-11.30 p.m.\n\nAccording to the prosecution while lshrat Malik Faqih (hereinafter referred to as 'lshraC) was returning from a movie in Paradise Cinema, situated at Lady Jamashedji Road, Mahim at aliout 12.15 a.m. he met Salim, a friend of his, alongwith Shaikh Abdul ."}}, {"text": "Salim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence out of which the present appeal arises appears to have taken place on April 2, 1972 at about 11-11.30 p.m.\n\nAccording to the prosecution while lshrat Malik Faqih (hereinafter referred to as 'lshraC) was returning from a movie in Paradise Cinema, situated at Lady Jamashedji Road, Mahim at aliout 12.15 a.m. he met Salim, a friend of his, alongwith Shaikh Abdul ."}}, {"text": "Shaikh Abdul . Kalim alias Pappu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence out of which the present appeal arises appears to have taken place on April 2, 1972 at about 11-11.30 p.m.\n\nAccording to the prosecution while lshrat Malik Faqih (hereinafter referred to as 'lshraC) was returning from a movie in Paradise Cinema, situated at Lady Jamashedji Road, Mahim at aliout 12.15 a.m. he met Salim, a friend of his, alongwith Shaikh Abdul ."}}, {"text": "Pappu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also saw another person standing with Salim and Pappu."}}, {"text": "Shashi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The car stopped near the place where the aforesaid persons were talking and\n\nA-1, A-2 (Shashi) and A-3 (Kumar) emerged from the car."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6886, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The car stopped near the place where the aforesaid persons were talking and\n\nA-1, A-2 (Shashi) and A-3 (Kumar) emerged from the car."}}, {"text": "Shanker Shetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an altercation took place in the course of which A-2 caught hold of the shirt of Shanker Shetty and assaulted b im with fists."}}, {"text": "Sbetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7422, "end_char": 7428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was joined by A-3 and the altercation culminated in a murderous assault said to have been made by A-1 who took out a dagger and stabbed Sbetty on the right side of the stomach below the chest.", "canonical_name": "Sbetty"}}, {"text": "Ishrat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7597, "end_char": 7603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishrat .imm<diately proceeded to the Mahim police station and lodged an F.I.R. with Sub-Inspector Sawant (P.W. 7) at 00.50 hrs."}}, {"text": "Mahim police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishrat .imm<diately proceeded to the Mahim police station and lodged an F.I.R. with Sub-Inspector Sawant (P.W. 7) at 00.50 hrs."}}, {"text": "Inspector Sawant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7685, "end_char": 7701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishrat .imm<diately proceeded to the Mahim police station and lodged an F.I.R. with Sub-Inspector Sawant (P.W. 7) at 00.50 hrs."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on April 3, 1972."}}, {"text": "Shetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7987, "end_char": 7993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, the informant had rushed to the police station and lodged the F.I.R. within an hour of the occurre~~.\n\nSubsequently, it appears that a wireless police van which passed through the place of occurrence having found Shetty lying injured picked him up and removed him to K.E.M. Hospital.", "canonical_name": "Sbetty"}}, {"text": "K.E.M. Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, the informant had rushed to the police station and lodged the F.I.R. within an hour of the occurre~~.\n\nSubsequently, it appears that a wireless police van which passed through the place of occurrence having found Shetty lying injured picked him up and removed him to K.E.M. Hospital."}}, {"text": "Heena", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8063, "end_char": 8068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Heena (P.W. 11) admitted Shetty and made a note of the injuries received by him in the notesheet of the hospital register and_ also mentioned the fact that the injured had named his assailant as one Tiny."}}, {"text": "Sawant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8315, "end_char": 8321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further alleged by the prosecution that Sawant after recording the F.I.R. rushed to the hospital and contacted Shetty and recorded his statement at 1.45 a.m.\n\nAfter the usual investigation, chargesheet was submitted against A-1 to A-3 wh.o were ultimately tried and convicted for an offence under s. 326 read withs."}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ishrat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8825, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-1 pleaded innocence and his defence was that he was falsely implicated due to enmity because Ishrat and his friends were carrying on Matka business and the appellant being an informer of the Customs Department had made certain reports against the prosecution witnesses particularly Ishrat who was a smuggler."}}, {"text": "Jetbmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9792, "end_char": 9802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, Sbetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence and thirdly, Mr. Jetbmalani argued, that his vcr.ion that the name of the appellant was disclosed to him by Salim should not be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Reena", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22) shows that when Shetty was taken to the hospital and produced before Dr. Reena (P.W. 11) be cave the name of bis assailant as one Tiny or Tony."}}, {"text": "Tiny", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22) shows that when Shetty was taken to the hospital and produced before Dr. Reena (P.W. 11) be cave the name of bis assailant as one Tiny or Tony."}}, {"text": "Tony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10191, "end_char": 10195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22) shows that when Shetty was taken to the hospital and produced before Dr. Reena (P.W. 11) be cave the name of bis assailant as one Tiny or Tony."}}, {"text": "Shctty", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10432, "end_char": 10438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 Shctty made a statement to Dr. Heena at 1.15 a.m. on April 3, 1972."}}, {"text": "Hcena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10926, "end_char": 10931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, the High Court laid great emphasis on the fact that where Dr. Hcena bad mentioned the name of Tiny, there was no particular column where the name of assailant could be given."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13356, "end_char": 13362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tinf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13560, "end_char": 13564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court tlien 'sought to exclude the evidence of P.W. 11 as being inadmissible as the provisions of s. 145 of the Evidence Act were not complied with.. It was suggested tha.t Shetty had mentioned the' name of the appellant in his stafemerit in court but the statement of P. W. II shows that he had mimed Tinf as his assailant and, therefore, Dr. Heena (P.W _ i I) should have been cross examined on this point to explain the contradiction."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13795, "end_char": 13801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14408, "end_char": 14410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14698, "end_char": 14704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14901, "end_char": 14907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15175, "end_char": 15181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15591, "end_char": 15597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15700, "end_char": 15726, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16532, "end_char": 16540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Shetty stated in his evidence that he named\" A I (Mohanlal) then that would be a statement which was contradic- ' tory to that of P. W. 11 and the question will be which of the two stateDJents should be preferred."}}, {"text": "Heena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16703, "end_char": 16708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Dr. Heena had made twg inconsistent statements then only s. 145 would have\n\nllpplid,\n\n'UPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn Bishwanath Prasad & Ors."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16756, "end_char": 16762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16964, "end_char": 16970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17121, "end_char": 17126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17608, "end_char": 17614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shetty", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17811, "end_char": 17817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the party because it is evidence proprio vigore : in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by s. 145 of the Evidence Ack''\n\nThe statement made by P.W. 11 was, therefore, an admission of a prosecution witness and if it was inconsisten\\ with the statement made by another prosecution witness namely Shetty, there was no question of the application of s. 145 of the Evidence !"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18509, "end_char": 18514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tiny Adv.ani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19419, "end_char": 19431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also relevant to note that Tiny Adv.ani is not an unknown figure but is a living person as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 3, Shaikh, where he says that he knew Tiny\" Advani who is also known to lshrat, Salim and Pappu and they are on greeting terms.", "canonical_name": "Tiny Adv.ani"}}, {"text": "Shaikh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19525, "end_char": 19531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also relevant to note that Tiny Adv.ani is not an unknown figure but is a living person as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 3, Shaikh, where he says that he knew Tiny\" Advani who is also known to lshrat, Salim and Pappu and they are on greeting terms."}}, {"text": "Tiny\" Advani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19560, "end_char": 19572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also relevant to note that Tiny Adv.ani is not an unknown figure but is a living person as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 3, Shaikh, where he says that he knew Tiny\" Advani who is also known to lshrat, Salim and Pappu and they are on greeting terms.", "canonical_name": "Tiny Adv.ani"}}, {"text": "Shelly", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19724, "end_char": 19730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another important circumstance which discredits the testimony of P.W. 5 (Shelly) is that he admits that although he did not know the accused from before the occurrence yet the accused was shown to him by the police at the police station."}}, {"text": "Mahim", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21002, "end_char": 21007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other witness who knew the accused is P. W. 1 (lshrat) who is said to have lodged the F.I.R. at Mahim police station at\n\n12.50 a.m. on 3.4.1972."}}, {"text": "3.4.1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other witness who knew the accused is P. W. 1 (lshrat) who is said to have lodged the F.I.R. at Mahim police station at\n\n12.50 a.m. on 3.4.1972."}}, {"text": "Sawant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21186, "end_char": 21192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is clear intrinsic evidence in the case to show that the FIR was ante-timed and could not have been lodged at 12.50 a.m. P.W. 7, Sawant had clearly admitted in his evidence at page 41 of the Paperbook that the station diary entry which has tp contain the contents 0£ the F. T.R. dos mention that Is brat had - - . '. ."}}, {"text": "K.E.M. hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21631, "end_char": 21646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness further admits that the station diary entry does not also mention anywhere that be (P. W. 7) bad left the police station for K.E.M. hospital accompanied by P.W. I, Ishrat."}}, {"text": ".5.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22251, "end_char": 22258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence, however, shows that A-I was arrested on .5.4.72, that is to say, two days after the occurrence."}}, {"text": "3.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22485, "end_char": 22491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, therefore, the statement of P.W. 1 that he lodged the F.I.R. at 12.50 a.m. on 3.4.72 and disclosed the name of the appellant becomes absolutely doubtf11I.\n\nIf we reject this part."}}, {"text": "Tripathi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23631, "end_char": 23639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where this Court made the following observations:\n\n\"Moreover, the identification of Tripathi by the witness for the first time in the court without being tested by a prior test identification parade was valueless.\""}}, {"text": "Shaikh alias Pappu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24159, "end_char": 24177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the eviden~ of P.W. 4, the High Court itself found at page 129 of the paperbook that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had disbelieved P. W: 4, Shaikh alias Pappu."}}, {"text": "[1944) FCR 223", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24733, "end_char": 24747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_288_297_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "288 .\n\nPARASHRAM THAKUR DASS & OTHERS\n\nRAM CHAND S/O SHRI RADHUMAL & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 17, 1982\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPA REDDY, JJ.)\n\nMadhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 Ss. 149(2) and 164(3) & Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code Rules, 1956, Rules 2 to 26.\n\nAllotment of nazul land to displaced persons-Applications from claimants~ State Government ini1ially deciding not to grant plots-Subsequent decision to allot .)..-~- - plots taken-Plots allotted to some claimants-Claims of other parties not considered-Such action-Whether valid.\n\nGrant of lease-Hold right in nazul land without auction-Rea,, ons to hi recorded in writing-Whether essential.\n\nRespondents Nos. I to 16 applied for the grant of plots of land for purposes of constructing shops, alleging that they were displacedpersons and entitled to the grant of plots. The appellants also made a similar application. There were applications from other claimants. The State Government acting on the report of the Commissioner rejected all the applications. Subsequently the Government at the instance of the appeJlants who had sought a review1 reversed its earlier or®r and df'cided to grant plots on permanent lease to the appellants. The deci sion was conveyed in a memorandum by the State Government, who granted the plots to the appellants as shop sites in Bhumidhari rights without auction on payment of premium. The allotment was assailed by the respondents and they repre.sented to the State Government that only after further inquiry should the land be reserved for do!serving claimants.\n\nThe respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the allotment made by the Government in favour of the appellants contending that no reasonable opportunity had been given to them to press their claim for grant of plots, after reversal of the earlier decision not to grant land, that the apoellants had been unduly favoured, and that the power to grant plot's was 't\"ested in the Collector and not in the State .Government. The appellants contested aHeging that they bad acquired a right to the land that -they could not be divested of those rights. The High Court quashed the order granting plots to the appellants and directed the State Government to take appropriate action on the several claims for allotment of lalld. It held that under sub--sect.ion (2) of section 149 read with\n\nsubsection (3) of section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so and that after initially deciding not to\n\nPARASRAM v. RAMCHAND 289\n\ngrant the plots, the su sequent decision to allot them was contrary to law as the claims of others had not been considered.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. The High Court was right in quashing the order granting plots to the appellants and directing the State Government to consider the several\n\n_ claims for allotment. [296 C-D] B\n\n2. The grant cannot be attributed to clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section\n\n149. _The land was disposed of in Bhumidhari right. It was not given on favourable terms to the appellants, tlie market value of the plots was taken for fixing the premium. From the nature of the grant, it was clear that action under subsection (I) of section 149 was intended. [293 El\n\n3. Under Rules 24 to 26 of the Land Revenue Code, lease-hold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction. If in any particular case the State Government or the Collector considers that there is good reason for grant ing the land without auction the reasons must be recorded in writing.· The exis\n\ntence of good reason for departillg from the general principle and the recording of the reason in writing are essential prerequisites which must be satisfied before lease hold rights are granted without auction. [295 A-CJ\n\nIn the instant case there is no evidence that the State Government has recorded any reasons in writing for prcfcring the mode of disposing of the land without auction. It had also no good reason for favouring that mode. In these circumstances the gfant ot land to the appellants was rightly quashed by the High Court. [295 E-F]\n\n4. The State Government hRd decided earlier, as a matter of policy, not to allot nazul land to displace.d persons, and pursuant to the decision all the appli cations for a11otment were rejected. The applications 'illCre not rejected on the merits of their respective claims. Subsequently, when the State Government made an allotment of the plots to the appellants, it was consequent to a decision, which. must be regarded as a composite of two decisions. one a policy decision to throw open the land to allotment in reversal of the earlier policy and, two, to allot the land to the appellants. The applications of the respondents for allotment of plots were rejected on te ground that the land was not available for a1lotment. That was a policy decision. When it was reversed it was incumbent on the State Government to reconsider those applications or to notify that the land was available for allotment and to invite fresh applications in that behalf.\n\nIt was not open to thC State Government to allot the plots to the appeUailts in disregard of the claims of others who bad also applied for allotment.\n\n[295 G-H; 296 AB]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 440 (N) of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th June 1969 of the Bombay High Co4rt in Misc. Civil Appln.\n\nNo. 139 of 1968.\n\n29()\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] j s.c.I!..\n\nA Naunit Lal, for the Appellant.\n\nA.G .. Ratnaparkhi for Respondents Nos. 1-6.\n\nM.N. Shroff, for Respondents Nos. 17-19.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court quashing the grant of Nazul land to the appellants on a writ petition filed by the respondents Nos. I to 16.\n\nThe respondents Nos. 1to16 applied on March 15, 1963 for the grant of sixteen plots of land included in Government Nazul Plot No. 31/l (Sheet No. 49-D) in Yeotmal Town for the purpose of constructing shops thereon. They alleged that they had not been allotted any land yet for carrying on business at Y eotmal, and inasmuch as land sites were being released to refugeea or displaced persons they claimed that having been compelled to migrate from West Pakistan to India during the partition of 1947 they were entitled to the grant of such plots. The appellants made a similar application on May 16, 1964 and it is their case that they had also applied earlier in the same behalf on February 27, !962. There were applications from other claimants also. The State Government, acting on the report of the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, rejected all the aplications. The appellants say that they sought a review of the order of the Government, and on June 28, 1965 the Government reversed its order and decided to grant plots on permanent lease to the appellants. The Collector, Yeotmal submitted a report to the Government pointing out that each plot would be 192 sq. ft. in area and having regard to its market value each allottee should be required to pay a premium of Rs. 960. The State Government granted the plots to the appellants as shop sites in Bhumidhari right without auction on payment of premium, and the decision. was conveyed in a Memorandum dated March 3, 1966.\n\nThe allotment was assailed by the respondents, and they represented to the State\n\nGovernment that after further inquiry the land should be reserved for deserving claimants.\n\nH The respondents filed a writ petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court challenging allotment made by the Government in favour of the appellants. They urged that no reason-\n\n• I /-\n\n-.:.-\n\n- ~-\n\nl>ARASRAM V, RAM CHAND (Pathak, J.) 291\n\n able opportunity had been given to them to press their claims for grant of plots after the Government had reversed its earlier decision not to grant land, that the appellants had been unduly favoured and that the order was bad in law because the plots had been granted without holding an auction. It was also contended that the power to grant the plots was vested in the Collector and not the State Government.\n\nDuring the pendency of the writ petition a statement was made on behalf of the State Government that it was prepared to consider the claims of the respondents. The appellants, however, maintained that they had acquired a right to the land in terms of the order dated March 3, 1966 and that they could not be divested of those rights,\n\nBy its judgment dated March 14, 1968 the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order granting plots to the appellants and directed the State Government and its officers to take appropriate action on the several claims for allotment of land. The High Court held that in view of sub•s. (2) s. 149 read with sub-s. (3) of s. 164 of the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954, as applied to the Vidharba region of Maharashtra, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code, it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so, and that after initially deciding not to grant the plots the subsequent decision to allot them to the appellants was contrary to law inasmuch as the claims of others had not been considered.\n\nIn this appeal, it is urged by the appellants that the High Court erred in applying sub-s. (3) of s. 164 and rule 26, and therefore in holding that the lease of the plots without auction and witliout recording any reasons was invalid.\n\nWhen the Government decided to grant land to the appellants, it thought that the grant should take the form of a permanent lease in their favour.\n\nThe Collector was requested to frame suitable proposals and to submit them to th~ Govenment.\n\nThe Collector submitted a report dated November 23, 1965. suggesting the allotment of plots for the construction of shops on the footing that each' plot would measure 192 sq. ft. and its market value, worked out on the basis of recorded sale transactions, and taking into regard the commercial purpose for which the land was intended, indicated a premium of Rs. 960. He recommended further that the plots may\n\nSUPaEMB COURT REPORTs [ i 982] j s.C.i<.\n\nbe granted without auction and in Bhumidhari right on payment of premium for constructing shops thereon for -carryin!l on business.\n\nOn March 3, 1966 the State Government made an order accordingly.\n\nNow s. 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1954 provides:\n\n\"149. (I) Subject to rules made under this Code, land belonging to the State Government, not beingland hereinafter mentioned in sub-section (2), shall be disposed of in Bhumidhari or Bhumiswami rights by the Deputy Commissioner who may require payment of a premium for such right or sell the same by auction.\n\n(2) The land referred to in sub-section (11 shall be the following, namely :-\n\n(a) land situate in the bed of a river of a tank ;\n\n(b) land reserved for communal purposes such as common grazing ground and cremation grounds;\n\n(c) 'land given out on favourable terms for the promotion of religious, charitable, educational, public or social purposes;\n\n(d) land given out to persons on the condition that it shall be used only for grazing cattle;\n\n(e) land given out for temporary purposes or for limited periods or for mining and purposes subsidiary thereto or for industrial or commercial purposes;\n\n(f) land given out to persons on favourable terms for rendering service as a kotwar;\n\n(g) any other may, by specify.\"\n\nland which the State notification issued in Government this behalf,\n\nSection 164 of the Code may also be set forth :\n\n• -4j\n\nI I ..\n\nI ,-. . .......\n\n\"164. (1)\n\nPARASRAM v. RAM CHAND (Pathak, J.) 29j\n\nEvery person who holds land from the State Government or to whom a right to occupy land is granted by the State Government or the Deputy Commissioner and who is not entitled to hold land as a tenureholder shall be called a Government lessee in respeet of such land .\n\n(2) The Government lessee shall, subject to any express provision in this Code, hold his land in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant which shall be deemed to be a grant within the meaning of the Government Grants Act, 1895 .\n\n(3) The State Government or the Deputy Commissioner may, subject to rules made under this Code, dispose of the right to occupy the land specified in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 149 on payment of a premium or by D auction or on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.\"\n\nIt is apparent that the grant cannot be attributed to clause (c) of sub-s. (2) of s. 149. The land was disposed of in Bhumidhari right.\n\nE Moreover, it was not given on favourable terms to the appellants; the market value of the plots was taken for fixing the premium. From the nature of the grant, it is clear that action under sub-s. (I) of s. 149 was intended. Now Part III of the Notification No. 1118-1832·55-XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 sets forth the rules framed with reference to sub-section (I) of s. 149. These rules pro- F vide for the grant of Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari rights in nazul land for dwelling houses and ancillary purposes. Rule 24 defines the expression \"Nazul Land\" to mean land belonging to the State\n\nGovernment which is used for building on, or for roads, markets and other public purposes. Rule 26 applies the provisions of rules 18 to 36 contained in Part V of the Notification No. I I J 9. J 832-55- G XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 to the disposal of nazul land under Part Ill. The provise to rule 26 declares that where nazul land is put to auction it should normally be i; ranted in Bhumiswami right, and where it is disposed of without auction it should normally be granted in Bhumidhari right.\n\nRule 22 of Part V defines the power\n\n. H of the State Government and of the Collector to dispose of nazul plots with or without auction. Rule 22 provides :-\n\n294 SUPREME coi.JkT REPoRTS\n\n( J 982) 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"22. Power to dispose of nazul plots with or without auction shall be exercised in accordance with these Rlues-\n\n(I) by the State Government in the case of-\n\n(i) plots of which the freehold market value is not Jess than Rs. 5,000;\n\n(ii) plots within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Nagpur, whether or not included in the Schemes of Nagur Improvement Trust;\n\n(iii) plots reserved for specific purposes under rule 20;\n\n(iv) strips of land not being 1ndependent plots to be settled with the occupants of adjoining land where the freehold value of the strip is not less ihan Rs. 5,000;\n\n(v) small strips of land adjacent to occupied plot, which cannot be disposed of as a separate site and in respect of which there is a difference of opinion betvyeen the Collector and the Officer-incharge, Town Planning and Valuation;\n\n(vi) independent plots not included in the approved lists where there is a difference of opinion between the Collector and the Officer-in-charge, Town Planning an<;} Valuation;\n\n(vii) plots granted without auction.\n\n(2) by the Collector, in case of the other plots.\"\n\nSub-rule (I) of rule 26 in Part V declares:-\n\n\"26. (I) . Leasehold rights in nazul land shall be disposed of by public auction except when in any particular case the\n\nState Government or as the case may be, the Collect\\lr thinks for reasons to be recorded in writing that there is good reast>n for granting the land without auction.\"\n\nPA!l.ASRAM i•. 11.AM t!IANI> (Pathak, J) 29~\n\nlt seems indisputable that under the Rules as a general principle leasehold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction. If in any particular case the State Govern ment or, as the case may be, the Collector considers that there is good reason for granting the land without auction the reasons must. be recorded in writing. The existence of good reason for departing from the general principle, and the recording of the reason in writing are essential prerequisites which must be satisfied before leasehold rights are granted without auction.\n\nIt is pointed out that under clause (vii) of sub-rule (I) of rule 22 the State Government is empowered to dispose of nazul plots without auction. We have no doubt it can do so, but only after full compliance with sub-rule (l) of rule 26. The sub-rule (I) controls the power of the State Government conferred by clause (vii) of subrule (I) of rule 22. To hold otherwise would be to confer an arbitrary power on the State Government to dispose of nazul plots.\n\nIt would be in the absolute discretion of the State Government to\n\ndecide whether nazul plots should be granted with auction or with D out auction. If that construction is accepted, it is clear that sub-rule (I) of rule 26 would be negatived. The only reasonble construction, it seems to us, is to read the two provisions together.\n\nIn the present case there is no evidence that the State Government has recorded any reasons in writing for preferring the mode of disposing of the land without auction and we are not satisfied that it had good reason for favouring that mode.\n\nIn the circumstances the grant of land to the appellants has been rightly quashed by the High Court.\n\nThere is also sufficient justification in the _grievance of the respondents that the State Government did not .!onsider the claims of other persons, .including the respondents, when making an allot ment of the plots. The State Government had decided earlier, as a matter of policy, not to allot nazul land to displaced persons, and pursuant to that decision all the applications for allotment were rejected. The applications were not rejected on the merits of the respective claims set out therein. Subsequently when the State Government made an allotment of the plots to the appellants, it was\n\nconsequent to a decision which analytically must be regded as a composite of two decisions, one, a policy deision to throw open\n\nSUPREME COUR1 REPORTS (J982j 3 S, C, R.\n\nthe land to allotment in reversal of the earlier policy and, two, to allot the land to the appellants. It will be remembered that the applications of the respondents for allotment of plots were rejected on the.ground that the land was not available for allotment. That was a policy decision. When it was reversed, it was incumbent on the State Government to reconsider those applications or to notify that the land was available for allotment and to invite fresh applications in that behalf. It was not open to the State Govenment to allot the plots to the appellants in disregard of the claims of others who had also applied for allotment.\n\nIn quashing the order granting plots to the appellants and directing the State Government or its appropriate officers to consider .t,· the several claims for allotment the High Court, in our opinion, did that which was plainly right.\n\nThe appellants say that the respondents must be taken to have accepted the rejection of their applications for allotment, and it was only the appellants who pursued the matter and obtained a reversal of the order of the Government and therefore the appellants alone were entitled to the allotment of plots. The submission would have had force but for the circumstance that the State Government effected what was a change of general policy.\n\nThe change of policy altered the situation completely, and all the claimants were entitled to the benefit of that change. By adopting the new policy, the State Government must be taken to have declared that the land was now open to allotment to the claimants who were found most deserving.\n\nThere were several applicants for allotment, and a selection had to be made.\n\nIt cannot be contended, as indeed it is urged before us, that the appellants constitute a distinct and separate lass from the respondents only because the appellants agitated against the rejection of their applications . While the respondents did not. ·\n\nThe controversy which remains is whether it is the State Government or the Collector who has power to dispose of the plots in view of their market value.\n\nThat is a matter on which we need express o opinion, having regard to the quashing of the entire allotment proceeding from its inception .. It will for the Govern\n\n• ••\n\nPARASHRAM v. RAM CHAND (Pathak, J.) 297\n\nment or the appropriate authority to decide what should be the A nature of the rights to be conferred on the allottees and, therefore, what should be the premium to he fixed.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "PARASHRAM THAKUR DASS & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARASHRAM THAKUR DASS & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM CHAND S/O SHRI RADHUMAL & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM CHAND S/O SHRI RADHUMAL & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 17, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PARASHRAM THAKUR DASS & OTHERS\n\nRAM CHAND S/O SHRI RADHUMAL & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 17, 1982\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 149(2) and 164(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2340, "end_char": 2351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2400, "end_char": 2438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3112, "end_char": 3124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954"}}, {"text": "Bhumidhari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3155, "end_char": 3165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land was disposed of in Bhumidhari right."}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954"}}, {"text": "A Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5655, "end_char": 5667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Naunit Lal, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.G .. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.G .. Ratnaparkhi for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Shroff, for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court quashing the grant of Nazul land to the appellants on a writ petition filed by the respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "PATHAK"}}, {"text": "Nagpur Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court quashing the grant of Nazul land to the appellants on a writ petition filed by the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Yeotmal Town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6204, "end_char": 6216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "49-D) in Yeotmal Town for the purpose of constructing shops thereon."}}, {"text": "Y eotmal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6350, "end_char": 6358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They alleged that they had not been allotted any land yet for carrying on business at Y eotmal, and inasmuch as land sites were being released to refugeea or displaced persons they claimed that having been compelled to migrate from West Pakistan to India during the partition of 1947 they were entitled to the grant of such plots."}}, {"text": "West Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They alleged that they had not been allotted any land yet for carrying on business at Y eotmal, and inasmuch as land sites were being released to refugeea or displaced persons they claimed that having been compelled to migrate from West Pakistan to India during the partition of 1947 they were entitled to the grant of such plots."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6513, "end_char": 6518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They alleged that they had not been allotted any land yet for carrying on business at Y eotmal, and inasmuch as land sites were being released to refugeea or displaced persons they claimed that having been compelled to migrate from West Pakistan to India during the partition of 1947 they were entitled to the grant of such plots."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants made a similar application on May 16, 1964 and it is their case that they had also applied earlier in the same behalf on February 27, !"}}, {"text": "February 27, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants made a similar application on May 16, 1964 and it is their case that they had also applied earlier in the same behalf on February 27, !"}}, {"text": "Nagpur Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, acting on the report of the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, rejected all the aplications."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants say that they sought a review of the order of the Government, and on June 28, 1965 the Government reversed its order and decided to grant plots on permanent lease to the appellants."}}, {"text": "Yeotmal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7124, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector, Yeotmal submitted a report to the Government pointing out that each plot would be 192 sq."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7509, "end_char": 7522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was conveyed in a Memorandum dated March 3, 1966."}}, {"text": "ARASRAM V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7913, "end_char": 7922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They urged that no reason-\n\n• I /-\n.:.-\n~-\n\nl>ARASRAM V, RAM CHAND (Pathak, J.) 291\n\n able opportunity had been given to them to press their claims for grant of plots after the Government had reversed its earlier decision not to grant land, that the appellants had been unduly favoured and that the order was bad in law because the plots had been granted without holding an auction."}}, {"text": "RAM CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7924, "end_char": 7933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They urged that no reason-\n\n• I /-\n.:.-\n~-\n\nl>ARASRAM V, RAM CHAND (Pathak, J.) 291\n\n able opportunity had been given to them to press their claims for grant of plots after the Government had reversed its earlier decision not to grant land, that the appellants had been unduly favoured and that the order was bad in law because the plots had been granted without holding an auction."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, however, maintained that they had acquired a right to the land in terms of the order dated March 3, 1966 and that they could not be divested of those rights,\n\nBy its judgment dated March 14, 1968 the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order granting plots to the appellants and directed the State Government and its officers to take appropriate action on the several claims for allotment of land."}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vidharba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9103, "end_char": 9111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) s. 149 read with sub-s. (3) of s. 164 of the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954, as applied to the Vidharba region of Maharashtra, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code, it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so, and that after initially deciding not to grant the plots the subsequent decision to allot them to the appellants was contrary to law inasmuch as the claims of others had not been considered."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9122, "end_char": 9133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) s. 149 read with sub-s. (3) of s. 164 of the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954, as applied to the Vidharba region of Maharashtra, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code, it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so, and that after initially deciding not to grant the plots the subsequent decision to allot them to the appellants was contrary to law inasmuch as the claims of others had not been considered."}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9625, "end_char": 9631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954"}}, {"text": "November 23, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10043, "end_char": 10060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector submitted a report dated November 23, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10659, "end_char": 10665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10673, "end_char": 10710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government Grants Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12632, "end_char": 12643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government Grants Act, 1895", "statute": "the Government Grants Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government Grants Act, 1895", "statute": "the Government Grants Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13083, "end_char": 13089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government Grants Act, 1895", "statute": "the Government Grants Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "May 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13167, "end_char": 13179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1118-1832·55-XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 sets forth the rules framed with reference to sub-section (I) of s. 149."}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13245, "end_char": 13251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government Grants Act, 1895", "statute": "the Government Grants Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "Bhumiswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13294, "end_char": 13304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rules pro- F vide for the grant of Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari rights in nazul land for dwelling houses and ancillary purposes."}}, {"text": "Bhumidhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13945, "end_char": 13955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J 832-55- G XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 to the disposal of nazul land under Part Ill. The provise to rule 26 declares that where nazul land is put to auction it should normally be i; ranted in Bhumiswami right, and where it is disposed of without auction it should normally be granted in Bhumidhari right."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15644, "end_char": 15650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASRAM i•. 11.AM t!IANI> (Pathak, J) 29~\n\nlt seems indisputable that under the Rules as a general principle leasehold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction.", "canonical_name": "PATHAK"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20659, "end_char": 20665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_298_306_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "RANDHIR SINGH\n\nUNION OF \\_NOIA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 22, 1982\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Articles 14, 19 and 3~( d) \"Equal pay for equal work\" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.\n\nThe petitioner is a driver constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administn1tion. The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for nonmatriculate drivers Rs. 210-270 and for m.atricuh.te drivers 225-308. The scare of pay of a driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400. The scaie of pay of drivers in the r..onsecretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326~EB-8-351), while that of Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8-390-10\n\n400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Ri. 260-300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigadge and the Department\n\nof Light House is Rs. 330-480. The petitioner and other driver constabl1es made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their pay sca1es should be the same as the drivers or heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with success, the present application has been filed by the petitioner for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the petition, the Court\n\nHELD: 1:1. The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi Police Force. After his discharge from the army question of his employment as a drive:.- in Delhi Police Force was considered, he was asked to appear for a test of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy Tran.sport Driving Licence, selected thereafter as a driver in Delhi Police Force under the category \"Employment of Ex-serviceman in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Contable).\" He was desigoate..:i as Constable, because for the purposes of th~ discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Ddhi Police Force he had 10 be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and bad to be asigned a rank in the Force.\n\nThe investiture of the petitioner with the \"powers, fun,; tion-; and privileges of a police Officer\" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force. '\n\n[302 H, 303 A-CJ\n\n1:2. The petitioner and other drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functio1':s and duties as other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration and th~ Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture\n\nwith the \"power, f11nctions and privilegeS of a police Officer'', their duties and\n\nsponsibilities re more ardqous. 'J'.he clarifi, catioQ. that the driver$ of the\n\nRANDffiR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 299\n\nDelhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the equal pay for equal work is not a prinCipTe which the courts may recognise and act upon is irrational. [306 A, B, C, DJ\n\n2:1. No doubt, equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily rOr the Executive Government and expert bodies and not for the courts, but where all thing~ are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the san1e, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank alld the nomenclature is the same. [303 G-H, 304 A]\n\n3:1. The principle \"equal pay for equal work\" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. There can be and there ar'e different grades in a service., with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue fqr officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the fficers into two grades with di'ffer.ent scales of pay. The principle Or equal paf for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attract ing Article 14 if sou11ht to be applied to them. [304 C-E]\n\n3:2. It is true that the principle of \"equal pay for equal work\" is not ex pressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims \"equill pay for equal work for both men aud women\" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. \"Equal pay for equal work for both men and womn\" means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes. Directive Principles have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Consti tution enjoins the State not to deny anyfperson equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equa1ity of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconCerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equ1t work means equal pay.\n\nQuestions concerning wages and the Hke, mundane they may be. are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the coD; stitutioo declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at ]east mean 'equal pa f equal work'. L304 E-H, 305 A-DJ , Y or\n\n3:3. From a construction of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Pre • ble and Article 39(d), it is clear that the principle ·\"equal pay for equal work~~ deducible from !hose Articles and may be rrperly applied to cases of uncqu:~\n\nscales of pay based on no classification or irration'al clasification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.\n\n[305 G-H, 306 A]\n\nKishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshlv. Union of India, A.J.R.' 1962 S.C.1139, distinguished.\n\nORIGINAL JuRJ.IDICTION : Writ Petition No. 4676 of 1978,\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nM.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.\n\nN.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Resp on dent.\n\n.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. 'Equal pay for equal work' is not a mere demagogic slogan. It is a constitutional gqal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies by.the enforcement of constitutional rights. So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts.\n\nArticle 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle, the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women'.\n\nArticles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the funda• mental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment and Art. 32 provides the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. So the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 and bas asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given others like him.\n\nTrue, he is the merest microbe in the mighty organism of the State, a little clog in a giant wheel.\n\nBut, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to directly apRfoach the highest Court in the land for redress. It is a matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so.\n\nHitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory' distribution of the buttered leaves amongst themselves.\n\nNow, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence, and the forward-looking posture of this Court, the underprivileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the Court. The judges of _the Court have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller\n\nthan to the guest of the five star hotel.\n\nUNDHIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n:JOI\n\nThe petitioner m a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and be demands that bis scale of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration.\n\nThe scale of pay of a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210-270 in the case of non-matriculates and Rs. 225-308 in the case of matriculates.\n\nThe scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400.\n\nThe scale of pay of drivers in the non-Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326.E-B-8-350. The scale of pay of drivers in the Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-\n\n6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8·390- I0-400.\n\nThe scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260-350. The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the 'f'.ire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330-480. The case of the petitioner is that be discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous duties than the others.\n\nHe complains that there is no reason whatsoever. to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver- Constables merely because be and bis ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force.\n\nIt appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head \"the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads .\n\nAfter considering the qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers. like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisations with large fieet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non-availability of\n\nadequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations.\n\nThe Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of the scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers' on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police\n\npersonnel, the Pay Commission failed to considr the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in tile case of drivers in other departments and which should have, tilerefore, prevailed. ill ti!~ ~Ilse of driver-consabl.es 11Isq,\n\nThe drivers-constables were not only required to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as ddverconstables in the police force. Their duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and' responsibilities of drivers in other departments. Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was, constant exposure to security risks.\n\nThe petitioner and other driver-con stables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments.\n\nAs their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issue of a Writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nAmong the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi.Police Force. The hollowness of this submission is exposed by a reference to the facts relating to the individual petitioner. The petitioner who was an ex-gunner (driver) in the artiliary corps of the Indian Army and who was experienced in the driving,_ operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks and heavy armoured vehicles was allowed to retire from the Army on compassionate grounds. He held an Army driving licence as also a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Lice.nee. After he was discharged from the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi. The question of his employment as a driver in the Delhi Police Force was considered and he was informed that a test of proficiency in driving would be held. He was required to produce his Civil Heavy transport driving licence at the time of the test. It is of interest to note that the subject of the communication sent by the Delhi Police establishment to the petitioner was \"Employment of ex-servicemen in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Const)\". He appeared at the test.\n\nBy a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that his name had been \"approved for enlistment as driver in the Delhi Police\". Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form was issued to him vesting him with the. powers, functions and privileges of a police , Officer.\n\nIt is clear and it cannot be seriously disputed that th(petitioner wa~ appointQd 11s a driver in . the Delhi\n\nRANDHIR SINGH v. UNiON OF iNDIA (Chinnappa Reddy, I.) 303\n\nPolice Force.\n\nHe was designated as constable, because, for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in . the Delhi Police Force, be bad to be made a member of the Delhi\n\nPolice Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force. The investiture of the petitioner with the \"powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer\" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.\n\nThe main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter-affidavit, as follows :\n\n\"It is subfoitted that there can be no comparison between the different departments of the Government of India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale. A pay scale has been fixed upon consideration of various factors. The pay scales of the drivers of the Delhi Police bas been fixed after duly considering all the circumstances. The drivers in the other departments are not similarly situated as the petitioner and there is no question of any hostile discrimi nation. It is, however, denied that the driveres have been treated as a separate class. It is also denied that the designation of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable)'\n\nThe counter-affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the view of the respon; derits, the circumstance that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify different scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties and responsibilities. We cannot accept this view. If this view is to be stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers duties and responsibilities are identical. We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we-must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform_ dissimilar functions and the powers,\n\n304 SUPREME COURT REPORts [1982)3 s.C.lt.\n\nduties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of .'dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.\n\nOur attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union of India('), Makhan Singh v. Union of India & Ors(')., where reference was made to the .observations of this Court in Kishori Mohan/al Bakshi v. Union of India(') describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14.\n\nWe shall presently point out how the principle, ''i:qual pay for equal work\", is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.\n\nKishori Mohan/al Bakshi v. Union of India is not itself of any real a'Sistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length ,, f service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers in lo two grades with different scales of pay.\n\nThe principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to them.\n\nIt is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims ''equal pay for equal work for both men and women\" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes.\n\nDirective principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental r.igbts as a matter of interprelation.\n\nArt. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under\n\n(I) l.L.R. [1973] 1 Delhi 427. (Z) I.L.R. [1975] 1 Delhi 227.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 1139.\n\n' 1\n\nRANDHlR slNOH v. UNION OF INblA (Chinnappa 1?.eddy, /.) 30S\n\nthe State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.\n\nWhether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other ques tions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that\" the equality clauses of the Constitution have any signi ficancc to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'To each according to his need', it must atleast mean 'equal pay for equal work'. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of ihe Hungarian Labour.\n\nCode, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code.\n\nIndeed this principle bas been incorporated in several western labour codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic; and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given U11iversal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265). The preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation re cognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions \"involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled\". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art.39(d) we ate of the view that the principle 'Equal pay for Equal work' is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based .\n\nsiJi>REMil CoiJltt ltEPOltTS\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.\n\nThere cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture with . the 'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver 0constabies of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in. other departments, ,_....... it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ?\n\nThere is none.\n\nThe only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments ahd that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon.\n\nWe have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers-constables of the Delhi Police Force atleast on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "SINGH\n\nUNION OF \\_NOIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 22, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 22, 1982\n\n(0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scaie of pay of drivers in the r..onsecretariat offices in Delhi is Rs."}}, {"text": "Third Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner and other driver constabl1es made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their pay sca1es should be the same as the drivers or heavy vehicles in other departments."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1346, "end_char": 1356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ddhi Police Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1998, "end_char": 2015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was desigoate..:i as Constable, because for the purposes of th~ discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Ddhi Police Force he had 10 be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and bad to be asigned a rank in the Force."}}, {"text": "Delhi Police Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2050, "end_char": 2068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was desigoate..:i as Constable, because for the purposes of th~ discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Ddhi Police Force he had 10 be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and bad to be asigned a rank in the Force."}}, {"text": "Delhi Police Force", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2732, "end_char": 2750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J'.he clarifi, catioQ. that the driver$ of the\n\nRANDffiR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 299\n\nDelhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the equal pay for equal work is not a prinCipTe which the courts may recognise and act upon is irrational. ["}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4184, "end_char": 4194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4776, "end_char": 4786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble to the coD; stitutioo declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5970, "end_char": 5988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshlv", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[305 G-H, 306 A]\n\nKishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshlv."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6508, "end_char": 6518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M.S. Ganesh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4676 of 1978,\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nM.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "N.C. Talukdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Resp on dent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Resp on dent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Resp on dent."}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7274, "end_char": 7281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8644, "end_char": 8659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNDHIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n:JOI\n\nThe petitioner m a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and be demands that bis scale of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12259, "end_char": 12266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi.Police Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Defence", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13086, "end_char": 13105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he was discharged from the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi Armed Police, Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he was discharged from the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13479, "end_char": 13491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is of interest to note that the subject of the communication sent by the Delhi Police establishment to the petitioner was \"Employment of ex-servicemen in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Const)\"."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13649, "end_char": 13663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that his name had been \"approved for enlistment as driver in the Delhi Police\"."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14739, "end_char": 14758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter-affidavit, as follows :\n\n\"It is subfoitted that there can be no comparison between the different departments of the Government of India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17141, "end_char": 17148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18028, "end_char": 18035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 39(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18246, "end_char": 18256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18663, "end_char": 18670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18796, "end_char": 18803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 1139", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19011, "end_char": 19032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) A.l."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19105, "end_char": 19110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' 1\n\nRANDHlR slNOH v. UNION OF INblA (Chinnappa 1?.eddy, /.) 30S\n\nthe State."}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20593, "end_char": 20604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20631, "end_char": 20641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20665, "end_char": 20675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20733, "end_char": 20743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20868, "end_char": 20878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Book I of the French Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20894, "end_char": 20919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21075, "end_char": 21084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Book I of the French Code", "statute": "Book I of the French Code"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21140, "end_char": 21148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Book I of the French Code", "statute": "Book I of the French Code"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21150, "end_char": 21161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Book I of the French Code", "statute": "Book I of the French Code"}}, {"text": "Istvan Szaszy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21273, "end_char": 21286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic; and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given U11iversal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265)."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21695, "end_char": 21713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Book I of the French Code", "statute": "Book I of the French Code"}}, {"text": "Art.39(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21747, "end_char": 21756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Book I of the French Code", "statute": "Book I of the French Code"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22268, "end_char": 22288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22297, "end_char": 22315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23483, "end_char": 23500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_307_317_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DAMOH\n\nVRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS.\n\nFebruary 23, 1982\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]\n\nCentral Provinces & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922-Ru/es made under the Act-Rute27(b) of the Octroi Ru/1s-Octroi duty paid on raw material imported into the municipality for manufacture of bidis;_Manufactured bidis exported out~ side ihe municipal limits-Refund, 11 allowable uncf.er rule 27(b).\n\nWords & phrases: \"manufacture\" and \"manufacturing process''-Meaning of.\n\nThe res\"pondents manufacture and selJ bidis in the state. At the time of import of tobacco and other raw materials into the municipal Jimits for the manufacture of bidis they paid oc:troi duty payable under the rules. Their claim for refund of octroi duty on the raw materials utilised for the bidis which they manufactured and exported outside the municipa1 limits was rejected by the muni cipal counCil.\n\nRejecting the appellant-council's contention that the benefit of rule 27(b) of the Rules was not available to the respondents fo! the reason that the exported goods (bidis) were not the same or identical as the imported raw materi8l'J the Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the respondent's appeal.\n\nIo revision the High Court upheld the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended tlrat refund is available under rule 27(b) only where even after undergoing the manufacturing process the impor ted article retained its essential character as sch ar!icle and the same was exported outside the municipal limits. (2) The respondents we~ not entitled to refund as they failed to satisfy the committee that the san1e or identical goods had been exported.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I (a) Rule 27(b) of the Octroi Rules in terms provides for refund of octroi paid on imported. raw materials when such raw material is actualJy used within the municipal limits for manufacturing the exported articles. Clause\n\n(b) of this rule itself speaks of the raw materials being \"used in the manufacture\"\n\nSUPREME CC)URt REPOR'rS [19821 s.c.a.\n\nso that use. or consumption which a manufacturing process entails was present to the mind of the framers of the rule when they provided for the refund on the export of finished goods manufactured within municipal limits. [313 F-H)\n\n(b) The well settled connotation of ''manufacture\" and \"manufacturing process\" is that as a result of undergoing the process, a distinct commercial commodity .different from the raw materials, comes into existence. Therefore B the expression 'manufacture' occurrine in rule 27(b) cannot be given a limited\n\nmeaning as suggested by the appellant. [313 H, 314 A-BJ\n\n2. The proviso to the rule is not attracted to a case of manufactured goods f.alling under clause (b). The proviso is applicable to cases where there is an export of the importc~ goods themselves without subjecting them to any manu factoring process. It is in such cases that in order to claim refund the exporter has to satisfy the committee that the Same goods on which import duty had been paid were bein_g exported. The proviso is not a proviso to clause (b) at all but will be applicable to the other parts Of the rule. [314 C, D, El\n\n3. It is not just to permit the appellant to raise the plea of limitation in the case becallse at one stage it acquiesced in the trial court's finding and did not raise the question in appeal before the High Court. While asking for a certifi- D cate for appeal the appellant did not raise the question of limitation before the High Co)lrt nor did it include the point of Jimitatioo in the memo of appeal filed in this Court. The point raised needs investigation into facts. [316 .F-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATB JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. !048 of 1970 & 845 of 1971.\n\nAppeals by certificate from the judgment and decree dated the 11th March & 15th November 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur) in Misc Petition No. 96 of 1959 and in First Appeal No. 44 of 1966 respectively.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. !047, 1048 & 1049 of 197!.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the 17th April, 197 l of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at iabalpur in Second Appeal Nos. 415, 416 & 417 of 1966 respectively.\n\nD.V. Patel, S.S. Kh, induja and C.L. Sahu for the Appellants in all the Appeals.\n\nDr.Y. S. Chitale)nd Rameshwar Nath for Respondent No. J in Civil Appeals Nos. 1048/70 & 845 of 1971.\n\nMtJNtCIPAt COtJNClt v. vllAl LAL (Tulzapurkar, 1.) 309\n\nRameshwar Nath for Respondent No. I in Civil Appeals Nos. 1047-1049 of I 971.\n\nGopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff for Respondents Nos. 2 & 3 in all the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. The aforesaid five appeals, the first two on a certificate granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the last three by special leave granted by this Court, raise a common question in regard to refund of octori duty collected by the appellant-Council from the respondent firms and are, therefore,' disposed of by common judgment. The principal question raised in these appeals relates to the proper construction of Rule 27 of the Octroi Rules of Damoh Municipal Council (the appellant) framed in exercise. of powers conferred by ss. 7 I, 76 and 85 of the Central Provinces & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922-which Rules were continued in operation even after the coming into force of the new Act, the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and the question arises in these circumstances :\n\nThe two respondent firms in the two sets of appeals (M/s. Vraj Lal Manila! & Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits. The respondents' case was that at the time of import of tobacco and other raw material into the municipal limits of Damoh they paid octroi duty as per Octroi Rules of the appellant Council and after utilising the said raw material for preparing bidis when they exported the manufactured bidis outside the limits of the appellant Council, they were entitled to a refund of the octroi duty paid by them on the raw material so utilized under Rule 27 of the\n\n' Octroi Rules but inspite of refund vouchers having been issued by the concerned official of the appellant council and inspite of having complied with the Rules and procedure prescribed in that behalf, the appellant Council refused to pay the amounts of the refund\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R •\n\nvouchers to them.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 1048 of 1970 sincethe claim for refund to the sum of Rs. 33,409.52 based on 1866 refund vouchers relating to the period from 4.12.1952 to 12.12.1959 arose under the old Act, namely, Central Provinces and Berar Mu, icipalities Act 1922, the respondent firm M/s Vraj Lal Mani Lal & Co. filed an appeal before the Sob Divisional Officer Damoh under s. 83 (1-A) of the Act against the refusal of the appellant-Council to make the refund. Apart from raising technical pleas such as .non-maintainability of the appeal, bar of limitation etc. the appellant Council resisted the claim on merits on the two grounds : (a) that since the raw material had been used or consumed in the manufacture of bidis and since the exported goods (finished products) were not the same or identical as the imported raw material on which the octroi duty had been paid no refund under Rule 27 (bl was available to the respondent firm and (b) . that the respondent firm had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Municipal Council as required by the proviso to Rule 27 (b) that the same or identical goods were being exported on which import octroi had been paid by them. The Sub Divisional Officer by bis order dated 30th June, 1961 negatived the technical pleas of the appellant council, which order was finally confirmed by the High Court on 25th February, 1963.\n\nThe Sub Divisional Officer al.so over-ruled the defences raised by the appellant Council on merits and by his final order dated 4th April, 1964 directed that the amount of 1865 refund vouchers aggregating to\n\nR~. 33409.52 minus the amount recovered under 19 vouchers should be refunded to the respondent firm.\n\nThe appellant Council wi; nt in revision to the State Government but the same was .dismissed on 28th September, 1968. The Sub Divisional Officer's decision as well as the State Government's order in revision were challenged by the appellant Council before the High Court by a Writ Petition (Miscellaneous Petition No. 96 of 1969) but the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court summarily and in doing so the High Court followed its earlier judgment in the case of Municipal Committee, Burhanp11r v. Allauddin Ao/ia Saheb and Co.(') where in regard to a similar refund rule obtaining in Burhanpur Municipal Committee the Court bad taken the view that \"Octori duty paid on imported tendu leaves and tobacco is refundable under the provisions of Rule 25 (b) of the Rules framed under s. 85 of the Act when bidis manufactured within the limits of the Municipal\n\n(1) 1957 MPL1 278.\n\n....,.--..\n\nMUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. VRAJ LAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) . 311\n\nCommittee are exported.\" In the remaining four matters, being Civil Appeals 845, 1047, 1048 and 1049 of 1971 the claims for refund made by the respondents in similar drcumstances were required to be prosecuted by filing civil suits against the appellant Council, inasmuch as when action was contemplated by the respon dents, the new Act, namely, Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act 1961 had come into force and no remedy by way of any appeal to Sub Divisional Officer was available. In each of these suits the appellant Council resisted the claims for refund on merits on the same grounds mentioned above The respondents failed in their suits in the two lower courts but succeeded in second Appeals in the High Court.\n\nln these appeals the self-same two contentions were urged before us on behalf of the appellant-council. First, since Octroi duty is a levy on imported goods meant for use, consumption and sale thereof within the municipal limits and since the raw material (tobacco) was used or consumed in the manufacture of bidis the same or identical goods were not exported by the respondent firms and so no refund under Rule 27 (b) was available to the respondent firms.\n\nSecondly no attempt was made by the respondent firms to satisfy the Municipal Ccmmittee that the same or identical goods had been exported as required by the proviso to Rule 27 (b).\n\nFor both these reasons it was urged that the respondent firms' claim to •efund of octr.oi should have been rejected. Counsel urged that these points did not arise and were not determined in Allaudin Saheb' s case (supra),\n\nThe admitted facts in these appeals are that the respondent firms, who carry on the business of manufacturing and selling bidis imported or brought into the municipal limits of Damoh during the relevant period tobacco and other raw material, that they paid the requisite octroi duty on such raw material on its import at the prescribed rates, that they utilised the said raw material for manufacturing bidis and they exported the finished product\n\n(bidis) outside the municipal limits of Damoh. and it was at that stage of export of bidis that they claimed under Rule 27 (b) a\n\nrefund of octori duty paid by them on tbe raw material from the appellant Council. The question raised is whether under the said provision they are entitled to the refund of octroi as claimed by\n\nthem. Rule 27 whib deals with rfu!J~ of otroi runs thus ;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.a.\n\n\"27. Refund of octroi. On the exportation of dutiable goods outide municipal limits the exporter shall be entitled to a refund of duty paid on them at the time of their import, provided that,\n\n(a) no refund shall be given, if the amount to be refunded be less than Re. l or if the claim be made after the expiry of two months from the date of export, unless the exporter is able to explain satisfactorily the reason for the delay.\n\n(b) the refund on the exported goods which have been manufactured within the municipal committee from imported raw materials liable to octroi, shall not exceed the octroi on the raw materials used in the manufacture, and\n\nProvided that the exporter shall not be entitled to a refund of octroi duty unless he proves to the satisfaction of the committee that the goods brought for export belong to him and .are the same on which duty was paid by the importer in whose favour the octroi receipt is produced in\n\nE support of the claim for refund of duty.\"\n\nIn support of their claim for refund the respondents obviously rely upon cl. (b) of Rule 27 under which refund is available on exported goods provided those have been manufactured within the municipal limits from out of the imported raw materials on which octroi has been paid and the clause indicates that quantum .of. refund shall not exceed the octroi duty actually paid on such raw materials at the time of their import. Counsel for the appellant, however, conterided that in its very nature octroi is a duty levied on import of goods which are meant for use, consumption or sale within the municipal limits and counsel urged that it cannot be disputed that when .raw material like tobacco is utilized in the manufacture of bidis such raw material is used or consumed in the process of manufacture and it is such finished product (bidis), a disputed commercial commodity that is being exported by the respondent-firms and, therefore, no refund under cl. (b) or Rule 27 would be available to them.\n\nCounsel urged that the word 'manufacture' occurring in the 9lause must be given a limited meaning, that is to say, only such\n\nMUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. YRAI LAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 313\n\nmanufacturing process is contemplated by that clause which does not alter. or change the identity of the imported commodity and only in respect of the 'eipott of such manufactured goods the refund Would be available and not where the imported commodity gets converted into an altogether different commercial article. Counsel also invited our attention to the proviso following cl. (b) which states that the exporter shall not be entitle~ to refund of octroi duty unless he proves to the satisfaction of the committee that .the goods brought for export are the same on which duty had been paid by the importer and according IQ Counsel the 'bidis' cannot be said to be the same goods on which the respondent-firms could be said to have paid the duty. In other words refund is available under cl.\n\n(b) in cases where even after undergoing the manufacturing process the imported article or commodity retains its essential character as such article or commodity and the same is exported outside the municipal limits. It is not possible to accept the aforesaid construction sought to be placed on cl. (b) of Rule 27 of the Octroi Rules by the appellant's counsel for reasons which we shall presently indicate. In the first place, though it is true that octroi by its nature is a lev) on import within the municipal limits of articles or goods meant for use, consumption or sale therein that does not prevent a Municipal Coullcil from framing a rule either granting exemption from that duty or refund of such duty after its collection in cases of certain type of use or consumption of the imported articles or goods for certain purposes. Secondly, a Municipal Council may do so for achieving certain objectives like increasing industrialisation by encouraging manufacturing activities within its limits. Clearly the avowed object of Rule 27 (b) appears to be of this nhture for in terms it provides for refund of octroi paid on imported raw materials when such raw-material is actually used within the municipal limits for manufacturing the exported article and it is in light of this objective that the said rule will have to be interpreted. Looked at from this angle it will be difficult to accept the narrow or limited construction of the word 'manufacture' appearing in cl. (b) as is suggested by Counsel for the appellant and the same could not have been intended by the framers of the rule.\n\nFurther clause (b) itself speaks of the rav; materials being \"used in the manufacture\" so that use or consumption which a manufacturing process entails was present to the mind of the framers of the Rule when they provided for the refund on the export of finished goods manufactured within the municipal limits. Moreover, tqe well-settled connot!ltion of the\n\nSUPRJ!ME COURT REPORTS (J982J 3 s.c.R.\n\nconcept of 'manufacture' and 'manufacturing process' is that as a result of undergoing the process a distinct commercial commodity different from !he raw materials comes into existence; it is difficult\n\nto visualise degrees of manufacture as suggested by counsel for the appellant and in any case none could be attributed to the framers of the Rule. It is, threfore, not possible to accept the contention that the expression \"manufacture\" occurring in cl. (b) of Rule 27 should be. given a limited meaning as is suggested.\n\nTurning to the proviso on which strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, it seems . to us that the proviso by its very terms is not attracted to a case of manufactured goods falling under cl. (b). If\n\ncl. (b) confers the benefit of refund of octroi duty on the export of goods manufactured out of raw material then it is difficult to appreciate how the exporter will be able to satisfy the Municipal Committee that the exported goods are the same or identical on which duty bas been paid, for admittedly the exported goods are the finished product and no import duty is paicl thereon by the exporter. The proviso in our view is applicable to cases where there is an export of the imported goods themselves without . subjecting them to any\n\nmanfacturing process and it is in such cases that the exporter bas to satisfy the Committee that the same goods on which import duty has been paid are being exported which would entitle the exporter to claim a refund; in other words it is not a proviso to cl.\n\n(b) at all but will be applicable to the other parts of the Rule. It is thus clear to us that when raw materials like tobacco etc. were imported by the respondent-firms within the limits of Damoh, on which they paid octroi-duty and when they manufactured bidis out of such raw.materials and exported the same they were entitled to get refund to the extent of quantum mentioned in cl. {b) of Rule 27.\n\nIn view of our aforesaid conclusion that the proviso is not applicable to cases of manufactured goods falling under cl. (b) of the rule the second contention urged by the Counsel for the nppel-\n\n1 lant that the respondent firms were not entitled\" to refund as they\n\nfailed to satisfy the Municipal Committee that the same or identical goods had been exported does not .survive.\n\nThat apart, the High Court has on a conspectus of the Octroi Rules came to the conclusion and in our view rightly, that . the Octroi, Superintendent is rs\n\nponsible for the proper ad!llinistratioQ of thy Otroi Depart!lleQt iQ\n\nMUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. VRAJ LAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 315\n\nall its branches which necessarily includes that it is he who should be satisfied as to the identity of the goods that are to be exported or that are utilized in the manufacture of goods which are to be exported.\n\nThe last contention sought to be urged on behalf of the appel !ant-council before us related to the bar of limitation to the responc dents' claim arising under section 319 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and counsel fairly stated that this arises only in Civil Appeal No. 845 of 1971. The facts in this behalf are these: Civil Suit No. 1-B of 1964, out of which the aforesaid appeal arises, was filed by the respondent-firm M/s Vraj Lal Manila! & Co. on 7.5.1964 claiming refund in respect of goods exported during the years 1959-1964; in other words, part of the claim from 1959 to 31st January, 1962 arose under 1922 Act while the claim pertaining to the period from 1.2.1962 to April 1964 arose under the 1961 Act, which came into force from 1.2.1962. The trial Court as well as the High Court took the view that non-payment of refund under the 1922 Act could be agitated only by way of an appeal under section 83 and other remedies were barred under s. 84 of the Act and, therefore, tliat part of the respondent's claim was dismissed as being not tenable but both the Courts held that non-payment of refund after 1.2.1962 could be agitated by a suit and the same was tenable On the question of limitation the trial Court held that that part of the claim was not barred but since it had negatived the respondent's claim for refund on merits it dismissed the respondent's suit entirely but the High court, which reversed the trial Court's view on merits allowed the respondent's claim in respect of refund vouchers which had• been certified and presented after 1.2.1962. Since, however, it was not possible for it to sort out the refund vouchers which had been certified the High Court by its judgment and decree dated 15.12.1969 remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining the amount payable to the respondent-firm.\n\nUpon remand the Ilia!\n\nCourt on the basis of statements made by the parties passed a decree in respondent's favour for Rs. 21,023.53 with interest thereon @ 4% and this decree was drawn up on 23.4.1970.\n\nSection 319 (2) of the 1961 Act runs thus;\n\n\"Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within 8 months from tqe <ll\\te of the awrual of thq alleged cause of action.\"\n\n- . - ' '\n\nSJ.IPREMB COURT REPORTS ' .\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\n-··~---•-C --·-- -\n\nRelying upon this provision counsel for the appellant urged that since the suit had been filed on 7.5.1964 _the respondent's claim for refund during 8 months prior to 7.5.1964 would be within limitation but the rest of the. claim from-1.2.1962 to 7.9.1963 would be ·-barred by limitation and to that extent the decree in favour of the n respondent-firm deserves to be modified\n\n,_D\n\n. We are not inclined. to entertain' this cont.intion soght to be urged by counsel for the appellant before\" us for.mi)re than one reason. It is true that . this bar ofJimitation under:.s. 319 (2) was pleaded by -the appellant council in. its written statement and an. issue thereon was also raised . t the trial but the trial , Court held that the claim arising\" under_ the 'new .Act. after 1.2.1962 was not barred by limitation. because cause . of action arose, on. 24.9.1963 when\"there_-was. refusal. io pay or accede to the notice of demand but when-th~ matter was carried in appeaf to the High. Court by !lie respondent firm against the dismissal of their claim 0 n merits and the . High Court reversed the trial Court's view on merits and held that the plaintiffs' claim for the period subsequent to 1.2.1962 was liable to be decreed, this point of limitation arising under s. 319 (2) was neither raised nor. pressed before , the High Court. No contention was\" raised that the refusal to pay on 24.9.1963 did not give rise to the cause_ of action but th.at it arose. on\" dates when goods were exported and refund vouchers ·.were presented or certified. Had it ·. been . pres; ed the High Court would have, while emanding the matter given appropriate directions to .the trial Court in that behalf. This shows that the appellant council acquiesced in the trial Court's finding on the question _of limitation, namely,. the cause of action : -arose on 24.9.1963. Secondly, while applying for a certificate from\n\n the High Court for appeal to this Court the appellant-Council sought _the certificate on points touching the merits of the claim and not on the question of limitation. Further . in the Memo of Appeal filed in . this Court the grounds do not include the point of limitation. Lastly the point raised cannot be said to . be a pure q11estion oflaw as it -will require investigation into . facts to ascertain tlie exact date or\n\n dates of accrual of the cause of action.\n\nWhen on the point of limi tation the appellant-Council had at one stage acquiesced in the trial Court's finding and did not raise the_ question in appeal before the High Court we do. not think it would be fair or just to permit the appellant-Council to raise . tl)e plea of limitation in thi_s Court,\n\nI ' ' ' ~. • .• - . . • • • . • • • .\n\n...\n\n. ..\\-\n\n-'f\n\n-'y\n\nMUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. VRAJ LAL (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 317\n\nespecially when the result of allowing such plea might be to defeat the just claim of the respondent-firm.\n\nIn the result the appeals are dismissed and each party will bear its own costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DAMOH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DAMOH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 23, 1982\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATB JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3687, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "316 .F-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATB JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. !"}}, {"text": "D.V. Patel", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.V. Patel, S.S. Kh, induja and C.L. Sahu for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "S.S. Kh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.V. Patel, S.S. Kh, induja and C.L. Sahu for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "induja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.V. Patel, S.S. Kh, induja and C.L. Sahu for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "C.L. Sahu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4257, "end_char": 4266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.V. Patel, S.S. Kh, induja and C.L. Sahu for the Appellants in all the Appeals."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale)nd", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4310, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.Y. S. Chitale)nd Rameshwar Nath for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.Y. S. Chitale)nd Rameshwar Nath for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gopal Subramanium", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S.A. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4670, "end_char": 4681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. The aforesaid five appeals, the first two on a certificate granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the last three by special leave granted by this Court, raise a common question in regard to refund of octori duty collected by the appellant-Council from the respondent firms and are, therefore,' disposed of by common judgment.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "Damoh Municipal Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal question raised in these appeals relates to the proper construction of Rule 27 of the Octroi Rules of Damoh Municipal Council (the appellant) framed in exercise."}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5263, "end_char": 5293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5387, "end_char": 5426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vraj Lal Manila! & Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 I, 76 and 85 of the Central Provinces & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922-which Rules were continued in operation even after the coming into force of the new Act, the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and the question arises in these circumstances :\n\nThe two respondent firms in the two sets of appeals (M/s. Vraj Lal Manila! &", "canonical_name": "VRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Prabhudas Kishoredas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5567, "end_char": 5587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits."}}, {"text": "Damoh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits."}}, {"text": "Madhya :", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits."}}, {"text": "Damoh city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits."}}, {"text": "Damoh Municipal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5907, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. and M/s. Prabhudas Kishoredas) carry on business of manufacturing and selling bidis in Damoh and other cities in Madhya :Pradesh and for that purpose they import tobacco and other raw material into the Municipal limits of Damoh city and after manufacturing bidis out of such imported raw mater.ial they export their finished product (bidis) outside Damoh Municipal limits."}}, {"text": "Damoh they paid octroi duty as per Octroi Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4.12.1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33,409.52 based on 1866 refund vouchers relating to the period from 4.12.1952 to 12.12.1959 arose under the old Act, namely, Central Provinces and Berar Mu, icipalities Act 1922, the respondent firm M/s Vraj Lal Mani Lal & Co. filed an appeal before the Sob Divisional Officer Damoh under s. 83 (1-A) of the Act against the refusal of the appellant-Council to make the refund."}}, {"text": "12.12.1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6873, "end_char": 6883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33,409.52 based on 1866 refund vouchers relating to the period from 4.12.1952 to 12.12.1959 arose under the old Act, namely, Central Provinces and Berar Mu, icipalities Act 1922, the respondent firm M/s Vraj Lal Mani Lal & Co. filed an appeal before the Sob Divisional Officer Damoh under s. 83 (1-A) of the Act against the refusal of the appellant-Council to make the refund."}}, {"text": "Vraj Lal Mani Lal & Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 7018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33,409.52 based on 1866 refund vouchers relating to the period from 4.12.1952 to 12.12.1959 arose under the old Act, namely, Central Provinces and Berar Mu, icipalities Act 1922, the respondent firm M/s Vraj Lal Mani Lal & Co. filed an appeal before the Sob Divisional Officer Damoh under s. 83 (1-A) of the Act against the refusal of the appellant-Council to make the refund.", "canonical_name": "VRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7081, "end_char": 7086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Damoh they paid octroi duty as per Octroi Rules", "statute": "Damoh they paid octroi duty as per Octroi Rules"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub Divisional Officer by bis order dated 30th June, 1961 negatived the technical pleas of the appellant council, which order was finally confirmed by the High Court on 25th February, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th February, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8056, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub Divisional Officer by bis order dated 30th June, 1961 negatived the technical pleas of the appellant council, which order was finally confirmed by the High Court on 25th February, 1963."}}, {"text": "4th April, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub Divisional Officer al.so over-ruled the defences raised by the appellant Council on merits and by his final order dated 4th April, 1964 directed that the amount of 1865 refund vouchers aggregating to\n\nR~. 33409.52 minus the amount recovered under 19 vouchers should be refunded to the respondent firm."}}, {"text": "28th September, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Council wi; nt in revision to the State Government but the same was .dismissed on 28th September, 1968."}}, {"text": "Burhanpur Municipal Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8981, "end_char": 9010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1969) but the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court summarily and in doing so the High Court followed its earlier judgment in the case of Municipal Committee, Burhanp11r v. Allauddin Ao/ia Saheb and Co.(') where in regard to a similar refund rule obtaining in Burhanpur Municipal Committee the Court bad taken the view that \"Octori duty paid on imported tendu leaves and tobacco is refundable under the provisions of Rule 25 (b) of the Rules framed under s. 85 of the Act when bidis manufactured within the limits of the Municipal\n\n(1) 1957 MPL1 278."}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9176, "end_char": 9181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9686, "end_char": 9724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allaudin Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10890, "end_char": 10904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel urged that these points did not arise and were not determined in Allaudin Saheb' s case (supra),\n\nThe admitted facts in these appeals are that the respondent firms, who carry on the business of manufacturing and selling bidis imported or brought into the municipal limits of Damoh during the relevant period tobacco and other raw material, that they paid the requisite octroi duty on such raw material on its import at the prescribed rates, that they utilised the said raw material for manufacturing bidis and they exported the finished product\n\n(bidis) outside the municipal limits of Damoh."}}, {"text": "SUPRJ!ME COURT REPORTS (J982J 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16711, "end_char": 16747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, tqe well-settled connot!ltion of the\n\nSUPRJ!ME COURT REPORTS (J982J 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19334, "end_char": 19345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Octroi, Superintendent is rs\n\nponsible for the proper ad!llinistratioQ of thy Otroi Depart!lleQt iQ\n\nMUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. VRAJ LAL (Tulzapurkar, J.) 315\n\nall its branches which necessarily includes that it is he who should be satisfied as to the identity of the goods that are to be exported or that are utilized in the manufacture of goods which are to be exported.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "section 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19730, "end_char": 19741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19753, "end_char": 19792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vraj Lal Manila! & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20017, "end_char": 20039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-B of 1964, out of which the aforesaid appeal arises, was filed by the respondent-firm M/s Vraj Lal Manila! &", "canonical_name": "VRAJ LAL MANILAL & CO. & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "31st January, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. on 7.5.1964 claiming refund in respect of goods exported during the years 1959-1964; in other words, part of the claim from 1959 to 31st January, 1962 arose under 1922 Act while the claim pertaining to the period from 1.2.1962 to April 1964 arose under the 1961 Act, which came into force from 1.2.1962."}}, {"text": "1.2.1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20258, "end_char": 20266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. on 7.5.1964 claiming refund in respect of goods exported during the years 1959-1964; in other words, part of the claim from 1959 to 31st January, 1962 arose under 1922 Act while the claim pertaining to the period from 1.2.1962 to April 1964 arose under the 1961 Act, which came into force from 1.2.1962."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20495, "end_char": 20505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20543, "end_char": 20548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "15.12.1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21310, "end_char": 21320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since, however, it was not possible for it to sort out the refund vouchers which had been certified the High Court by its judgment and decree dated 15.12.1969 remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining the amount payable to the respondent-firm."}}, {"text": "23.4.1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21612, "end_char": 21621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21,023.53 with interest thereon @ 4% and this decree was drawn up on 23.4.1970."}}, {"text": "Section 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21624, "end_char": 21635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SJ.IPREMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21819, "end_char": 21834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SJ.IPREMB COURT REPORTS ' ."}}, {"text": "s. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22454, "end_char": 22460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24.9.1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22736, "end_char": 22745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24.9.1963 when\"there-was."}}, {"text": "s. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23148, "end_char": 23154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_318_331_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "JYOTI BASU & OTHERS.\n\nDEBI GHOSAL & OTHERS.\n\nFebruary 26, 1982\n\n(R.S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the Pepople Act 1951, Ss. 82 and 86 (4) Election Petition- Parties to-Who are-Corrupt practice alleged against person who is not a candidate-Such person whether can be impleaded as respondent.\n\nElection Law-Right to elect-Neither fundamtntal right nor Common Law right-Statutory right subject to statutory limitations.\n\nCode of Civil Procedure 1908 Or. Ir. JO-Concept of'proper parties'-\n\nApplicability of to election petitions.\n\nThe Representation of the People Act 1951, by Section 81 prescribes who may present an election petition. It may be by any candidate at such election, by any elec1or of the cons.tituency, and by none ~Jse. Section 82 dause (a) provides that the retitioner in an election petition shall join as respondents to the petition the returned candidates if the relief claimed is confined to a diclaration that the election of all or any of . the returned candidates is void and all the contesting candidates if a further declaration is sought that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. Clause (b) of the section requires the petitioner to join as respondents any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. Section 86 (4) enables any candi date not already a respondent to be joined as respondent.\n\nThe first appeltant in the appeal is the Chief Minister and appellants 2 and 3 State Ministers. They had been impleaded by the first respondent as parties to an election petition filed by him in the High Ccurt qu£stioni11g the election of the second respondent to the House of the People. It was averred in the election peti tion that the Chief Ministers and the State ministers who Were impleaded as parties to the election petition had colluded and conspired with the returned candidate to commit 'various alleged corrupt practices. The Chief Minister and th~ other Ministers denied the commission of the various alleged corrupt practices and claimed that the election petitioner was not entitled to implead them as parties to the election petition, as they were not candidates at the election. They filed an application before tQ.e High Court to strike out their names from the array of parties in the election petition. It was dismissed on the ground that the appellants were proper parties to the election petitiqn and therefore their names could\n\npot be st~~ O\"?t of the array of parties\\ · . '\" , , . , ..\n\n- ....\n\n- y\n\nJYOTI BASU V. DEBI GHOSAL :119\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the concept of a proper p8.rty was not relevant in election law and that only those persons could be implcaded as parties who were expressly directed to be so implcaded by the Representation of the People Act 1951, and that they were entitled to be struck out from the array of parties. On behalf of the first resPOn, dent it was submitted that the appellants were proper parties to the electiori petition and their presence was necessary for a coi, n.plete, final and expeditiouS\n\ndecision on the questions involved in the action.\n\nAllowing the Appeal,\n\nHELD : I. No one can be joined as a party to an election petition other wise than as provide by Section 82 and 86 (4) of the Representation of the people Act 1951. A person who is not a candidate may not be joined as a respondent to the election petition. [331 C-D]\n\n--1.\n\nIn the instant case the names of the appeIJants and the 7th respondent in\n\nthe appeal are directed to be struck out from the array of parties in the election petition. [331 DJ\n\n2. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously 1 neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law Ribt. It is a statutory right.\n\nSo is the right to be elected, and the right to dispute an election. Outside of\n\nsta1ute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected, and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An Election petition is not an action at Cornmoo Law, nor in equity.\n\nIt is a statutory proceeding to which 1leither the Common Law nor the principles of Equity apply but only those rules which. the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged pol.icy because policy io such matters, as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a stl.'aight jacket. [326 F-H; 327 A-BJ\n\n3. The contest of the election petition is designed to be confined to the the candidates. at the ele-;;.tion. All others are excluded. The ring is c!c.sed to all except the petitioner and the candidates at the election. Such is the design of the statute. [328 C]\n\n4. While clause (b) of section 82 obliges the petitioner in an election petition to join as a respondent any candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the pet_ition, it does not obJige the petitioner to join as a respondent any other person against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made. While any candidate not already a respondent may seek and, if he so seeks, is entitled to be joined as a respondent undor section 86 (4), any other person cannot, under that provision seek to be joined as a respondent, even if allegations of any corrupt practice are made against him. [328 A-CJ\n\n326 SUPREME c6Uit REPORTS it982J 3 s.c.ii.\n\n5. The concept of •proper parties' is and niust remain alien to an election dispute under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Only those may be joined as respondents to an election petition who are mentioned in section 82 and section 86 (4) and no others, However desirable and expedient it may appear to be, none else shall be joined as respondents. [328 DJ\n\n'.• ••\n\n6. The provisions' of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be invoked to\n\npermit that which the Representation of the People Act 1951 does not permit.\n\nThe Civil Procedure Code applies subject to the provisions of the Represtation of the People Act 1951 and any rules made thereunder. Section 87 (1) expressly says so. When the Act enjoins the penalty of dismissal of the petition for nonjoinder of a party the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be used as a --~ curative means to save the petition. [328 F-H; 329 A-Cl\n\nMohan Raj v. Su7'ndra Kumar Taparia & Ors. [1961] I SCR and .R. Venkateswara Rao & Anr. v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi & Ors. [1969) I SCR\n\n679, referred to.\n\n7: Parliament has expressly provided that an opportunity should be given to a person who is not a candidate to show cause against being 'named' as one guilty of a corrupt practice. Parliament, however, has not thought fit to expressly provide for bis being joined-as a party to the election petition either by the election.petitioner or at the instance of the very person against whom the allega tiona of a corrupt practice are made. The right given to the latter is limited to show cause against being 'named' and that right opens up for exercise when, at the end of the election petition notice is given to him to show cause why he should not be 'named 9 • The right does not extend to participation at all stages and in all matters, a right which he would have if he is joined as a 'party' at the commencement. [329 E-G] ·\n\n8 (i) The election petitioner cannot by joining as a respondent a person who is not a candidate at the election subject him to a prolonged triaJ of an election petition with all its intricacies and ramificatio_ns. [329-Gj\n\n(ii) Mischievous minded persons may harass public personages like the Prime Minister of the country, the Chief Minister of a State or a political leader of a national dimension by impleading him as a party to election petitions. All that would be necessary is a seemingly plausible allegation, casually or spitefulJy made, with but a facade of truth. To permit such a public personage to be impleaded as a party to an election petition on the basis of a mere allegation, without even prima facie proof an allegation which may ultimately be found to be unfounded, can cuse needless vexation to sush pe°rsonage and prevent him from the effective discharge of his public duties. It would be against the public interest to do so. The ultimate award o.f co;, ts would be no panacea in such cases, since the Public mischi.ef cannot be repaired. Public Policy and legislative wisdooi both piot to an interpretation that the provisions of the Representation of the PeoJ)le Act 1951 does not permit the joining, at parties of persons other than those mention~ in sections 82 and 86 (4). [329 H; 330 A-DJ\n\n. JYOTI BASU v. DEBI GHOSAL (Chinnappa Reddy, j.) 32i\n\n' , ..... 9 (i) The legislative provisions contained in section 99 enables the Court,. \" . towards the end of the trial of an election petition,_ to issue a J?.Otice to a person not a party to the proceedings to show cause why he should not be rnamed' is a sufficient clarificatiOn of the.legislative intent ihat such person may not be permit ted to be joined as a party to the election petition. (330 E-F]\n\n9 (ii) If a person who 1s not a candidate but against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made is joined as a party he would also be entitled to 'recriminate' under section 97. Suctt a construction of the statute would throw the doors of an election wide open and convert the petition into a 'free for all' fight. The necessary consequence would be an unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of achieving the goal contemplated by sec. 86 (6) of the Act that the trial of the election petition should be concluded in six months.\n\n(330 H; 331 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLA1E JURISD1c:r10N : Civil Appeal No. 1553 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd July, 1980 of the Calcutta High Court in Election Petition Case No. 1 of 1980.\n\nSomnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants.\n\nSidhartha Shankar Ray, R.K. Lala and T. V.S.N. Chari fot Respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgmeat of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The first appellant, Jyoti llasu, is the Chief Minister and appellants two and three Budhadeb Bhattacharya and Hashim Abdul Halim, are two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal. They .have been impleaded by the first respondent as parties to an election petition filed by him questioning the election of the second respondent to the House of the People from the 19-Barrackpore Parliamentary Constituency in the mid-term Parliamentary election held in January, 1980. There were five candidates' who sought election from the .Constituency. Mod. Ismail, the first respondent, whose candidature was sponsored by the Communist\n\nParty of India (Marxist) was, elected securing 2,66,698 votes as against Debi Ghosal, a candidate sponsored by the Indian National Congress led by Smt. Indira Gandhi who secured 1,62, 770 votes.\n\nThe other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25, 734, 12,271 and 2, 763 votes respectively.\n\nThe first respondent fited an election petition in the High Court of ' '\n\n( ' 322 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982j 3 s.c.i.\n\nCalcutta questioning the election of the second respondent Mohd.\n\nIsmail on various grounds. He impleaded the returned candidate as the first respoudent, and tbe other three unsuccessful candidates respondents 2, 3 and 4 to the election petition. Besides the candi- _ dates at the election, he impleaded several others as respondents. The District Magistrate and Returning Officer was impleaded as the fifth respondent, Buddhadeb Bhattachar}a, the Minister for Information and Publicity, Government of West Bengal as the sixth respondent. Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. Amin, the Minister of the Transport Branch of the Home Department as the eighth respondent, Hashim Abdul Halim, the Minister of the Legislative and the Judicial Department as the ninth respondent and the Electoral Registration Officer as the tenth respondent. It was averred in the election petition that the Chief Minister and the other Ministers of the Government of West Bengal who were im pleaded as parties to the election petition had colluded and conspired with the returned candidate to commit various alleged corrupt practices. Apart from denying the commission of the various alleged corrupt practices, the Chief Minister and the other Ministers claimed in their written statements that the election petiti~\n\nner was not entitled to implead them as parties to the election petition. They claimed that as they were not candidates at the election they could not be impleaded as parties to the election petition. The Chief Minister and two of the other Ministers, Hashim Abdul Halim and and Buddhadeb Bhattacharya file\\! an application before the High Court of Calcutta to strike out ·their names from the array of parties in the elcctign petition. The application was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the applicants (appellants) were proper parties to the election petition and, therefore, their names should not be struck out of the array of parties. The appellants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nSbri Somnath Chatterjee, learned counsel for the appellant t submitted that the concept of a proper party was not relevant in election law and that only those persons could be impleaded as parties who were expressly directed to be so impleaded by the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nHe claimed that in any case such persons were entitled to be struck out from the array of parties.\n\nOn the other hand Shri Sidhartha Shankar Ray, and Shri R.K. Lala, learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that the appellan.\\s were proper parties to the election petition and their presence was\n\nJvOTl BASU v. DEBI GHOSAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 323\n\nnecessary for a complete, final and expeditious decision on the questions involved in the action.\n\nTo properly appreciate the rival contentions it i$ necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and\n\nthe two Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951.\n\nFirst the Constitution. Part lXV deals with elections. Art. 324 vests in the l'le•:tiqn Commission the superintendence, .direction and control of the preparation of the Electoral rolls and the conduct of all elections to Parliament and to the Legislatures of the States.\n\nArt. 325 provides that there shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency,.and that no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in such rolls on grounds only of religion, caste, sex or any of them. Art. 326 provides that election to the House of the\n\nPeople and to the Legislative Assemblies of States shall be on the basis of adult franchise.\n\nArt. 327 enables Parliament to make laws with respect to all matters relating to elections to either House of Parliament or to the Houses of the Legislature of a State. Art. 328 enables the Legh; lature of a State, if Parliament has not made such legislation, to make laws with respect to all matters relating to elections to the Houses of the Legislature of the State. Art. 329 bars interference by Courts in electoral matters and clause (b), in particular, provides that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority. and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature.\n\nNext, the Representation of People Act, 1950. This Act provides for the delimitation of the Constituencies for the purpose of elections to the House of the people .and the legislatures of States, the qualification of voters at such elections,. the preparation of electoral rolls and other matters connected therewith.\n\nLast, the Representation of the People Act of 1951, Part VI of the Act deals with \"Disputes regarding elections\". Sec. 79 defines various terms and expressions used in the Parts VI and VII.\n\nClause (b) defines a 'candidate' as meaning \"a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began to\n\n' ,,\n\n\\ D\n\n'' 324\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (i982j 3 S.C.R.\n\nhold himself out as a prospective candidate\". Sec. 80 imposes a statutory ban on an election being called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI of the, Act. Sec. 80-A vests in the High Court, the jurisdiction to try an election petition. Sec. 81 provides for the presentation of an election petition on one or more of the grounds specified in Sec. 100 (I) and Sec. IOI by any candidate at such election or any elector who was entitled to vote at the election. Sec. 82 is entitled \"Parties to the petition\" and is as follows :\n\n\"82.\n\nParties to the petition-A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition- .. (a) Where the petitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidate is void claims a further declara tion that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and\n\n(b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition\".\n\nSec. 83 prescribes the contents of the petition. 1 Sec. 84 provides that a petitioner may, in addition to clair; ning a declaration that the election of the returned candidate is void, claim a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate bas been duly elected. Sec. 86 deals with trial of ~Iection petition.s. Sub-Sec. (4) provides for an application by a candidate who is not already a respondent to be joined as a respondent. It is in these terms:\n\n\"(4) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, npon application made by him to the High Court within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the High Court, be entitled to be joined as a respondent\".\n\nSec. 87 is concerned with the procedure before the High Court and 'it is as follows:\n\nfrcrri BASU v. DEBI GHOSAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 325\n\n\"87 (I) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accorwith the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits;\n\nProvided that the High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to be. recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of such witness or witn\"esses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the p11rty tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay. the proceedings.\n\n(2) The provisitf'ns of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shait,\n\nsubject to Ille provisions of this Act, be deemed to D apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition\".\n\nSec. 90 enables the returned candidate or any other party to 'recriminate' in cases where in the election petition a declaration that a candidate other than the returned candidate has been elected is claimed. Sec. 98 prescribes the orders that may be made by the\n\n0High Court at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition. It provides that the High Court shall make an order d ismlssing the election petition or declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. Sec. 99, enables the High Court to make, at the time of making order under Sec. 98, an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice h11s or has not been proved to have been committed at the election, and the nature of corrupt practice; and the names of all persons, if any, who have been poved at the trial to have been guilty of corrupt practice and the nature of that practice. The proviso to Sec. 99 (I), however, prescribes that no person who is not a party to the petition shall be named in t, he order unless he had been given notice to appear before the High Court to show cause why he should not be so llamed and he had also been given an opportunity to cross examine any witness who had-already been examined by the High. Court and had given evidence against him and an opportunity of calling evidence in his\n\n. '\n\n,.-~:, __ , ~-1ilt~ '. :~SJ Ji::.-·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (J9szj J S.C.R.\n\ndefence and of being heard. '1Sec. 100 enumerates the grounds on which an election may be declared void. The High Court, it is said, among other grounds, shall declare the election of a returned candidate void .in cases where corrupt practices are proved, where suph corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent. Where the corrupt practice has been committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate must also be shown to have heeh materially affected.\n\nSec. IOI prescribes the grounds for which a candidate, other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. Sec. 110 provides for the procedure when an application for withdrawal of an election petition is made to the Court. Sec. 110 (3) (c) says that a person who might himself have been a petitioner may apply fo the Court to he substituted as a petitioner in place of the {>arty withdrawing.\n\nSec. 112 (3) provides for the continuance of the election petition on the death of the sole petitioner in an election petition or of tac survivor of several petitioners, by any person who might himself haYe been a petitioner and who applies for substitution within the stipulatd period.\n\nThe nature of the right to elect, the right to be elected and the right to dispute an election and the scheme of the Constitutional and statutory provisions in relation to these rights have been explained by the Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Ors.,(') and Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh.(') We proceed to state what we have gleaned from what has been said, so much as necessary for this case.\n\nI .\n\nA right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, I anomalously enough, neiher a fundamental right nor a Common , Law Right.· It ispure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute_!ln election.\n\nOutside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An Election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the Common Law nor the principles of Equity apply but\n\n(I l [1952) 1 S.C.R 218.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1954 SC 210.\n\nJYOTI BASU v. DEBI GHOSAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 327\n\nonly those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statutory creating it.\n\nConcepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a straight jacket. Thus the entire ./ elecr ion process commencing from the issuance of the notification calling upon a constitutuency to elect a member or members right up to the final resolution of the dispute, if any, concerning the . election is regulated by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of the process being dealt with by different provisions of the Act. There can be no election to Parliament or the State Legislature except as provided by the Representation of the People Act 195 l and again, no such election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. So\n\nthe Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election .dispute. We are concerned with an election dispute . ..:fhe question is who are parties to an election dispute and who may_ be impleaded as parties to an election petition.\n\nWe have already referred to the Scheme of the Act.\n\nWe have noticed the necessity to rid ourselves of notions based on Common Law or Equity. We see that we must seek an answer to the question within the four corners of the statute. What dqes the Act say?\n\nSec. 81 prescribes who may present an election petition. It may be any candidate at such election; it may be any elector of the constituency; it may be none else.\n\nSec. 82 is headed \"Parties to the petition\" and clause (a) provides that the petitioner shall join as respondents to the petition the returned candidates if the relief claimed is confined to a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void and all the contesting candidates if a further declaration is sought that he himelf or any other candidate has been duly elected. Clause (b) of Sec. 82 requires the petitioner to join as respondent any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.\n\nSec. 86 (4) enables any candidate not already a respondent to be joined as a respondent, There is 110 other provision dealinll wit!\\\n\nA •\n\n-··. '' 328\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C, R. •.\n\n---~--- ---~~---:\n\n. question as to who may be joined as respondents .. It is significant that while clause (b) of Sec. 82 obliges 'the petitioner to joiri as a respondent any candidate.against whom 'allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition, it does not oblige the.petitioner to join as a respondent any other person against 'whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made. ' It is equally significant that while any candidat.e not already a respondent may seek and, if he so seeks, is entitled to. be joined as a respondent under Sec.· 86 (4), any other. person cannot; under .that provision seek to be joined as respondent, even if allegations of any corrupt practice are made. agains't him.' It is dear thai the contest of the election petition is designed t~. be confined to the candidates at the election. All •.. others are excluded: The ring is closed to. all except the petitioner and the candidates . at the election.. If such is the design of the statute, how can the notion of 'proper parties' enter th.e picture at all ? We think thai the: concept of 'proper parties' is and must remain alien to an election 'dis· pute under the Represeiiiation of the People Act,. J951 ,· -· Only those may be joined as respondents to' an election petition who are mentioned. in Sec. 82 and Sec. 86 (4) and no others. However desirable and expedient it may appear to lie, none else shall be joined._.as\n\n.. ·. ' - - respondents. ' .\n\n\" It is said, the Civil Procedure Code . applies lo the trial, of election petitions and so proper parties whose presenco may be necessary in order to enable the Court' 'effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved' may' be joined as respondents to the petitions .. The questions is not whether' the Civil Procedure Code applies because it undoubtedly does, but only 'as far as may be' and subject to the provisions of the Representa tion of the People Act, 1951 and the. rules made _thereunder.\n\nSec. 87 (I) exepressly says so. The question is whether . the provisions .;-f the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked to permit that which the Representation of the People Act does not .. Quite obviously the provisions of the Code cannof be.so invoked .. • In Mohan Raj 1' Surendra Kuma~ Taparia & Ors.,(1) _this Court held ihat the undoubted power of the Court (i.e. the Election Court) to permit an amendment of the petition i:anno't be uied to stiike out allegations agairisi a candidate not joined as ll respondent so as to '. save the election petition from dismissal for nonjoinder of necessary ·\n\n(I) (1969].l SCR 630 .•\n\nL---~-~~---~-------\n\n.-J\n\n\\.: ·.\\ . _\\ . - JYOTI BA_SU v:_DEEl GHOSAL (Chinmppa Reddy, J.) ---329 --\n\nparties. It. was said, uThe Court can order an_ amendment and e'l'en strike out a party who is not necessary. Bui, where the Act niakes a person a necessary _party _and -provides that the petition shall be dismissed_ if such a party is not joined, the-_ power of\n\nameddient or to strike -out parties_ cannot be used at all. The - Civil Procedure Co-de appiies subjct to the provisions ~Ube Repre'\n\nsntation of th'e Peple Act and any ruies made ihereunder: When tlie Act enjoins_tlie penalty of dismissal of the petition for nonjoinder of a party the \"provisions of 'ihe Civil Procedure Code cannot be used asacurative means tci sae the petition.\"dAgain, in\n\nK.' VenkatesHara _Rao &. Anr.' v. Bekkam Narasimha -Reddi and _- Ors.,(1) it was o.bserVed :\n\n\"With regard . to the additin f parties - which\n\n- is possible in the case of a suit under tho provisions of\n\n0.1.r. 10 subject to the added party right •_to contend that the suit a_s against l.im -was -barred by limitation_ when he was added, no addition of parties is possible in the case of an election petition except under the -provi- . sions __ of Sub-sec. (4) of Section 86\".. -\n\nThe matter may be looked at froni another angle. The Parliament has expressly provided that an opportunityshould be given to a person who is not a candidate \"to -show cause against being 'named'. as _one guilty of a corrupt -practice. -Parliament however, has not thought fit to expressly provide for his being joined as a party to the election petition either by the election-petitioner or- at - the instance of the very person against _whom the allegations or' a_\n\ncorrupt prac'.ice are 'made. The right given to the latter is limited to show cause &gainst 'named' and that right opens up for exercise when, -\n\nai the end of the trial of the e'iection petition notice is given to him to show_catise why he should not be 'named'. The right does not extend to participation at all stages and in all matters, a right which he would have. if he is joined as a party at the commencement.\n\nConversaly the election petitioner cannot by joinig as a respondent a person who is not a candidate at the electior. subject him to a prolonged trial of aQ election petition with all its intricacies and ramifications.'> One may well imagine hw ni'ischievous minded persons may harass public per:sonages like the Prime MinisJer of,\n\n(I) [1977] I SCR 679.\n\n- ! •• -\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe country, the Chief Miilister of a State or a political leader of_ a national dimension by_ impleading :him as 'a party to election petitions, all the country over, . All that would be_ necessary is a seemingly · plausible . allegation, casually . or · spitefully made.- with\"_ but a facade of tnith. Evecyone is familiar with . S'!Ch allegations. To permit such _.a. public 'Personage . to,. be\n\nimpleaded as a party to an electiciu. petiti6n on the basis fa mere aiiegation, \"without , even prime facie proof,~ an' allegation which \"'may ultimately be found 10 be unfounded; can cause needless vexa~ .. tion to such personage and prevent him from the effective discharge of his public duties .. It would be against the public\" interest to do so . . The ultimate award of costs would be n\"o panacea in such cases, since the public mischief cannot be repaired. That is why public Policy and legislative wisdom both seem to_ point to an interpretation of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act which does not permit the joining,~. parties,•of persons other than those mentioned in, Sections 82 and 86 (4). It is not as i(a person guilty of a corrupt practice can get away with it. Where at the concluding stage of the trial of an election. petition, after evidence has been given, the Court finds that there is sufficient material to hold a . person guilty of a corrupt practice, the Court may then issue a notice to him to show cause under Sec. 99 and proceed with further action • . 1n our view the legislative provision contained in Sec. 99 which . enables the Court, towards the end of tht> trial of an election petition, to issue a notice to a person not a party to the proceeding to sh9w cause why he should not be 'named' is sufficient clarification of the . legislative intent that such person may not be permitied to be joined as a party to the election petit!on:\n\n, -G There is yet another view-point.· When in an election petition _in addition to the declaration that the election of the returned candate is void a further declaration is sought that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected, sec. 97 enables the returned candidate or any other party to 'recriminate' le. to give G ..... evidence to prove that the e\\ectia\"n of such candidate would have\n\n. beell oid if he had been a returned candidate and a petition had been presented to question his election. If a person who is not a candidate but against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made is joined as a party to the petition then, by virtue of his position as a party, he would also be entitled to 'recriminate' under sec. 97. Surely such a construction of the statute would. throw the_ !loors of an election petitin wide open and convert the petition into\n\nJYOTI BASU v. DEBI GHOSAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 331\n\na 'free for all' fight. A necessary consequence would be an unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of achieving the goal contemplated by Sec .. 86 (6) of the Act that the trial of the election petition should be concluded in six months. It is just as well to remember that 'corrupt practice' as at present defined by Sec. 123 of the Act is not confined to the giving of a bribe but extends to the taking of a bribe too and, therefore, the number of persons who may be alleged to be guilty of a corrupt practice may indeed be very large, with the consequence that all of them may possibly be joined as respondents.\n\nIn view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opmton that\n\n C no one may be joined as a party to aii election petition otherwise than as provided by Sections 82 and 86 ( 4) of the Act. It follows that a person who is not a candidlije may not be joined as a respondent to the election petition. The appeal is therefore, allowed wirh costs and the names of the appellants and the seventh respondent in the appeal are directed to be struck out from the array of D parties in the election petition. We may mention that in arriving at our conclusion we have also considered the followig decisions . • cited before us: S.B. Adityen .& Anr. v. S. Kandaswam{& Ors.,(') Dwijendra Lal Sen (Jupta v. Hrekrishna Koner,(2) H.R. Gokhale v.\n\nBharucha Noshir C. & Ors., (8) and S. Iqbal Singh v. S. Gurdas Singh / Badal & Ors.(4) E\n\n.N.V.K.\n\n(1) AIR 1958 Mad. 171. (2), A.l.R. 1963 Cat. 218.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1969 Bom. 177.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1973 P & H 163.\n\nAppeal allowed", "total_entities": 118, "entities": [{"text": "JYOTI BASU & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JYOTI BASU & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEBI GHOSAL & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEBI GHOSAL & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 26, 1982\n\n(R.S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. 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candidate to show cause against being 'named' as one guilty of a corrupt practice."}}, {"text": "sections 82 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9062, "end_char": 9072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10129, "end_char": 10148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd July, 1980 of the Calcutta High Court in Election Petition Case No."}}, {"text": "Somnath Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10191, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Rathin Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Aninda Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Sidhartha Shankar Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10261, "end_char": 10282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sidhartha Shankar Ray, R.K. 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The first appellant, Jyoti llasu, is the Chief Minister and appellants two and three Budhadeb Bhattacharya and Hashim Abdul Halim, are two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "Hashim Abdul Halim"}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10557, "end_char": 10582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgmeat of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The first appellant, Jyoti llasu, is the Chief Minister and appellants two and three Budhadeb Bhattacharya and Hashim Abdul Halim, are two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Mod. Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10944, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mod.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nIsmail"}}, {"text": "Debi Ghosal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ismail, the first respondent, whose candidature was sponsored by the Communist\n\nParty of India (Marxist) was, elected securing 2,66,698 votes as against Debi Ghosal, a candidate sponsored by the Indian National Congress led by Smt.", "canonical_name": "DEBI GHOSAL & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11144, "end_char": 11168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ismail, the first respondent, whose candidature was sponsored by the Communist\n\nParty of India (Marxist) was, elected securing 2,66,698 votes as against Debi Ghosal, a candidate sponsored by the Indian National Congress led by Smt."}}, {"text": "Indira Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11181, "end_char": 11194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Gandhi who secured 1,62, 770 votes."}}, {"text": "Ramjit Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11246, "end_char": 11256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25, 734, 12,271 and 2, 763 votes respectively."}}, {"text": "Robi Shankar Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11258, "end_char": 11277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25, 734, 12,271 and 2, 763 votes respectively."}}, {"text": "Bejoy Narayan Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11282, "end_char": 11302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25, 734, 12,271 and 2, 763 votes respectively."}}, {"text": "High Court of ' '\n\n( ' 322 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982j 3 s.c.i.\n\nCalcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent fited an election petition in the High Court of ' '\n\n( ' 322 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982j 3 s.c.i."}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nIsmail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11539, "end_char": 11552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta questioning the election of the second respondent Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nIsmail"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate and Returning Officer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate and Returning Officer was impleaded as the fifth respondent, Buddhadeb Bhattachar}a, the Minister for Information and Publicity, Government of West Bengal as the sixth respondent."}}, {"text": "Buddhadeb Bhattachar}a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11900, "end_char": 11922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate and Returning Officer was impleaded as the fifth respondent, Buddhadeb Bhattachar}a, the Minister for Information and Publicity, Government of West Bengal as the sixth respondent.", "canonical_name": "Buddhadeb Bhattachar}a"}}, {"text": "Jyoti Basu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12019, "end_char": 12029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. Amin, the Minister of the Transport Branch of the Home Department as the eighth respondent, Hashim Abdul Halim, the Minister of the Legislative and the Judicial Department as the ninth respondent and the Electoral Registration Officer as the tenth respondent.", "canonical_name": "JYOTI BASU & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Md. Amin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12077, "end_char": 12085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. Amin, the Minister of the Transport Branch of the Home Department as the eighth respondent, Hashim Abdul Halim, the Minister of the Legislative and the Judicial Department as the ninth respondent and the Electoral Registration Officer as the tenth respondent."}}, {"text": "Hashim Abdul Halim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12173, "end_char": 12191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. 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Lala, learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that the appellan.\\s were proper parties to the election petition and their presence was\n\nJvOTl BASU v. 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28333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28368, "end_char": 28375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representa tion of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representa tion of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28511, "end_char": 28543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohan Raj 1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28628, "end_char": 28639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the provisions .;-f the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked to permit that which the Representation of the People Act does not .. 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{"document_id": "1982_3_332_340_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 332\n\nSTATB OF BIHAR\n\nDR. YOGBNDRA SINGH COL. (RBTD.)\n\nANDOTHBR\n\n(P.N. BHAGWATI AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.)\n\nMarch 1, 1982 C Bihar Private Medical Col/ege1 (Taking over) Act 1978-Meaning and\n\neffect of sections 3 ond 6, explained,\n\nDr. Yogendra Singh col was appointed Professor of Surgery in the Magadh Medical College and as per the !Regulations of the University he was entitled to continue in service until be reached the age of superannuation, which was fixed at 62. Pursuant to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Bihar Private Medical Colleges (Takmg Over) Act, 1978, the State Government appointed a Screening Committee which, inter aJia, recommended the retirement of all teachers beyond the age of 58 years and their re-empolyment upto the age of 62 years only if there were no qualified substitutes available. On 11-9-1980, the Principal of the Magadh College, based on the circular dated 3-9-1980 issued by the State Government, after accepting the recommendation of the Screenihg Comniittee, issued a notice to Dr. Col. informing him that bis services will be terminated with effect rrom 10-10-1980. A writ petition filed in the High Court of Patna challenging the said order of termination of his services was allowed by the High Court taking the view that by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 3, the obligation to continue Dr. Col in service upto the age of 62 years devolved on the State Government on the taking over or the Magadh Medical College under sub-section (1) of section 3 and the State Government had no power under subsection (3) of section 6 to terminate bis services prior to his attaining the age of superannuation and hence the order dated 11-9-1980 was invalid.\n\nAllowing the appeal of the State, the Court\n\nHELD 1:1. The terinination of the service of Dr. Col. was perfectly valid.\n\nQuite apart from the power expressly conferred under sub-section (3) of section 6, the State Government would have power to terminate the services of any person employed on an ad hoc basis. [339!G-H, 340 A]\n\n1:2. It is elementary that when a person is appointed on an ad hoc basis his tenure is precarious and be cannot claim to continue in service until the age of superannuation. From and after the date of notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the 1978 Act Dr. Col. continued to serve the Magadh Medical College on an ad hoc basis in terms of the proviso to sub-section (l) of section 6 which declared tbat the staff employed in the CoHege \"shall continue to servo the college on an ad hoc basis till a decision under sub-section (3) and (4) is taken by the tat~ Government.'.' lq view of th~ clear and cxpli>il 1rm1 of sub\n\nBlHAR v. VOGENDRA SJNGH 333\n\nsection (I) of section 6 providing that as Crom the date or the notification issued, undersub-section (I) or sect ion 3, \"all the staff employed in the college shall cease to be employees of the college body\", the contract of Dr. Col with tho owners of the Magadh Medical College under the letter of appointment given to him did not devolve on the State Government but came to an end and he became the employee or tho State on an ad hoc basis, disentling him to the benefit or retirement at tho ago or 62. (338 C-G)\n\nIt was within the competence or the Screening Committee to make recommendation in regard to the age of superannuation of the teaching staff of the medical colleges iaken over by the State Government. Sub-section (2) or section 6 undoubtedly provides that the Committee or exports appointed under that provision will examine the bio-data of each member of the staff and ascertain whether appointment promotion or confirmation of such person was made in accordance with the University Regulations and in keeping with the guidelineslaid down bY. the Medical Council or India and will also take into consideration all othe_r relevant material including length of service in the college and submit its report to thC State Government. But sub-section (3) of section 6 also makes it clear th at the Committee of experts appointed eunder sub-section (2) of that section can make recommendations in regard to \"rank, pay, allowances and other conditions or service\" of tho teaching staff. [338 H, 339 A-CJ\n\n3. The State Government Was clearly within its powers under subsection (3) of section 6 to re-determine the age Of superannuation and to proide that the services or all the teachers in the medical colleges taken over by the State Government shall be terminated after giving them one month's notice, if they have attained the age oi 62 years or more than 58 years. but less than 62 years, in consonance with the age of retirment of aJI other Government employees.\n\nUnder sub-section (3) of section 6 tho State Government bad power to redetermine the rank, pay, allowances and other conditiOns of service of the teaching staff and \"other coditions of scrvicci'' would include the age of super .. annuation. (339 E-G]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3420 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th July, 1981 of the Patna High Court in C. W.J.C. No. 3032 of 1980.\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General of India, K.G. Bhagat and D.\n\nGoburdhan, for the Appellant.\n\nDr. Y. S, Chitale, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami for Respondent No. J.\n\n334 SUPREME COURT REPClRTS (i982j 3 s.c.a.\n\nP.P. Singh for Respondent No. 2.\n\nR.P. Singh for Respondent No. 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the Patna High Court quashing and setting aside the termination of service of the !st respondent and directing that the Isl respondent shall continue in service until he reaches the age of 62 years. The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows.\n\nThe I st respondent was appointed Professor of Surgery in the Magadh Medical College, Gaya in December; 1975 and he joined bis post as Professor of Surgery on 27th December, 1975. The letter • of appointment which set out the terms and conditions of service provided that the appointment would be subject to such regulations as might be in force from time to time in the Magadh University to which the Magadh Medical College was affiliated. These regulations provided that the age or superannuation shall be 62 years, and, therefore, the I st respondent was entitled to continue as Professor of Surgery until he reached the age of 62 y cars. But in or about the middle of 1976 a drastic change took place, as the Bihar Private Medical Colleges (Taking of Management) Ordinance, 1976 .(herein• after referred to at the Ordinance) was promulgated by the Governor of Bihar authorising the State Government by a notification to take over the management of any private Medical College and to exercise such functions of management in regard to such College as might be a specified in the notification. Pursuant to the Ordinance a notification was issued by the State Government taking over the management of the Magadh Medical College with effect from !st July, 1978. The ordin.ance was subsequently replacecf by the Bihar Private Medical Colleges (Taking Over) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nSection 3 of the Act provided for taking over of private Medical Colleges and it read as follows :\n\n\"3 (I). The State Government may, by a notified order and from the date mentioned therein, take over a College and the management and control thereof shall thereupon be exercised by the State Government in such manner as may be laid down in the said Order;\n\ni'ltl1AR v. YOGBNDRA SINGH (hhagwati, J.) .\n\n, 33S\n\n(2) All the assets and properties of the College and the College body whether movable or immovable including lands, buildings workshops, stores, instruments, machinery, vehicles, cash balance, reserve fund, investments, taxes, furniture and others shall, on the date of take O> r. stand transferred to and vested in, and be deemed to have come into the possession of the State Government;\n\n(3) All the liabilities and obligations of the College under any agreement or contract entered into bona fide before the date of taking over shall devolve and shall be deemed to have devolved on the State Government.\" •\n\nSection 6 dealt with the determination of terms of teaching staff and other employees of the Medical College taken over by the State\n\nGovernment and since the controversy in the present case has turned almost entirely upon tbe true meaning and effect of the provisions\n\nof this section, it would be convenient to set it out in full : D\n\n''6, Determination of terms of the teaching staff and other employees of the College-(!) As from the date of the notified order, all the staff eipployed in.the College shall cease to be the employees of the College body :\n\nProvided that they shall continue to serve the College on an ad hoc basis till a decision under sub-section (3) and\n\n(4) is taken by the State Government. (2) The State Government will set up one or more Committee' of experts and knowledgeable persons which will examine thebio data of each member of the teaching staff and ascertain whether appointment promotion or confirmation was made in accordance with the University Regulations and in keeping with . the guidelines laid down by the Medical Council of India and taking into consideration all other relevant materials including length of scTce in the College, and submit its report to the State Government.\n\n(3) The State Government on receipt of the report of\n\nl!l\n\nthe Committee or Committees, as the case may be, will H decide in respect ot' each member of teaching staff on the merits of each case, whether to absorb him in Government\n\n336 SuPRBMB COirltT RBPOllTS 119sil 3 s.c.il..\n\nservice or whether to terminate his service or to allow him to continue on an ad hoc basis for a fixed term or on contract and shall, where necessary redetermine the rank, pay, allowances and other conditions of service.\n\n(4) The State Government. shall similarly determine the term of appointment and other conditions of service of other categories of staff of the College on the basis of facts to be ascertained either by a Committee or by an officer entrusted with the task and th.e provisions of sub§ection (2) and (3) shall apply mutandis mutandis to such cases.\n\nIt appears that pursuant to section 3 of the Act a notification was issued by the State Government taking .. over the Magadh Medical College with the result that the management and control of the Magadh Medical College became exercisable by the State Government and all the assets and properties of the M.agadh Medical College D stood transferred to and became vested in the State Government and all its liabilities and obligations also devolved on the State Government. The State Governmen thereafter appointed a Committee called the Screening Committee under sub-section (2) of section 6 and the Screening Committee maµe a report which contained inter a/ia the following recommen !Iations : E\n\n(a) All teachers. beyond the age of 58 years may be retired subject to reappointment if there are no qualified substitutes. This shou Id apply to all\n\nState Medical Colleges and the re-employment .may be made up to maximum of 62 years of age.\n\n(b) In no case service of teachers who have already attained the age of 62 yeats be retained.\n\nThe State Government on the basis of this recommendation issued a circular letter dated 3rd September, J980 addressed to the Principals of various Medical Colleges taken over by the State Government which included the Magadh Medical College, advising the Principals that \"services of all the Directly appointed teachers in the Medical Colleges who have attained the age of 62 years or more than 58 years but less than 62 years be terminated after giving them one month's notice.\" ?llow the !st resp9ndnt had already attained\n\nhlHAR •• YOGE1'DRA SINGH (Bhagwati, J.) 337\n\nthe age of 58 years and the Principal of the Magadh.Medical College, therefore; addressed a letter dated 11th September, _l 980 to\n\nthe 1st respondent informing him that since bis age was more thal!\n\n58 years, bis service was being terminated after 30 days from the date of issue of that letter as pe~ the order of the State Government.\n\nThe result was that by virtue of this letter addressed by the Principal to, the 1st respondent, the service of the 1st respondent was terminated with effect from 10th October, 1980,\n\nThe first respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court of Patna challenging the termination of his service by the Principal of the\" Magadh Medical College and claiming a declaration that he is entitled to continue in service until he reaches the age of 62 years. The High Court of Patna upheld the contention of the first respondent, , and took the view that by virtue of subsection (3) of section 3, the obligation to continue the first respondent in service upto the age of 62 years devolved on the State Government on the taking over of the Magadh Medical College under sub-section (I) of section 3 and the State Government had no power under sub section (3) of section 6 to terminate the service of the first respondent prior to his reaching the age of superannuatbn and the termination of his service by the Principal of Magadh Medical College was therefore, invalid. The writ petition filed by the first respondent was accordingly allowed and a writ was issued quashing and setting aside the termination of service. of the first respondent and declaring that he is entitled to continue in service until he reaches the age of 62 years. The State of Bihar thereupon preferred the present appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nWe are of the view that it is impossible to sustain the judgment of the High Court .. It proceeds upon a complete mi;-apprehension of the true meaning and effect of the relevant provisions of sections 3 and 6 of the Act.\n\nSub-section (l} of section 3 provides for taking over of private medical colleges and by virtue of the notification issued by the State Government under that' provision, the Magadh Medical College was taken over by the State Government and its management and control became e•ercisable by the State Government. Whatever assets and properties appertained to the Magadh Medical College became vested in the State Government under sub-section (2) of section 3. Section 3 sub-section (3) provided for devoluti.)n of all th~ liabilities ancl obliations of Magadu\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 3 s.c.a.\n\nMedica~ College on the State Government and therefore, if sub, section (3) were the only provision in the statute, it would have been possible for the first respondent to contend that by yirtue of the contract contained in his .letter of appointment,. he was entitled to continue in service until , the age of 62 years and this obligation of the Magadh Medical College devolved on the State Government.\n\nBut section 6 dealt specifically with the subject of deiermination of terms of the teaching staff and other employees of the Magadh Medical College and if this special enactment contained any provision relating to termination of service of the first respondent, it would obviously prevail over the general provision enacted in subsection (3) of section 3.\n\nNow sub-section (I) of section 6 provided in clear and explicit terms that as from the date of the notification issued under sub-section (I) of section 3 \"all the staff employed in the e91lege shall cease to be employees of the College body,.'' The direct effect of this provision was that-the first respondent ceased to be the employee of the owners of the Magadh Medical_College. The proviso to sub-section (I) of section 6 proceeded to declare that_ the staff employed in the College \"shall continue to serve the College on an ad hoc basis till a decision under sub-sections 3 and 4 is taken by the State Government.\" The first respondent, therefore, continued to serve the Magadh Medical College on an adhoc basis from and after the date of the notification under sub-sec. (I) of section 3. The result was that the contract of the first respondent with the owners of the Magadh Medical College under the letter of appointment given to him, did not devolve on the State Government but came to an end and the first respondent became an employee of the State Government on an ad hoc basis.\n\nThe first respondent could not thereafter contend that he was entitled to continue in service until be reaches the age of 62 years. That. would be directly contradictory of the position that he continued to serve the State Government on an ad hoc basis. It is elementary that when a persol) is appointed c .1 an ad hoc basis, his tenure is precarious and he cannot claim to continue in service until the age of superannuation.\n\nNow the State Government appointed a Committee called t c Screening Committee under sub-section (2) of section 6 and the Screening Committee rcommended that all teachers beyond the age of 58 years may be retired subject to reappointment, if there are no qualified substitutes. The argument of the first respondent which appealed to the High Court was that the Screening Committee had po power under sub-section (2) of section 6 to make a recommenda-\n\n• •, ~-\n\n'~I\n\n. ,:::\n\n~·.\n\nPIHAR v. YOGENDRA SINGH (Bhagwati, J.) 339\n\ntion in regard to the age of superannuation of the teaching staff of the Medical College taken over by the State Government. This argument is, in our opinion, fallacious, in as much as it is based on reading of subsection (2) of section 6 as if it stood alone and does not take into account the effect of sub-section (3) upon it. Subsec.(2) of section 6 undoubtly provides that the Committee of Experts appointed under that provision will examine the bio-data of each member of the staff and ascertain whether appointment, promotion or confirmation of such person was made in accordance with the University Regulations and in keeping with the guidelines laid down by the Medical Council of- India and will also take into consideration all other relevant material. including length of service in the college and submit its report to the State Government. But it is clear fro, m sub-section (2) of section 6 that the Committee of Experts appointed under sub-section (2) of that section can also make recommendations in regard to \"the rank, pay, allowances and other conditions. of service\" of the teaching staff. It was therefore, not beyond the competence of the Screening Committee to make recommendations in regard to the age of superannuation of the teaching stalf of the Medical Colleges taken over by the State Government.\n\nBut, even if we are wrong in iaking this view, it is clear that under sub-section (3) of section 6 the State Government had power to redetermine \"the rank, pay, allowances and other conditions of service\" of the teaching staff and \"other conditions of service\" would include the age of superannuation. The State Government was therefore, clearly within its power unner sub-section (3) of section 6 to redetermine the age of superannuation and provide that the services of all teachers in the Medical Colleges taken over by the State Government shall be terminated after giving them one month notice, if they' have attained the age of 62 years or more than 58 years, but less than 62 years.\n\nObviously, when a member of the teaching staff becomes an employee of the State Government, he would be governed by the same age of superannuation which is applicable to other governments servants, namely, 58 years and it was for this reason that the State Government redetermined the age of superannuation of the teaching staff of the Medical Colleges taken over by it at 53 years and directed that the services of those who have attained the age of 58 years should be terminated after giving one month's notice. We may point out that, quite apart from the power expressly conferred under sub-section (3) of section 6, the State Government would have power to terminate the services of any person employed on an ; i.d. l!oc basis. The termination of service\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (J982j 3 S.C.ll.\n\nof the first respondent was therefore, perfectly valid and the High Court was in error in granting relief to the first respondent.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition of the first respondent.\n\nHaving regard to the fact that the first respondent is merely a teacher in a Medical College, we direct that there will be no order as to costs throughout.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n.,, y", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "332\n\nSTATB OF BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "YOGBNDRA SINGH COL. (RBTD.)\n\nANDOTHBR\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "YOGENDRA SINGH COL. (RETD.) 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PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yogendra Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 231, "end_char": 245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 1, 1982 C Bihar Private Medical Col/ege1 (Taking over) Act 1978-Meaning and\n\neffect of sections 3 ond 6, explained,\n\nDr. Yogendra Singh col was appointed Professor of Surgery in the Magadh Medical College and as per the !", "canonical_name": "YOGE1'DRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 516, "end_char": 525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11-9-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 837, "end_char": 846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-9-1980, the Principal of the Magadh College, based on the circular dated 3-9-1980 issued by the State Government, after accepting the recommendation of the Screenihg Comniittee, issued a notice to Dr. Col."}}, {"text": "Magadh College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 869, "end_char": 883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-9-1980, the Principal of the Magadh College, based on the circular dated 3-9-1980 issued by the State Government, after accepting the recommendation of the Screenihg Comniittee, issued a notice to Dr. Col."}}, {"text": "3-9-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 913, "end_char": 921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-9-1980, the Principal of the Magadh College, based on the circular dated 3-9-1980 issued by the State Government, after accepting the recommendation of the Screenihg Comniittee, issued a notice to Dr. Col."}}, {"text": "10-10-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1114, "end_char": 1124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "informing him that bis services will be terminated with effect rrom 10-10-1980."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1155, "end_char": 1174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ petition filed in the High Court of Patna challenging the said order of termination of his services was allowed by the High Court taking the view that by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 3, the obligation to continue Dr. Col in service upto the age of 62 years devolved on the State Government on the taking over or the Magadh Medical College under sub-section (1) of section 3 and the State Government had no power under subsection (3) of section 6 to terminate bis services prior to his attaining the age of superannuation and hence the order dated 11-9-1980 was invalid."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1316, "end_char": 1325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Magadh Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1457, "end_char": 1479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ petition filed in the High Court of Patna challenging the said order of termination of his services was allowed by the High Court taking the view that by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 3, the obligation to continue Dr. Col in service upto the age of 62 years devolved on the State Government on the taking over or the Magadh Medical College under sub-section (1) of section 3 and the State Government had no power under subsection (3) of section 6 to terminate bis services prior to his attaining the age of superannuation and hence the order dated 11-9-1980 was invalid."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1577, "end_char": 1586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2426, "end_char": 2435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2718, "end_char": 2727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 3981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "339 E-G]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L.N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General of India, K.G. Bhagat and D.\n\nGoburdhan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5167, "end_char": 5178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General of India, K.G. Bhagat and D.\n\nGoburdhan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D.\n\nGoburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5183, "end_char": 5196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General of India, K.G. Bhagat and D.\n\nGoburdhan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y. S, Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5222, "end_char": 5235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S, Chitale, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S, Chitale, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Ranjit Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S, Chitale, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S, Chitale, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar and S. Goswami for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5344, "end_char": 5354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.P. Singh for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B.P. Singh"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the Patna High Court quashing and setting aside the termination of service of the !", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Magadh Medical College, Gaya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5880, "end_char": 5908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I st respondent was appointed Professor of Surgery in the Magadh Medical College, Gaya in December; 1975 and he joined bis post as Professor of Surgery on 27th December, 1975."}}, {"text": "27th December, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I st respondent was appointed Professor of Surgery in the Magadh Medical College, Gaya in December; 1975 and he joined bis post as Professor of Surgery on 27th December, 1975."}}, {"text": "Magadh University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter • of appointment which set out the terms and conditions of service provided that the appointment would be subject to such regulations as might be in force from time to time in the Magadh University to which the Magadh Medical College was affiliated."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6682, "end_char": 6687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in or about the middle of 1976 a drastic change took place, as the Bihar Private Medical Colleges (Taking of Management) Ordinance, 1976 .(herein• after referred to at the Ordinance) was promulgated by the Governor of Bihar authorising the State Government by a notification to take over the management of any private Medical College and to exercise such functions of management in regard to such College as might be a specified in the notification."}}, {"text": "st July, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st July, 1978."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7223, "end_char": 7232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8244, "end_char": 8253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the guidelines laid down by the Medical Council of India and taking into consideration all other relevant materials including length of scTce in the College, and submit its report to the State Government."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10344, "end_char": 10353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.agadh Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10619, "end_char": 10642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that pursuant to section 3 of the Act a notification was issued by the State Government taking .. over the Magadh Medical College with the result that the management and control of the Magadh Medical College became exercisable by the State Government and all the assets and properties of the M.agadh Medical College D stood transferred to and became vested in the State Government and all its liabilities and obligations also devolved on the State Government."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10896, "end_char": 10905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd September, J980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11439, "end_char": 11458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government on the basis of this recommendation issued a circular letter dated 3rd September, J980 addressed to the Principals of various Medical Colleges taken over by the State Government which included the Magadh Medical College, advising the Principals that \"services of all the Directly appointed teachers in the Medical Colleges who have attained the age of 62 years or more than 58 years but less than 62 years be terminated after giving them one month's notice.\" ?"}}, {"text": "YOGE1'DRA SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11886, "end_char": 11901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st resp9ndnt had already attained\n\nhlHAR •• YOGE1'DRA SINGH (Bhagwati, J.) 337\n\nthe age of 58 years and the Principal of the Magadh.", "canonical_name": "YOGE1'DRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st resp9ndnt had already attained\n\nhlHAR •• YOGE1'DRA SINGH (Bhagwati, J.) 337\n\nthe age of 58 years and the Principal of the Magadh.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Magadh.Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11967, "end_char": 11989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st resp9ndnt had already attained\n\nhlHAR •• YOGE1'DRA SINGH (Bhagwati, J.) 337\n\nthe age of 58 years and the Principal of the Magadh."}}, {"text": "11th September, _l 980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12027, "end_char": 12049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Medical College, therefore; addressed a letter dated 11th September, _l 980 to\n\nthe 1st respondent informing him that since bis age was more thal!"}}, {"text": "10th October, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was that by virtue of this letter addressed by the Principal to, the 1st respondent, the service of the 1st respondent was terminated with effect from 10th October, 1980,\n\nThe first respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court of Patna challenging the termination of his service by the Principal of the\" Magadh Medical College and claiming a declaration that he is entitled to continue in service until he reaches the age of 62 years."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12849, "end_char": 12858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13051, "end_char": 13060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13604, "end_char": 13618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar thereupon preferred the present appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 13956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14386, "end_char": 14395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14935, "end_char": 14944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15276, "end_char": 15285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15311, "end_char": 15320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15432, "end_char": 15441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15704, "end_char": 15713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15857, "end_char": 15873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16072, "end_char": 16081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16911, "end_char": 16920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17226, "end_char": 17235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17559, "end_char": 17568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17674, "end_char": 17683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical Council of- India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18001, "end_char": 18026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsec.(2) of section 6 undoubtly provides that the Committee of Experts appointed under that provision will examine the bio-data of each member of the staff and ascertain whether appointment, promotion or confirmation of such person was made in accordance with the University Regulations and in keeping with the guidelines laid down by the Medical Council of- India and will also take into consideration all other relevant material."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18226, "end_char": 18235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18747, "end_char": 18756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19046, "end_char": 19055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19958, "end_char": 19967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_341_370_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "341 A\n\nNAGESH BISTO DESAI ETC. ETC.\n\nKHANDO TIRMAL . DESAI ETC. ETC.\n\nMarch 2, 1982\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.)\n\nBombay P0rgana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act 1950-Section 4(1} and Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act 1955-Section 7-Scope Of-Wotan properties if impartible-Members of joint family-If entitled to a share in the wata11 projUfties. ·\n\nThe plaintiff's father was the last holder of the office of Desai. After bis Cleath the plaintiff, whb W!J.S his eldest son, was recognised as the watandar. In\n\n1904 service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted.by the imposition D of 'judi' or quit-rent. Under s. 4 (l) of the Bomay Pargana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 ands. 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscel- Janeous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 all the watan lands were re-granted to the plaintiff and he was deemed to be the occupant thereof Within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.\n\nThe plaintiff (appellant) filed a suit against respondents wlio were members of a joint Hindu family holding properties described as Kundgol Deshg8t Estate claiming a declaration that the estate formed.an impartible estate governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture. The plaintiff claimed that as the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to remain in full and exclusive J)ossession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that other members of the family bad no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence and in the alternative for partition and separation of 1/6 share therein.\n\nDenying all the plaintiff's claims the respondents pleaded that the entire properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were therefore liable to be partitioned.\n\nRejecting all the claims of the appellant the Trial Court held that the pro- G perties belonged to the joint Hindu Family and were therefore partible.\n\nOn appeal the High Court, subject to a modification, upheld the decree of the court of first instance.\n\nThe question at issue in the appeal to this Court was whether, (I) oven assuming that the estate was impartible and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture by custom as pleaded, the igi~!lts of imartiiitr M well M t~~ ~.I~ ~(\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R. ·\n\nlineal primogeniture being nothing more than an incident of the watan, stood abrogated bys. 3(4) of the 19SO Act ands. 4 of the 19S5 Act and as such it was not open tO the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom,\n\n(2) with the resumption of the watan and the re-grant of the watan lands to him, the suit properties lost their character as being joint family property and had become, under the provisions of the 1950 and 1955 Acts, the plaintiff's exclusive property by reason of his status as watandar and as such wefc not capable of being partitioned.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : It is well settled that property though impartible may bo the ances- tral property of the Joint Hindu Family. The impartibility of the estate doe5 not per se destfoy its nature as joint family _property or render it the separate property of the last holder, so as to destroy the right of survivorship; hence, the estate retains its character of joint fami1y property and its devolution is governed by the rule of survivorship. To establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which ther~ is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or implie.d, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their succession to the estate. [3S4 C-D]\n\nMarland Rao v. Malhar Rao; [!928] SS IA 4S: AIR 1928 PC 10: 107 IC 7: Adrishappa v. Gurushidappa, (1880) 7 IA 162: !LR (1880) 4 Bom. 494: 7 Cal. LR 1 (PC); Vinayak Waman Joshi Rayarlkar v. Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar, [1903] 30 IA 77: !LR (1903) 27 Born. 3S3: 7 Cal. WN 409; Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumarl Debi, (1932) S9 IA 331: AIR 1932 PC 216: 138 IC 861; Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal, (1934) 61 IA 286: AIR 1934 PC 157: CIT v.\n\nDewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore, (1941) 68 IA lSS: AIR 1941 PC 120; Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil, (1943) 70 IA 232: AIR 1943 PC 196 and Chlnnathayl v. Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker, [19S2] SCR 241; AIR 19S2 SC 29, relied on.\n\nMirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur\n\nv. Shri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapalhi Raj, [1964] 2 SCR 403: AIR 1964 SC 118 and Rajah Ve/ugoti Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu v. Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna.\n\nKumara Krishna Yachendra Varu, (1969) 3 SCC 281: [1970) 3 SCR 88: AIR 1970 SC 1795, distinguished.\n\nNeelklslo Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor, (1867-69) 12 MIA 523; Rani Sarlaj Kuari v. Rani Deoraj Kuari (1888) 15 IA Si: !LR (1888) 10 All 272 (PC); Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. Court of Wards, (1899) 26 IA 83: !LR (1899) 22 Mad. 383 (PC); Raja Ram Rao v. Raja of Pillapur, (1918) 4S IA 148: AIR 1918 PC 81; Baifnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh, (1921) 48 IA 19S: AIR 1921 PC 62 and Bhaiya Ramanuj Pralap Deo v. Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo (1981) 4 SCC 613, referred to.\n\n2. The plaintiff's contention runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay jlereditar1 ()flie j\\ct, 1874, ~114 io aoainst settled legal principles. The plain-\n\nNAosslI v. KHANOO riRMAL (Sen, J.)\n\ntiff's rights to such watan properties, whatever they were, were subject to the rights of the other members of tho family. [359 C-D]\n\nIn the former Bombay Presidency, a Desghat watan had always been treated to be the joint family property and the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan property tho exclusive property of the person who\n\nwas the watandar for tho time being.\n\n3. The definition of the term Hwatandar\" as contained in s. 4 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act is in two parts: the first sets out what \"watandar\"\n\nmeans and the other states what is included in it, that is, the entire definition of watandar must be looked upon as one, the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in first part. Thus, a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to such office was also a ''watandar\" within the meaning of the Watan Act. There can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to prcServe to pre-existing rights of the members of a joint Hindu family. The expression ''wataD.dar Of the same watan'' would include members of the fainily other than thewatandar, who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan prOperty.\n\n[359 G-H 361 F]\n\nVijaysingrao Balasaheb Shinde Desai v. Janardanrao Narayanrao Shind~ Defai, 51 Bom. LR 556: AIR 1949 Bom. 314; Kadappo Bapurao Desaiv. Krishtappa Bachappa Desai, 37 Bom. LR 599: AIR 1935 Bom. 380 and Laxmibai Sa4a shi• Dal• v. Gan•sh Shankar Date, (1977) 79 Born. LR 234: AIR 1977 Bom. 350, approved.\n\nTarabai Sriniwa• Naik Gutta/ v. Murtacharya Anantacharya, 41 Born., LR 924: AIR 1939 Bom. 414, overruled.\n\n4. The commutation Of service under •. 15(3) of the Watan Act by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of 'judi' or quit-rent chargedupon the watan land unless where it was otherwise provided for, had not the effect of con~ verting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of the alionability, but to leave thorn attached to tho hereditary offices, which although free from tho performance of services, remain in tact. Dospile commutation of service, the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liabi~ lity to perform service, and on that account the character of the watan lands still remained attached to the grant. [364 D-F]\n\nCo/let:tor of South Satara v. Laxman Mahadev D'3hpand•, [1964] 2 SCR 48: AIR 1964 SC 326, relied on.\n\nAppafl Bapufl v. K'4hav.Slumlrav, ILR (1891) 15 Bom. 13, referred to.\n\nBachhararn Datta Patil v. Vishwanath Pundalik Patil, [1956] SCR 675: AIR 1957 SC 34: 1956 SCJ 721, referred to.\n\n344 SUPREME COUkT RllPORTS [19821 3 s.c.R.\n\n5. The irnpartibility of the watan lands of the applicability or the rule of lineal primogeniture regarding succession to the estate, by the alleged custom as plead ed, being nothing more than an incident of the watan, stood extinguished by s.3(4) of the 1950 Act and s.4 of the 1955 Act. The effect of these Acts was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan lands but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under the personal law. That being so, the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the . watan land along with the watandar for the time being and therefore the re-\n\n8:rant of the lands to the watandar under s. 4(1) of the 1950 Act and under s. 3 of the 1955 Act must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family.\n\n(365 C, E; 367 E]\n\n6. Section 4(2) of the 1950 Act ands. 7(3) of the 1955 Act do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a. partition once the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. [370 BJ\n\n, Laxmibai Sadashiv Datt v. Ganesh Shankar Date, (1977) 79 Born. LR 234: AIR 1977 Born. 350 and Dhondi Vithoba Kofi v. Mahadeo Dagdu Kofi, (1973) 75 Born. LR 290: AIR 1973 Born. 323, approved.\n\nKalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Ka/gonda Patil, (1975) 78 Born. LR 720, overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 'civil Appeals Nos. 615-617/ 73, 618-20/73 and 1850 to 1852 of 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd June, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No. 157/56 E Regular Appeal (Bl No. 16/57 & RA (B) 6 of 1958.\n\nU.R. La/it, S.S. Javali D.P. Singh & Ravi Parkash, for the Appellants in CA. 1850-52/72, R-5 in CA. 615/73, R-2 i.n CA. 616/73, R-6 in CA. 617/73 and R-3 in CA. Nos. 618-20/73.\n\nB.D. Bal, R.B. Datar & Miss Madhu Moolchandani, for the Appellant in C.A. Nos. 615-617/73, R-5 in CA. Nos. 1850-52/72 & for R-1 in CA. Nos. 618-620/73.\n\nS.T. Desai, K. N. Bhat & Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA. 618-620/73, RR 2 and 3 in CA. 1850 to 1851/72, RR. 2,3, 17 & 18 in CA. 1852/72, RR 2, 3 in CA. 615/73, RR 10 & 11 in CA. 616/73 & for RR l, 2, 4,5 in CA. 617/73.\n\nS.B. Bhasame, K.A. Naik, & M.R.K. Pillai for R-1 in CA.\n\nNos. 1850-52/72, CA 615-16/73, Rl4 in CA. 617173 and R-2 in CA. 618-620/'13.\n\nH K.R. Nagaraja & Alok Bhatacharya for R-12 in CA. Nos. 1850-52/72, CA. 615/73, R-9 in CA. 617/73, R-13 in.CA. 617/73 and R!O in CA, 618-620 of 1973.\n\n._ '*\n\nNAOESH v. ltHANDo TIRMAL (Sen, i.)\n\nP.R. Ramasesh, for RR 13, 15 (a) to (c) in CA. 1852/72, RR 15 & 17 in CA. 617/73 and RR 11, 14 (a) (c) and (d) in CA. 6l8/73.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. These nine consolidated appeals on certificate are directed from a common judgment and decree of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore dated June 22; 1962 which affirmed, subject to a modification, the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Senior\n\nDivision, Dharwar, dated July 5, 1956, substantially dismissing the plaintiff's claim for declaratioµ of title to, and possession of, certain watan properties and decreeing instead his alternative claim for partition and separate possession of his one-sixth share therein.\n\nTheprincipal question in controversy in these appeals is whether ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950 (for short 'Act No. 60 of 1950') and ss. 4 and 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 (for short 'Act No. 22 of 1955'), which provided for abolition of watans and alienations in the merged territories, resumption of watan land and its re-grant, to the holder for the time being, which brought about a change in the tenure or the character of holding as watan land, affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law.\n\nThe suit out of which these appeals arise, was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai, as plaintiff, claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisio Desai defendants Nos.2 & 3, mother Smt. Akkavva alias Parvathibai, defendant No. 4, brother Bhimaji Marland Desai, defendant No.5 who had gone in.adoption to Marland, member of a junior branch and father's brother's son Khando Tirmal Desai, defendant No. I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol\n\nknown as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos. 2 to 5, for exclusive possession of insignia of honour described in Schedule E and one-third share in the family movables described\n\n'A\n\n346 SUPlllME couat Rl!Mats\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.l.\n\nin Schedule D. Alternatively, in the event of the Court holding that the properties des.cribed in Schedule B, C and D, were properties belonging to the joint Hindu family, the plaintiff claimed partition and separate possession of his one-sixth share therein.\n\nIt will be convenient, in 'the first place, to refer briefly to the history of the estate, to set out the pedigree showing the descent from a common ancestor and to show how the present case arose.\n\nThe plaintiff's suit is brought on the allegation that the Deshgat family of Kundgol Paragana of which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are members is a very ancient and respectable one in the State of Jamkhandi which later merged in the then Province of . Bombay and is now in the State of K.arnataka. The lands and cash allowances described in Schedule B para (i) and (iii) are the emoluments of the district hereditary office of Desai. Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family. This amount, together with the cash allowance and the service lands appurtenant to the office of Desai and the houses and open sites form the impartible estate called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate, which was partly located within the territory of former fendatory State of Jhamkhandi and party in the territories of the then British India.\n\nThe first inam was granted at the time of Thimappa in 1575. All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rulers of Bijapur during the period from 1575 A.O. to 1694 A.O. with a couple of other grants received from the Chief of Jamkhandi during the period from 1120 A.D. to 1826 A.D. The watan has remained with the family which held the hereditary office of Desai for over four centuries. In 1904, service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted by the imposition of a \"judi\" or quit-rent.\n\nProperties described in Schedules F ad G have been in possession of the two junior branches descended frooi Gundopant and Lingappa from 1825 A.O. and 1854 A.O. respectively and are being enjoyed by them even now.\n\nThe plaintiff's father, Bistappa, the last holder of the office of Desai died on July 27, 1931 leaving behind him his widow Smt.\n\nAkkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal. Out\n\nof them, Bhimarao had gone in adoption to Marland. member of a junior branch.\n\nUpon, his father's. death the plaintiff Nagesh Bisio Desai was recognised to be the watandar. The plaintiff's cousin is Khandappa.\n\nThe subjoined genealogical' table gives the relationship of the parties belonging to the senior branch descended from Thimappa.\n\nl Nagesh (plaintiff)\n\nGENEALOGICAL TABLE\n\nI Rama pp a\n\nI . Bistappa (adopted)\n\nI I Ramappa (died 1924)\n\nBistappa (died 193 J) =Smt. Akkevva (Deft 4)\n\nI I Bhimrao (went in adoption to Marland)\n\nI Khanderao\n\nI Thimappa\n\nI I Nagappa\n\nI Pantoji\n\nI .\n\nI Gundopant\n\nI Nilkant !\n\nMallappa\n\nI Marland\n\nI Bistappa (went in adoption) I lmnagappa\n\nI Tirmallappa\n\nI Khandappa (Deft. 1)\n\nGanesh=Smt. Indirabai (Deft. 2) (Deft. 9)\n\nBhimrao (Adopted Deft. 5)\n\nGopal=Smt. Kashibai (Deft. 3) (Deft. 10)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.a.\n\nA It appears that after the death of the plaintiff's father in 1931, in the mutation proceedings that followed, the plaintiff first made a claim that the watan being impartible according to the custom of the family, he became the exclusive owner of the entire watan properties.\n\nAlthough his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando. In consequence of this, the plaintiff accepted before the revenue authori ties that the properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and refrai- C ned from making any claim on the footing of the properties being impartible. In 1945, the plaintiff's brother Bhimarao defendant No. 5 who .had gone inadoption to Marland, started asserting a claim to 7.\n\nMars of land and right of residence in the family Wada and this bad the support of the plaintiff's mother Smt. Akkavva. The defendant D . No. 5 Bhimarao in assertion of his claim brought Special Suit No. 51\n\nof 1949, in the Civil Court at Kundgol on the basis of the properties being impartible. In June 1946, the plaintiff leased out some home farm lands to defendants 6, 7 and 8, and this gave rise to proceedings uner s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Sub-Divilsional Magistrate Kundgol passed an order restraining defendants 2, 3 and \\5 from disturbing the possession of defendants\n\n6, 7 and 8 and this \\>rder was kept in. force by the former State of ·- Jamkhandi till merger in the former State of Bombay in August,\n\nI 948. The State Government revoked the order with effect from December 15, 1948, as a result of which the defendents 6, 7 and 8 brought suits for injunction. Due to discord in the family, the plaintiff left the ancestral residential house at Kundgol and started residing in his bungalow. The plaintiff has admittedly been regranted all the watan land under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of G 1950 ands. 7 of Act No. 22 of 1955 as if it were an unalienated\n\nland, being the bolder of the watan to which it appertained, and he is deemed to be an occupant thereof within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.\n\nThe defendants filed separate written statements and repudiated the plaintiff's claim of imPartibility. They denied that the suit\n\nNAGBSH v. KHANDO 'IIRMAL (Sen, i.\\ 349\n\nproperties formed an impartible estate and that succession to the estate was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.\n\nThe defendant No. I asserted that there had been at least three partitions in the family. According to him, the allotment of the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa represented allotment of shares 'on partition. He pleaded that all the properties described in Schedules B C D and E were joint family properties and claimed one-half share therein. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3, in their written statement, also asserted that the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were shares allotted to them on partition.\n\nThe defendant No. 4 supported the case pleaded by her sons defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The defendant No. 5, however, pleaded that there had never been a p:.rtition in the family and that the entire properties, that is to say, the properties described in the plaint Schedules B to G continued to be joint family properties wherein he claimed one-fourth share. The remaining defendants also denied that the suit properties were impartible.\n\nThe learned trial Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim that he 'E was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the aforementioned properties being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate and that other members had no right, title or interest therein except as to maintenance as junior members and held instead that properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were, therefore, partible. He further held that the properties described in Schedules F and G in possession of the junior branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were not allotted to them as their share on partition and therefore had to be put into th.e hotchpot. He accordingly passed a preliminary decree for partition, declaring the plaintiff's share to be one-twentyfourth of the entire estate and to other minor reliefs. On appeal, the High C!>urt upheld the judgment of the trial Judge, holding that the suit properties were not\n\nimpartible and were therefore liable to partition, but it set asido\n\n35() (1~82) j S.C.R.\n\nthe direction with regard to Schedules F and G properties on the finding that the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa had separated from the jt>int family. It accordingly modified the decree of the learned trial Judge and held that the plaintiff was entitled to one-sixth share in the properties described in Schedules B to E.\n\nArguments in these appeals have been confined to the question as to whether, as a matter of law, even if it were assumed that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was an impartible estate, and. that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture,· the incident of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand extinguished by Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955, and it is no longer open to the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom of impartibility or the rule of lineal primogeniture.\n\nThe questions that fall for determination in these appeals are, firstly, whether the impartibility of the tenure of a paragana watan appertaining to the office of a Hereditary District (Paragana) Officer in respect of which a commutation settlement has been effected, regulating succession to the property, by reason of family custom or a local custom being the incidents of such watan stands abolished by virtue of s. 3 of Act No. 60 of 1950 ors. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955, and, secondly, whether the watan lands lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan under s. 3 of Act No. 60 of 1950 or s.4 of Act No. 22 of 1955 and re-grants thereof were exclusive to the plaintiff under s. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955, by reason of his status as the watandar and therefore, they belonged to the plaintiff and were not capable of partition. There is no merit in any of these submissions.\n\nIt is argued that impartibility of the tenure was not an inci- G dent of the grant but the watan was impartible by custom and succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.\n\nOur attention is drawn to the averment contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint:\n\nH \"The Kundgol Deshgat Estate, along with the estates of two other District Hereditary Offices of Nadgir and\n\n, .....\n\nNAGESH v. ttHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 351\n\nDeshpande of Kundgol is impartible by custom and succession to it is governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.\n\nThis custom is ancient, invariable, definite and reasonable.\n\nIt is both a family custom and also a local custom prevailing in the families of Paragana Watandar of Kundgol\n\nIt is urged that in case of an impartible estate, the right to partition and the right of joint enjoyment arc from the very nature of the property incapable of existence and therefore, the courts below were in\n\n- error dismissing the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that being the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. It is further urged that even assuming that impartibility of the estate or the rule of primogeniture regulating succession were an incident of the watan the suit properties lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan and the re-grants of the suit lands were exclusively to the plaintiff under sub-s. (I) of s 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and sub-s. (I) of s. 7 of Act No. 22 of 1955, by reason of his status as the watandar and, therefore, they exclusively belonged to the plaintiff and they were not capable of being partitioned.\n\nThere is no merit in the submission.\n\nThe decision of these appeals must turn on the question whether the impartibility of the estate and the rule of lineal primogeniture by which succession to it was governed makes the suit properties the self acquired or exclusive properties of the plaintiff and, therefore, cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds between the members of the joint family .. In Marland Rao v. Malhar Rao,(') the Privy Council ruled as follows :\n\n\"If an impartible estate existed as such from before the advent of British Rule, any settlement or regrant thereof by the British Governmnt must, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and unless inconsistent with the express terms of the new settlement, be presumed to continue the estate with its previous incide1113 of impartibility and succession by special custom.''\n\nIt also held in that case :\n\n(I) L.R. [1928] SS I.A. 4~,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.C.R.\n\n\"When there is a dispute with respect to an estate being impartible or otherwise the onus lies on the party who alleges the existence of a custom different from the ordinary law of inheritance, according to which custom the estate is to be held by a single member, and as such, not liable to partition. In order to establish that any estate is impartible, it must be proved that it is from its nature impartible and descendible to a single person, or that it is impartible and descendible by virtue of a special custom.\"\n\n\"Any such special custom modifying the ordinary law of succession must be ancient and invariable and must be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence.\"\n\nThe courts below in their well considered judgments have considered minutely and elaborately the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, led by both the parties on the question of custom, and have come to a definitive finding that the evidence is of little or no assistance to establish the alleged custom pleaded by the plaintiff as to the impartibility of the estate or the rule of lineal primogeniture. They have held in favour of the defendants on this basic issue and substantially dismissed the plaintiff's suit claiming full and exclusive title.\n\nThat part of the judgment has rightly not been assailed before us, and the argument has proceeded on the footing that even if the Kundgol Dcshgat Estate were an impartible estate, and that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture the incidents of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand exting.uished by Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955.\n\nIt bas always been the accepted view that the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan properties the exclusive property of the person who is the watandar for the time being.\n\nIn order to understand the arguments on this point, it is necessary to deal with the incidents of a Deshgat watan.\n\nIn the Bombay Presidency, it has always been treated to be the joint (amily property. It may be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Adrishappa v. Gurshindappa,(1) the headnote of which is that :\n\n(!) i,, R. (1880) 7 J, A. 162.\n\ni NAGESH v. ICBANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.)\n\n.\"Deshgat watan or property held as appertaining to the office of Desai is not to be assumed prima facie to be impartible. The burde_n of proving the impartibility lies upon the Desai, and on his failing to prove a special tenure or a family or district or local custom to that effect, the ordinary law of succession applies.\"\n\nIn a suit for partition of property forming part of a Deshgat estate brought by the younger brothers against their eldest brother who held the hereditary district office of Desai, partly within the State of Jamkhandi and partly within the territory of British India, the defence was that the watan was held by him as an impartible estate and that he was entitled being the watandar to be in full and exclusive possession thereof, subject to a right by custom, that a brother should receive maintenance out of the income derived from it. The Court of first instance having found that there was no invariable rule against the partition of a Deshgat watan, the High Court refused to allow effect to be given to what had not been proved to be \"the established governing rule of the family, class or district\" sufficient to establish. the impartibility of the estate and held that the watan in question was subject to the general Hindu law, including the presumption as to the right to partition belongin~ to the members of the family to which it had descended. The Judicial Committee upheld the decision of the High Court holding that there was no general presumption in favour of the impartibility of an estate of this kind as to shift the burden of proof; the burden of proof was upon the Desai, who seeks to show that the property devolved upon him alone, in contra\\'.ention of the ordinary rule or succession according to the Hindu law, and that no sufficient evidenee had been given by the watandar either of family custom, or of district custom, to prevent the operation of the ordinary rule of law whereby the property would be partibJe.\n\nIn Vinayak Woman Joshi Rayarikar v. Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar & Ors.,(1) th.e Court of first instance held that by custom a Deshgat Inam had become impartible and hence dismissed the suit for pai:tition. On appeal, the High Court reversed upon the view that the mere fact that the management remained in the hands of th~ ~*IQst ranch was not sufflcieot to\n\n~1) L.R. (1903) 30 I.A. 77,\n\n354 (1982} 3 s.c.R.\n\nestablish the plea that the estate was impartible. While affirming. the decision of the Higlt Court, the Privy Council followed its earlier decision in Adrishappa 13 caJe (supra), and aereed with the conclusion arrived at by the Hlah Court that :\n\n\"Neither by the terms of the original grant nor of the subsequent orders of the ruling power, nor by family custom, nor by adverse possession (if such there could be in a case like this, the eldest branch of the family acquired a right to perpetual management of the villaae or in conse- . quence to resist its partitio~}.\"\n\nIt is a trite proposition that property though impartible may be the ancestral property of the joint Hindu family. The impartibility of property does not per se destroy its nature as joint family property or rener it the separate property of the last holder, so as to destroy the right of survivorship; hence the estate retains its character of joint f amity property and devolves by the general law upon that person who being in fact and in law joint in respect of the estate is also the senior member in the senior line.\n\nAs observed by Sir Dinsbaw Mulla in his celebrated judgment in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kummi Debi & Ors.' (1)\n\n\"The keynote of the whole position, in their Lordships view, is to be found in the following passage in the judgment in the Tipperah case :(2)\n\n''Where a custom is proved to exist, it supersedes the general'' law, which, however, still regulates an beyond the custom\"\n\n\"Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom. In the case of ordinary joint family property, the members of the family have (I) the right of partition, (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity, (3) the right of maintenance and\n\n(4) the right of survivorship. The first of these rights cannot exist in the case of an impartible estate, though.\n\nancestral, from the very nature of the estate. The secon<f\n\n(1) L.R. (1931-32) 59 I.A. 331 1\n\n(f) 12 M.l.A. 5~.\n\n~ ,,._\n\n~ (\n\n' )\n\nNAGESH v. ICHANDO TIRltAL (Sen, J.) 355\n\nis incompatible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Kuari' s(1) case and the first Pittapur cl1se;(') and so al.so the third as held in the second Pittapur case.(') To this extent the general law of the Mitakshara has been superseded by custom, and the impartible.estate though ancestral is clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. But the right of survivorship is not inconsistent with the custom 'of impartibility. This right; therefore, Still remaiDS, and this is What was. held in Baijnath's case:(') To this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property, and its devolution is governed by the general Mitaksh11ra law applicable to such property. Though the other rights which a coparcene:r acquires by birth in joint family property no longer exist, the birth-right of the sei; iior member to take by survivorship still remains. Nor is this right a mere spes succession is similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate. It is a right which is capable of being renounced and surrendred. Such being their Lordships' view, it .follows that in order to establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which there is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or\n\nimplied, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate.\"\n\nSince the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh' s case (supra), it is well-settled that an estate is impartible does not make it the separate and exclusive property .o( the holder : where the property is ancestral and the holder has succeeded to it, it will be part of the joint estate of the undivided family .\n\nThe incidents of impartible estate laid down by the Privy G Council in Shiba Prasad Singh' s caie, supra, and the law as there stated, have been reaffirmed in the subsequent decision& qf I.he Privy\n\n(I) L.R. (1888) 15 I.A. 51.\n\n(2) L.R. (1899) 26 I.A. 83.\n\n(3) L.R. (1918) 45 I.A. 148.\n\n(4) L.R. 48 I.A. 195.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nCouncil and of this Court : Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mn/ & Ors'!(1) Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab. v. Krishna Kishore(') Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra.Patil (8) Chinnathavi Alias Veeralakshmi v. Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker & Anr('). Mirza Raja Shrl Pushavathi Vizlaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur & Ors. v. Shri Pushavathi Viseswar Gajapathl Raj & Ors.(') Rajah Velugotl Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu & Ors. v.\n\nRajah Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu & Ors.(1) and Bhaiya Ramanuf Pratap Deo v. Lalu. Maheshanuf Pratap Deo & Ors.(')\n\nIn Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal's case, supra, it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuarl's case and the First Pittapur's case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamiadari could be in any sense joint family property, this view apparently implied in these ca1es was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnarh Prasad Singh's case. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab v. Krishna Kishore's case dealing with an impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904, it was held that the right of junior members of the family for maintenance was governed by custom and was not based on any joint right or interest in the property as co-owners. In Anant Bhlkappa Patil's case supra, it was observed that an impartible estate is not held in coparcenary though it may be joint family property. It may develove as joint family property or as separate property of the last male bolder. In the former case, it goes by survivorship to that individual, among those male members who in fact and in law are undivided in respect of the estate, who is singled out by the special custom e.g. lineal male primogeniture. In the latter case, jointness and survivorship are not as such in point the estate devolves by inheritance by the last male holder in the order prescribed by the special custom or according to the ordinary law of inheritance as modified by the custom.\n\n(!) L.R. (1934) 61 I:A. 286.\n\n(2) LR. (1941) 68 I.A. 155. (3l L.R. (1942-43) 70 I.A. zn.\n\n(4) (1952] S.C.R. 241.\n\n(5) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 403.\n\n\n(7) [1982] I S.C.R. 417.\n\nNAOBSH v. KHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 357\n\nIn Chinnathavi's case. supra, it was observed that the dictum of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh case, supra, that to etab lish that an impartible estate has ceased to be joint family property for purposes of succession, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or implied, on the part of the junior members of the family to give up their chance of succeeding to the estate. The test to be applied is whether the facts show a clear intention to renounce or surrender any interest in the impartible estate or a relinquishment of the right of succession and an intention to impress upon the zamindari the character of separate property.\n\nIn Mirza Raja Gajapathl' s case, supra, it was observed that an ancestral impartible estate to which the •bolder has succeeded by the custom of primogeniture is part of the joint estate of the undivided Hindu family.\n\nThough the other rights enjoyed by the members of a joint Hindu family are inconsistent in the case of an impartible estate, the right survivorship still remains. In Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna's case, supra, it was observed that the only vestige of the incidents of joint family property, which still attaches to the joint family property is the right of survivorship which, of course, is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility.\n\nIn Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo's case, supra, the principles laid down by_ the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh'.< case were reiterated.\n\nIn the course of argument, great reliance was placed on the two decisions of this Court in Mirza Raja Ganapathl's case, supra and Raja Velugotl Kumara Krishna's case, supra, for the proposition that the junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no right of partition having regard to the very character of -the estate that it is impartible. To our mind, the contention cannot be accepted. Both the decisions in Mirza Raja Ganapathi's case, supra, and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna's case, supra, turned on the provision of the Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904. There are express provisions made in ss. 45 to 47 of the Abolition Act for the apportionment of compensation to the junior members of zamindari estates and subs (2) of s. 45 there of provides for payment of the capitalised value of the compensation amount to them on the basis of extinction of the estate. Thi: scheme of the Abolition Act therefore contemplates the continued existence of the rights of the holder of an impaftibl~ est11te vis-a-W~ th~ junior\n\n\n( 1982) 3 S.C.R •\n\nA members of such an estate. The facts involved in those cases were also entirely different.\n\nIn Mirza Raja Ganapathi' s case, supra it was a suit for partition for Vizianagrlim Estate, an ancient impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Aet 1904. The claim of the junior members regarding buildings which had been incorporated in the impartible estate as also their claim with regard to jewels treated as state regalia and therefore impressed with the family custom of impartibility was negatived. Ii was held that despite the fact that Vizinagram Estate had been notified to be an estate within the meaning of s.3 of the Madras Estate(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) ct, 1948, the extin- ·~ , guishment of the proprietary right, title and interest of the zamindar did not affect his right or title to the impartible properties outside the purview of that Act and governed by the Madras Impartible Esl!ltes ).\n\nAct, 1904, but as regards other . properties falling within the zamindari including lands were held to be partible. With regard to the buildings, it was held that the buildings in question were not partible by virtue of sub-s. (4) of s. 18 of the Act as the buildings falling within the section vested in \"the person who owned them immediately before the vesting\". The expression \"the person who owned\" in subs. (4) of s. 18 of the Act was held to refer to the land-holder and not to any other person. Further, the buildings were outside the E limits of the zamindari estate and therefore not covered by s. 3 of the Abolition Act. The claim with regard to jewels failed because they were part of the impartible estate.\n\nIn Raja Velugoli Kumara Krishna's case, supra, it was a suit F for partition by the junior members of Vankatgiri Estate, an ancient inipartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904. The suit was principally confined to the claim for a share to the Schedule B properties.\n\nThe contention was that the impartibility was continued under that Act but ceased when the estate vested in the State Government under s. 3 of the Madras G Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and this had the effect of changing character of the properties in the B Schedule and making them partible. It was said that the junior members had l\\ present right in the impartible estate and were entitled to share in the properties once it lost its character of impar• H tibility. The Court haci to consider the effect of the Abolition Act on the rihts and oblijlations of the members of the fainily and held ..\n\nNAGESiI v. KHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 359\n\nthat the Abolition Act has Jio application to properties which are outside the territorial limit of the Venkatgiri Estate. The claim that faifed was in relation to properties which did not form part of a 'zamindari estate' within the meaning of s. 1 (16) and therefore did not come within the purview af s. 3 of the Abolition Act but continued to be governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act,\n\n1904.\n\nThe contention that the plaintiff holding the District Heredi _,...._ ··~\" taty Office of Desai and being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof to the exclusion of the other members of the joint Hindu family, runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (for short 'the Watan Act'), and is against settled legal principles. The plaintiff's rights to such watan\n\nproperties whatever they were, subject to the rights of the other members of the family.\n\nThe terms 'Watandar' is defined ins. 4 of the Watan Act.\n\nIt readt:\n\nWatandar means a person having a hereditary interest in the Watan. It includes a person holding watan property acquired by him before the introduction of British Govern ment into the locality of the watan, or legally acquired subsequent to such introduction, and a person holding such\n\npo[>erty from him by inheritance. It includes a person adopted by an owner of a watan or part of a watan subject to the conditions speci lied in sections 33 to 35\".\n\nIf the. words used in the definition are strictly and literally construed, it would mean that before a person can be said to .be a watandar, he must have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and iii the hereditary office, because it is these two that constitute the watan. There is no basis whatever for such a strict construction.\n\nThe aefinition is undoubtedly in two parts : the first sets out what \"watandar''\"means and the other states what is included in it and the question arises whether the primary definition i.e. the meaning portion of it should be regarded as primary and the inclusive part as illustrative or both the parts should be regarded as constituting one whole definition, the inclusive part being supplementary to the former.\n\nThe controversy arising from the rival constructions\n\n360 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS [!9821 3 s .. c.a.\n\nplaced on the definition of \"watandar\" in s. 4 of the Watan Act was set at rest by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vijayasingrao Bala Saheb Shinde Desai v. Janardanrao Narayanrao Shinde Desai.(') Prior to that decision, two contlicting constructions on the definition had been placed by two DivisioR Benches of the Bombay High Court. In Kadappa v. Krlshtappa,(') an alienation of watan land by a watandar to his bhaubandh for maintenance was challenged and Rangnekar and Divatia, JJ. held that the alienation was valid beyond the life time of the watandar inasmuch as it was to a watandar of the same watan, in other words, the alienee who was a bhaubandb to whom a watan land had been transferred for maintenance regarded as a watandar though he had no interest in . the hereditary office and the rights and privileges attached to it. It would, therefore, appear that in Kndappa' s case, supra; the entire definition of watandar in s. 4 was looked upon as one, the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in the first part. In Smt. Tarabai v. Murtarharya.(') Sir John Beaumont C.J. and Wadia, J. however, struck a discordant note. It was that a person who merely acquired a watan property withont acquiring the office and without being under any obligation to perform services attached to the office was not a watandar within the meaning of the aforesaid definition; in other words, it held that the first part of the definition was exclusive an\\i exhaustive, the latter part being merely illustrative and the illustrations given in the latter part should fall within the ambit of the exclusive definition given in the first part, that is to say, the primary definition of a \"watandar\" in s.4 was that be was a person having a hereditary interest in a watan, i.e. the office and a property if any, and the subsequent words were merely explanatory of the primary definition and did not curtail it.\n\nIn view of this .conflict, the &pecific question referred to the Full Bench in Vijayaslngrao' s case, &upra, was \"Whether the term 'watandar' as defined in s. 4 of the Watan Act necessarily and always meant a person who had a hereditary interest not only in the watan property but also in the hereditary office\".\n\nAnd, on a conside.ration of the scheme and the relevant sections of the Watan Act and the two earlier decisions, the Full Bench preferred the construction\n\n(I) 51 Born L.R. 556.\n\n(2) 37 Born. L.R. 559.\n\n(3) 41 Born. L.R. 924. '\n\n' '>\n\nNAotsil \\>. KHANOO Till.MAL (Sen, J.)\n\nplaced on the term 'watandar' in Kadappa's case, supra, and conclu\n\nded that a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to each office was also a \"watandar' within the meaning of the Watan Act.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to preserve the pre-existing rights of the members of joint Hindu family.\n\nThe word 'family' is defined in s. 4 of the Watan Act to include 'each of the branches of the family descended from an original watandar' and the expression 'head of a family' is defined therein to include 'the chief representative of each branch of a family'. 'Representative watandar' defined in s. 4 meant 'a watandar registered by the Collector under section 25 as having a right to perform the duties of a hereditary office'. Section 5 of the Watan Act prohibited alienations of watan and watan rights. Clause (a) of sub-s.\n\n(I) of s. 5. thereof, referred to a watander in general and provided D that it won.Id not be competent to such a watandar to mortgage, charge, alienate or lease, for a period beyond the term of his natural life, any watan, or any part thereof, or interest therein, to or for the benefit of any person who is not a watandar of the same watan, without the requisite sanction. The expression 'watandar of the same watan' occurs in many sections of the Act. As already indicated E the term 'watandar' as defined in s. 4 includes the members of a joint Hindu family. It must (ollow as a necessary corollary tht the expression 'watandar of the same watan' would include members of the family Qther than the watandar, who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan property • • It is necessary to emphasize that commutation of service had not the effect of changing the nature of the tenure. The effect of the Gordon Settlement came up for consideration in The Collector of South Satara & Anr. v. Laxman Mahadev Deshpande & Ors.(') when the Court referred to the decision in Appaji Bapuji v. Kesha; Shamrav.(2) and quoted the following passage from the judgment of\n\nSargent, C.J., with approval :\n\n\"What is termed a Gordon Settlement was an Arrangement-entered. into in 1864 by a Committee, of which Mr.\n\n(I) (1964) 2 S.C.R. 48, •\n\n(2) (1890) l.L.R. IS Bom. 13.\n\n362 A\n\nstli>RBMil oouitt IU!PORTS (!982] 3 S.C.k.\n\nGordon, as Collector, was Chairman, acting on behalf of Government-with the watandars in the Southern Maratha Country, by which the Government relieved certain watandars in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of a 'judi' or quit rent charged upon the watanlands ................ the reports of Mr. Gordon's Committee on the Satara and Poona Districts and their correspondence with Government can, we think, leave no doubt that th.e settlements ma(le by that committee, unless it was otherwise, specially provided by any particular settlement, were not !intended by either party to these settlements, to convert the watan lands into the private property of the vatandars with the necessary incident of alienabili ty, but to leave.them attached to the hereditary offices, which aithough freed from the perfor mance of service remain.ed intact.\"\n\nD T)J.e Court continued :\n\n\"But the Commutation settlement does not confer an indefeasible title to the grantee, for the right affirmed by the 11ettlement under s. 15(2) of the Watan Act is liable to be determined by lapse, confiscation or [resumption (s. 22 of the Watan Act). The State having created the watan, is entitled to put an end to the watan i.e. to cancel the watan and to resume the grant (I) : Bachharam Datta Patilv. Vishwanath Pundalik Patil.(') Therefore if there be mere commutation of service, the watan office ordinarily survives without liability to perform service, and on that account the character of watan property.still remains attached to the grant. But the State Government may abolish the office and release the property from its character as watan property.\"\n\nThe Court then dealt with the scheme of the Act No. 60 of 11)50.and observed. that in the light of the incidents of the watan and the property granted for remuneration of the watandar, that the relevant provisions of the Act had to be considered in regard to the right of the watandar to regrai; it of the watan lands. It was observed that. on a c01llbined• operation of sub-s. (3) of s. 3 ands. 4 of the Act, the holder of the watan land is entitled to regrant of the land in occupancy rights as an unalienated land. As to the effect of the •\n\n(!) [1956] S.C.R 675.\n\n--_< __ :_,__. ~:~------~ ~· --'. -\n\n. ~AGESB ' KBANDO niMAL (Sen, J.). : 363 ..-·( -·~ -\n\nlegislation, it was observed that S. 3 in terms proVides for abolition.\n\nof the watan, extinction of the officeand modification.of the right . in which the land is held. The abolition, extinction . and modification arise by operation of s. 3 of the Act, and no.t from the exercise of the exceutive power of confiscation or resumpti n by the State, and it was then said :\n\n'.'Undoubtedly the power of resumpiion. of a watari may be exercised under s.' 22 of the Watan Actand such a resumption niay destroy the right of the hold r both to; the .. office and the watan land, and in' the absence of any provi- : sion in that behalf no right to compensation inay arise; But .. where the .abolition of the watan is not by executive. -- action, but' by legislative -deeree, its consequences must . be songht in the 'statute which effectuates that abolition;''\n\n~.•-,•'- :..<!'\",'' __ ...... :·-!_ .... ; ... , • ' \\' ' - . . -·. . ' -. - As to the effect of the resumption of the'watan lands nnder. sub-s. (3) of s. 3 and their regrant under sub-s. (I} of s. 4 of the Act it was .observed : . • · ·• -_, .-_- •' •i ·-. ' ' ' ' ' . \"It mu8t be rcmemberd that 'the' pwer .which the. ' .State Government always possessed by the clearest implica- ·~· . . tion of s. 22 of the Bomba}''iiereditary 'offices Aci. 1874, of' . resumption is . statutorily enforced by s. 3 iri respect of the. :\n\n.~ Para&ana i111d Kulkarni WataiiS:' The State Government . . ' having. the power to abolish a watan office; and to resiiine \": . . land granted as remueration for performance of the duties .-·· , .- .,·-:- - 1 1· \\o -,·•. - ' -. • ' . . attached. to the . office was not obliged to compensate the .. '. watanda~ for eii:'tfuctlbn of his. rights. : . Bt the Legislature '\n\n0 as, as a matter.of grace, presuniablybCcatise of settlement .• beteen tne holders and the Government under the Gordon\n\nSettlement, provided by' s. 6 that cash' compensation he . awarded for loss' of the right to'i:ash allowance or ieinis- .. . sion of land 'revenue and has by s: 4 conferred upon the ..\n\nholder -of the watan land,'i'or loss of his right, a right to: .•. re grant of the land as occupant and free from the obliga- .. : ·\" . lion .iniposed by itS orlginal tenure as 'Yaian land. :. ....• : •..\n\nBy the operation· of s. '. 3 -au Paraganas. ancL Kulkarni . .. •, -.'\\•,··~•-- - -.\n\n'•'.I\n\n•-'J•' .- ,..-; watans fallmg withm . the Act are abolished, the right to . hofd 'office is extinguished, and the lnd 'g'rante'd'as' renirine~\n\n,. -·. '' ,.' •• ·.d ...... -· ~- ' ...\n\n- ...... ~· -· ... --1 ' • ration for performance of service. is resumed. . The holder . -'' . ·.·• ... ... ,, ....... ' :\n\n- .. -.. ,. ' of the land is thereafter liable . to pay land revenue, and is\n\nSUPREilil tOUllT RBi'ollT~ (1982! 3 s.c.a.\n\nentitled, on payment of the occupancy price at the preseribed rate, to be regranted \"occupancy rights as if it is unalienated land. The right so conferred is, though not a right to cash compensation, a valuable right of occupancy in the land. By the resumption of watan land and regrant thereof in occupancy right, all the restrictions placed upon the bolder of watan land are by the provisions of the Watan Act, and the terms of the grant, statutorily abolished. But the right of occupancy granted by s. 4 adequately compensates the holder for loss of the precarious interest of a watandar, because the land regranted after abolition of the watan, is held subject only to the restrictions imposed by sub-s. (2) of s. 4, and is freed from the incidents of watan tenure, such as restriction on alienation beyond the lifetime of the holder, devolution according to the special rule of succession, and the liability to consideration or resumption!'\n\nIt most therefore be observed that the commutation of serviee under subs. (l) s. 15 of the watan lands by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity froin liability to' perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of 'judi' or quit-rent charged upon the watan land, unless where it was otherwise provided for, had not the effect of converting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of alienability but to leave them attached to the hereditary offices which, although freed from the performance of services, remained intact. Despite commutation of service, the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liability to perform service, and on that account the character of tlie watan lands still remained attached to the grant. By the end of the first half of the 19th century, the watandars had lost much of their raison d\" etre. The British thought it expedient to dispense with their services and the watandars were given an offer to convert their watans into private property by the annual payment of a Nazrana but they were opposed to this.\n\nAt their own request, the Government agreed to continue their watans as unalienable after the service commutation settlements, subject to payment of 'judi' or quit-rent. After the service commutation settlements and the appointment of Mamlatdars, the watandars had practically no function to perform but the watans were not discontinued till the Government decided upon their abolition.\n\nliAGEsti v. KSANDO TiRMAL (Sen, J.)\n\n36S\n\nIt is said that although co-ownership of the joint family may exist in impartible property, a distinction must be drawn between present rights and future rights of the members of a family. This is because of the peculiar character of the property. Thus, while the junior members have future or contingent rights such as right of survivorship, they have, apart from custom or relationship, no present rights, as for instance, a right to restrain alienation or to claim maintenance. It is upon this basis that the submission is that the courts below manifestly erred in passing a decree for partition of the watan property described in Schedules B and <!appended to the plaint. We are afraid, these submissions based upon the alleged impartibility of the watan properties or the applicability of the rule of lineal primogeniture regulating succession to the estate cannot prevail, as these being nothing more than incidents of the watan, stand abrogated by sub-s. (4) of s. 3 Act No. 60 of 1950 and s. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955.\n\nIt seems plain to us that the effect of Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955 was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan land but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law.\n\nIt will be convenient to deal first with the provisions of Act No. 60 of 1950. Section 3 of the Act lays down that, with effect from, and on, the appointed day, notwi, thstanding anything contained in any law, usage, settlement, grant, sanad or order, all watans shall be deemed to have been abolished and all rights to hold office and any liability to render service appertaining to the said watana shall stand extinguished. It further lays down that subject to the provisions of s. 4, \"all viatan land is hereby resumed\" and \"shall be deemed to be subject to the payment of land revenue under the pr<>visions of the Code and the rules made thereunder as if it were an unalienated land\". The term 'Code' as defined in s. 2 (b) means \"the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879\". All incidents pertaining to the said watans stand extinguished from the appointed day.\n\nSub-s. (!) of s. 4 of the Act, insofar as material, provides :\n\n. \"4 (1). A watan land resumed under the provisions of this Act shall .......... be regranted to the holder of the 'watan to which it appertained, on payment of the occupancy price ............ and the holder shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code in respect of\n\nG .\n\n.>..--\n\nE.\n\n366 (1982} 3 s.e.R.\n\nSUPREME COtJkt REPORTS\n\n• • . '} , •\n\nI.-\n\nsuch land and shall primarily he liable to pay. land revenue to the State Government 'in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereuiider;\"all the provisions or\"the \"Code and rules .relating to'unalienated land. sliall, subject to tlie provisions of this Act, appiy to the.· said 1and :\" · · · \"\"' · • ' •· · - ! '•\n\n:· a~'use c2> of Exp1anaiton t~ 8., 4 reads :\n\n, ,. .'.: .- ' . . _ . ' . . . .', .- --\n\n. ~.\n\n \"Explanation-For the purposes. of this• section the. • ·· ·\n\n;.....\n\n/ expssio? :·~~Ider\" shll indde- ' . • ·· - \" , _>\n\n. . . _•- .. _,. .. - - . ·.. r·· \"(i) all . persons who on . the appointed day_ are the ·\n\n'ivatalldars of the same. watan to which the tand' . appeitamed; and . ' ' . .•; '\n\n~?.. ·J}.-' J.'• .. -' •,_:;-c••\"•-,;:• \"' '. xx xx xx\n\n.- . The provisions of Act No. 22 . of 1955 are more or less similar. '.Likewise; . s~ •(of th'e. Act provides .°that; notwlthstandini anything\n\n.,.~,,.~, ~\n\n~·I•' '• ~ '• • - .o. ~' . contained in any usage, settlement grant etc., with effect from the\n\n~~-> .•. .• l ... ·.~ - ' •.. ' ..... ,, ... - -·· . , ., .. ,, > .. appointed day, all alienationuhall be deemed to have been abolish- -ed and an rights JCgally. subsisiing on ih~ sald date. in cspect of-such .• 8.lienations \"and all other incidents of suchalienation shall be deemed\n\nto liavi:\"i, een extinguihed. ·. Seciion '( oL th~ Aci piovides that ~;~II\n\n.· ianci'heid Under a watan is hereby resumed\" 'and \"shaiJ be rgraied -to ihe holder in aceordance, with th~ provisions contin-ed i~ sob- - . ections. (i) to. (3) therein.-' Cluse (I) .. of Explanation to ~- 7 .\"ftads:·-. . ,.c -- ·. . .\"_ ... -:,· - : ·. --.~ ·,·~\n\n... ' .. . ..:!; -- .. ,__ • , t -·- ., -.-;-. -~-- ;\"Exp_l_anation-Fot , the purpose .of .this. section, the ' . ' - expression -\"holder\" shall include-:-\n\n-~.I. ; • ; : .• -- _;.\n\n-· ·· (I) an alience holding land under a watan, and. ·\n\n.(2) xx. xx xx xx\n\n-'·· Upon: a plain reading of sub-s. (1)-0f s. 4 or Act No. 60 of 1950 and of s;.7 of Act No. 22 of 1955, It is clear.that watan lands resun:ied under the provisions thereof, . have:' to '.be regranted . to the . bolder; or the .. watan,. ani:I: be.·hall .be \"deemed•; to•. be. an . occupant . within the meaning .of the Code in respeci of such land.:\n\n,., I '.\n\nNAG ESH v. ltH:'NDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 367.\n\nThe expression 'holder'. as defined in cl. (i) Explanation to s. 4 of the former Act includes '.'all persons who, on the appointed day, are the watandars of the same watan'' and cl. (I) of Explanation to\n\ns. 7 of the latter Act defines it to include ·•an a Jienee holding land under a watan\". The term \"an alienee\" is defined in s. 2 (!}(iii) to mean \"the holder of an alienation and includes bis co-sharer\".\n\nThe Watan Act contemplated two classes of persons. One is a larger class of persons belonging to the watan families having a • hereditary interest in the watan property as such and: th'e other a ' smaller class of persons who were appointed as representative watandars and who were liable for the performance of duties con-· C nected with the office of such watandars.\n\nAs already indicated, it would not be correct to limit 'the word \"watandar\" only to this\n\n. ..A narrow class of persons who could claim to have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and in the hereditary office. Watan property had al ways been treated as property belonging to the family and all persons belonging to the watan family who bad a hereditary interest in such watan property were entitled to be called \"watandars of the same watan° within the Watan Act. That being so, the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the w11tan land along with the watandar for the time being, and therefore the regrant of the lands to the wataildar under sub-s. (l) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and under s. 3 of Act No. 22 of 1955 must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family.\n\nIt appears that the same view has been taken iµ a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Laxrnibai Sadashiv Date v.\n\nGanesh Shankar Date('). .\n\nA controversy had arisen as to the purport and effect of the non-obstante clause contained in s. 4 of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959. Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba v.\n\nMahadeo Dagdu(') held that the effect of sub-s. (3) of s. 4 read with s. 5 of the Act was to bring about a change in the tenure or character of holding as Watan land, but it did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law. The learned Judge therefore held that even though the watan was abolished and the incidents thereof were extinguis bed an<l the land resumed under\n\n(I) (1977) 79 Born. L.R. 234.\n\n(l) (1972) 75 Dom. L.R.29Q,\n\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\ns. 4, the Act maintained the continuity of the interest in the lands of persons before and after the coming into frce of the Act provided, of course, the holder pay1 occupancy price in respect of the land. In other words, the property continues to jbe the joint family property or the property held by the tenants-in-common, as the case may be.\n\nIn Kalgonda Babgonda v. Balgonda,(') a Divi1ion Bench of the High Court took a view to the contrary and observed :\n\n\"The words \"all incidents appertaining to the said watans shall be and are hereby extinguished\", must include every kind of incident, including the so-called incident of a right to partition as cl.aimed by the plaintiff in this case, even if such right existed. Further, the lands were resumed by the Government on that date in law and vested in the Government till the lands were re-granted under s. 5 or 6, or 9 of that Act.\"\n\nxx xx xx xx\n\n\"It is not possible for us . to consider it reasonable to held that although the lands were resumed by the Government and the holder himself had lost all his rights till the lands were re-granted to him except the right of asking, for re-grant, the incidents of the property under personal law appertaining to irnpartible property would survive the extinguishrnent of the tenure and resumption of the land by the State.\"\n\nIt was obviously wrong in reaching the couclusion that it did.\n\nIn Laxmibai Sadashiv Date's case, supra, the Full Bench reversed ihe decision of the Division Bench and upheld the\"view taken by Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba's case, supra, observed:\n\n\"It is undoubtedly true that s. 4 starts with a nonobstante clause, but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to non-obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute. The non-obstanle clause is contained at the inception of s. 4 and the sole object of s. 4 is to abolish alienation and rights and incidents in respect thereof. The right of a member of joint Hindu family to ask for partition of a joint family\n\n(!) (1975) 78 Bom. l,.ll. 720.\n\nII!\n\n- I\n\nNAGESH v, r::HANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 369\n\nproperty cannot be regarded as a right relating to grant or , land as service inam or as an incident in respect thereof.\n\nxx xx xx\n\nThe object of s. 4 was not to affect in any manner rights created under the personal Jaw relating to the parties and if the property belonged to joint Hindu family, then the normal rights of the members of the family to ask for partition were not in any way affected by reason of the .\n\nnon-obstante clause contained in a. 4.\"\n\nThese observations, in our opinion, are clearly in consonance with the true meaning and effect of the non-obstanate clause.\n\nIt still remains to ascertain the impact of subs (2) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of /\\ct No. 22 of 1955, and the question is whether the occupancy of the land regranted under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the former Act and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the latter Act is still impressed with the character of being impartible property.\n\nAll that these provisions Jay down is that the occupancy of the land regranted under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the former Act shall not be transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the previous sanction of the Collector and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may, by general or special order, determine.\n\nIt is quite plain upon the terms of these provisions that they impose restrictions in the matter of making alienations. On regrant of the land, the holder is deemed to be an occupant and therefore the holding changes its intrinsic character and becomes Ryotwari and is like any other property which is capable of being transferred or partitioned by metes and bounds subject, of course, to the sanction of the Collector and on payment of the requisite amount.\n\nIt is the policy of the law to prevent the land-working classes being driven into the state of landless proletariates so far as may be, and accordingly it is provided by these provisions that alienations of such hold)ngs or partition thereof shall be ineffective unless the sanction of the Collector has first been obtained. It is of the utmost , importance that this important safeguard should be maintained in full,\n\nforce and effect so that the parties must exactly know what. they ban bargained for. The condition for the grant of sanction by the\n\nCollector as a pre-requisite , for a valid transfer of a holding or the\n\n37(} s!JPRBlll 'COUllT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.a.\n\nmaking of a partition by mete.s an!! bounds, is. to ensure that the actual tiller of the soil is not aeprived of hill fand except for valid consideration, or that the partition effected between the members of a family is not unfair or unequal. These provisions therefore do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a partition once the conditions. mentioned therein are fulfilled.\n\nIn the result, the appeals! mlHt fail and are dismissed. There -t shall however be no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dlslftisjed.\n\n• A", "total_entities": 206, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nNAGESH BISTO DESAI ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGESH BISTO DESAI ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KHANDO TIRMAL . DESAI ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHANDO TIRMAL . DESAI ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Merged Territories Miscel- Janeous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 939, "end_char": 989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapalhi Raj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur\n\nv. Shri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapalhi Raj, [1964] 2 SCR 403: AIR 1964 SC 118 and Rajah Ve/ugoti Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu v. Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna."}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 SCR 403", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1964 SC 118", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1969) 3 SCC 281", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970) 3 SCR 88", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4632, "end_char": 4647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1970 SC 1795", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1981) 4 SCC 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5815, "end_char": 5819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 SCR 48", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7951, "end_char": 7966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1964 SC 326", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7968, "end_char": 7983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1957 SC 34", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8137, "end_char": 8151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1956 SCJ 721", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8153, "end_char": 8165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9053, "end_char": 9065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court at Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd June, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No."}}, {"text": "U.R. La", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9787, "end_char": 9794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it, S.S. Javali D.P. Singh & Ravi Parkash, for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "S.S. Javali D.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it, S.S. Javali D.P. Singh & Ravi Parkash, for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "Ravi Parkash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9824, "end_char": 9836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it, S.S. Javali D.P. Singh & Ravi Parkash, for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "B.D. Bal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D. Bal, R.B. Datar & Miss Madhu Moolchandani, for the Appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "R.B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D. Bal, R.B. Datar & Miss Madhu Moolchandani, for the Appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "Madhu Moolchandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9993, "end_char": 10011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D. Bal, R.B. Datar & Miss Madhu Moolchandani, for the Appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "S.T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10118, "end_char": 10128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, K. N. Bhat & Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10130, "end_char": 10140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, K. N. Bhat & Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "Nanjappa Ganesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10143, "end_char": 10158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, K. N. Bhat & Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "S.B. Bhasame", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasame, K.A. Naik, & M.R.K. Pillai for R-1 in CA."}}, {"text": "K.A. Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10357, "end_char": 10366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasame, K.A. Naik, & M.R.K. Pillai for R-1 in CA."}}, {"text": "M.R.K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasame, K.A. Naik, & M.R.K. Pillai for R-1 in CA."}}, {"text": "H K.R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10478, "end_char": 10493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H K.R. Nagaraja & Alok Bhatacharya for R-12 in CA."}}, {"text": "Alok Bhatacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10496, "end_char": 10512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H K.R. Nagaraja & Alok Bhatacharya for R-12 in CA."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. These nine consolidated appeals on certificate are directed from a common judgment and decree of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore dated June 22; 1962 which affirmed, subject to a modification, the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Senior\n\nDivision, Dharwar, dated July 5, 1956, substantially dismissing the plaintiff's claim for declaratioµ of title to, and possession of, certain watan properties and decreeing instead his alternative claim for partition and separate possession of his one-sixth share therein."}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11440, "end_char": 11451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagesh Bisto Desai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12067, "end_char": 12085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which these appeals arise, was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai, as plaintiff, claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisio Desai defendants Nos.2 & 3, mother Smt.", "canonical_name": "Nagesh Bisto Desai"}}, {"text": "Ganesh Bisio Desai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12135, "end_char": 12153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which these appeals arise, was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai, as plaintiff, claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisio Desai defendants Nos.2 & 3, mother Smt.", "canonical_name": "Nagesh Bisto Desai"}}, {"text": "Gopal Bisio Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which these appeals arise, was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai, as plaintiff, claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisio Desai defendants Nos.2 & 3, mother Smt.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Bisio Desai"}}, {"text": "Akkavva alias Parvathibai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12210, "end_char": 12235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva alias Parvathibai, defendant No."}}, {"text": "Bhimaji Marland Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12262, "end_char": 12283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, brother Bhimaji Marland Desai, defendant No.5 who had gone in.adoption to Marland, member of a junior branch and father's brother's son Khando Tirmal Desai, defendant No."}}, {"text": "Khando Tirmal Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12390, "end_char": 12409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, brother Bhimaji Marland Desai, defendant No.5 who had gone in.adoption to Marland, member of a junior branch and father's brother's son Khando Tirmal Desai, defendant No.", "canonical_name": "KHANDO TIRMAL . DESAI ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Dharwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12580, "end_char": 12587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol\n\nknown as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12604, "end_char": 12613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol\n\nknown as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12757, "end_char": 12762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol\n\nknown as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Kundgol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13050, "end_char": 13057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol\n\nknown as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13314, "end_char": 13324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kundgol Paragana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13848, "end_char": 13864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's suit is brought on the allegation that the Deshgat family of Kundgol Paragana of which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are members is a very ancient and respectable one in the State of Jamkhandi which later merged in the then Province of ."}}, {"text": "Jamkhandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13980, "end_char": 13989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's suit is brought on the allegation that the Deshgat family of Kundgol Paragana of which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are members is a very ancient and respectable one in the State of Jamkhandi which later merged in the then Province of ."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14035, "end_char": 14041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and is now in the State of K.arnataka."}}, {"text": "K.arnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14069, "end_char": 14079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and is now in the State of K.arnataka."}}, {"text": "Desai. Abkari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14210, "end_char": 14223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands and cash allowances described in Schedule B para (i) and (iii) are the emoluments of the district hereditary office of Desai."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14277, "end_char": 14295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family."}}, {"text": "Hanchinal Inam Village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14349, "end_char": 14371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family."}}, {"text": "Deshgat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14381, "end_char": 14388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family."}}, {"text": "Jhamkhandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14667, "end_char": 14677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This amount, together with the cash allowance and the service lands appurtenant to the office of Desai and the houses and open sites form the impartible estate called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate, which was partly located within the territory of former fendatory State of Jhamkhandi and party in the territories of the then British India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14727, "end_char": 14732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This amount, together with the cash allowance and the service lands appurtenant to the office of Desai and the houses and open sites form the impartible estate called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate, which was partly located within the territory of former fendatory State of Jhamkhandi and party in the territories of the then British India."}}, {"text": "Thimappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14777, "end_char": 14785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first inam was granted at the time of Thimappa in 1575."}}, {"text": "All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14795, "end_char": 14894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bijapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14900, "end_char": 14907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rulers of Bijapur during the period from 1575 A.O. to 1694 A.O. with a couple of other grants received from the Chief of Jamkhandi during the period from 1120 A.D. to 1826 A.D. The watan has remained with the family which held the hereditary office of Desai for over four centuries."}}, {"text": "Jamkhandi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15011, "end_char": 15020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rulers of Bijapur during the period from 1575 A.O. to 1694 A.O. with a couple of other grants received from the Chief of Jamkhandi during the period from 1120 A.D. to 1826 A.D. The watan has remained with the family which held the hereditary office of Desai for over four centuries."}}, {"text": "Gundopant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15391, "end_char": 15400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Properties described in Schedules F ad G have been in possession of the two junior branches descended frooi Gundopant and Lingappa from 1825 A.O. and 1854 A.O. respectively and are being enjoyed by them even now."}}, {"text": "Lingappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15405, "end_char": 15413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Properties described in Schedules F ad G have been in possession of the two junior branches descended frooi Gundopant and Lingappa from 1825 A.O. and 1854 A.O. respectively and are being enjoyed by them even now."}}, {"text": "Bistappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15521, "end_char": 15529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's father, Bistappa, the last holder of the office of Desai died on July 27, 1931 leaving behind him his widow Smt."}}, {"text": "Akkavva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15627, "end_char": 15634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal."}}, {"text": "Nagesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15650, "end_char": 15656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal.", "canonical_name": "l Nagesh"}}, {"text": "Bhimrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal.", "canonical_name": "Bhimarao"}}, {"text": "Ganesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15667, "end_char": 15673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal.", "canonical_name": "l Nagesh"}}, {"text": "Gopal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal.", "canonical_name": "Gopal"}}, {"text": "Bhimarao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15699, "end_char": 15707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out\n\nof them, Bhimarao had gone in adoption to Marland.", "canonical_name": "Bhimarao"}}, {"text": "Marland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15732, "end_char": 15739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out\n\nof them, Bhimarao had gone in adoption to Marland."}}, {"text": "Nagesh Bisio Desai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15809, "end_char": 15827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "death the plaintiff Nagesh Bisio Desai was recognised to be the watandar.", "canonical_name": "Nagesh Bisto Desai"}}, {"text": "Khandappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15889, "end_char": 15898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's cousin is Khandappa.", "canonical_name": "Khandappa"}}, {"text": "l Nagesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16030, "end_char": 16038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l Nagesh (plaintiff)\n\nGENEALOGICAL TABLE\n\nI Rama pp a\n\nI .", "canonical_name": "l Nagesh"}}, {"text": "Gopal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16475, "end_char": 16480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5)\n\nGopal=Smt.", "canonical_name": "Gopal"}}, {"text": "Ganesh Bisio Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16857, "end_char": 16875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando.", "canonical_name": "Nagesh Bisto Desai"}}, {"text": "Gopal Bisto Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16880, "end_char": 16897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Bisio Desai"}}, {"text": "Tirmal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando."}}, {"text": "Khando", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17096, "end_char": 17102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando."}}, {"text": "Bhimarao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17362, "end_char": 17370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1945, the plaintiff's brother Bhimarao defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Bhimarao"}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17878, "end_char": 17884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17892, "end_char": 17924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sub-Divilsional Magistrate Kundgol", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17930, "end_char": 17964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub-Divilsional Magistrate Kundgol passed an order restraining defendants 2, 3 and \\5 from disturbing the possession of defendants\n\n6, 7 and 8 and this \\>rder was kept in."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18261, "end_char": 18278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government revoked the order with effect from December 15, 1948, as a result of which the defendents 6, 7 and 8 brought suits for injunction."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18570, "end_char": 18574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18789, "end_char": 18819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22532, "end_char": 22536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22717, "end_char": 22721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22747, "end_char": 22750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22833, "end_char": 22837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deshpande of Kundgol", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23463, "end_char": 23483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention is drawn to the averment contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint:\n\nH \"The Kundgol Deshgat Estate, along with the estates of two other District Hereditary Offices of Nadgir and\n\n, .....\n\nNAGESH v. ttHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 351\n\nDeshpande of Kundgol is impartible by custom and succession to it is governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture."}}, {"text": "s 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24499, "end_char": 24502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24543, "end_char": 24547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Presidency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27653, "end_char": 27670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bombay Presidency, it has always been treated to be the joint (amily property."}}, {"text": "Dinsbaw Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31430, "end_char": 31443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Sir Dinsbaw Mulla in his celebrated judgment in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kummi Debi & Ors.' ("}}, {"text": "Tipperah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31656, "end_char": 31664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1)\n\n\"The keynote of the whole position, in their Lordships view, is to be found in the following passage in the judgment in the Tipperah case :(2)\n\n''Where a custom is proved to exist, it supersedes the general'' law, which, however, still regulates an beyond the custom\"\n\n\"Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom."}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32479, "end_char": 32482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baijnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32898, "end_char": 32906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held in Baijnath's case:(') To this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property, and its devolution is governed by the general Mitaksh11ra law applicable to such property."}}, {"text": "Shiba Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33874, "end_char": 33892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh' s case (supra), it is well-settled that an estate is impartible does not make it the separate and exclusive property .o( the holder : where the property is ancestral and the holder has succeeded to it, it will be part of the joint estate of the undivided family ."}}, {"text": "L.R. 48 I.A. 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34450, "end_char": 34466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sartaj Kuarl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35210, "end_char": 35222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal's case, supra, it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuarl's case and the First Pittapur's case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamiadari could be in any sense joint family property, this view apparently implied in these ca1es was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnarh Prasad Singh's case."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35454, "end_char": 35461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal's case, supra, it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuarl's case and the First Pittapur's case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamiadari could be in any sense joint family property, this view apparently implied in these ca1es was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnarh Prasad Singh's case."}}, {"text": "Baijnarh Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35507, "end_char": 35528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal's case, supra, it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuarl's case and the First Pittapur's case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamiadari could be in any sense joint family property, this view apparently implied in these ca1es was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnarh Prasad Singh's case."}}, {"text": "Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35651, "end_char": 35686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anant Bhlkappa Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35868, "end_char": 35888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Anant Bhlkappa Patil's case supra, it was observed that an impartible estate is not held in coparcenary though it may be joint family property."}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 S.C.R. 403", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36698, "end_char": 36717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chinnathavi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36789, "end_char": 36800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAOBSH v. KHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 357\n\nIn Chinnathavi's case."}}, {"text": "Mirza Raja Gajapathl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37439, "end_char": 37459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mirza Raja Gajapathl' s case, supra, it was observed that an ancestral impartible estate to which the •bolder has succeeded by the custom of primogeniture is part of the joint estate of the undivided Hindu family.", "canonical_name": "Mirza Raja Gajapathl"}}, {"text": "Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37820, "end_char": 37849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna's case, supra, it was observed that the only vestige of the incidents of joint family property, which still attaches to the joint family property is the right of survivorship which, of course, is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility.", "canonical_name": "Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna"}}, {"text": "Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38101, "end_char": 38126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo's case, supra, the principles laid down by_ the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh'."}}, {"text": "Mirza Raja Ganapathl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38328, "end_char": 38348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of argument, great reliance was placed on the two decisions of this Court in Mirza Raja Ganapathl's case, supra and Raja Velugotl Kumara Krishna's case, supra, for the proposition that the junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no right of partition having regard to the very character of -the estate that it is impartible.", "canonical_name": "Mirza Raja Gajapathl"}}, {"text": "Raja Velugotl Kumara Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38367, "end_char": 38395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of argument, great reliance was placed on the two decisions of this Court in Mirza Raja Ganapathl's case, supra and Raja Velugotl Kumara Krishna's case, supra, for the proposition that the junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no right of partition having regard to the very character of -the estate that it is impartible.", "canonical_name": "Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna"}}, {"text": "Mirza Raja Ganapathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38754, "end_char": 38774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the decisions in Mirza Raja Ganapathi's case, supra, and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna's case, supra, turned on the provision of the Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904.", "canonical_name": "Mirza Raja Gajapathl"}}, {"text": "Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38794, "end_char": 38822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the decisions in Mirza Raja Ganapathi's case, supra, and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna's case, supra, turned on the provision of the Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904.", "canonical_name": "Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna"}}, {"text": "Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38941, "end_char": 38976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 45 to 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39015, "end_char": 39027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904", "statute": "the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39146, "end_char": 39151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904", "statute": "the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40089, "end_char": 40092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40631, "end_char": 40636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40816, "end_char": 40821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41001, "end_char": 41005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Velugoli Kumara Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41120, "end_char": 41148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Raja Velugoli Kumara Krishna's case, supra, it was a suit F for partition by the junior members of Vankatgiri Estate, an ancient inipartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904.", "canonical_name": "Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna"}}, {"text": "Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41284, "end_char": 41319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41546, "end_char": 41550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904", "statute": "the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42327, "end_char": 42331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42386, "end_char": 42390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abolition Act but continued to be governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42398, "end_char": 42477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42813, "end_char": 42848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 33 to 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43547, "end_char": 43564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "statute": "the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44472, "end_char": 44476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44544, "end_char": 44561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "placed on the definition of \"watandar\" in s. 4 of the Watan Act was set at rest by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vijayasingrao Bala Saheb Shinde Desai v. Janardanrao Narayanrao Shinde Desai.(')"}}, {"text": "Rangnekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44907, "end_char": 44916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kadappa v. Krlshtappa,(') an alienation of watan land by a watandar to his bhaubandh for maintenance was challenged and Rangnekar and Divatia, JJ."}}, {"text": "Divatia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44921, "end_char": 44928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kadappa v. Krlshtappa,(') an alienation of watan land by a watandar to his bhaubandh for maintenance was challenged and Rangnekar and Divatia, JJ."}}, {"text": "Kndappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45322, "end_char": 45329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would, therefore, appear that in Kndappa' s case, supra; the entire definition of watandar in s. 4 was looked upon as one, the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in the first part."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45383, "end_char": 45387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wadia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45565, "end_char": 45570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir John Beaumont C.J. and Wadia, J. however, struck a discordant note."}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46168, "end_char": 46171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vijayaslngrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46456, "end_char": 46469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this .conflict, the &pecific question referred to the Full Bench in Vijayaslngrao' s case, &upra, was \"Whether the term 'watandar' as defined in s. 4 of the Watan Act necessarily and always meant a person who had a hereditary interest not only in the watan property but also in the hereditary office\"."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46533, "end_char": 46537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NAotsil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46926, "end_char": 46933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '>\n\nNAotsil \\>."}}, {"text": "Kadappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46998, "end_char": 47005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAL (Sen, J.)\n\nplaced on the term 'watandar' in Kadappa's case, supra, and conclu\n\nded that a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to each office was also a \"watandar' within the meaning of the Watan Act.", "canonical_name": "Khandappa"}}, {"text": "can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47305, "end_char": 47339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47460, "end_char": 47464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47726, "end_char": 47730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47783, "end_char": 47793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47859, "end_char": 47868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47965, "end_char": 47969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act", "statute": "There can be no doubt that the Watan Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48469, "end_char": 48473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sargent", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49139, "end_char": 49146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when the Court referred to the decision in Appaji Bapuji v. Kesha; Shamrav.(2) and quoted the following passage from the judgment of\n\nSargent, C.J., with approval :\n\n\"What is termed a Gordon Settlement was an Arrangement-entered."}}, {"text": "(1964) 2 S.C.R. 48", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49282, "end_char": 49300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gordon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49387, "end_char": 49393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gordon, as Collector, was Chairman, acting on behalf of Government-with the watandars in the Southern Maratha Country, by which the Government relieved certain watandars in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of a 'judi' or quit rent charged upon the watanlands ................ the reports of Mr. Gordon's Committee on the Satara and Poona Districts and their correspondence with Government can, we think, leave no doubt that th.e settlements ma(le by that committee, unless it was otherwise, specially provided by any particular settlement, were not !"}}, {"text": "Southern Maratha Country", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49480, "end_char": 49504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gordon, as Collector, was Chairman, acting on behalf of Government-with the watandars in the Southern Maratha Country, by which the Government relieved certain watandars in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of a 'judi' or quit rent charged upon the watanlands ................ the reports of Mr. Gordon's Committee on the Satara and Poona Districts and their correspondence with Government can, we think, leave no doubt that th.e settlements ma(le by that committee, unless it was otherwise, specially provided by any particular settlement, were not !"}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50449, "end_char": 50457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50541, "end_char": 50546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51463, "end_char": 51467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51771, "end_char": 51775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51974, "end_char": 51978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52743, "end_char": 52747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52786, "end_char": 52790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52989, "end_char": 52994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53088, "end_char": 53092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53635, "end_char": 53639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55027, "end_char": 55031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55240, "end_char": 55244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55550, "end_char": 55555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57987, "end_char": 57991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58015, "end_char": 58019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58370, "end_char": 58379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58772, "end_char": 58776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59010, "end_char": 59014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59030, "end_char": 59060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59165, "end_char": 59169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61561, "end_char": 61565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61985, "end_char": 61989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62128, "end_char": 62132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62252, "end_char": 62256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63398, "end_char": 63402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63435, "end_char": 63439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63770, "end_char": 63774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63782, "end_char": 63832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Malvankar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63834, "end_char": 63843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba v.\n\nMahadeo Dagdu(') held that the effect of sub-s. (3) of s. 4 read with s. 5 of the Act was to bring about a change in the tenure or character of holding as Watan land, but it did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63925, "end_char": 63929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63940, "end_char": 63944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64347, "end_char": 64351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65207, "end_char": 65211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxmibai Sadashiv Date", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65740, "end_char": 65762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Laxmibai Sadashiv Date's case, supra, the Full Bench reversed ihe decision of the Division Bench and upheld the\"view taken by Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba's case, supra, observed:\n\n\"It is undoubtedly true that s. 4 starts with a nonobstante clause, but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to non-obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute."}}, {"text": "Dhondi Vithoba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65883, "end_char": 65897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Laxmibai Sadashiv Date's case, supra, the Full Bench reversed ihe decision of the Division Bench and upheld the\"view taken by Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba's case, supra, observed:\n\n\"It is undoubtedly true that s. 4 starts with a nonobstante clause, but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to non-obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65953, "end_char": 65957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66204, "end_char": 66208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66232, "end_char": 66236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66620, "end_char": 66624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67115, "end_char": 67119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67160, "end_char": 67164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67273, "end_char": 67277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67314, "end_char": 67318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67505, "end_char": 67509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_371_394_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "' •,\n\nSUKHNANDAN SARAN DINESH KUMAR &\n\nANOTHER ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER ETC. ETC.\n\nMarch 3, 1982'\n\n[D.A. DESAI, AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\n371 A\n\nSugar Cane (Control) Order 1966, Clauses 3, 3A, 4 and 4A & U.P. State C Government Notification dated September 3, 1980.\n\nSugar Cane brought in bundles-Binding material-Grant of rebate-Whb ther valid and reasonable.\n\nThe raw material for manufacturing sugar or Khandsri sugar is sugarcane.\n\nWhen the vacuum pan process is employed the end product is called sugar and when the open pan process is employed the end product is called Khandsari sugar. In order to extend protectiOn to the farmers who had undertaken raising of sugarcane crop, the Central Government issued the Sugarcane (Control) Order\n\n1966. Clause 3 of this Order conferred power on the Central Government to fix minimum price of sugarcane to be paid by produrs of sugar for sugarcane purchased by them. C1ause 4 conferred similar power to fix the minimum price to be\n\npaid by th\" producers of khandsari sugar for the sugarcane purchased. Clause 3A which was introduced on September 24, 1976 conferred power on the Central Government and various other authorities to allow a suitable rebate in regard to the weight of the binding material not exceeding 0.62S Kg. per quintal of sugarcane, when sugarcane was purchased by the producer of the sugar. Later, Clause 4A was introduced on March 20, 1978,. to provide for the rebate that can be deducted from the price paid for sugarcane by prp<jucers of kbandsari sugar.\n\nThe State Government issued a notification on September 3, 1980 to provide that where sugarcane is brought in !:undies and is weighed as such, a rebate in regard to the binding material at 0.650 Kg. per quintal should be allowed. As there waS a printing error in mentioning the figure '0.650 kg.' a corrigendum was issued to correct it, to '0.625 kS: per quintal in the notification.\n\nThe petitioners in the writ petitions who were manufacturing khandsari sugar by the open pan process assailed the decision of the State Government\n\nallowing rebate. They cootcoded that : (I) the power to prescribe the rate of rebate under the third proviso to clause 4 is conditional upon the fixing of the minimum priae of sugarcane and as the precondition for exercise of that power was not satisfied, the authorities canQQ\\ xercise Power to prescribe the 111te of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nrebate, (2) if the p\\lrchaser and seller of sugarcane are free agents to negotiate the price no useful purpose would be served by prescribing the rate of rebate statutorily. If higher rebate is to be allowed, the producer of khandsari sugar and the grower of sugarcane would work out the price accordingly and if Jess rebate is allowed, it will have a direct ipact on the negotiated ptj, cc, (3) assuming that the power to prescribe the rate of rebate under clause 4A read with the third proviso could also be exercised where the price of sugarcane was left to be negotiated between the growers of sugarcane and the producers of kbandsari sugar, the quantum of rebate determined must have a reasonable relation to the reality of market situation as well as to prevalent trade practice, (4) assuming that the Central Government was influenced by the report m::i.de by the Director, National Sugar Institute the report suggests that the average works out at 0.741 kg er quintal, and consequently there was no justification for further reducing it to 0.625 kg, (5) the notification places a restriction on the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) and as it is neither reasonable nor imposed in public interest, it is violative of freedom of trade and therefore void, and (6) in order that a restriction may be reasonable it must have a reasonable relation to the object which the statute seeks to achieve and must not be in excess of that object.\n\nDismissing the writ petitions.\n\nHELD: The State Government notification dated September 3, 19BO directing that where sugarcane is brought in bundles and is weighed as such a rebate in regard.to the binding material at 0.625 kg per quinta:I be allowed, is valid and legal. The rebate was statutorily prescribed to ensure that' sugarcane growers were not at the mercy of the producers of sugar and kbandsari sugar.\n\nThe statutory rebate serves two-fold purpose: (i) it ensures price of sugarcane avoiding impermissible deductions and (ii) it circumvents fraud by making such deductions as would render illusory even the negotiated price, if not fixed price.\n\nThe restriction is undoubtedly reasonable and is imposed in the interest of the\n\ngeneral pub1ic and the guarantee of freedom of trade is not violated.\n\n[376 E; 392 H; 393 A-C]\n\n1. (i) Though1clause 3A was inserted in the Control Order in 1976 conferr ing powerlon the Central Government or with the approval of the Central Government, on the State Government to allow rebate at 0.625 kg. per quintal of sugarcane purchased by manufacturers of sugar, such rebate was being prescribed by the Central Government since 1968. [379 G]\n\n(ii) Clause 4 confers power on the Central Government or a State Gove~ ment with the concurrence of the Central Government to fix the minimum price or ihe price of sugarcane to be paid by producer., s of khandsari sugar for sugarcane purchased by them. Third proviso to clause 4 provides that the Central Government or with the approval of the Central Government the State Government to allow. a suitable rebate in the price so fixed. If the provision were to end with clause 4, the question may arise whether the power to determine rate of rebate can be exercised de hors the power to fix minimum price or price of sugarcane or can be unilaterally exercised. But the language of the third proviso\" ... as it may specify. allow a suitable rebate of the price so fixed\", indicates that the rebate is :o-related to lhe price fixed. {381 C-F]\n\nSUKHNANDAN SARAN V. UNION 373\n\n(iii) The rebate contemplated by the third proviso to clause 4 is not necessarily con6ned to rate of rebate for binding material only but permissible rate of rebate from the price or minimum price fixed under the substantive provision of clause 4 can be prescribed. [381 H; 382 A)\n\n(iv) Clause 4A stands on an independent footing and it is independent of clause 4. Clause 4A is neither inter-dependent nor interrelated to clause 4.\n\nClause 4A visualises a situation in which either the minimum price of Sugarcane is fixed under clause 4 or where no such price if fixed, the price agreed to between the sugarcane grower and the producer who purchased sugarcane and even in this latter situation the power to prescribe rate of rebate only in respect of binding material was conferred on the authoiities set out in the third proviso to clause 4A. Therefore, fixing of the minimum price may be a p1e--condition to the exercise of power under the third proviso of clause 4, as far as clause 4A is concerned, even where the price to be paid by the producer to the sugarcane grower is the one negotiated between the two, the producer or his agent will have to allow that much rebate and no more for binding material if notified under the third proviso. This literal construction accords with the intendmcnt of the provision. [382 B-E; 383 G)\n\n2. (i) Sugarcane is a perishable commodity. The grower of the sugarcane is at the mercy of producers of sugar or khandsari sugar. It would be uneconomic for him to transport sugarcane to a long distance. The product, .being perishable and transport over a distance being uneconomic, the grower of sugarcane has limited choice in selecting the producer to whom it coUld be sold. Between the producer of khandsari and the grower of sugarcane, the first one is primarily in a position to dominate and dictate and they do not operate on the level of equality. The grower of sugarcane in relation to the producer of the khandsari sugar would therefore be weaker and requires to be protected. If the protection of fixing of minimum price is not resorted to because the authorities have information that the grower of sugarcane would be able to obtain a 'reasonably fair price for his labour, the only thing which is required to be protected against is inequitous. un3.uthorised and impermissible deductions. In the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the weight of the binding-material When sugarcane is brought in bundles to the producer bas been a fruitful surce for the producers of khandsari sugar to make deductions from the weight of sugitrcane delivered to them in an exorbitant quantity so as to deny in real money worth the ncgoti ated price. [382 H; 388 A-DJ\n\n(ii) While retaining the power to fix minimum price -0r price to be paid and also in a given situation leaving it to the purchaser of sugarcane to negotiate the price in order to eschew any exploitation of the weaker section between the two, th~ power to prescribe thC rate of rebate was acquired and it can be rightly enforced. There is therefore no merit in the submission that unless the power to fix the price or minimum price is exercised there is no power to prescribe the rate of rebate. [383 F-G]\n\n3. The rate of rebate has been determined by the law of averages after\n\nwllectin~ infor1DMioD from all over th~ \\09Ynt'i', and tile resent rate of r•bllt~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982} 3 s.c.R.\n\nA is in vogue for over a quarter of a century. It is therefore difficult to accept the submission that the fixation of-rate of rebate for bindin~ material at 0.625 kg. for\n\nth~ whole country is either arbitrary or unreal or unrelated to trade and practice.\n\n[386 G-H]\n\n(i) The differential between what is prescribed and what is calculated as average by the study of the National Sugar Institute is not so wide as to render B the prescribed rate arbitrary or unrealistic. The differentials being within a narrow range, the one which is in vogue for over a quarter of a century cannot be rejected as arbitrary or unrelated to trade and practice. Nor is the Court competent to work out the exact permissible rebate with mathematical accuril.cy.\n\n[387D-E]\n\n(ii) The rate of rebate set out in the impugned notificaiion bears resemblance to the sample testing of actual weight of binding. material used in binding sugarcane when brought in bundles to the khandsari factory. [388 E]\n\n(iii) This does not however imply that no case has been made for upward revision of the rebate. The Central Government may realistically .el!'.amine the same before the next crushing season commences. [_388 G]\n\n5. (i) It would be open to the producer of khandsari sugar to buy sugar- -cane from the grower who may be asked to bring sugarcane not bound in bundles. The rebate for binding material is to be aliowed only when sugarcane is brought to the khandsari sugar producing unit bound io bundles. It is always open to the purchaser of sugarcane to insist upon the grower bringing the sugarcane not bound in bundles and he is free to negotiate the price of sugarcane is not fixed and the impugned notification wiIJ not even remotely impinge upon his ffeedom to carry on his trade. The restriction Complained of therefore does not directly and proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of trade and Article 19(1) (g) is not attracted. [389 E-G]\n\n(ii) Producers of sugar and khandsari sugar constitcte powerful trade lobby, and this can be taken judicial notice. Sugar being an essential commodity occasionally kept in short supply and being a commodity needed for consumplion by almost the entire population, the pOwerfut industry magna tcs are in a position to dominate both the growers of sugarcane as also the consumers of the essential commodity. Number of regulations have been enacted to regulate this powerful combination of manufacturers of sugar and khandsari sugar all over the country for the ultimate benefit of consumers, the farmers-the growers of sugarcane. The marginal farmers, are unable to stand up againsfthe organised industry and need protection for selling at fair price their meagre agricultural produce. [391 DG]\n\n(iii) Sugarcane groers who are farmers cannot negotiate on the footing of equality with the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar. The State action for the protection of the weaker sect-ions is not only justified but absolutely necessary unless the restriction imposed is excessive. If price or minimum price \"of sugarcsne is fixed. the producers of sugar would try to circumvent the price or minimum price by unrealistic and impermissible deductions. The reb8.te for weight of binding material seems to be a source for indulging in this nefarious, if not wholly fr, audulent. conduct,\n\n' ;.\n\n-· ~\n\nsuKHNANi>AN SARAN v. UNION (besai, J.)\n\n6. To strike the balance between the conflicting interests not only the State A acquired power to fix minimum price of sugar and khandsari sugar but that this wholesome effort may not work to the disadvantage of the sugarcane growers another weaker section of th~ society, the power to prescribe rate of rebate was acquired. And the power to fix price or minimum price comprehends the power to so regu1ate supply as to ensure the price so fixed and to ensure that in the name of unauthorised and unwarranted deduction the price fixed or negotiated is not rendered illusory. [393 G-H; 394 A) B\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 0443-44/80, • 8829-30, 9123-24, 370·87, 777•796, 658·62, 732·63, 824-31, 847-62,\n\n1080-1103, 1131-52, 8916, 9071-74., 9130-32, 9176·79, 8965, 8971-72, 9347-48, 9352-67 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nAND\n\nWrit Petitions Nos. 14-19/82, 333-25, 458-96, 1307-17, D 1410-13, 1595, 8268-72 of 1981 and 152 of 1982.\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nC.M. Lodha. in W. P. No. 6443-44/80, Shanti Bhushan, in WP. Nos. 732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners.\n\nG.N. Dikshit and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for Respondents.\n\nGirish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India in W.l'. Nos. 6443-44/80. (>\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nDESAI, J. Even an innocuous marginally regulatory measure affecting the sugar trade at fringes is sufficient for this powerful\n\nipdustry to invade the courts with petitions galore almost pro- G claiming that there should be hands off policy in respect of this trade.\n\nThe filimsty albeit untenable grievance made in this group of petitions would underscore the truth of what is just stated.\n\nIn exercise of the power conferred by clause ( 4) third proviso of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, ('Control Order' for short), the 2nd respondent-State ofUttar Pradesh, with the permission of\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPORts [ 1982] 3 s.c.il.\n\nthe 1st respondent Union of India, issued Notification dated September 3, 1980, which is impugned in these petitions. The impugned Notification reads as under :\n\n\"Sr. No. 398 A (Ka)\n\nGovernment Gazette, U.P.\n\nExtraordinary\n\nLegislative Supplement\n\nPart 4, Seciion (b) (Kha)\n\n... Order\n\n13-38-16, 56\n\nLucknow, Wednesday, 3rd. September, 1980.\n\nNotification\n\nP.As.~306\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by clause 4 proviso 3 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966, the Governer, with the permission of the Central Government, allows in Uttar Pradesh in respect of Khandsari units, producing Gur, rab or Khandsari sugar, where sugarcane is brought in bundles and is weighed as such, a rebate in regard to the binding material at 0.650 kilograms per quintal.\n\nBy Order, R. Basudev,\n\nSecretary\"\n\nIt was stated that there was a printing error in mentioning the figure\n\n'0.650 kg.' and a corrigendum bas been issued to correct it to '0.625 kg.' per quintal in the Notification.\n\nTbe allegations in all the petitions are identical and, therefore, we would state a few representative facts from the writ petition , filed by M/s. Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar and Another. The petitioners are producers of sugar by open pan process, the product being described as Khandsari sugar. This term is to be understood in contra-distinction to the marketable commodity called 'sugar' -which is produced by vacuum pan process. The raw material for manusilkllNANbAN SARAN v. UNION (Desai, i.)\n\nfactoring sugar or Khandsari sugar is sugarcane. The petitioners have set up a factory for manufacturing khandsari sugar by open pan process. The petitioners buy sugarcane from the sugarcane growers. In order to extend protection to the farmers who have undertaken raising of sugarcane crop, tbe Central Government issued the Control Order in exercise of the power conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.\n\nBy clause 3 of this order, power was conferred on the Central Government to fix minimum price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of sugar for sugarcane purchased by them. Clause 4 confers similar power to fix the minimum price to be paid by the producers of khandsari sugar for sugarcane purchased by them. Other clauses of the Order for the present purpose are not relevant. Clause 3A was introduced by GSR 815 (E)/ESS. COM./Sugarcane dated September 24, 1976, which, inter a/ia, conferred power on the Central Government and various other authorities mentioned therein to allow a suitable rebate in regard to the weight of the binding material not exceeding 0.625 kg, per quintal of sugarcane, when sugarcane was purchased by the producer of sugar. Subsequently, by Notification\n\nGSR 197 (E)/Ess. Com./Sugarcane dated March 20,1978, Clause 4A with the marginal note \"Rebate that can be deducted from the price paid for sugarcane by producers of Khandsari sugar\" was introduced. Clauses 4 and 4 A are material for the present discussion and they may be extracted :\n\n\"4. Minimum price of sugarcane payable by producers of [(handsari sugar :~\n\nThe Central Government or a State Government, with the concurrence of the Central Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, fix the minim11m price or the price of sugarcane to 'be paid by producers of khandsari sugar or their agents for the sugarcane purchased by them : .\n\nx x x\n\nProvided also that the Central Government or, with the approval of the Central Government, the State Government, may in such circumstances and subject to such con-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS f 19821 :i s.c.il.\n\nditions as it may specify allow a suitable rebate in the price so fixed.\" ' ·\n\n*\"4A. Rebate that can be deducted from the price paid for sugarcane by producers of Khandsari sugar :\n\nA producer of khandsari sugar or his agent shall pay, for the sugarcane purchased by him, to the sugarcane grower or the sugarcane growers' co-operative society, either the minimum price of sugarcane fixed under clause 4, or the price agreed to between the producer or bis agent' and the sugarcane grower or the sugarcane growers' co\n\noperative society, as the case may be (hereinafter referred to as tbe agreed price : )\n\nProvided that :\n\nx x x\n\nx x x\n\n(iii) Where the sugarcane is brought bound in bundles and weighed as such, the Central Gove.rnment, or, with the approval of the Central Government, the State Government or the Director of Agriculture or the Cane Commissioner or the District Magistrate within their respective jurisdiction, may allow a suitable rebate in regard to the weight of the binding material not exceeding 0.625 Kilograms per quintal of sugarcane; and,\n\nx x x\n\nClause 4 c0nferred power on the Central Government or a State Government with the concurrence of the Central Government to fix the minimum price or the price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of khandsari sugar or their agents for the sugarcane purchased by them.\n\nThe second and third proviso to clause 4 were simultaneously introduced with clause 4A.\n\nBy the Third proviso to clause 4, power was conferred on the Central Government or\n\n* Inserted vide Notification No. GSR 197 (B)/Bsi. Com./Sugarcane dated 20.3. 78,\n\n, ·,(\n\n51.JltllNANl>AN SAl\\AN v. UDION (Desai, J.) 319\n\nwith the approval of the Central Government on the State Govern ment to allow a suitable rebate in the price fixed in exercise of the power conferred by clause 4. The purpose underlying the proviso is manifest.\n\nIf the minimum price or price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of khandsari sugar is fixed, it is incumbent upon the producers of khandsari sugar to pay that price and nothing less than that price on the pain of criminal prosecution. The authorities clearly envisaged a situation where sugarcane may be brought in bundles to the unit manufacturing khandsari sugar and if the sugarcane is weighed with the binding material used, the minimum price or price fixed by the Government to be paid per quintal of sugarcane would ipso facto include the weight of the binding material and if the power to grant rebate is not conferred the producer of khandsari sugar will be under an obligation to pay the same price even if the part of the payment was for something other than sugarcane, namely, binding material. The raison d'etre behind conferring this power is thus clearly discernible.\n\nClause 4A made it obligatory to pay the minimum price of sugarcane if so fixed under clause 4 or in the absence of price fixation, the negotiated price. Proviso (iii) to clause 4A confers power to allow rebate not exceeding 0.625 kg. per quinta:I of sugarcane where sugarcane is brought in bundles and is weighed as such, i.e. with the binding material. Armed with this power, the 2nd respondent after obtaining approval of the Central Government, as per letter dated September. 6, 1979, issued the impugned notification directing tha.t where sugarcane is brought in bundles and is weighed as such a rebate in regard to the binding material at 0.625 kg. per quintal be allowed.\n\nBefore adverting to the contentions raised in this group of petitions it may be made distinctly clear that though clause 3A was .inserted in the Control Order in 1976 conferring similar power on the Central Government. or with the approval of the Central Government, on the State Government to allow rebate at 0 .625 kg. per quintal of sugarcane purchased by manufacturers of sugar, such rebate was being prescribed by the Central Government since 1968, The Gazettes oflndia setting out the notifications for tbe years 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1975 were 11bown to us.\n\nThe notifications were issued in exercise of the power conferred by clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966.\n\nBy the notifications hereinabove referred to minimum price of sugarcane per quintal payable by each sugar mill enumerated in the Schedule to the notification was fixed.\n\n.ff\n\njgo SUPREME cOURT REi>OlTS l l 982j 3 s.c.tl.\n\nWhile fixing this minimum price the Central Government authorised itself as also conferred power on the State Governments or the Commissioner or Director of Agriculture within their jurisdiction to allow a suitable rebate in regard to the weight of binding material not exceeding 0.625 kg. per quintal of sugarcane. It thus clearly transpires that the power to fix the minimum price of sugarcane comprehended the power to fix rebate to be allowed for binding material where sugarcane is brought to the factory or the producing centre bound in bundles. However, to avoid any quibbling about the power to fix such.rates of rebate, clause 3A was added in 1976 and an identical clause 4A was added in 1978 acquiring power to prescribe rebate to be allowed for binding material where sugarcane is brought to the khandsari sugar producing units bound in bundles and weighed as such.\n\nThi~ would at least show that since 1968 rebate at 0.625 per quintal of sugarcane purchased by producers of sugar is being allowed. Sugarcane is a raw material both for sugar and khandsari sugar, the distinction between them being that when vacuum pan process is employed the end product is called sugar and when open pan process is employed the end product is called khandsari sugar. In case of either of them, the grower of sugarcane has hardly anythi.ng to do with the end product. After the grower sells his sugarcane, as far as he is concerned, it is immaterial whether the producer produces sugar or khandsari sugar or rab or jaggery or shakkar. Therefore, clause 4A was introduced to avoid discrimination between producers of sugar and khandsari sugar in the matter of rebate to be allowed when the grower of sugarcane brings the same bound in bundles to be delivered to the producer. The producers of sugar have without a murmur accepted this position but once the producers of khandsari sugar are brought within the purview of an identical provision, they have filed the present petitions.\n\nMr. C.M. Lodha who led on behalf of the petitioners contended that the power to prescribe rate of rebate under third proviso to clause 4 is conditional upon the fixing of minimum price or price of sugarcane, and as the pre-condition to exercise of power is not satisfied, the authorities cannot exrcise power to prescribe rate of rebate. The submission is that where minimum price of sugarcane is fixed by the Government, in order to ensure that that price is paid for sugarcane and simultaneously to avoid any unauthorised deduction, the' Central Government or the State Government may prescribe the rate of rebate to be allowed beyond which no deduction\n\n··~\n\nStiKllNANbAN SARAN v. UNION (Desai, J.) 381\n\nunder the camouflage of rebate for binding material can be. resorted to by the purchaser; but if the power to fix minimum price or price o( sugarcane is not exercised, there does not arise a situation in which the power to prescribe rebate to be allowed for binding material can be exercised. It was urged that the power to fix price or mfoimum price of sugarcane and to prescribe rte of rebate are not independent but they are inter-dependent and one cannot be exercised without exercising the other.\n\nClause 4 confers power on the Central Government or a State Government with the concurrence of the Central Government to fix the minimum price or th.e price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of khandsari sugar for sugarcane purchased by them.\n\nThird proviso to clause 4 provides that the Central Government or with the approval of the Central Government, the State Government may in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as it may. specify, allow a suitable rebate in the price so fixed. If the provision were to end with clause 4, a serious contention would arise whether the power to determine rate of rebate can be exercised de horse the power to fix minimum price or price of sugarcane or can be unilaterally exercised. Undoubtedly, if the power was exercised under clause 4 probably the pre-condition to exercise of power of prescrib-· ing suitable rebate viz. fixing of minimum price or prlce of sugarcane if not satisfied, the power to prescribe rate of rebate could not have been exercised because the latter power for its exercise is dependent npon the power to fix price or minimum price. Both the powers are interrelated as would be evident from the language of third proviso : \" .. ., as it may specify, allow a suitable rebate in the price so fixed.\" The rebate is thus co-related to price fixed.\n\nTherefore prima facie it appears that the power to fix rate of rebate under the third proviso to clause 4 cannot be exercised without exercising the power to fix price or minimum price. It being a conditional power, the satisfaction of condition giving rise to the occasion to exercise of power is a must. Therefore, before the rate of rebate is prescribed the price or the minimum price of sugarcane as provided in the substantive part of clause 4 will have to be fixed. From the price so fixed a rebate has to be allowed and, therefore, the power was conferred by the third proviso to prescribe the rate of rebate. The rebate contemplated by the third proviso to clause 4 is not necessarily confined to rate of rebate for binding material only but per-\n\n~82 SUPREMR COURT REPORtS [ 1982] j s.c . .t.\n\nmissible rate of rebate from the price or minimum price fixed under the substantive provision of clause 4 can be prescribed.\n\nClause 4A stands on an independent footing and it is independent of clause 4.\n\nClause 4A is neither inter-dependent nor interrelated to clause 4.\n\nClause 4A provides that the producer of khandsari sugar or his agent shall pay for the sugarcane purchased by him to the sugarcane grower or the sugarcane growers' cooperative society either the minimum price of sugarcane fixed under clause 4 or the prico agreed to between the 'producer or his agent and the sugarcane grower or the sugarcane growers' co-operative society as the case may be.\n\nClause 4A thus visualises a situation in which either the minimum price of sugarcane is fixed under clause 4 or where no such price if fixed, the price agreed to between the sugarcane grower and the producer who purchased sugarcane and even in this latter situation the power to prescribe rate of rebate only in respect of binding material was conferred on the Central Government or the authorities set ont in the third proviso to clause 4A.\n\nTherefore, fixing of the minimum price may be a pre-condition to the exercise of power under the third proviso of clause 4, as far as clause 4A is concerned, even where the price to be paid by the producer to the sugarcane grower is the one negotiated between the two, the producer or his agent will have to allow that much rebate and no more for binding material if notified in exercise of the power conferred by the third proviso. This literal construction accords with the intendment of the provision as would be presently pointed out.\n\nMr. Lodha urged that if the purchaser and seller of sugarcane are free agents to negotiate the price, what useful purpose would be served by prescribing the rate of rebate statutorily ? Says Mr. Lodha, that if higher rebate is to -be allowed, the producer of khandsari sugar and the grower of sugarcane would work out the price accordingly and if less rebate is allowed, it will have a direct impact on the negotiated price. This submission proceeds on the unwarranted assumption that a producer of khandsari sugar and the grower of sugarcane are capable of negotiatin& the price as free agoots and stand on a footing of equality.\n\nSugarcane is a perishable commodity. The grower of the sugarcane is at the mercy of producers of sugar or khandsari sugar. It would be uneconomic for him to transport sugarcane to a long distance. By the very nature of the product, it being perishable and transport\n\n.• A\n\n~'---\n\nSUKHNANDAN SARAN v. UNION (Desai, J.) 383\n\nover a distance being uneconomic, the grower of sugarcane bas limited choice in selecting the producer to whom it could be sold.\n\nBetween the producer of khandsari and the grower of sugarcane, the first one is primarily in a position to dominate and dictate and they do not operate on the level of equality. Unquestionably, therefore, the grower of sugarcane in relation to the producer of the khandsari sugar would be weaker and it is he who requires to be protected.\n\nNow, if the protection of fixing of minimum price is not resorted to because the authorities under the Control Order may have information before them that looking to the supply and demand and the demand and the market economy, the grower of sugarcane would be able to obtain a reasonably fair price for his labour, the only thing which is required to be protected against is inequitous, unauthorised and impermissible deductions. It appears that in the State of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the weight of the binding material when sugllrcane is brought in bundles to the producer has been a fruitful source for the producers of khandsari sugar to make deductions from the weight of sugarcane delivered to them in such an exorbitant quantity as to deny in real money worth the negotiated price. This can be demonstrably established by the claim made in these petitions that the weight of binding material is 2. 5 kg. per quintal of sugarcane while the authorities have prescribed only 0.625 kg. per quintal of sugarcane and the national average as worked out by National Sugar Institute, Kanpur is 0.741 kg. per quintal of sugarcane. If the price of sugarcane is fixed per quintal and the deduction is made as contended herein, it does not require imagination or mathematician's intellect to work out the invisible loss inflicted by the subtle method on the growers of sugarcane.\n\nTherefore, while retaining the power to fix minimum price or price to be paid and also in a given situation leaving it to the purchaser of sugarcane and grower of sugarcane to negotiate the price in order to eschew any exploitation of the weaker section between the two, the power to prescribe the rate of rebate was acquired and can be rightly enforced. Therefore, viewed from either angle, there is no merit in the submission that unless the power • to fix the price or minimum price is exercised there is no power to prescribe the rate of rebate. Language of clause 4A on a literal or grammatical construction negatives the submission and it must as well be rejected looking to the intendment underlying this provision.\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 734 to 763 urged that assuming thl!t\n\n384 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS [1982f 3 s.c.a'\n\npower to prescribe rate of rebate under clause 4A read with the third proviso could also be exercised where price of sugarcane may be left to be negotiated between the growers of sugarcane and pro- . ducers of khandsari sugar, yet the quantum as determined must at least have reasonable relation to the reality of market situation as well as prevalent trade practice.\n\nHe urged that viewed from this angle fixation of rate of rebate at 0.625 kg. per quintal of sugarcane is unjust and unfair' and therefore the Court should strike down the impugned notification on the ground that the determination is arbitrary and utterly unrelated to trade and practice. Simultaneously he contended that assuming that national average of weight of binding material works out at 0.741 kg. per quintal as submitted by the Respondents on the strength of the report of National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, there was absolutely no justification for reducing the same to 0.625 kg. per quintal and therefore prescribed rate of -rebate apart from being arbitrary is unrelated to trade and prac(ice and deserves to be quashed. In this connection, he referred to paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Shri H.A.M.L. Vaz, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food in which it is stated as under :\n\n\"The limit of_ 625 grams per quintal was adopted, as it was allowed by the States of U.P. and Bihar before the Cenlial Government took over the control over the price of sugarcane, and has continued since then. Representations were received from the Associations of the vacuumpan sugar mills etc. again! that limit. A survey was carried out by the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, and the average weight of the binding material worked out to\n\n0. 741 kg., per quintal for the winter season of the selected factories spread over the whole country.' Subsequently, on receipt of a representation from the Madras State Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories, views of the State Governments in the matter were also called for, with the specific request that they might also ascertain the views of the cane growers. The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it. The Bihar Govern- Jlle!lt bad alreadr indicated the same view. Hence fixation\n\nSUKHNANDAN SARAN .v. UNION <Desai, J.) 385\n\nof that limit cannot be said to be unreal and arbitrary or contrary to actualities of trade and practice.\"\n\nPetitioners countered it by the affidavit in rejoinder of Shri Prem Parkash Aggarwal; the relevant portion of para 4\n\nreaqs as under :\n\n\"With reference to Para 6 of the counter-affidavit I say that to the best of my information no survey was carried out at any time after 1976. It is to the best of my information that National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, conducted some kind of survey in 196.4 or earlier.\"\n\nThis half-hearted lack of knowledge would not be sufficient to reject what Mr. Vaz stated -in his counter-affidavit. However, to put this factual averment beyond the pale of controversy Mr. Girish Chandra, learned advocate who appeared for the Union Government produced a file of the Department of Food, Sugar Policy Desk, in which claim for upward revision of allowance for binding material presently allowed under Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 in the light of the suggestions received from Indian Sugar Mills Association as per its letter dated July 14, 1977 has been meticulously examined.\n\nIt appears that Indian Sugar Mills Association approached the Central Government requesting it for upward revision of the rebate for binding material till then granted under the Control Order.\n\nIndian Sugar Mills Association appears to be the spokesman of the sugar industry.\n\nProbably a grievance was voiced that while producers of sugar are under a statutory obligation to grant the prescribed rate of rebate, the producers of khandsari sugar are under no such obligation even though they purchase sugarcane from the the same market. Accordingly while examining the. question whether any upward revision in the rate of rebate shoqld be allowed to the producrsof sugar who purchase sugarcane, it was decided to simultaneously introduce an i.dentical provision in respect of purchase of sugarcane by producers of khandsari sugar. That . is the genesis of the introduction of clause 4A in, the Control Order.\n\nThe file meticulously examines the suggestion for upward revision of the rate of rebate. It clearly transpires from the file that a circular letter was sent to all the governments of sugar producing states requesting them to intimate their view on the desirability or other wise of any upward revision in the existing quantum of rebate of 0.625 kg. per quintal in respect of the weisht of the binding material'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhere sugarcane is brought bound in bundles and weighed as such.\n\nIt may be briefly mentioned that Punjab, Gujarat, Karnataka and U.P., did not consider it necessary to grant any upward revision.\n\nOn the other hand, Tamilnadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Pondicherry, Haryana, Rajasthan and Orissa were of the opinion that there is some justification for an upward revision not exceeding I kg. per quintal. The State of Bibar took a neutral stand stating that in Bihar, sugarcane is not supplied hound in bundles and therefore the question of giving any rebate in respect of binding material does not arise. After ascertaining the views of the different State Governments, the departmen_t was of the view that since the views of the State Governments are sharply divided, a request may be made to Director, National Sugar Institute, Kanpur to carry out an independent study in regard to the quantum of l:!'bate that should be given for binding material, to enable the Government to take a final decision, on the request of the industry for upward revision of the existing rebate of 0.625 kg per quintal. This is the genesis of the report of the Director, National Sugar Institute referred to in Para 6 of the counter-affidavit. The summary of the report of the Director, ; National Sugar Institute, Kanpur was examined and it was observed that the percentage of the binding materials varies from State to State and ranges between 0.64 to 1.5% except in Orissa where it is found to be 3.00%. When the matter was still under consideration of the Department, the present writ petitions were filed. It was observed that the present rate of rebate is in force for the last over 20 years, so far as the vacuum-pan sugar manufacturers are concerned and the same can be applied to the khandsari sugar manufacturers also. Probably further examination of the request for upward revision came to be stalled in view of the fact that the present writ petitions were filed.\n\nIn the light of the fact situation hereinabove set-out, it is difficult to accept the submission that the fixation of rate of rebate for binding material at 0.625 kg. for the whole country is either arbitrary or unreal or unrelated to trade and practice. The rate of rebate seems tg have been determined by the law of averages after collecting information from all over the country. Coupled with this is the fact that the present rate of rebate is in vogue for over a quarter of a century. It in itself is sufficient to negative the contention that the rate of rebate is fixed arbitrarily or unrelated to trade and practice,\n\n/-~\n\nSUKRNANDAN SARAN ~. UNION (Desai, J.) .387\n\nThe next submission is that assuming that the Central Govern ment was influenced by the report made by the Director of the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, the report suggests tbat the average works out at 0.741 kg, per quintal, being approximately the mean between 0.64 and 1.5o/o. Therefore, it was vehemently urged that there was no justification for further reduCing it to 0.625 kg.\n\nWhen the determination has to be made on law of averages and applicable to the whole country, the ftnal figure cannot be mathematically determined. If the existing rate of rebate, determined on the national average is marginally higher or lower than the average worked out by a later study team, it cannot be said that the existing prescription is arbitrary or unf.elated to trade or practice No doubt, if the range is wide, and the gap is unexplained, realistic redetermination may be directed. According to the average worked out by the Director of the National Sugar Institute, all India average rate of rebate would work out at 0. 741 kg. per quintal while the Government has been fixing for over a quarter of a century the rate of rebate al 0 625 kg. per quintal. Thus the differential between what is prescribed and what is calcula.!ed by the study is not so wide as to render the presc.ribed rate arbitrary or unrealistic.\n\nThe differentials being within a narrow range, the one which is in vogue for over a quarter of a century cannot be rejected as arbitrary or unrelated to trade and practice. Nor is the Court competent to work out the exact permissible rebate with mathematical accuracy.\n\nA reference at this stage to a piece of evidence furnished by the petitioners would suffice to repel the contention of the petitioners that the average weight of binding material is 2.5 kg. per quintal and, therefore, the prescribed rate is not merely marginally low but wholly unrealistic. Annexure I to the rejoinder affidavit filed by\n\nShri Prem Prakash Aggarwal, Secretary of Our Khandsari Utpadak\n\nSangh, Roorkee, dated December 24, 1981, purports to be a report of the Assistant Sugarc11ne Commissioner on his visit to M/s Anand Prakash Alulkumar, a Khandsari sugar producing unit on January 25, 1978. He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors. In order to ascertain the average weight of binding material a truck loaded to its full capacity with sugarcane was weighed.\n\nThe gross weight was 37 quintals and 36 kgs.\n\nSbri Shol?h~ !lam! the oner of the sugarcane was directed tq\n\nF -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nremove the joon (binding material) of sugarcane. The weight of M.\n\nTrolly was found to be 21 quintal~ and 40 kgs.\n\nSubstracting the weight of trolly from the gross weight, the weight of sugarcane with binding materials worked out at 15 quintals and 96 kgs. Then followed the calculation which may be extracted :\n\n\"The above farmer (kastkar) also reported that the sugarcane was being purchased at Rs. 9. IO p. per quintal.\n\nApproximately about 1800 quintals cane was lying at site.\n\nThe weight of the joon (binding material) after it bad been\n\nremoved came to 32 kgs.\"\n\nIf the actual weight of the binding material in respect of 1800\n\nquintals of sugarcane turned out to be 32 kg., obviously per each quintal it would be much less than 0.625 kg.\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan, however, attempted to urge that the last sentence in the Report is disjointed and misplaced and he wanted us to read the Report as . meaning that the weight of sugarcane in the trolly was 15.96 kg. and that the weight of the binding material in respect of the same was 32 kg. and, therefore, on an average it would work out at 2 kg. per quintal. It is not possible to read the Report in the manner indicated by Mr. Shanti Bhushan. In fact, the Report was produced on behalf of the petitioners and not a word has been stated in the affidavit to which it is annexed as to how the Report is to be read.\n\nIt would thus appear that the rate of rebate set out in the impugned Notification bears resemblance to the sample testing of actual weight of binding material used in binding sugarcane when brought \".: in bundles to the khandsari factory. ~\n\nOur rejection of the submission should not be interpreted to imply that no case is made out for upward revision of the rate of\n\n.A'.· rebate for binding material. There is by the law of average as recently worked out in 1980·81, an examinable case for revision up to at least 0.741 kg. per quintal. We do not purport to indicate the figure as a judicial pronouncement but we believe that the Central Government would continue its examination of the request made by Indian Sugar Mills Association, shelved because of these petitions, for upward revision and realistically examine the same as early as possible and before the next crushing season commences.\n\nWith this we reect the su!Jmission that the fixation of rate of rebate at\n\nSUKHNANDAN SARAN v, UNION (Desai, J.) 389\n\n0.625 kg. per quintal in the impugned notification is arbitrary or A unrelated to trade and practice.\n\nMr. Kackar, learned counsel who appeared in Writ Petitions 777-796 and 1131-52/81 urged that the impugned notification places a restriction on th~ freedom of trade guaranteed to the petitioners B under Article 19 (I) (g) and as it is neither shown to be reasonable nor imposed in public interest, it is violative of the freedom of trade and is, therefore, void.\n\nWhenever it is contended that a regulatory measure imposes restriction upon the freedom of trade guaranteed by Articles 19 ( J) (g), it must be shown that the restriction so imposed directly and proximately interferes in presenti with the exercise of freedom of trade. If the alleged restriction does not directly or proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of trade., the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (I) (g) is not violated.\n\nPetitioners contend that they have a right to carry on trade on manufacturing khandsari sugar and for facilitating the carrying on of this trade they have to buy the raw material called sugarcane. When they buy sugarcane in the absence of minimum price for sugarcane the sugarcane grower and the producer of khandsari sugar are free to negotiate the price.\n\nThe negotiated price would take care of the condition in which sugarcane should be supplied. It would be open to the producer of kbandsari sugar to buy sugarcane from the grower who .may be asked to bring sugarcane not bound in bundles. The rebate for binding material is to be allowed only when sugarcane is brought to the khandsari sugar producing unit bound in bundles. It is always open to the purchaser of sugarcane to insist upon the grower bringing the sugarcane not bound in bundles and _be is free to negotiate the price when price or minimum price of sugarcane is not fixed and the impugned notification will not even remotely impinge upon his freedom to carry on his trade. Therefore, the short answer is that the restriction complained of\" does not directly and proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of trade and Article 19 (I) (g) is not attracted.\n\nAssuming that the impugned notificaiion maing it obligatory to grant rebate for binding material when sugarcane is brought , pound in l)undles to the extent prescribed in the impugned notificai . '\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\ntion does impose a restriction on the freedom to carry on trade, the * next question is, whether the restriction is reasonable and imposed in the interest of general public. Once it is assumed that the impugned notification imposes a restriction on the freedo.m of trade, the burden is on those who support it, to show that the restriction imposed by the impugned law is reasonable and is imposed in. the interest or general public. In other words, the burden is on those who seek the protection or clause (6) of Article 19 not on the citizen who says that the restrictive enactment is invalid (see Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Ors.,(1) Khyerbari Tea Co.\n\nLtd. & Anr. v. The State of Assam(') and vraj/a/ Manila/ & Co. and .----.._\n\n/ Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,('). It is of course not necessary to recall the dissent of Sarkar, J. in Khyerbari, Tea Co.\n\nLtd. case. The learned judge was of the view that the whole theory of burden of proof rests on the assumption that clause (6) of i..\n\nArticle 19 carves out an exception and that the burden to prove that the case is covered by the exception is on him who pleads the same, but it was observed that this way of reading the Constitution is not proper and one may legitimately say that there is no exception because the real fundamental right is what is left after the restriction has been imposed. Consistently with the majority view, the burden will be on the authority who claims the protection of clause (6) of Article 19 to show that the restriction is a reasonable one and that is imposed in the interest of general public.\n\nHaving settled the question of burden, the passing submission made tiy Mr. Kacker may be dealt with. It was urged that in the batch of petitions in which he appears neither the Union Govern ment nor the State of Uttar Pradesh has filed counteraffidavit and therefore, one can say that no attempt has been made to justify the restriction. We are not disposed to accept this submission because the Union Government has filed counter-affidavit in Writ Petitions, Nos. 6443-6444 of 1980 and all the petitions in this batch raised'~ identical contentions and were directed to be heard with Writ ·-.,. ' Petitions Nos. 6443-6444 of 1980. Undeserved respect for processual ·\"- justice may have persuaded us to direct the Union Government to file a copy of the counter-affidavit iq each petition which we\n\n(I) [1955] l SCR 707.\n\n!2) [1964) 5 S.C.R. 975.\n\nq) [1970] l SCR 40<),\n\n§UKHNANDAN SARAN v. UNION (Desai, J.) j9j\n\nconsider superfluous. At any rate, the petitioners in the petitions A in which Mr Kacker appears, were supplied a copy of the counter affidavit and therefore this passing submission must be negatived.\n\nIf freedom of trade postulates, inter alia, freedom to negotiate\n\n-4. price for purchase and sale both the raw material and the finished product, the control order confers power. to fix price of sugarcane and to th11t extent there is a restriction on freedom of __,,__ trade. But the restriction is not under examination here Even -' \"'- when be is left free to negotiate the price where either the Central Government or with the approval of the Central Government, the State Government does not fix minimum price or price of sugar- , J cane there is a further restriction on his freedom of negotiating the price because he is statutorily bound to give rebate for the binding material as prescribed in the impugned notification. To that extent one may give credence to the contention that there is a marginal restriction on the freedom of trade.\n\nThe statutory prescription of quantum of rebate for binding material has been prescribed for the benefit of sugarcane growers.\n\nProducers of sugar and khandsari sugar constitute a powerful trade lobby, the fact of which one can take judicial notice.\n\nSugar being an essential commodity occasionally kept in short -\n\n,. supply and being a commodity needed for, consumption by almost the entire population, the powerful industry magnates in this field are in a position to dominate both the growers of sugarcane as also the consumers of the essential commodity.\n\nNumber of regulations have been enacted almost since the dawn of independence to regulate this powerful combination of manufacturers of sugar and khandsari sugar all over the country for the ultimate benefit of consumers on the one hand and on the other hand the farmers and the growers of sugarcane with their small holdings and raising a perishable food crop. The marginal farmers, are unable to stand up against the organised industry.\n\nIt does not require long argument in this predominantly agricultural society that the farmers having small holdings need protection for selling at fair price their meagre agricultural produce. As far back as 1953; the U.P. Legislature enacted U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, for rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on the organised scientific line, to protect the interest of cane\n\n\\<...\n\n392 SuPREMB COURT REPORTS ( 19s2j 3 s.c.ll.\n\ngrowers and of the industry, etc.\n\nConstitutionality of this Act was challenged on various grounds including one under Article 19 (!) (g) In Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,(1) this Court repelled the challenge under Article 19 (I) (g) holding that the restriction which is imposed upon the canegrowers in regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Canegrowers Co-operative Society if not less than 75 per cent of the total cane growers within the area, is a reasonable restriction in the public interest desigqed for safeguarding the interest of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. The proposition is now beyond the pale of controversy that the State can impose a restriction in the interest of general public on the right of a party io con tract where in the opinion of the Government the contracting parties are unable to negotiate on the footing of equality.\n\nConstitutional validity of statutes prescribing minimum wages has been founded on this proposition. The principle can be effectively extended to the powerful sugar industry and the cane growers because the cane growers admittedly are at a comparative disadvantage to the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar who were described in the course of arguments as sugar barons. It does not require an elaborate discussion to reach an affirmative conclusion that sugarcane growers who are farmers cannot negotiate on the footing of the equality with the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar. The State action for the protection of the weaker sections is not only justified but absolutely necessary unless the restriction imposed is excessive.\n\nViewed from another angle, the impugned restriction is entirely reasonable. If price or minimum price of sugarcane is fixed, the producers of sugar would try to circumvent the price by unrealistic and impermissible deductions. The rebate for the weight of binding material seems to be a source for indulging in this nefarious, if not wholly fraudulent conduct. It is equally well settled that the State can impose reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19 to prevent fraud or where advantage of a fraudulent conduct is sought to be taken (see M/s. Fedco (P) Ltd. v. S.N. Bilgrami(1). The impugned restriction serves two-fold purpose: (i) it ensures price of sugarcane avoiding impermissible ded, uctions; (ii) it circumvents\n\n(I) [1956] S.C.R. 393. tZJ [ t 960J 2 s.c.R. 40s.\n\n- ,__:,/\n\n-~-.\n\nsbirnNANDAN SAlAN v. UNION (Desai, J, J 393\n\npossible fraud by making such deductions as would render illusory even the negotiated price, if not fixed price.\n\nAnd it is indisputable that if the rebate is not statutorily prescribed the cane growers will be at the mercy of the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar. If price or minimum price of sugarcane can be fixed by the State, because this power was never questioned before us, this very power comprehends the power to provide such incidenta land ancillary regulations which will ensure the price. Price fixation measure is for protection of the farmer from the exactions of producers against which he cannot protect himself. (See Lee Nebbia v. People of the State of New York)('). The impugned measure ensures price either fixed or negotiated and, therefore, it is a restriction which is undoubtedly reasonable and is imposed in the interest of general public and the guarantee of freedom of frade is' not violated.\n\nThe last submission is that in order that the restriction may be reasonable it must have reasonable relation to the object which the :; tatute seeks to achieve and must not be in excess of the object. It was nrged that the Sugarcane Control Order was issued in exercise\n\nof power conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.\n\nOne of the objects sought to be achieved by the Essential Commidites Act, 1955, is to ensure availability at fair price the essential commodity to the consumers. It was further urged that one can visualise that the poer to fix minimum price or price of sugarcane may have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, namely, availability of sugar to the consumers at fair price. But it was urged that prescribing the rate of rebate for binding material has no relation with the aforementioned object. This submission does not commend to us for the obvious reason that the restriction is imposed in the\n\ninteest of the cane growers and the State while ensuring that sngar,\n\na commodity . of daily consumption by almost every one in this country, is available to everyone at a fair price simultaneously wanted to ensure that the gro\\Ver of sugarcane, another weaker section of the society is not left to vagaries of the trade or the powerful sugar industry. To strike the balance between the conflicting interests not only State acquired power to fix minimum price of sugar and khandsari sugar but that this wholesome effort may not work to the disadvantage of the sugarcane growers section of the society, the power to prescribe rate of rebate was acquired. And the power to fix price or minimum price comprehends the power to\n\n(1)78 L.Rd. 940 at 960.\n\n. F\n\n394 siJl>kEMil coililT REPORTs (1~82) S.C.ll..\n\nso regulate supply as to ensure the price so fixed and to ensure that in the name of unauthorised and unwarranted deduction the price fixed or negotiated is not rendered illusory.\n\nViewed from either angle the restriction is both reasonable and it is imposed in the interest of general public, and bas a rational B relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Control Order.\n\nThese were all the contentions in this batch of petitions and as none has merit in it, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs; hearing fee in one set. ,, r ~\"'--;- c\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions dismis$ed.\n\n- .f", "total_entities": 160, "entities": [{"text": "SUKHNANDAN SARAN DINESH KUMAR &\n\nANOTHER ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUKHNANDAN SARAN DINESH KUMAR &\n\nANOTHER ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to extend protectiOn to the farmers who had undertaken raising of sugarcane crop, the Central Government issued the Sugarcane (Control) Order\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 24, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 3A which was introduced on September 24, 1976 conferred power on the Central Government and various other authorities to allow a suitable rebate in regard to the weight of the binding material not exceeding 0.62S Kg."}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1376, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 20, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1404, "end_char": 1418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, Clause 4A was introduced on March 20, 1978,."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government issued a notification on September 3, 1980 to provide that where sugarcane is brought in !:"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2887, "end_char": 2896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3570, "end_char": 3583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 3, 19BO", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: The State Government notification dated September 3, 19BO directing that where sugarcane is brought in bundles and is weighed as such a rebate in regard.to the binding material at 0.625 kg per quinta:I be allowed, is valid and legal."}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5346, "end_char": 5354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5545, "end_char": 5553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6186, "end_char": 6194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6303, "end_char": 6311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6313, "end_char": 6322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6381, "end_char": 6390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6781, "end_char": 6790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6907, "end_char": 6915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8303, "end_char": 8316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the weight of the binding-material When sugarcane is brought in bundles to the producer bas been a fruitful surce for the producers of khandsari sugar to make deductions from the weight of sugitrcane delivered to them in an exorbitant quantity so as to deny in real money worth the ncgoti ated price. ["}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8321, "end_char": 8326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the weight of the binding-material When sugarcane is brought in bundles to the producer bas been a fruitful surce for the producers of khandsari sugar to make deductions from the weight of sugitrcane delivered to them in an exorbitant quantity so as to deny in real money worth the ncgoti ated price. ["}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11234, "end_char": 11247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13536, "end_char": 13546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13554, "end_char": 13575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13697, "end_char": 13707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13715, "end_char": 13736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13776, "end_char": 13790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6443-44/80, Shanti Bhushan, in WP.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13823, "end_char": 13834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13868, "end_char": 13877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13879, "end_char": 13888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "K.K. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13890, "end_char": 13900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "N.S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13902, "end_char": 13915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13917, "end_char": 13931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13936, "end_char": 13953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "732·63, 3423-25/81-S.N. Kackar, in W.P. 777-96 & 1131-52 of 81, R.K. Jain, S. Mitter, K.K. Mohan, N.S. Das Bahl, Rameshwar Dial and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "G.N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13976, "end_char": 13988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dikshit and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for Respondents."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13998, "end_char": 14012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dikshit and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for Respondents."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14031, "end_char": 14045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India in W.l'.", "canonical_name": "Girish Chandra"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14055, "end_char": 14068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India in W.l'."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14164, "end_char": 14169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nDESAI, J. Even an innocuous marginally regulatory measure affecting the sugar trade at fringes is sufficient for this powerful\n\nipdustry to invade the courts with petitions galore almost pro- G claiming that there should be hands off policy in respect of this trade.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPORts [ 1982] 3 s.c.il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the power conferred by clause ( 4) third proviso of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, ('Control Order' for short), the 2nd respondent-State ofUttar Pradesh, with the permission of\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPORts [ 1982] 3 s.c.il."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14815, "end_char": 14829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 1st respondent Union of India, issued Notification dated September 3, 1980, which is impugned in these petitions."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15203, "end_char": 15211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Basudev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Order, R. Basudev,\n\nSecretary\"\n\nIt was stated that there was a printing error in mentioning the figure\n\n'0.650 kg.'"}}, {"text": "Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15917, "end_char": 15946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe allegations in all the petitions are identical and, therefore, we would state a few representative facts from the writ petition , filed by M/s. Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar and Another.", "canonical_name": "SUKHNANDAN SARAN DINESH KUMAR &\n\nANOTHER ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16649, "end_char": 16658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16666, "end_char": 16697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16703, "end_char": 16711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16873, "end_char": 16881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Clause 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "March 20,1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17522, "end_char": 17535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com./Sugarcane dated March 20,1978, Clause 4A with the marginal note \"Rebate that can be deducted from the price paid for sugarcane by producers of Khandsari sugar\" was introduced."}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17537, "end_char": 17546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18762, "end_char": 18770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19440, "end_char": 19448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19821, "end_char": 19829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20.3. 78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19952, "end_char": 19960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com./Sugarcane dated 20.3."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21117, "end_char": 21126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21202, "end_char": 21210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21287, "end_char": 21296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September. 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21585, "end_char": 21603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Armed with this power, the 2nd respondent after obtaining approval of the Central Government, as per letter dated September."}}, {"text": "clause 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21910, "end_char": 21919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22429, "end_char": 22437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23328, "end_char": 23337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23373, "end_char": 23382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24240, "end_char": 24249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.M. Lodha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24681, "end_char": 24691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. C.M. Lodha who led on behalf of the petitioners contended that the power to prescribe rate of rebate under third proviso to clause 4 is conditional upon the fixing of minimum price or price of sugarcane, and as the pre-condition to exercise of power is not satisfied, the authorities cannot exrcise power to prescribe rate of rebate."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24805, "end_char": 24813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25887, "end_char": 25895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26151, "end_char": 26159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26424, "end_char": 26432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26672, "end_char": 26680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27310, "end_char": 27318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27653, "end_char": 27661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27878, "end_char": 27886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28113, "end_char": 28121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28142, "end_char": 28151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28210, "end_char": 28218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28221, "end_char": 28230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28278, "end_char": 28286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28289, "end_char": 28298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28523, "end_char": 28531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28683, "end_char": 28692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28783, "end_char": 28791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29114, "end_char": 29123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29240, "end_char": 29248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29260, "end_char": 29269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lodha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29670, "end_char": 29675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lodha urged that if the purchaser and seller of sugarcane are free agents to negotiate the price, what useful purpose would be served by prescribing the rate of rebate statutorily ?"}}, {"text": "National Sugar Institute, Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32147, "end_char": 32179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per quintal of sugarcane and the national average as worked out by National Sugar Institute, Kanpur is 0.741 kg."}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33028, "end_char": 33037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33194, "end_char": 33208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33400, "end_char": 33409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.A.M.L. Vaz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34547, "end_char": 34559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, he referred to paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Shri H.A.M.L. Vaz, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food in which it is stated as under :\n\n\"The limit of_ 625 grams per quintal was adopted, as it was allowed by the States of U.P. and Bihar before the Cenlial Government took over the control over the price of sugarcane, and has continued since then."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34579, "end_char": 34622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, he referred to paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Shri H.A.M.L. Vaz, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food in which it is stated as under :\n\n\"The limit of_ 625 grams per quintal was adopted, as it was allowed by the States of U.P. and Bihar before the Cenlial Government took over the control over the price of sugarcane, and has continued since then."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34742, "end_char": 34746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, he referred to paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Shri H.A.M.L. Vaz, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food in which it is stated as under :\n\n\"The limit of_ 625 grams per quintal was adopted, as it was allowed by the States of U.P. and Bihar before the Cenlial Government took over the control over the price of sugarcane, and has continued since then."}}, {"text": "Madras State Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35259, "end_char": 35314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on receipt of a representation from the Madras State Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories, views of the State Governments in the matter were also called for, with the specific request that they might also ascertain the views of the cane growers."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35524, "end_char": 35530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35532, "end_char": 35541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35543, "end_char": 35554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35556, "end_char": 35565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35567, "end_char": 35581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Pondicherry", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35583, "end_char": 35594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35596, "end_char": 35607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35609, "end_char": 35615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Madha Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35617, "end_char": 35630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35632, "end_char": 35638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35643, "end_char": 35650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major sugar producing State Governments of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry, West Bengal, Orissa, Madha Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat, recommF.nded that the limit already prescribed was adequate and that there was no need to revise it."}}, {"text": "Prem Parkash Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36047, "end_char": 36068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioners countered it by the affidavit in rejoinder of Shri Prem Parkash Aggarwal; the relevant portion of para 4\n\nreaqs as under :\n\n\"With reference to Para 6 of the counter-affidavit I say that to the best of my information no survey was carried out at any time after 1976.", "canonical_name": "Prem Parkash Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Vaz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36469, "end_char": 36472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This half-hearted lack of knowledge would not be sufficient to reject what Mr. Vaz stated -in his counter-affidavit."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36580, "end_char": 36594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, to put this factual averment beyond the pale of controversy Mr. Girish Chandra, learned advocate who appeared for the Union Government produced a file of the Department of Food, Sugar Policy Desk, in which claim for upward revision of allowance for binding material presently allowed under Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 in the light of the suggestions received from Indian Sugar Mills Association as per its letter dated July 14, 1977 has been meticulously examined.", "canonical_name": "Girish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Indian Sugar Mills Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36880, "end_char": 36910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, to put this factual averment beyond the pale of controversy Mr. Girish Chandra, learned advocate who appeared for the Union Government produced a file of the Department of Food, Sugar Policy Desk, in which claim for upward revision of allowance for binding material presently allowed under Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 in the light of the suggestions received from Indian Sugar Mills Association as per its letter dated July 14, 1977 has been meticulously examined."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36935, "end_char": 36948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, to put this factual averment beyond the pale of controversy Mr. Girish Chandra, learned advocate who appeared for the Union Government produced a file of the Department of Food, Sugar Policy Desk, in which claim for upward revision of allowance for binding material presently allowed under Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 in the light of the suggestions received from Indian Sugar Mills Association as per its letter dated July 14, 1977 has been meticulously examined."}}, {"text": "clause 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37857, "end_char": 37866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamilnadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38559, "end_char": 38568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Tamilnadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Pondicherry, Haryana, Rajasthan and Orissa were of the opinion that there is some justification for an upward revision not exceeding I kg."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38604, "end_char": 38611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Tamilnadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Pondicherry, Haryana, Rajasthan and Orissa were of the opinion that there is some justification for an upward revision not exceeding I kg."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38627, "end_char": 38633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Tamilnadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Pondicherry, Haryana, Rajasthan and Orissa were of the opinion that there is some justification for an upward revision not exceeding I kg."}}, {"text": "State of Bibar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38747, "end_char": 38761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bibar took a neutral stand stating that in Bihar, sugarcane is not supplied hound in bundles and therefore the question of giving any rebate in respect of binding material does not arise."}}, {"text": "National Sugar Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39491, "end_char": 39515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the genesis of the report of the Director, National Sugar Institute referred to in Para 6 of the counter-affidavit."}}, {"text": "SUKRNANDAN SARAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40928, "end_char": 40944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It in itself is sufficient to negative the contention that the rate of rebate is fixed arbitrarily or unrelated to trade and practice,\n\n/-~\n\nSUKRNANDAN SARAN ~. UNION (Desai, J.) .387\n\nThe next submission is that assuming that the Central Govern ment was influenced by the report made by the Director of the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, the report suggests tbat the average works out at 0.741 kg, per quintal, being approximately the mean between 0.64 and 1.5o/o. Therefore, it was vehemently urged that there was no justification for further reduCing it to 0.625 kg."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40955, "end_char": 40960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It in itself is sufficient to negative the contention that the rate of rebate is fixed arbitrarily or unrelated to trade and practice,\n\n/-~\n\nSUKRNANDAN SARAN ~. UNION (Desai, J.) .387\n\nThe next submission is that assuming that the Central Govern ment was influenced by the report made by the Director of the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur, the report suggests tbat the average works out at 0.741 kg, per quintal, being approximately the mean between 0.64 and 1.5o/o. Therefore, it was vehemently urged that there was no justification for further reduCing it to 0.625 kg.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Prem Prakash Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42906, "end_char": 42927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure I to the rejoinder affidavit filed by\n\nShri Prem Prakash Aggarwal, Secretary of Our Khandsari Utpadak\n\nSangh, Roorkee, dated December 24, 1981, purports to be a report of the Assistant Sugarc11ne Commissioner on his visit to M/s Anand Prakash Alulkumar, a Khandsari sugar producing unit on January 25, 1978.", "canonical_name": "Prem Parkash Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Anand Prakash Alulkumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43091, "end_char": 43114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure I to the rejoinder affidavit filed by\n\nShri Prem Prakash Aggarwal, Secretary of Our Khandsari Utpadak\n\nSangh, Roorkee, dated December 24, 1981, purports to be a report of the Assistant Sugarc11ne Commissioner on his visit to M/s Anand Prakash Alulkumar, a Khandsari sugar producing unit on January 25, 1978."}}, {"text": "Shanker Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43197, "end_char": 43211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors."}}, {"text": "Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43232, "end_char": 43253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors."}}, {"text": "R.C. Kureel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43255, "end_char": 43266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors."}}, {"text": "Deoband", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43268, "end_char": 43275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors."}}, {"text": "Navin Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43280, "end_char": 43293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by Shri Shanker Shukla, Khandsari Officer, Sarvashri 'S.D. Verma, R.C. Kureel, Deoband and Navin Chandra, Khandsari Inspectors."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nTrolly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43658, "end_char": 43668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The weight of M.\n\nTrolly was found to be 21 quintal~ and 40 kgs."}}, {"text": "Kackar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46087, "end_char": 46093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kackar, learned counsel who appeared in Writ Petitions 777-796 and 1131-52/81 urged that the impugned notification places a restriction on th~ freedom of trade guaranteed to the petitioners B under Article 19 (I) (g) and as it is neither shown to be reasonable nor imposed in public interest, it is violative of the freedom of trade and is, therefore, void.", "canonical_name": "Kackar"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46285, "end_char": 46295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46557, "end_char": 46568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46851, "end_char": 46861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48084, "end_char": 48094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48852, "end_char": 48862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,(')", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49089, "end_char": 49123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,(')."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49180, "end_char": 49186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is of course not necessary to recall the dissent of Sarkar, J. in Khyerbari, Tea Co.\n\nLtd. case."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49348, "end_char": 49358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49824, "end_char": 49834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50015, "end_char": 50021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having settled the question of burden, the passing submission made tiy Mr. Kacker may be dealt with.", "canonical_name": "Kackar"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50143, "end_char": 50165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that in the batch of petitions in which he appears neither the Union Govern ment nor the State of Uttar Pradesh has filed counteraffidavit and therefore, one can say that no attempt has been made to justify the restriction."}}, {"text": "[1964) 5 S.C.R. 975", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 50765, "end_char": 50784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P. Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53121, "end_char": 53137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As far back as 1953; the U.P. Legislature enacted U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, for rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on the organised scientific line, to protect the interest of cane\n\n\\<...\n\n392 SuPREMB COURT REPORTS ( 19s2j 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53519, "end_char": 53529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53644, "end_char": 53654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Canegrowers Co-operative Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53835, "end_char": 53867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(1) this Court repelled the challenge under Article 19 (I) (g) holding that the restriction which is imposed upon the canegrowers in regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Canegrowers Co-operative Society if not less than 75 per cent of the total cane growers within the area, is a reasonable restriction in the public interest desigqed for safeguarding the interest of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55623, "end_char": 55633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57237, "end_char": 57246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57254, "end_char": 57279, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "One of the objects sought to be achieved by the Essential Commidites Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57282, "end_char": 57360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_38_42_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "EX-CAPT. ASHOK Kl1MAR SAWHNaY\n\n1'.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nJanuary 13, 1982\n\n[A.O. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R.B. MISRA, JI.]\n\nRe/eastd Emergency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers (Reservation of Vacancies) Rules, 1971, Rules 4(1), 6(3) and 8-Inter Pretation of-'Recruitment'-Meaning of. ./'\n\nResPonC:ents Nos. 2 to 14 were appointed to the cadre of Income-tax Officers, Class I, against vacancies reserved for Scheduled Caste and Schedules Tribes, as a result of a Competitive examination or test as envisaged by sub-rule (3) of Rule 6. The Petitioner was similarly appointed to the same cadre but against a vacancy reserved under sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 for certain officers of the Armed Forces of the Union. He was placed in the imi::ugned seniority list below respon dents Nos. 2 to 14. He made a representation against the seniority assigned to him on the ground tha~ under sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 he was entitled to rank immediately below candidate~ appointed against unreserved vacancies. The representation was rejected by a letter dated 16th March, 1979. The petitioner filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India s:eking the issuance of a writ quashing that letter. At the hearing it was not disputed that the petitio11er was entitled to the benefit o:f reservation sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 and to have his seniority determined in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 6. However, it was contended on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 to 14, inter alia, that the rules of the service had been amended earlier to 1971, so as to place candidates covered by sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 below those who had been appointed against reserved vacancies through a competititive examination.\n\nAccepting the petition, it was\n\nHELD : (1) Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 is not ambiguous in any manner what soever and lays down in clear terms that the officers appointed against vacancies reserved under sub-rule.(I) of Rule 4 shall rank below candidates who were appointed against unre1erved VacanrieS in the Services concerned through a com. petiye examination, etc. [40 F-G]\n\n2. Respondents Nos. 2 to 14 have been appointed against vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes. Clearly therefore, they must rank below the petitioner inasmuch as it caanot be said with aay plausibility that they were appointed against unreserved vacancies. [41 A-BJ ,\n\n3. The argument that the rules of the service in question had been amended to 1971, so as.to place candidates coverved by Rule 4(1) below those who bad been appointed to reserved vacancies through a competitive examination has no substance and makes no difference to tht iOterpretation which is-given above to\n\nA.It. SAWHNEY ' UNlON (Koshar, J.) 39\n\nsub-rule (3) of Rule 6, Rule 8 of the Rules declares in no uncertain terms that all rules regulating the recruitment of persons to Central Civil Services and Posts, Class I, to which the Rules apply, shall be deemed to have been amended to the\n\nextent provided for in the Rules. Although the rules regulating the seniority of the petitiopers and respondents Nos. 2 to 14 were so amended earlier to 1971 as to assign to the petitioner seniority below respondents Nos 2 to 14, the situation is Wholly irrelevant to the present dispute because after the ameOdooent brought about by Rule 8 of the Rules, the members of the service to :which the contenting parties belong, have to be governed by 1he later amendment, of which sub-rule\n\n(3) of Rule 6 forms a part. This is the inescapable consequence fl.owing from Rule 8 of the Rules. [41 G-H, 42 A-DJ\n\n4. The word 'recruitment' is comprehensive enough to embrace the content of all the rules proceeding Rule 8 including the fitment of candidates recruited to the service vis-a-vis each other. [ 42 D-E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1337 of 1979.\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India). '\n\nV.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and Hemani Sharma for the • D Petitioner.\n\nAbdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short question which falls for determination in this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of appropriate writs quashing the letter dated 16th of March, 1979, by which the representation made by the petitioner against the seniority assigned to him in the cadre of Income-tax Officers, Class-I was rejected and he was informed that the seniority list forming an appendix to Annexure 'l' had been correctly framed in accordance with the rules then in force.\n\n2. The answer to the question posed by the petition has to be answered with reference to Rules 4, 6 and 8 of the Released , Emergency Commissioned Officers & Short Service Commissioned Officers (Reser vat.ion of Vacancies) Rules, 19 71 (hereinafter called the Rules). The relevant part of Rule 4(1) reads thus :\n\n4(1) Twenty percent of the 'vacancies in the Indian Foreign . Service, and 25 percent of the vacancies in all the Central Civil Services and posts, Class I, to which these rules apply ................ ..\n\n40 1198~1 j s.c.lt.\n\nA shall be reserved.for being filld by the Btnergency Commissioned.\n\nOfficers and. the Short , Service .. Commissioned Officeri; .of the Armed.\n\nForceH>fthe Union.who wcrcomUJissioned., after.the 1st November, 1962 'but before the 10th January, 1968', and who-\n\n(i) ,,,,, ......................................... ..\n\n(ii) in the caseof.Sllort Service Commissioned Officers ue .\n\nreleased onthe expiry•of•tlretenure of'th'eir service; or\n\n(iii) .... : ............................................. .\n\nRule '6 in so far asit is relevant for our purpose provides :\n\n~I) ................................................. .\n\n(2) Seniority inter se of candidates who are appointed against the vacancies. rflllt'ved' uadc!l' sub-l'ule (I) of rule 4 and allotted to a particular year shall be determined accordillg to the merit list prepared by tl:le Commission on the basis of the results of their perfor• mance at the examination or test or interview.\n\n(3) All candidates who have been appointed . against: tho\n\nvacancies reserved under sub-rule (I) of rule 4 shall rank below tho<1:andidates who Wire appointed1again1t unreserved vacancies in the services of posts through the competitive examination or test or interview conducted by the CommiSsh>n corresponding to the year to which the former candidates are-allotted.\n\nIt is not disputed thaMhepetitionerian officer who is entitl•. ed to the benefit of' reservation underthe11bove abstracted portion of Rule 4(1) and to have his seniority accordance with sub-rule\n\n(3) of Rule 6.\n\nAs we read the subrole last mentioned we-do not find it to be ambiguous in any manner whatsoever.\n\nIt lays down in clear terms that the officers appointed against vacancies reserved under sub-rule (I) of Rule 4 shall rank.below candidates who were appointed against unreserved vacancies in the services concerned. through a competitive examination,.etc. Respondents Nos. 2 to 14 who have been placed in the impugned seniority list above the petitioner were appointed to the .cadre of Income-tax Officers,. Class I through a competitive .e; tamination or test aunvisaged. by sub-rule(3)\n\nof Rule 6.\n\nNow if they were. appointed, aginst unreserved. vacaD::\n\ncis, they are eniitled to rank above the petitioner but not otherwise.\n\n--+\n\nA.K. SAWHNEY v. UNION (Koshal, J.) 41\n\nIt is conceded before us that respondents Nos. 2 to 14 have been appointed against vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.\n\nClearly, therefore, they must rank below the petitioner inasmuch as it cannot be said with any plausibility that they were appointed against unreserved vacancies.\n\n3, Mr. Abdul Khader appearing for the Union of India has contested the interpretation just above placed by us on sub-rule\n\n(3) of Rule 6.\n\nAccording to him that interpretation makes the sub-rule retrospective in operation, which it is not.\n\nWe agree that the subrule is intended to be prospective only and that the above interpretation would be operative only after the date on which the sub-rule was promulgated and not before that. But then that means that every seniority list prepared after the date of the promulgation of the sub-rule would be governed by it. Similarly, every promotion made and every question relating to seniority cropping up after the date of the promulgation of the sub-rule (which is 28th August,\n\n1971) shall be determined according to that sub-rule. No question of retrospectivity of the sub-rule is thus involved. Of course, the interse seniority of officers of the cadre prevailing upto 28th August, 1971 bad to be determined under the rules as they existed before that date and any promotions made earlier to that date would continue to be good if made in accordance with those rules.\n\nHowever, the position changed with the promulgation of the Rules and any promotion made thereafter has to conform to them.\n\nFaced with the above situation Mr. Abdul Khader argued that the word, 'unreserved' in sub.rule (3) of Rule 6 would embrace the vacancies reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who bad joined the cadre through open competition, etc., because the sub-rule meant to take within its ambit all such persons who had been recruited in that manner. The logic of the argument is not clear to us because it makes the whole subrule meaningless.\n\nIf the argument were to be accepted, the use of the word 'unreserved' would be wholli uncalled for and we just cannot bold that the word is redundant, forms part as it does of subordinate legislation. The word 'unreserved' can obviously not be .equated with its antonym, that is, 'reserved', and has to be applied only to vacancies which do not fall within the reserved categories.\n\nMr. Abdul Kbader took another point and that was to the effect that the rules of the servic~ ill uestion haq been amndq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\n earlier to 1971 so as to place candidates covered by Rule 4(1) below those who had been appointed to reserved vacancies through a competitive examination. That may well have been so but then that makes no difference to the interpretation which is given above to sub-rule (3) of Rule 6.\n\nRule 8 of the Rules declares in no uncertain terms that all rules regulating the recruitment of persons to Central Civil Services and Posts, Class I, to which the Rules apply, shall be deemed to have been amended io the extent provided for in the Rules. If the rules regulating the seniority of the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 14 were so amended earlier to 1971 as' to assign to the petitioner seniority below respondents Nos. 2 to 14, the situation would be wholly irrelevant to the present dispute because after the amendment brought about Rule 8 of the Rules, the members of the service to which the contested parties belong, have to be governed by the amendment of which sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 forms a part. This is the inescapable consequence flowing :rrom Rule 8 of ·\n\nthe Rules.\n\nWe may take note here of the only other argument raised by Mr. Abdul Khader and that is that Rule 8 regulates only the recruitment of persons to Central Civil Services and Posts, Class I, and not to their conditions of service. We do not find any substance in this argument either..\n\nThe word 'recruitment' is comprehensive enough to embrace the content of all the mies preceding Rule 8 including the fitment of candidates recruited to the service vis-a.vis each other.\n\n7. In the result, we accept the petition, quash the seniority list abovementioned as well as the letter by which the representation there against made by the petitioner was rejected and direct respondent No. l to re-frame the seniority list assigning the petitioner seniority in accordance with law as explained above. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nN. K. A. .Petition allowed.", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "EX-CAPT. ASHOK Kl1MAR SAWHNaY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EX-CAPT. ASHOK KUMAR SAWHNEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 13, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nJanuary 13, 1982\n\n[A.O. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R.B. MISRA, JI.]"}}, {"text": "A.O. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "16th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1081, "end_char": 1097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was rejected by a letter dated 16th March, 1979."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1152, "end_char": 1173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.It. SAWHNEY ' UNlON", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument that the rules of the service in question had been amended to 1971, so as.to place candidates coverved by Rule 4(1) below those who bad been appointed to reserved vacancies through a competitive examination has no substance and makes no difference to tht iOterpretation which is-given above to\n\nA.It."}}, {"text": "Koshar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2734, "end_char": 2740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAWHNEY ' UNlON (Koshar, J.) 39\n\nsub-rule (3) of Rule 6, Rule 8 of the Rules declares in no uncertain terms that all rules regulating the recruitment of persons to Central Civil Services and Posts, Class I, to which the Rules apply, shall be deemed to have been amended to the\n\nextent provided for in the Rules.", "canonical_name": "Koshar"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and Hemani Sharma for the • D Petitioner."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and Hemani Sharma for the • D Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Hemani Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and Hemani Sharma for the • D Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Khader"}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4017, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4094, "end_char": 4100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short question which falls for determination in this petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Koshar"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4177, "end_char": 4184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4192, "end_char": 4213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7763, "end_char": 7775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Mr. Abdul Khader appearing for the Union of India has contested the interpretation just above placed by us on sub-rule\n\n(3) of Rule 6.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Khader"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7794, "end_char": 7808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Mr. Abdul Khader appearing for the Union of India has contested the interpretation just above placed by us on sub-rule\n\n(3) of Rule 6."}}, {"text": "28th August,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8467, "end_char": 8485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, every promotion made and every question relating to seniority cropping up after the date of the promulgation of the sub-rule (which is 28th August,\n\n1971) shall be determined according to that sub-rule."}}, {"text": "Abdul Kbader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9860, "end_char": 9872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Abdul Kbader took another point and that was to the effect that the rules of the servic~ ill uestion haq been amndq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\n earlier to 1971 so as to place candidates covered by Rule 4(1) below those who had been appointed to reserved vacancies through a competitive examination.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Khader"}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader and that is that Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11165, "end_char": 11199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. K. A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11929, "end_char": 11937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. A. .Petition allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_395_410_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "'., ii\n\n3~5 A\n\nRAM KARAN & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nMarc~ 4, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D.A. DESAI AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ,)\n\nSentencing-lmpqsition of appropriate Jentence, under stction 302 or 304 depends on the nature of offence of culpable homicide-Evidence showing homicide by both parties in a CiVil Suit in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a quarrel-Appropriate sentence would be olie under sections 304(1)/34 Indian Penal\n\nCode and not under sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code-Probability of culpability not proved by legal evidence- Benefit of doubt must ensue in such cases.\n\nThe five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.\n\nDevi,. alleging that while constructing their new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land. In that suit appellant Ram Karan got Commissioners appointed by the court on five or six occasions for taking measurements of the properties with the object of proving his case of encroach .. - ment by Prakash Chandra,. the deceased. But these Commissioners' reports were set aside on the objection raised by Prakash Chandra and the other defendants. The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6\"\"9-1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for decoased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan. After the completion of the survey work and measurements at about 1 P.M. when all the three lawyers were standing and talking in front of the house of the appellants deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra came there to talk to the Commissioner, which. interference was not liked by the appollants. This resulted in a sudden quarrel, exchange of hot words later followed by assault with knife etc., on the appellants which, according to prosecution, was in the exercise of right of self-defence by the prosecution party, particulary Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11).\n\nOn the side of the ' appellants Ram Karan's son Chhotey Lal (accused) died and on the side of the prosecution Prakash Chandra and his son Umesh Chandra died and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) was grievously injured. All the five accused were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge for offences under sections 302/149 J.P.C. (two counts) and 307/149 I.P.C. and were sentenced to imprisonment for life and rigorous im.Pi'isonment for four years respectively.\n\nRam Karan was also convicted under sectioD. 147 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and his four sons were convicted under section 148 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years. In appeal the\n\n396 iUPRBME COURT Ri!i>oilTs [I982j 3 s.c.a.\n\nHigh Court acquitted Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, set aside the conviction and sentence under sections 147 and 148 l.P.C. in respect of the rest and confiribed {a) their sentence of life imprisonment by alterting the conviction one under sections 302/34 I.P .C. and (b) their sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment to one under sections 307/34 I.P.C. Hence the appeal by special leave by Ram Karan and bis two sons.\n\nB Acquitting Ram Karan and allowing the appeal of the other two Jn part,\n\nthe Court\n\nHELD : Having regard to the age of the appellant Ram Karan who was about 70 years old at the time of the occurrence, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he would have caught hold of the young man Dinesh Chandra\n\n/\"\" -.-A--:~ (P.W. 11) by his waist and whether he would have asked all hi< sons to attack and kill Prakash Chandra and his sons. The appellant Ram Karan is entitled to be set at liberty. [409 DEl\n\nBY MAJORITY\n\nPer Faza/ Ali, J. (and on behalf of D.A. Desai, J.)\n\n1:1. Exception 4 to section 300 I.P.C. provides that culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without pre-meditation in a lsudden fight in the beat of passion upon a sudden qUarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in_a cruel or unusual manner. {399 D]\n\nl :2. In this case, the incident occurred upoD. a sudden quarrel a1;1d no one took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner on either side.\n\nPrakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on the side of the prosecution died and Chhotey Lal on the side of the accused died and each of them met a homicidal death. Therefore exception 4 to section 300 Indian Penal Code is clearly attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of Sushi! Kumar and Ved Prakash and, therefore, they would be guilty of committing on offence-under section 304(1)/34 I.P.C. A sentence of rigorous imprit_onment for seven years would be appropriate ; conviction and sentence under sections 307/34 I.P.C. being in order would run con currently.\n\n[399 B-C, G-H, 400 A]\n\nPer Varadarajan, J. (contra).\n\nSunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were theaggressors and they have been rightly convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under sections 307 /34 I.P.C. with reference to P. W. 11. Neither Exception 2 nor Exception 4 to section 300 l.P.C. would apply to the facts of the case and the offence cannot be brought under section 304 (Part 1) I.P.C. The evidence of P.Ws. l, IO and 11 proves beyond reasonable doubt_ that these two appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash\n\nattacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Un1esh Chandra with kniveS as a result of which both of them, who had no weapons died on the spot and these two apellants attacked P.W. 11 with knives with such intention that if he had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him they would be guilty of murder in furtherance of their common intention to murder. Their conviction under section 307/34 is proper. [ 408 F-H, 409 C-D]\n\nI,\"\" t' --\n\nfl.AM KARAN v. U.P. (Fazal Afi, J.) 397\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON : Criminal Appeal No. 329.\n\nA of 1975.\n\nFrom the Judgment & Order dated the 15th April, 1975 of ibe Allahabad High Court in Cr!. A. No. 1144 of J971.\n\nRL. Kohli and S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellants.\n\nD.P. Uniyal and R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 15.4.1975 of the Allahabad High Court by which the Judges of the High Court while acquitting the accused, Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash from one under ss. 302 and 307 read with s. 149 I.P.C. to one under ss. 302 and 307; read; with s. 34, I.P.C. and confirmed the sentences of imprisonment for life imposed.on these appellants.\n\nThe prosecution case has been detailed in the judgment of the High Court as also in the judgment of our learned Brother Varadarajan J. and it is not necessary to repeat the same. So far as the question of occurrence is concerned that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as pointed out by Brother Varadarajan, J. as also by the High Court.\n\nWe also agree with the appreciation of the evidence by Brother Varadarajan, J. and his conclusion that the two deceased died at the hands of the appellants.\n\nThe entire occurrence seems to have been the result of 'l1 chronic land dispute between the parties in which several commis sions were issued and which ultimately proved futile.\n\nThe prose• cution bas no doubt proved that the two persons were killed at the hands of the accused and that the occurrence had taken .place while the Commissioners were present at the spot though they were not able to see the actual assault and were, therefore, not in a position to depose the detailed manner in which the assault had. taken place.\n\nThe only serious question on which we would like ito sound a\n\n discordant note from our Brother Varadarajan, J. is as to the actual H nature of the offence which had been committed by the appellants,\n\nSunil Kumar and Ved Prakash.\n\nIt would appear from the evidence\n\n398 SiJJ'llEM~ couat REPOllts [198~1 j s.c.i<.\n\nof CW I as also other eye-witnesses that the accused were also assaulted with knife and one of them, Chhotey Lal, died as a re•ult of the injuries caused to him.\n\nThe medical evidence as also the evidence of CW I clearly shows that there was exchange of hot words, followed bY the assault on the appellants which, according to the prosecution, was a result of the exercise of elf-defence by the prosecution party, particularly Dinesh Chandra.\n\nIn fact, the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court held that the acc11sed were the aggressors and, therefore, they had no right of private defence.\n\nIn order to ascertain whether the accused had the right of private defence, the genesis of the incident has to he traced. !'!ow, in this case the prosecution witnesses being partisan, the only important injured witness Dinesh Chandra, PW 11 being the son of the deceased, it would be necessary to ascertain with accuracy the genesis of the quarrel as revealed from the evidence of Court witnesses not shown to be partisan. CW I, Prem Narain Mathur is the practising advocate and was appointed as a Commissioner. He was .accompanied by Mahesh Chandra, Vakil, CW 3, advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs (accused Ram Karan) in the suit in which Commission was issued and Shri Jafar Imam, CW 2, learned advocate appearing for the defendants. in the same suit. C.W. I and C.W. 3 were at the house of accused I Ram Karan. C.W. I says that several persons assembled at that time at the house of Ram Karan. He is a bit vague but he says that at that time after tea was served and he was about to leave that place he saw a person lying on the pavement of the road. This injured person was lying in front of the house of accused I Ram Karan.\n\nThis statement has not been questioned in cross-examination nor\n\ndversely commented upon. It give.s a clue to the genesis of the occurrence.\n\nAfter measurements were taken as directed by the Court, C.W. I and C.W. 3 came to the house of accused I Ram Karan. Some persons collected there. According to C.W. I injured persons were seen lying in front of the house of accused 1 and that was none else than the deceased.\n\nIf amongst those who collected at the house were the t\"o deceased and P.W. 11 Dinesh Chandra, another injured witness on the side of the prosecution, it is crystal clear that the prosecution witnesses and the two deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra had come to the house of accused I Ram Karan.\n\nHow, if one of them was armed with a knife, they must have come with a view to either picking up quarrel or to guard themselves.\n\nThe occurrence took place in front of the house of\n\n. ..\n\nii.AM KARAN v. U.P. (Fazal Ali, J.) 399\n\naccused I.\n\nOn the side of [the prosecution Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra received fatal injuries and Dinesh Chandra was also injured.\n\nHowever, on the side of the accused Chhotelal, son of accused I Ram Karan, suffered six injuries one of which proved fatal and he died.\n\nAccused Ram Karan himself was also injured.\n\nInjuries on both sides appear to have been caused with sharp eutting weapon like knife, It is easy to infer the genesis of the dispute .\n\nBoth the parties were completely exasperated with the liti~ .ion.\n\nAccused I Ram Karan had. summoned Commission on five to six occasions and his attempt to end the litigation was thwarted by objections being taken on the side of Prakash Chandra deceased.\n\nTherefore, both sides were in an exasperated mood.\n\nSuddenly at the spur of the mo.men! there ensued a quarrel. Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on the side of the prosecution died and Chhotelal on the side of the accused died and each of them met a homicidal death. On the side of the prosecution Dinesh Chandra was injured, on the side of accused Ram Karan was injured. From this an irresistible inference ensues that exception 4 to s. 300, I.P.C.\n\nwould be attracted.\n\nThe exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder, if it .is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of p!!ssion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.\n\nAll the ingredients of Exception 4 are satisfied.\n\nPrakash Chandra and his two sons and others came to the house of accused I to protest for the work of the .Commi.ssioner.\n\nDinesh Chandra amongst them was armed with a knife.\n\nMay be, he may be usually carrying the same for his safety. The incident ocurred\n\nin front of the house of accused I upon a sudden quarrel by this confrontation with eyebrows .having been raised because of a persistent litigation, the occurrence took place. There is no clear evidence to show that any.one took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.\n\nTaking an overall view of the situation, we find no evidence of any intention to kill the two deceased on the part of the accused because the occurrence itself had taken place suddenly when, to begin with, the entire episode started for the particular purpose of partitioning the land by the Commissioners who had visited the village.\n\nIn these circumstances we are satisfied that Exception 4 of s. 300, J.P.C. is attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of accused Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and, therefore, they would be 1;1uilty of committinl; l\n\nan offence under s. 304(1)/34 I.P.C. and they should be convicted accordingly. To this extent, therefore, we are unable to agree with Brother Varadarajan, J. that the conviction of the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the l.P.C. should be confirmed.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this appeal to the exterit that the conviction of Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash are altered from one under s. 302 read withs. 34 of the I.P.C. to that under s. 304(1)/34 I.P.C. and they are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.\n\nConviction and sentences under s. 307/34, I.J>.C. are maintained and ,,..,.-__.. sentences award_ed have already been directed to run concurrently.\n\nWe allow the appeal of Ram Karan as indicated by Brother Varadarajan, J.\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.\n\nThis Criminal Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad D High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1144 of 1971, whereby the learned Judges, while acquitting two appellants Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar of the charges, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, appellants in this Criminal Appeal, under s. 302 and s. 307, both read with s. 149 l.P.C., into one under ss. 302 and 307 both read with s. 34 I.P.C. and confirmed E the sentences of imprisonment for life for each of the two counts of murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and rigorous imprisonment for four years for attempt to murder. Dinesh Chandra\n\n(P. W. 11) to run concurrently and set aside the conviction of the appellant Ram Karan under s. 147 and the other two appellants under s. 148 I.P.C.\n\nThe first appellant Ram Karan is the father of other appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and also of Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar,· who have been acquitted by the High Court as well as of deceased Chhotey Lal.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge who tried the case convicted Ram Ra ran -and all bis four sons, Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar, Ved Prakash and Satish Kumar under s. 302 read with s. 149 I.P.C. (two counts) and s. 307 read with s. 149 l.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life on each of the two counts under s. 302 read withs. 149 I.P.C. and to imprisonment for four years unper s. 307 read with s. 149 I.P.C.\n\nHe convicted Ram Karan under s. 147 and bis aforesaid four sons under s. 148 J.P.C. and sentenced Ram Kiiran to undergo rigorous imprisonment\n\n- -~.\n\nfor one year and his sons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under s. 147 and s. 148 J.P.C. respectively.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was this :- The deceased Prakash Chandra was the father of the deceased Umesh Chandra and the injured witness Dinesh Chandra (P.W. II) as well as ofGyan Chand (P.W. !). Prakash Chandra and his sons were living in Seohara town, Bijnor district. The appellant Ram Karan and his five sons including the deceased Chhotey Lal were living in another house in the same town as the neighbours of Prakash Chandra and his sons.\n\nPrakash Chandra and his sons built a new house on a vacant land\n\nwl!ich existed between these two houses about three years prior to the occurrence in this case which has taken place at about !.00 p.m. on 6.9.1970.\n\nThe appellant Ram Karan and five others filed Civil Suit No. 34 of 1967 in the court of the Munsif, Nagina against Prakash Chandra and his brother Gopi Chandra and one Krishna Devi, alleging that while constructing the new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land. In that suit, Ram Karan got Commissioners appointed by the court on five or six occasions for taking measurements of the properties with the object of proving his case of encroachment by Prakash Chandra.\n\nBut those Commissioners' reports •were set aside on the objection raised by Prakash Chandra and the other defendents.\n\nThe last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6.9.1970, accompained by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for Prakash Chandra and another and Mr. Mahesh Chand (C. W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan. After the completion of the survey work at about 12.30 p.m. all the three lawyers were standing and talking in front of Ram Karan's baithak at about 1.00\n\np.m.\n\nThen Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra came there to talk with the Commissioner.\n\nRam Karan, who was present there afong with his five sons, did not like that interference of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra with the Commissioner.\n\nHe stated that he has spent thousands of rupees for taking out the commissions and that the reports of the Commissioners were set aside on the objection of Prakash Chandra. So saying, he instigated bis sons to kill Prakash Chandra and his sons. Thereupon, Chhotey Lal . and Ved Prakash attacked Prakash Chandra with knives while Sunil\n\nKumar, Anil Kumar am! Salish attacked Umesh Chandra with knives.\n\nOn seeing Dinesb Chandra (P.W. 11) who rushed meanwhile from the eastern side to help his father] andJilbrother, Ram Karan instigated . bis sons to attack:him:and cau$hl hold of him by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.ll.\n\nhis waist, and all his five sons 'attacked him and inflicted injuries.\n\nThen P. W. 11 took out a knife from his pent pocket and wielded it against Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal in self-defence and they sustained injuries. P.W. 11 received injuries and fell down.\n\nGyan Chandra (P.W. I), who was seeing the occurrence, ran to his house along with some others and bolted the door when Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar and Satish chased him for attacking him.\n\nAbdul Wahid, P.W. JO, and others who were witneising the occurrence raised an alarm, and Ram Karan and his sons ran away.\n\nGyan Chand, (P.W. I) came out of his house sometime later • and found his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra dead and Dinesh Chandra (P .W. 11) lying witlt injuries. He prepared the report, Ex. Ka. 3 and proceeded in a jeep with his brother Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11), to Seohara Police Station situate about half a mile away and handed over that report at 1.30 p.m. Dinesh Chandra (P.W. II) was taken to Dhampur hospital after he was given first aid by a Doctor on the way.\n\nHe was examined at the Dhampur hospital by Dr. Bagchi, P.W. 3 who found on his person an abrasion and nine incised wounds of which injury No. 7 on the right side of the chest through which blood and air were coming out was serious and the rest were simple. ' .\n\nThe dead bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra which were found lying in front of their house where blood also was found, were later sent for autopsy.\n\nRam Karan and Chhotey Lal went to the Government hospital, Bijnor where they were examined by Dr. Sarin (P.W. 2) at 4] p.m. and 4.15 p.m. respectively on 6.9.1970. P.W. 2 found one punctured wound and four incised wounds on Chhotey Lal and three incised wounds on Ram Karan.\n\nThe injuries on both of them were fresh and those on Ram Karan were simple while injury No. 1 on Chhotey Lal, namely, a punctured wound which was lung-deep and anterior to the left nipple, was grievous and the rest were simple. The injuries on both could, in the opinion of P.W. 2, have been caused by knife.\n\nP.W. 2 issued the wound certificates Ex. Ka. 12 and Ka. 13.\n\nRam Karan' s report was lodged at the Police Station at 10.30 p.m. on 6.9.1970. Chhotey Lal died in the District'hospital, Bijnor on 10.9.1970.\n\nDr. Zuber conducted autopsy on the bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on 7.9.1970 and found nine antemortem, injuries, of which six were incised wounds, on the body of\n\nfra)cas!i Chandra and sil( a11temortem incised woµn\\ls 011 tile l;>o\\ly\n\n_ ..\n\nof Umesh Chandra and he opined that the death of both of them was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from the incised injuries.\n\nEx. Ka. I and Ka. 2 are the post-mortem certificates relating to Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra issued by Dr. Zuber who was examined as P.W. I in the Committing Magistrate's Court (Ex.\n\nKa. 37). Dr. Dua (C.W. 4) conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal on 11.9.1970 and found an abrasion a11d five incised wounds which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\n- The prosecution's case rests mainly on the evidence of Gyan Chand (P.W. I), Abdul Wahid (P.W. 10) and D)nesb Chandra\n\nA •\n\n(P.W. 11). As stated earlier P.Ws. I and 11 are the sons of deceased C Prakash Chandra and brothers of the other deceased Um\"esh Chandra. P.W. 11 had received injuries during the occurrence and P. W, I is the witness who had lodged the First Information Report (Ex. K. 3) in the Seobara Police Station at the earliest opportunity at 1.30 p.m. soon after the occurrence which bad taken place at about 1.00 p.m. These three witnesses were put forward as eyewitnesses and they have deposed in support of the case of the prosecution.\n\nThe accused put forward their version of the case. According to the accused, after the Commissioner (C. W. I) finished bis work and went to the house of the appellant Ram Karan, Prakash Chandra and bis sons Umesh Chandra and Dinesb Chandra (P. W.\n\n11) came to the baitbak of Ram Karan and attacked Ram Karan and deceased Chbotey Lal with knives and thereupon they grappled with those three persons and wrested the knives from them and attacke.d them in self-defence. The accused examined D.W. 1 on their behalf. The court examined the Commissioner and the counsel of the parties in the civil suit as C. Ws. I to 3 and the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal as C. W. 4.\n\nThe evidence of C.W. I is that after he completed taking measurements he went along with Ram Karan's counsel Mr. Mahesh\n\nChandra (C.W. 3) to the baithak of Ram Karan's house, that both G of them came out of the house 8 or JO minutes later, that when he advanced from the door of the baithak he saw a person lying injured on the pavement of the road and another injured person . standing there, that a third person came and struck the injured person who was standing, and that he and C.W. 3 left the place H thereafter. The evidence of C.W. 3 is that he and C.W. I who bad goo~ to the baithak of R\\lm Karan'a holJse after G w. I hl!d\n\ntaken the measurements, came out of the baithak 5 or 7 minutes • later, and saw Chhotey Lal grappling with a young man, that in ' the course of grappling Chhotey Lal fell down bleeding, that Chhotey Lal managed to get up and snatched the weapon of the assilant and struck him with it, that Prakash Chandra came to the rescue of the young man and Cbhotey Lal struck him with the same weapon and both the youngman and Prakash Chandra fell down after receiving injuries from Chhotey Lal, and that on account of the incident he went away along with C. W. I. C.W. 3 has added that soon after he went and sat in the baithak of Rani Karan's house, Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) came and said something to C.W. I from beyond the door of the baithak. The evidence of Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) is that after measurements had been taken C.\n\nWs. I and 3 went to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house while he sat in the verandah of the old haveli of Prakash Chandra, that he and Prakash Chandra's son, who is now no more, thereafter went near the Commissioner (C.W I) and he told C.W. 1 that he mily hear what Prakash Chandra wanted to say, that after saying so he got back for meeting another person while Prakash Chandra and his son remained there, that after reaching the verandah of Prakash Chandra he went away with Mchboob Ali who was waiting for him to Mehboob Ali's house and that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when be was returning to the verandah of Prakash Chandra's house he heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan's house.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge bas observed in his judgment that the evidence of C.Ws. 1 to 3 is contradictory, unnatural and not truthful. He found that P.W. l's report (Ka. 3) was lodged in the Police Station at 1.30 p.m. soon after the occurrence had taken place at about 1.00 p.m. and that there bas been no attempt at concoction in this case. He rejected the contention that Abdul Wahid, (P.W. IO) had any reason to depose falsely against the appellant Ved Prakash and found his evidence to be reliable. He observed, that though Prakash Chandra bad been working as an Engineer in a sugar mill at Seohara and P.W. 10 was employed in the engineering department, P.W. 10 was actually working under one Bachcha Lal and is an independent witness. P.W. 1 has stated in his evidence that Prakash Chandra, Umesh Chandra and Ram Karan did not have any weapon at the time of the occurrence. The evidence of the injured witness P.W. 11 is that when he returned home from Moradabad a, t abol!t 12,30 p.m. on the day of occurrence\n\n....-·----........_\n\n- -~\n\nhe saw his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra lying in a pool of blood and that on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he also should be killed and caught hold of him by his waist and that he was attacked with knives by the accused persons inclu\n\nding Ram Karan and he wielded in self-defence the knife which he had purchased on that day for his work.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge accepted the evidence of P.Ws. I, IO and 11 and commented upon Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal going to the hospital at Bijnor without arranging for a report being given at the Police Station at Seohara in time and held that the accused were the aggressors and that Dinesh Chandra (P.W~ 11) caused injuries to Ram Karan and the deceased Chhotey Lal in the exercise of the right of private defence.\n\nAccordingly he found the accused guilty and convicted them and sentenced them as mentioned above.\n\nThe High Court also rejected the defence theory that Chhotey\n\nLal was attacked by three persons armed with knife, chura and D khukhri having regard to the fact that he had only one lung deep punctured wound and the other four wounds were only skin deep and of very minor dimensions,\n\nThe learned. Judges of the High Court found that the name of Anil Kumar is not mentioned in the First Information Report (Ex.\n\nKa. 3) but instead the name of one Virendra is mentioned and that it appears from the evidence of P.W. I that Virendra is the name of Prakash Chandra's brother. They found that in the state ment of P.W. 11 recorded as dying declaration, Sushi! Kumar is mentioned instead of Satish Kumar.\n\nIn these circumstances the learned Judges found that there is reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the accused Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar and they gave the benefit of that doubt to those two appellants before them and acquitted them.. In other respects, the learned Judges accepted the evidence of P.Ws. !, IO and 11 regarding the occurrence and rejected the defence version and held the appellants guilty under s. 302 read with s. 34 in respect of the murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under s. 307 read with s. 34 in respect ofDinesh Chandra, (P.W. II) and convicted them accordingly and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisof!men\\ for four years under s, 307 read with s. 34 I.P.C ·\n\ntt\n\nWe perused the records and the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge and of the learned Judges of the High Court and heard the arguments .of Mr. R. L. Kohli, Senior Advocate who appeared for the appellants and of Mr. D.P. Uniyal, Senior Advocate who. appeared for the respondent-State of U.P. We were taken through the evidence of P. Ws. I, JO and J l. The learned Sessions Judge bas observed in bis judgment that the evidence of the three lawyers C.Ws. 1 to 3 is contradictory, unnatural and nqt truthful and that if they had given honest evidence it would have been easier for the court to conclude which side was the aggressor. This observation of the learned Sessions Judge appears to be too sweeping and not correct at least with reference to C.W. 2 who has professed ignorance about the actual occurrence in the case and has stated that he left after asking C.W. 1 from outside the baithak of Ram Karan's house to hear what Prakash Chandra who had gone with him and his deceased son wanted to tell him because another person Mehboob Ali with whom he later went to his house was waiting for him in the verandah of Prakash Chandra's house. The evidence of C.W. 2 that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when he was returning to the verandah of Pr(lkash Chandra's house be heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan's house, is, in a way, corroborated by the evidence of P.W. I. P.W. 1 has stated that when e•change of hot words started the Commissioner and Vakils of the parties moved from there to the road and that just when Ram Karan's Vakil had gone a short distance from Ram Kiiran's house, Ram Karan and others stated that \"they have got our thousands of rupees spent over litigation.\n\nWe have become tired of getting commissions issued. Kill them today so that the trouble may be ended for ever. At that time all the five sons of Ram Karan, Chhotey Lal, V ed Prakash, Salish Kumar, Sunil Kumar and Anil Kumar were present, and when 'Ram Karan said so all five sons whipped out knives and started assulting ...... \", This portion of the evidence of P.W. I is to the effect that the lawyers C.Ws. 1-3 were not present at the time of the actual assault on the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra as well as on P.W. 11.\n\nEven P.W. 10 has stated in his evidence that \"when he reached near dharmshala at about 12.45 p.m. he heard the shouts of Ram Karan from his house situate at a distance of 30 paces, tha(when he reached the end of the road he was in a position to see the house of Ram Karan, that on hearing the shouts he proceeded towards the place from where they came and stood near\n\nRAM KARAN v. U.P. (Varadarojan, J.) 401\n\nthe wall and found three Vakils present and also Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, fthat as soon as he reached the place, the Vakils left the place, that Ram Karan then stated that he got the Commissioner appointed 5 or 6 times and spent several thousands of rupees and he should be killed and that when Ram Karan said so his sons Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash began to attack Prakash Chandra with knives, that Sunil Kumar and Ram Karan's other sons began to assault Umesh Chandra with knives, that during the marpit Prakash Chancjra and Umesh Chandra fell down after . _ receiving injuris. that thereafter Dinesh Chandra, son of Prakash r 'chandra came from the eastern direction, and on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he should also be done to death, and he caught hold of-Dinesh Chandra by his waist, and that all the four boys and deceased Chhotey Lal began to assault Dinesh Chandra with knives, and Dinesh Chandra wielded his knife in self-defence and caused injuries to Ram Karan and hhotey Lal and thereafter fell down and became unconscious ... \"; This portion of the evidence of P. W. I 0 also shows that C. Ws. I to 3 left the place soon after exchange of hot words began between the two sides. Therefore, I am of the opinion that there is no reason to reject the evi dence of C.W. 2 that no quarrel took place when he was present near about the scene of occurrence. In the circumstances of the case, it is very probable that before serious trouble started from the exchange of hot words, C.Ws. I to 3, the Commissioner and th~ counsel for both the parties in the civil suit, left the place and were not present at the time of the actual occurrence as stated by P.Ws.\n\nI and 10.\n\nMr. R. L. Kohli drew our attention to some portions of the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court and submitted that the observation of the learned Judges .that from the side of the defence it was not suggested to any witness that Abdul Wahid\n\n(P. W. 10) was a different man and that h~ has been introduced because the real Abdul Wahid was not prepared to support the prosecution case is incorrect. The learned counsel further .sub. mitted that the observation of the learned Judges that the presence of Gyan Chand (P. W. l) at the time of the occurrence does not appear to have been challenged by the defence is also not correct.\n\nThis criticism of the learned counsel for the appellants appears to be well-founded, for I find that a suggestion has been made to P.W. IO in cross-examination and he has admitted that there is also\n\nanother person named Wahid son of Abdul Rehman in his ruohalla and that that person was an accused in a rioting case. And in the crossexamination of P.W. I it has been clearly suggested that he was not present at the spot and that he prepared the report Ex.\n\nKa. 3 afterwards with some consultation. P. W. I has no doubt denied that suggestion and stated that he was present at the spot and that he himself wrote the report Ex. Ka. 3 before he came out of the house by opening the door. The learned Judges have stated in their judgment that after Ram Karan stated that he has spent thousands of rupees on commissions and every time the report of the Commissioner was set aside on the objection of Prakash Chandra / andhe instigated his sons to kill Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, all the five sons of Ram Karan started giving knife blows to Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and both of them fell down.\n\nThis portion of the judgment of the learned Judges is to the effect that all the five sons of Ram Katan including the deceased Chhotey Lal attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra whereas it is the case of the prosecution as brought out in the evidence of P.W. I that after.Ram Karan instigated his sons to open the attack only Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash attacked Prakash Chandra with knives and only Sunil Kumar. Anil Kumar and Salish Kumar attacked Umesh Chandra with knives. It is unfortunate that these inaccuracies have crept into the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court. But on an overall consideration of the entire material on record and the evi.dence in the case in the light of the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the appreciation of the evidence of . P.Ws. !, 10 and l! by the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Judges of the High Court in so far as the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash are concerned is correct and that the evidence of P.Ws. I and JO proves beyond reasonable doubt that these two appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra with knives as a result of which both of them, who had no weapons died on the spot, and the evidence of P.Ws. IO and 11 proves satisfactorily and beyond any reasonable doubt that these two appellants attacked\n\nP.W. 11 with knives with such intention that if he had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him they would be guilty of murder in furtherance of their common intention to mnrder.\n\nThe dead bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and blood were ifound in front of the house of both the\n\n_ _,..\n\ndeceased and P.W. 11. Both the deceased had no weapons and they bad been attacked before P.W. 11 arrived and wield his knife against Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal. The main occurrence had taken place in front of the house of both the deceased and P. W. 11.\n\nBefore the trial court it was not submitted that the attack by the accused persons on both the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh\n\nChandra and P.W. 11 was without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. Nor is it a case in which it could be said that the offenJers had not taken undue advantage or had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. No such argument was put forward even bef ere the High Court to bring the main occurrence under s. 304 (Part I) I.P.C. Since I have found that the occurrence has taken place in front of the house of the two deceased and P.W. 11 in this case and that the accused persons were the aggressors neither Exception 2 nor Exception 4 to s. 300 I.P.C. would apply to the facts of this case and the offence cannot be brought under s. 304 (Part I) I.P.C. In these circumstances, I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were the aggressors and find that they have been rightly convicted under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of those two persons and under s. 307 read with s. 34 I.P.C. with reference to P.W. II. But I am of the opinion, having regard to the age of appellant Ram Karan, who was about 70 years old at the time of the occurrence that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he would have caught hold of the young man Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) by bis waist and whether he would have asked all his sons to attack and kill Prakash Chandra and his son. I therefore, give the benefit of this reasonable doubt to the appellant Ram Karan and set aside his conviction under s. 302 read with s. 34 (two counts) and under s. 307 read with s. 34 and acquit him and direct him to be set at liberty forthwith if he is in custody and his presence is not required in connection with any other case. In other respects I dismiss the criminal appeal and confirm the con- viction of Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and the sentences awarded to them.\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the conviction of Ram Karan under s. 302 read with s. 34 (two counts) and under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside and he is acquitted and that convictions of the appellants, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, are\n\n410 SiJPREMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n• ( 1 !>82J 3 S.C.R.\n\nA altered from one under s. 302/34, I.P.C to that under s. 304(1)/34, -r IPC and they are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Conviction and sentences under section 307/34, I.P.C. are maintained and sentences awarded have already been directed to ·\n\nB - run concurrently.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal parrly allowed.", "total_entities": 206, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nRAM KARAN & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM KARAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal\n\nCode", "statute": "Indian Penal\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 482, "end_char": 499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Karan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kiiran"}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Sunil\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Ved Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 651, "end_char": 662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "V ed Prakash"}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 664, "end_char": 674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Sunil\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Salish Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Salish Kumar"}}, {"text": "Chhoteylal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 706, "end_char": 716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Prakash Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Prakash r 'chandra"}}, {"text": "Oopi Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 796, "end_char": 808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan.", "canonical_name": "Oopi Chandra"}}, {"text": "Krishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 817, "end_char": 824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Salish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Oopi Chandra and one Krishan."}}, {"text": "Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devi,."}}, {"text": "Mathur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1330, "end_char": 1336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6\"\"9-1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for decoased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "6\"\"9-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1366, "end_char": 1375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6\"\"9-1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for decoased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Zafar Hussain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1419, "end_char": 1432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6\"\"9-1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for decoased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Mahesh Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1492, "end_char": 1506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6\"\"9-1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for decoased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Umesh Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the completion of the survey work and measurements at about 1 P.M. when all the three lawyers were standing and talking in front of the house of the appellants deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra came there to talk to the Commissioner, which.", "canonical_name": "Um\"esh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Dinesh Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2080, "end_char": 2094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the appellants which, according to prosecution, was in the exercise of right of self-defence by the prosecution party, particulary Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11)."}}, {"text": "Chhotey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the side of the ' appellants Ram Karan's son Chhotey Lal (accused) died and on the side of the prosecution Prakash Chandra and his son Umesh Chandra died and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) was grievously injured.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2453, "end_char": 2458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2709, "end_char": 2720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "iUPRBME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the\n\n396 iUPRBME COURT Ri!i>oilTs [I982j 3 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "Satish Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court acquitted Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, set aside the conviction and sentence under sections 147 and 148 l.P.C. in respect of the rest and confiribed {a) their sentence of life imprisonment by alterting the conviction one under sections 302/34 I.P .C. and (b) their sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment to one under sections 307/34 I.P.C. Hence the appeal by special leave by Ram Karan and bis two sons.", "canonical_name": "Salish Kumar"}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2930, "end_char": 2950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3074, "end_char": 3086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dinesh Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Acquitting Ram Karan and allowing the appeal of the other two Jn part,\n\nthe Court\n\nHELD : Having regard to the age of the appellant Ram Karan who was about 70 years old at the time of the occurrence, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he would have caught hold of the young man Dinesh Chandra\n\n/\"\" -.-A--:~ (P.W. 11) by his waist and whether he would have asked all hi< sons to attack and kill Prakash Chandra and his sons."}}, {"text": "D.A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "409 DEl\n\nBY MAJORITY\n\nPer Faza/ Ali, J. (and on behalf of D.A. Desai, J.)\n\n1:1.", "canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3846, "end_char": 3857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4457, "end_char": 4468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4586, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore exception 4 to section 300 Indian Penal Code is clearly attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of Sushi!"}}, {"text": "section 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4830, "end_char": 4835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4905, "end_char": 4916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[399 B-C, G-H, 400 A]\n\nPer Varadarajan, J. (contra).", "canonical_name": "Varadarajan"}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were theaggressors and they have been rightly convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under sections 307 /34 I.P.C. with reference to P. W. 11.", "canonical_name": "Sunil\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Ved Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were theaggressors and they have been rightly convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under sections 307 /34 I.P.C. with reference to P. W. 11.", "canonical_name": "V ed Prakash"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5022, "end_char": 5033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5044, "end_char": 5054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5152, "end_char": 5157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5856, "end_char": 5867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S.K. Sabharwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6153, "end_char": 6167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kohli and S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "D.P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.P. Uniyal and R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.P. Uniyal and R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6279, "end_char": 6287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 15.4.1975 of the Allahabad High Court by which the Judges of the High Court while acquitting the accused, Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash from one under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6574, "end_char": 6589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6600, "end_char": 6606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6627, "end_char": 6642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prem Narain Mathur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CW I, Prem Narain Mathur is the practising advocate and was appointed as a Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Vakil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9245, "end_char": 9250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was .accompanied by Mahesh Chandra, Vakil, CW 3, advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs (accused Ram Karan) in the suit in which Commission was issued and Shri Jafar Imam, CW 2, learned advocate appearing for the defendants."}}, {"text": "Jafar Imam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9377, "end_char": 9387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was .accompanied by Mahesh Chandra, Vakil, CW 3, advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs (accused Ram Karan) in the suit in which Commission was issued and Shri Jafar Imam, CW 2, learned advocate appearing for the defendants."}}, {"text": "I Ram Karan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9507, "end_char": 9518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.W. I and C.W. 3 were at the house of accused I Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Umesh Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If amongst those who collected at the house were the t\"o deceased and P.W. 11 Dinesh Chandra, another injured witness on the side of the prosecution, it is crystal clear that the prosecution witnesses and the two deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra had come to the house of accused I Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Chhotelal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10963, "end_char": 10972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on the side of the accused Chhotelal, son of accused I Ram Karan, suffered six injuries one of which proved fatal and he died.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11939, "end_char": 11945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11947, "end_char": 11952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prakash Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12289, "end_char": 12304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash Chandra and his two sons and others came to the house of accused I to protest for the work of the .Commi.ssioner.", "canonical_name": "Prakash r 'chandra"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13444, "end_char": 13453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13457, "end_char": 13462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13657, "end_char": 13663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13674, "end_char": 13679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13842, "end_char": 13848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13871, "end_char": 13876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13892, "end_char": 13901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13905, "end_char": 13910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14009, "end_char": 14015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14201, "end_char": 14212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We allow the appeal of Ram Karan as indicated by Brother Varadarajan, J.\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.\n\nThis Criminal Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad D High Court in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Varadarajan"}}, {"text": "Allahabad D High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We allow the appeal of Ram Karan as indicated by Brother Varadarajan, J.\n\nVARADARAJAN, J.\n\nThis Criminal Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad D High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14436, "end_char": 14446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1144 of 1971, whereby the learned Judges, while acquitting two appellants Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar of the charges, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, appellants in this Criminal Appeal, under s. 302 and s. 307, both read with s. 149 l.P.C., into one under ss.", "canonical_name": "Sunil\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Satish Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14451, "end_char": 14463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1144 of 1971, whereby the learned Judges, while acquitting two appellants Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar of the charges, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, appellants in this Criminal Appeal, under s. 302 and s. 307, both read with s. 149 l.P.C., into one under ss.", "canonical_name": "Salish Kumar"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14599, "end_char": 14605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14652, "end_char": 14667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14683, "end_char": 14688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14689, "end_char": 14694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15047, "end_char": 15052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Ra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15324, "end_char": 15330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge who tried the case convicted Ram Ra ran -and all bis four sons, Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar, Ved Prakash and Satish Kumar under s. 302 read with s. 149 I.P.C. (two counts) and s. 307 read with s. 149 l.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life on each of the two counts under s. 302 read withs.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kiiran"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15419, "end_char": 15425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15436, "end_char": 15442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15443, "end_char": 15448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15467, "end_char": 15473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15484, "end_char": 15490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15582, "end_char": 15588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15605, "end_char": 15610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15653, "end_char": 15659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15670, "end_char": 15676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15677, "end_char": 15682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15714, "end_char": 15720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15755, "end_char": 15761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ram Kiiran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15783, "end_char": 15793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "149 I.P.C. and to imprisonment for four years unper s. 307 read with s. 149 I.P.C.\n\nHe convicted Ram Karan under s. 147 and bis aforesaid four sons under s. 148 J.P.C. and sentenced Ram Kiiran to undergo rigorous imprisonment\n-~.\n\nfor one year and his sons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under s. 147 and s. 148 J.P.C. respectively.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kiiran"}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15914, "end_char": 15920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15925, "end_char": 15931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ofGyan Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16128, "end_char": 16140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution was this :- The deceased Prakash Chandra was the father of the deceased Umesh Chandra and the injured witness Dinesh Chandra (P.W. II) as well as ofGyan Chand (P.W. !)."}}, {"text": "Bijnor district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16209, "end_char": 16224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash Chandra and his sons were living in Seohara town, Bijnor district."}}, {"text": "6.9.1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16605, "end_char": 16613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".00 p.m. on 6.9.1970."}}, {"text": "Gopi Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16763, "end_char": 16775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of 1967 in the court of the Munsif, Nagina against Prakash Chandra and his brother Gopi Chandra and one Krishna Devi, alleging that while constructing the new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land.", "canonical_name": "Oopi Chandra"}}, {"text": "Krishna Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16784, "end_char": 16796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of 1967 in the court of the Munsif, Nagina against Prakash Chandra and his brother Gopi Chandra and one Krishna Devi, alleging that while constructing the new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land."}}, {"text": "Mahesh Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17406, "end_char": 17418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. I) visited the spot on 6.9.1970, accompained by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for Prakash Chandra and another and Mr. Mahesh Chand (C. W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan."}}, {"text": "Sunil\n\nKumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18180, "end_char": 18192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ved Prakash attacked Prakash Chandra with knives while Sunil\n\nKumar, Anil Kumar am!", "canonical_name": "Sunil\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Salish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18209, "end_char": 18215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Salish attacked Umesh Chandra with knives.", "canonical_name": "Salish Kumar"}}, {"text": "Dinesb Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On seeing Dinesb Chandra (P.W. 11) who rushed meanwhile from the eastern side to help his father] andJilbrother, Ram Karan instigated ."}}, {"text": "Gyan Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18739, "end_char": 18751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gyan Chandra (P.W. I), who was seeing the occurrence, ran to his house along with some others and bolted the door when Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar and Satish chased him for attacking him."}}, {"text": "Satish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gyan Chandra (P.W. I), who was seeing the occurrence, ran to his house along with some others and bolted the door when Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar and Satish chased him for attacking him.", "canonical_name": "Salish Kumar"}}, {"text": "Abdul Wahid", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Wahid, P.W. JO, and others who were witneising the occurrence raised an alarm, and Ram Karan and his sons ran away."}}, {"text": "Gyan Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19047, "end_char": 19057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gyan Chand, (P.W. I) came out of his house sometime later • and found his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra dead and Dinesh Chandra (P .W. 11) lying witlt injuries."}}, {"text": "Seohara Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19331, "end_char": 19353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and proceeded in a jeep with his brother Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11), to Seohara Police Station situate about half a mile away and handed over that report at 1.30 p.m. Dinesh Chandra (P.W. II) was taken to Dhampur hospital after he was given first aid by a Doctor on the way."}}, {"text": "Dhampur hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19464, "end_char": 19480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and proceeded in a jeep with his brother Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11), to Seohara Police Station situate about half a mile away and handed over that report at 1.30 p.m. Dinesh Chandra (P.W. II) was taken to Dhampur hospital after he was given first aid by a Doctor on the way."}}, {"text": "Bagchi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19582, "end_char": 19588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was examined at the Dhampur hospital by Dr. Bagchi, P.W. 3 who found on his person an abrasion and nine incised wounds of which injury No."}}, {"text": "Government hospital, Bijnor", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19993, "end_char": 20020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal went to the Government hospital, Bijnor where they were examined by Dr. Sarin (P.W. 2) at 4] p.m. and 4.15 p.m. respectively on 6.9.1970."}}, {"text": "Sarin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20053, "end_char": 20058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal went to the Government hospital, Bijnor where they were examined by Dr. Sarin (P.W. 2) at 4] p.m. and 4.15 p.m. respectively on 6.9.1970."}}, {"text": "Bijnor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20725, "end_char": 20731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotey Lal died in the District'hospital, Bijnor on 10.9.1970."}}, {"text": "Zuber", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20751, "end_char": 20756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Zuber conducted autopsy on the bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on 7.9.1970 and found nine antemortem, injuries, of which six were incised wounds, on the body of\n\nfra)cas!i Chandra and sil( a11temortem incised woµn\\ls 011 tile l;>o\\ly\n\n_ ..\n\nof Umesh Chandra and he opined that the death of both of them was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from the incised injuries."}}, {"text": "Zuber", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21250, "end_char": 21255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 are the post-mortem certificates relating to Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra issued by Dr. Zuber who was examined as P.W. I in the Committing Magistrate's Court (Ex."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21339, "end_char": 21342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Dua (C.W. 4) conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal on 11.9.1970 and found an abrasion a11d five incised wounds which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."}}, {"text": "11.9.1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Dua (C.W. 4) conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal on 11.9.1970 and found an abrasion a11d five incised wounds which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."}}, {"text": "D)nesb Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution's case rests mainly on the evidence of Gyan Chand (P.W. I), Abdul Wahid (P.W. 10) and D)nesb Chandra\n\nA •\n\n(P.W. 11)."}}, {"text": "C Prakash Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21723, "end_char": 21740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 11 are the sons of deceased C Prakash Chandra and brothers of the other deceased Um\"esh Chandra."}}, {"text": "Um\"esh Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21776, "end_char": 21790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 11 are the sons of deceased C Prakash Chandra and brothers of the other deceased Um\"esh Chandra.", "canonical_name": "Um\"esh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Seobara Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21933, "end_char": 21955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. 3) in the Seobara Police Station at the earliest opportunity at 1.30 p.m. soon after the occurrence which bad taken place at about 1.00 p.m. These three witnesses were put forward as eyewitnesses and they have deposed in support of the case of the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Chbotey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22506, "end_char": 22517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the accused, after the Commissioner (C. W. I) finished bis work and went to the house of the appellant Ram Karan, Prakash Chandra and bis sons Umesh Chandra and Dinesb Chandra (P. W.\n\n11) came to the baitbak of Ram Karan and attacked Ram Karan and deceased Chbotey Lal with knives and thereupon they grappled with those three persons and wrested the knives from them and attacke.d them in self-defence.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Mahesh\n\nChandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22989, "end_char": 23004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of C.W. I is that after he completed taking measurements he went along with Ram Karan's counsel Mr. Mahesh\n\nChandra (C.W. 3) to the baithak of Ram Karan's house, that both G of them came out of the house 8 or JO minutes later, that when he advanced from the door of the baithak he saw a person lying injured on the pavement of the road and another injured person ."}}, {"text": "Cbhotey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23856, "end_char": 23867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of C.W. 3 is that he and C.W. I who bad goo~ to the baithak of R\\lm Karan'a holJse after G w. I hl!d\n\ntaken the measurements, came out of the baithak 5 or 7 minutes • later, and saw Chhotey Lal grappling with a young man, that in ' the course of grappling Chhotey Lal fell down bleeding, that Chhotey Lal managed to get up and snatched the weapon of the assilant and struck him with it, that Prakash Chandra came to the rescue of the young man and Cbhotey Lal struck him with the same weapon and both the youngman and Prakash Chandra fell down after receiving injuries from Chhotey Lal, and that on account of the incident he went away along with C. W. I. C.W. 3 has added that soon after he went and sat in the baithak of Rani Karan's house, Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) came and said something to C.W. I from beyond the door of the baithak.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Rani Karan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24131, "end_char": 24141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of C.W. 3 is that he and C.W. I who bad goo~ to the baithak of R\\lm Karan'a holJse after G w. I hl!d\n\ntaken the measurements, came out of the baithak 5 or 7 minutes • later, and saw Chhotey Lal grappling with a young man, that in ' the course of grappling Chhotey Lal fell down bleeding, that Chhotey Lal managed to get up and snatched the weapon of the assilant and struck him with it, that Prakash Chandra came to the rescue of the young man and Cbhotey Lal struck him with the same weapon and both the youngman and Prakash Chandra fell down after receiving injuries from Chhotey Lal, and that on account of the incident he went away along with C. W. I. C.W. 3 has added that soon after he went and sat in the baithak of Rani Karan's house, Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) came and said something to C.W. I from beyond the door of the baithak.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kiiran"}}, {"text": "Mchboob Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24805, "end_char": 24816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 3 went to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house while he sat in the verandah of the old haveli of Prakash Chandra, that he and Prakash Chandra's son, who is now no more, thereafter went near the Commissioner (C.W I) and he told C.W. 1 that he mily hear what Prakash Chandra wanted to say, that after saying so he got back for meeting another person while Prakash Chandra and his son remained there, that after reaching the verandah of Prakash Chandra he went away with Mchboob Ali who was waiting for him to Mehboob Ali's house and that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when be was returning to the verandah of Prakash Chandra's house he heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan's house.", "canonical_name": "Mchboob Ali"}}, {"text": "Mehboob Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24844, "end_char": 24855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 3 went to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house while he sat in the verandah of the old haveli of Prakash Chandra, that he and Prakash Chandra's son, who is now no more, thereafter went near the Commissioner (C.W I) and he told C.W. 1 that he mily hear what Prakash Chandra wanted to say, that after saying so he got back for meeting another person while Prakash Chandra and his son remained there, that after reaching the verandah of Prakash Chandra he went away with Mchboob Ali who was waiting for him to Mehboob Ali's house and that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when be was returning to the verandah of Prakash Chandra's house he heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan's house.", "canonical_name": "Mchboob Ali"}}, {"text": "Seohara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25670, "end_char": 25677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed, that though Prakash Chandra bad been working as an Engineer in a sugar mill at Seohara and P.W. 10 was employed in the engineering department, P.W. 10 was actually working under one Bachcha Lal and is an independent witness."}}, {"text": "Bachcha Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25773, "end_char": 25784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed, that though Prakash Chandra bad been working as an Engineer in a sugar mill at Seohara and P.W. 10 was employed in the engineering department, P.W. 10 was actually working under one Bachcha Lal and is an independent witness."}}, {"text": "Ram Karan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25890, "end_char": 25899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 1 has stated in his evidence that Prakash Chandra, Umesh Chandra and Ram Karan did not have any weapon at the time of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Moradabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26034, "end_char": 26043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of the injured witness P.W. 11 is that when he returned home from Moradabad a, t abol!t 12,30 p.m. on the day of occurrence\n\n....-·----........_\n-~\n\nhe saw his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra lying in a pool of blood and that on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he also should be killed and caught hold of him by his waist and that he was attacked with knives by the accused persons inclu\n\nding Ram Karan and he wielded in self-defence the knife which he had purchased on that day for his work."}}, {"text": "Chhotey\n\nLal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27057, "end_char": 27069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also rejected the defence theory that Chhotey\n\nLal was attacked by three persons armed with knife, chura and D khukhri having regard to the fact that he had only one lung deep punctured wound and the other four wounds were only skin deep and of very minor dimensions,\n\nThe learned.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Virendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27450, "end_char": 27458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) but instead the name of one Virendra is mentioned and that it appears from the evidence of P.W. I that Virendra is the name of Prakash Chandra's brother."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28128, "end_char": 28134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28145, "end_char": 28150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28223, "end_char": 28229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28240, "end_char": 28245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ofDinesh Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28257, "end_char": 28273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IO and 11 regarding the occurrence and rejected the defence version and held the appellants guilty under s. 302 read with s. 34 in respect of the murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under s. 307 read with s. 34 in respect ofDinesh Chandra, (P.W. II) and convicted them accordingly and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisof!men\\ for four years under s, 307 read with s. 34 I.P.C ·\n\ntt\n\nWe perused the records and the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge and of the learned Judges of the High Court and heard the arguments .of Mr. R. L. Kohli, Senior Advocate who appeared for the appellants and of Mr. D.P. Uniyal, Senior Advocate who."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28374, "end_char": 28380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28391, "end_char": 28396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28397, "end_char": 28402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28469, "end_char": 28474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28475, "end_char": 28480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28635, "end_char": 28646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IO and 11 regarding the occurrence and rejected the defence version and held the appellants guilty under s. 302 read with s. 34 in respect of the murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under s. 307 read with s. 34 in respect ofDinesh Chandra, (P.W. II) and convicted them accordingly and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisof!men\\ for four years under s, 307 read with s. 34 I.P.C ·\n\ntt\n\nWe perused the records and the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge and of the learned Judges of the High Court and heard the arguments .of Mr. R. L. Kohli, Senior Advocate who appeared for the appellants and of Mr. D.P. Uniyal, Senior Advocate who."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28769, "end_char": 28782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeared for the respondent-State of U.P. We were taken through the evidence of P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Pr(lkash Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29758, "end_char": 29774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of C.W. 2 that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when he was returning to the verandah of Pr(lkash Chandra's house be heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan's house, is, in a way, corroborated by the evidence of P.W. I. P.W. 1 has stated that when e•change of hot words started the Commissioner and Vakils of the parties moved from there to the road and that just when Ram Karan's Vakil had gone a short distance from Ram Kiiran's house, Ram Karan and others stated that \"they have got our thousands of rupees spent over litigation."}}, {"text": "V ed Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30399, "end_char": 30411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time all the five sons of Ram Karan, Chhotey Lal, V ed Prakash, Salish Kumar, Sunil Kumar and Anil Kumar were present, and when 'Ram Karan said so all five sons whipped out knives and started assulting ...... \", This portion of the evidence of P.W. I is to the effect that the lawyers C.Ws.", "canonical_name": "V ed Prakash"}}, {"text": "dharmshala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30836, "end_char": 30846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even P.W. 10 has stated in his evidence that \"when he reached near dharmshala at about 12.45 p.m. he heard the shouts of Ram Karan from his house situate at a distance of 30 paces, tha(when he reached the end of the road he was in a position to see the house of Ram Karan, that on hearing the shouts he proceeded towards the place from where they came and stood near\n\nRAM KARAN v. U.P. (Varadarojan, J.) 401\n\nthe wall and found three Vakils present and also Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, fthat as soon as he reached the place, the Vakils left the place, that Ram Karan then stated that he got the Commissioner appointed 5 or 6 times and spent several thousands of rupees and he should be killed and that when Ram Karan said so his sons Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash began to attack Prakash Chandra with knives, that Sunil Kumar and Ram Karan's other sons began to assault Umesh Chandra with knives, that during the marpit Prakash Chancjra and Umesh Chandra fell down after . _"}}, {"text": "Prakash Chancjra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31694, "end_char": 31710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even P.W. 10 has stated in his evidence that \"when he reached near dharmshala at about 12.45 p.m. he heard the shouts of Ram Karan from his house situate at a distance of 30 paces, tha(when he reached the end of the road he was in a position to see the house of Ram Karan, that on hearing the shouts he proceeded towards the place from where they came and stood near\n\nRAM KARAN v. U.P. (Varadarojan, J.) 401\n\nthe wall and found three Vakils present and also Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, fthat as soon as he reached the place, the Vakils left the place, that Ram Karan then stated that he got the Commissioner appointed 5 or 6 times and spent several thousands of rupees and he should be killed and that when Ram Karan said so his sons Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash began to attack Prakash Chandra with knives, that Sunil Kumar and Ram Karan's other sons began to assault Umesh Chandra with knives, that during the marpit Prakash Chancjra and Umesh Chandra fell down after . _", "canonical_name": "Prakash r 'chandra"}}, {"text": "Prakash r 'chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31807, "end_char": 31825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that thereafter Dinesh Chandra, son of Prakash r 'chandra came from the eastern direction, and on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he should also be done to death, and he caught hold of-Dinesh Chandra by his waist, and that all the four boys and deceased Chhotey Lal began to assault Dinesh Chandra with knives, and Dinesh Chandra wielded his knife in self-defence and caused injuries to Ram Karan and hhotey Lal and thereafter fell down and became unconscious ... \"; This portion of the evidence of P. W. I 0 also shows that C. Ws.", "canonical_name": "Prakash r 'chandra"}}, {"text": "hhotey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32025, "end_char": 32035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that thereafter Dinesh Chandra, son of Prakash r 'chandra came from the eastern direction, and on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he should also be done to death, and he caught hold of-Dinesh Chandra by his waist, and that all the four boys and deceased Chhotey Lal began to assault Dinesh Chandra with knives, and Dinesh Chandra wielded his knife in self-defence and caused injuries to Ram Karan and hhotey Lal and thereafter fell down and became unconscious ... \"; This portion of the evidence of P. W. I 0 also shows that C. Ws.", "canonical_name": "Chhotey\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32875, "end_char": 32886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. L. Kohli drew our attention to some portions of the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court and submitted that the observation of the learned Judges .that from the side of the defence it was not suggested to any witness that Abdul Wahid\n\n(P. W. 10) was a different man and that h~ has been introduced because the real Abdul Wahid was not prepared to support the prosecution case is incorrect."}}, {"text": "Wahid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33734, "end_char": 33739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This criticism of the learned counsel for the appellants appears to be well-founded, for I find that a suggestion has been made to P.W. IO in cross-examination and he has admitted that there is also\n\nanother person named Wahid son of Abdul Rehman in his ruohalla and that that person was an accused in a rioting case."}}, {"text": "Abdul Rehman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33747, "end_char": 33759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This criticism of the learned counsel for the appellants appears to be well-founded, for I find that a suggestion has been made to P.W. IO in cross-examination and he has admitted that there is also\n\nanother person named Wahid son of Abdul Rehman in his ruohalla and that that person was an accused in a rioting case."}}, {"text": "Ram Katan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34715, "end_char": 34724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This portion of the judgment of the learned Judges is to the effect that all the five sons of Ram Katan including the deceased Chhotey Lal attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra whereas it is the case of the prosecution as brought out in the evidence of P.W. I that after.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kiiran"}}, {"text": "Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36689, "end_char": 36696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the trial court it was not submitted that the attack by the accused persons on both the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh\n\nChandra and P.W. 11 was without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel."}}, {"text": "Umesh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36701, "end_char": 36706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the trial court it was not submitted that the attack by the accused persons on both the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh\n\nChandra and P.W. 11 was without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel."}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37058, "end_char": 37064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37074, "end_char": 37079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37291, "end_char": 37297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37298, "end_char": 37303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37383, "end_char": 37389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37399, "end_char": 37404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37591, "end_char": 37597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37608, "end_char": 37613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37614, "end_char": 37619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37678, "end_char": 37684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37695, "end_char": 37700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37701, "end_char": 37706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38204, "end_char": 38210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38221, "end_char": 38226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38250, "end_char": 38256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38267, "end_char": 38272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38689, "end_char": 38695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38706, "end_char": 38711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38735, "end_char": 38741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38752, "end_char": 38757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38765, "end_char": 38782, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38965, "end_char": 38971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38976, "end_char": 38981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38996, "end_char": 39005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39013, "end_char": 39016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39113, "end_char": 39124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39129, "end_char": 39134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_411_443_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "V.T. KHANZODE & ORS.\n\nRESERVE BANK OF INDIA & ANR.\n\nMarch 5, 1982\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND\n\nA.O. Ko!HAL, JJ.J\n\nSeniority-Draft combined seniority list fixed by the Administrative Circular No. 8 dated January 7, 1978, Office Order No. 679 dated April 27, 1978 by the Reserve Bank, whether violative of Articles 14 and 16 of th• Constitution of India.\n\nReserve Bank of India Act, (Act II) of 1974-Section 58(1) & (2), scope of- Whether the power tomakt regulations emanate .from section 58(1)-Competency of tlu! Central Board of Director~ to make regulations and to issue administrative Circulars in respect of service conditions of staff.\n\nRetrospectivity of the operation of tlu s1niority scheme, ralidity of.\n\nUnder the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 framed under section S8 of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, the terms and conditions of service of the staff (including officers) in the Reserve B\"\"* were revised and regulated from time to time.\n\nEver since the date of the Staff Regulations ot 1948 and even prior thereto, there were 0 groups\" constituted for the different departments of the Reserve Bank, and officers were required to exercise irrevocable options for service in any particular Group, Those who had opted for a service in a particular Group were to be normally eligible for promotion io that Group only. The grouping was revi1ed with effect from April 1951 when employees were asked to exercise their option with regard to the Group of their choice. In 1951, the various departments of the Bank were rc4 classified into three Groups, Group I, Group II and Group III. This system of grouping continued until 1955, in which year the Ban'k found it necessary to 'reorganise the Agricultural Credit Department.\n\nAccordingly, the staff attachect to the various departments were regrouped into Groups I, ii, Ill, and IV, with effect from April I, 1957. In each of these Groups, there are six grades of officers based on pay scales, namely, Grades A,\n\nB, C, D, E and F, the lowest being Grade A and the highest being Grade F.\n\nEach Group had its own seniority list, that is to say, there were four separate seniority lists, ooe for each group. The latest of such lists prior to the draft ·\n\ncominep seniority list of 1978 is dated July I, 1976. .\n\nEarlier to the said list dated luly I, 1976, the Reserve Bank\"had constituted a Cadre Review Olmmi ttee in 1970 followed by another Committee.\n\nOn the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS {i 982j j s.C.lt.\n\nbasis of the report submitted by the Cadre Review Committee in October 1972, the Bank issued an Administrative Circular No. 15 dated May 22, 1974 specifying the decisions taken by it in the light of the recommendations made by the Committee. One such decision which the Bank took was to prepare a common seniority list for and to provide for inter-group mobility at the lowest Jevel of officers in each group, namely, Grade A officers, including those who were pron10ted to Grade Bon or after January l, 1970. With regard to. higher grades (including officers in Grade B promoted prior to January I, 1970), the Bank decided to retain the \"groupwise seniority as at present\". The inter-group mobility in Grades C and D was to be introducd only to a limited extent, namely, \"on a . swap basis\". It was first to be introduced in Grade C and thereafter to be extended \"in due course'' to the officers in Grade D. The two higher Grades, namely, Grades E and F were left unt01:JChed and no intention was expressed in the above circular to introduce either combined seniority or any scheme for inter-mobility in these grades. In accordance with the decisions expressed in the Administrative Circular dated May 22, 1974 tho Bank published separate seniority lists of officers in Grade Band above for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976.\n\nBy the Administrative Circular No. 3 dated January 7, 1978, the Bank. stated that it had decided to combine the seniority of all officers on the basis of their total length of service (including officiating service) in Group I (Section A), Group II and Group III. The seniority of all officers in each of the three Groups was to be combined with effect from May 22, 1974 on the basis of their total length of service, including officiating service, in the grade in which they were then posted on a reQ, ular basis. The Circular introduced combined seniority with retrospective effect from May 22, 1974 (the date or Administration Circular No. 15) as it was \"fair and equitable to the officers as a class\". The effect of this decision is that the group-wise system of seniority Which was in existence for more than 27 years stands substituted by a combined seniority for officers in Group I (Grade A) and in Groups II and IJJ with retrospective effect. That bas adversely affected the existing seniority of officers, particularly of those in / Group I, who are now placed many places below their existing position of seniority, some by several hundred places.\n\nHence these twenty five petitions under Art. 32 by the petitioners, all of whom are officers in Group I, and who are given their due seniority as on July l, . 1976.\n\nDismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD: 1:1. The Administrative Circular No. 8 dated 7-1-1978, the Office Order No. 679 dated 22-4-1978 and the draft combined seniority list are not violative of the rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nWhether there should be a combined seniority in different cat1res or groups is a matter of policy which does not att1act the applicability of the equaJity clause. [442 DF] •\n\nR6Serve Bank of lndia v. N. C. Paliwal, [1977] l SCR 377, applied and followed.\n\n/ ,\n\n' ).\n\nV.t. KHANZODB V. RBSBRVB BANK 413\n\n1:2. The historical events make it clear that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank were grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such adjust\n\nmeats in the administrative affairs of the Bank are a necessary sequel to the growing demands of new situations which are bound to arise in any developing economy, The group system has never been a closed or static chapter and the officers of the various groups were not kept, as it were, in quarantine. The group system has been a continuous process of trial and error and the impugned scheme of inter-group mobility has emerged as the best solution of the experience of the past. Combined seniority has been recommended by two special committees, whose reports reflect the expertise and objectivity which was brought to bear on their sensitive task. [441 B-D]\n\n1:3. Inter-group mObility and common seniority are a safe and sound solution to the conflicting demands of officers belonging to Group I on one hand and those of Groups II and III on the other. Private interest of employees of public undertakings cannot override public interest and an effort has to be made to harmonize the two considerations. No scheme governing service matter can be fool-proof and some section or the other of employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled.\n\n[441 DB)\n\nArbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and malafid.es will of course render any.scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employee is not evidence of these. Vested interests are prone to hold on to their acquisitions and the Group I officers have to surrender a part of the benefits which had accrued to them in a w'ater-tight system of grouping. Combined seniority is indispensable for the smooth functioning of the Bank and no organisation can function smoothly if one section of its officers has an unfair advantage over others in matters of promotional opportunities.\n\nThe reports of the Cadre Review Committee and the Tbareja Committee show that combined seniority has emerged as the most acceptable solution as a matter of administrative, historical and functional necessity\". Further, the conclusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. Narasimhan, later India's Executive Director in the World Bank, was the Governor and it was after Dr. I.G. Patel, Formerly Secretary, Economic Affairs, Govt. of India and Deputy Administrator, United Nations Development Programme, took over as Governor in Oecembcr 1977 that the final devjsion was taken by the Central Board to introduce inter-group mobility and combined seniority.\n\n(441 B-H, 442 AB)\n\n2. As regards the retrospective operation given to Scheme with effect from May 22, 1974, it does appear that the Board has struck a via media between two extreme contentions advanced by officers belonging to Group I and those belonging to Groups II and III. But that was inevitable and it was the best solution in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Io order to rectify the imbalances and anomalies caused by the compartmentalised and group-wise seniority, it was necessary to give retrospective effect to the Combined Seniority List. Officers belonging to Group I urged that the Scheme should be brought into effect from January I, 1976, while those belonging to Groups II and III wanted the Scheme to be brought into effect from January 1, 1970. The Central Board struck a balance by choosing the date May 22, 1974, because that was the dato on which\n\n414 SUPkllME c!Jbkt ltEPbitts [19811 s.c.k.\n\nthe decision in regard to combining the seniority retrospectively with effect from January 1, 1970 in regard to Grade 'A' and part of Grade 'B' officers was announced. It was, again, on that date that the Bank bad announced that a similar decision in regard to the remaining grades of officers was under its consideration. Thus, at least on May 22, 1974 it was known to officers of all grades that a combined seniority list was due to be brought into force. If a certain section of officers succeeded in obtaining promotional benefits thereafter, the imbaJance introduced thereby in the services of the Bank and the consequent dissatisfaction had to be rectified. That could only be done by not recosnising the accelerated promotions obtained in the intervening period by a certain class of officers. Any scheme of seniority is bound to produce isolated aberrations and that fact cannot justify the argument that the entire scheme is for that reason vioJative of the guarantee of equality. [442 F-H, 443 A-DJ\n\n3:1. The power to frame service conditions is not derived from clause (j) of section 58(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. Section 58(2)\n\n(j) refers to staff funds and superannuation funds and it cannot comprise service conditions. Clause (j) cannot be split up to read: \"the constitution and management of staff: and superannuation funds for the officers and servants of the Bank\". It hardly makes any sense that way. What the clase\n\nmeans is : \"the constitution and management of staff ai:; i.d superannuation funds for the officers and servants of the Bank\". An important subject like the service conditions of the staff cou1d not have been provided for in such a dubious and indirect mann'er. Nor indeed, could it have been described as \"constitution and management of staff:'. A rule of seniority cannot properly fall under such a head. [426 A-DJ\n\nRestrv• Bank Employ .. • Association v. Union of India, 1980 (2) S.L.R. 167 approved.\n\n3:2. Where a specific power is conferred without prejudice to the generality of a power already conferred, the specific power is only illustrative and cannot restrict to width of the general power. Therefore, the ambit of the general power conferred by sub-tion (I) cannot be. attenuated by limiting it to matters ., ecified in subMsection (2) of section SB, the provisions whereof are not exhaustive of the power of the CentraJ Board to make regulations. [426 D-F]\n\nEmperor v. Shibnalh Banerjee, 12 I.A. 241; Omp.arkash v. Union of India, A.J.R. 1971 SC 771, 773, 774, referred to.\n\n4:1. The doctrine of ullra vlres in relation to the powers of a statutory corporation has to be understood reasonably and so understood, \"whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, those things which the Legislature bas authorised ought not (unle1§ expressly prohibited) to be held by judicial construction to be ultra vires\". The Central -Board of DireCtors of the lleserve Bank has the power to make service regulations under section 58(1) of the Act. The Board is vested with power to make regulations in order to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or convenient for the\n\nV.T. KHANZODE V. RESERVE BANK 415\n\npurpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and it is not only convenient but manifestly necessary to provide for the service conditions of the Bank's staff in order to give effect to the .provisions of the Act. It cannot be denied that the power to provide for service conditions of the staff is at least incidental to the obligation to carry out the purposes for which Bank was constituted.\n\n[426 G-H, 427 A-DJ\n\nArmour v. Liverpool Corporation, 1939 (I) Cb.D. 422, 434, 435; Attorney General v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 5 Appeal Cases 473, quoted with approval.\n\n4:2. There is no doubt that a statutory corporation can do only such acts as are authorised by the statute creating it and that, the powers of such a corporation cannot extend beyond what the statute provides xpressly or by necessary implication. If an act is neither expressly or impliedly authorised by the statute which creates the corporation, it must be taken to be prohibited. But, section 58(1) being in the nature of an enabling provision under wich the Central Board \"may\" make regulations in order to provide for all matters for which it is neces~ sary or convenient to make provisions for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of the Act, the Central Board has the power to frame reg.ulation relating to the conditions of service of the Bank's staff. If it has that power, it may exercise it in accordance with section 58(1) or by acting appropriately in the exercise of its general power of administration and superioteiidence.\n\n[428'EF, G-H, 429A]\n\n4:3. By section 7(2) of tbe Reserve Bank of India Act, tbe general svperintendence and direction of the affairs and business of the Bank are entrusted to . the Central Board of Directors, which is empowered to exercise all powers and do all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Bank. Matters relating to the service conditions of the staff are, pre-eminently, matters which relate to the affairs of the Bank. It would therefore be wrong to deny to the Central Board the power to issue administrative directions or circulars regulating the conditions of service of the Bank's staff. To read into the provisions of section 58 (1) a prohibition against the issuance of such administrative directions or circulars is patently to igaore the scope of wholesome powers conferred upon the Central Board of Directors by section 7 (2) of tbe Act. While issuing the administrative circular governing the staff's conditions of service, the Central Board of Directors has neither violated any statutory injunction nor indeed has it exercised a power which is not conferred upon it by the statute. The circular is strictly within tbe confines of section 7 (2). [429 A-E, G-H, 430 AJ\n\nSukhdev Singh v. Bhogotrom, [1975] 3 SCR 619, reiterated.\n\n4:4. So long as staff regulations are not framed under section 58 (I), it is open to the Central Board to issue administrative circulars regulating the service conditions of the staff, in the exercise of power conferred by section 7 (2) of the Act. The power to frame rules or regulations does not nec1ssarily imply dhat no action can be taken administratively ill regard to a subject-matter on which a rule or regulation can be framed, unil it is so framed. The oniy precaution to observe in the cases of statutory corporations is that they must act within the framework of their charter. Its express provisions and necessary implications mu•t at all events be observed scrupulously. [430 A-B, 431 A-Bl\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA T. Ca/ee v. U. Jormanik Siom, [1961] 1 SCR 750; B.N. Nagarajan v. State of\n\nMysore, [1966] 3 SCR 682, explained and applied.\n\n4:5. Any action taken by the Central Board of Directors under section 7 (2) is subject to the directions given by the Central Government under section 7 (1), just as any regulation framed by it under section 58 is subject to the previous sanction of the Central Government. In either case, the Central Board has to abide by the decision or directions of the Central Government. There can, therefore; be no apprehension that, by taking action under section 7 (2), the Central Board may circumvent the condition on which the power confer red by section 58 can be exercised by it. The overall authority of the Central Government acts as a restraining influence on any action taken by the Central Board, whether it acts under one or the other provision of the Act. [ 431 B-D)\n\nS:l. A consideration of the entire material on the subject, including the correspondence thathas transpired between the Reserve Bank and the Central Government and in particular the Memorandum of January 21, 1949, makes it clear that the Staff Regulations of 1948 were not framed in the exercise of power conferred by section 58 of the Act and that they were not made with the D previous sanction of the Central Government. Whereas section 58 (1) envisages the making of regulations \"with the previous sanction of the Central Government\", the Regulations of 1948 do not purport to have been made with such sanction. Indeed, in so far as the ex facie aspect of the matter is concerned, the Regulations of 1948 have not been made under section 58 at all. The statement contained in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit of the Deputy Manager\n\ndated March 30, 1980 that the Memorandum. of January 21, 1949 contains a E\n\n- \"factual mistake\" to the effect that the Staff Regulations (which would include the Regulations of 1948) were made with the approval of the Central Goverment, correctly clarifies the position. It is one thing to infer that the Regulations had the approval of the Central Government since no objection was raised by it to the making of the Regulations and quite another that they were made with its previous sanction. [431 F-H, 433 B-D)\n\nReserve Bank Employees Association v. Union of India, 1980 (2) S.L.R. 167 (Cal.); Emptror. v. Shibnath Barer; ee,· 721.A. 241; Om Parkash v. Union of India\n\nA.I.R. 1971 S.C. 771, 773, 714; Rerer>e Bank of India v. N.C. Pliwal,[1977] 1 SCR 377; Bimal Kumar Shome v. P.C. Bhattacharya, Misc. Petition No. 206 of 1967 decided on August 6, 1969 (Bombay H.C.) R.M. Joshi v. The Reserve Bank of India, Civil Writ No. 876 of 1974 dedcided on March 19, 1980 by a Full Bench (Delhi H.C.), approved\n\n5:2. Since the Staff Regulations of 1948 are in the nature of administrative directions, it was cpmpetfnt to the Central Board to alter or amend them by an administrative circular. No lack of statutory powers is involved in that process. Under section 7(2), the .Central Board has the power to provide for service conditions of the Bank's staff by administration circulars, so long as they\n\nPo not impinge upon any Regulations made 1,1nder section 58 of the Act. .\n\nI 433 F-G, 434 AJ\n\nv.T. KHANZODE v. RESERVE BANK (Cha, ndrachud, C.J.) 417\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 4158-4182 A of 1978.\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nF.S. Nariman, B.R. Agarwala and P.G. Gokha/e for the Petitioners.\n\nB. Sen, 1.N. Shroff and H.S. Parihar for Respondents Nos. 1 & 2.\n\n~----....._ R.K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M.K.D. Namboodiry for Res pondent No. 3.\n\nP.R. Mridul, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.\n\nThese are 25 petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the decision of the Reserve Bank of India as regards the introduction of common seniority.and inter-group mobility amongst different grades of officers gelonging to Group I (Section A), Group II and Group III, with retrospective eflect from May 22, 1974.\n\nThat decision or order is contained in Administration Circular No. 8 dated January 7, 1978 as also in Office Order No. 679 dated April 27, 1978 and has been acted upon in the draft combined seniority list of officers in Grade 'B' (appointed as such prior to January 1, 1970) and in Grades 'C', 'D', 'fl' and 'F' The contention of the petitioners is that the aforesaid circular, office order and combined seniority list are violative of their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and are also ultra vires the power, jurisdiction and competence of the Reserve Bank of India, being without the authority of law and in contraven tion of the provisions of the Reserve Bank of Indfa Act, 1934.\n\nThe facts leading upon the impugned decision dated January 7, 1978, the office order dated April 27, 1978, and the draft combined seniority list are as follows : The Reserve Bank of India (Respondent No. I) was established under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\". Under the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 framed under .section 58 of the Act, the terms and conditions of service of the staff (including officers) of !lie respondent Bank werQ\n\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nrevised and regulated. These Regulations were ameneded from time to time. Provisions regarding record of service, seniority and promotion are contained in Regulations 27 to 30 (Chapter III), which read thus :\n\n\"27. Record of Service : A record of service shall be maintained by the Bank in respect of each employee at such place or places and shall he kept in such form and shall contain such information as may be specified from time to time by the Chief Manager.\n\n• 28. Seniority : An employee confirmed in the Bank's service shall ordinarily rank for seniority in his grade according to his date of confirmation in the grade and an employee on probation shall ordinarily rank for seniority among the employees selected along with him in the same batch according to the ranking assigned to him at the time of selection.\n\n29. Promotion: All appointments and promotions shall be made at the discretion of the Bank and notwith- \"' standing his senioritX in a grade, no employee shall have a right to be appointed or promoted to any particular post or grade.\n\n30. (I) An employee transferred from one appointment to another .or confirmed in a grade or appointment higher than his substantive grade or a11pointment, shall be liable to be reverted without notice at any time within one year of such transfer or confirmation.\n\n(2) An 'employee who has been appointed to officiate in a higher grade or appointment, or whose confirmation in a higher grade or appointment is subject to his undergoing probation for any specified period or otherwise, shall be liable to be reverted without notice at any time when be is so officiating or undergoing probation.\n\n(3) Nothing in sub-regulations (!) and (2) shall affect\n\nthe provisions of Regulation 47.''\n\n. ..\n\n--- ,_?/\n\n-. ' ' /\n\nv.T. KHANZODE v:RESERVE BANR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 419'\n\n. Ever since the daie of the Staff Reg.ulations of 1948 and even prior thereto, there were \"groups\" constituted 'for. the dilfe-. rent departments of the Reserve Bank, and officers were required to exercise irrevocable options for service in any particular Group.\n\nThose who had opted for a service in a particular Group. were to be normally eligible for promotion in that Group. only. .The grouping was revised with effect from April, 1951 when employees were.· asked to exerci•e their option with regard to the Gronp, of their choice.\n\nIn 1951, the various departments of the Bank were re-classified into three Groups, Group I, Group II and Group. III. This system~- •, of gronping continued until 1955, in which year the Bank foun~ it ~--'- necessary to reorganise the °AgriculturaL-Credit . Department.-.\n\nAccordingly, the staff attached to the various. departments -were .. regrouped into Groups I, II, III and IV; with effect from -Ap.ril 1,··-- 1957 .. In _eacli of these Groups, there are. six grades .of, officers.\n\nbased on pay scales, namely, , Grades A, B, C, n, E and F,.\n\nthe lowest -being Grade A . and the highest being . Grade F. Each. Group . had its own. seniority List, that is to say,· there were four separate seniority lists, one for . each group~ . The. latest of such lists, prior to. the impugned combined . seniority lisi, is dated July I, 1976.\n\n The Reserv~ Bank had co~tituted a Cadre Rbview. Commitee in 1970, comprising Shri , Justice J.L. Nain, then a sitting Judge of• the Bombay High Court, Shri V. Isvaran, I.C.S. (Retd.). and Prof.' N.S. Ramaswamy, a Management Expert. , The Committee_ submitted a report in Octobr 1972, on the basis of which the Bank issued.\n\nAdministration_Circular No. IS, dated May 22, 1974, specifying the . decisions taken by it in the .light of the recommendations made by_ the Committee .. One such decision which the Bank took wa• ia prepare a common seniority list for and to provide for inter group mobility at the lowest level officers in each group, -namely, Grade A 'officers, including those who were •promoted to Grade B on or after January I, 1970.: With regard to higher grades (including officers. iri .Grade B promoted prior to January I, J970); the Bank decided to retain the \"groupwise seniority as at present\". The inter'group mobility in Grades C and D was to be introduced only to a limited, extent, namely, \"on a swap basis\" : It was first to be introduced in .\n\nGrade C and thereafter to be extended \"in due course\" to the . _officers in Grade D. The two higher Grades.viz. Grades E and F were left u111011ched 1111d no intention was expressed in the above\n\nI i I'\n\n_ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' ·-(1982} f s, c.11..\n\nA circular to . introduce either combined seniority. or _any scheme for inter-mobility in these grades.\n\nIn _accordance_ with the decisions expressed in the aforesaid' circular. dated May 22, 1974, the Bankpublished separate seniority lists of officers in Grade B and above for the years 1974; 1975 and 1976. The. petitioners, all of whom are officers in Group I, were given their due seniority \"as of July I,\n\nB . 1976. '\n\n- _,\n\nBy the impugned Administration Circular No. 8, dated January 7, 1978, the Bank stated that it had decided to combine the seniority of all officers on the basis of their total length of service including officiating service) in Group I (Section A), Group II and Group III. The seniority o( all officers in each of the three Groups was to be combined with effect -from May 22, 1974 on-the basis of - their -total -length . of -service, including officiating_ service, in the grade in which they were then posted on -a regular basis .. The Circular introduced combined seniority with retrospective effect from May 22, 1974 (the date of Administration Circurlar :r-i:o. 15) as it was . \"fair and equitable to the officers as a class\".- ·\n\n Briefly stated, the effect of this decisions is that the group-wise system of seniority which_ was in existence for more than 27 years stands substituted . by a combined seniority for officers in Group I (Grade A) and in Groups II and III with retrospective effect.-· That has adversely affcted 'the existing seniority of officers; particularly of those in Group I, who are now placed many places below their existing position of seniority, some by several hundred places.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, the Reserve Bank has no power, competency or jursdiction to introduce the impugned scheme which discriminates against officers in higher posts; adversely affecting _ their _vested and existing rights of seniority. . The scheme, according to them, is _without any rational and far from furthering the efficient functioning .of the Bank, it will -affect it adversely by compelling\n\n- officers to leave positions in which they had acquired long and valuable experience and work in posts for which they possess no expertise. ' For example, for the Department of Banking Operations and Development (in Group IO. the emphasis : was laid o!l the commercial banking experience of officers whereas, for recruitment and selection in the Agricultural Credit Department (in Group III), the emphasis was on experience in co-operation and agricultural finance. That is why the Bank had laid the p_re-condition that the\n\n. .:;_.\n\n• \\ . . \\ _ _,,;---\n\n- ·~\n\nV.T. KHANZODE v. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 421\n\nselected officer should give a specific and irrevocable undertaking to serve in the Goup for which he was selected. Anot.her grievance of the petitioners is that although the Bank has stated in paragraph 9.2.1 of the impugned Circular that the seniority of officers will be combined on the basis of their total length of service, the seniority list bas in fact, been prepared in a very arbitrary and inequitous manner. In a large number of cases, it is alleged, the actual service rendered by the officers concerned has been arbitrarily reduced and adjusted in the length of service of other officers, and the latter have been notionally treated as officiating in higher grades from dates much prior to their actual promotions to those grades. In some cases, on the other hand, officiation in higher posts has been wholly ignored. This has generally resulted in accelerated and discriminatory benefit being conferred upon officers mostly belonging to Groups II and III, vis-a-l'is the petitioners and the other officers in Group I.\n\nThe petitioners apprehend I.hat a large number of officers who have been promoted since January I, 1976 against normal vacancies in their own departments on the basis of their experience and expertise of the relative work are likely to be reverted and replaced by officers from other groups, mostly from Group III,\n\nwho were selected for the specific job requirements of that group and who have no experience of the work done in the Group I departments. The petitioners also challenge the retrospective effect given to the impugned circular from May 22, 1974 as irrational and arbitrary.\n\nFurther, according to them, the said circular dated January 7, 1978, the Office Order dated April 27, 1978 and the combined seniority list are violative of. the Reserve Bank (Staff) Regulations. 1948.\n\nIn reply to the writ petition, a counter-affidavit has ceen filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Shri S. L. Jathar, Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel, Central Office, Bombay. The case of the Bank, as disclosed in that affidavit is as follows: The Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948, are not statutory in character, not having been framed under section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, The said Staff Regulations did not provide for the division of the staff of the Bank into different groups but only categorised them as Officers, Personal Assistants, etc. In view of the growing need for specialisation in departments handling research work and developmental activities, a functional\n\nsegregation of departments into four groups, with roup-wise\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nseniority for Officers, was introduced in the year 1951.\n\nAppendix XII to the Report of the 'Reserve Bank of India Cadre Review Committee', which refers to the grouping of the departments from time to time, shows that the groupings were not static and fixed but were changed as and when necessary. Group I was composed of General Departments dealing with the day-to-day operational functions of the Bank including accounts and organisational mattres, Group II of Departments dealing with regulatory and .inspection functions over the money market; Group III of Departments dealing with the Co-operatives and agricultural Credit institutions; and Group IV of Research Departments. Each Department had a seperate line of seniority and although the Bank had the right under the Staff Regulations to post any employee to any group, each group operat ed as an independent seniority unit and the employees were eligible for promotion within their group only. It was, however, noticed that the group system had resulted in glaring inequalities in promotional opportunities in the various Departments, because of the accelerated pace of expansion of Departments in some of the Groups wherein relatively junior employees were able to secure earlier promotions and confirmations. So far as the non-officers staff was concerned, the Bank took several steps from time to time to equalise their chances of promotion. Finally, in pursuance of an agreement with the All-India Reserve Bank Employees' Association, which is a representative Association of Class III employees of the Bank, the Bank introduced a combined scheme for clerical staff in May 1972 under which, the separate seniority lists of clerical employees in Class III were merged into one list with effect from 7th May, 1972, irrespective of their respective groups. The validity of that Scheme was challenged in several High Courts and the matter came up on appeal to this Court from a decision of the Delhi High Court which bas struck down the Scheme. This Court; in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Pa/iwa/(1) upheld the Scheme. The 'Cadre Review Committee' whose report was received by the Bank on October 11, 1972 recommended, broadly, the gradual introduction of inter-mobility of officers in different groups and the framing of a common seniotity list, except for officers in specialised groups like Economists, statisticians, Lawyers and Engineers. According to the Committee, the most rational basis for drawing up a common seniority list was to go by the date of entry of each officer in a grade in a continuous officiating capacity. The Bank announced its decision as regards the Committee's recommend!ltions, by the Administra-\n\n(I) [1977] I SCR 377,\n\nV.T. KilANZODE v. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 4~~\n\ntive Circular dated May 22, 1974. Io December 1975; the Bank appointed a Departmental Committee under Shri C.L. Thareja, the then Chief Manager of the Bank, to work out the modalities of integration of the group-wise seniority lists of officers in the higher grades which had not yet been integrated. That Committee submitted its report on December 15, 1976. It unanimously recommended simultaneous introduction of combined to seniority for all grades but, its members could not agre@ on the date to b1. adopted for integration of the group-wise eniority lists. The Chairman and one member favoured January I, 1976 as the date of integration while the remaining two members favoured January I, 1970. A Committee of the Central Boaril of the Bank decided to appoint May, 22 1974 as the date for integration as a via media and also because, it was on that date that the Bank had announced to its officers its decision on combined seniority, mobility and interchangeability. Fixation of January I, 1970. as the date for integration would have adversely affected the intere; ts of Group I officers while the other date January\n\nI, 1976, would have adversely affected the interests of officers in D other groups.\n\nThat is the answer made by the Reserve Bank to the petition.\n\nOriginally, the writ petition was filed against two respondents only; (I) The Reserve Bank of India and (2) the Chief Manager, Reserve Bank of India; Department of Administration & Personnel, Central Office, Bombay. The petitioners did not implead to the petition any of the officers belonging to the other groups who are likely to be affected if the relief sought by the petitioners is granted. Later, by an order dated July 24, 1978, respondents 3 and 4 were allowed to join in the petition on their own application. Respondent 3, Shri\n\nM.P. Saxena, was then the Deputy Chief Officer, Department of Banking Operations and Development, New Delhi, while respondent 4, Shri S. Acharya, was Deputy Chief Officer, Agricultural Credit Department, Chandigarh.\n\nRespondent 3, whose counter-affidavit has been adopted by 0 responc'ent 4, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that hundreds of officers similarly situated who are all specifically identifiable and who would be prejudicially affected if the prayers in the writ petitions are granted, have not been impleaded as respondents.\n\nAccording to H him, this is a case of a few privileged persons trying to retain their undue privileges at the cost of a scheme introduced to improve the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOltTS (J9SiJ J S.C.R.\n\noperational efficiency of the Institution and for the common good of the officers as a class.\n\nRespondent 3 has also raised the objection that no writ petition can lie under article 32 to enforce or challenge service conditions which are purely contractual.\n\nThe contentions raised by re&pondent 3 in his counter-affidavit may be summed up thus : Groupings and re groupings of departments have been undertaken by the Reserve Bank as and when the need arose in the context of changing requirements, and all such groupings and regroupings have been done as a result of administra tive decisions and given effect to through appropriate Administration Circulars.\n\nWhile the expedient of group-wise promotions based on group-wise seniority lists served the immediate convenience over a period of time, this artificial segregation resulted in compart mentalised approach to questions of policy, impairing thereby the. overall efficiency of the institution as a whole. Further, it also led to other anomalies and imbalances, more particularly in promotional opportunities of the staff attached to different groups.\n\nIn some groups, expansion was quicker and greater than in others. It is in order to meet this situation that several measures were initiated by the Bank and by the Associations of employees of various categories. Since these measures did not meet the situation adequately, the Bank initated a dialogue with the respective Associations for introducing a combined seniority for the various grades in different groups. For officers at the base level, namely, 'A' Grade (direct recruits), the Bank had maintained a common list of seniority in place of groupwise lists since 1968. Thereafter, groupings and regroupings have been a continuous process to meet the needs of the changing situations, and the present scheme of combined seniority which is one such, has come about as a matter of administrative, and historical and functional necessity.\n\nThe implementation of the scheme of inter-group mobility is being stalled by the Bank's internal administration, which was controlled solely by a small section of officers drawn from Group-I, which all along had unfair advantage of accelerated promotions as compared with officers in Groups II and III. Thus, the petitioners' plea is an attempt to perpetuate the unfair and unequal privileges which they had enjoyed over the years without any justification and with detriment to Bank's interests a fact which has been recognised by an impartial tribunal like the Cadre Review Committee. The Staff R1igulations\n\nof 1948 are in the nature of standardised contractual conditions of service. They were not framed under section 58 of the Act and\n\nv.t. KHANZObE v. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.)\n\n42S\n\ntherefore, it is competent to the Bank to alter them by administrative circulars.\n\nOn these pleadings, the three main questions which arise for our consideration are, firstly, whether the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 are statutory in character; secondly, whether it is competent to the Bank to provide for conditions of service of its staff by administrative circulars; and, thirdly, whether the impuged circular and seniority list offend against the provisions of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The contention of the petitioner is that the Regulations were framed under section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; that they cannot be altered by administrative circulars; that conditions of service cannot be framed by administrative circulars but must be framed by Regulations made under section 58 of the Act; and that, the impugned circular and seniority list violate' their right to equal treatment in the matter of their service conditions and career. The Reserve Bank and the contesting respondents have joined issue with the petitioners on all these questions.\n\nTurning to the first question, section 58(1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 provides that :\n\n\"The Cen.tral Board may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, make regulations consistent with this Act to provide for all matter for which provision is necessary or convenient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nSub-section (2) of section 58 provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, such regulations may provide for all or any of the matters mentioned in the various clauses of that sub-section. Clause (j) refers to \"the constitution and management of staff and supernnuation funds for the oflicers and servants of the Bank'', while clause (r) refers to the subject : \"generally, for the efficient conduct of the business of the Bank\". Sub-sections (3) and (4) were inserted in section 58 by Act 51 of 1974.\n\nBy sub-section (3). any regulation made under section 58 shall have effect from such earlier or. later date as may be specified in it. Sub-section (4) requires that every Regulation shall, as soon as may be. after it is made by the Central Board, be forwarded to the Central Government which, in turn, shall cause a copy of the same 'to be laid before each House of Parliament. Thereafter, the\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PORTS [1982] 3 s.C.k.\n\nA Regulation takes effect in accordance with the modifications, if any, made by the Parliament.\n\nA side argument may be disposed of briefly. It was suggested on behalf of the petitioners, though faintly, that the power to frame service conditions is derived from clause ij) of section 58 (2) of the Act. It is impossible to accept this contention. That clause cannot be split up to read : ''the constitution and management of staff; and superannuation funds fr.r the officers and servants of the Bank\". It hardly makes any sense that way.\n\nWhat the clause means is : \"the constitution and management of staff funds and superannuation funds for the officers and servants of the Bank''. An important subject like the service conditions of the staff could not have been provided for in such a dubious and indirect manner.\n\nNor indeed, could it have been. described as \"constitution and management of staff.\" A rule of seniority cannot properly fall under such a head.\n\nWe endorse the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Reserve Bank Employees Association v. Union of lndia(') that section 58 (2) (j) refers to staff funds and superannuation fun9s and that it cannot comprise service conditions.\n\nBut, the provisions of sub.section (2) of section 58 cannot be taken to be exhaustive of the power of the Central Board to make regulations. It is well-settled that where a specific power is conferre,1 without prejudice to the generality of a power already conferred, the specific power is only illustrative and cannot restrict the width of the general power. (See Emperor v. Shibnath Barerjee;(') Om Parkash v. Union of India('). Therefore, the ambit of the general power conferred by sub-section (I) cannot be attenuated by limiting it to matters specified in sub-section (2) of Section 58.\n\nSection 58 (I) of the Act confers power on the Central Board of Directors of the Bank to make regulations in order to provide for all matters for which provisions is µecessary or convenient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. It seems to us clear that it is not only convenient but mainfestly necessary to provide for the service conditions of the Bank's staff in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act. The Act was passed in order to constitute a Bank for achieving economic purposes of the\n\nH (I) 1980 (2) S. L.R. 167 Cal.\n\n(2) 72 I.A. 241.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1971 SC 771, 773, 774.\n\n...\n\nV.f. KltANZODE v. RESEl\\VB BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 427\n\nhighest national importance : regulating the issue of Bank notes, keeping reserves with a view to !!eCuring monetary \"stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage. It is, in our view, not open to any question either on the basis of reason or authority that the power to provide for service conditions of the staff is at least incidental to the obligation to earry out the purposes for which the Bank was constituted.\n\nAs observed in Armour v. Liverpool Corporation,(') \"To assist in removing from the minds of its employees the fear of an un protect ed old age, to foster their happiness and contentment and to procure their good and efficient service, these are objects which, even if economic considerations alone count, are incidental, if not vital, to the proper carrying on of any undertaking as well by a municipal as any other corporation.\" The doctrine of ultra vires in relation to the powers of a statutory corporation has to be understood reasona bly and so understood, \"whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, those things which the Legislature has authorised ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held by judicial construction, to be ultra vires.\" (See J.ttorney-General\n\nv. Great Eastern Ry. Co.(') The Central Board has, therefore, the power to make service regulations under section 58 (I) of the Act.\n\nShri Nariman pleads for such a power but his purpose in doing so is to urge that section 58 (7) is the sole repository of the power of the Central Board to provide for the conditions of service of the Bank's staff. He contends that statutory corporations like the Reserve Bank of India have no inherent or residuary powers and that they must seek and find their powers and obligations in the Charter of their creation Therefore, the argument proceeds, it is imperative that regulations governing terms and conditions of service of the Bank's staff must be framed under section 58 (1) only and cannot be framed by administrative circulars issued in the exercise of any non-statutory power authority.\n\nIn support of this submission, reliance is placed 'by the learned counsel on the statement of law contained in paragraphs 1326 and\n\n(1) 1939 (1) Ch.D. 422, 434, 435.\n\n(2) 5 Appeal Cases 473.\n\nl!l\n\n428 SUPREME COURT RilPORTs [1982] 3 s.c.il..\n\nA 1333 (pages 775 and 779) of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth edition. In paragraph 1326 it is stated that :\n\n\"Corporations may be either statutory or non-statutory and a fundamental distinction exists between the powers and liabilities of the two classes. Statutory corporations have such rights and can do such acts only as are authorised directly or indirectly by the statutes creating them; nonstatutory corporations, speaking generally, can do everything that an ordinary individual can do unless restricted directly or indirectly by statute\".\n\nParagraph 1333 says that :\n\n\"The powers of a corporation created by statute are limited and circumscribed by the statutes which regulate it, and extend no further than is expressly stated therein, or is necessarily and properly required for carrying into effect the purposes of its incorporation, or may be fairly regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon; these things which the legislature has authorised. What the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorise is to be taken to be prohibited.\"\n\nThere is no doubt that a statutory corporation can do only such acts as are authorised by the statute creating it and that, the powers of such a corporation cannot extend beyond what the statute provides -expressly or by necessary implication. If an act is neither expressly or impliedly authorised by the statute which creates the corporation, it must be taken to be prohibited. This cannot, however, produce the result for which Shri Nariman contends. His contention is not that the Central Board has no power to frame staff regulations but that it must do so under section 58 (I) only. On that argument, it ls material to note that section 58 (I) is in the nature of an enabling provision under which the Central Board \"may\" make regulations in order to provide for all matters for which it is necessary or convenient to make provision for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. This provision does not justify the argument that staff regulations must be framed under it or not at all. The substance of the matter is. that the Central Board has the power to frame regulations relating to the conditions of service of the Bank's staff. If it has that power, it may exercise\n\nV, t, ICHANZODB v. i\\.ESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 429\n\nit either in accordance with section 58 (1) or by acting appropriately in the exercise of its general power of administration and superintendence.\n\nThe statement of law in Halsbury puts emphasis on the limitation on powers of statutory corporations in the light of the provisions of statutes under which they are constituted; From that point of.view, the provisions of section 7 (2) of the Act are important. By that section, the general superintendence and direction of the affairs and busin.ess of the Bank are entrusted to the Central Board of Director~, which is empowered to exercise all powers and do all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the ank.\n\nMatters relating to the service conditions of the staff are, preeminently, matters which relate to the affairs of the Bank. It would therefore be wrong to deny to the Central Board the power to issue administrative directions or circulars regulating the conditions of service of the Bank's staff. To read into the provisions of section 58 (1) a prohibition against the issuance of such administrative directions or circulars is patently to ignore the scope of wholesome powers conferred upon the Central Board of Directors by section 7 (2) of the Act.\n\nIndeed, this section brings the impugned circular and senioritY, list within the rule mentioned in Halsbury ; they have the authority of the statute.\n\nIn this behalf, reliance is also placed by Shri Nariman on a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sukhdev Singh\n\nv. Bhagatram,(1) Ray, C.J., who spoke for three members of the Bench, observea in his judgment that the powers of statutory bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes which create them and that any action of such bodieS' in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra-vires. The concurring judgment of Mathew, J. also contains observations to the same effect (see pages 628, 630 and 659 of the Report). This enunciation of law is to the same effect as in Halsbury and our answer is the same.\n\nWhile issning the administrative. circular governing the staff's conditions of service, the Central Board of Directors has neither violated any statutory injunction nor indeed has it exercised a power which is\n\n(I) [197S] 3 S.C.R 619.\n\n430 SUl>REM~ COURT lUlPoRTS [19821 s.c.tt\n\nnot conferred upon it by the statute. The circular is strictly within the confines of section 7 (2).\n\nSo long as staff regulations are not framed under section 58 (!), it is open to the Central Board to issue administrative circulars regulating the service conditions of the staff, in the exercise of power conferred by section 7 (2) of the Act. In T. Cojee v. U.\n\nJormanik Siem,(') a District Council was constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, for the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam.\n\nThe rules in the Sixth Schedule empowered the District Council to make Jaws with respect ~- to various matters regarding the administration of the District, including the appointment or succession of Chiefs and Headmen.\n\nNo law was however made regulating such appointments. Even so, it was held by this Court that the District Council had the power to appoint or remove administrative personnel under the general power of administration vested in it by the Sixth Schedule. Delivering the leading judgment of the Bench, Wanchoo, J., said that where executive power impinges upon the rights of citizens, it will have to be backed by an appropriate law; but where executive power is concerned only with the personnel of the adminis'tration, it is not necessary that there must be laws, rules or regulations governing the appointment of those who could carry on the administration under the control of the District Council. The District Council had therefore the power to appoint officers by virtue of the fact that the administration was vested in it.\n\nIn B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore(') Rule 3 of the Mysore State Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957 provided that recruitment to the State Civil Services shall be made by a competitive exam, ination or by promotion and that the method of recruitment and qualifications shall be as set forth in the Rules specially made in that behalf. It\n\n__ _,., V was urged before this Court that no recruitment' could be made to any service until the rules were made. That argument was rejected on the ground that it is not obligatory under the proviso to art. 309 ,_ to make rules of recruitment before a service can be constituted and that it was not necessary that there must be a law in existence before the executive is enabled to function.\n\nIt is true that reliance was placed in that case on the provisions of art. 162, by which the executive power of a State extends to the matters with respect to\n\n(I) [1961] I S.C.R. 750.\n\n(2) [1966] 3 S.C.J, l. 682.\n\nV.T. KHANZODE v. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 431\n\nwhich the legislature of the State has power to make laws.\n\nBut the decision is useful for illustrating that the power to frame rules or regulations does not necessarily imply that no action can be taken administratively in regard to a subject matter on which a rule or regulation can be framed, until it is so framed. The only precaution to observe in the cases of statutory corporations is that they must act within the framework of their charter. Its express provisions and necessary implications must at all events be observed scrupulously.\n\nIt may bear mentioning that any action taken by the Central Board of Directors under section 7(2) is subject to the directions given y the Central Government under section 7(1) just as any regulation fra.med by it under section 58 is subject to the previous sanction of the Central Government. In either case, the Central Board has to abide by the decision or directions of the Central Government.\n\nThere can therefore, be no apprehension that, by taking action under section 7 (2), the Central Board may circumvent the condition on which the power conferred by section 58 can be exercised by it. The overall authority of the Central Government acts as a restraining influence on any action taken by the Central Board, whether it acts under one or the other provision of the Act.\n\n• Having seen that the Central Board has the power to provide for service conditions of the staff by issuing administrative circulars, the next question for consideration is whether the Staff Regulations of 1948 were issued under section 58 of the Act. The importance of this question lies in the fact that, quite clearly, if the 1948 Regulations are statutory, they cannot be altered by administrative circulars and, in that event, the impugned circular will not have the effect of ·· superseding them. Having considered the entire material on this subject including the correspondence that has transpired between the Reserve Bank and the Central Govermeot, we find it difficult to take the view that the Staff Regulations of 1948 were framed in the exercise of power conferred by section 58. One fact which stands out in this regard is that whereas section 58 (I) envisages the making of regulations :'with the previous sanction of the Central Government'', the Regulations of 1948 do not purport to have been made with such sanction.\n\nIndeed, iu so far as the exfacie aspect of the matter is concerned, the Regulations of 1948 do not purport to have been made under section 58 at all.\n\nIt is true that this by itself is not conclusive because, failure to mention the source of power\n\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\ncannot invalidate the exercise of power, if the power is possessed by the authority which exercises it.\n\nBut, the common course of the manner in which the Central Board exercises its power when it pnrports to do so under section 58 is not without relevance and has an important bearing on the question under consideration. The Employees' Provident Fund Regulations of 1935, the Note Issue Regulations of 1935 the General Regulations of 1949, the Scheduled Banks' Regulations of 1951 and the Guarantee Fund Regulations, which were all framed under section 58, contain a preamble reciting that they we re framed under that section and that they were framed with the pre vious sanction of the Central Government. By way of illustration, we may cite the preamble of the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1949, which runs thus:\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred hy section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934) and iri supersession of the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1935, the Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, is pleased to make the following Regulations ... \"\n\nIt is significant that such a recital is conspicuously absent in the Regulations of 1948. That renders it safe and reasonable to accept the statement contained in the counter affida¥it filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Shri Shamrao Laxman Jathar Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel to the effect that the Staff Regulations of 1948 are not statutory in character, not having been made under section 58 of the Act of 1934. The rejoinder affidavit dated July 16, 1979 filed on behalf of the petitioners by Shri Jamnadas Gupta reiterates the contention that the Regulations of 1948 were framed under section 58 (I) with the sanction of the Central Government. Support is sought to that contention from the correspondence annexed to the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and the correspondence annexed to the rejoinder.\n\nOf particular importance is the statement contained in the 'Memorandum to the Central Board\" dated January 21, 1949, submitted by the then Governor of Reserve Bank, Sbri C.D. Deshmukh, on the subject of \"Reserve Bank of India Regulations\" .. That Memorandum contains a list of regulations which were made by the Central Board \"with the approval of the Central Government\". The very first item in the list is \"Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations\".\n\nHaving considered the correspondence bearing on the subject and particularly the aforesaid Memor<1ndum, we see no reason to doubt\n\niii - '~~ ll . --\n\nV.T. KHANZODB v. RESERVB BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.} 433\n\nthe contention of the Bank that the Regulations of 1948 were not framed under section 58 and that they were not made with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The then Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Shri C. D. Deshmukh, a distinguished Economist and Civilian, was perhaps justified in assuming from the correspondence that the Central Government bas no objection'to the proposed regulations, wbfoh explains his statement, that they were made with t: e \"approval\" of the Central Government. But, it is one thing to infer that the Regulations had the approval of the Central Government since no objection was raised by it to the making of the regulations and quite another that they were made with its previous sanction. The supplementary affidavit dated March, 1980 which was filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Sbri Pradeep Madhav Joshi, Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel, has dealt fully with the correspondence on the subject of previous sanction of the Central Government to the Regulations of 1948. We are inclined to accept the statement contained in paragraph 9 of the said affidavit that the Memorandum of January 21, 1949 contains a \"factual mistake\" to the effect that the Staff Regulations, (which would include the Regulations of 1948) were made with the approval of Central Government. We therefore conclude that the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations of 1948 were not made under sction 58 of the Act and that, in fact, the Central Board bad not obtained the sanction of the Central Government to the making of those Regulations.\n\nThe High Courts of Bombay,(') Calcutta and Delhi(') have all taken the view that the Staff Regulations of 1948 are not statutory, not having been 'framed under section 58 of the Act. We endorse the correctness of that view.\n\n' Since the Staff Regulations of 1948 are in the nature of administrative directions, it was competent to the Central Board to , alter or amend them by an administration circular.\n\nNo lack of statutory powers is involved in that process.\n\nUnder section 7 (2), the Central Board bas the power to provide for service conditions of the Bank's staff by administration circulars, so long as they do\n\n{l) Misc. Petition No. 206 of 1967 (Bimal Kumar Shorn• v. P.C. Bhattacharya) decided on August 6, 1969. (Bombay H.C.J\n\n(2) Civil Writ No. 876 of 1974 (R.M. Joshi v. The Reserve Bank oj India) decided on March 19, 198Q by a Full J!ench (Delhi H.C.)\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nnot impinge upon any Regulations made under section 58 of the Act.\n\nIt now remains to be considered whether the impugned Administration Circular, No. 8, dated January 7, 1978; Office Order No. 679, dated April 27 1978; and the draft Combined Seniority List of officers prepared pursuant thereto,_ are violative of the petitioners' right to equality in the matter of their service conditions. The salient features of the impugned Ad ministration Circular mav be summarized ths : . ·\n\n(a) A common seniority and inter.group mobility is introduced simultaneously in all Grades of officers attached to Group I (Section A) and Groups II and III.\n\n(b) The seniority of all officers is combined as on May 22, 1974, on the basis of their total length of service (including officiating service), in the grade to which they were then posted on a regular basis.\n\nIn doing so, the existing infer se seniority of the officers in the respective groups is maintained and the subsequent supersessions for promotion or confirmation in the respective groups are suitably .reflected. The date of confirmation is not taken into account for th, is purpose.\n\n(c) The Circular covers all officers in Group I (Section A) and Groups II aud III who were appointed to Grade 'B' prior to January I, 1970 as well as officers in the higher grades 'C', 'D', 'E' and 'F'.\n\nThe Circular does not cover officers in Sections B to L of Group I, technical officers in Group III and officers attached to Group IV.\n\n(d) All promotions to Grade 'C' and above which were made on a provisional basis after January 1, 1976 are to be reviewed individually in order to ascertain as to which of the officers may be allowed to continue in the higher grade on the basis of their seniority and suitability.\n\nConsequential adjustments 11re to be made in a phased and\n\n-•.\n\n- ' -\n\nV.T. KHANZODE V. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 435\n\ngradual manner in order to ensure that the opera A tional efficiency of the various departments and the Bank's requirements of a specialised staff of officers are not adversely affected.\n\n(e) Officers promoted to higher grades prior to January I, 1976 are to be allowed to retain their existing. grades, though not necessarily the same posts, and their seniority is to be adjusted under a common seniority scheme.\n\n(f) Officers appointed to officiate in the higher grade on a provisional basis on or after January I, 1976 and who are all0wed to continue in such grade on the basis of their seniority and suitability, are to be considered for confirmation in the normal course.\n\n(g) Officers who are in a lower grade but \"ho rank higher in seniority in the common seniority list than those who are already 0°fficiating or confirmed in the higher grade, are to be considered for promotioµ on the basis of their suitability.\n\n(h) All future promotions to Grade 'C' and to the higher grades are to be made on the basis of the common seniority list, subject to selectivity.\n\n(i) Wherever possible, the transfer of officers from one department or gropp to another in the same • grade has to be encouraged in order to enable a broader diffusion of experience and to prepare a wider base for development of officers in different departments.\n\n(j) All promotions from Grade 'B' to 'C' are to be made on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability, with greater emphasis on suitability. The selec\n\nlions for this purpose are to be made by the Reserve Bank of India Services Board.\n\n(k) Selections for promotions to Grade 'D' and above are to b~ Jll\\lde by a Comll1Hle~ of \\e Qeputy\n\nD •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R\n\nGovernors, who are to give greater consideration to merit apart from the aptitude and experience of the officers concerned.\n\nOffice Order No. 679, dated April 27, 1978 was issued in pursuance of the aforesaid Circular.\n\nThe Bank announced by it that the tentative Combined Seniority List of officers in Grade 'B' (appointed prior to January I, 1970) and Grades 'C', 'D', 'E' and 'F' would be available for inspection upto May 12, 1978.\n\nOfficers aggrieved by the tentative Seniority List were asked to submit their representations within fifteen days.\n\nThe tentative Combined Seniority List shows the proposed position occupied seniority-wise by 644 officers belonging to Group I (Section A) and Groups II and III.\n\nThese writ petitions 'were filed by the petitioners on June l 0, 1978 in order to challenge the Administration Circular, the Office Order and the Combined Seniority List referred to above. The 25 petitioners are all officers in Group I.\n\nThe case of the petitioners is that the Administrative Circular and the draft Combined Seniority list are violative of their rights under articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because; (a) The combined fixation of seniority has the effect of treating unequals as equals in so far as officers belonging to different groups are concerned, whose appointment, recruitment, promotion and seniority had all along been fixed, accepted and acted upon on a group-wise basis; and (b) Recruitment, selection and promotion of officers having been made on a group-wise basis from time to time and their seniority having been fixed accordingly, the seniority is now fixed retrospectively from an arbitrary date viz., May 22, 1974.\n\nThese contentions, particularly the first, have to be answered in the light of historical data governing the constitution and management of Services under the Reserve Bank, from time to time. Without an awareness of the history leading to the events which the petitioners have challenged as unconstitutional, it will not be possible either to appreciate their contention. or to provide an answer to it.\n\nH the Reserve Bank of India was constituted on April J, 1935 under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. The main purpose c; if constituting the Bank, M stated in the Preamble ' - , , . - . - .\n\n.·~\n\n. 'I\n\n. \"-, .\n\n-----··-~---·-~~- .\n\nV.T. !W'.l<ZOr\"' v .. 'tF.SERVE BANK' (Chandrachud, C.J.) 437\n\n' of the Act was \"To regulate the issue of bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a. view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage.\" In course of time: 'new fonctions came to be added as' a result of new moasures so as to meet the growing needs of an expanding economy. Dufing the first decade after.the ini:eptionof the Bank in '1935, these' functions were carried out through three departments : The Banking Department, the Issue Department and the Agricultural Credit Department.\n\nThe Agricultural Credit Department was trifurcated irito three branches with effect from August I, 1945 : (i) the Agricultural Credit '- Department, (ii) the. Department of Research and Statististics\n\n, and (iii)' the Department of Banking Operations;· The first two branches, which were of a specialised nature, were grouped together for the purposes of promotions of officers while the third branch was grouped for that purpose with. the banking group on tht> ' ' .\n\nGeneral Side. All promotions were made from two separate common seniority lists,' one for the specialised or 'technical group and the other for the banking group. The departments were . regrouped again. into three Groups, with effect from . April l, ! 951.\n\nGroup I consisted of Staff attached to the Department of Research and Statistics, Group II of the Staff attached to the Department of Banking Operations, the Department of Banking Development and the Agricultural Credit Department and Group III of the Staff attached to the other Departments on the General Side. The Staff attached to the Agricultural Credit Department was reconstituted into a new Group, namely, Group IV with effect from April l, 1955 .\n\nThe Industrial Finance Department and the Dep4rtment of Non ..\n\nBanking Companies were added to Group II . in September 1957' and March 1966, respectively. Group V was created for the staff of the Industrial Department Bank of India with effect from April 1,\n\n1965. The composition of the five Groups was readjusted on that date to ensure greater administrative efficienCY.·\n\n This system of grouping had many drawbacks 'bearing on the promotional opportunities of Officers in the various Groups.· To mention but a few, the drawbacks were : (i) Unequal size of one Group as compared to another, (ii) Uneven expansion in one Group as Compared to another, and (iii) Earlier confirmations of ·\n\nOfficer~ in one Group as coml'ard \\o \\o~' in a, nother. ·\n\n.· F\n\n• -\n\n~I _, _ __.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1982] 3 s.c;' 1\n\nIn 1955, Group I was the largest of all the three Groups on the basis of the total number of officers in Grades 'B' and above .in each of the three Groups.\n\nThe . subsequent'. expansion in staff strength bas been greater in Groups II and III . than in Group I with the result that by the end of 1975, the total strength of Officers in Grade 'B' and above was the smallest in GroupJ as. compared to· the other Groups. .The number of officers in Grade •A', however~ continu.es to be the largest in Group I on account of the operational nature of its functions. While the iricrease in the total num her of -officers in Grade 'B' and above in. Gro\"up I over a period of twenty\n\nyears was 280%, the corresponding increase in Groups II arid III was . .451% and 1100% respectively. However, te large expansion in_,. .Groups II and III was mairily at the junior officers 'level' particularly . in •Grade 'B'. As regards senior officers i.e: officers in Grades 'D',\n\n 'E' and .'F' while the expansion in Groups I and II could be .. regarded as more or less equal, the expansidn. in Group III, parti-\n\n. cularly in Grade 'D' was marked. In spite of this, the total number of posts of senior officers and the percentage of such posts as com- . pared with those of junior officers . continued . to be smaller i.n ·\n\nGroups II and III. Officers in .Groups II and III also took a longer • . time generally for confirmation as the posts against.which they were promoted were either initially sanctioned on a temporary basis and . continued as such for quite sometime .before they were made perma- nent or the vacancies were caused by' deputation of regular officers to commercial banks,. state co-operative. banks, etc. for which no permanent_va=ancies w:re created. On the other hand, Group I had more or less its normal growth during these years and there was a smooth flow of normai vacancies .. The officers recruited in the early . years of the Ban\\: had also gradually started reaching the age of\n\nsuperannuatio,; and there was a regular flow of retirement vacan-· cies. The Officers in Group I bad, therefore, their confirmation quickly and thereby derived distinct benfits. . ·\n\nUnder the Bank's rules, .. the seniority of an Officer in a parti- . cular grade was ordinarily dependent on the date of his confirmation in that grade and although for the purpose of promotion, the seniority of an officer was given weightage only whhin the same group for a notional comparison of seniority of officers in different Groups an officer who was confirmed earlier in one Group as compared with another wlio was confirmed later in another Group had an . edge over tho;.!attc:( if! alters of servi9e benefits, Such comparison~\n\n~ \\'\n\nV.T. KHANZODB v. RESERVE llANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 439\n\narising from promotional imbalances in the various groups caused resentment among the affected officers. This state of affairs had long agitated the minds of the officers in Groups II and III and they brought this state of affairs to the management's notice by various representations beginning from 1968.\n\nThe Management of the Bank took several steps from time to time to correct the promotional imbalances but these steps did not touch even the fringe of the problem, especially since, the adhoc schemes and proposals were mainly. aimed at correcting imbalances that the lower level.\n\nUltimately, in face of growing discontentment amongst officers belonging to Groups II and III, the Management decided to refer the question to the Cadre Review Committee (CRC) which was appointed by the Bank in May 1970. The Committee was, among other things, required to examine and make recommendations for the changes desirable in the existjng constitution of the cadres of officers; having due rega; d to the ueed to provide reasonable prospects of increments and promotion and to ensure such degree of inter-changeability as administrative efficiency and exigen cies of the Bank's services demanded. The Committee, under the\n\nChairmanship of Shri J. L. Nain, a sitting Judge of the Bombay High Court, submitted its report in October 1972.\n\nThe Cadre Review Committee expressed the view that there was irrationality in the way the groupings had been done and the way in which seniority was being maintained •group-wise and that Group I had an unfair advantage in matters of promotion over Groups II and III. The Comm.ittee further held that as certain departments were inordinately large as compared to others, this by\n\nitself, in the context of absence of inter group mobility brought about imbalances in promotional opportunities. The Committee\n\n- F also recognised that mobility from one group to another would not only facilitate removing the imbalances in promotional opportunities but that it would also lead to \"better operational efficiency\". The Committee stressed the need for a common seniority list for each grade of officers throughout the Bank, except in respect of the Economic and Statistics Departments and among lawyers, engineers and other technical sections of officers. It recommended a system of promotion from a lower grade to higher grade which would\n\nensure, among other things, to the.'; largest extent possible; equality of opportunity of promotion among all officers in t4e llQlC grade'' u.. '\n\n- '. ,·:r.-. .... .... 1._3.,..;_.~;\n\n., J'\n\n• ..\n\n' c\n\n440 SUPREME CoURT REPORTS . (i9s2j 3 s.c.ii..\n\n. and effective operation of• mobility of officers between different departments and groups. In \"regard to the operation of the combined 'eniority scheme, the Committee recommended its immediate introduction for' A' and 'B' grades and within a period of two years.for the 'C' grade. In regard to the rest of the grades, namely, 'D', 'E' and 'F', the Committee recommended the application of this principle mutatis mutandis and left it to the discretion of the Bank to introduce it as and wheh it chose, taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation. The Committee was also of the view . that it was necessary that mobility and inter-changeability as between\n\ngroups among all grades of officers should be introduced in the\n\nshortest time possible.\n\nFollowing th'e . recommendations of .the Cadre ·: Review Committee, the Bank introduced through an administrative circular . (No. 15, dated 22.5.1974), a combined seniority for' A' and part of 'D' 'grades, with retrospective effect. 1n regard _to 'C' and 'D' Grades, the circular provided.for mobility and interchangeability on . a swap basis, but the Officers'. Association protested against it and\n\ndemanded immediate and simultaneous. introduction of combined seniority and interchari geability for the rest of the grades also. . ' . . . . ''\n\n Following the perslstent demand ade by the majority of the officers,. the Bank appointed a Committee comprising Shri c. L.\n\nThareja; the then Chief. Manager, as Chairman, Shri K: Madhava\n\nDas,· Chief 'office~,· Agricultural Credit Departent, Shri 'P. N.\n\nKhamia, Chief Officer, Department of Banking. Operations and Development, and Shri T. ri. Katara, Manager, Bombay Office, to work out the modalities of. the implementation of the combined . seniority scheme for grade~ 'C' to 'F' and to determine the operatie . date for.con!bining the seniority.' The Bant- 'decided that pendir{ll\n\nthe submission of the .report by this Committee, all future promo- .. tions namely those effected from I.l.1976, will be prely ad hoc and provisional. . . ' -\n\n~-\"\n\nThe Thareja Committee, like the Cadre Review Committee; unanimously recommended the introduction of cobined seniority simultaneously for all grades of officerS. However, on the question of the operative date, it was divided in its views. : Whereas Shri Thareja and Shri Katara, both Group I officers, recommended that - the scheme be given retrospective effect from January 1, 1976, the·\n\n.. ,,\n\nv.r. KHANZODE v. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 441\n\nother two members representing Groups II and III, were-0f the view that it should be given effect from January 1, 1970. The Bank, by the impugned circular, accepted May 22, 1974 as the date from which the combined seniority list was to have effect.\n\nIt is clear from this narration of historical events that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank were grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such adjust men ts in the admiqj, strative affairs of the Bank are a necessary sequel to the growing aemands of new situations which are bound to arise in any developing economy. The group system has never been a closed or static chapter and it is wrong to think that the officers of the various groups were kept, as it were, in quarantine. The group system has been a continuous process of trial and error and the impugned scheme of inter-group mobility has emerged as the best solution out of the experience of the past. Combined seniority has been recommended by two special committees, whose reports reflect the expertise .and objectivity which was brought to bear on their sensitive task. It is clear that inter-group mobility and common seniority are a safe and sound solution to the conflicting demands of officers belonging to Group I on one band and those of Groups II and III on the other. Private interest of employees of public undertakings cannot override public interest and an effort has to be made to harmonize the two considerations. No scheme governing service matters can be fool-proof and some section or the other employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the .scheme does not satisfy the expect~ tions of every employee is not evidence of these.\n\nVested interests arc prone to hold on to their a•uisitions and we understand , the feelings of Group I officers who have to surrender a pai:t of the , benefits which had accrued to them in . a water-tight system of grouping.\n\nCombined seniority is indispensable for the smooth functioning of the Bank and no organisation can function smoothly if one section of its officers has an 1.1nfair advantage over others in matters of promotional oppor- .tunities. The reports of the Cardre Review Committee and the\n\nThareja Committee show !bat com_bined seniority has emerged as the. mo.st accepiable solution as a matter of. administrative, his~ t9ricai. and functional -ncessity. We see no justification for und6ing\n\n442 SUPREME cOURT REPORTS [1982i s.c.k.\n\nwhat these committees have achieved after an objective and integral exaifiination of the whole issue. We may mention that the con clusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. Narasimhan, later India's Executive Director in the World Bank, was the Governor and it was after Dr. I.G. Patel,\n\nFormerly Secretary, Economic Affairs, Govt. of India and Deputy Administrator, United Nations Development Programme, took over as Governor in December 1977 that the final decision was taken by the Central Board to introduce inter-group mobility and combined seniority . •\n\nIn Reserve Bank of India\". N.C. Pa/iwal, a Combined Seniority Scheme was introduced by the Reserve Bank of India, consisting of two parts, one part provided for the integration of the clerical staff of the General Departments with the clerical staff of the Specialised Departments, while the other provided for the switchover and integration of the nonclerical staff with the clerical staff in all the Departments of the Bank. The Delhi High Court set aside the\n\nScheme on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court held that the integration of different cadres into one cadre did not involve violaiion of the equality clause and that neither Article 14 nor Article 16 forbids creation of different cadres in Government service.\n\nWhether there should be a combined seniority in different cadres or groups was, according to the Court, a matter of policy which did not attract the applicability of the equality clause. The intergration. of non-clerical with clerical services which was effectuated by the Combined Seniority Scheme was, in the circumstances, held to be not violative of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16.\n\nAs regards the rctrospecliire operation given to the Scheme with effect from May 22, J 974, it does appear that the Board has struck a via media between two extreme contentions advanced by G officers belonging to Group I and those belonging to Groups II and III. But that was inevitable and we consider it as the best solution in the peculiar circumstances of the case. In order to rectify the imbalances and anomalies caused by the comparimentalised and groupwise seniority, it was necessary to give retrospective effect to the Combined Seniority List. Officers belonging to Group I urged that the Scheme should be brought into effect from January I, 1976, while those belonging to Groups II and III wanted the Scheme to\n\n\\l,'i', ltilANZoDE r. RBSBilVB BANK (Chandrachud, C}.) 443\n\nbe brought into effect from January I, 1970. The Central Board struck a balance by choosing the date May 22, 197 4, becaust! that was the date on which the decision in regard to combining the seniority retrospectively with effect from January I, 1970 in regard to Grade 'A' and part of Grade 'B' officers was announced. It was, again, on that date that the Bank had announced that a similar decision in regard to the remaining grade, of officers was under its considerations. Thus, at least on May 22, 1974 it was known to officers of all grades that a combined seniority list was due to be brought into force. Jf a certain section of officers succeeded in obtaining promotional benefits thereafter, the imbalance introduced thereby in the services of the Bank and the consequent dissatisfaction had to be rectified. That could only be done by not recognising the accelerated promotions obtained in the intervening period by a certain class of officers. Shri Nariman has drawn our attention to various individual cases of officers in Group I whose old seniority • has gone down by several steps in the new Scheme. As we have stated earlier, any scheme of seniority is bound to produce isolated aberrations. That cannot justify the argument that the entire\n\nScheme is for that reason violative of the guarantee of equality.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned Administration Circular, the Office Order and the Combined Seniority List are not violative of the rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nFor these reasons, the Writ Petitions are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 212, "entities": [{"text": "V.T. KHANZODE & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.T. KHANZODE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RESERVE BANK OF INDIA & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RESERVE BANK OF INDIA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 5, 1982\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND\n\nA.O. Ko!HAL, JJ.J\n\nSeniority-Draft combined seniority list fixed by the Administrative Circular No."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. 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Narasimhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8030, "end_char": 8043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the conclusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. Narasimhan, later India's Executive Director in the World Bank, was the Governor and it was after Dr. I.G. Patel, Formerly Secretary, Economic Affairs, Govt."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8051, "end_char": 8056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the conclusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. Narasimhan, later India's Executive Director in the World Bank, was the Governor and it was after Dr. I.G. Patel, Formerly Secretary, Economic Affairs, Govt."}}, {"text": "World Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8085, "end_char": 8095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the conclusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. 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["}}, {"text": "Central -Board of DireCtors of the lleserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12242, "end_char": 12290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central -Board of DireCtors of the lleserve Bank has the power to make service regulations under section 58(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12339, "end_char": 12352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13504, "end_char": 13517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13948, "end_char": 13961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14096, "end_char": 14108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14116, "end_char": 14141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14718, "end_char": 14728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reserve Bank of India Act", "statute": "Reserve Bank of India Act"}}, {"text": "Central Board of Directors", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To read into the provisions of section 58 (1) a prohibition against the issuance of such administrative directions or circulars is patently to igaore the scope of wholesome powers conferred upon the Central Board of Directors by section 7 (2) of tbe Act."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14916, "end_char": 14925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reserve Bank of India Act", "statute": "Reserve Bank of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15237, "end_char": 15246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15303, "end_char": 15319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15389, "end_char": 15399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15557, "end_char": 15566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 750", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16111, "end_char": 16127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16165, "end_char": 16181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16269, "end_char": 16278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16325, "end_char": 16343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any action taken by the Central Board of Directors under section 7 (2) is subject to the directions given by the Central Government under section 7 (1), just as any regulation framed by it under section 58 is subject to the previous sanction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16350, "end_char": 16359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16407, "end_char": 16417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16501, "end_char": 16514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In either case, the Central Board has to abide by the decision or directions of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16655, "end_char": 16664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16750, "end_char": 16760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 21, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17176, "end_char": 17192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "431 B-D)\n\nS:l. A consideration of the entire material on the subject, including the correspondence thathas transpired between the Reserve Bank and the Central Government and in particular the Memorandum of January 21, 1949, makes it clear that the Staff Regulations of 1948 were not framed in the exercise of power conferred by section 58 of the Act and that they were not made with the D previous sanction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17298, "end_char": 17308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17714, "end_char": 17724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Goverment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18038, "end_char": 18055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of January 21, 1949 contains a E\n\"factual mistake\" to the effect that the Staff Regulations (which would include the Regulations of 1948) were made with the approval of the Central Goverment, correctly clarifies the position."}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 377", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18561, "end_char": 18577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 6, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18661, "end_char": 18675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "206 of 1967 decided on August 6, 1969 (Bombay H.C.) R.M. Joshi v. The Reserve Bank of India, Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18770, "end_char": 18784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "876 of 1974 dedcided on March 19, 1980 by a Full Bench (Delhi H.C.), approved\n\n5:2."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18802, "end_char": 18807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "876 of 1974 dedcided on March 19, 1980 by a Full Bench (Delhi H.C.), approved\n\n5:2."}}, {"text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18830, "end_char": 18857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19069, "end_char": 19081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Since the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19265, "end_char": 19275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Since the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19439, "end_char": 19449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Since the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19457, "end_char": 19478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F.S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19481, "end_char": 19493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nF.S. Nariman, B.R. Agarwala and P.G. Gokha/e for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "B.R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19495, "end_char": 19508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nF.S. Nariman, B.R. Agarwala and P.G. Gokha/e for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "P.G. Gokha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19513, "end_char": 19523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nF.S. Nariman, B.R. Agarwala and P.G. Gokha/e for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19548, "end_char": 19554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, 1.N. Shroff and H.S. Parihar for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "1.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19556, "end_char": 19567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, 1.N. Shroff and H.S. Parihar for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "H.S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19572, "end_char": 19584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, 1.N. Shroff and H.S. Parihar for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19626, "end_char": 19635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~----....._ R.K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M.K.D. Namboodiry for Res pondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19637, "end_char": 19652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~----....._ R.K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M.K.D. Namboodiry for Res pondent No."}}, {"text": "M.K.D. Namboodiry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19657, "end_char": 19674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~----....._ R.K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M.K.D. Namboodiry for Res pondent No."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19717, "end_char": 19731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19741, "end_char": 19754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the intervener."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19820, "end_char": 19831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.\n\nThese are 25 petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the decision of the Reserve Bank of India as regards the introduction of common seniority.and inter-group mobility amongst different grades of officers gelonging to Group I (Section A), Group II and Group III, with retrospective eflect from May 22, 1974.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19868, "end_char": 19878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19886, "end_char": 19907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19940, "end_char": 19961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.\n\nThese are 25 petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the decision of the Reserve Bank of India as regards the introduction of common seniority.and inter-group mobility amongst different grades of officers gelonging to Group I (Section A), Group II and Group III, with retrospective eflect from May 22, 1974."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20305, "end_char": 20319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "679 dated April 27, 1978 and has been acted upon in the draft combined seniority list of officers in Grade 'B' (appointed as such prior to January 1, 1970) and in Grades 'C', 'D', 'fl' and 'F' The contention of the petitioners is that the aforesaid circular, office order and combined seniority list are violative of their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and are also ultra vires the power, jurisdiction and competence of the Reserve Bank of India, being without the authority of law and in contraven tion of the provisions of the Reserve Bank of Indfa Act, 1934."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20434, "end_char": 20449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "679 dated April 27, 1978 and has been acted upon in the draft combined seniority list of officers in Grade 'B' (appointed as such prior to January 1, 1970) and in Grades 'C', 'D', 'fl' and 'F' The contention of the petitioners is that the aforesaid circular, office order and combined seniority list are violative of their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and are also ultra vires the power, jurisdiction and competence of the Reserve Bank of India, being without the authority of law and in contraven tion of the provisions of the Reserve Bank of Indfa Act, 1934."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20643, "end_char": 20661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of Indfa Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20859, "end_char": 20890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading upon the impugned decision dated January 7, 1978, the office order dated April 27, 1978, and the draft combined seniority list are as follows : The Reserve Bank of India (Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "RESERVE BANK OF INDIA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21126, "end_char": 21157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21269, "end_char": 21279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "J.L. Nain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24703, "end_char": 24712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commitee in 1970, comprising Shri , Justice J.L. Nain, then a sitting Judge of• the Bombay High Court, Shri V. Isvaran, I.C.S. (Retd.).", "canonical_name": "J. L. Nain"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24743, "end_char": 24760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commitee in 1970, comprising Shri , Justice J.L. Nain, then a sitting Judge of• the Bombay High Court, Shri V. Isvaran, I.C.S. (Retd.)."}}, {"text": "V. Isvaran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24767, "end_char": 24777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commitee in 1970, comprising Shri , Justice J.L. Nain, then a sitting Judge of• the Bombay High Court, Shri V. Isvaran, I.C.S. (Retd.)."}}, {"text": "N.S. Ramaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24806, "end_char": 24820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Prof.' N.S. Ramaswamy, a Management Expert. ,"}}, {"text": "S. L. Jathar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30527, "end_char": 30539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the writ petition, a counter-affidavit has ceen filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Shri S. L. Jathar, Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel, Central Office, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30623, "end_char": 30629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the writ petition, a counter-affidavit has ceen filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Shri S. L. 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Thareja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34139, "end_char": 34151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Io December 1975; the Bank appointed a Departmental Committee under Shri C.L. Thareja, the then Chief Manager of the Bank, to work out the modalities of integration of the group-wise seniority lists of officers in the higher grades which had not yet been integrated.", "canonical_name": "c. L.\n\nThareja"}}, {"text": "May, 22 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34797, "end_char": 34809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Committee of the Central Boaril of the Bank decided to appoint May, 22 1974 as the date for integration as a via media and also because, it was on that date that the Bank had announced to its officers its decision on combined seniority, mobility and interchangeability."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35724, "end_char": 35737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, by an order dated July 24, 1978, respondents 3 and 4 were allowed to join in the petition on their own application."}}, {"text": "M.P. Saxena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35842, "end_char": 35853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3, Shri\n\nM.P. Saxena, was then the Deputy Chief Officer, Department of Banking Operations and Development, New Delhi, while respondent 4, Shri S. Acharya, was Deputy Chief Officer, Agricultural Credit Department, Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35940, "end_char": 35949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3, Shri\n\nM.P. Saxena, was then the Deputy Chief Officer, Department of Banking Operations and Development, New Delhi, while respondent 4, Shri S. Acharya, was Deputy Chief Officer, Agricultural Credit Department, Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "S. Acharya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35976, "end_char": 35986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 3, Shri\n\nM.P. Saxena, was then the Deputy Chief Officer, Department of Banking Operations and Development, New Delhi, while respondent 4, Shri S. Acharya, was Deputy Chief Officer, Agricultural Credit Department, Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36809, "end_char": 36819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39302, "end_char": 39312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39869, "end_char": 39887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39984, "end_char": 39994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40002, "end_char": 40033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40209, "end_char": 40219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "section 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40520, "end_char": 40533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40541, "end_char": 40572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40869, "end_char": 40879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41372, "end_char": 41382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41449, "end_char": 41459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41769, "end_char": 41779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "after it is made by the Central Board, be forwarded to the Central Government which, in turn, shall cause a copy of the same 'to be laid before each House of Parliament."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT R~PORTS [1982] 3 s.C.k", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41798, "end_char": 41834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PORTS [1982] 3 s.C.k."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42114, "end_char": 42124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42836, "end_char": 42855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We endorse the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Reserve Bank Employees Association v. Union of lndia(') that section 58 (2) (j) refers to staff funds and superannuation fun9s and that it cannot comprise service conditions."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42920, "end_char": 42930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43077, "end_char": 43087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43616, "end_char": 43626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43629, "end_char": 43639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45702, "end_char": 45712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45735, "end_char": 45742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nariman pleads for such a power but his purpose in doing so is to urge that section 58 (7) is the sole repository of the power of the Central Board to provide for the conditions of service of the Bank's staff."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45811, "end_char": 45821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46299, "end_char": 46309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48303, "end_char": 48313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48370, "end_char": 48380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49020, "end_char": 49030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49163, "end_char": 49171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement of law in Halsbury puts emphasis on the limitation on powers of statutory corporations in the light of the provisions of statutes under which they are constituted; From that point of.view, the provisions of section 7 (2) of the Act are important."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49360, "end_char": 49369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49990, "end_char": 50000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50188, "end_char": 50197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50859, "end_char": 50865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The concurring judgment of Mathew, J. also contains observations to the same effect (see pages 628, 630 and 659 of the Report)."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51012, "end_char": 51020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This enunciation of law is to the same effect as in Halsbury and our answer is the same."}}, {"text": "Central Board of Directors", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51142, "end_char": 51168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "circular governing the staff's conditions of service, the Central Board of Directors has neither violated any statutory injunction nor indeed has it exercised a power which is\n\n(I) [197S] 3 S.C.R 619."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51415, "end_char": 51424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51481, "end_char": 51491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51649, "end_char": 51658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51757, "end_char": 51771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Khasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51801, "end_char": 51813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In T. Cojee v. U.\n\nJormanik Siem,(') a District Council was constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, for the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51864, "end_char": 51869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In T. Cojee v. U.\n\nJormanik Siem,(') a District Council was constituted under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, for the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District in the Tribal Areas of Assam."}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51889, "end_char": 51903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52330, "end_char": 52344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52392, "end_char": 52399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delivering the leading judgment of the Bench, Wanchoo, J., said that where executive power impinges upon the rights of citizens, it will have to be backed by an appropriate law; but where executive power is concerned only with the personnel of the adminis'tration, it is not necessary that there must be laws, rules or regulations governing the appointment of those who could carry on the administration under the control of the District Council."}}, {"text": "art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53481, "end_char": 53489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53742, "end_char": 53750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54573, "end_char": 54585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54652, "end_char": 54664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54708, "end_char": 54718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54956, "end_char": 54965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55050, "end_char": 55060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55499, "end_char": 55509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govermeot", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55909, "end_char": 55926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having considered the entire material on this subject including the correspondence that has transpired between the Reserve Bank and the Central Govermeot, we find it difficult to take the view that the Staff Regulations of 1948 were framed in the exercise of power conferred by section 58."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56051, "end_char": 56061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56120, "end_char": 56130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56438, "end_char": 56448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56795, "end_char": 56805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provident Fund Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56912, "end_char": 56938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57121, "end_char": 57131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Fund Regulations", "statute": "Provident Fund Regulations"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57340, "end_char": 57387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57447, "end_char": 57457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1949", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1949"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57465, "end_char": 57496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57538, "end_char": 57585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57591, "end_char": 57633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By way of illustration, we may cite the preamble of the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1949, which runs thus:\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred hy section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934) and iri supersession of the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1935, the Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, is pleased to make the following Regulations ... \"\n\nIt is significant that such a recital is conspicuously absent in the Regulations of 1948."}}, {"text": "Shamrao Laxman Jathar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57970, "end_char": 57991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That renders it safe and reasonable to accept the statement contained in the counter affida¥it filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Shri Shamrao Laxman Jathar Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel to the effect that the Staff Regulations of 1948 are not statutory in character, not having been made under section 58 of the Act of 1934."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58165, "end_char": 58175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1935", "statute": "the Reserve Bank of India General Regulations, 1935"}}, {"text": "July 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58226, "end_char": 58239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rejoinder affidavit dated July 16, 1979 filed on behalf of the petitioners by Shri Jamnadas Gupta reiterates the contention that the Regulations of 1948 were framed under section 58 (I) with the sanction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Shri Jamnadas Gupta reiterates the contention that the Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58278, "end_char": 58344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58371, "end_char": 58381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shri Jamnadas Gupta reiterates the contention that the Regulations", "statute": "Shri Jamnadas Gupta reiterates the contention that the Regulations"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58809, "end_char": 58842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59342, "end_char": 59352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reserve Bank of India Regulations", "statute": "Reserve Bank of India Regulations"}}, {"text": "C. D. Deshmukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59488, "end_char": 59502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Shri C. D. Deshmukh, a distinguished Economist and Civilian, was perhaps justified in assuming from the correspondence that the Central Government bas no objection'to the proposed regulations, wbfoh explains his statement, that they were made with t: e \"approval\" of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Sbri Pradeep Madhav Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60098, "end_char": 60123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The supplementary affidavit dated March, 1980 which was filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank by Sbri Pradeep Madhav Joshi, Deputy Manager in the Department of Administration and Personnel, has dealt fully with the correspondence on the subject of previous sanction of the Central Government to the Regulations of 1948."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Bombay,(') Calcutta and Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60872, "end_char": 60916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courts of Bombay,(') Calcutta and Delhi(') have all taken the view that the Staff Regulations of 1948 are not statutory, not having been 'framed under section 58 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61028, "end_char": 61038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61095, "end_char": 61122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61338, "end_char": 61347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Since the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "Bombay H.C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61593, "end_char": 61605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay H.C.J\n\n(2) Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "March 19, 198Q", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61691, "end_char": 61705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "876 of 1974 (R.M. Joshi v. The Reserve Bank oj India) decided on March 19, 198Q by a Full J!ench (Delhi H.C.)\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nnot impinge upon any Regulations made under section 58 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61799, "end_char": 61809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the Staff Regulations", "statute": "Since the Staff Regulations"}}, {"text": "January I, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63015, "end_char": 63030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) The Circular covers all officers in Group I (Section A) and Groups II aud III who were appointed to Grade 'B' prior to January I, 1970 as well as officers in the higher grades 'C', 'D', 'E' and 'F'."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63319, "end_char": 63334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) All promotions to Grade 'C' and above which were made on a provisional basis after January 1, 1976 are to be reviewed individually in order to ascertain as to which of the officers may be allowed to continue in the higher grade on the basis of their seniority and suitability."}}, {"text": "V.T. KHANZODE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63585, "end_char": 63598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequential adjustments 11re to be made in a phased and\n•.\n' -\n\nV.T. KHANZODE V. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 435\n\ngradual manner in order to ensure that the opera A tional efficiency of the various departments and the Bank's requirements of a specialised staff of officers are not adversely affected.", "canonical_name": "V.T. KHANZODE & ORS"}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63616, "end_char": 63627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequential adjustments 11re to be made in a phased and\n•.\n' -\n\nV.T. KHANZODE V. RESERVE BANK (Chandrachud, C.J.) 435\n\ngradual manner in order to ensure that the opera A tional efficiency of the various departments and the Bank's requirements of a specialised staff of officers are not adversely affected.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Services Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65168, "end_char": 65204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selec\n\nlions for this purpose are to be made by the Reserve Bank of India Services Board."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65773, "end_char": 65785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bank announced by it that the tentative Combined Seniority List of officers in Grade 'B' (appointed prior to January I, 1970) and Grades 'C', 'D', 'E' and 'F' would be available for inspection upto May 12, 1978."}}, {"text": "June l 0, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66122, "end_char": 66136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These writ petitions 'were filed by the petitioners on June l 0, 1978 in order to challenge the Administration Circular, the Office Order and the Combined Seniority List referred to above."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66443, "end_char": 66461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67499, "end_char": 67530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April l, ! 951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69012, "end_char": 69026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April l, !"}}, {"text": "April l, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69469, "end_char": 69482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Staff attached to the Agricultural Credit Department was reconstituted into a new Group, namely, Group IV with effect from April l, 1955 ."}}, {"text": "Industrial Finance Department", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 69490, "end_char": 69519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Finance Department and the Dep4rtment of Non ..\n\nBanking Companies were added to Group II ."}}, {"text": "Industrial Department Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 69683, "end_char": 69718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Group V was created for the staff of the Industrial Department Bank of India with effect from April 1,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "April 1,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69736, "end_char": 69750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Group V was created for the staff of the Industrial Department Bank of India with effect from April 1,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "Management of the Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73387, "end_char": 73409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Management of the Bank took several steps from time to time to correct the promotional imbalances but these steps did not touch even the fringe of the problem, especially since, the adhoc schemes and proposals were mainly."}}, {"text": "J. L. Nain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74316, "end_char": 74326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee, under the\n\nChairmanship of Shri J. L. Nain, a sitting Judge of the Bombay High Court, submitted its report in October 1972.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Nain"}}, {"text": "c. L.\n\nThareja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 77120, "end_char": 77134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bank appointed a Committee comprising Shri c. L.\n\nThareja; the then Chief.", "canonical_name": "c. L.\n\nThareja"}}, {"text": "K: Madhava\n\nDas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 77179, "end_char": 77194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manager, as Chairman, Shri K: Madhava\n\nDas,· Chief 'office~,· Agricultural Credit Departent, Shri 'P. N.\n\nKhamia, Chief Officer, Department of Banking."}}, {"text": "P. N.\n\nKhamia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 77251, "end_char": 77264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manager, as Chairman, Shri K: Madhava\n\nDas,· Chief 'office~,· Agricultural Credit Departent, Shri 'P. N.\n\nKhamia, Chief Officer, Department of Banking."}}, {"text": "T. ri. Katara", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 77341, "end_char": 77354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Operations and Development, and Shri T. ri."}}, {"text": "Thareja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78008, "end_char": 78015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas Shri Thareja and Shri Katara, both Group I officers, recommended that - the scheme be given retrospective effect from January 1, 1976, the·\n\n.. ,,\n\nv.r."}}, {"text": "Katara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78025, "end_char": 78031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas Shri Thareja and Shri Katara, both Group I officers, recommended that - the scheme be given retrospective effect from January 1, 1976, the·\n\n.. ,,\n\nv.r."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81922, "end_char": 81940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82152, "end_char": 82162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82167, "end_char": 82177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82620, "end_char": 82638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 22, J 974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82718, "end_char": 82731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the rctrospecliire operation given to the Scheme with effect from May 22, J 974, it does appear that the Board has struck a via media between two extreme contentions advanced by G officers belonging to Group I and those belonging to Groups II and III."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84931, "end_char": 84949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_43_46_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "\"-· '\n\nSMT. ANAND KAUR\n\nPRITAM LAL\n\nJanuary 14, 1.982\n\n[A.D. KO!HAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JI.]\n\n43 A\n\nDelhi R.nt Control Act-Section 14(1). proviso (a) read with provllO to C 114ction 14(2)-rcope of.\n\nWhen a tenant has either paid DOI'. tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverabl~ from him within two months of the date on which the notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord proviso (a) to section 14(1) empowers the Controller to make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises. The proviso to section 14(2) states that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under the sub-section if having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for thrie consecutive months.\n\nOn 14th December, 1973. the land-lady-appellant issued a notice to the tenant stating that be had not paid the damages after May 11973 and called upon him to pay the arrears within two months from the date of notice. The tenant E remitted the rent to the land-ldy by money-.order towards the end of February 1974 .but she refused to accept the same.\n\n_On the landlady's application the Controller, and the Tribunal in appeal, held that the notice was valid and that the expression Hdamages for the use and occupation\" meant nothing more nor less than rent. But the High Court on appeal held that the term \"rent\" tlnd \"damages for use and occupation\" could not be taken to be synonymous ters and that the notice issued by Ehe land-lady did not satisfy the requirements of clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act in that it did not demand rent from the tenant.\n\nAllowing the appeal and remitting the case to the Court below\n\nHELD : The notice issued by the land-lady satisfies the requirements of G clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1). [46 DJ\n\nThe High Court has taken an unnecessarily hypertechnical view of the con ten ts of the notice which speeificldly stated that on account of the termination of the tenancy by an earlier notice the tenant had become a statutory tenant and it was in this context that a claim was made for damages for use and occupation at a rate equivalent to the agreed rent.\n\nThe demand so ma~• ~OQld qot b~ i; oostrued as anything but a demaq<! fQr rent, [ 46 B.C]\n\nB.·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.a.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 966 of 1976.\n\n(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th February, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.148 of 1975)\n\nVlnoo Bhagat for the Appellant,\n\nG. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short point arising for determination in this appeal concerns the validity of a notice served by the landladyappellant on the tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we may at the very outset reproduce the. relevant provisions of that section :\n\n\"14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the. landlord against a tenant :\n\nProvided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the foUowing grounds only, namely:\n\n(a) that the tenant has neiiher paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;\n\n14(2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall b~ made on the rouncj specified in clause\n\nAi-IAND KAtlR v. Pkl'i'AM LAL (Koshal, J,)\n\n(a) of the proviso to sub-section (I), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 15 :\n\nProvided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit _once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.\"\n\n2. The tenant respondent has remained absent and unrepresented at the hearing and we have had the advantage of being addressed by Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant only.\n\n3. It was not disputed before the High Court that in an earlier pr<Jceeding the tenant had taken advantage of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that he committed another default in the payment of rent which covered the period from 1.6.1973 to 30.11.1973 and that it was then that a notice dated 14.12.1973 was served on him. The notice stated:\n\n\"Your contractual tenancy in respect of House No.\n\nA-54 (double-storey) Kalkaji, New Delhi-19 had already been terminated whereafter you are a statutory tenant liable o pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 1!5/- (Rupees fifteen per month) to me. That you have not paid the said damages after May, 1973. In case you do nllt clear the arrears upto date within two months from the date of this notice, I shall be compelled to issue instruct1ions to my legal adviser to file an application for your eviction . , ... \"\n\nNo attempt to pay the rent was made inspite of the notice till the end. of February, 1974.\n\nAlthough thereafter rent was remitted to the landlady through money orders but she refused to accept the 11ame and made an application to the Controller for eviction of the tenant on the sole ground of a second default in the payment of rent. Both the Controller and the Tribunal in the appeal held that the notice was a valid one and that the expression \"damages for use and occupation\" contained therein meant nothing more or less than rent. In a second appeal, a learned Single Judge differed from the Courts below and was of the opinion that the word 'rent' and the said expression could not be taken to be\n\n4/i $tlPll!NS COUkT kBPokTS (1982] 3 s.e.11.\n\nA. synonymous and that there was no demand of rent in the notice in question which did not, therefore, satisfy the requiremepts of the provisions contained in clause (a) above extracted. It is the judgment of the learned Single Judge which is assailed in the present appeal .\n\n. B\n\nAfter. hearing Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has taken an unnecessarily hypertechnical view of the contents of the notice. It is significant that the notice specifically stated that on account of the termination of the tenancy by an earlier notice the tenant had become what is popularly known as a statutory tenant and it was in this context that a claim was made for damages .for\n\nuse and occupation at a rate equivalent to the agreed rent. We are of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case the demand so made could not be construed as anything but a demand for rent.\n\nConsequently the notice mut be held to satisfy the requirements of clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the Act.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, w~ accept the appeaJ, set aside the impugned judgmeat and restore the orders of the Controller and the Tribunal. The case is remitted for further proceedings to the Controller who shall dispose of it within three months from the receipt of records from. this Court. No costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "ANAND KAUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANAND KAUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRITAM LAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRITAM LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 14, 1.982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANAND KAUR\n\nPRITAM LAL\n\nJanuary 14, 1.982\n\n[A.D. KO!HAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JI.]"}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th December, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 836, "end_char": 855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14th December, 1973."}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1633, "end_char": 1646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1873, "end_char": 1886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2389, "end_char": 2417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Vlnoo Bhagat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th February, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.148 of 1975)\n\nVlnoo Bhagat for the Appellant,\n\nG. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short point arising for determination in this appeal concerns the validity of a notice served by the landladyappellant on the tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we may at the very outset reproduce the.", "canonical_name": "Vlnoo Bhagat"}}, {"text": "G. D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th February, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.148 of 1975)\n\nVlnoo Bhagat for the Appellant,\n\nG. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short point arising for determination in this appeal concerns the validity of a notice served by the landladyappellant on the tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we may at the very outset reproduce the."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th February, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.148 of 1975)\n\nVlnoo Bhagat for the Appellant,\n\nG. D. Gupta for the Respondent (Not Present)\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. The short point arising for determination in this appeal concerns the validity of a notice served by the landladyappellant on the tenant-respondent and purporting to be one issued in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act), and we may at the very outset reproduce the.", "canonical_name": "KosHAL"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4033, "end_char": 4039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "landlord against a tenant :\n\nProvided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the foUowing grounds only, namely:\n\n(a) that the tenant has neiiher paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;\n\n14(2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall b~ made on the rouncj specified in clause\n\nAi-IAND KAtlR v. Pkl'i'AM LAL (Koshal, J,)\n\n(a) of the proviso to sub-section (I), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 15 :\n\nProvided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit _once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.\"", "canonical_name": "KosHAL"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4139, "end_char": 4149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Vinoo Bhagat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant respondent has remained absent and unrepresented at the hearing and we have had the advantage of being addressed by Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant only.", "canonical_name": "Vlnoo Bhagat"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "1.6.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed before the High Court that in an earlier pr<Jceeding the tenant had taken advantage of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that he committed another default in the payment of rent which covered the period from 1.6.1973 to 30.11.1973 and that it was then that a notice dated 14.12.1973 was served on him."}}, {"text": "30.11.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4866, "end_char": 4876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed before the High Court that in an earlier pr<Jceeding the tenant had taken advantage of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that he committed another default in the payment of rent which covered the period from 1.6.1973 to 30.11.1973 and that it was then that a notice dated 14.12.1973 was served on him."}}, {"text": "14.12.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4918, "end_char": 4928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed before the High Court that in an earlier pr<Jceeding the tenant had taken advantage of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, that he committed another default in the payment of rent which covered the period from 1.6.1973 to 30.11.1973 and that it was then that a notice dated 14.12.1973 was served on him."}}, {"text": "New Delhi-19", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-54 (double-storey) Kalkaji, New Delhi-19 had already been terminated whereafter you are a statutory tenant liable o pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_444_452_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 444 .\n\nDR B.L. ASA WA\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.\n\nMarch 5, 1982\n\n[A.O. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nEducational qualificationS-Postgraduate qualification in medicine granted by a University established under a statutt-Qua/ification recognised by the Medical Council-Recognition or declaration of equivalence by every University in the country-Whether necessary. ·\n\nThe qualificationS prescribed for the post of lecturer in Forensic Medicine • under the Rajas than Medical Service were (i) , a basic university degree. or equivalent qualification entered in the schedules to the Ir.dian Medical Council Act 1956; (ii) Registration under tbe State Central Medical Registration Act;\n\n(iii) Post-Graduate qualification in the concerned subject\" and '(iv) two years experience of medico.legal work.\n\nThe appellant was the bolder of a !M.B.B.S. degree from the Rajastban University which was a _qualification ._entered the first schedule to the Indian\n\nMedical Council Act. He was regist'ered under the Medical Registration Act.\n\nHe possessed a postgraciuate degree in Forensic Medicine from .the UniversitY of Bibar.\n\nThe respondent's application for thC post of lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected by the State Public Service Commission on the ground that the post .. graduate degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by him was not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and that the degree which he possessed had also nOt been recognised by the University of Rajasthan.\n\nA single Judge of the High Court allowed the appeUant's writ petition impugning the order of the State Public ServiCe Commission.j\n\nOn appeal by the State a Division Bench of the High Court held 0.tbat the post-graduate degree in Forensic Medicine which !.the appellant possessed could not be treated as a valid qualification for recruitment to the post of lecturer because, firstly, it was not a degree .from the university of Rajasthan and secondly, neither had the Uoiveristy of Rajastban recognised it nor bad the University declared it as a qualification equivalent to the post-Sraduate degree in Forensic Medicine.\n\n• Allowing the appeal,\n\n' -\n\nii.L. ASAWA v. RAiA5rl!AN (81/akrishna Eradi, J.) 445\n\nHELD : I. A posi-graouate medical degree granted by a university duly established by statute in this country and which bad been recognised by tho Indian Medical Council by inclusion in the schedule of the . Medical Council Act bas ipso facto to be regarded, accepted and treated as valid throughout the country. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, sJJch a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other universities in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification (or appointment in a-ny post in a State. [ 450 F-G I\n\nIn the instant case the University of Bihar was duly established by statute.\n\nIt is fully competent to lconduct examination and award degrees_ the degree of DoctOr of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) of the University of Bihar is included in '°' the schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 as a degree recognised by the Medical Indian Council, the peramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise m\n\n1edical qualifications granted by any university or medical institution in India. [450 D-E]\n\n2. There can be declaration of equivalence only as between a degree etc. awarded by the concerned university and a qualification obtained from a body different from the concerned university. When tlie University of Rajasthan does not conduct any examination for the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) there cannot be any question of declaration of 'equivalence• in respect of such a degree awarded by any university. [451 B-C]\n\n3. In the case of a postgraduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University no recognition or declaration of equiValence by any other university is called for. This is all the more so in the case of a medica1 degree awarded bf a statutory Indian University and which has been speciically recognised by the Indian Medical Council. [451 D-E)\n\n~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICfION: Civil Appeal No. 303 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated th• 30th October, 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court in Q.B. Civil\n\nSpecial Appeal No. 247 of 1974.\n\nY.S. Chi/ale, Mrs. Sadha11a Ramachandran & Parveen Kumar for the Appellant. ·\n\nBadri Das Sharma for the Respondents Nos. I & 2.\n\n. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALA.KRISHNA BRAD!, J. This appeal by special leave afises out of a writ petition filed by the appellant herein in the High Court ofRajasthan, challenging the legality of the action of the.Rajasthan Public Service Commission in issuing of the appellant the Communication_._Annexure IV-:dat~ July 21, 1973, statin& that the\n\n446 SUPREME coulit REPORTS [!981j 3 s.C.I<\n\nappellant was not eligible for being considered for recruitment to the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine in the Government Medical Colleges in the state since he lacked the necessary academic qualifications specified in the advertisement and that consequently, the application of the appellant stood rejected.\n\nThere were also . other incidental prayers in the writ petition for the issuance of an appropriate writ or direction to the Public Service Commission to refrain from finalising the selection without considering the case of ,_. the appellant, and for a direction being issued to the State Government of Rajathan not to accept the recommendations of the Public Service Commission in making appointments to the post of Lecturer\n\n,,,. ,.,--A..._ in Forensic Medicine to Medical Colleges in Rajasthan in case the appellant was not called for interview along with the other\n\ncandidates.\n\nA learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ petition holding that the Public Service Commission had acted illegally in treating the appellant as not possessing the requisite academic qualifications and in rejecting his candidature for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine on the said ground. The State of Rajasthan and the Rajasthan Public Service Commission carried the matter in appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nThat appeal was allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated October 30, 1974, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.\n\nAggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has pre- . ferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nThe appellant secured the M.B.B.S. Degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1954 and after undergoing housemanship for one year, he was substantively appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Rajasthan State Medical Service with effect from May 26, 1956. In 1962, the Rajasthan Medical Service was bifurcated into two branches, namely, (I) The Rajasthan Medical Service and (2) The Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch). Separate service rules known as the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called the Rules) were framed for the Collegiate branch and all appointments of teaching staff in the Government Medical Calleges in Rajas(han were thereafter governed by the said Rules. Under the provisions of the Rules, the post of Lecturer is to be filled up only by direct recruitment.\n\nIt is laid down in Chapter IV of the Rules which prescribes the procedure or direct recruitment that the. appointments are to be\n\n• B.L. ASAWA v. RAJASTHAN (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 447\n\nmade on the basis of selection by the State Public Service Commission. Rule 12 lays down that \"the candidate for direct recruitment to the post specified in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule shall possess such academic and technical qualifications and experience as is laid down, from time to time, by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges\". The post of Lecturers is included in Part C of the schedule to the Rules. Hence, for ascertaining the qualifications required for the post of Lecturer under the Rules one has to refer to the Rules relating to technical qualifications and experience laid down by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges. ·\n\nClause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 occurring in Chapter XX of the Handbook of the University of Rajasthan, Part II, Vol. I, is the relevant provision wherein the University of Rajasthan has prescribed the academic and technical qualifications and experience required for r.ligibility for appointment as teachers in Medical Colleges.\n\nThat clause is in the following terms :\n\n\"!. All teachers must possess a basic University or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act 1956, except in the non-clinical departments of Antomy, Physiology, Biochemistry, Pharmacology, Microbiology where non-medical teachers, to the extent of 30% of the total posts of the department may be appointed to posts other than that of the Director or Head of the Department, who must necessarily hold a recognised medical qualification.\n\n2. Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act and non-medical persons must be recognised as teachers with the University before appointments are made permanent.\n\nAll the teachers in Medical Colleges except Registrars and Demonstrators must possess the requisite post- G graduate qualification in tl\\eir respective subjects.\n\n4. 50% of the time spent in recognised research under the Indian Council of Medical Research or a University or a Medical College, after obtaining the requisite Pot-gradu ate qualification be counted towards teaching experience for the post of Lecturer in the s11me or in !lllid subject\n\nff.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [I 9821 3 s.c.tt.\n\nprovided that 50% of the. teaching experience fhall be the regular teaching experience.\n\n 5. Equivalent qualification referred to above and in the recommendations below shall be determined by the University of Rajasthan.\n\n6. In case of specialities under Medicine and Surgery the qualifications and experience s~ ould also be as scheduled below but in case the post has been advertised and . suitable candidates are not available the qualifications can be reladed.\"\n\nThis is followed by a tabular statement headed 'Requirements of Special Academic Qualifications and Teaching Experience'. Column 1 of this table deals with the posts, Column 2 lays down the academic qualifications and Column 3 is about Teaching Experience. The table has a number of sub-headings according to the various specialities. The speciality of Forensic Medicine is given at page 168 of the Handbook (1971 Edition). The relevant provision regarding \"Lecturer in Forensic Medicine\" is as follows:\n\n\"(d) Assistant\n\nProfessor/ Lecturer\n\nM.D. (Path.), M.D. (Forensic Medicine), Speciality Board of Pathology (USA),\n\nM.D./M.R.C.P./ F.R.C.P. (with Diploma D.F.M.), . M.R.C.P. (with Forensic Medicine as Special Subject) or equivalent qualification or Post-graduate\n\nTwo years of Medico- Legal work,\n\ndegree or equivalent qualification in.\n\nMedicine or Surgery.''\n\nOn March 3, 1972, the Rajastban Public Service Commission (for short, the commission) issued a1lvertisements invitins appli-\n\n'-·\"-- •\n\n' )\n\n11.t. ASAWA v. RAJASTHAN (Ba/akrishna Eradi, J.) 44~\n\ncations for the recruitment of two Lecturers in : Forensic Medicine for Medical Colleges, Medical & Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules.\n\nThe appellant had, by then, obtained the M.D. Degree in Forensic Medicine from the University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur in 1970 and had been functioning as Lecturer in Forensic Medicine in one of the Government Medical Colleges in Rajasthan on a temporary and ad hoc basis fro(n December 31, 1970 on wards. \"\n\nIn response to the aforesaid advertisement published by the Commission, the appellant applied for appointment to one of the two posts.\n\nHowever, by the impugned letter (Annexure IV) dated July 21, 1973, issued by the Secretary of the Commission, the appellant was informed that his application for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected since he did not possess the necessary academic qualification. A representation made by the appellant to tbe Public Service Commission for reconsideration of the matter did not meet with any favourable response and hence the appellant approached the High Court by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution out of which this appeal has arisen. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Commission conducted the interview of the remaining candidates and selected respondents Nos. 3 and 4 for appointment to the two posts and on the basis of the said selection the State Government appointed respondents 3 and 4 as lecturers. The appellant thereupon amended the writ petition by incorporating a further prayer that the High Court should issue an appropriate writ or direction cancelling the interview and selection conducted by the Commission as well as the consequential appointments given by the State Government to respondents 3 and 4 as Lecturers in Forensic Medicine.\n\nThe short point to be considered is whether the Commission was right in law in excluding the appellant from consideration on the ground that he did not possess the academic qualification prescribed by clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine.\n\nThe qualifications prescribed for the said post by clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 are :\n\n(!) A basic University (Degree?) or equivalent qualification entered in Sc!idµles to the Indian Medical Council Act, !95().\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\nI 1982] 2 8.C.R.\n\n(2) Registration under the State/Central Medical Registration Act.\n\n(3) Post-graduate qualification in the concerned subject.\n\n(4) Two Years' experience of Medico-legal work.\n\nThe appellant is admittedly the holder of the basic Degree of M.B.B.S.Jrom the N.ajasthan University, which is a qualification entered in the First Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act. It is also not in dispute that he is duly registered under the Medical Registration Act. The sole ground on which the aapellant was treated by the Commission as ineligible for consideration was that the Post-graduate' degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by the appellant is not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and the.said Degree has also not been recognised by the University of Rajasthan as an equivalent qualification.\n\nThe University of Bihar at Muzaffarpur is one duly established by statute and it is fully competent to conduct examinations and award degrees.\n\nThe Degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine)-M.D. (Forensic Medicine)-of the University of Bihar is included in the Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 as a degree fully recognised by the Indian Medical Council which is the paramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise the medical qualifications granted by any University or Medical Institution in India. A Post-graduate Medical Degree granted by a University duly established by statute in this country and which has also been recognised by the Indian Medical Council by inclusion to the Schedule of the Medical Council Act has ipso facto to be regarded, acepted and treated as valid throughout our country. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other Universities in any State in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in such a State. The Division Bench of the High Court was, in our opinion, manifestly in error in thinking that since the Post-graduate degree possessed by the appellant was not one obtained from the University of Rajasthan, it could not be treated as a valid qualication for the purpose of recruitment in question in the absence of any specific order by the University of Rajasthan recognising the said degree or declaring it as an equivalent qualification. It is\n\nommon ground before us that the University of Rajasthan d9es not\n\n' {\n\nil.i.. ASAWA v. ilAJASTHAN (Baiakrishna Eradi, J.) 451\n\nconduct Post-graduate examinations in the subject of Forensic Medicine and it does not award the degree of M.L. (Forensic Medicine). In order that there should be scope for declaration o.f 'equivalence' of a qualification obtained from another body, there should be a corresponding qualification that can be earned by viriue of passing an examination or test conducted by the concerned,\"University. There can be declaration of equivalence only as between a degree etc. awarded by the concerned University and one obtained from a body different from the concerned Universily.\n\nWhen the _..., - - ., University of Rajasthan does not conduct any examination for the award of the degree of M.L. (Forensic Medicine), there cannot be any question of declaration of 'equivalence' in respect of s.ucb a degree awarded by any University.\n\nUnfortunately, the tate Public Service Commission as well as the Division Bench of the .High Court failed lo notice this crucial aspect. We may also point out that the declaration of 'equivalence' referred to in Section 23A of the Rajasthan University Act as well as in clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances can only be in respect of qualifications other than basic or Post-graduate degrees awarded by other statutory Indian Universities in the concerned subjects. In the case of a Post-graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University, no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other University is called for.\n\nThis is all the more so in the case of a medical degree-basic as well as Post-graduate-that is awarded by a statutory Indian University and which has been specifically recognised by the Indian Medical Council.\n\n,-'-\n\nThough a contention was taken by the respondents in the High Court as well as before us that the appellant did not also satisfy the requirement regarding \"two years of Medico-legal work\", we do not find any force in the said plea. The certificates from the Principal and Heaas of Departmenfs of Forensic Medicine in the concerned Medical Colleges produced by the appellant in the High Court as annexures in his affidavit dated July 27, 1973 which are at pages 31 and 33 of the printed Paper Book, establish beyond doubt that the appellant had put in more than two years of Medicolegal work in Dr. S. N. Medical College and in the Dharbhanga Medical College, prior to the last date fixed by the Commission for receipt of the applications.\n\nThe conclusion that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the appellant was fully qualified for being considered for\n\nSUPltBME robitr it~Poi\\TS (!982] 3 s.c.k ..\n\nappointment to the two posts of Lecturer.s in Forensic Medicine advertised by the Commission on November 16, 1972, and that the Commission acted illegally in treating the appellant as not being possessed of the requisite academic qualification and excluding him from consideration on the said ground.\n\nAccordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge, subject to the moditlcaiion that in carrying out the directions contaiued in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Commission should treat the appellant as a fully qualified candidate in the light of the finding recorded by us that at the relevant time the appellant possessed not merely the prescribed academic qualification but also the requisite experience of two years' Medico-legal work.\n\nThe appellant will get his costs throughout from respondents I and 2 in equal shares.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "WA\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 5, 1982\n\n[A.O. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.O. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Medical Council Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Registration under tbe State Central Medical Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1030, "end_char": 1046, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "University of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1377, "end_char": 1400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's application for thC post of lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected by the State Public Service Commission on the ground that the post .. graduate degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by him was not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and that the degree which he possessed had also nOt been recognised by the University of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Uoiveristy of Rajastban", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".the appellant possessed could not be treated as a valid qualification for recruitment to the post of lecturer because, firstly, it was not a degree .from the university of Rajasthan and secondly, neither had the Uoiveristy of Rajastban recognised it nor bad the University declared it as a qualification equivalent to the post-Sraduate degree in Forensic Medicine."}}, {"text": "Medical Council Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2415, "end_char": 2434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2664, "end_char": 2669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, sJJch a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other universities in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification (or appointment in a-ny post in a State. ["}}, {"text": "University of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2799, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "450 F-G I\n\nIn the instant case the University of Bihar was duly established by statute."}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3037, "end_char": 3069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Medical Indian Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is fully competent to lconduct examination and award degrees_ the degree of DoctOr of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) of the University of Bihar is included in '°' the schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 as a degree recognised by the Medical Indian Council, the peramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise m\n\n1edical qualifications granted by any university or medical institution in India. ["}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is all the more so in the case of a medica1 degree awarded bf a statutory Indian University and which has been speciically recognised by the Indian Medical Council. ["}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chi/ale, Mrs. Sadha11a Ramachandran & Parveen Kumar for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "Sadha11a Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chi/ale, Mrs. Sadha11a Ramachandran & Parveen Kumar for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "Parveen Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chi/ale, Mrs. Sadha11a Ramachandran & Parveen Kumar for the Appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "Badri Das Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4423, "end_char": 4439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Das Sharma for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "BALA.KRISHNA BRAD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4519, "end_char": 4536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALA.KRISHNA BRAD!,", "canonical_name": "BALA.KRISHNA BRAD"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajasthan Public Service Commission in issuing of the appellant the Communication."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".,--A..._ in Forensic Medicine to Medical Colleges in Rajasthan in case the appellant was not called for interview along with the other\n\ncandidates."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Rajasthan and the Rajasthan Public Service Commission carried the matter in appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court."}}, {"text": "30, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6309, "end_char": 6317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That appeal was allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated October 30, 1974, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State Medical Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant secured the M.B.B.S. Degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1954 and after undergoing housemanship for one year, he was substantively appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Rajasthan State Medical Service with effect from May 26, 1956."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant secured the M.B.B.S. Degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1954 and after undergoing housemanship for one year, he was substantively appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Rajasthan State Medical Service with effect from May 26, 1956."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Medical Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6852, "end_char": 6877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, the Rajasthan Medical Service was bifurcated into two branches, namely, (I) The Rajasthan Medical Service and (2) The Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch)."}}, {"text": "Rajas(han", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Separate service rules known as the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called the Rules) were framed for the Collegiate branch and all appointments of teaching staff in the Government Medical Calleges in Rajas(han were thereafter governed by the said Rules."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7568, "end_char": 7585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointments are to be\n\n• B.L. ASAWA v. RAJASTHAN (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 447\n\nmade on the basis of selection by the State Public Service Commission.", "canonical_name": "BALA.KRISHNA BRAD"}}, {"text": "State Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointments are to be\n\n• B.L. ASAWA v. RAJASTHAN (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 447\n\nmade on the basis of selection by the State Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 12 lays down that \"the candidate for direct recruitment to the post specified in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule shall possess such academic and technical qualifications and experience as is laid down, from time to time, by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges\"."}}, {"text": "Lecturer under the Rules one has to refer to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8109, "end_char": 8163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9152, "end_char": 9231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Medical Research", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50% of the time spent in recognised research under the Indian Council of Medical Research or a University or a Medical College, after obtaining the requisite Pot-gradu ate qualification be counted towards teaching experience for the post of Lecturer in the s11me or in !"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9771, "end_char": 9774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act", "statute": "Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act"}}, {"text": "Rajastban Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11201, "end_char": 11236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3, 1972, the Rajastban Public Service Commission (for short, the commission) issued a1lvertisements invitins appli-\n\n'-·\"-- •\n\n' )\n\n11.t."}}, {"text": "Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11474, "end_char": 11527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 21, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12024, "end_char": 12037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, by the impugned letter (Annexure IV) dated July 21, 1973, issued by the Secretary of the Commission, the appellant was informed that his application for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected since he did not possess the necessary academic qualification."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12484, "end_char": 12495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules", "statute": "Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules"}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13686, "end_char": 13712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Medical Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13796, "end_char": 13828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14081, "end_char": 14095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Medical Registration Act", "statute": "Central Medical Registration Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14103, "end_char": 14129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14202, "end_char": 14218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "University of Bihar at Muzaffarpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14571, "end_char": 14605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The University of Bihar at Muzaffarpur is one duly established by statute and it is fully competent to conduct examinations and award degrees."}}, {"text": "University of Bihar is included in the Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14796, "end_char": 14883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17311, "end_char": 17322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 27, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18432, "end_char": 18445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificates from the Principal and Heaas of Departmenfs of Forensic Medicine in the concerned Medical Colleges produced by the appellant in the High Court as annexures in his affidavit dated July 27, 1973 which are at pages 31 and 33 of the printed Paper Book, establish beyond doubt that the appellant had put in more than two years of Medicolegal work in Dr. S. N. Medical College and in the Dharbhanga Medical College, prior to the last date fixed by the Commission for receipt of the applications."}}, {"text": "S. N. Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificates from the Principal and Heaas of Departmenfs of Forensic Medicine in the concerned Medical Colleges produced by the appellant in the High Court as annexures in his affidavit dated July 27, 1973 which are at pages 31 and 33 of the printed Paper Book, establish beyond doubt that the appellant had put in more than two years of Medicolegal work in Dr. S. N. Medical College and in the Dharbhanga Medical College, prior to the last date fixed by the Commission for receipt of the applications."}}, {"text": "Dharbhanga Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificates from the Principal and Heaas of Departmenfs of Forensic Medicine in the concerned Medical Colleges produced by the appellant in the High Court as annexures in his affidavit dated July 27, 1973 which are at pages 31 and 33 of the printed Paper Book, establish beyond doubt that the appellant had put in more than two years of Medicolegal work in Dr. S. N. Medical College and in the Dharbhanga Medical College, prior to the last date fixed by the Commission for receipt of the applications."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_453_473_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "WING COMMANDER J. KUMAR\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 5, 1982\n\n[A.O. KosHAL, V. BAL>.KRJSHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\n453 A\n\nDefence Restarch and Development Organisati•n Giid Government of India 0.M. dated November 23, 1919, Rule 16-\"Senlority after permanent second- C ment\"-R & D Cadre-Intake of service officers-Seniority after 'permanent secontlment'-Based upon seniority of substantive rank held by the officer in the grade of major or equivalent rank-Such principle for determination whether valid.l\n\n\"Secondment\" of an officer-Whether constitutes a tra_nsfer.\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Art, 309 proviso-Statutory rule covering seniority-Rule to take effect from date of promulgation-Whether element of retroactivity involved in operation of rule.\n\nAdministrative Law-Prineip/~ of natural justice-Applicability of-In promu/gati'on of statutory rule governing seniority.\n\nThe Defence Research and Development Organisation (R & D) was set up under th! Ministry of Defence for carrying out scientific and technological research and development work on projects or vital importance to the defence forces. Its personnel consist or large number of civilian scientists as well as a smaller number of service officers drawn Crom the three wings of the Armed Forces who have operational experience of weapon systems.\n\nThe policy followed in regard to the intake of service officers was that they were initially taken on , a tenure basis and subsequently absorbed in the organisation on a permanent basis in the event of being found suitable and willing. Since the Office.rs from the three services came to the R & D cadre with different lengths of service and at different-levels, it became imperative to evolve a reasonable principle for the determination or their interse seniority arter their secondment to the _organisation.\n\nIn November 197P in supersession of an previous Rules and Orders on the subject, rules were mado under the proviso to Art. 309 laying down the pro ccdure for the intake of service officers in the R & D organisation and the terms and conditions of service of those permanently retained therein. Rule 16 dealt\n\nwith \"Seniority after permanent secondment\" and provided that \"seniority or H all service Officers permanently seconded to DRDO will continue to be based upon thir s~0iorit~ of substantive ran~ of Major/Sn. Ldr./Lt. Cdr ... , .. , ad th~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 3 s.c.R.\n\nA seniority or officers with substantive ranks higher than Major/Sqn. Ldr./Lt. Cdr. will after their permanent secondment, alo reckon visa-vis other officers in the R & D Cadre, for future promotioa/confirmation, from the date of their subs tantive rank or Major/Sqn. Ldr./Lt. Cdr ........ \".\n\nThe appellant who was commissioned in the Air Force was seconded to the service. In hiS writ petition -he contended that the principle for determina tion of seniority laid down in Rule 16 was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and as he had been permanently seconded to the R & D Organisation in 1971 long prior to the proclamation of the rule his rights regarding seniority and promotion could not be affected by the provisions of this rule. By taking the date of substantive appointment to -the rank or Major/ equivalent as the basis for reckoning seniority, officers who had obtained substantive promotions to higher ranks in the oarent service earlier than some of their seniors who were onl)' subsquently. promoted to such higher ranks, suffer - 11erious prejudice because the latter gain over the earlier promotees and supersede them in the matterof 1en'iority in. the R & D -Organisation, and that subsequent inductees in the R & D Organisation cannot be legally assigned seniority above those already borne on the cadre, irrespective or the substantive rank held by them at the time or their intake Into the R & D.\n\nD The Single Judge rejected all the contentions and declined to grant relief.\n\nThe.R & DOrganiS11tion was however directed to issue .the tentative seniority list drawn up in accordance with Rule 16. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appe1lant was dismissed in limlne.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : l. Since officers from different sources are taken into the R & D Organi<sltion for meeting the disciplinewise requirements arising therein from time to time and they are brought into a common pool on such permanent secondment, a reasonable principle had to be evolved for fixation of inter se seniority within the R & D cadre. The principle adopted under Rule 4 of reckonins: seniority with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of subs .. tantive Majorjequivalent strikes areasonable mean as it ensures to all: the service officers in the R & D the fixation of seniority in the integrated cadre giving full credit to the length of service put in by them in their respective parent services. [466 C; 466 H; 467 A]\n\n2. It is settled law that the urvice conditions pertaining to seniority are Hable to alteration by subsequent changes that may be introduced in the rules and except to the extent of protecting promotion\\ that have already been earned under the previous rules, the revised rules will operate to govern seniority and future promotion prospects. There is, therefore, no substance in the argument advanced by the appellant that it was not open to the Government of India to introduce a new principle or seniority by promulgation of Rule 16 so as to affect his rights for future promotion. [463 DE]\n\n3. A statement contained in the statute or statutory rule or the factual background leading up to the enactment has ordinarily to be accepted and acted upon by the court as wholly correct, [ 463 A]\n\n---\"\"'-.... -\n\n'I. KUMAR V, UNION OF INDIA 455\n\n4. Rule 16 contains a categorica1 declaration that in the past also the seniority of service officers permanently seconded to.the R & b Organisation was b'eing reckoned on the basis of their dates of attainment of substantive rank of Major/Sqn. Ldr./Lt. Cdr. subject to any 'penalty/loss of seniority that an officer might suffer subsequently. It is therefore not possible to accept 'the contention\n\n<>f the appellant that prior to the coining ihto f<>roe of the rule he had acquired a vested right to have his seniority in the R & D reckoned with reference to the date of his permanent esecondment and to have aJ1 Officers joining the organisation on subsequent dates ranked only below him. (462 G-H; 463 B-C)\n\nThe, tructure and composition of the Organisation have necessarily to undergo rapid, qualitative and quantitative changes in the ligPt of the fast developments that take place in science, technology and international relations.\n\nThe intake of service Officers is not on the basis of any general seletion from service cadres. As and when the Organisation finds it necessary to obtain the service of officers with operational experience in any particular weapon system or other scientific discipline the parent service is requested to spare for deputation suitable hands in the particular branch or speciality and initially they are taken on a tenure basis. There is a selection only in a very limited sense that the suitability of the concerned officer is adjudged before hC is taken but the claims or merits of others are not considerl\"d. The secondment of such officers to the R & D Organisation is not therefore, effected on the basis or a general selection.\n\nOfficers who are senior in the parent service in relation to the person who is seconded and who may possess greater eXperience and superior attainment might not have been considered for secondment when their juniors 'in the service were seconded to the R & D Organisation, because the parent service might not have been in the position at the relevant point of time to spate the services of the former. (463 G-H; 464 AEJ\n\n6. Where persons from different sources _are drafted to serve in a new service a just and wholesome principle comtnonl, f applied is that the pre existing length of service in the parent department should be respected and prese1ved by taking the same into account in determining their ranking in the new service cadre. Such a provision does not involve any discrimination violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. [470 E]\n\nR.S. Makashi & Ors. v. l.M. Mellon & Ors., [1982] l S.C.C. 379, referred to.\n\n7. The secondment of ail ofliCer from bisparer'lt service to the R & D is not a transfer to Centril Service from a subordinate service or from another department. [469 G]\n\n8. Rule 16 being statutory in origin, its validity cannot be affected by C: re3.son of any inconsistency With the provision of a pi'ior executive order issued by the Central Government i.e. Office Memorandum dated July 22, 1972.\n\n[469 HJ\n\n9. When a statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service) the said rule would govern the personnel in the ervice with e'ffect from the date of its promulgation and in so giving effect to 'the role in future, no\n\nelement of retroactivity is involved, (470 G-H)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\n10. The promulgation of a statutory rule governing seniority is not a\n\nquasi-judicial fLinction. It is the exercise of a legislative power and in respect thereof the principlea of natural justice have no application at all. (472 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1742 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the I Ith day of April, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 53 of 1980. •\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Misc. Petitions Nos. 69 and 5698 of 1981.\n\nWing Commander J. Kumar Appellant in Person. I\n\nP.A. Francis, Narayan Nettar and Miss A. Subhashlni, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAltRISHNA ERADI, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissing in limine a Letters Patent Appeal filed by the present appellant against the jHdgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court whereby the contentions raised by the appellant in Civil Writ Petition No. 1423 of 1979 were rejected and the said writ petition was dismissed.\n\nThe appellant-Wing Commander J. Kumar-was commis 1ioned in the ln; lian Air Force on September 3, 1956 with ante dated seniority from December IO, 1955.\n\nHe was permanently 'seconded to the Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation (for short, the LR D &1 Organisation) of the Ministry of Defence on October 14, 1971. On the bifurcation of the LRL & I Organisation effected in July 1976 by the separation of the Inspection Wing, the appellant was retained in the Defence Research and Development Organisation, which will hereinafter be referred to as the R & D Organisation. The Director-General of Defence Research and Development, who is also the Secretary to Government of India, Defence Research, is the controlling authority of the R & D cadre.\n\nThe said cadre has service officers drawn from all the three Wings of the Armed Forces, namely, the Army, the Navr and the Air\n\ni. KUMAR v. tJNION OF INDIA (!Jaiakrishna Eradi, J.) 457\n\nForce, and in addition thereto a large number of civilian employees are also borne on it.\n\nIn November 1979, in supersession of all previous Rules and Orders on the subject, the President of India promulgated under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution rules laying down the procedure for the intake of service officers in the R & D Organisation and the terms and conditions of service of those permanently retained therein.\n\nThose rules were issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India in Office Memorandum No. Persjl8601/RD.\n\nSel. Bd//7971/D (R&D) dated November 23, 1979, The provisions of the said Memorandum will hereinafter be referred to as the rules.\n\nRule 16 deals with the subject of \"Seniority after permanent secondment\". That rule js in the following terms :\n\n\"As hithertofore seniority of all service officers rermanently seconded to D RDO will continue to be based upon their seniority of substantive rank of Major/Sqn.\n\nLdr./Lt. Cdr., subject to any penalty /loss of seniority that an• officer might suffer subsequently and tbe seniority of officers with substantive ranks higher than Major/Sqn.\n\nLdr./Lt. Cdr. will after their permanent secondment, also reckon vis-a-vis other officers in the R&D Cadre, fer future promotion/confirmation, from the date of their substantive rank of Major/Sqn. Ldr./Lt. C.dr., subject to any penalty/ loss of seniority that an officer might have suffered in his parent Arm/Service.\"\n\nThe principal contention advanced by the appellant before us is that the principle for determination of seniority laid down inthe above rule is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Alternatively, it is contended by the appellant that since he had been permanently seconded to the R&D Organisation in 1971, long prior to the promulgation of the impugned rules, his rights regarding seniority and promotions cannot, in any way, be effected by the provisions of the new rule. According to the appel- lant, he continues to be governed by the principles that had been originally laid down in Government of India (Ministry of Defence) Memorandum dated March 18, 1967, which were the rules in force at the time of his secondment to the R&D Organisation. It is the further case of the appellant that the R&D being an independent\n\nOrganisation, the seniority of the personnel absorbed therein has to be reckoned only with reference to the dates on which they were\n\nsUPREMB cOtJkt REPoRTs (19Si) 3 ~.C.R.\n\nselected and appointed in the said Organisation and subsequent entrants into the R&D in any particular category or rank should, therefore, be placed only below all those who had already joined the Organisation by virtue of permanent secondment. The appellant also contends that by taking the date of substantive appointment to the rank of Major/equivalent as the basis for reckoning seniority, officers who had obtained substantive promotions to higher ranks in the parent service earlier than some of their seniors who were only subsequently promoted to such higher ranks, will suffer very serious prejudice because the latter will gain a march over the earlier promotees and supersede them in the matter of seniority in the R&D Organisation. Elaborating this plea, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the result of the impugned rle would be to bring about the anomalous situation where a penon permanently seconded to the R&D and holding substantively the rank of Lt.Col./equivalent can be superseded in seniority in the said Organisation by a Major/equivalent of old vintage who had been overlooked for promotion in his parent service and may have thereupon come over to the R&D Organisation. Another objection strongly put forward by the appellant was against the lateral induction of officers at levels higher than that of substantive Major/equivalent. It was urged by the appellant that such subsequent inductees into the R&D Organisation cannot be legally assigned seniority above . those a.lready borne on the cadre, irrespective of the substantive rank held by them at the time of their intake into the R&D. The appellant has rested this contention on the premise that the intake of officers into the R&D is by a selection based on merit and hence those selected earlier must necessarily rank higher in the seniority list of the Organisation in relation to those who are selected and appointed in the Organisation only on later dates.\n\nThe appellant has urged a further point before us that the seniority of officers of the Navy, Army and - Air Force holding equivalent ranks who served in the Organisation is governed by the principle laid down in, Regulation No. 251 of the \"Naval Ceramonials, Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Regulations, 1964\", and the impugned rule in so far as it is contrary to the principle laid down in the said Regulation has to be declared as invalid and inoperative. Some other incidental pleas and grievances were also put forward by the appellant before the High Court as well as before us and we shall be dealing with them later on at the appropriate stage.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court rejected all the aforesaid contentions advanced by the appellant and declined to\n\n~\\\n\nJ. KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) . 459\n\ngrant any relief to him, except to the extent of directing the R&D Organisation to issue the tentative seniority list drawn up in accordance with the impugned rule within three months from the date of the judgment and to record the Annual Confidential Reports on the appellant from April 1, 1976 to March 3.1, 1979 within the same . . period. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appeJJant against the said judgment having been dismissed in Ii mine b;· a Division • Bench of the High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nThe Defence Research and Development Organisation (R&D) has been set up under the Ministry of Defence for carrying on scientific and technological research and development work on projects of vital importance to the defence forces of this country. The head of the said Organisation is a civilian, namely, the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry and its personnel consist of a large number of civilian scientists and a much smaller number of service officers drawn from the three defence services. The service officers \"are initially taken on short tenure and are later permanently seconded to the R&D Organisation if found suitable and willing.\n\nThose service officers who were permanently seconded and absorbed in the R&D cadre are thereafter governed by the terms and conditions of service applicable to the officers of the said cadre.\n\nOriginally, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (R&D) and the Director-General of Inspection (DGI) had a combined cadre-Research Development and Inspection-and the terms and conditions of service of the personnel borne o0 the said cadre were governed by the provisions contained in Government of India (Ministry of.Defence) Memorandum No. 11/(5)/58/D-(R&D) dated March 18, 1967.\n\nBut, those rules which had also been issued by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution did not contain any provision laying down the principles for determination of the seniority of the officers functioning in the DRD&I Organisation. Those rules were in force at the time when the appellant was permanently seconded to the DRD&I Organisation in 1971.\n\nJn the writ petition filed in the High Court, the appellant had impleaded 8 officers of the R&D Organisation, r.amely, respondents . nos. 7 and 11 to 17 contending that they have been assigned seniority and granted promotions in supersession of the appellants's legitimate claims and ill viol11tio11 of the l'll!e•: n \\h~ appeal before,\n\n460 SUPllBMB COURT llBPOllrS (!982) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nthis Court, the appellant had added several more service officers of the R&D as additional respondents. the appellant argued his case in person and so did some of the respondents whose promotions ind seniority etc., have been challenged by the appellant.\n\nArguments advanced by the parties appearing in person were heard by us at considerable length and S'lri P.A Francis, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of Respondents Nos. I and 2, namely, the Union of India and the Director-General, R&D Organisation, also addressed arguments before us covering all the aspects.\n\nAs already noticed, the main contentions put forward by the aupellant are two-fold, namely, that the principles laid down in rule 16 of the rules for determination of the seniority of officers permanently seconded to the R&D are arbitrary and illegal, and that lateral induction of officers holding r_anks above substantive Major/ equivalent and assigning of seniority to such subsequent inductees by applying the provisions of rule 16 amounts to deprivation of the vested rights of persons-like the appellant-who had joined the '\" Organisation earlier and it is, therefore, illegal and unwarranted.\n\nAfter aiving our best consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, we do not see any substance in either of the aforesaid contentions advanced by te appellant.\n\nThe Defence Research Development and Inspection Organi sation is a Specialised Technological Organisation set up under the - Ministry of Defence for carrying out research and development work in weapons like guns, electronics, missiles, tanks etc. Its personnel consist of a large number of civilian scientists (about 3,600) and about 430 service officers drawn from all the three Wings of the Armed Forces with operational experience of such weapon system to work with the scientists in the research and development programme. The policy followed in regard to the intake of service officers appears to have been to take them initially on a tenure basis and subsequently to absorb them in the Organisation on a permanent basis in the event of their being found suitable and willing. It is seen from the affidavits and documents filed on behalf of the respondents that the secondment of service officers depended upon the exigencies and the special type of need of the Organisation at each relevant point of time so much so that officers who could fill the bill by virtue of their qualification, experience, aptitude and suital>ility in that particular lm1m;4 of defe~W science for which the neecl\n\n:,,·\n\n1. KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 46!\n\nfor personnel had arisen and whose services could be spared by their parent service were taken into the R&D Organisation from time to time. Since the officers from the three services came to the R&D cadre with different lengths of service a11d at different levels, it became imperative to evolve a reasonable principle for determination of their inter se seniority after their secondment to the R&D Organisation.\n\nThe case of the respondents is th.at right. from the beginning, the policy and practice followed by DRD&I Organisation as well as - -.....__ '-- . by the bifurcated R&D Organisation was to assign seniority with reference to the date on which the officers attained their rank of substantive Major/equivalent. This was, however, strongly refuted by the appellant who asserts that no such principle had been formulated or followed by the Organisation prior to the promulgation of the impugned rules. The respondents produced for our perusal various files pertaining to the determination of seniority and grant of promotions in the Organisation during the period , prior to the issuance of the impugned rules. The appel!l(tlt pointed out with reference to those very files that there were quite a few instances where promotions had been effected on a basis. totally at variance with the principle propounded by the respondents.\n\nFrom a scrutiny of the files of the Ministry of Defence-R&D E -\n\nOrganisation-produced before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Go:vernrrient of India, it has clearly emerged that, excepting for a few stray instances, the practice followed in the R&D Organisation was to reckon the seniority of the permanently seconded officers wjth reference to the date of their attaining substantive rank of Major/equivalent. The principle underlying the said practice was later formally incorporated in the Minutes of the DRD&l Selection Board as a decision taken by the Board at its meeting held in February 1974. The relevant paragraph of the Minutes runs thus :\n\n\"Officers with substantive ranks higher than Maj/Sqn Ldr/Lt Cdr who are offered permanent secondment will reckon their substantive seniority in the R&D/Inspection Organisation for future promotion/confirmation from the date they got their substantive ranks as Maj/Sqn Ldr and subject to any penalties as regards loss of seniority that they might have suffered in thir Arm/Service thereafter. The\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ·\n\n(1982] 3 !.C.R.\n\nposition as above should be clarified to the officers concerned and their acceptance obtained before issuing the orders of permanent secondment in such cases. These decisions will apply to cases of permanent secondment approved by the RD&I Selection Board from 2(74) meeting onwards.\"\n\nIt is also seen from the files pertaining to the period subsequent to February 1974 that the aforesaid principle was thereafter consistently followed as a binding rule and when it was found that a departure from the said principle had been erroneously made by placing three Air Force officers in their substantive rank of Wing Commander, the authorities concerned rectified the said mistake ' after clearly noting in the file that the aforesaid principle went unnoticed by oversight during the processing of those cases by HQ, R&D and the ranking of those officers \\\\'as revised so as to bring it into conformity with the aforesaid rule.\n\nThe relevant file leading up to the issuance of the impugned rules was also carefully perused by us. This file contains the Minutes of the Chief of Staff Committee recommending to the Government of India that the draft rules may be finally accepted and issued expeditiously and the noting therein also contains a clear statement that the principle incorporated in the decision taken at the combined meeting of' the DRD&I Selection Board held in February 1974 w11s merely to incorporate \"a rule which was unwritten earlier but actually applied in practice\". Thus, there is sufficient material available on record to substantiate the plea put forward by the repondents that the policy and practice followed in the DR&DI Organisation an<l later in the R&D Organisation was to fix the seniority of permanently seconded officers with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/ equivalent.\n\nFurther, the impugned rules are statutory in origin as they have been promulgated by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 16 co0tains a categorial declaration that in the past also the seniority of service officers permanently seconded to the R&D Organisation was being reckoned on the basis of their dates of attainment of substantive rankM of Major/Sqn Ldr/Lt Cdr. subject to any penalty/loss of seniority that an officer might suffer subsequently. The said declaration is clearly implied in the openin!! words \"As hithertofore\" occurring in rule 16\n\ni. KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (iJaiakrishna Eradi, J.) 463\n\nof the impugned rules.\n\nA statement contained in a statute or statutory rule of the factual background leading up to the enactment has ordinarily to be accepted and acted upon by the court as wholly correct; nothing clinching has been brought to our notice by the appellant to justify any departure from the said principle. We do not, therefore, find it possible to accept the contention of the appellant that prior to the corning into force of the impugned rule, he had acquired a vested right to have his seniority in the R&D reckoned with reference to the date of his permanent secondment and to have all officers joining the Organisation on subsequent dates ranked only below him. The plea advanced by the appellant that the impugned rules . have illegally purported to divest hfm of his vested rights of seniority and promotion in the R&D must, therefore, be rejected as devoid of merit.\n\nApart from what is stated above, it is settled law that the service conditions pertaining to seniority are liable to alteration by subsequent changes that may be introduced in the rules and except to the extent ofprotecting promotions that have already been earned under the previous rules, the revised rules will operate to govern the seniority and future promotion prospects of all the persons in the concerned service.\n\nThere is, therefore, no substance in the argument advanced by the appellant that it was not open to the Government of India to introduce. a new principle of seniority by promulgation of the impugned rules so as to affect his ri&hts for future promotion.\n\nThe next question to be considered is whether the principle enunciated in rule 16 can be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary, as contended by the appellant. It is in this context that the specialised character of the R&D OrganlSation assumes importance. Its personnel consist of civilian scientists and service officers of high technological at•ainments in diffrent disciplines who have been drawn to the Organisation from time to time according to its exigencies and needs.\n\nThe structure and composition of the Organisation have necessarily to undergo rapid qualitative and quantitative changes in the light of the fast developments that take place ia the field of science and technology as well as in international relations. The research and development work is carried on by the R&D in different systems of weapons and equipments and a variety of disciplines like electronics, missiles, tanks, telecommunication, rocketry, radars ' .\n\nSUPBEME COURT REPORTS ' [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\netc. In addition to about 3,600 civilian scientists, the Organisation . bas about 160 permanently seconded service officers and about 430 service officers taken on a tenure basis. The intake of service officers is not on the basis of any general selection from service cadres. As and when the Organisation finds it necessary to obtain .the services of officers with operational experience in any particular weapon system cir other scientific discipline, suitable hands wit' aptitude skill and experience in that particular branch or speciality whom their parent service is willing to spare for deputation are initially taken on a tenure basis. Thus, there is a . selection only in a very limited sense that the suitability of the concerned officer is adjudged before he is taken.\n\nBnt what is important to note is that in the intake of officers into R&D Organisation there is n~ comparative evaluation of the merits of the other personnel occupying the same rank oi possessing like experience in the Defence Services. There is no process of select.ion. in whih their claims or merits are considered. Thus, it is clear that the secondment of officers to the R&D Organisation is not effected on the basis of a general selection.\n\nThere is, therefore, no substance in the contention advanced by the appellant that the service officers who are seconded to the R & D on a later date must take rank only below all those who had joined the Organisation earlier by virtue of their prior \"selection\". Officers who are senior in the parent service.in relation to the person who is seconded and who may possesfl greater experience and superior attainments might not have been considered for secondment when their juniors in the service were seconded to the R &D Organisation, because the parent service might not have been in the position at the relevant point of time to. spare the s.ervices of the former.\n\nFurther, the disciplinewise reqnirementin the R & D at any particular tiine will depend upon the nature of the project then taken on hand and posting of a service officer to the R & D Organisation will be on the consideration of his experience and apptitude for that particular type of specialised work and not seniority in the parent service. It may well happen that a junior officer who has experier ce and expertise in that special discipline alone may be considered for secondment at that particular , time. Thus, the entry of a service officer into the R & D is to a large extent dependant on fortuitious circumstances related to the exigencies and needs that arise in the Organisation from time to time. It is certainly not based on the result of any comparative evaluation of his merit, ability or suitability as against_those of his compeers m the concerned parent service. . Such being the factual situation, we are of t.Jie view that\n\n\ni. ituMAR v. uNiON oF INDIA (1Jalakrishna Eradi, J.) 46~\n\nit will not be reasonable, just or fair to determine the seniority of A the permanently seconded service personnel merely on the basis ofthe date of their secondment to the Organisation.\n\nThe next question to be considered is whether the principle for determination of seniority laid down in the impugned rule 16 is just, fair and reasonable or whether it is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Consitution, as contended by the appellant.\n\nThe R & D Organisation has in its cadre service officers who were taken initially on tenure basis from the Army, the Air Force and the Navy and were later on permanently seconded into the DRD & I/ R & D cadre on their being found suitable and willing.\n\nThe contention of the appellant is that on such permanent secondment into the R & D, the interse seniority of the officers should be reckoned only with reference to the dates of their selection for such permanent secondment. It is the further plea of the appellant that since at the time of permanent secondment the oflker concerned has to certify in writing that he is relinguishing all his claims of seniority etc., in his parent service, no weightage can thereafter be given to the rank or seniority which the person inducted had earned in his parent service prior to the date of his permanent secondment.\n\nWe do not find it possible to accept this contention. Officers from the three Services holding different ranks are inducted into R & D Organisation from time to time depending upon the needs of the Organisation, and if the appellant's contention is to be accepted, it would lead to serious anomalies and manifest injustice by upsetting the norms of seniority and rank structure which is the basic fabric on which the Armd\n\nForces of the country are built.\n\nThe unreasonable -consequences that will flow from the acceptance of the appellant's arguments will be clearly seen from the following simple illustration :\n\nSuppose, in the year 1974, on a particular date, when two officers are working in the Air Force-:-one as a Wing Commander and the other in the higher rank of Group Captain-the Wing Commander is permanently seconded to the R & D Organisation and, later, the Group Captain is also permanently seconded to the R & D in 1975. If the principle advocated by the appellant is to be accepted, the Group Captain will become junior to the Wing Commander by virtue of the latter's earlier induction into the R & D despite the fact that he had not been even considered for secondment to the R & D at the time when the Wing Commander was taken. . -\n\nSUPREME COURT RHPORTS (1928] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nIn view of our having already found that the appellant's contention that the secondment to the R & D is based on a \"selection\" is incorrect, the basic premise' on which the appellant has founded his plea that the date of secondment should be the determinative factor for reckoning seniority in !be R & D cadre, falls to the ground.\n\nSince officers from different sources are taken into the R & D for meeting the disciplinewise requirements arising in the Organisation from time to time and they are brought into a common pool on such permanent secondment, it is inevitable that a reasonable principle has to be evolved for fixation of their inter se seniority within the R & D cadre. The fixation of the seniority on the basis of the ranks held by them in the different branches of the Armed Forces would not be reasonable or fair, because substantive ranks above Major/equivalent in the three Wings of the Armed Forces are conferred by different Selection Boards at different times and under varying circumstances and conditions depending upon the vacancies arising at the different levels in the distinct services from time to time. It is pointed out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf on the Union of India (Respondent No. I) that the promotional chances of officers belonging to the three distinct Wings of the Armed Forces to posts above the rank of Major/equivalent vary widely and dependant upon fortuitious circumstances which may obtain ., in relation to the distinct services at any relevant point of time. We find there is force in this submission. In all the three Services, the promotions up to and inclusive of the rank of Major/equivalent are time-scale promotions based only on fixed len&th of service. In the Air Force and the Army, the ranks of Major and Sqn. Leader, respectively, are attained on an officer puttingin 13 years' service. In the Navy, the time-scale period for promotion to the equivalent rank of Lt.\n\nCommander is said to vary between about 10 and 13 years.\n\nBut, what is important to notice is that 'the promotion to the rank of Major/equivalent is based only on length of service and not on any \"selection\". For posts higher. than that of Major/equivalent, promotions in all the three Services would depend upon. the occurrence of vacaacies in the particular branch or group in the concerned Service, the schemes of expansion that may be taken up from time to time in the particular Service or branch and also the. extent of stagnation that may be caused to officers at lower levels by reason of the officers who are young in age occupying posts in the immediate higher levels, etc. When due regard is had to all the aspects and circumstances, narrated above, it will be seen that the\n\n. '\n\n• ~.\n\nj, itUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (/Jafakrishna Eradi, J.) 467\n\nprinciple adopted under the impugned rule of reckoning seniority with reference to a date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/equivalent strikes a reasonable mean as it ensures to .all the service officers in the R & D the fixation o(seniority in the integrated cadre giving full credit to the length of service put in by them in their respective parent services.\n\nA similar seniority rule fol'!llulated by the State of Maharashtra in a somewhat like situation, when an integrated cadre consisting of personnel drawn from different sources was.formed in the State of Maharashtra for, administering the Rationing Scheme, was recently upheld by this Court in R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. J.M. Menon &\n\nOrs.(')\n\nThe following observations contained in that judgment are apposite in the present .context :\n\n\"When personnel drawn from different sources are being absorbed and integrated in a new department, . it is D primarily for the Government or the executive authority concerned to decide as a matter of policy how the equation of posts should be effected. The courts will not interfere with such a decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair, and if no manifest unfairness or unreasonableness is made out, the court will not sit in E appeal and examine the propriety or wisdom of the principle of equation of post9 .adopted by the Governments.\"\n\nIn enunciating the principle incorporated in the impugned rule, the rule-making authority has adopted as the base for reckoning seniority the highest common factC>r applicable in respect of time scale promotions in the three services, namely the rank of Major/ equivalent and thereby ensured to the service officers seconded to the R & D Organisation a just and equitable treatment. The rule provides for the reckoning of the seniority of the seconded officers by taking into account the length of their service in the parent service, for which the date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/equivalent would furnish a safe index. In our opinion, the said principle cannot be said to be arbitrary, unjust or unreasonable and the contention to contrary put forward by the appellant will, therefore, stand rejected.\n\n(I) [1982) I s.c.c. 379.\n\n.ff\n\n468 SUPREME COURT RilPORtS [ i 9s2j 3 s.c.it.\n\nIt is no doubt true that in the Navy, promotions te the rank of Lt. Commander which• is equivalent to that of Major in the Army may be -attained by an officer within a slightly shorter period of service, namely, between IO and 13 years whereas, in the Army and the Air Force, the promotion to the rank of Major/equivalent is given only on completion of 13 years of service. The slight disparity in the promotion prospects between the Navy and the other two Serviceswill not, however, affect the reasonableness of the impugned rule because it is impossible to achieve perfect arithmetical precision in such matters where officers. drawn from different sources are to be integrated into one common cadre and a rule for fixing their inter se seniority is formulated.\n\nFurther, it is seen from the counter-affidavits of Respondents I to 3 that out of about 160 permanently seconded officers of the R & D Organisation, the large majority are from the Army, a considerable section of the balance is from the Air Foree and only less than 10 officers have come from the Navy.\n\nIt is also relevant to notice in this context that it is specifically provided in rule 4 oftbe impugned rule that t_he intake of service officers to fill appointments in the R & D Organisation will ordi narily be at Major/equivalent level. Under rule 5, officers in higher ranks should be considered for permanent secondment only in exceptional cases and when such a course is adopted, it will be subject to the condition that their seniority in the R & D cadre will be fixed as stipulated in rule 16. The incorporation of the afore' said provisions which operate as a safeguard against large scale induction of officers above the substantive rank of Major/equivalent further fortifies the conclusion arrived at by us that the adoption of the date of substantive Major/equivalent as the criterion for fixing inter se seniority in the R & D cadre was logically fair, just and reasonable.\n\nThe appellant sought to rely strongly on Regulation 251 of the Naval Ceremonials, Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Regulations, 1954 and on the provisions contained in the Order A0102/73.\n\nRegulation 251 provides that \"the relative seniority of officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force, holding equivalent ranks, who ·\n\nserve together in an Inter-service Organisation will be regulated as follows.\" The latter Order is in the following terms : ·\n\n\"(a) Officers holding equivalent substantive rank (no acting rank) will rank .according to their seniority in the substantive rank ; and\n\n-\"-· .•\n\n), K{/MAR v. tJNiON oF INDIA (Ba/akrishna Eradi, J.) 469\n\n(b) Officers holding acting rank will rank after officers A holding corresponding substantive rank and in relation to each other, they will rank according io their seniority in the substantive rank.\"\n\nIn our opinion, neither the Regulation aforementioned nor the Order, extracted above, has any application to the present situa-\n\n. B tion. The R & D Organisation is not an lnter-servic, ll Organisation within the meaning of the expression as used in the aforementioned Regulation and Order.. It is predominantly a civil organisation headed by a civilian Director-General and having a total strength of about 24,000 employees. The large majority of the personnel working in the R & D Organisation are civilian scientists who are more than 3,000 in number, there are also about 160 service officers permanently seconded to the R & D cadre and about 240 service officers taken on tenure basis. But, merely because the R & D Organisation has on its staff serving officers from the Army, Air Force and Navy, it cannot be Said to be an \"Inter-service Organisation\" governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Regulation and Order. The topic°dealt with in the aforesaid Regulation and Order\n\nis only \"seniority\" for purposes of command, precedence, discipline etc., for working purposes to be allied in situations where officers from more than one service operate together in one group as in times of war for carrying out any particular mission or task. ·\n\nAnother argument advanced by the appellant was that the impugned rule cannot be upheld as valid inasmuch as it is in conflict with paragraph 7 of the Government of India Offioe Memorandum No. 9372Estt(D), Cabinet Secretariat, Department of Personnel, dated July 22, 1972, which is in the following terms :\n\n\"7. Transferees :-(I) The relative seniority of persons appointed by transfer to Central Services from the subordinate offices of the Central Government or other department shall be determined in accordance with the order of their selection for such transfer.\"\n\nWe see no substance in this contention. The secondment of an officer from his parent service to the R&D is not a transfer to Central Service from a subordinate service or from another department.\n\nFurther, the impugned' rule being statutory in origin, its validity cannot be affected by reason of any inconsistency with the provisions of a prior executive order issued by the Central Government.\n\n470 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS [19.82j 3 s.c.R.\n\nAn allegation has been put forward by the appellant that \"the letter dated November 23, 1979 was a fraud on rules and the Consti'tution, played by respondent no. 5 who got the same issued to obtain personal gain by misusing his official position, leading to colourable exercise of power by the authority who actually issued that letter\". To put it mildly, we find that this is a reckless alle gation devoid of any factual basis.\n\nWe h'ave gone through the files leading up to the issuance of the impugned rules and it is seen therefrom that the matter has been processed by different authorities at different stages and before the draft rules were ultimately submitted to the Government of India for approval, they had been considered and approved at a joint meeting of the Chiefs of Staff also.\n\nEqually untenable is the further plea advanced by the appellant that since the R&D is an integrated cadre, there cannot be any further classification of the officers comprised therein on the basis of the length of service put in by them in their respective parent D services prior to their permanent secondment in the R&D. As pointed out by this Court in the decision in R. S. Makashi v !. M.\n\nMenon (supra), ir is a just and wholes?me principle commonly applied in such situations where persons from different sources are drafted to serve in a new service that their preexisting length of service in the parent department should be respected and preserved E by taking.the same into account in determining their ranking in the new service cadre. Such a provision does not involve any discrimination violative of Article 16 of the Constitution.\n\nYet, another argument advanced by the appellant is that the Impugned rule not having been specifically declared to be retrospective in operation, its provisions cannot be applied to the appellant inasmuch as he had been inducted into the R&D cadre on October 14, 1971 long prior to the promulgation of the new rules. We have already found that, as a matter of fact, the practice generally followed in the R&D Organisation, even prior to the promulgation of the impugned rules, was to reckon seniority with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/equivalent.\n\nEven otherwise, when a statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service, the said rule would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of its promulgation and in so giving effect to the rule in future, there is no element of retroactivity involved.\n\nOf course, the rules will not operate to deprive any person of promotions already earned in the past, but, for purposes\n\nJ, KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA !Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 471\n\nOf future promotions and seniority in the department, the principles A laid down in the impugned rule will necessarily govern all the personnel alike. This contention of the appellant has also to fail.\n\n It was very strongly contended by the appellant that the lateral induction of senior service officers holding ranks above the subs tantive Major/equivalent level operates to deprive the existing R&D personnel of their vested rights to promotions within. the cadre and hence, such inductions must be held to be illegal and void. This contention ignores the fact that rule 5 specifically provides that in exceptional cases, officers above the rank of Major/equivalent may be drafted into the R&D. The contention of the appellant appears to us to be based on a fallacious assumption that the R&D cadre exists for the sake of the personnel working therein and not for effectuating the purpose underlying its constitution which is of such vital importance to the Nation's safety. The Organisation has been formed with a view to have a highly specialised cadre of techno logical and scientific experts to design and develop military hardware etc., for the Armed Forces of the country keeping abreast of the latest developments and advances in the field of defence science .• To effectuate this purpose, such an Organisation by its very nature cannot remain static or stagnant, but has to be constantly expanding qualitatively and quantitatively. The personnel requir•ments of the Organisation are, therefore, bound to change from time to time and to meet such changing needs, the services of qualified experts with specialised knowledge, skill and experience will have to be enlisted from time to time. A particular service officer in the Army, Air Force or Navy may be the best person suited for being placed in charge of a specialised job newly taken on band, and in such a situation the Organisation must have the freedom to indent for the services of the officer concerned irrespective of the rank that he may be holding in his parent service. We do not find it possible to recognise any right in the officers already working in the R&D to obiect to the lateral induction of senior officers under such circumstances.\n\nThe contention put forward by the appellant that lateral inductions into the R&D cadre constitute an illegal deprivation of the vested rights of persons already working therein and are consequently illegal and void, cannot, therefore, be accepted.\n\nThe next point urged by the appellant is that since the im pugned rules disturb the previously fixed seniority, it is guasi judicial in nature and they ought to h11ve been issued only aftef\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R,\n\ngiving notice to all the affected persons. We have already found th• t no alteration in the pre existing policy relating to determination of seniority in the R&D has been brought about by the impugned rules. Quite apart from that, the promulgation of a statutory rule governing seniority is not a quasi-judicial function. It is the exercise of a legislative power and in respect thereof the principles of natural justice have no application at all.\n\nDetailed facts pertaining to the history of service of the various officers impleaded in the appeal as respondents were referred to by the appellant during the course of bis arguments, and such of the respondents who appeared in person countered those submissions by placing before us, what, according to them, are the correct facts relating to their service history. The challenge made by the appellant against the ranking and seniority of the officers impleaded as reipondents is based solely on his contention tha.t the seniority principle enundated in rule 16 is arbitrary, illegal anc! ultra vires and that, in any event, the said principle cannot be applied to him. The said contention has been found by us to be untenable. Hence, it is not necessary for us to refer to the details regarding the service history of •.he appellant vis-a-vis those of the service officers who have been impleaded as respondents in the appeal.\n\nIn the light of our foregoing discussion, it follows that the High Court was perfectly. right in upholding the validity of the impugned rule and in rejecting the challenge raised by the petitionerappellant against the selections, inductions and , promotions made in the R&D Organisation on the basis of the said rule.\n\nIn the course of his submissions befere this Court, the appellant put forward a grievance that, notwithstanding the directions issued by the High Court in its judgment under appeal, he has not been given any posting or assign men!.\n\nCounsel appeario g on behalf of the Union of India and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister made available for our perusal the files relating . to the appellant's posting to the D R&D Laboratory at Hyderabad and the allotment of specific assignments therein to the appellant from time to time. Having gone through the files, we have come to the conclusion that there is no factual foundation for the grievance put forward by the appellant, and hence no directions from this Court are calledfor in regard to the said matter. We are purposefully refraining from dwelling in greater detail on this aspect lest any observations that we may make should prejudicially affect the future\n\n~··\n\nJ. KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (Ba/akrishna Eradi, J.) 473\n\nservice prospects of the appellant. We, however, consider it necessary to observe that the appellant would do well to rid himself of the obseession that all his official superiors are put to harass or persecute him and open up a new chapter of devoting his high talents and skills for advancing the effectiveness of the R&D Organisation.\n\nThe charges put forward by the appellant in the Contempt Application (C.M.P. No. 5698 of 1981) and in C.M.P. No. 69 of 1981 filed by the appellant under Section 340(1), Code of Criminal Procedure are bereft of merit and those applications will accordingly stand dismissed.\n\nIn the result, we dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their respective costs.\n\nN.V.K .\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "WING COMMANDER J. KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WING COMMANDER J. KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.O. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BAL>.KRJSHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2939, "end_char": 2957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, therefore, no substance in the argument advanced by the appellant that it was not open to the Government of India to introduce a new principle or seniority by promulgation of Rule 16 so as to affect his rights for future promotion. ["}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8244, "end_char": 8254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J. Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9603, "end_char": 9611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wing Commander J. Kumar Appellant in Person."}}, {"text": "I\n\nP.A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9633, "end_char": 9648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nP.A. Francis, Narayan Nettar and Miss A. Subhashlni, for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "I\n\nP.A. Francis"}}, {"text": "Narayan Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9650, "end_char": 9664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nP.A. Francis, Narayan Nettar and Miss A. Subhashlni, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashlni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nP.A. Francis, Narayan Nettar and Miss A. Subhashlni, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "BALAltRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAltRISHNA ERADI, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissing in limine a Letters Patent Appeal filed by the present appellant against the jHdgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court whereby the contentions raised by the appellant in Civil Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "BALAltRISHNA ERADI"}}, {"text": "September 3, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10251, "end_char": 10268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-Wing Commander J. Kumar-was commis 1ioned in the ln; lian Air Force on September 3, 1956 with ante dated seniority from December IO, 1955."}}, {"text": "Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10356, "end_char": 10412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was permanently 'seconded to the Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation (for short, the LR D &1 Organisation) of the Ministry of Defence on October 14, 1971."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Defence", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was permanently 'seconded to the Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation (for short, the LR D &1 Organisation) of the Ministry of Defence on October 14, 1971."}}, {"text": "October 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10481, "end_char": 10497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was permanently 'seconded to the Defence Research Development and Inspection Organisation (for short, the LR D &1 Organisation) of the Ministry of Defence on October 14, 1971."}}, {"text": "Defence Research and Development Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10644, "end_char": 10689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the bifurcation of the LRL & I Organisation effected in July 1976 by the separation of the Inspection Wing, the appellant was retained in the Defence Research and Development Organisation, which will hereinafter be referred to as the R & D Organisation."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Defence of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11584, "end_char": 11630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those rules were issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India in Office Memorandum No."}}, {"text": "November 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bd//7971/D (R&D) dated November 23, 1979, The provisions of the said Memorandum will hereinafter be referred to as the rules."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13253, "end_char": 13267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appel- lant, he continues to be governed by the principles that had been originally laid down in Government of India (Ministry of Defence) Memorandum dated March 18, 1967, which were the rules in force at the time of his secondment to the R&D Organisation."}}, {"text": "Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Regulations, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15817, "end_char": 15874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16688, "end_char": 16701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "459\n\ngrant any relief to him, except to the extent of directing the R&D Organisation to issue the tentative seniority list drawn up in accordance with the impugned rule within three months from the date of the judgment and to record the Annual Confidential Reports on the appellant from April 1, 1976 to March 3.1, 1979 within the same . ."}}, {"text": "March 3.1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16705, "end_char": 16720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "459\n\ngrant any relief to him, except to the extent of directing the R&D Organisation to issue the tentative seniority list drawn up in accordance with the impugned rule within three months from the date of the judgment and to record the Annual Confidential Reports on the appellant from April 1, 1976 to March 3.1, 1979 within the same . ."}}, {"text": "Defence Ministry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17322, "end_char": 17338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The head of the said Organisation is a civilian, namely, the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry and its personnel consist of a large number of civilian scientists and a much smaller number of service officers drawn from the three defence services."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18291, "end_char": 18296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, those rules which had also been issued by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution did not contain any provision laying down the principles for determination of the seniority of the officers functioning in the DRD&I Organisation."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18318, "end_char": 18329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.A Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19360, "end_char": 19371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments advanced by the parties appearing in person were heard by us at considerable length and S'lri P.A Francis, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of Respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "I\n\nP.A. Francis"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19451, "end_char": 19465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 2, namely, the Union of India and the Director-General, R&D Organisation, also addressed arguments before us covering all the aspects."}}, {"text": "Defence Research Development and Inspection Organi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20348, "end_char": 20398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Defence Research Development and Inspection Organi sation is a Specialised Technological Organisation set up under the - Ministry of Defence for carrying out research and development work in weapons like guns, electronics, missiles, tanks etc."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21576, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (Balakrishna Eradi, J.) 46!", "canonical_name": "BALAltRISHNA ERADI"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Defence-R&D", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22979, "end_char": 23002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From a scrutiny of the files of the Ministry of Defence-R&D E -\n\nOrganisation-produced before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Go:vernrrient of India, it has clearly emerged that, excepting for a few stray instances, the practice followed in the R&D Organisation was to reckon the seniority of the permanently seconded officers wjth reference to the date of their attaining substantive rank of Major/equivalent."}}, {"text": "DR&DI Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25692, "end_char": 25710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, there is sufficient material available on record to substantiate the plea put forward by the repondents that the policy and practice followed in the DR&DI Organisation an<l later in the R&D Organisation was to fix the seniority of permanently seconded officers with reference to the date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/ equivalent."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26021, "end_char": 26032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "iJaiakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26518, "end_char": 26536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "words \"As hithertofore\" occurring in rule 16\n\ni. KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (iJaiakrishna Eradi, J.) 463\n\nof the impugned rules."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32389, "end_char": 32407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RHPORTS (1928] 3 s.c.ll.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34575, "end_char": 34613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT RHPORTS (1928] 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35816, "end_char": 35830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pointed out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf on the Union of India (Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "/Jafakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37384, "end_char": 37402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ~.\n\nj, itUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA (/Jafakrishna Eradi, J.) 467\n\nprinciple adopted under the impugned rule of reckoning seniority with reference to a date of attainment of the rank of substantive Major/equivalent strikes a reasonable mean as it ensures to .all the service officers in the R & D the fixation o(seniority in the integrated cadre giving full credit to the length of service put in by them in their respective parent services.", "canonical_name": "BALAltRISHNA ERADI"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37835, "end_char": 37855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar seniority rule fol'!llulated by the State of Maharashtra in a somewhat like situation, when an integrated cadre consisting of personnel drawn from different sources was.formed in the State of Maharashtra for, administering the Rationing Scheme, was recently upheld by this Court in R.S. Makashi & Ors."}}, {"text": "Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Regulations, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41730, "end_char": 41787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "akrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42282, "end_char": 42296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter Order is in the following terms : ·\n\n\"(a) Officers holding equivalent substantive rank (no acting rank) will rank .according to their seniority in the substantive rank ; and\n\"-· .•\n\n), K{/MAR v. tJNiON oF INDIA (Ba/akrishna Eradi, J.) 469\n\n(b) Officers holding acting rank will rank after officers A holding corresponding substantive rank and in relation to each other, they will rank according io their seniority in the substantive rank.\""}}, {"text": "R & D Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42651, "end_char": 42669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The R & D Organisation is not an lnter-servic, ll Organisation within the meaning of the expression as used in the aforementioned Regulation and Order.. It is predominantly a civil organisation headed by a civilian Director-General and having a total strength of about 24,000 employees."}}, {"text": "Government of India Offioe Memorandum No. 9372Estt(D), Cabinet Secretariat, Department of Personnel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43908, "end_char": 44007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another argument advanced by the appellant was that the impugned rule cannot be upheld as valid inasmuch as it is in conflict with paragraph 7 of the Government of India Offioe Memorandum No."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44015, "end_char": 44028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9372Estt(D), Cabinet Secretariat, Department of Personnel, dated July 22, 1972, which is in the following terms :\n\n\"7."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44199, "end_char": 44217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Transferees :-(I) The relative seniority of persons appointed by transfer to Central Services from the subordinate offices of the Central Government or other department shall be determined in accordance with the order of their selection for such transfer.\""}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46377, "end_char": 46387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52306, "end_char": 52315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the appellant's posting to the D R&D Laboratory at Hyderabad and the allotment of specific assignments therein to the appellant from time to time."}}, {"text": "Section 340(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53342, "end_char": 53356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53358, "end_char": 53384, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_474_481_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 474\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nMarch 5, 1982\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA BRAD! AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nRajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, Jtction 6(3)\n\n(a) (i) read with the definition of\"settled village\" in section 2(n)-Scope of.\n\nThakur Sangram Singh, the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur. Hisjagir was resumed on 1st of July, 1954 under section 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952 entitling him to compensation on the date of resump.tion of his jagir under section 26 of the Jagirs Act. The compensation was to be determined according to the principles laid down in the Second Schedule attached to the Act. If the jagir was a ett1ed one the compensation would be assessed on the basis of the rent rates as settled in settlement operation which were prevalent on the date of resumption and <:S entered in the Revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6(3) (a)(i) read with the definition of \"settled village\"' con- E tained in section 2(n). If on the other hand, the jagir was an unsettled one the compensation would have to be assessed on the actual income from the rents during the three agricultural years: 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52 as provided in section 7 of the Act.\n\nPrior to the date of resumption settlement operation were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 in respect of the jagir. The rent rates proposed by the Settlement Officer were published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 23rd of August, 1952. The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July 1953 and, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, on Ist July, 1955, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government were in force, for the purpose of payment of compensation under the Jagirs Act.\n\nSangram Singh challenged the validity of the rent rates fixed under the settlement operation by means of a writ petition No. 308 of 1953. The High Court quashed the order settling the rent rates being. in -flagrant violations of sec. 82 (!)(a) and (b) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 with a direction to settle fresh rent rates in accordance with the said provision. Pursuant to the order of the High Court fresh rent rates were settled by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 with retrospective operation from !st July, 1953.\n\nAccording to the new settlement the total rental income from the jagir wa:& reduced from Rs. 1,31,657.48 to Rs. 82,501.50.\n\n--1\n\n-\"f-·\n\n• -\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN 475\n\nThe Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th November, 19fi0 granted compensation on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955. The Jagirdar unsuccessfully preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue. Sangram Singh died in the mean time so his' son the appellant challenged the order of the Board of Revenue on two grounds: (1) that the co1npensation should have been assessed on the basis of rent rates determined in 1953 as it stood on the date of resumption. (2) or in the absence-of a valid settlement on the basis of actual income from rents during the three agricultural years. Treating the Jagir as unsettled, the High Court rejected both the grounds. Hence the appeal by certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the qppeal and remanding the case, the Court\n\nHELD: I. As a result of the quashing of the order of Settlement of rent rates of 1953 by the High Court, the jagir would be taken as an unsettled one on the date of resumption. The quashing of the order of Settlement only means tabula rasa (dean slate) as if there was no determination of rent rates in 1953.\n\n[479 E-F]\n\n2. The criterion to determine whether a particular jagir is a settled one or not is to see whether the rent rates determined in settlement operations have been made applicable. It is only from the date of effectuation of a valid settlement of rent rates in respect of a particular jagir which makes the jagir a settled one. [480 C-D]\n\n3, Section 86 of the JaiPur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 clearly indicates that the rent fixed by the SettlemeLt Officer shall normally be payable from the first of July next foliowing the date of such order and.further authorises the Settlement Offier to make the same shall be payable from some earlier date.\n\nThe realisation of rent from a retrospective date will not make the jagir in ques- -tion a settled one as from that date. The settlement of rent rates is one thing and the realisation of rent on the basis of the settlement is quite another. In the case of a settled village the compensation would be determined on the basis of the rent rates settled during the settlement operation recorded in the Revenue Papers on the date of resumption. Thus it is the effectuation of the rent rates determined during the settlement mape prior to the date of resumption which would make the village a settled village as on that date. [480 F-HJ\n\nIn the instant case, the jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption. If the village was an unsettled village on the date of resumption he would be entitled to con1pensation on the basis of the village being un\n\nsettled. The right of compensation vested in the jagirdar on the date of resumption and he could not be deprived of bis right by a subsequent amendment unless\n\nthe amendment in law specifically or by necessary implication provided for depriving the jagirdar of his vested right. There is nothing in the definition of tho term \"settled\" under sec. 2 (n) of the Act or in sec. 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act to indicate that the Legislature intended to affect the vested right. [481 AD] '\n\nCIVIL APPEL~ATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1825 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment an order dated the 28th August, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Writ No. 365 of ~- 1962.\n\nS.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & S. K. Gupta for the Appellant.\n\nBadri Das Sharma for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J.\n\nThe present appeal by certificate granted under Article 133 (I) (a) of the Constitution is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 28th of August, 1969 dismissing writ petition No. 365 of 1962.\n\nThakur Sangram Singh~ the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur.\n\nHis jagir was resumed on 1st of July, 1954 under section 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as 'the Jagirs Act, 1952'. The Jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption of his jagir under section 26 of the Jagirs Act.\n\nThe compensation was to be determined according to the principles laid down in the second schedule attached to that Act.\n\nHe filed his claim for compensation in August, 1954.\n\nHe claimed compensation on the basis of rent rates which were in force on the date of resumption.\n\nIt appears that settlement operations were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.\n\nThe rent rates Pf•iposed by the Settlement Officer were published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 23rd of August, 1952. The final proposals of the Settlement Officer were sanctioned by the Government on 25th of November, 1953.\n\nThe rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July, 1953.\n\nObviously, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, 1st of July, 1954, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government on 25th November, 1953 were in force.\n\nSangram Singh, however, challenged the validity of the rent rates fixed under the settlement by means of writ petition No. 308 of\n\n• -\n\n• -\n\n1953, which was allowed by the High Court qn 23rd of November, 1954, quashing the rent rates as they were in flagrant violation of section 82 (I) (a) and (b) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.\n\nThe High Court gave a direction for fresh rates to be proposed in accordance with the said provisions. Pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 23rd November, 1954 the rent rates were revised and fresh rent rates were fixed by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 and they were applied retrospectively from !st of July, 1953. The revised rent rates were subs•antially lower than the rent rates assessed in 1953.\n\nAccording to the rent rates of 1953 the total rental income from the jagir was Rs.131,657.48 while accor\n\nding to the revised rent rates the rental income was reduced to Rs. 82,501.50.\n\nThe jagirder again filed a writ petition No. 135 of 1955 for a direction to the State Government not to apply the rent rates assessed in 1955 retrospectively with effect from 1st of July, 1953. The High Court, however, held that it was open to the Settlement Officer to apply rent rates retrospectively under section 86 of the Jaipur Stale Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.\n\nBut the High Court specifically left open the question whether or not the rent rates asses sed in 1955 and applied retrospectively from !St July, 1953 could form the basis for determining compensation payable to the jagirdar under the Act.\n\nWhen the jagirdar filed his claim for compensation in August, 1954 his writ petition challenging the rent rates enforced by the Government. order dated 25th of November, 1953 was pending. The jagirdar, therefore, based his claim for compensation alternatively under sections 6 and 7 respectively of the Jagirs Act. As pointed out earlier, on the basis of the settlement of 1953 the rental income from the jagir came to Rs. 1,31,657.48. If on the other hand the jagir was taken to be unsettled, he was entitled to compensation on the basis of actual rental income for three years which came to about Rs. 3 lakhs. The Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th of November, 1960 granted compensation on the basis of rent rates assessed in 1955.\n\nThe jagirdar preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue but the same was dismissed.\n\nSangram Singh died 'in December 1961 and the order of the H Board of Revenue was challenged by his son the petitioner appellant in the High Court of Rajasthan. Two alternative contentions were\n\nraised before the High Coun on behalf of the petitioner : (I) that the compensation should have been assessed on the basis of rent rates determined in 1953 as they were the rent rates assessed on the jagir lands as entered in the revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6 (3) (a) (i) read with the definition of 'settled village' contained in section 2 (n) as it stood on the date of resump tion; (2) that in the absence of a valid settlement on the date of resumption the jagir should be treated as. not being a 'settled village' and compensation . should be assessed on the actual income from rents during the three agricultural years; 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52, as provided in section 7 of the Act.\n\nThe High Court declined to accept either of the contentions.\n\nThe first contention was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the petitioner was estopped from taking up the position by his own conduct inasmuch as his father had challenged the rent rates assessed in 1953 by means of a writ petition which was allowed and the rent rates assessed in 195 3 were quashed,. and secondly because the rent rates assessed in 1953 were a nullity and in the eyes of law there were no valid rent rates assessed and entered in the revenue records on the basis of which compensation could have been determined. The second contention was also negatived on the ground that fresh rent rates in accordance with the directions of the High Court were assessed in 1955 and were applied retrospectively with effect from 1st July, 1953 and, therefore, the jagir could not be taken to be an unsettled village. The petitioner has now come to challenge the order of the High Court by the present appeal.\n\nIt may be pointed out that if the jagir was a settled one the compensation would be assessed on the basis of the rent rates as settled in settlement operations, which were prevalent on the date of resumption. and as entered in the revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6 (3} (a) (i} read with the definition of 'settled village' contained in section 2 (n). If on the other hand, the jagir was an unsettled one the compensation would have to be assessed on the actual income from the rents during the three agricultural years: 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52 as provided in section 7 of the Act.\n\nShri S.N. Kacker has contended on behalf of the appellant that the rent rates settleil in 1953 having been quashed by the High\n\n• -\n\n-:Y\n\n. \"\n\n• ...\n\n(°'-- y\n\nCourt, the jagir would be deemed to be an unsettled village and, therefore, the compensation should be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act and not in accordance with the rent rates determined in 1953. From the observations made by the High Court itself it is evident that the rent rates notified in 1953 were quashed as invalid.\n\nAfter the quashing of rent rates determined in 1953 it can by no stretch of imagination be said that the settlement made in . 1953 still stood for the purpose of deterninming the compensation for the jagir in question.\n\nShri Badri Das Sharma appearing for the State on the other hand has contended that it is true that the determination of rent rates in 19 53 had been quashed, but the High Court had directed re-determination of the rent rates in accordance with the provisions of section 82 and, therefore, the direction of the High Court was for rectifying the mistake that bad cropped in the determination of the rent rates of 1953 and if this be so, the rent rates determined in 1953 were still there and the compensation could be determined on that basis.\n\nHaving given our anxiou~ consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the parties we are of the positive view that after the quashing of the settlement made in 1953 it cannot be said that the settlement of the jagir still existed. It is to be noted at this stage that the settlement of 1953 was quashed by the High Court on the ground that the procedure laid down in the statute had not ben followed.\n\nThe quashing of such an order only means tabula rasa (clean slate) as if there was no determination of rent rates in 1953. In this view of the _matter the jagir would be taken to be an nsettled village on the date of resumption .\n\nShri Badri Das Sharma, however, contended that pursuant to the direction of the High Court in Writ No. 308 of 1953 fresh rent rates were assessed in 1955 which were made applicable with retrospective effect from !st of July, 1953 and that, therefore, the rent rates assessed in 1955 will be taken to be the rent rates prevalent on the date of resumption and as such the Board of Revenue as well as the High Court were fully justified in taking the view that compensation was to be determined on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955. _In sµpport of bis contention Sbri Sharma referred to the definition of the 'settled village' in section 2 (n), which reads:\n\n\"(n) 'Settled' when used with reference to a village or any other area, means the village or other area to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable whether prospectively or retrospectively, and the whole of such village or other area shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act and the rules and orders made thereunder, to be so settled if such rittes have been made so applicable to not less than three fourths of such village or other area.\"\n\nOn the strength of this definition it is sought to be contended that the jagir in question would be deemed to be a settled village as it is open to the authorities to apply the settlement either prospectively or retrospectively, and it was made applicable by the Settlement Officer retrospectively.\n\nWe are afraid, the argument cannot be accepted. The criterion to determine whether a particular jagir is a settled one or not is to see whether the rent rates determined in settlement operations have been made applicable. It is only from D the date of effectuation of a valid settlement of rent rates in respect of a particular jagir which makes the jagir a settled one.\n\nReliance was also placed on se.ction 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947, which runs thus:\n\n\"86. Any rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer under this Act shall be payable from th~ first day of July next following the date of such order, unless the Settlement Officer thinks fit, for any reasori to direct that it shall be payable from some earlier date.\"\n\nA plain reading of this section indicates that the rent fixed by the Settlement Officer shall normally be payable from l st of July next following the date of such order. The section, however, further authorises the Settlement Officer to direct that the same shall be payable from some earlier date. The realisation of rent from a retrospective date will not make the jagir in question a settled one as from that date.\n\nThe settlement of rent rates is one thing and the realisation of rent on the basis of the settlement is quite another.\n\nIn case of a settled village the compensation would be determined on the basis of the rent rates settled during a settlement operation recorded in the revenue papers on the date of resumption. \" Thus, it is the applicability of the rent rates determined during a settlement made prior to the date of resumption which would make the village a settled village as on that date.\n\n, ..\n\n• • _)\n\n• \"\n\n.. -\n\n_,,.\n\n• I \"\n\n• -\n\n-...\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH •• RA1ASTHAN (Misra,].) 481\n\nThere fs yet another aspect from which the matter can be looked into. The jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption and, therefore, we have to examine the position as it stood on the date of resumption. If the village was an unsettled village on the date of resumption he would be entitled to compensation on the basis of the village being unsettled. The right of compensation vested in the jagirdar on the date of resumption and he could not be deprived of his right by •a' subsequent amendment unless the amendment in law specifically or by necessary implication provided or depriving the jagirdar of his vested right.\n\nWe do not find anything in the definition of the term 'settled' under section 2 (n) of the Act or in section 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act to indicate that the legislature intended to affect the vested right.\n\nIn this view of the legal position, the jagir Commissioner was not justified in assessing the compensation on the basis of the assessment of rent rates in 1955. The only correct basis will be io treat the jagir in question as an unsettled one and determine the compensation in accordance with section 7 of the Act.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed with costs. The orders of the High Cou.rt, the Board of Revenue and tha{ of the Jagir Commissioner are set aside and the case is sent back to the Jagir Commissioner to determine the compensation afresh treating the jagir in question ro be unsettled one and in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act. The appellant will also be entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum on the amount of compensation so determined, from the date of resumption till the date of payment of the compensation .\n\nS.R. 'Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "474\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A 474\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nMarch 5, 1982\n\n[A.D. KOSHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA BRAD!"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Thakur Sangram Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 274, "end_char": 294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Sangram Singh, the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur.", "canonical_name": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN"}}, {"text": "1st of July, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hisjagir was resumed on 1st of July, 1954 under section 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952 entitling him to compensation on the date of resump.tion of his jagir under section 26 of the Jagirs Act."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 705, "end_char": 720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 6(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1307, "end_char": 1316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of D Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "23rd of August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rent rates proposed by the Settlement Officer were published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 23rd of August, 1952."}}, {"text": "1st of July 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1652, "end_char": 1668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July 1953 and, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, on Ist July, 1955, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government were in force, for the purpose of payment of compensation under the Jagirs Act."}}, {"text": "Ist July, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1723, "end_char": 1737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July 1953 and, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, on Ist July, 1955, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government were in force, for the purpose of payment of compensation under the Jagirs Act."}}, {"text": "Sangram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sangram Singh challenged the validity of the rent rates fixed under the settlement operation by means of a writ petition No."}}, {"text": "sec. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2126, "end_char": 2133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prior to the date of resumption settlement operation were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "statute": "Prior to the date of resumption settlement operation were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2156, "end_char": 2198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6th of June, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the order of the High Court fresh rent rates were settled by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 with retrospective operation from !"}}, {"text": "st July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st July, 1953."}}, {"text": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\"f-·\n\n• -\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN 475\n\nThe Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th November, 19fi0 granted compensation on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955.", "canonical_name": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN"}}, {"text": "Jagir Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\"f-·\n\n• -\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN 475\n\nThe Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th November, 19fi0 granted compensation on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955."}}, {"text": "25th November, 19fi0", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2671, "end_char": 2691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\"f-·\n\n• -\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN 475\n\nThe Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th November, 19fi0 granted compensation on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3335, "end_char": 3346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4091, "end_char": 4101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JaiPur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4109, "end_char": 4151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5643, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5964, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & S. K. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & S. K. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5989, "end_char": 5997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & S. K. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6000, "end_char": 6011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & S. K. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Badri Das Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6032, "end_char": 6048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Das Sharma for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Badri Das Sharma"}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J.\n\nThe present appeal by certificate granted under Article 133 (I) (a) of the Constitution is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 28th of August, 1969 dismissing writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th of August, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J.\n\nThe present appeal by certificate granted under Article 133 (I) (a) of the Constitution is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 28th of August, 1969 dismissing writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Thakur Sangram Singh~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6347, "end_char": 6368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Sangram Singh~ the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur.", "canonical_name": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6513, "end_char": 6523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jagirs Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "1st of July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July, 1953."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7606, "end_char": 7625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Obviously, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, 1st of July, 1954, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government on 25th November, 1953 were in force."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7914, "end_char": 7924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It appears that settlement operations were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "statute": "It appears that settlement operations were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 23rd November, 1954 the rent rates were revised and fresh rent rates were fixed by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 and they were applied retrospectively from !"}}, {"text": "st of July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8313, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of July, 1953."}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8913, "end_char": 8923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Jaipur Stale Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8931, "end_char": 8973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th of November, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order dated 25th of November, 1953 was pending."}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jaipur Stale Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Jaipur Stale Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "25th of November, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9871, "end_char": 9893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th of November, 1960 granted compensation on the basis of rent rates assessed in 1955."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10186, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sangram Singh died 'in December 1961 and the order of the H Board of Revenue was challenged by his son the petitioner appellant in the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10528, "end_char": 10537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10949, "end_char": 10958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11778, "end_char": 11792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second contention was also negatived on the ground that fresh rent rates in accordance with the directions of the High Court were assessed in 1955 and were applied retrospectively with effect from 1st July, 1953 and, therefore, the jagir could not be taken to be an unsettled village."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12243, "end_char": 12252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12324, "end_char": 12333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12552, "end_char": 12561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12885, "end_char": 12894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13328, "end_char": 13338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Badri Das Sharma appearing for the State on the other hand has contended that it is true that the determination of rent rates in 19 53 had been quashed, but the High Court had directed re-determination of the rent rates in accordance with the provisions of section 82 and, therefore, the direction of the High Court was for rectifying the mistake that bad cropped in the determination of the rent rates of 1953 and if this be so, the rent rates determined in 1953 were still there and the compensation could be determined on that basis."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13579, "end_char": 13589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Badri Das Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14506, "end_char": 14522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Badri Das Sharma, however, contended that pursuant to the direction of the High Court in Writ No.", "canonical_name": "Badri Das Sharma"}}, {"text": "Sbri Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15072, "end_char": 15083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In sµpport of bis contention Sbri Sharma referred to the definition of the 'settled village' in section 2 (n), which reads:\n\n\"(n) 'Settled' when used with reference to a village or any other area, means the village or other area to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable whether prospectively or retrospectively, and the whole of such village or other area shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act and the rules and orders made thereunder, to be so settled if such rittes have been made so applicable to not less than three fourths of such village or other area.\""}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16380, "end_char": 16422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Any rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16447, "end_char": 16511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17679, "end_char": 17698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• I \"\n\n• -\n...\n\nTHAKUR NARAIN SINGH •• RA1ASTHAN (Misra,].)", "canonical_name": "THAKUR NARAIN SINGH V. RAJASTHAN"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18445, "end_char": 18454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18476, "end_char": 18486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18895, "end_char": 18904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19248, "end_char": 19257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_47_57_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "MtJNNA & OTHERS ETC.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ETC.\n\nJanuary 19, 1982\n\n[P.N. BHAOWATI AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 32-Juvenile undertriaJ prisors-111treatmtnt ana exploitation in jail-Newspaper report-Writ petition filed seeking relief-A/legations denied by jailor-Al/egations h\"eld seTious-Writ petition cannot be summarily dismissed.\n\nCrime and Punishment-Juvenile delinquency-Inhibition against sending children to jail-Person under sixteen years of agt-Not to he sent to Jail- Detention in Children's Home or 'Place of safe'-Necessity of-Duty of Magistrates.\n\nUttar Pradesh Childrtn Act 1951, ss. 2(9), 29, 30, 32 and 33 & Uttar Pradesh Children's Rules 1962, Ru/ts U and 15. Child-Arrtsted for offenct-Not rtleastd on bail-Cannot be sent to jail-Detention in 'place of safety' or Children's Homt- Statutory requirement-Government to implement provisions of A.ct-Setting up plaCes for detention for chiJdren-Necessity of.\n\nThree writ petitions wCre filed alleging on tbe basis of a news report in the Indian Express dated 2nd December, 1981 that one Mr. Madhu Mehta had visited the Kanpur Central Jail incognito and found several juvenile undertrial prisors lodged there even though there was a Cbildten's Home in Kanpur, and that these juvenile prisoners were being sexually exploited by adult prisoners.\n\nNotice was issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nIn the meanwhile a writ petition was filed in the High Court of Allahabad seeking relief in respect of these juvenile undertrial prisoners.\n\nThe High Court decided to investigate and by its order dated 18th December, 1981 directed the Sessions Judge of Kanpur to visit the Jail and to report whether any dctcou below the age of 16 years was detaiOed, whether any detenu below the age of 21 years was being kept under fetters, and whether they were subjected to torture by adult prisoners as alleged in the writ petition. The Sessions Judge visited the Jail on 21st December, 1981 and submitted his report dated 22nd December, 1981 to the High Court.\n\nThe report stated that there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of sixteen in the jail and that one Des Raj was transferred to the Children's Home on 19th December, 1981 and that the rest of the prisoners happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981 before the order of the High Court on 18th December, 1981. .The Sessions Judge in Annexure •A' to his report gave the names, ages and other particulars of 84 undertriaJ prisoners who according to the jail report were above 16 but below 21 years of age and stated that he had nine from among these undertrial prisoners examined by the Chief Medical Officer and appended the report as Annexure 'B'.\n\nHe fUrther reported about the general ignorance of the provisions of the Uttar\n\nPradesh Children's Act, l~SI and stated that he bad instructed the Jail Superin-\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.e.\n\ntendent and the Jail Doctor that in case of any doubt about the age of an under .. trial pr)soner they should instead of relying upon the Police papers with regard to age, obtain the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer.\n\nIn the writ petitions, it was\n\nHELO : 1. The allegations made in the writ petition are serious. lf correct they disclose to what utter depth of depravity man can sink.\n\nThe Court cannot abdicate its c_onstitutional duty of ensuring human dignity to the juvenile under. trial prisoners and summarily throw out the writ petitions me'rcly on the basis of a denial made by the Assistant Jailer. Tho instant case must be investigated not only in the interest of fair administration of justice but 3.lso for enforcing the basic human rights of undertrial prisoners who are alleged to have been illtreated. [53 D-E]\n\n2. Juvenile delinquency is, by and large, a product of social and economic mal-adjustment. Even if it is found that juveniles have committed any offence they cannot be allowed to be mal-treated.\n\nThey do not shed their fundamental rights when they enter the jail. [53 EF]\n\n3. The object of punishment being reformation, no social objective ca.n be gained by sending juveniles to jails where they would come into contact with hardened criminals and lose whatever sensitivity they may have to finer and nobler sentiments, That is the reason why Children Acts are enacted by States all over the country and the Uttar Pradesh Legislature has also enacted the Uttar Pradesh Children Act 1951. [53 F-G]\n\n4. The inhibition against sending a child to jaif does not depend upon any - proof that he is a child under the age of 16 years but as soon as it appears that a person arrested is apparently under the age of 16 yc-ars this inhibition is attracted. The reason for this inhibition lies in the solicitude which the Jaw entertains for juveniles below the age of 16 years. [55 H, 56 A]\n\n5. The law is very much concerned to see that juveniles do not come into contact with hardened criminals and that chances of reformation are not blighted by contact with criminal offenders.\n\nThe law throws a cloak of protection round juveniles and seeks to isolate them from criminal offenders, because the emphasis placed by the Jaw is not on incarceration but on reformation~ [56 B]\n\n6. When a child is arrested for an offence and is not released on bail, he cannot be sent to jail but he must be detained in a 'place of safety' as defined in section 2 subsection (9) of the Act. The manner in which a child can be detained is prescribed in the Uttar Pradesh Children's Rules, 1962.\n\nRule 14 provides that except as provided in the Act, where a child having been arrested is not released on bail under section 23, the officer-in-charge of the Police Station shall cause him to be detained in a 'place of safety' until he can be brought before a court, and Rule 15 says that except as provided in the Act where a child is not released on bail, the court shall on remanding or committing a child for trial order him to be detained in a 'place of safety' pending the disposal of the proceedings.\n\n[55 G-H, 55 DF]\n\n7. How anxious is the. law to protect young children from contamination with hardened criminals is apparent from section 27 of the Act which provides\n\ni.iUNNA V. U.P. STATB 49 ,\n\nsubject only to a few limited and exceptional cases referred to in the proviso, that notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary, no court can sentence a / . child to death or transportation or imprisonment for any term-or commit him to prison in default of payment of ftno.\n\nEven where a child is convicted of an offence, he is not to be sent to a prison but ho may be committed_ to an approved school under section 29 or _be either discharged or committed to suitable custody under section 30.\n\nEven where a child is found to have committed an offence of so serious a nature that that court is of opinion that no punishment which under the provisions of the Act it is authorised to inflict, is sufficient section 32 provides that tho offender shall not be sent to jail but shall be kept in safe custodyin such place or manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for tke order of the State\n\nGovernment.\n\nSection 33 sets out various methods Of dealing with children charged with offences.\n\nBut in no case except the exceptional ones mentioned in the Act, a child can be sent to jail.\n\n8(i) It is impressed upon tho magistrates in the State of Uttar Pradesh and also in the other parts of tho country that whore !the Children Acts are in force they must be extremely careful to see that no person apparently under the age of 16 years is sent to jail but he must be detained in a Children's Home or other 'place of safety'. (ii) It is absolutely essential in order to implement the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951 that Children's Home or other suitable places of safety afe set up by the Government for the purpose of providing a place of detention for children under the age of 16 years. [56 CH, '7 A)\n\nThe Court also gave the followin11 directions :\n\n(I) Since the Assistant Jailor has denied the visit of Shri Madhu Mehta, it\n\nis necessary that Shri Madhu Mehta should be impleaded as a party respondent E to th~, writ petitions so that he can state arr oath whether he visited the Jail, and if so what were the facts which he observed. [53 B-CJ ·\n\n(2) The Superintendent of the Jail to inform by a proper affidavit as to what were the circumstances in which the six: children whose names are given at serial numbers 2 to 7 in Annexure 'B' were released and also produce the orders of the Magistrate directing their.release. He is also to inform wJly Des Raj was detained in tho Jail from. 7th March, 1981 though he was admittedly even on the basis of the jail records a child below 16 years of age and how it happened that suddenly on 19th December; 1981 an order wa-s obtained for transferring bi(ll to the Children's Home. The State of Uttar Pritdesh and the Superiniendent of the Jail will explain why an order for transfer of Des Raj to the Children's Home could not be obtained earlier. [54 C-E)\n\n(3) The Registrar of the High Court to forward immediately copies of all Annexures to the Report of the Sessions Judge. [54 F)\n\n(4) According to tho report of the Sessions Judge there were seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of 16 years. Out of these six were released prior to the_ visit of the Sessions Judge, and they could not, therefore, be interviewed. Shri O.P. Garg, Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh State Board of Legal Aid and Advice to immediately contact these six children after finding out their addresse{ either from the court proceedings or from .the jail records and take\n\n50 StJPRllMB CotJlT lBPOllTS [ 1982) 3 s.c.a.\n\nA *heir statements with a view to ascertain w1lat was the treatment mented Out to them in the jail and whether any of them was mal-treated. The report to be submitted on or before 27th January, 1982. [53 GH, 54 A-BJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION I Writ Petition Nos. 9133, 8974 of 1981 & 6 of 1982.\n\nUnder article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nKrishan Mahajan for the Petitioner in WP. 6/82.\n\nMiss Lily Thomas for the Petitioner in WP. 8974/81.\n\nMrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner in WP. 9133/81.\n\nR.K. Bhatt for Respondent in all WPs.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. These three writ petitions come before us on notice to the State of U ttar Pradesh. They seek relief in respect of certain juvenile undertrial prisoners in the Kanpur Central Jail. The allegations in respect of these juvenile undertrial prisoners are that though there is a Children's Home in Kanpur, these juvenile undertrial prisoners who arc, according to the allegations in the writ petitioners, more than JOO in number are lodged in the Kanpur Central Jail instead of being sent to the Children's Home and they are being sexually exploited by the adult prisoners.\n\nThese allegations are based on a news report published in the issue of the Indian Express dated 2nd December, 1981 where a reference is made to a visit of Shri Madhu Mehta of the Hindustani Andolan to the Kanpur Central Jail incognito. Shri Madhu Mehta, according to this news report, found that \"young boys of JO to 14 years\" were being \"supplied to convicts for their delectation\" and a boy named Munna whom he met, was in agony because \"after the way he was used, he was unable to sit.\" When these three writ petitions based on the news report came up for admission, it was not possible to state whether these allegation' contained in the news report were correct or not. But if they were correct, they disclosed an extremely distressing state of affairs and they were sufficient to shock the conscience of the court. The Court, therefore, issued notice to the State of Uttar Pradesh in each of these three writ petitions. But, it appears that, in the, meanwhile, a writ petition bearing number 14645 of 1981 was also filed in the High Court of Allahabad by an organisation called\n\nj ,\n\n; I\n\nMUNNA ' U.P. STATB (Bhagwatl, 1.) 51\n\nHuman Rights Organisation seeking relief in respect of these juvenile undertrial prisoners and on this writ petition, the High Court of Allahabad rightly activated itself and decided to investigate into the matter and with that end in view, made an order dated 18th December, 1981 requesting the senior most Sessions Judge of Kanpur to visit the Kanpur Central Jail and to make a report on the following points:\n\nWhether there is any detenu below the age of 16 years who is being detained in the Dist!. Jail, Kanpur ? if so, the names of such detenus and the offences in connection with which they are being detained be indicated.\n\nWhether any detenu below the age of 21 years is being kept under fetters or was being kept under fetters ?\n\nWhether any such person is being subjected to torture of the nature mentioned in the petition ?\n\nWhether such inmates of the prison are being provided with proper medical facilities ?\n\nThe Sessions Judge accordingly visited the Kanpur Central Jail on 21st December, 1981 and submitted his Report dated 22nd December, 1981 to the High Court of Allahabad.\n\nWe do not propose to consider this Report in detail at this stage, but suffice it to state that according to this Report, there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of 16 in the Kanpur Central Jail, but, curiously enough, barring one Deshraj who was transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur on 19th December, 1981, all the rest happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981, before the order made by the Allahabad High Court on 18th December, 1981. It is rather interesting to note that the news report in the issue of the Indian Express was published on 2nd December, 1981 and writ. petition No. 8974/81 which is the first of these three writ petitions was filed by Miss Lily Thomas on 3rd December, 1981 and these juvenile underttial prisoners were released within a few days of the publication of the news report and the filing of the writ petition. Even so far as Deshraj is concerned, though he was admitted in the Kanpur Central Jail on 7th March, 198.1 he was not transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur until 19th December, 1981 after the order was made by the Allahabad High Court.\n\nThe consequence of release of these undertrial juvenile prisoners, except Deshraj, was that the Sessions Judge could not\n\n52 sUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.f!..\n\ninterview any of them when he visited the Kanpur Central Jail on 21st December, 1981.\n\nThe Sessions Judge gave in Annexure A to his Report the names, ages and other particulars of 84 undertrial prisoners who, according to the jail record, were above 16 but below 21 years of age and added that the possibility could not be ruled out that on proper scientific medical examination, three or four out of these 84 undertrial prisoners might be found to be below 16 years ofage. The Sessions Judge picked out nine from amongst these undertrial prisoners and got them examined by the Chief Medical Officer and enclosed the Report of the Chief Medical Officer as Annexure B to his Report.\n\nThe Sessions Judge also reported that there appeared to be general ignorance in the Kanpur Central Jail about the provisions of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 and observed:\n\n\"All the child accused mentioned in Annexure B should have been produced before the Juvenile Judge after their arrest. Where there was doubt \"hether the detenu was above the age of 16 or below it, he should have been sent for medical report in connection with his age and on being found to be a child, should have been dealt in accordance with the Children Act.\"\n\nThe Sessions Judge instructed the Jail Superintendent and the jail doctor that in case there was any doubt about the age of an undertrial prisoner, they should instead of relying upon the police papers with regard to age, obtain the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer and \"apprise the court concerned of it so that the presiding officer directs the accused to be produced before the Juvenile Judge to enable him to take the benefit of the provisions of the Children Act for a better social order.\" We do not know what order has been passed by the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition before it but when these three writ petitions came up for hearing before us on 5th January, \\982, the Report of the Sessions Jdge was placed before us and an affidavit in reply was also filed by the Assistant Jailer of the Kanpur Central Jail denying the allegations made in the news report.\n\nNow in the first place, since these three writ petitions are based upon certain statements said to have been made by Shri Madhu Mehta and set out in the news report of the Indian Express;\n\nwe think it would be desirable to join Shri Madhu Mehta as a party\n\nrespondent in each of the three writ petitions, so that he can place before the court all the facts gathered by him in regard to the juvenile inlnates of the Kanpur Central Jail. The Assistant Jailer has in bis affidavit in reply disputed that Shri Madhu Mehta ever visited the jail, but since, according to the news report, Sbri Madbu Mehta entered the jail incognito, it is quite possible that the Assistant Jailer may not have any record of his visit.\n\nBut, since the Assistant Jailer bas denie.d the visit of Shri Madbu Mehta, we think it necessary that Shri Madhu Mehta should be impleaded as a party respondent to the writ petitions so that he can state on oath whether he visited the Kanpur Central Jail and if so, what were the fact which he observed.\n\nWe cannot reject in limine the allegations made in the news report in regard to what Shri Madho Mehta found in the course of his visit to the Kanpur Central Jail, merely because the\n\nAssist3nt Jailer bas disputed the visit of Sbri Madhu Mehta.\n\nThe allegations are indeed so serious and, if correct, disclose to what utter depths of depravity man can sink, that the court cannot abdicate its constitutional duty of tnsuring huma'n dignity to the juvenile undertrial prisoners and summarily throw out the three writ petitions merely on the basis of a denial made by the Assistant Jailer.\n\nWe must investigate into this matter not only in the interest of fair administration of justice but also for enforcing the basic human rights of these unfortunate juvenile undertrial prisoners who are alleged t~ have been.the victims of sexual exploitation. Juvenile delinquency is, by and large, a product of social and economic maladi\\lstment.\n\nEven if it is found that these juveniles have committed any offences, they cannot be allowed to be mal-treated. They do not shed their fundamental rights when they enter the jail. Moreover, the object of punishment being reformation, we fail to see what social objective can be gained by sending juveniles to jails where they would come into contact with hardened criminals and lose whatever sensitivity they may have to finer and nobler sentiments. That is the , reason why Children Acts are enacted by States all over the country and the U.P. Legislature bas also enacted the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951.\n\nSince, according. to the Report of the Sessions Judge, there were 7 juvenile undertrial prisoper below the age of 16 years, that being the limit of age below which a juvenile would be regarded as a 'child' within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951, and out of these seven child undertrial prisoners, six were released prior to the visit of the Session Judge and they could not therefore be interviewed by the Sessions Judge, we would direct Shri Q.P, Gar~, Secretary of the T, J.p. tate !}oar<). of Leal Aid ang\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nAdvice, to immediately contact these six children after finding out their addresses either from the court proceedings or from the jail records and take their statements with a view to ascertaining what was the treatment meted out to them in the Kanpur Central Jail and whether any cf them was mal-treated or sexually exploited.\n\nShri O.P. Garg will immediately without any delay, proceed to take the statements of these six children and submit them to this Court along with bis report on or before 27th January, 1982. His expenses may be met by the U.P. State Board of Legal Aid and Advice.\n\nWe should also like the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Superintendent of the Kanpur Central Jail to inform us by a proper affidavit before the next hearing of the writ petitions as to what were the circumstances in which these six children whose names are given at serial numbers 2 to 7 in Annexure B were released, and also produce before us the orders of the Magistrates directing their release.\n\nWe should also like the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Superintendent of the Kanpur Central Jail to inform us as to why Deshraj was detained in the Kanpur Central Jail from 7th March, 1981 though he was admittedly, even on the basis of the jail records, a child below 16 years of age and how did it happen that suddenly on 19th December, 1981, an order was obtained for transferring him to the Children's Home, Kanpur. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Superintendent of the Kanpur Central Jail will also explain as to why such an order for transfer of Desbraj to the Children's Home Kanpur could not be obtained earlier.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh handed over to us copies of Annexures A and B, but we do not have copies of the other annexures to the Report of the Sessions Judge.\n\nWe would therefore request the Registrar of the High Court of Allahabad to forward to us immediately copies of all the annexures to the Report of the Sessions Judge. The copies may be in quaduplicate.\n\nSince, according to the Report of the Sessions Judge, 7 children were lodged in the Kanpur Central Jail and perhaps a few more out of the 84 undertrial prisoners mentioned in Annexure A to the Report of the Sessions Judge could possibly .he children within the meaning of Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951, we think it is necessary to point out that under the provisions of that Act, no\n\nhild can, except in the r11re cases provided in the Act, be detained\n\n. -.r\n\n1 ,_. --\n\nin jail. Chapter IV of the Act deah with youthful offenders.\n\nSection 23 which occurs in this chapter provides in sub-section (I) that when a person apparently under the age of 16 years is arrested for a nonbailable offence and cannot be brought forth before a court, the oflicerin-charge of the police station to which such person is brought may in any case and shall unless the offence is one of culpable homicide or-is an offence punishable with death or transportation release him on bail unless for reasons to be recorded In_ writing the officer believes that such release will bring him into association with any reputed criminal or expose him to moral danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. Section 24 then proceeds to enact that when a person apparently under the age of 16 years having been arrested is not released under section 23 or otherwise, the officer-in-charge of the police station, shall cause hini to be detained in the prescribed manner until he can he brought before a court. So also section 25 provides that a court, on remand ing or committing for trial a child who is not released on bail, shall order him to be detained in the prescribed manner.\n\nThe manner in which a child can be detained is prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Children Rules, I 962 made in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (I) of section 88 of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951.\n\nRules 14 and 15 are the relevant rules which make provision in this behalf.\n\nRule I 4 provides that except as provided in the Act, where a child having been arrested is not released on bail under section 23, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall cause him to be detained ic a place of safety until he can he brought before a court and rule I 5 says that except as provided in the Act, where a child is not released on bail, the court shall on remanding or committing a child for trial order him to be detained in a place of safety pending the disposal of the proceeding. What is a \"place of safety\" is defined in section 2, sub-section (9) of the Act to mean, \"any observation home or any orphanage, hospital, or any other ; suitable place or institution, the occupier or manager of which is williug temporarily to receive a child, or where such observation home, orphanage, hospital or other suitable place of institution is not available in the case of a male child only, a police station in which_ arrangements are available or can be made for the safe keeping of a child separately from adult offenders.\" It is therefore clear that when a child is arrested for an offence and is not released on bail, be cannot be sent to jail but be must be detained in a place of safety as defined in section 2 sub-section (9) of the Act.\n\nThe inhibition 1111ainst sending a ~!!!Id to jail docs not depend upon any proof that\n\nSUPRE MB COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nhe is a child under the age of 16 years hut as soon as it appears that a person arrested is apparently _under the age of 16 years this inhibition is attracted.\n\nThe reaaon for this inhibition lies in the court solitude which the]law entertains for juveniles below the age of 16 years. The law ii very much oncerned to see that juvenile do not come into contact with hardened criminals and their chances of reformation are not blighted by contact with criminal offenders.\n\nThe law throws a clock of protection round juveniles and seeks to isolate them from criminal offenders, because the emphasis placed by the law is not on incarceration but on reformation.\n\nHow anxious is the law to protect young children from contamination with hardened criminals is also apparent from section 27 of the Act which provides, subject only to a few limited and exceptional cases referred to in the proviso, that notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary, no court can sentence a child to death or transportation or imprisonment for any term or commit him to prison in default of payment of fine.\n\nIt would thus be seen that even where a child is convicted of an offence, he it not to be sent to a prison but he may be committed to an approved school under section 29 or either discharged or committed to suitable custody under section 30.\n\nEven where a child is found to have committed an offence of so serious a nature that the court is of opinion that no punishment which under the provisions of the Act it is authorised to inflict is sufficient, section 32 provides that the offender shall not be sent to jail but shall be kept in safe custody in such place or manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the orders of the State Government.\n\nSection 33, sets out various methods of dealing with . ' children charged with offences. But in no case except the exceptional ones mentioned in the Act, a child can be sent to jail. It is therefore very surprising that the seven children whose names are mentioned in Annexure B to the Report of the Sessions Judge were sent by the concerned Magistrate to jail instead of being sent to Children's Home which we believe was a place of safety in Kanpur within the meaning of section 2 sub-section (9) of the Act.\n\nWe would strongly impress upon the magistrates in the State of Uttar Pradesh-and what we say here must apply mutatis mutandis to the magistrates in the other parts of the country where the Children Acts are in force, that they must be extremely careful to see that no person apparently under the age of 16 years is sent to jail but he must be detained in a Children's Home or other place of safety. It is absolutely essential in order to implement the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951 that children's Home or other\n\nsuitable places of safety are set up by the government for the purpose of providing a place of detention for children under the age of 16 years. No words we can use would be strong enough to convey our feelings in this respect. A nation which is not concerned with the welfare of its children cannot look forward to a bright future.\n\nWith these observations, we adjourn the hearing of these three writ petitions' to 29th January, 1982.\n\nN.V.K.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "MtJNNA & OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNNA & OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 19, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 19, 1982\n\n[P.N. BHAOWATI AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Childrtn Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2(9), 29, 30, 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh Childrtn Act 1951", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh Childrtn Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Madhu Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three writ petitions wCre filed alleging on tbe basis of a news report in the Indian Express dated 2nd December, 1981 that one Mr. Madhu Mehta had visited the Kanpur Central Jail incognito and found several juvenile undertrial prisors lodged there even though there was a Cbildten's Home in Kanpur, and that these juvenile prisoners were being sexually exploited by adult prisoners.", "canonical_name": "Madhu Mehta"}}, {"text": "Kanpur Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1116, "end_char": 1135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three writ petitions wCre filed alleging on tbe basis of a news report in the Indian Express dated 2nd December, 1981 that one Mr. Madhu Mehta had visited the Kanpur Central Jail incognito and found several juvenile undertrial prisors lodged there even though there was a Cbildten's Home in Kanpur, and that these juvenile prisoners were being sexually exploited by adult prisoners."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1248, "end_char": 1254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three writ petitions wCre filed alleging on tbe basis of a news report in the Indian Express dated 2nd December, 1981 that one Mr. Madhu Mehta had visited the Kanpur Central Jail incognito and found several juvenile undertrial prisors lodged there even though there was a Cbildten's Home in Kanpur, and that these juvenile prisoners were being sexually exploited by adult prisoners."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1366, "end_char": 1388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice was issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1441, "end_char": 1464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile a writ petition was filed in the High Court of Allahabad seeking relief in respect of these juvenile undertrial prisoners."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Kanpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court decided to investigate and by its order dated 18th December, 1981 directed the Sessions Judge of Kanpur to visit the Jail and to report whether any dctcou below the age of 16 years was detaiOed, whether any detenu below the age of 21 years was being kept under fetters, and whether they were subjected to torture by adult prisoners as alleged in the writ petition."}}, {"text": "21st December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1951, "end_char": 1970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge visited the Jail on 21st December, 1981 and submitted his report dated 22nd December, 1981 to the High Court."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge visited the Jail on 21st December, 1981 and submitted his report dated 22nd December, 1981 to the High Court."}}, {"text": "Des Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2173, "end_char": 2180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of sixteen in the jail and that one Des Raj was transferred to the Children's Home on 19th December, 1981 and that the rest of the prisoners happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981 before the order of the High Court on 18th December, 1981.", "canonical_name": "Des Raj"}}, {"text": "19th December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2223, "end_char": 2242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of sixteen in the jail and that one Des Raj was transferred to the Children's Home on 19th December, 1981 and that the rest of the prisoners happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981 before the order of the High Court on 18th December, 1981."}}, {"text": "7th and 16th December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2329, "end_char": 2356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of sixteen in the jail and that one Des Raj was transferred to the Children's Home on 19th December, 1981 and that the rest of the prisoners happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981 before the order of the High Court on 18th December, 1981."}}, {"text": "18th December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2395, "end_char": 2414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of sixteen in the jail and that one Des Raj was transferred to the Children's Home on 19th December, 1981 and that the rest of the prisoners happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981 before the order of the High Court on 18th December, 1981."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4396, "end_char": 4421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of punishment being reformation, no social objective ca.n be gained by sending juveniles to jails where they would come into contact with hardened criminals and lose whatever sensitivity they may have to finer and nobler sentiments, That is the reason why Children Acts are enacted by States all over the country and the Uttar Pradesh Legislature has also enacted the Uttar Pradesh Children Act 1951. ["}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6194, "end_char": 6204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7179, "end_char": 7189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8(i) It is impressed upon tho magistrates in the State of Uttar Pradesh and also in the other parts of tho country that whore !"}}, {"text": "is absolutely essential in order to implement the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8684, "end_char": 8699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7th March, 1981 though he was admittedly even on the basis of the jail records a child below 16 years of age and how it happened that suddenly on 19th December; 1981 an order wa-s obtained for transferring bi(ll to the Children's Home."}}, {"text": "19th December; 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7th March, 1981 though he was admittedly even on the basis of the jail records a child below 16 years of age and how it happened that suddenly on 19th December; 1981 an order wa-s obtained for transferring bi(ll to the Children's Home."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pritdesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8924, "end_char": 8947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pritdesh and the Superiniendent of the Jail will explain why an order for transfer of Des Raj to the Children's Home could not be obtained earlier. ["}}, {"text": "O.P. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9475, "end_char": 9484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri O.P. Garg, Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh State Board of Legal Aid and Advice to immediately contact these six children after finding out their addresse{ either from the court proceedings or from .the jail records and take\n\n50 StJPRllMB CotJlT lBPOllTS [ 1982) 3 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9503, "end_char": 9528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri O.P. Garg, Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh State Board of Legal Aid and Advice to immediately contact these six children after finding out their addresse{ either from the court proceedings or from .the jail records and take\n\n50 StJPRllMB CotJlT lBPOllTS [ 1982) 3 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10045, "end_char": 10055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10063, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishan Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10087, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishan Mahajan for the Petitioner in WP."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Lily Thomas for the Petitioner in WP.", "canonical_name": "Lily Thomas"}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10194, "end_char": 10206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner in WP."}}, {"text": "R.K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10243, "end_char": 10253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt for Respondent in all WPs."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. These three writ petitions come before us on notice to the State of U ttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State of U ttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10395, "end_char": 10418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. These three writ petitions come before us on notice to the State of U ttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Munna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11305, "end_char": 11310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Madhu Mehta, according to this news report, found that \"young boys of JO to 14 years\" were being \"supplied to convicts for their delectation\" and a boy named Munna whom he met, was in agony because \"after the way he was used, he was unable to sit.\""}}, {"text": "Deshraj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not propose to consider this Report in detail at this stage, but suffice it to state that according to this Report, there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of 16 in the Kanpur Central Jail, but, curiously enough, barring one Deshraj who was transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur on 19th December, 1981, all the rest happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981, before the order made by the Allahabad High Court on 18th December, 1981.", "canonical_name": "Des Raj"}}, {"text": "'s Home Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13440, "end_char": 13454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not propose to consider this Report in detail at this stage, but suffice it to state that according to this Report, there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of 16 in the Kanpur Central Jail, but, curiously enough, barring one Deshraj who was transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur on 19th December, 1981, all the rest happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981, before the order made by the Allahabad High Court on 18th December, 1981."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13601, "end_char": 13621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not propose to consider this Report in detail at this stage, but suffice it to state that according to this Report, there were admittedly seven juvenile undertrial prisoners below the age of 16 in the Kanpur Central Jail, but, curiously enough, barring one Deshraj who was transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur on 19th December, 1981, all the rest happened to be released on different dates between 7th and 16th December, 1981, before the order made by the Allahabad High Court on 18th December, 1981."}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13752, "end_char": 13770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is rather interesting to note that the news report in the issue of the Indian Express was published on 2nd December, 1981 and writ."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13869, "end_char": 13880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8974/81 which is the first of these three writ petitions was filed by Miss Lily Thomas on 3rd December, 1981 and these juvenile underttial prisoners were released within a few days of the publication of the news report and the filing of the writ petition.", "canonical_name": "Lily Thomas"}}, {"text": "3rd December, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13884, "end_char": 13902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8974/81 which is the first of these three writ petitions was filed by Miss Lily Thomas on 3rd December, 1981 and these juvenile underttial prisoners were released within a few days of the publication of the news report and the filing of the writ petition."}}, {"text": "Deshraj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so far as Deshraj is concerned, though he was admitted in the Kanpur Central Jail on 7th March, 198.1 he was not transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur until 19th December, 1981 after the order was made by the Allahabad High Court.", "canonical_name": "Des Raj"}}, {"text": "7th March, 198.1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14140, "end_char": 14156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so far as Deshraj is concerned, though he was admitted in the Kanpur Central Jail on 7th March, 198.1 he was not transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur until 19th December, 1981 after the order was made by the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Children's Home Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14187, "end_char": 14209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so far as Deshraj is concerned, though he was admitted in the Kanpur Central Jail on 7th March, 198.1 he was not transferred to the Children's Home Kanpur until 19th December, 1981 after the order was made by the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15278, "end_char": 15296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5th January, \\982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16346, "end_char": 16363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know what order has been passed by the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition before it but when these three writ petitions came up for hearing before us on 5th January, \\982, the Report of the Sessions Jdge was placed before us and an affidavit in reply was also filed by the Assistant Jailer of the Kanpur Central Jail denying the allegations made in the news report."}}, {"text": "Madbu Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Jailer has in bis affidavit in reply disputed that Shri Madhu Mehta ever visited the jail, but since, according to the news report, Sbri Madbu Mehta entered the jail incognito, it is quite possible that the Assistant Jailer may not have any record of his visit.", "canonical_name": "Madhu Mehta"}}, {"text": "Madho Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17668, "end_char": 17679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We cannot reject in limine the allegations made in the news report in regard to what Shri Madho Mehta found in the course of his visit to the Kanpur Central Jail, merely because the\n\nAssist3nt Jailer bas disputed the visit of Sbri Madhu Mehta.", "canonical_name": "Madhu Mehta"}}, {"text": "Legislature bas also enacted the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19058, "end_char": 19123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19358, "end_char": 19390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Q.P, Gar~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19589, "end_char": 19598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Report of the Sessions Judge, there were 7 juvenile undertrial prisoper below the age of 16 years, that being the limit of age below which a juvenile would be regarded as a 'child' within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951, and out of these seven child undertrial prisoners, six were released prior to the visit of the Session Judge and they could not therefore be interviewed by the Sessions Judge, we would direct Shri Q.P, Gar~, Secretary of the T, J.p."}}, {"text": "27th January, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20194, "end_char": 20212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri O.P. Garg will immediately without any delay, proceed to take the statements of these six children and submit them to this Court along with bis report on or before 27th January, 1982."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20245, "end_char": 20261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His expenses may be met by the U.P. State Board of Legal Aid and Advice."}}, {"text": "Desbraj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21241, "end_char": 21248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Superintendent of the Kanpur Central Jail will also explain as to why such an order for transfer of Desbraj to the Children's Home Kanpur could not be obtained earlier.", "canonical_name": "Des Raj"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21989, "end_char": 22021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22200, "end_char": 22221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22253, "end_char": 22263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22911, "end_char": 22921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23044, "end_char": 23054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23219, "end_char": 23229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23553, "end_char": 23563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23571, "end_char": 23603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23802, "end_char": 23812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24231, "end_char": 24240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24908, "end_char": 24917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25848, "end_char": 25858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26324, "end_char": 26334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26395, "end_char": 26405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26617, "end_char": 26627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26823, "end_char": 26833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27296, "end_char": 27305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is absolutely essential in order to implement the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27737, "end_char": 27837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th January, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28285, "end_char": 28303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With these observations, we adjourn the hearing of these three writ petitions' to 29th January, 1982."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_482_490_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 482\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nMOHD. ASHRAFUDDIN\n\nMarrh 5, 1982 • [A.D. KOlHAL, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.J\n\nAndhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on. Agricultural-Holdings) Act 1913- Section 3(i), Ia and 12-Scope of-\" Holding\" and 'held'-Meaninlf of.\n\nOut of the total holding of hisland the respondent transferred land to two persons under two unregistered. sale deeds and gifted away some land to his son.\n\nJn the return submitted by him the respondent did not include in his holding the area transferred under the unregistered sale deeds. The Land Reforms Tribunal, ignoring the two transfers, computed his holding at 1.7692 standard holding and calJed upon him to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding.\n\nOn appeal the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal.\n\nIn revision the High CQurt held that the land transferred under the two sale deeds could not be included in the holding of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area. In coming to this conclusion the High Court gave the benefit of section 53A of Property Act to the person in possession of the plots pursuant to the contract for sale and treated the land as a part of his holdjng. It was contended on behalf of the resrondent that the definition of 'holding' contemplates ownership with possession and if so the transferee in possession will be taken to be the holder of tbe land transferred and not the respondent who was the transferor or who was not in possession.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The respondent satisfies the conditions contemplated by the deft~ nition of the term 'holding' and the land transferred by him under-a defective tit1e deed will form p8rt of his holding. The High Court was in error in holding that the land in possession of the transferee cannot be taken to be a part of the holding .of the respondent. [486 H; 487 A]\n\nThe expression 'held' connotes both ownership as well as possession. In H the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret term 'held' only in the sense of possession. Tbe explanation to the definition of 'holding' clearly contempates that the same land can be the holding of two different persons holding\n\n-. •\n\n' .J\n\n-->\n\nthe land in two different capacities. The respondent in the instant case is holding the land as owner although he was not in possession. [486 C-EJ\n\nIt is well settled that a person in possession, pursuant to a contract for sale. docs not get title to the 1and unless there is a valid document of title in his favour. In the instant case the transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement for sale but no valid deed of title was executed in his favour. There• fore, the ownership remained with the transferor. But even in the absence of a valid deed of title the possession pursuant to an agreement of transfer cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is entitled to remain in possession. If per chance he is dispossessed by the transferor he can recover possession. The transferor cannot file any suit for get ting back possession but an the same he will continue to be the owner of the land agreed to be transferred. [486 F-H]\n\nThere may conceivably be cases where the same land is included in holding of two persons in different capacities and serious prejudice might be t11used to one or both of them if they were asked to surrender the excess area. To safeguard the interest of the owners in such a cast the legislature has made 8 provi .. sion in section 12(4) and (5) of the Act. Even so there might be cases where some prejudice might be caused to some tenure holders. [439 C-E; G] .\n\nBut if the definition of the term 'holding' is couched in clear and unambi .. guous language the Court bas to accept it as it stands. So construed th~ same\n\nland can be a part of the holding of various persons holding it in different capa .. cities. When the terms of the definition are c1ear and unambiguous there is no qliestion of taking extraneous aid for construing it. (489 H. 490 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1346 E of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th September, 1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 743 of 1976.\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK. Dua, for the Respondent.\n\nA. V. Rangam for the applicant/interveners.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA J, The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment .and order of the High Court of Andhra\n\nradesh dated the 17th of September, 1976 allowing a civil revision arising out of proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms\n\n(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinarter referred to as 'the Act'.\n\nThe holding of the respondent consisted of survey Nos. 36, 37, 41, 42 and 92, all dry, admeasuring acres 88.46 cents in village Ghotkuri in district Adilabad. It appears that he had transferred 17 acres from survey Nos. 36 and 11 acres and 48 cents from survey No. 41 to another person under unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an agreement for sale and had gifted away survey Nos. 37, 42 and 92 to his own son Naimuddin by a document written on a plain paper.\n\nPursuant to a notice section 8 of the Act the respondent filed a declaration in respect of his holding. In his declaration, however, he did not include in his holding the area transferred by hini under two unregistered sale deeds and the aroresaid gift deed.\n\nThe Land Reforms Tribunal ignoring the aroresaid transfers computed his holqing at 1.7692 standard holding. Under the Act be was entitled to possess one standard holding only. He was, therefore, asked to surrender land equivalent to 0. 7692 standard holding.\n\nThe respondent feeling aggrteved took up the matter in appeal to the Land Reforms Appllate Tribunal. He, however, confined his appeal to the land covered by the two sale deeds in respect of survey Nos. 36 and 41 and submitted to the finding of the Land Reforms Tribunal regarding the gift or survey Nos. 37, 42 and 92. The Appel-· late Tribunal confirmed the order of the Land Reforms Tribunal and ignored the sale deeds executed by the respondent in respect of survey Nos. 36 and 41. The respondent challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal by preferring a revision to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court in its turn allowed the revision holding that the land transferred under the two sale deeds could not he included. in the holding of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area.\n\nThe High Court has given the ben.efit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to the person in possession of the plots pursuant to the contract for sale and treated the land as. a part of his holding.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh has come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nlir\n\n~ '\n\n- t\n\nOM PRAKASH v. DIOVIJENDRAPAL (Misra, J.) . 485\n\nThe Attorney General appearing for the State has raised only one contention. According to him, on a correct interpretation of the definition of 'holding' as given in clause (i) of section 3 of the Act, the land transferred by the respondent will still continue to Ile a part of bis holding. In order to appreciate the contention we have to read the definition of 'holding' along with the explanation attached to it :\n\n\"3 (i) 'holding' means the entire I.and held by a person-\n\n(i) as an owner ;\n\n(ii) as a limited owner ;\n\n(iii) as an usufructuary mortgage ;\n\n(iv) as a tenant ;\n\n(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by condi- D tional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise, or in one or more of such capacities ;\n\nand the expression 'to bold land' shall be construed E accordingly.\n\nExplanation :-Where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons.\"\n\nThe term 'holding' takes in its fold land held by various persons in various capacities viz., as an owner ,.as a limi led owner, as an usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant or as a person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or othcwise, or in one or more of such capacities. The Explanation appended to the definition clearly contmplatcs that if the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in another capacity such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons.\n\nObviously, therefore, the same land can be taken to be a Jlllrt of the holding of more persons than one provided they hold it in different capacities.\n\n- -\n\nShri P. Govindan Nair appearing for the respondent on the other hand has contended that the expression 'held' in the definition of 'holding' contemplates ownership with po.•session and that if this be so the transferee who is in possession will be taken to be the holder of the land transferred, and not the respondent who was the transferor and who was not in possession. He has also contended that the interpretation sought to be put by the Attorney General on the definition would create an anomalous situation.\n\nThe word 'held' is not defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term. According to Oxford Dictionary 'held' means : to possession to be the owner or holder or tenant of ; keep possession of; occupy. Thus, 'held' connotes both ownership as well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term 'held' only in the sense of possession.\n\nFor example, if a land is held by an owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of all such persons. It obviously means that an owner who is not in actual possession will also be taken to be a holder of the land. If there was any doubt in this behalf, the same has been dispelled by the explanation attached to the definition of the term 'holding'.\n\nThe explanation clearly contemplates that the same land can be the holding of two different persons holding the land in two different capacities. The respondent in view of the definition certainly is holding as an owner, alt bough he is not in possession.\n\nIt is by now well settled that a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale do es not get title to the land unless there is a valid document of title in his favour.\n\nIn the instant case it has already been pointed out that the transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement for sale but no valid deed of title was executed in. hisf avour. Therefore, the ownership remained with the respondent-transferor.\n\nBut even in the absence of a valid deed of title the possession pursuant to an agreement of transfer cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is entitled to remain in possession.\n\nIf per chance.be is dispossessed by the transferor, be can recover possession.\n\nThe transferor cannot file any suit for getting back possession but all the same he will continue to be the owner of the land agreed to be transferred. The respondent, in our considered opinion, satisfies the conditions contemplated by the definition of the term 'holding' and the land transferred by him under a defective\n\ntitle deed will form part of his holding. The High Court, therefore, erred in holding that the land in i possession of the transferee cannot be 1aken to be a part of tbe holding of the transferorresponden t.\n\nThis takes y_s to the other contention raised by Shri P.\n\nGovindan Nair that the interpretation sought to be put by the Attorney General on the definition would create an anomalous position in as much as the same land according to the definition may form part of the holding of the transferor as well as of the transferee or of the owner as well as of the tenant.\n\n, At the tint flush it may appear to be paradoxical to say that c\n\nte same land could form part of the holding cf various persons en\\!.£. rated in the definition of 'holding' but on a closer scrutiny oft. e relevant provisions of the Act the proposition presents no diffic 1ty. .\n\nD ! '\n\n1A reference may be made to sections 10 and 12 of the Act.\n\nIn so far as they are material for the purpose of this case they read :i\n\n1 \"10 (I) If the extent of the holding of a person is in j!xcess of !the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to ; surrender the land held in excess.\n\n(2) The Tribunal shall serve on every person, who is liable to surrender the land held in excess of the ceiling ' area under sub-section (!), a notiee specifying therein the\n\neittent of land which such persori has to surrender and requiring him to file a statement within such period not being less than fifteen days, as it may fix, indicating therein full particulars of the lands which such person proposes to surrender.\n\n(3) (4) .......................... .\n\n(5) (a) Noth withstanding anything in this section it shall be open to the Tribunal to refuse to accept the surrender of any land-\n\nSUPRBMF COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.11..\n\n(i) which has been converted into non•agricultura\\ land and has been rendered incapable of being used for purposes of agriculture;\n\n(ii) the surrender of which is not acceptable on account of a dispute as to the title to the land or an encumbrance on the land or on account of the land being in the possession of any person mentioned in item (ii) or item (v) of clause (i) of . section 3 or on account of the land proposed to be surrendered becoming in accessible by reason of its severence from the remaining part of the holding; and\n\nthe Tribunal shall, in every such case, serve a notice on the person concerned requiring him to surrender any other land in lieu thereof; and thereupon th provisions of subsections (3) and (4) shall, mutati • mutandis apply to such surrender : }\n\nProvided that where land proposed to be surrenderd under this section is burdened with a mortgage, t!he Tribunal may, on an application made by the mo!rt gagor with the consent of the mortgagee, by ordler, ' transfer such mortgage from the land so proposed 1to be surrendered to the residuary holding of the mortf48\n\ngor or to any part thereof. ;\n\n(b) Where the I and so surrendered under clause (a)\n\nis also not 'acceptable to the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall, after giving an opportunity to the person concerned of being heard, select any other land ' in lieu thereof, and thereupon, the said land shall be deemed to have been surrenllered by such person.\"\n\n\"12(1) Where any land is surrendered! or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act b~ any usufructuary mortgagee or tenant, the possession of such land shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed revert to the owner.\n\n(2) (3) ................. .\n\n(4) Where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act by any limited owner or by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through a part performance of contract for sale or otherwise, the possession of such land shall, subject to such rules as may be prescribed, revert to the owner.\"\n\nIt may be argued on the strength of section IO that if the same land is included in the holding of two persons in different capacities both of them may be asked to surrender the excess area and in that case serious prejudice might be caused to one or to both of them.\n\nFor example, A is the owner of certain plots and he delivers possession of a part of his land to B pursuant to an agreement for sale.\n\nAccording to the definition of 'holding' the land in possession . of B will be taken to be a part of the holding of A and B both. If the land forming part of the holding of A and B is in excess of the ceiling area, both may be obliged to surrender the excess area. The legislature, however, has ma.de a provision to safeguard the interest of the owner in such a case.\n\nSection 12 (4) provides ; \"Where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act by any limited owner or by any perscrn in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through a part performance of contract for sale or otherwise, the possession of such land shall, subject to such rules as may be prescribed, revert to the owner.\n\nSub-section (5) also safeguards the interest of the mortgagee in possession or a person in possession in pursuance of a contract for sale and provides : \"the owner to whom the possession of the land reverts under sub section (4) shall be liable to discharge the claim enforceable against the land by the limited owner or person in possession; and the land surrendered shall, if held as a security, continue to be the security.\"\n\n Even so, there may be cases in which some prejudice might be caused to some tenure holders but that cannot be helped. If the definition of the term 'holding' is couched in clear and unambigllous language the court has to accept it as it stands, and if it is so construed, there is not the slightest doubt that the same land can be a part of the holding of various persons holding it in different capacities. When the terms of the . definition are clear and unambi-\n\n490 SUPREME COURT IU!POl.TS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.11.\n\nA guous there is no question of taking extraneous aid for construing it.\n\nLastly, Sbri P. Govindan Nair referred to Form No. I in the rules framed under the Act. He relies on item 8 of that form in support of bis contention. It reads :\n\n\"8. Have all details of all lands owned by others but held by the declarant and where the declaration is by a family unit, by all members of : the family unit as limited owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant, or in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise on the specified date, been furnished in Enclosure or I , . . .\n\nWe are afraid, item No. 8 of Form l of the rules does not help ithe respondent at all. Rather it goes counter to .his content. It env1tge1 that the same land can be part of the holding or various perso s in different capacities.\n\nFor the foregoing discussion the appeal must succeed'. We, accordingly allow the same and set aside the order of the High; Court .and restore that of the Land Reforms Tribunal. In the circumtances\n\nof the case, there will be no order as to casts.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal aliowed.\n\n-r..:- . 't l", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "482\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHD. ASHRAFUDDIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. ASHRAFUDDIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 3(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "489 H. 490 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4184, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th September, 1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No."}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK."}}, {"text": "B. Parathasarthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4337, "end_char": 4353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nGovindan Nair"}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK."}}, {"text": "P.N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK."}}, {"text": "MK. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, P.P. Rao and B. Parathasarthy, for the Appellant\n\n_ P. Govindan Nair, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and MK."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4411, "end_char": 4423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam for the applicant/interveners."}}, {"text": "MISRA J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA J, The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment .and order of the High Court of Andhra\n\nradesh dated the 17th of September, 1976 allowing a civil revision arising out of proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms\n\n(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinarter referred to as 'the Act'."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra\n\nradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4596, "end_char": 4624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA J, The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment .and order of the High Court of Andhra\n\nradesh dated the 17th of September, 1976 allowing a civil revision arising out of proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms\n\n(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinarter referred to as 'the Act'."}}, {"text": "Ghotkuri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36, 37, 41, 42 and 92, all dry, admeasuring acres 88.46 cents in village Ghotkuri in district Adilabad."}}, {"text": "Adilabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 4993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36, 37, 41, 42 and 92, all dry, admeasuring acres 88.46 cents in village Ghotkuri in district Adilabad."}}, {"text": "Naimuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5247, "end_char": 5256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37, 42 and 92 to his own son Naimuddin by a document written on a plain paper."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms Appllate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent feeling aggrteved took up the matter in appeal to the Land Reforms Appllate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6650, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6669, "end_char": 6693, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6822, "end_char": 6845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Andhra Pradesh has come up in appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-\n\nShri P. Govindan Nair appearing for the respondent on the other hand has contended that the expression 'held' in the definition of 'holding' contemplates ownership with po.•session and that if this be so the transferee who is in possession will be taken to be the holder of the land transferred, and not the respondent who was the transferor and who was not in possession.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nGovindan Nair"}}, {"text": "P.\n\nGovindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11629, "end_char": 11646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, therefore, erred in holding that the land in i possession of the transferee cannot be 1aken to be a part of tbe holding of the transferorresponden t.\n\nThis takes y_s to the other contention raised by Shri P.\n\nGovindan Nair that the interpretation sought to be put by the Attorney General on the definition would create an anomalous position in as much as the same land according to the definition may form part of the holding of the transferor as well as of the transferee or of the owner as well as of the tenant.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nGovindan Nair"}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12256, "end_char": 12274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMF COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.11..\n\n(i)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13111, "end_char": 13155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) (a) Noth withstanding anything in this section it shall be open to the Tribunal to refuse to accept the surrender of any land-\n\nSUPRBMF COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.11..\n\n(i) which has been converted into non•agricultura\\ land and has been rendered incapable of being used for purposes of agriculture;\n\n(ii) the surrender of which is not acceptable on account of a dispute as to the title to the land or an encumbrance on the land or on account of the land being in the possession of any person mentioned in item (ii) or item (v) of clause (i) of ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13530, "end_char": 13539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15978, "end_char": 15988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sbri P. Govindan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17376, "end_char": 17397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, Sbri P. Govindan Nair referred to Form No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_491_499_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "491 A\n\nOM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC.\n\nDIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC.\n\nii~ March 5, 1982\n\n[A.D. KosHAL, V. BA.LAKRISHNA BRAD! AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Urban Building• (&gu/ation of Letting, &nt and Eviction) Act 1972.\n\nS.2 (1) and Expln.1 ands. 39.\n\nApplicability of th• Act-Act not to apply to building for a period of t411\n\n~ ytars from 'date of completion of construction'.\n\nDate of completion of construction--What is-' Date of first assessmen1• if asussed-'Date of occupation' when no record of completion of construction or of D asstssnunt. ·\n\nInterpretation of Statutes-Intention of legislature-To ht ascertain\"/ primarily Jrom words 11std by legislative-Question of interpretation .arises whtlt\n\nlanguage ambiguous.\n\nTho U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Lotting, Rent and (Eviction) Act, 1972 provided by subsection (2) of section 2 that except as provided in the Act, the Act was not to apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the date on which its construction was completed. Explanation I to the sub-section provided that the building shaU be deemed t<;> have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment. the date on which the first. assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different,_ the earliest of the said date, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time.\n\nThe appellant-tenant was in occupation of a shop from the 16th June, 1967 and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half. The first a8'essment of tho shop took place on !st of April, 1968. The respondent-landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the Act did not apply to the shop and the tenant was liable to eviction.\n\nThe Trial Judge finding that the construction of the shop was completed H in the year 1967 and that 10 years having not elapsed since then, held that tho provisions of tho Act did not apply and decreed tho suit. The appellant's\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\npetition under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was dis .. missed. In bis revision petition to the-High Court under section llS of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant contended that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the construction of the shop and not the date of first assessment. The High Court overruled the contention and held that the constru:tion of the shop would be deemed to have been completed on 1st of April, 1968 the date of the first assessment and ten years not having elapsed, the Act would not be applicable to the building and dismissed the revision petition.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant:\n\n(1) that by Virtue of sub-sction (2) of s'!ction 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question and that the e.:ttemption created by the sub-section did not embrace bui1diogs constructed prior to the commencement of the Act and (2) that the building should be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date or the first assessment. and that the appellant wa~ entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nD HELD: l(i) The suit was rightly decreed by the Courts below. The Act had no application and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section\n\n39. [498 G-H]\n\n(ii) Primarily, the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is'that the\n\nintentin of the legislature must be _found in the words used by the legislature E itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambigUoua\n\nand, therefore capable of two interpretations. [497 F)\n\n(iii) The language of sub-section (2) of section Z of the Act is explict and unambiguous and is not capable of two interpretations. [497 Gl\n\nIn 'the absence of ally ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section.\n\nThe sub-section contemplates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of 10 yesrs from the date on which its construction is completed. It no where says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to inter pret it in such a way would be to add words to the sub-section. which is not permissible. [ 497 D-F)\n\n2 (i) Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation wollld be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof. If there is an assessment, as in the instant case it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction. The building had not therefore become more than ten years' old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court and consequently there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant.\n\n[498 D-F]\n\n' - '\n\n.J, ..\n\n'-.,.-\n\nOM PRAKASH v. DIGVUENDRAPAL (Mi8ra, J.) 493\n\n(ii) In order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of the commencement of the Act which was 15th of July, 1972. (498 F]\n\nIn the instant case the suit was filed ou 23rd of March 1974 long after the\n\ncommencement of the Act. (498 F]\n\n(iii) In view of sub-section (2) of section 2, the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years. If the Act itself was riot appli-\n\n. B cable, it would be &bsurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable.\n\n[498 O] .\n\nRattan Lal Shlnghal v. Smt. Murti Devi (1980) 4 S.C.C. 258 andRam Saroop Rai v. Lilavati (1980) 3 S.C.C. 452, over-ruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated\n\nthe 23rd March, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision D\n\nNo. 1906 for 1976.\n\nWITH\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 2436 OF 1981\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6909 of 1979.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL. No. 1710 OF 1981\n\nFrom the judgment and Decree dated the 13th March, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 6167 of 1979.\n\nAND\n\nSPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 3573 OF 1979\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 S.C.Jl.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 3rd January, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 3714 of 1978.\n\nG.L. Sangh!, Mrs. A. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the Appellant in CA. No. 1314 of 1978.\n\nB , J.P. Goyal, S. Markandeya and C.K. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA. 1314 of 1978. -<.-\n\nA.K. Srivastava for the Appellant in CA. 1710/80.\n\nR.B. Mehrotra for Respondent in CA. 1710/80.\n\nPramod Swarup and Mrs. S. Markandeya for the appellant in CA. 2436 of 198J.\n\nS.N. Kacktr and K.K. Gupta for the Respondent in CA. 2436\n\n D of 1980.\n\nP.R. Mridul, Praveen Jain and K.B. Rohatgl for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No. 3573 of 1979\n\nR.H. Dhebar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA J. The first two appeals by special leave and the third by certificate and the special leave petition raise a common question of law and, therefore, we propose to dispose of them by a common judgment.\n\nThe pattern of facts in all these cases is similar. We, therefore set out the facts of Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978 to bring out the point for consideration in these matters.\n\nThe appellant Om Prakash Gupta is a tenant of a shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. The respondent-landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act 13 of I 972 and hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') did not apply to the shop and the tenant was liable to eviction.\n\nThe Judge, Small Causes Court, Mainpuri decreed the suit on the finding inter a/ia that the construction of the shop in suit was completed in the year I 967 and\n\n~ '\n\n,,.J,\n\n\" -\n\n~··\n\n• .. (\n\nOM PRAl:ASH. V. DIGVJJENDRAPAL (Mista, J.) 495\n\nthat ten years having not elapsed since then, the provisions of the Act did not apply to the case. The defendant went op in revision under section 25 of the Provincial. Small Causes Courts Act against the judgment and decre' of the trial Court but the same was\n\nsubstantially dismissed.. The defendant thereupon filed a revision ander section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in the High Court which came up for hearing before a learned Single Jupge who remitted the following issue to the trial court :\n\n\"On what date was the construction of the building in dispute completed within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and deemed to have been completed as contemplated by Explanation I (a) thereto.\"\n\nThe Judge Small Causes Court by his order dated 26th of November 1977 returned the following finding :\n\n\"The construction of the disputed shop will be deemed to have been completed op the date of the first assessment i.e., 1.4.68 within the meanini: or section 2 (2) of the U.P.\n\nUrban Buildings Act, 1972.\"\n\nThe finding returned by the trial court was sought to be challenged on behalf or the tenant on the ground that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the cqnstruion of the shop and not the date of the first assessment.\n\nIn Tilak Raj v.\n\nSardar Derendra Singh,(') a learned Single Judge of the same High Court had the occasion to consider section 2 (2) of the Act. He held : -·\n\n\"It is apparent from tJ; iis provision that for purposes of this Act, a building is to be deemed to be constructed, if it is subject to assessment, on the date with effect from which the first assessment is made. It is immaterial whether the building was constructed actually prior to that date or it had come into occupation prior to that date. The law recognised for the purposes of this Act, the date of assessment as the date of the completion of the building. There is thus no error in the judgment of the court below.\"\n\n(1) 1976 (2) ALR 721 ...\n\nThe learned Single Judge before whom the revision in the instant case came up for hearing doubted the correctness of the above decision. He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench.\n\nThe~ is no dispute that the first assessment of the shop took place on 1st of April, 1968.\n\nIt is also not in dispute that the shop in question was occupied by the defendent on 16th of June, 1967, and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half.\n\nThe appellant sought the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the ground that if the date of occupation was taken to be the date of the completion of the construction of the shop, then ten years having elapsed during the pendency of the revision before the High Court, the Act would be applicable. The Division Bench, however, over-ruled the contention of the appellant and held that the _construction of the shop in question would be deemed to have been completed on !st of April 1968 and, therefore, the Act would not be applicable to the building till the date of the decision of the revision on March 23, 1968. The defendant undaunted by the failure came to this Court to challenge the judgment of the High Court.\n\nMr. G.L. Sanghi, senior counsel; appearing for the appellant strongly contended that on a correct interpretation of sub-section (2) E of section 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question.\n\nIt wonld be appropriate at . this stage to extract subsection (2) of section 2 of the Act insofar as it is material for the purposes of the case :\n\n\"Except as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12, sub-section (1-A) of section 21, sub-section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from th~ date on which its construction is completed :\n\nExplanation I. For the purposes of this sub-section:\n\n(a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the cae of a building subject to_ assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof\n\n--~\n\n. '\n\n> ,),\n\n.. .\n\nOM PRAKASH v. DIGVIJENDRAPAL (Misra, J.) 497\n\ncomes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time : . \"\n\nThe precise contention on behalf of the appellant is that the exemp tion created by this sub-section does not embrace buildings constructed prior to the enforcement of the Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan Lal Shinghal v. Smt. Murti Devi.(1) The same contention was raised by him in that case also and a Division Bench of this Court accepted the contention and held that Act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to build ings brought into being de nova after the Act came into force.\n\nIn that case there is no discussion except this bald observation.\n\nThis Court in a subsequent case Ram Saroop Rai v. Li/avati(2) held to the contrary. It is on this account that the present appeals were referred to a larger Bench.\n\nThere no ambiguity in the language of sub section (2) of section 2 and in the absence of any ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section. In plain words the sub.section contemplates that the .\n\nAct shall not apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. It nowhere says that the buildieg should have been constructed after the enforce ment of the Act and to interpret it in the way the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to interpret it, we would be adding words to the sub-section, which is not permissible.\n\nPrimarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature.\n\nThe first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.\n\nThe question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore, capable of two interpretations. In the present case the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explicit and unambiguous and it is not capable of two interpretations.\n\n(I) [1980] 4 s.c.c. 258.\n\n(2) [1980] 3 s.c.c. 452.\n\nAs a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this he so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1978. In order to appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to Explanation I to sub-section (2) of section 2 which has already been extracted. Explanation I provides that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities I:taving jurisdiction, and in case of a buildlng subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are-different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of anv such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied .for the first time.\n\nA perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation wonld be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment, thereof. If there is an assessment, as in tbe present case it is, it will be the date of tbe first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of tbe construction and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten years' old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court, and therefore there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of tl1e Act to the appellant.\n\nFurther, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet another reason why section 39 wilt have no application to the present case. In view of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which bas not a standing of ten years and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. Considered from any angle the Act bas no application to the present case and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. The suit bas, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below.\n\nWe find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr.\n\nSanghi. The counsel for the appellants in the other appeals and\n\nOM PRAKASH v. DIOVIJENDRAPAL (Misra, J.) 499\n\nthe petitioner in the special leave petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi.\n\nFor the foregoing discussion the appeals and the special leave petition are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. '\n\nWe, however, direct that the order of eviction in each case shall not be executed before 30th of June, 1982 on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition files an undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to the following effect :\n\nI. that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord-respondent on or before 30th of June, J 982;\n\n2. that he will pay to the respondent arrears of rent, if any, within a month from today;\n\n3. that he will pay to the respondent future compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises for each calendar month by the l 0th of the succeeding month; and\n\n4. that he will not induct any other person in the suit premises as a sub-tenant or licensee or in any other capacity whatsoever.\n\nWe further direct that in default of compliance with any one or more of the conditions of the undertaking or if the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated time, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith .\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nOM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th June, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1582, "end_char": 1597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-tenant was in occupation of a shop from the 16th June, 1967 and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half."}}, {"text": "st of April, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of April, 1968."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2665, "end_char": 2683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court overruled the contention and held that the constru:tion of the shop would be deemed to have been completed on 1st of April, 1968 the date of the first assessment and ten years not having elapsed, the Act would not be applicable to the building and dismissed the revision petition."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3355, "end_char": 3365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5181, "end_char": 5191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G.L. Sangh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6703, "end_char": 6713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sangh!,", "canonical_name": "G.L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "A. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. A. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "D.N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. A. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "B , J.P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B , J.P. Goyal, S. Markandeya and C.K. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "S. Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B , J.P. Goyal, S. Markandeya and C.K. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "C.K. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B , J.P. Goyal, S. Markandeya and C.K. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "A.K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-<.-\n\nA.K. Srivastava for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "R.B. Mehrotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.B. Mehrotra for Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6984, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pramod Swarup and Mrs. S. Markandeya for the appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacktr", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7061, "end_char": 7072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2436 of 198J.\n\nS.N. Kacktr and K.K. Gupta for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "K.K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7077, "end_char": 7087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2436 of 198J.\n\nS.N. Kacktr and K.K. Gupta for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Praveen Jain and K.B. Rohatgl for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No."}}, {"text": "Praveen Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7146, "end_char": 7158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Praveen Jain and K.B. Rohatgl for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No."}}, {"text": "K.B. Rohatgl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7163, "end_char": 7175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Praveen Jain and K.B. Rohatgl for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3573 of 1979\n\nR.H. Dhebar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7305, "end_char": 7310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA J. The first two appeals by special leave and the third by certificate and the special leave petition raise a common question of law and, therefore, we propose to dispose of them by a common judgment."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Om Prakash Gupta is a tenant of a shop on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Small Causes Court, Mainpuri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judge, Small Causes Court, Mainpuri decreed the suit on the finding inter a/ia that the construction of the shop in suit was completed in the year I 967 and\n\n~ '\n\n,,.J,\n\n\" -\n\n~··\n\n• .. (\n\nOM PRAl:ASH."}}, {"text": "V. DIGVJJENDRAPAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. DIGVJJENDRAPAL (Mista, J.) 495\n\nthat ten years having not elapsed since then, the provisions of the Act did not apply to the case."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8444, "end_char": 8454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Small Causes Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8474, "end_char": 8497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8640, "end_char": 8651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Small Causes Courts Act", "statute": "Small Causes Courts Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8903, "end_char": 8912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Small Causes Courts Act", "statute": "Small Causes Courts Act"}}, {"text": "26th of November 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judge Small Causes Court by his order dated 26th of November 1977 returned the following finding :\n\n\"The construction of the disputed shop will be deemed to have been completed op the date of the first assessment i.e., 1.4.68 within the meanini: or section 2 (2) of the U.P.\n\nUrban Buildings Act, 1972.\""}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Small Causes Courts Act", "statute": "Small Causes Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Urban Buildings Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9760, "end_char": 9769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Urban Buildings Act, 1972", "statute": "Urban Buildings Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "16th of June, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10721, "end_char": 10739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also not in dispute that the shop in question was occupied by the defendent on 16th of June, 1967, and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10881, "end_char": 10891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 23, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11443, "end_char": 11457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of April 1968 and, therefore, the Act would not be applicable to the building till the date of the decision of the revision on March 23, 1968."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11567, "end_char": 11578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G.L. Sanghi, senior counsel; appearing for the appellant strongly contended that on a correct interpretation of sub-section (2) E of section 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question.", "canonical_name": "G.L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11834, "end_char": 11843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11955, "end_char": 11965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11988, "end_char": 11998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12019, "end_char": 12029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 24A, 24B, 24C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12031, "end_char": 12053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12076, "end_char": 12086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13198, "end_char": 13204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan Lal Shinghal v. Smt.", "canonical_name": "Sanghi"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13800, "end_char": 13809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14788, "end_char": 14797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd of March, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15309, "end_char": 15328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this he so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1978."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15436, "end_char": 15445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16628, "end_char": 16638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16699, "end_char": 16709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th of July, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16783, "end_char": 16801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act."}}, {"text": "23rd of March, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16954, "end_char": 16964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17041, "end_char": 17050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17213, "end_char": 17223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17378, "end_char": 17388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17519, "end_char": 17525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr.\n\nSanghi.", "canonical_name": "Sanghi"}}, {"text": "30th of June, J 982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18273, "end_char": 18292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, however, direct that the order of eviction in each case shall not be executed before 30th of June, 1982 on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition files an undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to the following effect :\n\nI. that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord-respondent on or before 30th of June, J 982;\n\n2."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18915, "end_char": 18921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_500_509_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nTHUMMALA KRISHNA RAO & ANR.\n\nMarch 16, 1982\n\n[ Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nAMARBNDRA NATH SEN, JJ. )\n\nAndhra Pradesh Land Encrqachment Aci, 1905-S. 6-Prot1ision for .summary eviction of unauthorised occupant of government land-Existe11ce of bona fide dispute regarding title between government and occupant-Resort to summary remedy-Whether valid and legal?\n\nThe Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 was enacted to check unauthorised occupation of government lands. Under s. 2 Of the Act all public roads, streets, lands, paths, bridges etc., are deemed to be government property, . Any person who is 'in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the government is liable to pay assessment as provided in s. 3 of the Act.- Section 5 provides that any person, liable to assessment shall also be liable to pay an additional sum by way of penalty. Undei s. 6(1) the CoBector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tabsildar has the power to summarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying any land for which be is liable to pay assessment under s. 3, after issuing a show ca.use notice as provided in s. 1.\n\nSome time between the years 1932 and 1937 certain lands were acquired by the Government of Nizam of Hyderabad for the benefit of a University. A question having arisen es to whether three specific plots of land had been included in the acquisition, the University filed a suit in 1956 praying for the eviction of the occupant. Th.is suit was dismissed in 1959 on the ground that one of the plots bad not been acquired by the Government and in respect of the other two plots the University had failed to prove its possession within 12 years before the filing of the suit. The trial court found that the heir of the original owner of the plots bad encroached on the said two plots in 1942. The judgment of the trial courr was confirmed by the High Court in 1964. The State Government was not a party to those proceedings.\n\nThe University activated the State Government for summary eviction of the heir of the originaJ owner from the three plots of lands. The Tahsildar i:D.itiated action and passed an order of eviction under s. 6(1) of the Act on December 15, 1964. Appeals against the order were rejected by the Collector in 1965 and by the Revenue\"Board in 1968. The respondents who pur<:hased tho plots during the pendency of the appeal before the Revenue Board were impleaded as parties\n\n:\"'\n\nANDHRA PRADESH V. T.Jt. RAO 501\n\nto the proceedings on the death of the heir of the original owner and their appeal from the decision of the Revenue Board was rejected by the Government in 1973.\n\nThe respondents challenged the order of eviction by a petition under Art. 226 which was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court who held that the question of title to the property could not properly be decided by him under Article 226 but the fact that there was a finding by the Civil Court that there was encroachment by the alleged encroacher was sufficient to entitle the Government to initiate action under the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act.\n\nThe appeal of the respondents ms allowed by the Division Bench which bola that a dispute relating to as far back as 1942 could not be dealt with in summary proceedings under the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act.\n\nThe summary remedy could not be resorted to unless there was an attempted encroachment or encroachment of a very recent origin; nor could it be availed of in cases where complicated questions of title arose for decision.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : (I) The summary remedy for eviction provided by s. 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in un authorised occupation of any tand which is the property of ttie Government. If there is a bonpfide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the .property belongs to it and on that basis take recourse to the summary remedy provided by s 6. In the instant case there was unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plOts of land had been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad, and whether the University for whose benefit the plots were alleged to have been acquired bad lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The respondents had a bona fide claim to litigate and they c; ould not be evicted save by the due process of law. , The summary remedy prescribed by s. 6 was not the kind of legal process which was suited to adjudication of ompJicated questions of title. That procedure was, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. [506 H; 507 A; 507 DH)\n\n2. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by s. 6 could not be resorted to unless the alleged enci'oacbment was of'~ very recent origin\" cannot be stretched too far. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person.\n\nWhat is relevant for the decision of that qqestion is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide, Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and th• occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in nccupation of a property openly for\n\nan appreciable length pf time can be taken prima facie to have a bona fidt claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. In the instant case, the long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title raised a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title. Whether the title to the property had come to be vested in the Government as a resuit of acquisitjon and whether the heir of the original owner had encroached upon that property and perfected his title by adverse possession had to be decided in a properly constituted suit.\n\n[508 A-D; 508 E-0]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2031 of 1977.\n\nC Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated\n\nthe 30th June, 1977 of the Andbra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 905 of 1975.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 136 & 137 of 1978.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the. 30th June, 1977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 796 & 922 of 1975 respectively.\n\nE Ramachandra Reddy, Advocate General and B. Parthasartm\n\nfor the Appellants.\n\nP. Rama Reddy and A. V.V. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in CA. 2031, R. 3 in 136 & R. 2 in 137.\n\nA. Subba Rao for RR I & 2 in CA. 136/78.\n\nA.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No. I in CA. 137/78.\n\nB. Kanta Rao for Respondent No. I in CA. 2031/77.\n\nG The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. These three appeals arise out of a common judgment dated June 30. 1977 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, setting aside tbe judgment of a H learned single Judge dated November 18, 1975 in Writ Petitions Nos. 1539 of 1974 and 79.8 of 1975. Civil Appeal No. 2031 (NCM) of 1977 is by special leave while the other two appeals are by certi-\n\n...\n\nficate granted by the High Court. The' question which these appeals involve is whether the appellant, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, bas the power to evict the respondents summarily in exercise of the power conferred by the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905. This question arises on the following facts :\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals with three groups of lands situated in Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Aodhra Pradesh.\n\nThose lands are : R.S. No. 10/ I, which corresponds to plot No. 94 aclmeasuring I 0 acres and 2 guntas, R.S. No. 10/2 which corresponds to plot No. I 04 admeasuring 9 acres and 33 guntas ; and R.S.\n\nNos. 7, 8 and 9 which correpond to plot No. 111 admeasuring 26 acres and 14 guntas. These lands belonged originally to Nawab\n\nZainuddin and after his death, they devolved on Nawab Habibuddin.\n\nSometime between the years 1932 and 1937, certain lands were acquired by the Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act of 1309 Fasli, the provisions of which are in material respects similar to those of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The lands were acquired for the benefit of the Osmania University which was then administered as a Department of the Government of Hyderabad. The University acquired an independent legal status of its own under the Osmania University Revised Charter, 1947, which was promulgated by the Nizam.\n\nThe question whether the aforesaid three plots of land were included in the acquisition notified by the Government of Nizam became a bone of contention between the parties, the Osmania University contending that they were so included and that they were acquired for its benefit and the owner, Nawab Habibuddin, contending that the three plots were not acquired.\n\nOn February 13, 1956 the Osmania University filed a suit (O.S. No. 1 of 1956) against Nawab Habibuddin, in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, claiming that the three lands were acquired by the Government for its benefit and asking for his eviction from those lands. That suit was dismissed in 1959 on the ground that plot No. 111 was not acquired by the Government and that though plots Nos. 94 and 104 were acquired, the University failed to prove its possession thereof within twehe years before the filing of the suit. In regard to plots Nos. 94 &\n\n104, it was found by the trial court that Habibuddin had encroached thereupon in the year 1942, which was more than twelve years before the filing of the suit.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 61 of 1959 filed by\n\nthe University against that judgment was dismissed on January 24, 1964 by the High Court which affirmed the findings of the trial court. The State Government was not impleaded as a party to those proceedings. ·\n\nOn May 8, 1964 the Osmania University wrote a letter to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, requesting it to take steps for the summary eviction of persons who were allegedly in unauthorised occupation of the 3 plots. On December 8, 1964, the Tahsildar, Government of Andhra Pradesh, acting under section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905, issued a notice to Nawab Habibuddin to vacate tbe lands and on December 15, 1964 the Tahsildar passed an order evicting him from the lands. The appeal filed by Habibuddin to the Colleetor was dismissed in 1965 and the appeal against the decision of the Collector _was dismissed by the Revenue Board in\n\n1968. During the pendency of the appeal before the Revenue Board, the respondents purchased the plots from Habibuddin for valuable consideration and on the death of Habibuddin, they were impleaded to the proceedings before the Revenue Board. They pre ferred an appeal from the decision of the Revenue Board to the Government but that appeal was dismissed on November 26, 1973.\n\nOn March 19, 1974, the respondents filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the order by which they were evicted from the plots summarily under the provisions Of the Act of 1905. The learned siogle Judge dismissed those Writ Petitions observing:\n\n\"The question whether the lands with which we are concerned in the writ petition were acquired by the Government or not and the question whether the Government had transferred its title to the University or not are questions which cannot properly be decided by me in an application under article 226 of the Constitution. The appropriate remedy of the petitioners is to file a suit to establish their title.\"\n\nThe learned Judge held that :\n\n\"Though the title of the Government is not admitted by the alleged encroacher, there is a finding by the Civil\n\nCourt that there was encroachment by the alleged encroacher. That is sufficient to entitle the Government to initiate action under the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act.\"\n\nThree appeals were preferred to the Division Bench against the judgment of the learned single Judge, two of them being by the petitioners in one writ\" petition and the third by the petitioner in the other writ petition.\n\nThe Division Bench, while setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge, held :\n\n\"The question whether the lands belong to Osmania University or not will have to be decided as and when the Government comes forward with a suit for tho purpose., Even if we assume for the purpose of our judgment, as we are not pronouncing any conclusion as to whether the land vested in the Government or University, that the Government is the owner, the dispute going back from 1942 cannot be dealt with in summary proceeding under sec \\ tion 7 of the Land Encroachment Act.\"\n\nThe summary remedy provided by section 7, according to the Division Bench, cannot be resorted to \"unless there is an attempted encroachment or encroachment of a very recent origin\" and further, E that it cannot be availed of in cases where complicated questions of title arise for decision.\n\nWe are in respectful agreement with the view _taken by the Division Bench, subject however to the observations made herein below. The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905, was passed in order \"to provide measures for checking unauthorised occupation of lands which are the property of Government.\" The preamble to the Act says that ii had been the practice to check unauthorised occupation of lands which are the property of the Government \"by the imposition of penal or prohibitory assessment or charge\" and since doubts bad arisen whether such practice was authorised by law, it had become necessary to make statutory provisions for checking unauthorised occupations. Section 2 (I) of the Act provides that all public roads, streets, lands, paths, bridges, etc. shall be deemed to be the property belonging to Government, unless it falls under clauses (a) to (e) of that section. Section 2 (2) provides that all public roads and streets\n\nvested in any public authority shall be deemed to be the property of the Government.\n\nBy section 3 (1), any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of Government, is liable to pay assessment as provided in clauses (i) and (ii) of that section.\n\nSection 5 provides that any person liable to pay assessment under section 3 shall also be liable, at the discretion of the Collector, to pay an additional sum by way of penalty.\n\nSections 6 (I) and 7, which are relevant for our purpose, read thus:\n\n\"Sec. 6 (1) Any person unauthori sedly occupying any land for which he is liable to pay assesssment under section 3 may be summarily evicted by the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar and any crop or other product raised on the land shall be liable to forfeiture and any building or other construction erected or anything deposited thereon shall also, if not removed by him after such written notice as the Collector, Tahsildar, or Deputy Tahsildar may deem reasonable, be '.liable to forfeiture.\n\nForfeitures under this section shall be adjudged by the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar and any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar may direct.''\n\n\"Sec. 7.\n\nBefore taking proceedings under section 5 or section 6, the Collector or Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar as the case may be shall cause to be served on the person reputed to be in unauthorised occupation of land being the property of Government, a notice specifying the land so occupied and calling on him to show cause before a certain date why he should not be\n\nproceded against under section 5 or section 6.\"\n\nIt seems lo us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in\n\n- _ _),\n\n\" ANDHRA PRADESH v. T. IC. RAO (Chandrachufl, C.J.) 507\n\nunauthorized occupation of any land which is \"the property of Government\". In regard to property described in sub-sections (I) and (2) of section 2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would be free to ta, ke recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in section 6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by section 2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously, which can only be done by resorting to the summary remedy provided by the Act. But section 6 (I) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land \"for which he is liable to pay assessment under section 3\". Section 3, in turn,\n\nrefersto unauthorised occupation of any land \"which is the property of Government\". If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the Osmania\n\nUniversity, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Naab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than.twelve years before the date of the suit and the University was nor in possession of the property at any time within that .period. Having failed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible.\n\nThe respondents have a lwna fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to. an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of Jaw, for evicting the respondents.\n\n•UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by section 6 cannot he resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of \"a very recent origin\", cannot be stretched too far.\n\nThat was also the view taken by the learned single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meherunnissa Begum v.\n\nState of A.P.(') which was affirmed by a Division Bench.(') It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person.\n\nWhat is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facti\n\nwhich raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unila teral!y in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision.\n\nBut duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjuilication according to the established procedure of law.\n\nThe conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry contemplated by sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to 1'e vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be, that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but, until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.\n\nFor these reasons, we uphold the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss these appeals with costs.\n\n(I) (1970)) ALT 88.\n\n!2) (1971) I A.L.T. 292; AIR 1971 A.P. 382.\n\n, J..--\n\n,. .~ .\n\nWe do not propose to pass any orders on CivU Misc. Petitions Nos. 18974, 18975, 18976, 18497, 18498 and 18499 of 1981 which have been filed for adding certain parties as respondents to these appeals. Those petitions involve the question of a Will alleged to have been made by Nawab Habibuddin in favour of Entashamuddin alias Anwar Siddiqui and his elder brother.\n\nWe cannot go into the validity of that Will and other incidental questions in these appeals.\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THUMMALA KRISHNA RAO & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THUMMALA KRISHNA RAO & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1982\n\n[ Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nAMARBNDRA NATH SEN, JJ. )"}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARBNDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 793, "end_char": 802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1154, "end_char": 1158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andbra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "Government of Nizam of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time between the years 1932 and 1937 certain lands were acquired by the Government of Nizam of Hyderabad for the benefit of a University."}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 15, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tahsildar i:D.itiated action and passed an order of eviction under s. 6(1) of the Act on December 15, 1964."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722, "end_char": 2730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case there was unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plOts of land had been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad, and whether the University for whose benefit the plots were alleged to have been acquired bad lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "E Ramachandra Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6740, "end_char": 6759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Ramachandra Reddy, Advocate General and B. Parthasartm\n\nfor the Appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasartm", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Ramachandra Reddy, Advocate General and B. Parthasartm\n\nfor the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Rama Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6819, "end_char": 6832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rama Reddy and A. V.V. Nair for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V.V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6837, "end_char": 6849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rama Reddy and A. V.V. Nair for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6912, "end_char": 6924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Subba Rao for RR I & 2 in CA."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "G.R. Subbaryan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6987, "end_char": 7001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "I. Kott Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7003, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7021, "end_char": 7034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, K. Rajendra Choudhury, G.R. Subbaryan, I. Kott Reddy and Mahabir Singh for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Kanta Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7072, "end_char": 7084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kanta Rao for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. These three appeals arise out of a common judgment dated June 30."}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The' question which these appeals involve is whether the appellant, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, bas the power to evict the respondents summarily in exercise of the power conferred by the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7779, "end_char": 7821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Habsiguda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7943, "end_char": 7952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question arises on the following facts :\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals with three groups of lands situated in Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Aodhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7969, "end_char": 7974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question arises on the following facts :\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals with three groups of lands situated in Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Aodhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Aodhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7976, "end_char": 7990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question arises on the following facts :\n\nWe are concerned in these appeals with three groups of lands situated in Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Aodhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Nawab\n\nZainuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8311, "end_char": 8327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These lands belonged originally to Nawab\n\nZainuddin and after his death, they devolved on Nawab Habibuddin."}}, {"text": "Nawab Habibuddin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8366, "end_char": 8382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These lands belonged originally to Nawab\n\nZainuddin and after his death, they devolved on Nawab Habibuddin.", "canonical_name": "Nawab Habibuddin"}}, {"text": "Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime between the years 1932 and 1937, certain lands were acquired by the Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act of 1309 Fasli, the provisions of which are in material respects similar to those of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8628, "end_char": 8654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Osmania University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8703, "end_char": 8721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands were acquired for the benefit of the Osmania University which was then administered as a Department of the Government of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8942, "end_char": 8947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The University acquired an independent legal status of its own under the Osmania University Revised Charter, 1947, which was promulgated by the Nizam."}}, {"text": "February 13, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9316, "end_char": 9333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 13, 1956 the Osmania University filed a suit (O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Nawab Habibuddin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9399, "end_char": 9415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1956) against Nawab Habibuddin, in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, claiming that the three lands were acquired by the Government for its benefit and asking for his eviction from those lands.", "canonical_name": "Nawab Habibuddin"}}, {"text": "Habibuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9905, "end_char": 9915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94 &\n\n104, it was found by the trial court that Habibuddin had encroached thereupon in the year 1942, which was more than twelve years before the filing of the suit."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10116, "end_char": 10132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "61 of 1959 filed by\n\nthe University against that judgment was dismissed on January 24, 1964 by the High Court which affirmed the findings of the trial court."}}, {"text": "May 8, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10277, "end_char": 10288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 8, 1964 the Osmania University wrote a letter to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, requesting it to take steps for the summary eviction of persons who were allegedly in unauthorised occupation of the 3 plots."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10493, "end_char": 10509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 8, 1964, the Tahsildar, Government of Andhra Pradesh, acting under section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905, issued a notice to Nawab Habibuddin to vacate tbe lands and on December 15, 1964 the Tahsildar passed an order evicting him from the lands."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10586, "end_char": 10613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 26, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11276, "end_char": 11293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They pre ferred an appeal from the decision of the Revenue Board to the Government but that appeal was dismissed on November 26, 1973."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11299, "end_char": 11313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1974, the respondents filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the order by which they were evicted from the plots summarily under the provisions Of the Act of 1905."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11359, "end_char": 11387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1974, the respondents filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the order by which they were evicted from the plots summarily under the provisions Of the Act of 1905."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11859, "end_char": 11870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13122, "end_char": 13131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14059, "end_char": 14068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14271, "end_char": 14280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14418, "end_char": 14427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905", "statute": "The Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14609, "end_char": 14618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14675, "end_char": 14684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14788, "end_char": 14798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14859, "end_char": 14865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14964, "end_char": 14973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15573, "end_char": 15579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15614, "end_char": 15623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15627, "end_char": 15636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15967, "end_char": 15976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15980, "end_char": 15989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16098, "end_char": 16107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16393, "end_char": 16402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16626, "end_char": 16635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16796, "end_char": 16805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17204, "end_char": 17213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17216, "end_char": 17225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17590, "end_char": 17599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Osmania\n\nUniversity", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the Osmania\n\nUniversity, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation."}}, {"text": "Naab Habibuddin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18202, "end_char": 18217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Naab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than.twelve years before the date of the suit and the University was nor in possession of the property at any time within that .period.", "canonical_name": "Nawab Habibuddin"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18698, "end_char": 18707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19012, "end_char": 19021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Meherunnissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19238, "end_char": 19250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was also the view taken by the learned single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meherunnissa Begum v.\n\nState of A.P.(') which was affirmed by a Division Bench.(')"}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20490, "end_char": 20506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Entashamuddin alias Anwar Siddiqui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21809, "end_char": 21843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those petitions involve the question of a Will alleged to have been made by Nawab Habibuddin in favour of Entashamuddin alias Anwar Siddiqui and his elder brother."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_510_521_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "P.P. ENTERPRISES ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ETC.\n\nMarch !6, 1982\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RB. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nSugar (Control) Order 1966, clause 5 read with Order No. G.S.R. 410 E/Ess. Com./Sugar dated 14-7·1980-0rdtr prescribing maximum quantity of sugar (Vacuum J!an Sugar) and Khandsari (Open Pan Sugar) to be kept in stock, whether violativt of Artie/ts 14 and 19(J){g) of th• Constitution and also ultra vires section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.\n\nJn exercise of powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodi ties Act, 1955, Sugar Control Ordc~ 1966 was issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture Clause S of that Order empowered the Central Government to issue directions, inter a/J'a, to recognised dealers regarding production, maintenance of stock, storage, sale, grading, packing, making weighment, disposal, delivery and distribution of sugar.\n\nBy Order No. GSR-410-E/Ess. Com./Sugar dated 14·7·1980, the Central Government issued directions to the effect that no recognised dealer shall keep in stock at anytime (a) Vacuum pan sugar in excess of, (i) in Calcutta and other - extended area recognised dealers who irnport sugar from outside West Bengal? 3500 quintals; other recognised dealers 250 quintals; (ii) in other places in cities and towns with a population of one lakh or more 250 quintals and with a population of less than one lakb 100 quintals and (b) Khandsari (open pan sugar) 250 quintals. Further no recognised dealer shall hold any stock of vacuum pan sugar or khandsari (open pan sugar) for a peripd exceeding 10 days from the date of receipt by hi.m of such stock of sugar or khandsari.\n\nThe recognised dealers, therefore, assailed the constitutional validity of the said Order on three groundS : (1) the impugned order is not covered by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and is ultrtJ vtres; (2) the impugned order imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade and so it is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution: (3) the impugned order is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for two reasons: (a) the petitioners have been singled out for hostile treatment from other dealers of sugar at Calcutta: (b) the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable.\n\nDismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD: 1, The order dated 14·7·1980 is not ultrq vires section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The expression \"to secure their equitablo\n\n).-\n\n-;.\n\n, ..\n\n~ I\n\nP.P. BNTERPRUBS v. UNION 511\n\ndistribution and availability at fair prices\", is wide enough to cover the impugned order. Likewise, the expression ''storage and distribution\" used in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 should be given a liberal construction to give effect to the legislative intent of public welfare. Sugar, which term includes khaodsari, is an essential commodity and over the years it has become a scarce commodity.\n\nIn the public interest it became essentialto pass the order tci secure its eq:.1itable distribution and availa~ bility at fair prices. To that end it became ; nocessary to prevent hoarding and black-marketing. (515 F-H, 516 A-El\n\n2. Restrictions put by the impugned order can by no means be said to be unreasonable, lt is only regulatory and not prohibitory. The direction erijoineci a recognised dealer not to keep sugar in stock at a, ay time in excess of the q\\iantity specified therein. It only s'eeks to regulate the limit of storage of sugar and does not prohibi.t its storage. By the impugned order the Central Government sought to prevent hoarding and blackmarketing, and to ensure equitable distri bution and availability of sugar at fair prke:i in th;! op;!n market. [516 B, Sl9 DJ\n\nA person has a right to carry on any occupation, trade or business and the only restriction on this unfettCred right is the authority of the-State to make a law imposing reasonablC restrictions under clause (6). The expression 'reasonable restrictions' signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of that right should not be arbitrary _or of an oxcessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. No cut and dry test can be applied to each individual statute impugned, nor an abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable in all caseS. The Supreme Court in each case hasto strike a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (g) and the soda! control pr1nitt\"d by clause (6) of Article\n\n19. [516 B-D]\n\nState of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, [1967] 2 SCR 360, explained and distinguished.\n\nM/s. Laxmi Khandsari & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1981] 2 SCC 609, followed.\n\n3. The order is not violative of Article 14 of the constitution. The fixation of limits fqr storing sugar in Calcutta and other places is not arbitrary but is . based on reasonable classiil.cation. The government is the best judge of the situation in a particular State and what quantity of sugar will meet the exigencies of the situation at a particular place is purely a governmental function. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requirements of sugar to the eastern\n\nart of the country, and therefOre, the stocks or sugRr to be held by th~ dtalers tn Calcutta are not required for consumption in Calcutta alone. Besides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing_ units in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesal~ dealers tn railway wagons which take sometime unusually longer time in transit.\n\nThese and various other factors have been taken into consideration by the Government while fixing the storage limits of sugar for the dealers in Calcutta. [519 F-ll, S20 A]\n\nSUPREME COUR1 REPORTS\n\nI 1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe fact that over the. years sugar has become a scarce commodity and people have to purchase it even at a prohibitive price, the dealers would be able to sell the sugar in their stock without difficulty at any time at the prevalent market price. In a rare exceptional case there may be some hardship on that score but it cannot be said, on that account, that the order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In such cases, we hope and trust that the concern ed Government would allow a reasonable time within wb ich the dealers could dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. [520 G, 521 A-CJ\n\nSuraj Mal Kaia1h Chand & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., Writ Petitions Nos. 8334-48 of 1981 decided on September 25, 1981 (unreported case): Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors, etc. v. Stat1 of Uttar Pra\"sh & Ors. etc., Writ Petitions Nos. 2907~2908 of 1981 and conoec!ed writ petitions (a group of\n\nSOS writ petitions) decided on November 5, 1981, followed.\n\nORIGINAL\n\nJURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 3846/81, 6454-55/80, 230-249, 502-510, 524, 726-27, 777-96, 803, 1069, 1207-09, 1326, 439-40, 1607, 1691-93, 1702, '1703-7, 1734·36, 1737-40, 1759-72, 1789-90, 1879, 1946-47, 1948, 1959, 1972-97, 2012-17, 2027-39, 2076, 2077-78, 2125·83, 2194.95, 2204-11, 2284-2326,' 2361-62, 2363-64, 2365-2404, 2405-26, 2444-58, 2459·88, 2497-2501, 2503·05, 2513-19, 2520-25, 2542-73, 2597, 2616-41,2642-48, 2661-63, 2665-66, 2698-2700, 2702-21, 2723-26, 2730-44 2756-62, 2766-76, 2779-2802, 2803-15, 2818-26, 2847-55, 2856-67, 2885-96, 2897 98, 2912-15, 2917-26, 2968-76, 2980-3001, 3002-46, 3047-52, 3070-87, 3088-3102, 3165-3205, 3210-17, 3259-64, 3268-77, 3286, 3305-11, 3312-22, 3325, 3346, 3355, 3357-70, 3371-91, 34f\\3, 3477-82, 3484·88, 3492-3504, 3505-15, 3516, 3517-34, 3560, 3572-79, 3637, 3693-3730, 3732-36, 3757-75, 3899-3912, 4053·69r 4192\"4229, 4261, 4329, 4495, 4496-4508, 4606-09, 4617-21, 4622-69, 4846-75, 4978-86, 5218, 5349, 5533-43, 5597-5609, 5623, 5626-42, 5728, 5746, 6577-81, 6814, 6934·42, 7203, 7217-20, 7409, 7454-56, 7484, 7641, 7659, 7773, 7943, 7944, 8084, 8089, 8090, 8192, 8195, 8201, 8431, 8436, 8834, 8862, 8878·8!, 8924 & 8979 of 1981.\n\nG (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nShanti Bhushan, V.M. Tarkunde, P.A. Francis and G.N.\n\nDikshit.\n\nR.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. Kapoor, Miss Bhajan Ram Rakhyani, S.R; Srivastava, B.V.\n\nTawakley, Shobha Dikshit, B. Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \"\n\nN.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties.\n\nThe Jud;; ment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMrSRA J. In exercise of powers. conferred by section ' of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Sugar Control Order 1966 was issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture.\n\nClause ' of that Order empowered the Central Government to issue directions, inter alia, to recognised dealers regarding production, maintenance of stock, storage, sale, grading, packing, making weighment, disposal, delivery and distribution of sugar.\n\nBy Order No. GSR-410-E/Ess. Com./Sugar dated the 14th of July, 1980 the Central Government issued the following directions :\n\n''In exercise of the powers conferred by clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, and in supersession of the order of the Government of India in the ivlinistry of Agticultuie (Department of Food) No. GSR-60 (E)/Ess.\n\nCom./Sugar, dated the 26th February, 1980, the Central Government hereby directs that no recognised dealer shall• keep in stock at any time-\n\n(I) Vacuum pan sugar, in the places mentioned below; in excess of the quantities mentioned against each-\n\n(i) in Calcutta and extended area-\n\n(a) recognised dealers who import sugar from outside West Bengal-'-3,500 quintals;\n\n(b) other recognised dealers-250 quintals;\n\n(ii) in other places\"-\n\n(a) in cities and towns with a population of lakh or more-250 quintals; one\n\n(b) in other towns with a population of less than one lakh-100 quintals.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(2) Khandsari (open pan sugar) in excess of 250 quintals.\n\nProvided that no recognised dealer shall hold any stock of Vacuum pan sugar or Khandsari (open pan sugar) for a period exceeding ten days from the date of receipt by him of web stock of sugar or Khandsari.\n\nProvided further that nothing in this Order shall apply to the holding of stocks of sugar-\n\n(i) on Government account ; or\n\n(ii) by the recognised dealers nominated by a State Government or an officer authorised by it to hold such stock for distribution through fair price shops; or\n\n(iii) by the Food Corporation of India.\n\nExplanation :-For the purpose of this Order, \"Calcutta and extended area\" means the areas specified in the\n\nSchedule to the notification of the Goyernment of West Bengal No. 7752 F.S./14-R-92/61, dated the 16th December, 1964.\"\n\nThe petitioners in this groups of petitions, who are dealers in sugar, seek to challenge the constitutional validity of the said order on three grounds ; (I) the impugned order is not covered . by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and is ultra vires;. (2) the • impugned order imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade and so it is violative of Article 19 '.:) (g) of the Constitution; (3) the impugned order is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for t,\\, o reasons : (a) the petitioners have been singled out for hostile treatment from other dealers of sugar at Calcutta, (b) the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable.\n\nG Shri Shanti Bhushao, senior counsel appearing in one of the\n\npetitions viz., Writ Petition No. 3846 of 1981, took up the first point and urged that the impugned order is not covered by any of the clauses of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.\n\nSection 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, insofar as it is material for the purposes of this case, reads :\n\nP. P. ENTERPRISES v. UNION (Mi!llll, J.) 515\n\n\"3. (I) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibition the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein\n\n(2) With prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (!), an order made thereunder may provide'......\n\n(a) ...•••...... (b) .......... . (c) ......... .\n\n(d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the\n\nstorage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition,\n\nD . use of consumption of, any essential commodity.\"\n\nThe language of section 3 (l) coupled with clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 3 is wide enough to cover the impugned order.\n\nSection 3 (I) authorises the Central Government to pass an order fonegulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein if it is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so for securing the equitable distribution and availability at a fair price of the essential commodity. The same power has been made more specific by clause !dl of sub-section (2) of sectin 3, which provides for regulating by licences. permits or otherwise, the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity. Sugar, which term includes khandsari, is an essential commdity and over the years it has become a scarce commodity.\n\nIn the public interest it became essential to pass the impugned order to secure its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. To that end it became necessary to prevent hoarding and black-marketing. The expression \"to secure their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices\" is wide enough to cover tbe impugned order. Likewise, the expression \"storage and distribution\" used in clause (d) of sub.section (2) of section 3 should be given a liberal construction to give effect to the legislative intent of public welfare.\n\nSo construed, the impugned order is fully pro-\n\n516 SUlliREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntected and is not ui1ru vires section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 19:05.\n\nThis leads us to the second contention, namely, the impugned order being violative of Arricle 19 (I) (g) of' the C.mstitution inasrn11ch as i1 imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business.\n\nA person has a right to carry on any occupation, trade or business and unl.v restriction on this unfettered right is the author, ty of the State to make a law imposing resonable reastrictions under clause (6).\n\nThe expression 'reasonable restrictions' signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of that ri (ht should not be arbitrary or of an ncessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public.\n\nNo cut and dry test can be applied to each individual statute impugned, nor an abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable in all cases.\n\nThe Court in each case has to strike a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (I) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19.\n\nBy the impugned order the <;:entral Government has only put an embargo on the dealers on keeping sugar in excess of the quantity specified.\n\nIt was passed only with a view to preveat hoarding and black-marketing, and to ensure equitable distribution and availability of sugar at fair prices in the open market.\n\nReliance was placed by Shri Shanti Bhushan. on State of Mysore v, H. Sanjeeviah.(1) In that Case the State Government of Mysore had framed rules to regulate the transit of timber, firewood, charcoal and bamboos from all lands in exercise of powers C<•nferred by section 37 of the Mysore Forest Act 11 of\n\n1900.\n\nBy rule 2 framed on October 13, 1952, it was provided that no person shall import forest produce into, export forest produce from, or move forest produce within, any of the areas specified in Schedule A miless such forest produce is accompanied by permit prescribed in rule 3.\n\nOn April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued . a notification adding a proviso to rule 2 which read as follows :\n\n\n-·).\n\n\"Provided that no such permit shall authorise any person to transport forest produce between sun set and sun-rise in any of the areas specified in Schedule A.\"\n\nBy another notification dated September_l4, 196: the State Government introudced the second proviso to rule 2 which read : 8\n\n\"Provided further that permission may be granted to timber merchants on their request to transport timber upto 10 p.m. (22 hrs) under the following conditions:\n\n(i) the party who wishes to avail of the concession should\n\npay a cash deposit of Rs. IOOO as security for the compliance with the timber transit rules as in force;\n\n(ii) that the deposit may be forfeited to government for breach of any of the conditions of the timber transit rules.\"\n\nThe dealers in timber challenged the two provisos on the grounds inter alia that they were beyond Jhe rule making authority conferred upon the State Government by section 37 of the Myaore Forest Act 11 of 1900 and in any event the provisos imposed unauhorised restrictions 'on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. The High Court held that the State Government while seeking to regulate the transport of timber stopped transport altogether. This Court upholding the order of the High Court observed :\n\n\"Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated by the two provisos to r. 2 is not to be found in any of the clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 37.\n\nBy sub-s. (I) the State Government is invested with the power to regulate transport of forest produce \"in transit by land or water.\" The power which the Stale Government may exercise is however power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power tel prohibit orrestrict transport.\n\nPrima fade, a rule which totally prohibits the movement of forest produce during the period between sun-set and sun-rise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce.\n\nA rule regulating transport in its essence permits transport, subject to certain conditions devised to promote transport.\"\n\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThis Court further observed :\n\n\"If the provisos are in truth restrictive of the right to transport the forest produce, however, good the grounds apparently may be for restricting the transport of forest produce, they cannot . on that - account transform the power conferred by the provisos into a power merely regulatory.\"\n\nThe facts of the present cases are materially different from the facts of H. Sanjeeviah's case (supra).\n\nIn that case the impugned provisos to rule 2 completely prohibited the trans port of the fore st produce between sun-set and sun-rise. But in the cases in hand the direction enjoined a recognised dealer not to keep sugar in stock at any time in excess of the quantity specified therein. It only seeks to regulate the limit of storage of sugar and does not prohibit its storage.\n\nThe case of H. Sanjeeviah, therefore, is not of much help to the petitioners herein.\n\nIn M/s. Laxmi Khandsari & Ors. v. State of U.P . . & Ors.(1) this Court made the following observations about reasonable restrictions on the right conferred by Article .19 (I) (g) of the Constitution in the followi.ng terms :.\n\n\"As to what are reasonable restrictions would naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it seeks to srve, the existing circumstances, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of restraint or restriction placed on the rights of the citizen. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule of universal application but in imposing such restrictions the State must adopt an objective standard amounting to a social control by restric ting the right of the citizens where the necessities of the situation demand.\n\nThe restrictions must be in public interest and are imposed by striking a just balance between the deprivation of right and the cianager or evil sought to be avoided.\n\nIf the restrictions imposed appear to be consistent with the directive principles of State policy they would have to be upheld iis the same would be in public\n\nc11 [198IJ 2 sec 600.\n\n' \"\n\nP. P. ENTER•RISBS v. UNION (Misra, J.) 519\n\ninterest and manifestly reasonable.\n\nFurther, restrictions may be partial, c.omplete, permanent or temporary but they must bear a close nexus with the object in the inter.est of which they are imposed.\n\nAnother important test is that restriction should not be excessive or arbitrary. The court must examine the direct and immediate import of the restrictions on the rights of the citizens arid determine if the restrictions are in larger public interest\" while deciding the question that they contain the quality of reasonableness. In such cases a doctrinaire approach should not be made but care should be taken to see that the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by restricting the rights of the citizens is subserved.\n\nAt the same time, the possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been enforced would not expose the restrictions to challenge on the ground that they are not reasonable.\"\n\nJudged in that light and on an overall consideration of the various D aspects of the matter, restrictions put by the impugned order can by no means be said to be unreasonable. It is only regulatory and not prohibitory.\n\nWe now take up the last contention, namely, the impugned order being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned E counsel seeks to invoke Article 14 on two grounds: (1) the impugned order applies two standards, one for the dealers, at Calcutta, who had been authorised to keep 3,500 quintals at one time, while the dealers at other places have been authorised to keep only 250 quintals in cities with a population of one lakh or more, a)ld only 100 quintals in other towns with a population of less than one lakh.\n\nThe fixation of limits for storing sugar in Calcutta and other places is not arbitrary but is based on reasonable classification. The government is the best judge of the situation in a particular State and that quantity of.sugar will meet the exigencies of the situation at a particular place is purely a governmental functio~. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requirements of sugar to the eastern part of the country, and therefore, the stocks of sugar to be held by the dealers in Calcutta are not required for consumption in Calcutta alone.\n\nBesides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing units in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, from whwo bulk of t1uppliaa are obtained, llOpr is transported by tho whol•I•\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORJ;\n\n[I 982J 3 S.C.R\n\ndealers in railway wagons which take sometime unusuallv !on•er time in transit.\n\nThese and various otber factors have ben taken into consideration by the Government while fixing the storage limits of sugar for the dealers in Calcutta.\n\nHis second ground for invoking Article l 4 of the Constitution is that the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable in that no dealer can be sre of the sale of sugar on any particular day. If per chance a dealer is not able to disp<Jse of the excess sugar on a particular day be would expose himself to punishment under the Act.\n\nNo provision has been made in the order or in the rules for the purchase by the Government of the excess sugar.\n\nFor the State it was contended that similar orders witl1 regard to wheat came up for consideration in this Court in Suraj Mal Kaifosh Chand & Ors.\n\nv. Union of India & .4nr.(1) and Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors. etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. etc.(2) when this Court upheld the validity of these orders.\n\nIn view of the decision of this Court in those cases it is not open to Shri Shanti Blmshan to challege the constitutional validity of the impugned order.\n\nShri Shanti Bhushan, however, refutes the argument and says that those decisions do not stand in the way of the petitioners.\n\nThe situation with regard to wheat was quite different inasmuch. s clause 25 of the impugned order in Surnj Mal's case\n\n(supra) provided that the State Government or the Collector or the Licensing Authority may issue directions to any dealer wirh regard to purchase, sale, disposal, storage or exhibition of the price and stock list of all or any of the trade articles.\n\nBut there is no such provision in the impugned order in the instant case and, therefore, the dealers can expose them, dves to punishment merely because at any particular pofot of time the stock was in excess of the prescribed limits.\n\nBishambhar Duya/'s case (supra) also related to wheat.\n\nThere was a scheme for the procurement of wheat by the State Government but there is no such scheme in respect of sugar. fhis fact distinguishes the present case for the facts of the aforesaid decision.\n\nThe argument though attractive cannot be accepted.\n\nOver the years sugar has become a scare commodity and people have to\n\n(I) Writ Petitions Nos. 8334-48 of 198t decided on Septernber.25, 1981 (unreported case) (2) Writ Petitions Nos. 2907-2908 of 1981 and connected Writ Petitions\n\n{i group of 505 writ petitions) decided on November 5, 1981,\n\n\"Purchase it even at a prohibitive price. In the circumstances it cannot be expected that the dealers would not be able to sell the sugar in their stock. There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the . petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. In any case, in some given case there may .be some hardship but it cannot be said on that account that the impugned order is violative of' Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the foregoing discussion the writ petitions inust fail. They are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed,", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "P.P. ENTERPRISES ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.P. ENTERPRISES ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RB. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. 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The Supreme Court in each case hasto strike a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (g) and the soda!"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 360", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing_ units in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesal~ dealers tn railway wagons which take sometime unusually longer time in transit."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5472, "end_char": 5485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing_ units in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesal~ dealers tn railway wagons which take sometime unusually longer time in transit."}}, {"text": "S20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8049, "end_char": 8059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nShanti Bhushan, V.M. Tarkunde, P.A. Francis and G.N.\n\nDikshit."}}, {"text": "P.A. Francis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8113, "end_char": 8125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nShanti Bhushan, V.M. Tarkunde, P.A. Francis and G.N.\n\nDikshit."}}, {"text": "G.N.\n\nDikshit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8130, "end_char": 8143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nShanti Bhushan, V.M. Tarkunde, P.A. Francis and G.N.\n\nDikshit."}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. 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Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \""}}, {"text": "Bhajan Ram Rakhyani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. Kapoor, Miss Bhajan Ram Rakhyani, S.R; Srivastava, B.V.\n\nTawakley, Shobha Dikshit, B. Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \""}}, {"text": "Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. Kapoor, Miss Bhajan Ram Rakhyani, S.R; Srivastava, B.V.\n\nTawakley, Shobha Dikshit, B. Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \""}}, {"text": "B.V.\n\nTawakley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. 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Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8303, "end_char": 8314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. Kapoor, Miss Bhajan Ram Rakhyani, S.R; Srivastava, B.V.\n\nTawakley, Shobha Dikshit, B. Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \""}}, {"text": "A. Subhashinl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8321, "end_char": 8334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain, Pankaj Kalra, S. Millar, M.G. Gupta, B.R. Kapoor, Miss Bhajan Ram Rakhyani, S.R; Srivastava, B.V.\n\nTawakley, Shobha Dikshit, B. Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashinl,\n\n; w \\..\n\n\"----. , \""}}, {"text": "N.N. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8358, "end_char": 8369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "T.C. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8371, "end_char": 8382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "A,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8384, "end_char": 8386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8387, "end_char": 8392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "S. V. Tambwekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8394, "end_char": 8409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8414, "end_char": 8428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, T.C. Sharma, A, Ghosh, S. V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9108, "end_char": 9116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "West Bengal-'-3,500", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9625, "end_char": 9644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com./Sugar, dated the 26th February, 1980, the Central Government hereby directs that no recognised dealer shall• keep in stock at any time-\n\n(I) Vacuum pan sugar, in the places mentioned below; in excess of the quantities mentioned against each-\n\n(i) in Calcutta and extended area-\n\n(a) recognised dealers who import sugar from outside West Bengal-'-3,500 quintals;\n\n(b) other recognised dealers-250 quintals;\n\n(ii) in other places\"-\n\n(a) in cities and towns with a population of lakh or more-250 quintals; one\n\n(b) in other towns with a population of less than one lakh-100 quintals."}}, {"text": "Food Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10478, "end_char": 10503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provided further that nothing in this Order shall apply to the holding of stocks of sugar-\n\n(i) on Government account ; or\n\n(ii) by the recognised dealers nominated by a State Government or an officer authorised by it to hold such stock for distribution through fair price shops; or\n\n(iii) by the Food Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "16th December, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10712, "end_char": 10731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7752 F.S./14-R-92/61, dated the 16th December, 1964.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10932, "end_char": 10941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10949, "end_char": 10974, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11137, "end_char": 11147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Shri Shanti Bhushao, senior counsel appearing in one of the\n\npetitions viz.,", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushao"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11647, "end_char": 11656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11664, "end_char": 11689, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11692, "end_char": 11701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11709, "end_char": 11740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12148, "end_char": 12153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibition the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein\n\n(2) With prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (!),"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12700, "end_char": 12709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12759, "end_char": 12768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12814, "end_char": 12823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13986, "end_char": 13995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14221, "end_char": 14230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14238, "end_char": 14263, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15216, "end_char": 15226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15285, "end_char": 15295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15638, "end_char": 15652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by Shri Shanti Bhushan.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushao"}}, {"text": "State Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15711, "end_char": 15737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on State of Mysore v, H. Sanjeeviah.(1) In that Case the State Government of Mysore had framed rules to regulate the transit of timber, firewood, charcoal and bamboos from all lands in exercise of powers C<•nferred by section 37 of the Mysore Forest Act 11 of\n\n1900."}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15872, "end_char": 15882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 13, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15942, "end_char": 15958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By rule 2 framed on October 13, 1952, it was provided that no person shall import forest produce into, export forest produce from, or move forest produce within, any of the areas specified in Schedule A miless such forest produce is accompanied by permit prescribed in rule 3."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16203, "end_char": 16217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued ."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16222, "end_char": 16237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued ."}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17218, "end_char": 17228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17710, "end_char": 17715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. Sanjeeviah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18747, "end_char": 18760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the present cases are materially different from the facts of H. Sanjeeviah's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "sec 600", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20415, "end_char": 20422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20458, "end_char": 20463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' \"\n\nP. P. ENTER•RISBS v. UNION (Misra, J.) 519\n\ninterest and manifestly reasonable."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21706, "end_char": 21716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21776, "end_char": 21786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bishambhar Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23802, "end_char": 23818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Union of India & .4nr.(1) and Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors.", "canonical_name": "Bishambhar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Shanti Blmshan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision of this Court in those cases it is not open to Shri Shanti Blmshan to challege the constitutional validity of the impugned order.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushao"}}, {"text": "clause 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24288, "end_char": 24297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Surnj Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24323, "end_char": 24332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s clause 25 of the impugned order in Surnj Mal's case\n\n(supra) provided that the State Government or the Collector or the Licensing Authority may issue directions to any dealer wirh regard to purchase, sale, disposal, storage or exhibition of the price and stock list of all or any of the trade articles."}}, {"text": "Bishambhar Duya/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24827, "end_char": 24843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishambhar Duya/'s case (supra) also related to wheat.", "canonical_name": "Bishambhar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Septernber.25, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25260, "end_char": 25279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8334-48 of 198t decided on Septernber.25, 1981 (unreported case) (2) Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25413, "end_char": 25429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2907-2908 of 1981 and connected Writ Petitions\n\n{i group of 505 writ petitions) decided on November 5, 1981,\n\n\"Purchase it even at a prohibitive price."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26050, "end_char": 26060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_522_532_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 522\n\nVIJAY KUMAR\n\nSTATE OF J & K & OTHERS\n\nMarch 17, 1982\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL {SLAM, JJ.)\n\nJammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978~Section 13(1)-Detaining _authprity must gi¥t the dttenu earliest opportunity of making reprtsentation- Forwarding detenu's representation to Goternment-Jail authorities-Mere channel of commqnication-Delay in transit-No excuse for delay in dealing with representation-Unexplained delay-Invalidates order of detention.\n\nThe petitioner has arrested on June 26, 1981 under the Enemy Agent Ordinance. The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected his application for bail on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try him. Tho Addi. Sessions Judge rejected his bail application on the ground that as he was by then ordered to be detained under the J & K Public Safety Act tho bail application has become infructuous.\n\nThe detention order dated July 11, 1981 was served on the detenue in Jail on July 15, 1981. His representation dated July 29, 1981 was forwarded to the E State Government on July 29. 1981 and simultaneously a wireless message was sent\"on the same day. The representation was received by the Government on August 12, 1981. After investigation. the file was put up to tho Chief Minister on August 28, 1981 for approval. The Chief Minister rejected the representation on August 31, 1981 which Was communicated to the petitioner in jail on Septem~ ber 1, 1981. The detenu's case was referred to the Advisory Board on August 3, 1981. Its report was submitted on September 4, 1981.\n\nIn this petition under art. 32 of the Constitution it was contended before this Court on behalf of the petitioner that as section 13 (1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public S<ifety Act 1978 imposes an obligationon the detaining authority to give the detenu the earliest oppOrtunity of making a representation against the detention order the long unexplained delay in this case had invalidated the order of detention.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : The petitioner's representation had not been dealt with as expeditiously as possible. There was therefore contravention of section 13 of the Act which invalidated the detention. [532 D]\n\nPreventive detention, unlike punitive detention, does not afford all opportunity to \\he detenu to explain his sid~ Qf \\11• matter l?efoi~ !I~ is .deprive4 t\n\nVIJAY KUMAR v. J & K STATS 523\n\nor his liberty and therefore the statute makes it obligatory on the authorities to\n\nafford him ttie earliest opportunity to represent his case and a corresponding obligation on the autho'rity to consider the representation. The word \"earliest\" which qualifies the term \"opportunity\" must equalliqualify the corresponding obligation of the State to deal with the representation iC and when made as expeditiously as possible. [529 H; 530 A-Bl\n\nThe jail authorities who are merety a communicating channel have to move with promptitude so that sufficient guarantee of affording earliest opportu .. nity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that time was lost in transit. The State Government must aear up its own machinery to see that In these cases the representation reaches the Government as early as possible and is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. Any unexplained delay would bo denial of the statutory protection given to tho dotonu. [530 0-G]\n\nIll the instant case there were two time lags : the representation handed in to the Jail Superintendent on July 29, 1981 reached the Government on August 12, 1981 after a time lag of fourteen days and tho representation was disposed of on August 31, 1981 after a time lag of nineteen days and the delay has not been explained on any convincing ground. [531 F, 532 BJ\n\nKhudi Ram Da.t v. Stat• of W••I Bef18a/, [1975) 2 SCC 81, referred to.\n\n' Preventive detention is resorted to~ to thwart future action. lf the dctenu is already in jail charged with a serious offence, he is thereby prevented from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. Where there is need to Order preventive detention of a person already in jail the detaining authority mu1t disclose awareness of the fact that the rson against whom an order of preventive detention is being ruade is to the knowledge or the authority already in jajl and yet for compelling reasons a preventive detention ofder needs to be made. L528 F-GJ\n\nIn the instant case there is nothing to indicate awarenw of the detaining authority that the detenu was already in jail for more than 16 days and yet the\n\nimpugned order was made. This clearly exhibits non-application of mind and would result in invalidation of the. order. But the Court did not base its order on this ground. [528 G-H]\n\nORIGINAL JuR1smcrloN: Writ Petition (Ciminal) No. 9516 G of 1981.\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nBhim Singh, P.D. Sharma & Subash Sharma fot the Petitioner.\n\nM.N. Phadke and Alta/ Ahmed fqr the Respondeqt1,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s:c.R.\n\n. The Judgment of the. Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. On February 9, 1982 we made an order quashing the detention order dated July 11, 1981 made by the District Magistrate, Jammu in exercise of' the power conferred by Section 8 of The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 ('Act' for short) and we announced that the reasons would follow.\n\nHere are the reasons.\n\nThe detenu Vijay Kumar was arrested on June 26, 1981. A petition wa~ moved on his behalf bfore the Chief Judicial Magistrate Jammu praying for releasing the detenu, on bail. This petition for bail appears to have come up before thi: learned Magistrate on July 4, 1981 when the following. order was made:\n\n\"I have heard the advocate for the applicant and perused the C.D. File. Put up for orders on 6.7.81.\"\n\nWhen the matter again came up on July 6, 1981, the learned Magistrate made the following order :\n\n\"Although there was nothing in the C.D. File about his (Petitioner) involvement in E.A.O. (Enemy Agents Ordinance) on 4.7.81, but today a detailed report has been presented in which one of the offences of which he is charged is u/s 3, E.A.O. which this Court is not competent to try. Hence this application is returned to the applicant for presentation to the proper court alongwith report.\"\n\nThe detenu thereupon moved an application for releasing him on bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, who, we are informed, was competent to try the accused charged with an offence under Enemy Agents Ordinance.\n\nHis petition for hail came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on July G 11, 1981 when the following order was made:\n\n\"This application pertains to Vijay Kumar accused who is involved for an offence under the Enemy Agents Ordinance which is being investigated by the Counter H Intelligence Police, Jammu. The learned Chief Prosecuting Officer and the learned counsel for the accused have been heard,\n\n) )\n\n/ vi!AY KUMAR v. 1 & K STATE (Desai, i.)\n\nDuring the course of arguments an order has been shown. to me by the police that said Vijay Kumar accused has now been ordered to be detained under the Pliblic Safety Act.\n\nIn view of this order, this bail application has become B infructuous which is disposed of accordingly.\"\n\nThe detemi was served with the detention order dated July 11, 1981 on the same day in jail because he was already in jail from June 25, J.981. The grounds for detention were served on him on July 15, 1981. The deienu submitted his representation dated July 29, 1981 addressed to the Secretary the Government Home Department to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jammu where the detenu was detained. One .Shri K.D. Sharma, Incharge Superintendent, Central !ail Jammu bas stated in bis affidavit dated February. 6, 1982 that the representation of the detenu dated July 29, 1981 was forwarded to the.Government at Srinagar vide Office letter , No. 2595 dated July 29, 1981 and simultaneously a wireless message No. 2596 on the same day was also sent to the Government intimating that the representation of the detenu bad been forwarded to the Govern ment for appropriate action. Mr. K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Jammu .and Kashmir, Home Department, Jammu, in bis affidavit dated °February 9, 1982 has stated that the representation of the detenu was received from the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jammu in the office of the Home Department at Srinagar on August 12, 1981. . The department also received the comments of S.P., C.l.D. Counter Intelligence, Jammu and there- . after the case was processed on August 24, 1981 in the office of the Home Department at Srinagar a.nd the file was placed before the Home Secretary on August 25, 1981, who recommended the same. for approval on August 28,1981 to the Chief Minister (Home) From the same affidavit, it further transpires that the Chief Minister rejected the representation on August 31, 1981 an'ci the same was communicated to the detenu on September 1, 1981. In the meantime, the case of the detenu was referred to the Advisory Board on August 3, 1981. The Advisory Board submitted its report to the Government on September 4, 1981.\n\nOne Rattanlal, the brother of the detenu moved Petition No. 31 of 1981 for writ of Habeas Corpus in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu. The petition came up for hearing before\n\nG .. ,.\n\n~·.\n\nsiJPkEME cOVRT REPORTS ( 1982] j s.C.lt.\n\nA the learned Single Judge, who by his judgment dated December 7, 1981 rejected the same. Thereafter the detenu by the present writ petition; moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of Habeas Corpus.\n\nSection 8 of the Act prescribes grounds for detention, one such ground being to prevent any person from 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The impugned order of detention recites that the detenu is detained with a view to preven ting him from 'acting in any manner prejudicial to 'the security of the State.' The expression 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State' has been defined in Section 8 (3) of the Act to mean making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using or ins\\igating, inciting, provoking or otherwise abetting the use of force, to overthrew or overawe the Government established by the law in the State. The detenu contended before the High Court that accepting all the activities attributed to the detenu in the grounds of detention at their face value. the alleged prejudicial activity would not fall within the ambit of the expression 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State.' The definition of the expression as hereinbefore extracted indicates that the person accused of 'acting in any manner prejudical to the security of the State' must be shown to be making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using or instigating, inciting or provoking or otherwise abetting the use of force, and the intention or motive for the activity must be to overthrow or overawe the Government established by law in the State. The learned judge of the High Court following an earlier Division Bench judgment of the same High Court in Kharatilal v. State,(') negatived this contention ob- . serving that where the Government accusation against the dctenu is that he had been indulging in supplying information for Pakistan Army Intelligence and was passing on vital information pertaining to the Army deplopmen.t etc. to that Agency, such activities were likely to assist Pakistan in any armed aggression against the State and were a threat to the security of the State. This view needs examination but as the argument was not pressed before us, we refrain from examining the same.\n\nNumber of contentions were advanced at the hearing of this petition but we propose to deal with only two of them which in our\n\n(I) 1981 K.L.H. 71 •\n\nViiAY ltul.!AR v. J & It STATE (besai, J.)\n\nopinion go to the root of the matter and which, wheh accepted, in our opinion, would result in invalidation.of the order .\n\nThe first contention is that the order of the District Magistrate suffers from non-application of mind inasmuch as the date on which he passed the impugned order of detention dated July 11, 1981, the detenu was long before arrested and locked up in Jail on the allegation tha\\ he was suspected to have committed some offence under the Enemy Agents Ordinance 8 of Samvat Year 2005, and, therefore there was no present apprehension that the detenu, if not detained, was likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State.\n\nThe District Magistrate passed the impugned order of detention on being satisfied that with a view to preventing the detenu from -acting in a manner prejudical to the security of the State it was necessary to detain him. The order ex facie does not show that the deiaining authority was aware that the detenu was already arrested and kept in jail. If the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that_ the dctenu was already arrested and confined in jail, the order ex facie would have shown that even though the detenu was in jail, with a vic\\v to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State it was necessary to detain him. There is a foot note in the order that the order was forwarded to the S.P., C.I.D.- Counter IntelHgence, Jammu for execution of the order under section 3 of the Act. The further direction was that notice of the order shall be given to Vijay Kumar s/o Anant Ram, r/o-H. No. 609, Peer Mitha, Jammu, by reading over and explaining the same to him in language he understands.\n\nThe detention order docs not give , the sligbteit indication that the detaining authority was aware that the dctcnu was already in jail yet on the material placed before him he was satisfied that a detention order ought to he made. There is nothing in the order to show that to the knowledge of the detaining authority the detenu was already in jail for a period of more than 1 b days before the date on which he passed'the order and that such detention in the opinion of the detaining authority was not sufficient to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State,\n\nand therefore power under section 8 of the Act is required io be exercised,\n\nThe detenu in para 3 of his petition before this Court has specifically averred that he was arrested on June 26 1981, the correct\n\n528 s~PRllME cOURt RllPOtlts ! 1982) 3 s.c.tl.\n\ndate being June 25, 1981, unde( a false and fabricated charge. Shri K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department, who has filed the counter affidavit has with reference to the averments made in para 3 of the petition made a very very ambiguous statement that 'for the purpose of J iind K Public\n\nSafety Act the petitioner was arrested on July 11, 1981, pursuant to the detention order. It is no where suggested that the detaining authority was awa.re of the fact that the detenu was already. in jail and _that\n\nkeeping in view the fact the detenu was already locked up in jail yet it was considered necessary for preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State to pass the detention order. It may further be pointed out that Shri A. Sahasranaman, the District Magistrate of Jammu who has made the impugned detention order, filed an affidavit on February 7, 1982. Of course, in fairness to him it must be stated that this affidavit was for the limited purpose of pointing out as to how he dealt with the case of Hans Raj, another detenu whose detention was quashed by this Court. subsequent to the order of this Court. It may be noticed ia passing that Hans Raj and the detenu were involved jointly in the activity, which led to the detention of the detenu.\n\nEven though this affidavit was filed for the limited purpose, it came on record after the case was taken up for hearing by this Court and the affidavit at least does not throw any light on the vexed question whether the detaining authori:y was aware of the fact that the detenu on being suspected of having committed a serious offence, was already in jail for a priod of more than a fortnight before the date of the impugned detention order. Preventive detention is resorted to, to thwart future action. If the detenu is already in jail charged with a serious offence, he is thereby prevented from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security . of the State. May be, in a given case there yet may be the need to order preventive detention of a person already in jail. But in such a situation the detaining authority must disclose awarness of the fact that the person against whom an order of preventive detention is being made is to the knowledge of the authority already in jail and yet for compelling reasons a preventive detention order needs to be made. There is nothing to indicate, the awarer.fss of the detaining authority that detenu was already. in jail and yet the impugned order is required to be made. This, in our opinion, clearly exhibits non-application of mind and would result in invalidation of the order. We,· however, do not base our order ?n this ground.\n\nVliA\\' KUMAil v. 1 & K STATE (Desai, J.)\n\nThe second contention which in our opinion goes to the root of the matter is that there has been a violation of section 13 of the Act. Section 13 provides as under :\n\n\"13. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the o.rder : -(!) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than.five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the Government.\"\n\nx x x\n\nThe provision contained in section 13 (I) is on par with the constitutional protection conferred by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The contention is that the obligation on the detaining authority to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention, in order not to render it illusory simultaneously obliges the authority to whom the representation is made to consider the same expeditiously. Suboiission is that a statutory right conferred on the detenu enabling him to make a representation which of necessity must be giving an opportu'nity to point out. to the Government as to why the detention order was not justified and that it must be revoked and the personal liberty deprived under the detention order must be restored; is to convince the Government to take into consideration the facts and contentions set out in the representation, which must imply that the Government must consider the same. The earliest. opportunity to be afforded for making representation inheres 'the correspondiag duty of the Government to consider the representation so received expeditiously. The reason behind enacting this provision is manifest.\n\nWhen power to detain without trial isexercised, the authority exercising the power must afford an opportunity to the detenu to convince the Go.vernment/detaining authority that the power was not justifiably ex.ercised or no occasion. arose for exercise of the power.\n\nIn a punitive detention which is the end product of a trial in which the convict participates and has lull opportunity to present his side of the case while preventive detention ordinarily described as jurisdiction based on suspicion does not afford any opportunity to the. detenu to explain his side of the matter before\n\n( 198~1 s.e.i.\n\nhe is deprived of the liberty and; therefore, so soon after the detenu is deprived of biS personal liberty the statute makes it obligatory on the authorities concerned to afford him an earliest opportunity to represent bis side of the case and which inheres the corresponding obligation on the authority to consider the same.\n\nThe word 'earliest' which qualifies the opportunity must equally qualify the corresponding obligation of the State to deal with the representation if and when made, as expeditiously as possible. The opportunity contemplated by the section is the . opportunity to make a representation against the detention order to. the Government and therefore ex hypothese soon after the person isdeprived of his personal liberty be must be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation.\n\nThe representation is to be made to the Government. Therefore the detenu who bas already been served with the detention order and thus deprived of his liberty would ordinarily be in a position to send his representation tbrough the jail authorities. The jail authority is merely a communicating channel because the representation has to reach the Government which enjoys the power of revoking the detention order. The intermediary authorities who are communicating authorities have also to move wit}! an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. If the Government enacts a law like the preseni Act empowering certain authorities to make the detention order and also simultaneously makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity tci the detenu to make bis representation against his detention, to the Government and not the detain log authority, of necessity the State Government must gear up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. Aoy slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the protection conferred by the statute and would result in invalidation of the order.\n\nReverting to the \"facts of this case, the detenu who in jail from June 25, 1981, was served with a detention or(ler on July 11, 1981, the very day on which the detention order was made. The grounds of detention were served upon him on July 15, 1981. Admittedly the detenu submitted his representation to the Superintendent of Jail on foty 29, 1981. One K.D. Sharma, Medical Officer, Central Jail,\n\n-~-\n\nl '\n\n__ ,\n\n--\"\n\nVIJAY KUMA!l v. J & K STATE (l>esai, J.) 531\n\n• Jllll)mu, Incharge Central Jail, Jammu who has filed his affidavit dated February 6, 1982, has admitted that the detenu submitted his represtntation addressed to the Secretary to the Government, Home Department, on July 29, 1981. He proceeds tp assert that the said representation in original was forwarded by post to the Government in Srinagar vide his office No. 2595 dated July 29, 1981. He further adds that a wireless message No. 2596 dated July 29, 1981, was alo sent to the Government to intimate that the representation of the detenu had been forwarded to the 'Government for appropriate action. Postal communication from\n\nJammu to Srinagar hardly takes two days unless it is pointed out that there was some break down of communication. Nothing to that effect was brought to our notice. Now, Shri Salathia has stated In\n\nhis counter affidavit that as no representation was received a wireless message was sent on August 6, 1981, making reference to the wireless communication from the Superintendent of Jail.that the representation referred to in the wireless message of the Jail Superintendent bas still not been received at Srinagar. He requested the Superintendent to send a duplicate copy of the same by air consignment, and gave a further direction that in future all such communications should be sent through air consignment. Be that as it may, be says that the representation was received in the office on August 12, 1981. The comments from S.P., C.l.D., Counter Intelligence were called for on August 14, 1981. He.does not state the date on which they were received but be says that the case was examined and processed on August 24, 1981 i~ the office and the file was placed before the Home Secretary on August 25, 1981, who recommended the same for approval on August 28, 1981, and the Chief Minister (Home) rejected the representation on August 31, 1981, and the facto( rejection of the representation was communicated to the detenu on September 1, 1981. There arc two time lags which may De noticed. Representation admittedly handed in the Superintendellt of Jail on July 29, 1981 to at Jammu reached Srinagar, the summer capital of the State on August 12, 1981, which shows a time lag of 14 days. The second time lag is, from our point of view,.more glaring. Even though the concerned office was made aware of the fact by the wireless message of the Superintendent of Jail, Jammu, dated July 29, 1981, that a representation of the detenu has been sent by post, the first query about its non. receipt came as per the wireless message dated August 6, 1981.\n\nThat can be overlooked, but it has one important message. The concerned office was aware of the fact that a representation .has\n\n532 StJPIU!Mll c:OtJRT IU!MR1'S , . [I §81] 3 s.c.R.\n\nalready been made and a duplicate was sent for.\n\nWith the background of this knowledge trace the movement of the representation from the date of its admitted receipt being Augu5t 12, 1981.\n\nI(the representation was received on August 12, 1981, and the same office disosed it of on August 31, 1981, there has been a time lag of 19 days and the explanation in that behalf in the affidavit of Shri Salathia is far from convincing. In . our opinion, in the facts of this case this delay, apart from being inordinate, is not explained on any convincing grounds.\n\nIn Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal,(') this Court held that one of the basic requirements of clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making the order of detention must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention and this requirement would become illusory unless there is a corresponding obligation on the detaining authority to cbnsider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Thus, in the facts of this case we are not satisfied that the representation was dealt with as early as possible or as expeditiously as possible, and, there-· fore, there would be contravention of section 13 of the Act which would result in the invalidation of the order.\n\nThese are the reasons which had prompted us to quash and set aside the detention order.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed •.\n\n(1) [197S] 2 s.c.c. 81. 1", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "522\n\nVIJAY KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIJAY KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF J & K & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF J & K & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978", "statute": "Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "Public Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 783, "end_char": 800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detention order dated July 11, 1981 was served on the detenue in Jail on July 15, 1981."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detention order dated July 11, 1981 was served on the detenue in Jail on July 15, 1981."}}, {"text": "July 29. 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1021, "end_char": 1034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His representation dated July 29, 1981 was forwarded to the E State Government on July 29."}}, {"text": "12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1159, "end_char": 1167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was received by the Government on August 12, 1981."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the file was put up to tho Chief Minister on August 28, 1981 for approval."}}, {"text": "August 31, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1315, "end_char": 1330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Minister rejected the representation on August 31, 1981 which Was communicated to the petitioner in jail on Septem~ ber 1, 1981."}}, {"text": "Septem~ ber 1, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Minister rejected the representation on August 31, 1981 which Was communicated to the petitioner in jail on Septem~ ber 1, 1981."}}, {"text": "August 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1460, "end_char": 1474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu's case was referred to the Advisory Board on August 3, 1981."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its report was submitted on September 4, 1981."}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547, "end_char": 1554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Safety Act", "statute": "Public Safety Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Safety Act", "statute": "Public Safety Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 29, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3589, "end_char": 3602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "530 0-G]\n\nIll the instant case there were two time lags : the representation handed in to the Jail Superintendent on July 29, 1981 reached the Government on August 12, 1981 after a time lag of fourteen days and tho representation was disposed of on August 31, 1981 after a time lag of nineteen days and the delay has not been explained on any convincing ground. ["}}, {"text": "August 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "530 0-G]\n\nIll the instant case there were two time lags : the representation handed in to the Jail Superintendent on July 29, 1981 reached the Government on August 12, 1981 after a time lag of fourteen days and tho representation was disposed of on August 31, 1981 after a time lag of nineteen days and the delay has not been explained on any convincing ground. ["}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhim Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4941, "end_char": 4951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nBhim Singh, P.D. Sharma & Subash Sharma fot the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "P.D. Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nBhim Singh, P.D. Sharma & Subash Sharma fot the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "P.D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Subash Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4967, "end_char": 4980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nBhim Singh, P.D. Sharma & Subash Sharma fot the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M.N. Phadke", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5002, "end_char": 5013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Phadke and Alta/ Ahmed fqr the Respondeqt1,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s:c.R.\n\n."}}, {"text": "Alta/ Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Phadke and Alta/ Ahmed fqr the Respondeqt1,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s:c.R.\n\n."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. On February 9, 1982 we made an order quashing the detention order dated July 11, 1981 made by the District Magistrate, Jammu in exercise of' the power conferred by Section 8 of The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 ('Act' for short) and we announced that the reasons would follow.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate Jammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition wa~ moved on his behalf bfore the Chief Judicial Magistrate Jammu praying for releasing the detenu, on bail."}}, {"text": "Enemy Agents Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4.7.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter again came up on July 6, 1981, the learned Magistrate made the following order :\n\n\"Although there was nothing in the C.D. File about his (Petitioner) involvement in E.A.O. (Enemy Agents Ordinance) on 4.7.81, but today a detailed report has been presented in which one of the offences of which he is charged is u/s 3, E.A.O. which this Court is not competent to try."}}, {"text": "s 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Enemy Agents Ordinance", "statute": "Enemy Agents Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu thereupon moved an application for releasing him on bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, who, we are informed, was competent to try the accused charged with an offence under Enemy Agents Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Enemy Agents Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6566, "end_char": 6588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July G 11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6669, "end_char": 6684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His petition for hail came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on July G 11, 1981 when the following order was made:\n\n\"This application pertains to Vijay Kumar accused who is involved for an offence under the Enemy Agents Ordinance which is being investigated by the Counter H Intelligence Police, Jammu."}}, {"text": "Vijay Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His petition for hail came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on July G 11, 1981 when the following order was made:\n\n\"This application pertains to Vijay Kumar accused who is involved for an offence under the Enemy Agents Ordinance which is being investigated by the Counter H Intelligence Police, Jammu."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His petition for hail came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on July G 11, 1981 when the following order was made:\n\n\"This application pertains to Vijay Kumar accused who is involved for an offence under the Enemy Agents Ordinance which is being investigated by the Counter H Intelligence Police, Jammu."}}, {"text": "Vijay Kumar accused has now been ordered to be detained under the Pliblic Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 25, J.981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detemi was served with the detention order dated July 11, 1981 on the same day in jail because he was already in jail from June 25, J.981."}}, {"text": "K.D. Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7738, "end_char": 7749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One .Shri K.D. Sharma, Incharge Superintendent, Central !", "canonical_name": "P.D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7940, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government at Srinagar vide Office letter , No."}}, {"text": "K.S. Salathia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8209, "end_char": 8222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Jammu .and Kashmir, Home Department, Jammu, in bis affidavit dated °February 9, 1982 has stated that the representation of the detenu was received from the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jammu in the office of the Home Department at Srinagar on August 12, 1981. .", "canonical_name": "K.S. Salathia"}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu .and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Jammu .and Kashmir, Home Department, Jammu, in bis affidavit dated °February 9, 1982 has stated that the representation of the detenu was received from the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jammu in the office of the Home Department at Srinagar on August 12, 1981. ."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8330, "end_char": 8346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Jammu .and Kashmir, Home Department, Jammu, in bis affidavit dated °February 9, 1982 has stated that the representation of the detenu was received from the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jammu in the office of the Home Department at Srinagar on August 12, 1981. ."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for approval on August 28,1981 to the Chief Minister (Home) From the same affidavit, it further transpires that the Chief Minister rejected the representation on August 31, 1981 an'ci the same was communicated to the detenu on September 1, 1981."}}, {"text": "Rattanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9243, "end_char": 9252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Rattanlal, the brother of the detenu moved Petition No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9343, "end_char": 9383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 of 1981 for writ of Habeas Corpus in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9536, "end_char": 9552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A the learned Single Judge, who by his judgment dated December 7, 1981 rejected the same."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9647, "end_char": 9657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9708, "end_char": 9717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10145, "end_char": 10154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to that Agency, such activities were likely to assist Pakistan in any armed aggression against the State and were a threat to the security of the State."}}, {"text": "besai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11971, "end_char": 11976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Number of contentions were advanced at the hearing of this petition but we propose to deal with only two of them which in our\n\n(I) 1981 K.L.H. 71 •\n\nViiAY ltul.!AR v. J & It STATE (besai, J.)\n\nopinion go to the root of the matter and which, wheh accepted, in our opinion, would result in invalidation.of the order ."}}, {"text": "S.P., C.I.D.- Counter IntelHgence, Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a foot note in the order that the order was forwarded to the S.P., C.I.D.- Counter IntelHgence, Jammu for execution of the order under section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13456, "end_char": 13465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anant Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13563, "end_char": 13572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further direction was that notice of the order shall be given to Vijay Kumar s/o Anant Ram, r/o-H. No."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14315, "end_char": 14324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.S. Salathia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14613, "end_char": 14626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department, who has filed the counter affidavit has with reference to the averments made in para 3 of the petition made a very very ambiguous statement that 'for the purpose of J iind K Public\n\nSafety Act the petitioner was arrested on July 11, 1981, pursuant to the detention order.", "canonical_name": "K.S. Salathia"}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14648, "end_char": 14677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K.S. Salathia, Deputy Secretary to Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Home Department, who has filed the counter affidavit has with reference to the averments made in para 3 of the petition made a very very ambiguous statement that 'for the purpose of J iind K Public\n\nSafety Act the petitioner was arrested on July 11, 1981, pursuant to the detention order."}}, {"text": "Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14878, "end_char": 14888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. Sahasranaman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15344, "end_char": 15359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may further be pointed out that Shri A. Sahasranaman, the District Magistrate of Jammu who has made the impugned detention order, filed an affidavit on February 7, 1982."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Jammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15365, "end_char": 15393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may further be pointed out that Shri A. Sahasranaman, the District Magistrate of Jammu who has made the impugned detention order, filed an affidavit on February 7, 1982."}}, {"text": "February 7, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15459, "end_char": 15475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may further be pointed out that Shri A. Sahasranaman, the District Magistrate of Jammu who has made the impugned detention order, filed an affidavit on February 7, 1982."}}, {"text": "Hans Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15625, "end_char": 15633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, in fairness to him it must be stated that this affidavit was for the limited purpose of pointing out as to how he dealt with the case of Hans Raj, another detenu whose detention was quashed by this Court."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17281, "end_char": 17286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VliA\\' KUMAil v. 1 & K STATE (Desai, J.)\n\nThe second contention which in our opinion goes to the root of the matter is that there has been a violation of section 13 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17405, "end_char": 17415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17428, "end_char": 17438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17938, "end_char": 17948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18033, "end_char": 18054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 25, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22137, "end_char": 22150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reverting to the \"facts of this case, the detenu who in jail from June 25, 1981, was served with a detention or(ler on July 11, 1981, the very day on which the detention order was made."}}, {"text": "Salathia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23343, "end_char": 23351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, Shri Salathia has stated In\n\nhis counter affidavit that as no representation was received a wireless message was sent on August 6, 1981, making reference to the wireless communication from the Superintendent of Jail.that the representation referred to in the wireless message of the Jail Superintendent bas still not been received at Srinagar."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23459, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, Shri Salathia has stated In\n\nhis counter affidavit that as no representation was received a wireless message was sent on August 6, 1981, making reference to the wireless communication from the Superintendent of Jail.that the representation referred to in the wireless message of the Jail Superintendent bas still not been received at Srinagar."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24049, "end_char": 24064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D., Counter Intelligence were called for on August 14, 1981."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24177, "end_char": 24192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He.does not state the date on which they were received but be says that the case was examined and processed on August 24, 1981 i~ the office and the file was placed before the Home Secretary on August 25, 1981, who recommended the same for approval on August 28, 1981, and the Chief Minister (Home) rejected the representation on August 31, 1981, and the facto( rejection of the representation was communicated to the detenu on September 1, 1981."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24260, "end_char": 24275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He.does not state the date on which they were received but be says that the case was examined and processed on August 24, 1981 i~ the office and the file was placed before the Home Secretary on August 25, 1981, who recommended the same for approval on August 28, 1981, and the Chief Minister (Home) rejected the representation on August 31, 1981, and the facto( rejection of the representation was communicated to the detenu on September 1, 1981."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25970, "end_char": 25980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26516, "end_char": 26526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_533_542_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "~--\n\n'/ .. }\n\n• ; j\"\n\nANIL YADAV. & _ORS.'\n\n' v.\n\n.'_;--;:.I ·.' l.\n\n. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.\n\n. •, ,,- .•.. ., . ·.· , , March 23, 1982; ·-; ,\"-;.··\n\n\".-· .. V'.\n\n[Y.V. CJIANDRACHUD, C.J., A.' v ARADARAJAN AND\n\nA!llARENDRA NATH SEN, JI.] -. . .\n\n_, .. _ ..\n\n. •• f\n\n ...\n\n, ..\n\n. __ . ConJt/tullon oflmlia 1950, Art.32-Habea• CorpuJ petltlon-&•pondmt a go1ernment official directed tO file Oj/idarit..:...OffiClal' 1usp•nded by; government-\n\nSusptn1/011 Order whether Can be challenged in /11cldental Proceedt,, Z8. · -\n\nThe second respondent who was the Superintendent or the BbagaJpur Central Jail was suspended by the State Government on the groand that he was negligent in providing~ propel- -medicai aid to the blinded undertrial prisoners inside the jail and that he bad failed to make entries in the jail register as regrds\n\nthe physical condition or the ui:tdeririat prisoners.': I In a Mlscellaneous Petition filed by him he claimed that bis order of suspeOsion be quashed as itwas passed ma/a fide. with the object ol preventing him from tiling the affidavit as directed by the cOurt. ; ..\n\nThe. State GovemiDent contested the petitiO~ cOntendi.iig that the respondent was suspended for his failure to Comply with the requirements of Rule 474\n\n(1) of the Bihar Jail Manual in that he -did iiot scrutinise and sign the entries made in the Admission Register maintained at the jail to satisfy himself whether those entries were correct and whether the relevant rules in regard to the admission of the prisoners were complied with.· He_ did_ not. aJso record any 'special\" . ofdei under Rule 474 (2) regarding the medical treatmeiit given or to be given to the blinded prisoners with the reslllt that they were not sent for examination to any eye specialist. He did ... not make 3. report on the blindings of the prisoners and. he ~pplied .to newsP_aper_s bis own version of the blindings •\n\n. , .\n\nDismissing the petitions;-, ' ,--. : \",\n\nHELD: . OrdinarilY 30: older or sus~D.Sion cailliot be haunied i~. I.a inCideiltal proceeding but it was heaid Since the allegation was th3t the petitioD.Cr was suspended in order 10 defeat the order passed _by this Court. [539 E] · , ·:\n\n< - ' ~\n\n~ . . .. 2. The Order of, suSpension. was -not._ passed: by the GoveiUment ma/a\n\nJ; j~ as a couuterblast to the order passed b)' this Coor! on December l, 1980\n\nlliid 10 c!efct it. (540 FJ · ·\n\n3. The allegation that the motive behind the order was to frustrate the purpose of the Court's direction calJing upon the petitioner to file an affidavit is not proved. The evidence on record indicates that the State Government officials were enquiring into the blindings of the under-trial prisoners and there is a report in the- Government files recommending that the petitioner be suspended for dereliction of duty, It cannot be said that this report was prepa1ed later and antedated to justify the order of suspension. [540 G-H; 541 A-BJ\n\n4. By placing the petitioner under suspension the State Government could not prevent him from filing an affidavit in Court. He was free to file bis affidavit and in fact he filed an affidavit after suspension. [541 CJ\n\nThe petitioner will be at liberty to challenge the order of suspension in a properly constituted proceedings on such grounds as may be open to him including the ground that the order was passed ma/a fide. [541 Fl\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Criminal Misc. Petitions Nos. 8774 of 1980 & 2581of1981. ~-,\n\nWrit Petition No. 5352 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nB.L. Das Petitioner-in-person.\n\nK.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent (State).\n\nR.N. Poddar for the Res, Pondent (CBI).\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, CJ. These Misc. Petitions are an off-shoot of the blindings of undertrial prisoners at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar. Truth has a strange habit of revealing itself and in spite of the veil of secrecy behind which the blindings of those prisoners lay concealed or suppressed, this Court and the country awoke one day to the incredible fact that, in Bhagalpur, undertrial 'prisoners were subjected to the most inhuman torture imaginable : their eyes were pierced with needles and acid poured into them. Whether these barbarous acts were committed by members of the public after the prisoners were caught or by the police after they were arrested, is not a matter directly in issue before us. The greater probability\n\ni' th11t thes~ a~\\s mat have been ommitted mostly by the poli~.\n\nBut this much is certain, that six prisoners were thus blinded between\n\nOctober 1979 and May 1980 and twelve between lune 11 and July 25, 1980. The petitioner Bacbcho Lal Das, who has filed the11e Misc. Petitions, had assumed charge as the Superintendent of the Bhagalpur Central Jail.on April 19, 1979.\n\nOn October 26, 1979 a prisoner by the name of Arjun Goswami was sent to the Bhagalpur Central Jail. On November 20, 1979 he addressed an application to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur, asking that an inquiry be held into the torture infticted upon him, especially the blinding of his eyes. That application was forwarded by the petitioner to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.\n\nLater, eleven prisoners made similar complaints which were forwarded by the petitioner to the learned Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, on July ~O, 1980. The complaints made by these prisoners unquesionably demanded the most prompt and careful attention. But, instead of directing a full and proper inquiry into the allegati-Ons matle by the undertrial prisoners, the learned Sessions Judge, on August 5, 1980, sent a cold and indifferent reply to the petitioner's covering letter, saying that \"there is no provision in the Cr. P.C. to provide a lawyer to any person for prosecuting a criminal case as a complaint\" and that the petitions of the prisoners Were forwarded. to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhargalpur, \"for needful in accnrdance with Jaw.\"\n\nOn October 9, 1980, ten blinded prisoners filed a Habeas Corpus petition in this Court (Criminal Writ Petition No. 5352 of\n\n1980) asking that : (I) they should be produced in the Court, (2) they should be examined by a Medical Board, (3) they should be paid compensation for the damage done to their eyes and that (4) .the police officers guilty of committing atrocities upon them should be suitably punished. On October 10, 1980 a Bench 'of this Court consisting of one of us, (the Chief Justice), and Justice A.D. Koshal passed the following order in that petition :\n\n\"We direct that the petitioners shall be. examined. by the Jail Doctor forthwith and a report shall be submitted to this Court expeditiously in regard to the allegation in the petition that their eyes haye been damaged by certain police officers by putting acid therein. The report shall be submitted within four weeks from today. The W.P. be listed for hearing after \\he report is rec; eiv~4,\"\n\nBy hisJettCli, dated October 31, 1980 the petitioner, who is respon dent 2 in the Habeas Corpus petition, forwarded to this Court the report of the Jai.1 Doctor on the condition of the eyes of the prisoners. The remaining 2 prisoners were already rele.ased and could not therefore be examined. The report of the Jail Doctor in regard to one of the prisoners, Anil Yadav, is representative of the conclhion of all the eight of them and may be extracted here :\n\n\"(!) Presence of old burn scar around both the eyelids of both the eyes and on left cheek.\n\n(2) Collapse of both the eye balls.\n\n(3) Perception of light and projection of rays abseat in both the eyes.\n\n(4) Eye sight of both the eyes lost.\n\nThe cause is perforation of eye balls by burn with some corrosive substance and puncture by some sharp and pointed weapon.\n\nFrom the records of Jail Hospital it is known that he was admitted in Jail Hospital on 8. 7 .1980 for acid burn injury of both the eyes.\"\n\nOn December I, 1980, the Court (the Chief Justice and Chinnappa Reddy, J.), while directing that the prisoners be brougltt to Delhi the following week and be examined at the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi, passed the following order :\n\n\"The report of the doctor which we had called for by our Order dated October 10, 1980 shows that eight out of the ten petitioners before us have lost their eye-sight totally or partially. The report submitted by Dr. K.S. Roy in each individualcase shows that :\n\n(i) most of the petitioners are suffering from collapse of one or both of the eye-balls ;\n\n(ii) the sighi of one or both of their eres is lost ;\n\n(iii) there is perforation of .their eye-balls by burn with a corrosive substance and that\n\n(iv) their eyes have been punctured by some sharp and pointed weapon.\n\nThe remaining two petitioners have been released and therefore no report could be sent regarding them.\n\nThe report of the doctor will shock the conscience of mankind. There has been the most flagrant violation of the safeguards provided by Articies 19 and 21 of the Constitution. There is ndthing that the Court can do to restore the physical demage, which seems irreparable.\n\nBut the offenders must at all events be brought to book, at least in the hope that such brutal atrocities will not be committed again.\n\nWith that end in view, we direct the Superintendent D of the Bhagalpur Central Jail to file an affidavit in this Court within two weeks from to-day stating :\n\n(a) the names of convicts and nndertrial prisoners in the jail whose eyes have been damaged or impaired bfore or after their lodgement in Jail ; E\n\n(b) the names of policemen, police officers and the members of the.jail stJff who were in charge of those prisoners at the relevant time ;\n\n(c) the names of doctors who were in charge of the jail\n\ndispensary or hospital at the relevant time ; and\n\n(d) the names of doctors who have examined, from time to time, the petitioners and other prisoners whose eyes have b.een damaged or impaired after their lodgement in jail:\n\nWe direct that the Registrar of the Supreme Court and one other officer of the Court shall visit the Bhagalpur Central Jail during this week and obtain first-hand the\n\nversion of the petiticiners and other prisoners similarly ff situated as regards the impairment or blinding of their eyes.\n\nThe two. officers of the Court hall. be anted everr facilit¥\n\nto meet the prisoners, to talk them beyond the hearing of any jail officer or police officer and to record the statemepts of the prisoners. We direct the Jail Superintendent to ensure due and full complince with these directions.\n\nIssue notice to the State of Bihar asking it to show cause on the petition as also as to why the petitioners should not be released on bail on their personal recognizance.\"\n\nShri R. Narasimhan, Registrar (Judicial) and Shri Y. Lal, Assistant Registrar of this Court visited the Bhagalpur Central Jail on December 3 and 4, 1980 and recorded the statements of 17 prisoners who were blindeg. These statements show that 15 out of the 17 prisoners were blinded by the police and the remaining 2, whose names appear at Serial Nos. 14 and 15 of the report of the Registrar, were blinded by the members of the public.\n\nThe method adopted for blinding the undertrial prisoners, as described by the prisoners themselves, was that a 'takwa' (a long needle used for stitching gunny bags) or a barber's nail-cqtter or a cycle spoke was poked into tb&ir eyes and acid was poured into the eyes, sometimes with the help of a dropper, sometimes with a syringe and sometimes directly from a bottle. It is alleged that the prisoners were held firmly on the ground by policemea who either pulled the ropes tied to their feet or sat upon their feet.\n\nThe Registrar questioned the Petitioner, Bachcho Lal Das, in Delhi. The petitioner stated to him that as many as 31 blinded prisoners were brought to the Jail under orders of remand issued by the Magistrate and that they were given medical treatment by the Jail Doctor. According to the petitioner, he got a blinded prisoner Umesh Yadav examined by the Jail Doctor, since the report of the doct<•r was required by the learned District .and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, in connection with a bail application filed by the prisoner. The petitioner disclosed to the Registrar that be bad made inquiries from Umesh Yadav, who told him that V.K. Sharma, D.S.P., had thrust a long needle in both of his eyes and had poured acid into the eyes. The other blinded persons appear to have taken a cue from Umesh. Yadav and submitted similar petitions for being forwarded to the District and essions Judge. The petitioner disclosed to the Registrar the names of the police officer3 who\n\n;,.t\n\n. . \\.\n\n}.. '\n\n.. ..\n\nwere involved by the prisonem as being responsible for their blindings. ·\n\nIt may be recalled that thi.s Court by its order dated December I, 1980 had directed the petitioner, who was then the Superintendent of the Bhagalpur Central Jail, to file an affidavit within two weeks on Points (a) to (d) mentioned in that order. On that very day, the petitioner was suspended by the Government of Bihar on the grour, d the he was negligent in providing proper medical aid to the blinded nndertrial prisoners inside the Jail and that . he had failed to make proper entries in the Jail Register as regards the physical condition of the undertrial prisoners. On December 10, 1980 the petitioner filed the main Misc. Petition in this Court in the Writ Petition filed by the blinded prisoners. He prays that the order of' suspension dated December I, 1980 l!e quashed, since at was passed by the State of Bibar mala fide with the object of preventing him from filing an affidavit in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court on December I, 1980.\n\nWe would not have entertained I\\ petition of this nature in the normal circumstances, because an order of suspension cannot be challenged in this manner in an incidental proceeding. We, however, decided to hear the Misc. Petitions filed by the petitioner for quashing the order of suspension, since he alleged which, at first blush, seemed plausible, that he was suspended in order to defeat the order passed by this Court on December I, 1980.\n\nThe petitioner appeared in person before us and argued his case at great length. We gave him all reasonable facilities to substantiate his contentions, which he did with the help of the voluminous record prepared by him. Having considered the submissions of the petitioner and .those of Shri K.G. Bhagat, who appeared on behalf of the State of Bihar, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the complaint of the petitioner that he was suspended on December l; 1980 in order to prevent him from complying with the order passed by this Court on that day and with the ulterier object of defeating that order.\n\nShri Ambik .. iasad Poddar, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar, has filed an affidavit in this Court, settling out the circumstances in which and the reasons for which the petitioner was suspended by the Government Qf :Qihar. The cae ma, ge 011t in tha, t\n\naffidavit is that the petitioner failed to discharge his official functions enjoined upon him by Rule 474 (I) of the Bihar Jail Manual, in that he did not scrutinise and sign the entries made in the Admission Register maintained. at the Central Jail, in order to satisfy himself whether those entries were correct and whether the relevant rules in regard to the admission of the prisoners were complied with. It is stated in the affidavit that contrary to Rule 474 (2), the petitioner failed to record any 'special order' regarding the medical treatment given or to be given to the . blinded prisoners, with the result that they were not sent for examination to any eye specialist either in the Jail or at the Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital.\n\nThough the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, had given his approval on October 21, 1980 to the proposal for sending the blinded prisoners for specialised treatment at the Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital, the petitioner;· it is alleged, neglected to discharge his duty and sent the prisoners f9r medical .treatment to the Hospital ten days later on October 31, 1980. According to Shri Ambika Prasad, Poddar, the petitioner omitted to make a report on the blindings of prisoners lodged in the Jail which was under his charge, he did not hold a parade of the prisoners nor did he make the weekly inspection of the Jail, and on the top of it all, he supplied to newspapermen his own onesided •version of the blindings. The suspension order, according to Shri Poddar, was passed on the basis of the various rules and notifications governing the conditions of the petitioner'sservice and was not passed in order to frustrate or defeat the order passed by this Court on December 1, 1980,\n\nOn a careful consideration of the aforesaid affidavit and the arguments advanced before us by the parties, we find it difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the order of suspension was passed by the Government of Bihar ma/a fide, that is to say, as a counterblast to the order passed by this Court on December I, 1980 and to defeat it. The question for inquiry in these Miscellaneous Petitions is very narrow and limited. The question is not even whether the order of suspension is ma/a fide in a broad and general sense, covering the entire gamut of extraneousness. The question before us is whether the motive behind the order was to frustrate the purpose of our direction calling upon the petitioner to file an affidavit, That charge is not substantiated and is difficult to accept.\n\nIt. appears that officers of the State Government91e enquiring into the blindings of the undertrial prisoners at least from November 27,\n\n1980, There is a report <late<l Peceml;>er 1, 1980 in the Govermen~\n\n11,\n\nAidt YADA'v v. BillAR (Chandrachud, t.J.), 54!\n\nfiles, which was produced before us by Shri K, G. Bhagat, by which Shri L.V. Singh, Deputy I.G.P. (Prisons), recommended that for reasons of dereliction of duty the petitioner should be suspended.\n\nWe find it quite difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the report of Shri Singh was prepared later and was antedated in order to justify the order of suspension.\n\nWe are also unable to appreciate how the State Government could prevent the petitioner from filing an affidavit as directed by this Court, by placing him under suspension. The petitioner would be free to file his affidavit in spite of the order of suspension and in fact he has filed an affidavit in this Court after he was suspended.\n\nDuring the course of arguments before us, he produced photostat copies of quite a few documents, which also show: that the order of suspension is not calculated to interfere with the direction given by this Court, asking the petitioner to file his affidavit. If we had found that by reason of the order of suspension the petitioner was prevented from filing his affidavit, we would not have hesitated to ask the Government of Bihar to supply copies of necessary documents to the petitioner in order to enable him to file a full and complete affidavit in compliance with our order.\n\nThe Miscellaneous petitions have therefore to be dismissed. We would, however, like to state that we are not called upon to consider in tbe, se incidental proceedings, and we have in fact not considered, the question of the validity of the order of suspel.li!on dated December I,1980. The petitioner will be at liberty to cb!lenge that order, if so advised, in a properly constituted proceedings, on such grounds as may be open to him including the ground that the order was passed ma/a fide.\n\nWe have only dealt with the narrow question as to whether the order of suspension was passed with the object of preventing the petitioner from filing an affidavit in this Court and on that question we have rejected the petitioner's contention that the order of suspension was passed for that purpose.\n\nWe have not inquired into the question whether the order of suspension is vitiated by ma/a fa/es for any other reason,\n\nIt ls desirable and but proper that the State Government ought not to visit the petitioner with any penalty or punishment for app-\n\n542 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nroaching this Court or for having attempted to lay before this Court, what according to the petitioner, was the truth of the matter in regard to the bizarre blindil)gs of the under trial prisoners.\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n- ----", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "ANIL YADAV. & _ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANIL YADAV. & _ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A!llARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 231, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art.32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 312, "end_char": 318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3491, "end_char": 3501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.L. Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nB.L. Das Petitioner-in-person."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3556, "end_char": 3567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent (State).", "canonical_name": "K.G. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Respondent (State)."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.N. Poddar for the Res, Pondent (CBI)."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, CJ."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitions are an off-shoot of the blindings of undertrial prisoners at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The greater probability\n\ni' th11t thes~ a~\\s mat have been ommitted mostly by the poli~.\n\nBut this much is certain, that six prisoners were thus blinded between\n\nOctober 1979 and May 1980 and twelve between lune 11 and July 25, 1980."}}, {"text": "Bacbcho Lal Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner Bacbcho Lal Das, who has filed the11e Misc.", "canonical_name": "Bacbcho Lal Das"}}, {"text": "April 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitions, had assumed charge as the Superintendent of the Bhagalpur Central Jail.on April 19, 1979."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 26, 1979 a prisoner by the name of Arjun Goswami was sent to the Bhagalpur Central Jail."}}, {"text": "November 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 20, 1979 he addressed an application to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur, asking that an inquiry be held into the torture infticted upon him, especially the blinding of his eyes."}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 20, 1979 he addressed an application to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur, asking that an inquiry be held into the torture infticted upon him, especially the blinding of his eyes."}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5151, "end_char": 5176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was forwarded by the petitioner to the Chief Judicial Magistrate."}}, {"text": "August 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5567, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, instead of directing a full and proper inquiry into the allegati-Ons matle by the undertrial prisoners, the learned Sessions Judge, on August 5, 1980, sent a cold and indifferent reply to the petitioner's covering letter, saying that \"there is no provision in the Cr."}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhargalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5850, "end_char": 5887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhargalpur, \"for needful in accnrdance with Jaw.\""}}, {"text": "October 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 9, 1980, ten blinded prisoners filed a Habeas Corpus petition in this Court (Criminal Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6341, "end_char": 6357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 10, 1980 a Bench 'of this Court consisting of one of us, (the Chief Justice), and Justice A.D. Koshal passed the following order in that petition :\n\n\"We direct that the petitioners shall be."}}, {"text": "A.D. Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6439, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 10, 1980 a Bench 'of this Court consisting of one of us, (the Chief Justice), and Justice A.D. Koshal passed the following order in that petition :\n\n\"We direct that the petitioners shall be."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6915, "end_char": 6931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The W.P. be listed for hearing after \\he report is rec; eiv~4,\"\n\nBy hisJettCli, dated October 31, 1980 the petitioner, who is respon dent 2 in the Habeas Corpus petition, forwarded to this Court the report of the Jai.1 Doctor on the condition of the eyes of the prisoners."}}, {"text": "Anil Yadav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report of the Jail Doctor in regard to one of the prisoners, Anil Yadav, is representative of the conclhion of all the eight of them and may be extracted here :\n\n\"(!)", "canonical_name": "ANIL YADAV. & _ORS"}}, {"text": "8. 7 .1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the records of Jail Hospital it is known that he was admitted in Jail Hospital on 8."}}, {"text": "I, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7869, "end_char": 7876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December I, 1980, the Court (the Chief Justice and Chinnappa Reddy, J.), while directing that the prisoners be brougltt to Delhi the following week and be examined at the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi, passed the following order :\n\n\"The report of the doctor which we had called for by our Order dated October 10, 1980 shows that eight out of the ten petitioners before us have lost their eye-sight totally or partially."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7911, "end_char": 7926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December I, 1980, the Court (the Chief Justice and Chinnappa Reddy, J.), while directing that the prisoners be brougltt to Delhi the following week and be examined at the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi, passed the following order :\n\n\"The report of the doctor which we had called for by our Order dated October 10, 1980 shows that eight out of the ten petitioners before us have lost their eye-sight totally or partially."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7983, "end_char": 7988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December I, 1980, the Court (the Chief Justice and Chinnappa Reddy, J.), while directing that the prisoners be brougltt to Delhi the following week and be examined at the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi, passed the following order :\n\n\"The report of the doctor which we had called for by our Order dated October 10, 1980 shows that eight out of the ten petitioners before us have lost their eye-sight totally or partially."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8035, "end_char": 8081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December I, 1980, the Court (the Chief Justice and Chinnappa Reddy, J.), while directing that the prisoners be brougltt to Delhi the following week and be examined at the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Opthalmic Institute, New Delhi, passed the following order :\n\n\"The report of the doctor which we had called for by our Order dated October 10, 1980 shows that eight out of the ten petitioners before us have lost their eye-sight totally or partially."}}, {"text": "K.S. Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report submitted by Dr. K.S. Roy in each individualcase shows that :\n\n(i) most of the petitioners are suffering from collapse of one or both of the eye-balls ;\n\n(ii) the sighi of one or both of their eres is lost ;\n\n(iii) there is perforation of .their eye-balls by burn with a corrosive substance and that\n\n(iv) their eyes have been punctured by some sharp and pointed weapon."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur Central Jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9258, "end_char": 9280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With that end in view, we direct the Superintendent D of the Bhagalpur Central Jail to file an affidavit in this Court within two weeks from to-day stating :\n\n(a) the names of convicts and nndertrial prisoners in the jail whose eyes have been damaged or impaired bfore or after their lodgement in Jail ; E\n\n(b) the names of policemen, police officers and the members of the.jail stJff who were in charge of those prisoners at the relevant time ;\n\n(c) the names of doctors who were in charge of the jail\n\ndispensary or hospital at the relevant time ; and\n\n(d) the names of doctors who have examined, from time to time, the petitioners and other prisoners whose eyes have b.een damaged or impaired after their lodgement in jail:\n\nWe direct that the Registrar of the Supreme Court and one other officer of the Court shall visit the Bhagalpur Central Jail during this week and obtain first-hand the\n\nversion of the petiticiners and other prisoners similarly ff situated as regards the impairment or blinding of their eyes."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9961, "end_char": 9974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With that end in view, we direct the Superintendent D of the Bhagalpur Central Jail to file an affidavit in this Court within two weeks from to-day stating :\n\n(a) the names of convicts and nndertrial prisoners in the jail whose eyes have been damaged or impaired bfore or after their lodgement in Jail ; E\n\n(b) the names of policemen, police officers and the members of the.jail stJff who were in charge of those prisoners at the relevant time ;\n\n(c) the names of doctors who were in charge of the jail\n\ndispensary or hospital at the relevant time ; and\n\n(d) the names of doctors who have examined, from time to time, the petitioners and other prisoners whose eyes have b.een damaged or impaired after their lodgement in jail:\n\nWe direct that the Registrar of the Supreme Court and one other officer of the Court shall visit the Bhagalpur Central Jail during this week and obtain first-hand the\n\nversion of the petiticiners and other prisoners similarly ff situated as regards the impairment or blinding of their eyes."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10530, "end_char": 10544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Issue notice to the State of Bihar asking it to show cause on the petition as also as to why the petitioners should not be released on bail on their personal recognizance.\""}}, {"text": "R. Narasimhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10689, "end_char": 10702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. Narasimhan, Registrar (Judicial) and Shri Y. Lal, Assistant Registrar of this Court visited the Bhagalpur Central Jail on December 3 and 4, 1980 and recorded the statements of 17 prisoners who were blindeg."}}, {"text": "Y. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. Narasimhan, Registrar (Judicial) and Shri Y. Lal, Assistant Registrar of this Court visited the Bhagalpur Central Jail on December 3 and 4, 1980 and recorded the statements of 17 prisoners who were blindeg."}}, {"text": "December 3 and 4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. Narasimhan, Registrar (Judicial) and Shri Y. Lal, Assistant Registrar of this Court visited the Bhagalpur Central Jail on December 3 and 4, 1980 and recorded the statements of 17 prisoners who were blindeg."}}, {"text": "Bachcho Lal Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11681, "end_char": 11696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Registrar questioned the Petitioner, Bachcho Lal Das, in Delhi.", "canonical_name": "Bacbcho Lal Das"}}, {"text": "Umesh Yadav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11965, "end_char": 11976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner, he got a blinded prisoner Umesh Yadav examined by the Jail Doctor, since the report of the doct<•r was required by the learned District .and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, in connection with a bail application filed by the prisoner.", "canonical_name": "Umesh. Yadav"}}, {"text": "District .and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12066, "end_char": 12105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner, he got a blinded prisoner Umesh Yadav examined by the Jail Doctor, since the report of the doct<•r was required by the learned District .and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, in connection with a bail application filed by the prisoner."}}, {"text": "V.K. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner disclosed to the Registrar that be bad made inquiries from Umesh Yadav, who told him that V.K. Sharma, D.S.P., had thrust a long needle in both of his eyes and had poured acid into the eyes."}}, {"text": "Umesh. Yadav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other blinded persons appear to have taken a cue from Umesh.", "canonical_name": "Umesh. Yadav"}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13017, "end_char": 13036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that very day, the petitioner was suspended by the Government of Bihar on the grour, d the he was negligent in providing proper medical aid to the blinded nndertrial prisoners inside the Jail and that ."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 10, 1980 the petitioner filed the main Misc."}}, {"text": "December I, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He prays that the order of' suspension dated December I, 1980 l!e quashed, since at was passed by the State of Bibar mala fide with the object of preventing him from filing an affidavit in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court on December I, 1980."}}, {"text": "State of Bibar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13525, "end_char": 13539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He prays that the order of' suspension dated December I, 1980 l!e quashed, since at was passed by the State of Bibar mala fide with the object of preventing him from filing an affidavit in pursuance of the direction issued by this Court on December I, 1980."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having considered the submissions of the petitioner and .those of Shri K.G. Bhagat, who appeared on behalf of the State of Bihar, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the complaint of the petitioner that he was suspended on December l; 1980 in order to prevent him from complying with the order passed by this Court on that day and with the ulterier object of defeating that order.", "canonical_name": "K.G. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Ambik .. iasad Poddar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ambik .. iasad Poddar, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar, has filed an affidavit in this Court, settling out the circumstances in which and the reasons for which the petitioner was suspended by the Government Qf :Qihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14810, "end_char": 14815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ambik .. iasad Poddar, Assistant Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar, has filed an affidavit in this Court, settling out the circumstances in which and the reasons for which the petitioner was suspended by the Government Qf :Qihar."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15720, "end_char": 15754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "blinded prisoners, with the result that they were not sent for examination to any eye specialist either in the Jail or at the Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Bhagalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15768, "end_char": 15798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, had given his approval on October 21, 1980 to the proposal for sending the blinded prisoners for specialised treatment at the Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital, the petitioner;· it is alleged, neglected to discharge his duty and sent the prisoners f9r medical .treatment to the Hospital ten days later on October 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "October 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15826, "end_char": 15842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, had given his approval on October 21, 1980 to the proposal for sending the blinded prisoners for specialised treatment at the Bhagalpur Medical College Hospital, the petitioner;· it is alleged, neglected to discharge his duty and sent the prisoners f9r medical .treatment to the Hospital ten days later on October 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "Ambika Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Ambika Prasad, Poddar, the petitioner omitted to make a report on the blindings of prisoners lodged in the Jail which was under his charge, he did not hold a parade of the prisoners nor did he make the weekly inspection of the Jail, and on the top of it all, he supplied to newspapermen his own onesided •version of the blindings."}}, {"text": "Poddar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16157, "end_char": 16163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Ambika Prasad, Poddar, the petitioner omitted to make a report on the blindings of prisoners lodged in the Jail which was under his charge, he did not hold a parade of the prisoners nor did he make the weekly inspection of the Jail, and on the top of it all, he supplied to newspapermen his own onesided •version of the blindings."}}, {"text": "Poddar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16513, "end_char": 16519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suspension order, according to Shri Poddar, was passed on the basis of the various rules and notifications governing the conditions of the petitioner'sservice and was not passed in order to frustrate or defeat the order passed by this Court on December 1, 1980,\n\nOn a careful consideration of the aforesaid affidavit and the arguments advanced before us by the parties, we find it difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the order of suspension was passed by the Government of Bihar ma/a fide, that is to say, as a counterblast to the order passed by this Court on December I, 1980 and to defeat it."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16721, "end_char": 16737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suspension order, according to Shri Poddar, was passed on the basis of the various rules and notifications governing the conditions of the petitioner'sservice and was not passed in order to frustrate or defeat the order passed by this Court on December 1, 1980,\n\nOn a careful consideration of the aforesaid affidavit and the arguments advanced before us by the parties, we find it difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the order of suspension was passed by the Government of Bihar ma/a fide, that is to say, as a counterblast to the order passed by this Court on December I, 1980 and to defeat it."}}, {"text": "K, G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17845, "end_char": 17857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "files, which was produced before us by Shri K, G. Bhagat, by which Shri L.V. Singh, Deputy I.G.P. (Prisons), recommended that for reasons of dereliction of duty the petitioner should be suspended."}}, {"text": "L.V. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17873, "end_char": 17883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "files, which was produced before us by Shri K, G. Bhagat, by which Shri L.V. Singh, Deputy I.G.P. (Prisons), recommended that for reasons of dereliction of duty the petitioner should be suspended."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18088, "end_char": 18093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find it quite difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the report of Shri Singh was prepared later and was antedated in order to justify the order of suspension."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_543_552_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "•. J\n\n• •\n\n543 A\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR iNDUSTRIES LTD.\n\nSTATE OF M.P. & OTHERS\n\nMarch 23, 1982\n\n(V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND AMARENDRA NATH SBN, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958-S. 21-Levy of commission on purchase of cane from outside 'reserved area' or through Cane-growers' Cooperative Society-Whether legal?\n\nSection 21 (I) of the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958, imposes an obligation upon an occupier of a factory to pay commission at prescribed rates on all its purchases of sugarcane. While in respect oC purchases made through fl. Cane-growers' Cooperative Society the commission is payable to that Society and the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (a), in respect of purchases made directly from the cane growers the commission is payable to the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (b).\n\nThe appellant, a company which crushes sugar cane in its factory, purchased cane directly from the cuJtivators of 'reserved area' as well as of 'non-reserved area'. Resp\"ndent No. 2, the Cane J)evelopment Council, demanded commission in respect of purchases made from both 'i\"eserved 1 as well as 'non-reserved' areas.\n\nThe appellant also purchased cane from Or through respondent No. 3, a Canegrowers' Cooperative Society and in respect of those purchases, the demand for commission was made by that Society.\n\nThe demands for payment of commission were challenged by the appellant by a petition under Art. 226 which was dismissed by the High Court .\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since the Cane Development Council had been established for the 'reserved area' of the appellant's factory so declared under s. 15 of the Act and its statutory functions and duties were confined to that area under s. 6 of the Act, its demand for commission on purchases made from 'non-reserved area' was illegal, there being no quid pro quo in the shape of rendering services in respect of purchases made from' non-reserved area'. As regards the demand of the Cane-growers' Cooperative Society for commission in respect of purchases made through it, the contention was that in everything being done by it, the Society was rendCring services to its own members and since no services resulting in any special benefit to the appellant were being rendered by it in terms of the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri'1 case, (1979] 3 SCR 1217, there was no quid pro quo and therefore no commission was legally recoverabl .. y the Society.\n\nS44 sOP!tili.le coUilt llllPoRts [1982) 3 s.t.lt\n\nA Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. The levy under s. 21 of the Act though called 'commission' is really in the nature of a fee and its imposition is supportable only on the basis of quid pro quo in the shape of rendition of services to a factory in the matter of cane purchased by it. [548 C-D]\n\n8 Jaora Sugar Milla (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. [1966] 1\n\nSCR 523, referred to.\n\n2. The imposition of commission by the Cane Development Council on purchases of cane from 'non-reserved area' was proper and justified as there was quid pro quo in the form of rendering services in the m:tter of bettef cane production, distribution and supply thereof. The area of operation or the 'zone' of the CounciJ could include areas outside the 'reserved area' of the factory as a Council could be established for a larger or smaller area \"than the reserved area of a factory\" under s. 5 of the Act, and its functions and duties under els. (a) to\n\n(g) of s. 6(1) included functions like considering and approving development progi'ammes for the zone. devising waysand means for execution of development plan in a!J its essentials such as cane varieties, cane seed, sowing programme, fertilizers and manures, taking steps for preven.tion of diseases and pests and rendering all help in soil extension work, etc. Some of thCse functions mentioned in els. (b), (d) and (el of s. 6(1) are of general character and not confined to even the zone of the Council. Further, s. 21 of the Act does not contain any qualifying words limiting the imposition of ommission to purchases of cane made by a factory from. 1reserved area' onJy; the imposition is on every maund of cane purchased by a factory irrespective of the area from where such purchases might have been made. [549 A-Fl\n\n3. The contention that in respect of purchases of cane made through the\n\nCaoeMgroers' Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act and the activities undertaken by the Society in the discharge of its normal functions. The scheme of the Act, particularly in ss. 15.16 and 19, contemplated situations where the.appellant's factory might have had to purchase cane from within reserved or assigned areas, only through the Society. The Society had been .established to develop scientific methods of sugar cane growing and it bad called upon Its members to introduce modern means of implements for cultivating sugarcane w-bk.b unqueslionably made for assured bulk supply of uniformly good quality cane throllgh its members tO the appellant's factory. It could not, therefore, be said that no services conferring special benefit on the' appeUant's factory in the matter of purchases of cane were being rendered by the Society to the appellant's factory.\n\n[S5l A-H; 552 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 504 (N) of 1971.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th Apri 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 246 ·\n\nof 1967. •\n\n,,,,. .. --~-\n\n• •\n\n---+-\n\n~··\n\nllltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S\n\nR.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra\n\nfor the appellant.\n\nGopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff' for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. Two questions were raised for our determination in this appeal by a certificate :\n\n(a) Whether the Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore\n\n(respondent No. 2) can charge commission under section 21 (I) of the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Act, 1958 on purchases of sugarcane made by the appellantcompany from outside the \"reserved area\" ? and\n\n(b) Whether the Sugar Cane-Growers Development Co- D operative Union Ltd., Sehore (respondent No. 3: the concerned Cane Growers Co-operative Society) cancharge commission under section 21 (I) (a) of the Act in respect of the purchases of sugarcane made by the appellant through the Union when there is no. quid pro quo by way of rendering any services by E Union to the appellant-company ?\n\nThe short fac(s giving rise to the above questions may be stated : The appellant-company crushes sugarcane in its factory at Sebore in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nFor its business 'it purchases sugarcane from \"reserved area\" as well as from outside both directly from the F cane-growers as well as through respondent No. 3, a Cane.growers Co-operative Society, Sehore. Section 21 of the Act imposes an obligation upon the !IPPellant-company to pay commission on all its purchases of cane at prescribed rates and .it bas to pay such commission in respect of purchases made through the Society to the Society and the Development Council and in . respect of purchases\n\nG made directly from the cane-growers to the Development Council.\n\nAccording to the appellant-company judicial decisions rendered by Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as this Court have settled the position that the commission chargeable under s. 21 of the Act is in H the nature of a fee the imposition of which is supported on the basis of quid pro quo in the shape of services rendered by the Development .\n\n546 SuPRBMi! COIJRt Rl!POl!.TS (1~82) 3 s.c.a.\n\nCouncil to a factory (vide : Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others.(') It appears that during\" the seasons 1960-61 to 1964-65 the appellant-company purchased cane directly from the cultivators of \"reserved area\" as well as from the cultivators of \"non-reserved area\" and respondent No. 2 (Development Council, Sehore) maife a demand of commission from the appellant-company in respect of such purchases both from \"reserved area\" as well as from \"non-reserved area.\" Similarly, during the crushing seasons 1963-64 to 1966-67 the appellant-company made purchases of cane from or through respondent No. 3 (Co-operative Society) in respect whereof a demand of commission was made by respondent No; 3 from the appellantcompany. By a writ petition (being Misc. Petition No. 246 of 1967) filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur the apppellant-company challenged the validity of the demand made by respondent No. 2 insofar as it related to purchases made from non-reserved area on the ground that it (Council) was established for the reserved area of the appellant-company's factory and its functions were confined to that area and as such no commission (fee) could be recovered by it in respect of purchases made by appellant-company from nonreserved area; similarly, the demand made by respondent No. 3 (Co-operative Society) was challenged on the ground that no services of any kind whatsoever were rendered by it to the appellantcompany, and the charge would be invalid in the absence of any quidpro quo. The High Court negatived both the contentions and dismissed the petition. It is this decision of the High Court that is challenged before us in the appeal and counsel for the appellant- company raised the two questions mentioned at the commencement of the judgment.\n\nSection 21, which deals with commission on purchase of cane, runs thus:\n\n\" (I) There shall be paid by the occupier a commission for every one maund of cane purchased by the factory-·\n\n(a) where the purchase is made through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, the commission shall be payable to the Cane• growers' Cooperative\n\n(!) [1966) I S.C.R. 523.\n\n\" BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES v. M. l'. STATE (tulzapurkar, J.) 541\n\nSociety and the Council in such proportion as the State Government may declare ; and\n\n(b) where the purchase is made directly from the cane-grower, the commission shall be payable to the Council.\n\n(2) The Commission payable under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (I) shall be at such rates as may be prescribed provided, however, that the rate fixed under clause (b) shall not exceed the rate at which the commission may be payable to the Council under clause (a).\"\n\nSection 30 confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and under cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) such Rules may provider for \"the rate at\n\nwhich and the manner in which commission shall be paid to the\n\nCae-growers' Co-operative Society on the supply of cane by them.\" Under the aforesaid provisions certain rules called the Madhya Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1959 have been framed by the State Government. Rules 45 and 46 occurring in Chapter X of the Rules are material and they are as follows:\n\n\"45. The occupier of factory shall pay a comm1ss1on for the cane purchased at the following rates namely :-\n\n(i) Where . the purchase is made. through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, at the rate of 5 Naya Paise per maund out of which 2 Naya Paise shall be payable to the Society and 3 Naya paise to the Council;\n\n(ii) Where the purchase is made. directly from the cane-growers, at the rate of 3 Naya Paise per maund, payable to the Council.\n\n46. In determining the proportion to which pay :-ients out of commission shall be made to the Council and the Cane-growers' Co-operative Society of an area the State Government may take into consideration the\n\nS4S\n\n• ..\n\nSUl>R.li.Mll totJltT REl>oRts [l982J 3 s.c.lt.\n\nfinancial resources the Council and Society.\"\n\nand the working requirements of. the Cane-growers' Co-operative\n\nIt is thus clear from the aforesaid statutory prov1s1ons that every factory is uncler , an obligation to pay commission on all its . purchases of cane at the prescribed rates and it has to pay such commission at the rate of 2 Naya Paise per maund to the Society and 3 Naya Paise to the Cuncil in respect of purchases made through a Cane-growers' Co-operative Society and at the rate of 3 Naya Paise per maund to the Council where the purchases are made directly from the cultivators or cane-growers. It cannot be and was not disputed by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the levy under s. 21 of the Act though called \"commission\" is really in the nature of a fee, the imposition of which is supportable only on thebasis of quid pro quo in the shape of rendition of services to the factory in the matter ofo cane purchased by it and Counsel accepted this position as emerging from this Court's decision in Jaora Sugar Mills'. case (supra). ·\n\nNow, turning to the first question raised before us Counsel for the appellant.company contended that respondent No. 2 Council has been established for the \"reserved area\" of the appellant's factory so declared under s. 15 of the Act, that respondent No. 2 Council is required to discharge its statutory functions and duties under s. 6 of the Act confined to the \"reserved area\" meant for the appellant's factory and as such the demand for commission (fee) in respect . of purchases of cane made by the appellant-factory from nonreserved areas (which it is entitled to make alongwith its purchases from the \"reserved area\") would be illegal and without any autho rity of !awe because in respect of such purchases there is no quid pro quo in the shape of renderi!lg of services by respondent No. 2 to the\n\nappellnt-factory. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reasort. In the first place there arc no qualifying words to be found in s. 21 of the Act which limit the imposition of commission (fee) to purchases of cane made by a factory from reserved area only; the imposition is on every maund of cane purchased by factory irrespective of the area from where such purchases may have been inade.\n\nSecondly, and this is important, if the relevant provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act are carefully examined it will appear that the functions and duties of the Development Council are not confined to the \"reserved area\" of a factory as\n\nBHOPAL SUOAR INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATE (Tulzapurkar, J.) 549\n\nurged\" by the Counsel for the appellant-company. Under s. 5 \"there shall be established, by notification, for the reserved area of a factory a Cane Development Council which shall be a body corporate .. . provided that where the Cane Commissioner so directs, the Council may he established for a larger or smaller area \"than the reserved area of a factory\" and sub-s. (2) provides that \"the area for which a council is established shall be called a Zone\". In other words, the Zone (area of operation) of a Council could be larger than the \"reserved area\" of a factory i.e. would, in elude areas outside the reserved area of the factory. Further, the func- tions and duties of the Council are indicated seriatim in els. (a) to (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 6 and these include functions like considering and approving development programmes for the Zone, devising ways and means for execution of development plan in all its essentials such as cane varieties, cane-seed, sowing rrogramme, fertilizers and manures, taking steps for the prevention of diseases and pests and rendering all help in soil extension work, etc. etc. and it will be noticed that some of these functions under cl. (b), (d) and (e) are of general cha- . racier and not confined even to the Zone of the Council.\n\nIn other words, the funcJions and duties of the Council which are in the nature of-rendering services in the matter of better cane produciion, distribution and supply thereof to the factory are not confined to the \"reserved area\" so declared for a factory under sec. IS of the Act.\n\nIf that be so it is difficult to accept the contention that in the matter of cane purchases made by the appellant's factory from non-reserved areas no services are rendered by. the respondent No. 2 Council to the appellant's factory. The quid pro quo being there the imposition of a fee on such purchases from non-reserved areas would be proper and justified .\n\nAs regards the demand and recovery of commission (fee) by respondent No. 3 under s. 2l(l)(a) in respect of purchases of sugarcane made by the appellant's factory through it, the contention of Coun.sel for the appellant-company has been that respondent No. 3 is the concerned Cane-growers' Co-operative Society in the area, one of the objects of which is to sell cane grown by its members to the appellant's factory, that the said Society does not render any services to the appellant's factory under the Act or otherwise and hence is not , entitled to recover any fee from the appellant-company. It is pointed out that respondent No. 3 is meant for helping its members , and in fpt renders various types of services to its cultivator-men:rber$\n\nSUPBEME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nso that they are not exploited. In fact in the matter of supplies of cane made through the respondent No. 3 it is the Society which deals with its members who receive their price from the Society. Counsel pointed out that even in the return filed by respondent No. 3 to the writ petition, respondent No. 3 enumerated four types of services which it claimed was rendering to .the appellant's factory, namely, (a) it made. arrangements for Jumpsum cane supply on Jumpsum demand from the factory; apart from convenience this resulted in economy to the factory as it had to maintain Jess staff; (b) it undertook equitable distribution of quota and the factory had not to undertake this function; (c) it undertook the maintenance of the records of illdividual growers for cane supplies and the factory had not to undertake this function and (d) it made payment to the suppliers though the factory is required to make payments for supplies effected immediately and, in actual practice mostly the factory made payments late at its convenience but the Society made payments to the suppliers regularly according to the programme drawn by it; the appellant's factory thus benefited . by the existence of this Society. But according to Counsel for the appellant-company none of these items referred to above really amounts to rendering any service to the appellant's factory by way of conferring on it some special benefit having a direct, close or reasonable correlation to its transactions of purchase of cane and, if at all, all these items referred to in the Return are really for the benefit of cultivator-members of the Society and in this behalf, Counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri' s('J case where in the context of enhanced market fee levied under Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 this Court has observed tht the quid pro quo by way of rendering services must result in the conferal of some special benefits to the persons charged which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between such persons and their transactions and that any indirect or remote.' benefit to them would in no sense be such benefit.\n\nCounsel for the appellant-company, therefore, urged that since in everything that is being done by it respondent No. 3 is rendering services to its own members and no services resulting in any special benefit to the appellant's factory are rendered, no charge by way of any fee would be legally recoverable by respondent No. 3 from the appellant's factory.\n\n(2) (1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217.\n\n--- ......\n\n< , /\n\n, .\n\n-J-..--\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES v. M~P. STATE (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 551\n\nIn our view having regard to the scheme of the Act and the activities which respondent No. 3 has been undertaking . in the discharge of its normal functions it will be difficult to\n\nacept the contention urged by Counsel for the appellant's factory that no services of any kind whatsoever resulting in conferal of special benefits on the appellant's factory in regard to its transactions of purchases of cane are rendered by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory. The scheme of the Act is that under sections 15 and 16 a declaration of reserved and assigned areas for purchase and supply of sugarcane is made by thlj, Cane Commissioner for every factory after consulting in the manner prescribed the occupier of the factory and the Cane-growers' Co-operl\\live Society, if any, in that area and upon declaration of such areas an obligation is cast upon the occupier of the factory, in the case of \"reserved area\", to purchase 311 cane grown in such area which is offered for sale and in respect of \"assigned area\" to purchase such quantity of cane grown therein and offered for sale for te factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. Further, under s. 19 the State Government can by order regulate the distribution, sale and purchase of cane witin any \"reserved and assigned area\" as also from areas other than \"reserved and asssigned areas\" and under\n\ncl. (b) of sub-sec. (2) such order made by the State Government may provide for the manner in which cane grown in the \"reserved area\" or the \"assigned area\" shall be purchased by the factory and .the cane grown by a cane-grower shall not be purchased except through a Cane-growers' Co-operative Soiety. In other words the scheme of Act contemplates situations where the appellant's factory may have to purchase cane from within reserved or assigned areas only through the respondent No. 3 Society.\n\nMoreover in its Return the respondent No. 3 has averred that unc\\fr its bye-laws the Society is established to develop scientific methods of sugar cane growing and calls on its me.mbers to introduce modern means of implements for cultivating sugarcane which unquestionably makes for assured bulk supplv of uniformly good quality cane through its members to the appellant's factory.\n\nIn other words this funclion undertaken by respondent No. 3 is of a nature or kind similar to that undertaken by the council and therefore it cannot be said that no services conferring special benefit on the appellant's factory in the matter of its purchases of cane are rendered by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory.\n\nHving regard to the aforesaid position it is not possible to accept the contention that in respect of purchases of cane made through the respondent No. 3 Society there is nQ\n\nE •\n\n552 SUPREME COURT REPOP..'l'S\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nelement of quid pro quo in the shape of rendering services by respondent No. 3 to the appellant's factory.\n\nIn the result both the questions are answered against the appellant-company and the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n. ,\n\n. -\n\n...", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR iNDUSTRIES LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cane Development Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cane-growers' Cooperative Society the commission is payable to that Society and the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (a), in respect of purchases made directly from the cane growers the commission is payable to the Cane Development Council under s. 21 (I) (b)."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 721, "end_char": 726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 860, "end_char": 865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1478, "end_char": 1486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1815, "end_char": 1819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kewal Krishan Puri'1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the demand of the Cane-growers' Cooperative Society for commission in respect of purchases made through it, the contention was that in everything being done by it, the Society was rendCring services to its own members and since no services resulting in any special benefit to the appellant were being rendered by it in terms of the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri'1 case, (1979] 3 SCR 1217, there was no quid pro quo and therefore no commission was legally recoverabl .. y the Society.", "canonical_name": "Kewal Krishan Puri'1"}}, {"text": "(1979] 3 SCR 1217", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2543, "end_char": 2546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2644, "end_char": 2649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaora Sugar Milla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2892, "end_char": 2909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "548 C-D]\n\n8 Jaora Sugar Milla (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. ["}}, {"text": "[1966] 1\n\nSCR 523", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2955, "end_char": 2972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4694, "end_char": 4700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "S5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Cooperative Society there was no element of quid pro quo cannot be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5403, "end_char": 5431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S5l A-H; 552 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.P. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--~-\n\n• •\n+-\n\n~··\n\nllltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S\n\nR.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra\n\nfor the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ashok Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--~-\n\n• •\n+-\n\n~··\n\nllltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S\n\nR.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra\n\nfor the appellant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanjl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--~-\n\n• •\n+-\n\n~··\n\nllltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S\n\nR.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra\n\nfor the appellant."}}, {"text": "D.N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5745, "end_char": 5755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--~-\n\n• •\n+-\n\n~··\n\nllltOPAL SUGAll INDUSTRIES v. M. P. STATB.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) S4S\n\nR.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mehta, J.B. Dadachanjl and D.N. Misra\n\nfor the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Subramanium", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff' for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S.A. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramanium and S.A. Shroff' for the respondents."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5878, "end_char": 5889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. Two questions were raised for our determination in this appeal by a certificate :\n\n(a) Whether the Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore\n\n(respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. Two questions were raised for our determination in this appeal by a certificate :\n\n(a) Whether the Sugarcane Development Council, Sehore\n\n(respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6079, "end_char": 6089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sugar Cane-Growers Development Co- D operative Union Ltd., Sehore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and\n\n(b) Whether the Sugar Cane-Growers Development Co- D operative Union Ltd., Sehore (respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sebore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short fac(s giving rise to the above questions may be stated : The appellant-company crushes sugarcane in its factory at Sebore in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6792, "end_char": 6806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short fac(s giving rise to the above questions may be stated : The appellant-company crushes sugarcane in its factory at Sebore in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7015, "end_char": 7025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7445, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appellant-company judicial decisions rendered by Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as this Court have settled the position that the commission chargeable under s. 21 of the Act is in H the nature of a fee the imposition of which is supported on the basis of quid pro quo in the shape of services rendered by the Development ."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7556, "end_char": 7561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Development Council, Sehore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (Development Council, Sehore) maife a demand of commission from the appellant-company in respect of such purchases both from \"reserved area\" as well as from \"non-reserved area.\""}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8592, "end_char": 8629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "246 of 1967) filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur the apppellant-company challenged the validity of the demand made by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10464, "end_char": 10474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter X of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Rules", "statute": "Chapter X of the Rules"}}, {"text": "Cane-growers' Co-operative", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11859, "end_char": 11885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Cane-growers' Co-operative\n\nIt is thus clear from the aforesaid statutory prov1s1ons that every factory is uncler , an obligation to pay commission on all its ."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12481, "end_char": 12486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaora Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12800, "end_char": 12817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot be and was not disputed by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the levy under s. 21 of the Act though called \"commission\" is really in the nature of a fee, the imposition of which is supportable only on thebasis of quid pro quo in the shape of rendition of services to the factory in the matter ofo cane purchased by it and Counsel accepted this position as emerging from this Court's decision in Jaora Sugar Mills'."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13053, "end_char": 13058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13167, "end_char": 13171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13795, "end_char": 13800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14121, "end_char": 14132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14413, "end_char": 14417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15105, "end_char": 15109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16360, "end_char": 16364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kewal Krishan Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18754, "end_char": 18772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But according to Counsel for the appellant-company none of these items referred to above really amounts to rendering any service to the appellant's factory by way of conferring on it some special benefit having a direct, close or reasonable correlation to its transactions of purchase of cane and, if at all, all these items referred to in the Return are really for the benefit of cultivator-members of the Society and in this behalf, Counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri' s('J case where in the context of enhanced market fee levied under Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 this Court has observed tht the quid pro quo by way of rendering services must result in the conferal of some special benefits to the persons charged which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between such persons and their transactions and that any indirect or remote.'", "canonical_name": "Kewal Krishan Puri'1"}}, {"text": "Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18841, "end_char": 18885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19582, "end_char": 19602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20204, "end_char": 20222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20863, "end_char": 20868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_553_582_EN", "year": 1982, "text": ":; J ,.,. \"' ij\n\n; f;:\n\nDEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC.\n\nTHE ADMINJSTRATOR OF GOA, DAMAN &\n\nDIU & ANR.,\n\nMarch 29, 1982\n\n[D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL lsLAM, JJ.J\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act-Section 3-Detention order passed by Administrator of Goa-Administrator, if coTnpetent to pas1 Juch order.\n\nDetenu-W/tetMr .haJ a right to be representd by a legal practitioner, or friend or agent IMfore the Advisory Board.\n\n'Union Territories Act, 1963-Sectlon 46(2)-Scope o~Administrator WhetMr bound by the advice of Council of Ministers.\n\nIri thejr petitions under Article 32 of the Con, stitutioo the three petitioners, who were detained under sectii:>n 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smugglin's: Activities Act, 1974, contended that in the mattir of discharge of executive •functions conferred upon him, the Administrator of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman -and Diu who passed the impugned oi'ders, is in the same pqsition as a Governor of a State of the President who must act on the iid and advice of the Council of Ministers and, that in theinstant'case the orders of detention having been passed by the Administrator himself instead of by the Chief Minister io the name pf the Ad.;, iolstrator, were invalid.\n\nDismissing the petitions,\n\nHELD : I, (a) Although section 46(2) of the Union Territories Act, 1963 provides that aU executive action of the AdministratOr, Whet, her takn on the advice of his Ministers or otherwise shall be expressed to be taken in the na•11e of the Administrator, the Administrator is not pureiy a constitutional functionary who is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Miqisters and could not act on his own. The language of Arts.· 74 and 163 on the one hand and the language of section 44 of the Union Territories Act 1963 on the other shows that the Administrator is siffiilarly situated with. thC Governor but not with the President when he is to act in his discretio:i; i unde( the Act. While exercising judicial or\n\n0quasi judicial functions, the Administrator has to act on hi!i own unaided by. the Council of Ministers like the President who, while exercising power conferred.by Article 217(3), disl'harl!OS a juqiciat [unction 11!\\q is not required t.o act oq IQ<;\n\n' •\n\n, F\n\n\\ 554 SUPREME COURT !lEPOR'rS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nadvice of the Council of Ministers. But there the analogy ends. The Administrator, even in matters where he is not required to act in his diseretion uder the Act or where he is. not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions, is not bound to act according to the advice of the Council. of Ministers. In the event of difference between him and his Ministers, he Administrator under the proviso to section 44(1) of the Act, is required to refer the matter to the President for decision and act according to that decision. Therefore in such a situation the rigb, t to give a decision on the difference of opinion between the two vests in the Union Government and the Council of Ministers of the Union Territory is bound by the view of the Union Government. There are also powers in the Administrator to act in derogation of the advice of the Council of Ministets.\n\n[560 C-D, 561 A-HJ\n\n- '\n\n(b) The proviso to section 44(1) of the Act a1so envisages that when a ,--~ difference of opinion between him and the Council of Ministers is referred to the r- Pfesident, if the Administrator considers the matter urgent and necessary to take immediate action during the interregnu~, he can completely override the advice of the Council of-Ministers and act according to his own lights which power\n\n..J.-._ neither the Governor nor the President enjoys. [562 A-Cl\n\nShamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1976] l SCR 814 held inapplicable.\n\n2 .. The grievance that the detaining authority had no material from which to infer that the petitioners Were engaged in smuggling activities is not borne out by the material ,_on rCcord. Copies of recorded statements and ct.her relevant documents had been taken into-consideration by the deJaining athority.\n\nThese copies were supplied to the detenu. [563 A-Bl\n\n3. It cannot be said that there was. any violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution or that the detenu was in any way handicapped in submitting his representation. A Gujarati translation of the grounds of detention was supplied to the detenu. The order of detention was a formal recital OfsectiOn 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act showing the provision of law under which the order of deten lion had been made. Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act bas not been mentioned, the grounds of detention were sufficiently clear to bring horn~ to the detenu that he was engaged in smuggling activities. ,[565 F, C-E] , ___ __,/..\n\nThe State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] 2 SCR 167, held inapplicable.\n\n4. (a) Clause (e) of <ection 8 of the COFEPOSA Act in express terms disentitles a detenu to appeaJ through a legal practitioner in any matter connec~ ted with the reference to-the Advisory Board. It is now well settled that the right t6 consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice conferred by a Article 22(1) is denied by clause 3(b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. According to the express intendment of the Constitution itself no person who is detained under any law which provides for preventive etentio~ cp l•i!D ti>• ri¥ht to consult a legal practitionef of hi&\n\no.v. TANDEL v .• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, 'Jo) 555\n\nchoice or be defended by him. Therefore it cannot be said that a detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. [570 F]\n\n(b) The embargo on the appearance of legal practitioner does not apply\n\nto a friend who in truth and substance is not a legal practitioner; but if such a B friend also happens to be a\n\nlegal practitioner he cannot as of right appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu. [574 Fl\n\n(c) So is the case with reference to agents. If an agent is in troth and substance an agent, the detenu maY appear through him; but if the agent is a legal practitioner, appearance by him as of right would be barred. A friend or an agent of the detenu who, is essentially a c'omrade in the .Profession of the detenu for which he is detained. suh a friend or agent would also be barred from appea. ranee on behalf of the detenu. Although a person may have a common law right to appoint an agent there is no obJigatioD On the other side to deal with the agent. The other sie hits an equal right to refuse to deal with ari agent. ·\n\n(574 G-H, 575 A]\n\nIn the instant case the sender of the telegram stated in. clear terms that he D was an advocate and was representing the detenu. He had not stated that he\n\nwa~ a fiend or agent Of the detenu and therefore the Administrator was justified in refusing permission to he advocate to assist the detenu. [575 CE]\n\n5. A persop detained under a Jaw providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a matter of constitutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice; nor can tie insist upon being ptoduced before a Magistrate within 24 hours or Jiis arrest. This is evident from A.rticle 22 (3) (b) which provides that nothing in clauses (I) and (2) of this Article shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive dete1;1tion.\n\n, • (575 GfI; A-BJ\n\n6. It is implicit in Articles 22(5) that the representation has to be a written representation communicated throllgh the jail authorities or through any other mode which the detenu thinks. fit of adopting. But the detaining au tho rity is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at the time of considering the representation. If the representation has to .be a written representation, there is no question ofhearing_anyone much less-a lawyer. Therefore; the Administra tor's rfusal to hear the advocate of the detenu while\" considering the representa tion would not be deniaJ of the common Jaw right of the detenu to be represented by an agent. [577 A-CJ\n\nFrancis Coralie Mullin v. The AdNJfnislrator, Union Territory of D, el/ii Ors .. (1981] 2 SCR 516, held inapplicable,\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : 'Writ Petition (CRL ) Nos. 8070 of\n\n19s1, z3 1111\\i 79 or 19s2.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\n~' • -. • . ' • • • - - I\n\n- • 556\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.ll.\n\nA Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioners.\n\n.,.\n\nEduardo Falireo and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by ,\n\nBARARUL l!LAM, J. These three .writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India involve~ common questions of facts and law. This common order of ours, therefore, will dispose of all of them. It will be sufficient .jf we refer to the facts only of Writ Petition No. 8070 .of 1~81. This petition is directed against the order dated !Ith September, 1981 made under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (the COFEPOSA) by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu (hereinafter 'the Administrator'), detaining .the petitioner \"with a view to pre\\'.enting him from smuggling goods\".\n\nThe material facts in a nutshell as alleged in the grounds of detention in Writ Petition No. 8070 of 1981 are that the peti- . tioner along with Lallu Govan Tande! alias Lallu Malbari, Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande! (the petitioners in the ot-her two writ petitions) and Narsinghbhai Daulabhbhai (detenu since released) indulged in smuggling of foreign goods such as fabrics, speakers, cassettes, video cassettes, wrist watches, refrigerators, silver, etc. The goods in 36'packages were .recovered from House No. 12/134 of Daman Municipal Area. These goods were kept there by two persons, namely; Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande! and Mangalbhai Bh~Ia: bbai Tande! engaged by the aforesaid four detenus for lifting the said 36 packages from a vessel grounded in sea off Ghati SUeri; Nani Daman.\n\nThe contraband goods recovered were worth Rs.5,30,281.50. The aforesaid Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai made certain statements on 2nd July, 1981 implicating the aforesaid four persons including the pedtioner.\n\nWhn the Customs squad was keeping a watch on Nani Daman coast, a vessel was found in the sea and goods were being unloaded. fo the process Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai and Manga!bhai Bhulabhai were accosted and each had a package with him and on being led by them ihe customs squad reached the house bearing.municipal No. 12/134. On being questioned, the aforementioned two labourers Tulsibhai and Mangalbhai stated that. they were engaged as laboure.rs for tran$porting packages of contraband goods from a vessel grounded in sea on Ghatisheri to the said house bearin(l No. 12/ 134. -Tulsi\\>hai iind 1'4ang11l!J!iai, in the course of\n\n' '\n\n.i.._\n\nb.\\r. TANDEL V, ADMINISTRATOR (Baharu' fs/am, J,) 551\n\ninterrogation, admitted that they .were engaged by detenu Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! and Lallu Govan for unloading the packages containing contraband goods.\n\n3. The impugned order of detention datei! 11th September, 1981 (Annexure 'A,') together with the grounds of detention (Annexure 'B') were served cin the petitioner on June 30,1981, which was, the date of apprehension.\n\nThe first submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, (hereinafter the Act), the order of detention can be made only by the Chief Minister and in the name of the Administrator and not by the Administrator, though it can be made in the name of the Administrator. In the instant case, the order of detention was made, and the representation dated 10th October, 1981 of the petitioner was disposed of, by the Administrator, which it is submitted, is not permissible in law.\n\n' The argument sought to be made seems to be that the status of the Administrator is s.imilar to that of the Governor of a State and as such the Administrator had to act with the aid and advice of the. Council of Ministers. Admittedly, there is an elected Assembly with a Council of Ministers in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu .. Therefore, the argument. proceeds, the Administrator on his own cannot make an order of detention. The order can be made by the Chief Minister or any oiher persorl authorised under section 3 of the COFEPOSA in the tiame of the Administrator. ·\n\nOn the other hand in paragraph 7 of the qounteraffidavit, it has been stated by the respondent, \"that the respondent has full authority to make the. order of detention under COFEPOSA in exercise of the powers conferred under the statute. In case of the Union Territories the power of detention 1s specifically conferred on the Administrator by virtue.of the definition of the \"State Government\" under Section 2 (fl of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 and as such the Administrator as the detaining authority, has to form his own opinion and is not bound to act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers .......... Even, then the Administator has 'considered the advice of the Chief Minister, who is' the Minister in-charge of the department dealing with COFEPOSA matters\". ...\n\n' I\n\n.F\n\nsui>kiiMii cobar RlliioRfs [19s2J 3 s.c.11..\n\n5. Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 (the Administrator) has placed the entire records before us. On a perusal of the relevant papers, we find that the matter was routed through the Chief Minister. who considered the case and sent it to the Aaministrator, wjJ.o thereafter, passed the order of detention.\n\nThere is thus a substantial compliance of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA. Even so, the legal submission of learned counsel has to be answered, as he urged it with vehemence.\n\nSection 2 (f) of the COFEPOSA provides :\n\n\"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-\n\n(f) \"State Government\", in relation to a Union\n\nTerritory, means the administrator thereof\".\n\nIn the Union 'Territories. Act, 1963 (hereinafter the 'Act'), under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, 'Administrator' has been defined as :\n\n\" 'Administrator' means the administrator of a Union Territory appointed by the President under article 239\".\n\nE Under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, \"Union\n\nTerritory\" has been defined as :\n\n\" 'Union Therritory' means any of the Union Territoris of ............ Goa, Daman and Din ......... \". (Material portion only)\n\nSub-section (I) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Provides : __ j\n\n\"The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting' in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmenta- 1'\n\nb.v. 'r_ANDEL v. ADMiNIS'ri\\A'rOR (Baharu/ lslm, J.) ss~\n\ntion of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from\n\n(i) smuggling goods, or\n\n(ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or\n\n(iii) engaging in transporting ot concaling or keeping\n\n' smuggled_ goods; or\n\n(iv) .dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in traqsporting o.r concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or\n\n(v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods,\n\nit is necessary so to do, make.an order directing that D such person be detained\".\n\nThe fasciculus of Sections 44 to 46. in Part IV of the Act provides for setting up a Council of Ministers.\n\nSection 44 reads as under:\n\n\"44. Council of Ministers '- (!) There shall be a Council of Ministers in each Union Tetritory with the Chief Minister at the head. to aid and advise the Administrator in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by or under this Act to act_in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi judicial functions :\n\nProvided that in case of difference of opinion btween the Administrator and his Ministers on any' matter, .the Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Administrator in any case where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary forJ1iin to t!!.ke imme\n\n' , i I \\ ': I\n\n. .\n\nSuPREMB COUil~ REPORts (1982] 3 s.c.il._\n\ndiate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary\".\n\nx. x x x\n\nSection 46 confers power on the President to make rules : {a) for the all(lcation of business to the Ministers; and (b) for the more convenient transaction of business with the Ministers including the procedure to be adopted in the case of difference of opinion between -the Administrator .and the Council of Ministers or a Minister. Sub-section (2) provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, all executive action of the Administrator, whether taken on the advice of his Ministers or'otherwise, shall be expressed to be\n\ntken in the name of the Administrator. The contention is that the Administrator of the Union Territory appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution by .the President is in the same position as the Governor of a State or the President of India in the matter of discharge of executive functions conferred upon him and he must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. It was accordingly 'further submitted that the Administrator cannot act on his own and in this cas_e it is claimed on behalf of the Administrator in the affidavit that he can act _on his own as stated above. Reliance was placed on Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab(') wherein it was held that the Presideot or the Governor acts on th_e aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of a State in all matters which ves't in the executive whether those functions are executive or legislative in character. It was further held that neither the President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive functions , personally. It is _not possible to accept this submission.\n\nArticle 74 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance-With such advice. The proviso to the Article is not material.\n\nSimilrly, Article 163 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid ano advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as lie is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his\n\n<I)\n\n(1975] I SCR 814.\n\n-.J.\n\n' t>.v. TANDEL v. ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul lslam, 1.) S6i\n\ndiscretion.\n\nOnce we compare the language or' Articles 74 and 163 with. the language of Section 44 of the Act, the difference between the position of the President and the Governor on the one hand and the. Ad.ministrator of the Jn-oin territory n the other becomes manifest. The first difference is that he is similarly situated with the Governor hut not 'with, the President when he is to act in his discretion under the Act.\n\nFurther, the Administrator has to act on his own unaided by the Council of Ministers when he is to exercise any judicial or quasi judicial functions. The nearest analogy to . this provision is one to. be found in Article 217 (3) when the\n\nPresident has to determine the age 0£ a Judge of the High Court.· It has been held 'that while exercising the power conferred by Article 21i (3), the President discharges a judicial function and .is ot\n\nequired to agi on the advice of the Council of Ministers, his only obligation being to decide the question about the age of the Judge\n\nfter consulting the Chief Justice of India (see Union of Initia v. J.P.\n\nMitter.(1) But there the analogy ends. The Administrator even in matters where he is not required to act in his discretion under th~ Act or where he is not exercising any judicial or quasi judicial functions, is not bound to act according to the advice of the Council of Ministers. This becomes manifest from the proviso to Seciion 44 (!). It transpires from the proviso that in the event of a difference of opinion between th~ Administrator and his Ministers on any matter, the Administrator shall refer the matter to the President for decision and act accordiiig to the decision given thereon by the President. If the President\n\n0 'in a given. situation agrees with what the Administrator opines contrary to the advice of the Council of' Ministers, the Administrator would be able to overriM the advice , of the Council of Ministers and on a reference to the President\n\nunder the proviso, obviously the. President would not according to the advice of the Council of Ministers given under. Article 74.\n\nVirtually, therefore, in the event of a difference of opinion between the Coucil of Ministers of the Union territory and. the Administ- rator, the right t.o decide would vest in the.Union Government and the Council of Ministers of the Un ion territory would be bound by tlie view faken b} the Union Government. Further, the Administrator enjoys still some more power to act in derogation of the advice of the Council of Minisiers.\n\n(I) [1971) 3 S.C.R. 483@ 504-SOS.\n\n§_UPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] s.c.R.\n\n' The second limb of the proviso to Section 44 (I) enables the Administrator that in the .event of a difference of opinion between him and the Council of Ministers not only he can refer the matter to the President but during the interregnum where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary for him to take' immediate action, he has the power to take such action or to give such directions in the matter as be deeins necessary. Jn other words, during the interregnum he can completely override the advice of the Council of Ministers and act according to his light. Neither the Governor nor the President enjoys any such power. This basic functional difference in the powers and position enjoyed by the Governor and the President on the one hand and the Administrator on the other is so glaring that it is not possible to Mid on the analogy of the deci .sion in Shamsher Singh' s case that the Administrator is purely a constitutionai functionary bonnd to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers and cannot act on his own. Therefore, for this additional reason also the submission of Mr. Jethmalani must be rejected.\n\n7. The second submission of learned counsel was to the effect that the statements of labourers Tulsibbai and Mangalbhai of 30th June, 1981, being the earlier'statements of the two labourers were not supplied to the detenu but only the two' statements of !st • July; 1981, were supplied and, therefore, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation by which he wanted to controvert the statements of 'Tulsibhai and Mangalbbai.\n\nThe submission was that in their statements recorded on J:st July, 1981, they did not state that during the earlier interrogation on the night of 30th June, 1981, they informed the Customs authorities that they, were employed as labourers .by the detenu and Lalubhai Govan.\n\nConsequently, it was contended, the detaining authority bad no material from which to infer that on being first accosted by the customs squad the two labourers gave out that they were engaged in this unlawful activity as wage earners by the detenu and Lallo Govan. The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu. Further, the grievance made by the detenu is not warranted by the materials 9n record. For, in the penultimate paragraph of the grounds of detention, it was stated, \"copies of the statements and other documents which have been taken into consideration by the detaining authority are also enclosed as per the indeJ!: attached\" (underline mine).\n\nThereafter, no grievance appears to !}ave been made by the detenu in his representation.\n\nEven from the grounds in the Writ J>etition, it does not appear which documents, if any, were not supplied to the detenu. The records show that there was great tension on the date at the place of apprehension and as such no statements could be and were recorded on the date of apprehension, but subsequently recorded on 2nd July, 1981.\n\nThe submission therefore has no substance. ·\n\n8. The third submission of learned counsel is, ''that the order of detention was not properly served\" .. The submission is that the Gujarati translatioµ of the.order was not supplied to the detenu.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, \"the petitioner does not know and cannot speak or write in a language other than /Gujarati, and that Annexure 'A' ought to have been translated Jnto Gujarati. The petitioner was thereby deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against his detention\".\n\nThe submission is not wholly correct on facts. Annexure 'A' is the 'ORDER'. exprrssed in terms of Section 3 (1) of the COFBPOSA. It is in English and. reads :\n\n\"SECRET\n\nNo. 14/3/80/HD (G) Administrator of Goa, Daman & Diu, Cabo Raj Niwas, Caranzalem (P.O.)\n\nGoa.\n\nORDER\n\nWHEREAS, I, Jagmohan, Administrator of Goa, Daman and Biu, am satisfied with respect to, the person known as Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! alias Devji Boss son of Shri Vallabhbhai Tande! residing at .H. No. 1/255,\n\nPenta Sheri, Vadi Falia, Nani Daman, tat with a vfew to preyenting him from smugg, ling goods:\n\n~64 SUPltEME coUkt REl'olt'ts !J 982] 3 s.c.11..\n\n A It is necessary to make the following order :\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 (1) of the, Ccinservation of Foreign Exchange and\n\nPrevention. of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974;\n\nI, Jagmoan, Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu direct that 'the said Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande! be detained at the Central Jail, Aguada, and the enclosed grounds of detention be served on him.\n\nPlace :-Cabo Raj Niwas Date :-11.9.81\n\n' Encl : As above\n\nSEAL\n\nSd/- (Jagmohan) Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu.\n\n/ Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande!\n\nalias Oevji Boss, H. No. 1/255, Fenta Sheri, Vadi Falia, Nni Daman\"\n\nAdmittedly, this 'ORDER' -as per Annexure •A' was in English but the enclosure, Annexure 'B' which contains the grounds . of detention together with the materials on which the grounds were based was in Gujarati. In paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of th.e Administrator, i~ has been stated :\n\n\"As regards Ground D it is denied that the detaining authority bas not furnished Gujarati version of the order of detention as alleged by the petitioner ................... ..\n\nThe petitioner by his own. admission kiiows Gujarati and\n\n, o.v. TANDEL v.°AD¥1NISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 565\n\naccordingly the grounds of detention have been communicated to the petitioner in Gujarati language. The aJlegatitm is, therefore, untenable\".\n\nThe above statement of the respondent is supported by the internal evidence of Annuextre 'B' itself. For, in the penultimate paragraph of the \"grounds\" it has been stated :\n\n\"The Gujarati version of the grounds of detention is enclosed to enable you to understand the grounds for which detention order is passed agai!ht you\".\n\nThis shows that the Gujarati version of the grounds as per Annexute 'B' was . sent to the detenu alongwi th the ORDER as per Annexure 'A'. Admittedly,, the deten.u is a Gujarati speaking person. • So far as the non-supply of the Guj; irati version of the ORpER\n\nas per Annexure 'A' is concerned, in our opinion, there has been no D violation of Article 27 (5) or any other law.' The ORDER as per\n\nAnnexure 'A' was a mere formal recital of section 3 (I) of the COFEPOSA, showing the . provision of law under which the order of detention has beeni made.\n\nAlthough, the section of the COFE- POSA has nt been nlentioned in the last but two paragraphs of the . \"groun, ds\", it has been stated that the detenu engaged himself\"i!t E smuggling goods and that there is sufficient cause to pass detention order against you with a view to preventing you from smuggling goods\", which was in Gujarati. It cannot, therefore, be said that' the detenu was in any way handicapped in submitting his representtion, or there has been any violation of Article 22 (5) of the Const.itution.\n\n. F\n\n9 .. The learned couns.el, in -support of his third submission, ·--... cited before us the decision of this Court in the case' of The State Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.(') The decision is beside . the point and need not be referred to.\n\n, Learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited another decision of this Court reported in (1980) 4 SCC 427. 1n that case, it .has been held that failure to supply the grounds of detention in the language understood by the detenu violates Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. In the instant case, as we have found above the .\n\n(I) [1951) s.C.R. 167 •\n\n566 SUPREME COUll.T REP<)JlTS (198213 s.c.tt.\n\nGnjarati translation of the grounds was supplied to the detenu. The\n\ndeision cited has not held that the.. ORDER expressed in terms of Section 3 (l) of the COFEPOSA must.also be in the language understood by the detenu. Section 3 (l) as stated above merely gives power of detention to the detaining au4hority.\n\nThis submission also has no substance. .\n\n-10. The fourth submission of learned counsel was that by a telegrari) dated lst October, 1981, the detenu requested for an immediate !hearing through his lawyer but this request was denie~. There was a delay of six days in deciding the matter.\n\nThis was contrary to Jaw. That apart, the \"respondent misled the detenu by indicating to him that the only way by which the Administrator could be per-· suaded would be a representation through the jail'\\ The factual part of the submission is not correct. Ori !st October, 1981, one Shri Thaku Ajwani, Advocate for the pe.titioner, sent a telegram to the Administrator. It was in the following 'terms :\n\nORDINARY\n\n\\ -\n\n\"JAGMOHAN\n\nADMINISTRATOR OF GOA\n\nDAMAN & DIU\n\n-CABO RAJ NIWAS\n\nCARANZALER GOA\n\nDETENUS DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL AND\n\nNARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL DETAINED\n\nUNDER COFEPOSA ORDERS DATED liTH SEPTEM-\n\nBER !981 HAVE INSTRUCTED ME TO APPEAR\n\nBEFORE YOU AND REPRESENT THEIR CASE FOR REVOKING DETENTION ORDERS (Stop) KINDLY\n\nINTIMATE FORTHWITH DATE, TIME AND PLACE.\n\nTHAKU AJW ANI AI'.>VOCATE 22\n\nPANCHSHILA C ROAD CHURCHGATE •\n\nBOMBAY 400 020\n\n\" 11\"-!!l''''\"\"l;;\n\ni>.v. TANDEL v. ADMINi§TRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 561\n\nThere was a reply telegram by the Chief Secretary of the Union Territory in question. The post copy of the reply telegram reads thus : (material portions only) :\n\n\"STATE\n\nTELEGRAM\n\nADVOCATE SHRI THAKU AJWANI\n\nCHAMBERS C/.0 RAM JETHMALANI\n\nADVOCATE SUPREME COJJRT\n\n22 PANCHSHILA C ROAD,\n\nCHURCHGATE, BOMBAY-400 020\n\nEXPRESS\n\n........ No. 14/3/80/HD (G) (.) REFERENCE YOUR\n\nLETTER DATED !ST OCTOBER 1981 REGARDING\n\nDETENTION OF SARVASHRI DEVJI. VALLABHBHAI\n\nTANDEL AND NARSINBHAI DURLABBHAI TANDEL\n\n. DETAINED UNDER COFEPOSA ACT RECEIVED IN\n\nTHE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR ON 5/10/1981\n\n(.) \"YOUR TEI, EGRAM DATED !ST OCTOBER 198t\n\nREFERRED THEREIN HAD BEEN REPLIED UNDER\n\nTHIS DEPARTMENT'S TELEGRAM OF EVEN NUM-\n\nBER DATED 6TH OCTOBER 1981 AND ITS COPIES\n\nHA VE ALSO BEEN SENT TO THE CONCERNED\n\nDETENUS AT (::ENTRAL JAIL AGUADA (.) CON\n\nTENTS OF THE SAID TELEGRAM ARE REPRODUC-\n\nED BELOW(.) QUOTE(.) YOUR TELEGRAM DATED\n\n!ST OCTOBER 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE ADMINI-\n\nSTRATOR GOA DAMAN AND DIU REGARDING\n\nDETENTION OF SARY ASHRI DEV JI VALLABHBHAI\n\nTANDEL AND NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TAN-\n\nDEL DETAINED UNDER. COFEPOSA ACT(.) YOUR\n\n REQUEST FOR APPEARANCE BEFORE THE ADMI-\n\nNISTRATOR AND REPRESENT THE CASE OF THE\n\nAFORESAID DETENUS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY\n\nCONSIDERED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR AND HE\n\nHAS DECIDED THAT THE DETllNUS CAN .Mi\\Ke\n\n' E\n\n568 '\n\nSUPREMF COURT REPORTS [1982J 3 s.c.tt.\n\nREPRESENTATION\n\nTO THE\n\nADMINISTRATOR\n\nTHROUGH CENTRAL JAIL AGUADA WHERE THEY\n\nARE. DETAINED (.)\n\nTHE REPRESENTATION OF\n\nTHE AFORESAID DETENUS WILL RECEIVE HIS\n\nDUE CONSIDERATION AS. AND WHEN THEY ARE\n\nRECEIVED (.) UNQUOTE (.)\n\n--CHIEF SEC--\" '\n\nIt has been stated in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit as follows:\n\n\" .......................... ., it is admitted that the telegram dated !st October, 1981, purported to have been made by . the Advocate on behalf of petitioner requesting the Administrator for. grant of personal appearance' before him for'revocation of detention order was received in the office of the Administrator on 3, rCI October, 1981. This request was duly examined and it was felt that under the law, the detenu is not entitled to be represented by an Advocate and . the Detaining Authority is not legally bound to grant the prayer made on behalf of the detenu. The Advocate of the petitioner was telegraphically informed on 6th October 1981 that the request had been duly considered by the Administrator who had decided that the detenl} could m1ke a representation to the Administrator through the Superintendeqt, Central Jail, Aguada, where he was. detained and that the same would receive his due consideration as and when it was received. A copy of the said telegram sent to the Advocate was also e11dorsedto the detenu and the same was received by him on 7th October, 1981. A letter in confirmation of the Advocate' s telegram was received from. the Advocate of the petitioner in the office. of the Administra tor on 5.10.193·1 and the.same was replied to telegraphically on 7th October, 1981, reiterating the earlier position as conveyed in the said telegram of 6th October.\n\n_ The allegation that IO days were. taken by the respondent in only deciding the .representation and in coming to the conclusio11 thiit he would not permit a lawyer to plead\n\nI ' \"j\n\n;; Ji'\n\n' ·~\n\nD.V. TANDEL v. THE ADMINl>TRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 569\n\nfor revocation of the order of de1ention is, therefore, not correct. To give further details, the telegram of the petitioner's Advocate was received in the Administrator's office on 3rd October, 1981, and was sent to the Joint Secretary (Home) the same day.\n\nIt was referred to the law Department on 3rd October, 1981 itself and through usual channels reached the Law Secretary on 5th October, 1981, the 4th of October being a Sunday. The Law Secretary gave his opinion and referred the telegram to the Home Department on the same day Le. 5th October, 1981. In the Home Department 'it was sent by the Under Secretary (Home) to the Chief Secretary and by the latter to the Chief Minister the same day.\n\nOn 6th October, 1981, it was examined by the q, Governor and the reply was sent to the petitioner on the same day. The reply was received by the petitioner/detenu on 7th October, 198)\". ·\n\nIn addition to the above explanation of the respondent in para 9 of the counter-affidavit, we peruied the file and we are satisfied that there was no delay in disposal. On the contrary, it may be said to the credit of the administration that it was dealing with the matter with utmost promptitude.\n\n11. Now to examine the second part of the fourth contention of learned counsel.\n\nHis submission is that the Administrator committed an illegality not only by refusing the detenu to be heard through a lawyer, but, in addition, by misleadiog the detenu by his telegram. The detenu's counsel, Mr. Ajwani, informed the Administrator that the detenu had instructed him to represent his case before the Administrator. He made a request to 'the. Administratorto Jet him know the date, time and place of his appearance before the Administrator. The reply telegram quoted above ha~ stated that his request has been \"carefully considered by the Administrator\" who, by implication, rejected the request. Besides, it was furthsr stated in the telegram that the Administrator \"has decided that the detenu can make representation to the Administrator through the jailor and that the representation so snt would be duly considered by the Administrator to which exception has been taken. In th'ese circumstances, the following questions arise :\n\n(1) whether the detenu has a right to ; ippear before !he detainin~ 11u, t4oritr through a lawrer;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(2) \\\\bether the last sentence in tte telegram has misled the detenu.\n\nMr. Jethmalani submits that Article 22 (3) enables the legislature to take away the common law right of acting through an agent generally or through a particular class of agents. Tbe statute does not deal with the general but with . a particular class, namely, the legal practitioners. The statute confines this legal disability to the matter connected with reference to the Advisory Board. So he submits that lawyers are not compeletely sought to be excluded.\n\nUnder Article 22 counsel submits there are two distinct and independent rights : (I) to persuade the detaiqing authority to revoke the order of detention and (2) to-persuade the Advisory Board to disapprove the detention. It is only in the second process that the agent called lawyer is excluded. The learned counsel further submits that every person has a common law right to employ an agent and do an act through him. The detenu could, therefore, send an 'agent' or a 'friend' who might have been his law.yer.\n\nLet us first examine whether the detenu has a right to appear through a lawyer. This examination need not detain us long.\n\nSection 8 (e) of the COFEPOS A reads: (material portion only)\n\n\"For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) of clause (7), of Article 22 of the Constitution,-(e)-a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the ..\n\n reference to the Advisory Board ....... \" (emphasis added). ·~ ·~-\n\nClause (e) in express terms disent.itles the detenu to appear through a legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. It is indisputable that a detention matter which is pending before the Administrator is nndoubtedly a matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. The detenu, therefore, has no right to appear before the detaining authority or before the Advisory Board by a legal practitioner.\n\nThis Court in the case of Smt. Hemlata Kanti/4/ Shah ;:-The State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1) have held :\n\n(1)£(1981) 3 Sqile 165?,\n\nl---·-\n\n·~\n\n··~\n\nD.V. TANDBL v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul ls/am, J.) 571\n\n\"Section 8 (e) has not barred representation of a detenu by a lawyer. It only lays down that the detenu cannot claim ropresentation by a lawyer as of right. It has given the Board a discrection tolpermit or not to permit representation of the detenu by counsel according to the necessity in a particular case\".\n\nIn the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India(') relied on by .\n\nMr. Jethmalani, a Constitution Bench of this Court has held :\n\n\"First and foremost, we must consider whether and to what extent the detenu is entitled to exercise the trinity of rights before the Advisory Board; (i) the right of legal representation; (ii) the right of cross:examination and (iii) the right to present his evidence in rebuttal. These rights undoubtedly constitute the core of just process because without them, it would be difficult for any person to disprove the allegations made against him and to establish the truth. But there are two considerations of primary importance which must be borne in m.ind in this regard. There is no prescribed standard of reasonableness and therefore, what kind of processual rights should be made available to a person in. any proceeding depends upon the nature of the proceedings in relation to which the rights are claimed.\n\nThe kind of issues involved in the proceeding determine the kind of rights available to the persons who are parties to that proceeding. Secondly the question as to the availability of rights has to be decided not generally but on the basis of the statutory provisions which govern the proceeding, provided of course that those provisions are valid ......... \"\n\n(para 84)\n\n'Turning first to the right of legal representation which is claimed by the petitioners, the relevant article of the Constitution to consider is Article 22 which bears the marginal note \"protection against arrest and detention in certain cases\". That article provides by clause (J) that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall q~ Qe <lenieq the riht to consult, an<!\n\n(I) (1982l 1 s.c.c. 271,\n\nSUPREME COURTi.REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R. ,\n\nto be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause\n\n(2) requires that every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest and that no person shall be detained in.custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. Clause (3) provides that nothing in clauses (I) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the. time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. It may be recalled that clause (4) (a) of Article 22 provides that no law of preven tive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory Board has reported -before the expiry of. the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.\n\nBy clause (7) (c) of Article 22, the • Parliament is given the.power to prescribe by law the-procedure to be followed by the. Advisory Board in an inquiry under clause (4) (aJ:'. (para 85)\n\n\"On a combined reading of clauses (I) and (3) (b) of Article 22, it is clear that the .right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice, which is conferred by clause (I), is denied by clause J (b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Thus, according to the express intendment of the Co.nstitution itself, no person who is detained under any law, which provides for preventive detention, can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him. In view of this, it seems to us difficult to hold, by application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board ... ,, ...... It is indeed true to say, after the decision in the Bank Nationalisation case, that though the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in Article 22, the requirements of Article 21 have nevertheless to be satisfied. It is therefore necessary that the procedure prescribed by )aw for the proceedings before the Advisory Boards must be fair, just and reasonable. But then, the Constitutioq itself has providN a )'llr<lstiqk for\n\nb.v. tANbEL v. ni~ ADMiN!stRATOR (fJaharui Isiam, J.) SH • the application of that standard, through the medium of the provisions contained in Article 22 (3) (b). Howsoever much we would have liked to hold otherwise, we experience serious difficulty in taking the view that the procedure of the Advisory Boards in which the detenu is denied the right of legal representation is unfair, unjust or unreasonable. If article 22 were silent on the question, of the right of legal representation, it would have been possible, indeed right. and proper, to hold that the detenu cannot be denied the right of legal representation in the proceedings before the Advisory Boards. It is unfortunate that courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Article 22 (3) (b) read with Article 22 (I)\". (para 86).\n\n\"To read the riglit of legal representation in Article 22 (5) is straining the language of that article.\n\nClause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be ' effective, but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board merely because, by Section 10 of the National Security Act, the representation made by tlie detenu is required to be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration.\n\nIf anything, the effect of Section 11 (4) of the Act, which conforms to Article 22 (3) {b), is that the detenu cannot appear before the Advisory Board through a legal practitioner. The written representation of the detenu does not have to be expatiated upon by a legal practitioner\". (para 88)\n\n\"We must therefore hold, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to uppear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board; It is, however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason behind the provisions contrained in Article 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any party ................ , ........ \". {para 93) (underlines added)\n\n514 sbt>kEMB cotritt RBPbl!.ts fl 982] 3 s.t.lt.\n\nWhat bas been said above about appearance through lawyer before the Advisory Board under the National Security Act equally apply to appearance by lawyer before the Advisory Board under\n\nCOFEPOSA.\n\nWith regard to appearance through a 'friend', the Court observed :\n\n\"Another aspect of this matter which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by, a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner. Every person whose interests are adversely affected as a result of the .proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to be heard in those proceedings . and be assisted by a friend .\n\n.. . .. . .. . . . .. .. \". (para 94) (emphasis added).\n\nBut the Court observed :\n\n\"The appearance of the legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner.\" (emphasis added).\n\nIn other words, a 'friend' who, in truth and substance, is a friend of the detenu may appear for the detenu but if such a 'friend' '.l also happens to be a legal practitioner, he cannot, as of right, appear before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detenu.\n\n12. The same reasoning will apply to appearance by an 'agent' .. In other words, if an 'agent' is in 'truth and substance' an agent, t)le detenu .may appear through h.im.\n\nBut if the 'agent' is a legal prJ1ctitioner, appearance by him as of right will be barred.\n\nBut a 'friend: or an 'agent' of the detenu who is essentially a comrade in the profession of.the detenu for which be is detained, such H a 'friend' or 'agent' will also be barred from appearance on behalf\n\n1 of the detenu.\n\n..,.,..__ ..\n\nh.v. TANDEL v. THE AOMiNISTRATOR (Baharul ls/am, J.) s7s\n\nIn passing it must be stated that a man has a right to appoint an agent.. One may call it a common law right: But there is no obligation on the other side io deal with the agent. The other side has an equal right to refuse to deal with an agent. In any view of the matter, in the absence of any right to give an oral hearing in the form of making a representation under Article 22 (5), the question of hearing a legal practitioner on behalf of the detenu does not. arise.\n\nIt . cannot, therefore, be said that refllsal to hear Mr. Ajwani, advocate engaged by the detenu, by the Administrator has resulted in denial of constitutional right to make a representation .\n\nThat apart, in this case, the case, the ielegram in express terms has described the sender, Thaku Ajwani, as an advocate, who in clear terms stated that he , had been iitslr!Jcted by the detenu to appear before the detaining authority tcirepresent the case of the detenti; In other words, Mr. Ajwani cleirly told the Administrator that the detenu was his client and that Ile himself was his counsel andtbat he desired to represent the case of the detenu in his capacity as a legal practitioner. The telegram was not sent by Mr: Ajwani telling the Administrator that he wanted to appear before the Administrator as a 'friend' or an 'agent' of the detenu in order to represent hiscase. It, therefo, re, cannot be said that the Administrator refused a 'friend' or an 'agent' of the detenu to appear\n\nbefore him to assist the detenu.\n\n: 13. Article 22 (I) and (2) confer fundamental right of protection against arrest and detention in .. certain cases. Sub.Article (!) enjoins il duty on the person arfesting any person to inform the ... . \\ person arrested, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest : ';'. '-.before detaining him in custody and s1ch detained person shall oot (, c • be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practit1, _ tioner, of his choice. Sub-Article (2) enjoins a duty on the person arresting and detaining any one to produce him before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary fo1 the journey from .the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. These two fundamental rights, namely, right to be informed of the grounds of detention at the time of arrest and the right to _ consult and be defended by a lawyer or his choice, and any detention beyond the period of 24 hours plus the time taken in the\n\nsiJPRilMB couRt RBi>ORTS [1982] s.c.ll.\n\njourney, unless authorised by a magistrate to be illegal would have also been available to any one detained under the preventive deten tion laws but for sub-Article (3).\n\nSub-Article (3) provides that nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the iime being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person w)lo is arrested or drtained under any law providing for preventive deten tion.\n\nAs a necessary corrollary, any law providing for preventive detention would not be unconstitutional even if it contravenes Article 22 (1) and (2). In other words, a person detained under a law providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a matter of constitutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice. Nor can he insist upon being produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest.\n\n14. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA soows as noticed above that a person against whom an order of detention has been made under the Act sha!I not be entitled . to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board.\n\nAssuming that the right to make a representation and tbe corres ponding obligation cast on the detaining authority to consider the representation expeditiously is not a matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board and that both are independent stages, it cannot be said that the refusal of the Administrator to hear the advocate of the detenu while considering the representation would be denial of common law right of the detenu to be represented .bY an agent. Article 22 (S) which has provided a safeguard in the matter of preventive detention confers the right on the detenu and simultaneously casts an obligation on the detaining authority, as soon as may be, after the arrest to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order bas been made and to afford the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Representation is to be made by the detenu. Detenu is a person who is already deprived of his liberty. Giving the ordinary connotation to the expression 'earliest opportunity of making a representation' as set out in sub-Article (S) would only imply that the person can send his written representation through the jail. authorities. It would be open to him to send it by any other communicating media but the opportunity to make a representation does not comprehend an oral hearing. If it does, the detenu will have to be taken from the jail where he is detained to the detaining authoricy which in a given situation may not even be feasible and the delay in transit may be\n\n!>, V, TANbEl v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (!Jaharui [s/am, J.) 511\n\ncounterproductive to the earliest opportunity to be afforded to make a representation. It is, therefore, implicit in Sub-Article (5) of Article 22 that the representation has to be a written representation communicated through the jail authorities or through any other mode which the detenu thinks fit of adopting but the detaining authority is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at the time of considering the representation. Now, if the.representation has to be a written representation, there is no question of hearing any one much less a lawyer. Reliance was, however, placed on Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.,(1) In that case the detenu challenged the validity of clause 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Condition of Detention laid down by the jail administration under an order dated 23rd August, 1975, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the COFE POSA. The relevant condition was as under :\n\n3. The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under :\n\n(b) Interviews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under:\n\n(i) Interview with legal adviser :\n\nInterview with legal adviser. in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention.\n\n(ii) Interview with family members :\n\n(2) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516.\n\n51s.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982j 3 s.c:ii..\n\nA monthly dnterview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of Wife, children or parents of the detenu ..... \"\n\nThe contention was that the condition in clause 3 (b) (ii) which restricts the interview.to only• o.ne in a month in case of a deteu is unreasonable and arbitrary when contrasted with an undertrial prisoner who was entitled to the faeility of interviews with friends and relatives twice in a week and e'1en thoiigh a detenu stands on a · higher pedestal than an:under-trial prisoner or a convict, the Jimi!atioh of interview to one in a month is utterly ar&ittary. This contehlion\\ i. found fav.our wi.th the.Court oil the ground that restrictions Placed on a detenu must, consistent with the effectiveness Of detention; be minimal (see Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, [1969] 3 $.C.R. 574. Proceeding further, this Court held that sµb-clause\n\n(i) of clause 3 (b) which prescribes that the detenu can have an inter view with a legal adviser:of his choice with prior permission of the District Magistrate and the interview has to take place in the presence of a Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement officer nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise/Deputy Director of Enforcement, was unreas., nable and hence invalid.\n\nNow, this judgment is not an authority forthe proposition that a detenu as a matter of right is entitled fo make his representation by an oral bearing before th1! detaining authority under Article 22 (5), The right to consult a lawyer was granted •by the conditions of detention prescribed under Section 5.\n\nThis right was not spelt out as an incident of Article 21 and what has been found invalid is the presence of officers at. the interview and the number of interviews.\n\nTherefore, Francis Coralie Mullin' s case is not an authority for the proposition and frankly, cannot be one for the putpose of spelling out a right to be represented by a lawyer ..y.hile ~\\)-king representa tion before th~ detaining authority.\n\nEverfthoiign there are some observations'w!licb may imply sµch a . right, they would be comple-. tely obiter for the obvious reasd~ that a right was conferred by the Conditions of Detention and not for the first time a right was being spelt out by the expanded horizons of right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 .. The attempt to read or imply something in Article 21, which is positively reflected by Article 22 (5) would be contrary to any canon of construction because it is wen settled) th.at what is expressly reflected cannot be brought in by the back door of implication. It was not necessary to spell out these rights in the facts of that case for the obvious reason that the right was conferred\n\nb.v. TANhEL v. TllB Ai>i.dNISTRATOR (Baharul Islam J.) 519 ,\n\nby the conditions of detention. One need not go in search of some such right implicit in Article 21 by a process of interpreta, tion .when it was expressly granted in the Conditions of Detention under the Act. Therefore, with respect, the decision in Mullin's case cannot help the petitioner to spell out right to be represented by a fawyer before the detaining authority.\n\n15. Now the other aspect oftbe submission, namely; whether the respondent misled the detenu by bis telegram. Objection has been taken to the following sentence of the telegram :\n\n\"He (administrator) has decided that the detenus can make representation to the adminimator through Central jail, Aguada, where they are detained\".\n\nIt may be remembered that the telegram was sent to the detenus' advocate, Mr. Ajwani, and not to the detenus. The above sentence conveying an advice, albeit gratuitious, could hardly mislead a lawyer who is supposed to know bow a representation of a detenu is to b~ sent to the detaining authority. The submission of Mr. Jethmalani was that the sentence give the impression that the representation if sent through the jail only, and in no other way, would be, considered.\n\nThe submission was hypothetical.\n\nThe detenu was in jail. The_ representation, of necessity, had to be sent through the Superintendent of the jail where be was detained with the former's necessary endorsement and seal. It would be difficult for the detaining authority to immediately ascertain whether the representation sent otherwise than through the jailor was genuine.\n\nEven so the Administrator did not say that the detenu's representa tion, unless sent through the jail would be considered. There is no merit in the submission.\n\n16.\n\nThe sixth point raised by learned counsel for the peti tioner is that illegalities were committed in dealing with the representation of the detenu in that :\n\n\"(a) the detenu was not heard.\n\n(b), his advocate was not heard.\n\n(c) he was not told that be could be represented by a friend.\n\n(d) he wa.s not permitted cross-examination. of re,\n\nbutt al evidence.\"\n\nThe submission of learned counsel has no substance.\n\n(a). A perusal of the record shows that the detenu was heard in person, was questioned by the Board on several points in Gujarati which was the language of the detenu, and necessary answers elecited. He does not have any right to be heard in person by the detaining authority.\n\n(b) It is true that the advocate of the detenu was not heard but the former's right to be heard either by the detaining authority or by the Advisory Board has been answered above.\n\n(c) The contention has been dealt with above.\n\n(d) This Court in A.K. Roy's case (supra) dealt with the detenu\"s plea of cross-examination, and bas held ;\n\n•• ..... It seems to us difficult to bold that a detenu can claim the right of cross; examination in the proceeding before the Advisory Board. First and foremost; cross• examination of whom? The principle that witnesses must• be. confronted and offered for cross-examination applies generally to propdings in . which witnesses are examined or docmµen(s are adduced in .evidence in order to prove a\n\npoi9t.\n\nCro:ss-examination then becomes a powerful weapon for showing the untruthfulness of that evidence.\n\nIn proceedings before the Advisory Board, the question for consideration of the Board is not whether the detenu is guilty of any charge but whether there is sufficient cause for the detention of. .the person concerned.\n\nThe detention, it must be remembered, is based not onfacts. proved either G by applying the test of preponderance of probabilities or of reasonable doubt. The det, ention is based on the. subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain a particular person in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain stated objects.\n\nH The proceeding of the Advisory Board has therefore to be\n\n-~\n\no; v. TANDEL v. THE ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 581\n\nstructed differently from the. proceeding of judicial° or quasi judicial tribunals, before which there is a tis to adjudicate\n\nupon.\"\n\nFinally, the Court observed\n\n\".We are therefore ofthe opmton, that, in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detenu has no right to cross-examine either the persons on the basis of whose statement the order of detention is made or the detaining\n\nauthority.\"\n\n17. Faced with the difficulty created by the above decision, learned counsel submits that he bas not used the word 'cross-examination' in the technical sense but used it loosely in the sense that the detenu would have examined as bis witneses the persons on whose statements the order of the detention has been based, to establish bis iooococe particularly before the judicially trained minds of the Members of the Advisory B ·ard. Even if the word 'cross- -examination' is taken in the loose sense as submitted by the learned counsel, the Advisory Board cannot be blamed; for, there was no request by the deteou for the production of those persons before the Advisory Board to examine them as bis defence witnesses.\n\nThe sixth submission also bas no substance.\n\n18. The seventh point formulated by learned counsel was . .._ _,,: \"that the Advisory Board was required 10 decide two issues :\n\n(i) whether the detention was justified when made;\n\n(ii) whether it was justified on the date of the Advisory Board's report\".\n\nMr. Jethmalani did not press before us sub-point (i).\n\nBut he submitted that the Board ought to have found whether or not the order of detention was justified on the date of its report.\n\nWe have perused the report of the Advisory Board and find that the report covers both sub.points (i) and (ii) enumerated above.\n\nI~. The eight point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the procedure before the Advisory Board was 'totally unjust\n\nand discriminatory'. His submission was that although the detaining H 1111thoritr was not present in perso11 before the Advisory Board, bi~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS /198,2] 3 s.c.li.. ' '.'\n\nrepresentatives were present to assist the Advisory Board on issues of law and fact in support of the order of detention while there was none to assist the detenu.\n\nThe submission has been b_ased on suspicion or guess, and is not borne out by records. The record shows that the detenu - was produced before the Advisory Board and necessary questions were put to him and answers elicited by the Chairman and the Member of the Advisory Board and there was none present on behalf of the detaining authority. This submission also has no substance.\n\n20. The last point raised by Mr. Jethmalani was that the cases of the four cletenus connected with the same incident were reviewed by the Board; after having released one co-detenu, namely; Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai, in pursuance of the Advisory Board's order, it was incumbent on the detaining authority to review the order of detention of the petitio1Jers before us namely; Devji Vallabhbhai Tande(, (petitioner in Writ Peiition No. 8070 of 1981), Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande!, (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 23 of\n\n1982) and Lallubhai Govanbbai Tande! (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 29 of 1982).\n\nAs on a perusal of the report of the Advisory Board, it was found that Narsinh Vallabhbbai Tande! was advised to be released on the ground of tender age, learned counsel did not press the submission._\n\n21. These petitions have no merits and are dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n--- ---", "total_entities": 176, "entities": [{"text": "DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ADMINJSTRATOR OF GOA, DAMAN &\n\nDIU & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GOA, DAMAN & DIU & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act"}}, {"text": "Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 772, "end_char": 792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1342, "end_char": 1355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1363, "end_char": 1390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1796, "end_char": 1806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Union Territories Act 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2203, "end_char": 2217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Union Territories Act 1963", "statute": "the Union Territories Act 1963"}}, {"text": "section 44(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Union Territories Act 1963", "statute": "the Union Territories Act 1963"}}, {"text": "section 44(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3264, "end_char": 3277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4206, "end_char": 4219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1951] 2 SCR 167", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act", "statute": "Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act"}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5203, "end_char": 5214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act", "statute": "Although the section of the COFEPOSA Act"}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5540, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Baharul Islam", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Articles 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7504, "end_char": 7518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1981] 2 SCR 516", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8470, "end_char": 8486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8496, "end_char": 8511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Ram Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Eduardo Falireo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8539, "end_char": 8554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eduardo Falireo and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.", "canonical_name": "Eduardo Falireo"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eduardo Falireo and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "BARARUL l!LAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8647, "end_char": 8660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by ,\n\nBARARUL l!LAM, J. These three .writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India involve~ common questions of facts and law."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8699, "end_char": 8709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8717, "end_char": 8738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Goa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ith September, 1981 made under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (the COFEPOSA) by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu (hereinafter 'the Administrator'), detaining .the petitioner \"with a view to pre\\'.enting him from smuggling goods\"."}}, {"text": "Lallu Govan Tande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9441, "end_char": 9458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tioner along with Lallu Govan Tande!", "canonical_name": "Lallu Govan Tande"}}, {"text": "Lallu Malbari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "alias Lallu Malbari, Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande! ("}}, {"text": "Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9481, "end_char": 9507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "alias Lallu Malbari, Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande! (", "canonical_name": "Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande"}}, {"text": "Narsinghbhai Daulabhbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9564, "end_char": 9588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioners in the ot-her two writ petitions) and Narsinghbhai Daulabhbhai (detenu since released) indulged in smuggling of foreign goods such as fabrics, speakers, cassettes, video cassettes, wrist watches, refrigerators, silver, etc."}}, {"text": "Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9890, "end_char": 9920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These goods were kept there by two persons, namely; Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande!", "canonical_name": "Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande"}}, {"text": "Mangalbhai Bh~Ia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9926, "end_char": 9942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Mangalbhai Bh~Ia: bbai Tande!", "canonical_name": "Mangalbhai Bh~Ia"}}, {"text": "bbai Tande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Mangalbhai Bh~Ia: bbai Tande!"}}, {"text": "Ghati SUeri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10061, "end_char": 10072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "engaged by the aforesaid four detenus for lifting the said 36 packages from a vessel grounded in sea off Ghati SUeri; Nani Daman."}}, {"text": "Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10159, "end_char": 10184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai made certain statements on 2nd July, 1981 implicating the aforesaid four persons including the pedtioner."}}, {"text": "2nd July, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10212, "end_char": 10226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid Tulsidas ITT!~ Mangalbhai made certain statements on 2nd July, 1981 implicating the aforesaid four persons including the pedtioner."}}, {"text": "Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10431, "end_char": 10454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fo the process Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai and Manga!bhai Bhulabhai were accosted and each had a package with him and on being led by them ihe customs squad reached the house bearing.municipal No.", "canonical_name": "Tulsibhai -Ranchhodhbhai Tande"}}, {"text": "Manga!bhai Bhulabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10459, "end_char": 10479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fo the process Tulsibhai Ranchhodhbhai and Manga!bhai Bhulabhai were accosted and each had a package with him and on being led by them ihe customs squad reached the house bearing.municipal No."}}, {"text": "Tulsibhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10671, "end_char": 10680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being questioned, the aforementioned two labourers Tulsibhai and Mangalbhai stated that.", "canonical_name": "Tulsibhai"}}, {"text": "Mangalbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10685, "end_char": 10695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being questioned, the aforementioned two labourers Tulsibhai and Mangalbhai stated that.", "canonical_name": "Mangalbhai Bh~Ia"}}, {"text": "Ghatisheri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10820, "end_char": 10830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "they were engaged as laboure.rs for tran$porting packages of contraband goods from a vessel grounded in sea on Ghatisheri to the said house bearin(l No."}}, {"text": "TANDEL V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10941, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TANDEL V, ADMINISTRATOR (Baharu' fs/am, J,) 551\n\ninterrogation, admitted that they .were engaged by detenu Devji Vallabhbhai Tande!"}}, {"text": "Lallu Govan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11077, "end_char": 11088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Lallu Govan for unloading the packages containing contraband goods.", "canonical_name": "Lallu Govan Tande"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11393, "end_char": 11407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, (hereinafter the Act), the order of detention can be made only by the Chief Minister and in the name of the Administrator and not by the Administrator, though it can be made in the name of the Administrator.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11463, "end_char": 11504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "10th October, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11797, "end_char": 11815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, the order of detention was made, and the representation dated 10th October, 1981 of the petitioner was disposed of, by the Administrator, which it is submitted, is not permissible in law."}}, {"text": "Daman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, there is an elected Assembly with a Council of Ministers in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu .. Therefore, the argument."}}, {"text": "Diu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12258, "end_char": 12261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, there is an elected Assembly with a Council of Ministers in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu .. Therefore, the argument."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12446, "end_char": 12455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12911, "end_char": 12920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COFEPOSA Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12932, "end_char": 12950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Eduardo Faleiro", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13348, "end_char": 13363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Eduardo Falireo"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13723, "end_char": 13732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974", "statute": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13851, "end_char": 13860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974", "statute": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14143, "end_char": 14152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14289, "end_char": 14300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14345, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14593, "end_char": 14611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Material portion only)\n\nSub-section (I) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Provides :  j\n\n\"The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting' in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmenta- 1'\n\nb.v. '"}}, {"text": "Sections 44 to 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15740, "end_char": 15757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15762, "end_char": 15780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Act", "statute": "Part IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16916, "end_char": 16926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17566, "end_char": 17577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17687, "end_char": 17692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention is that the Administrator of the Union Territory appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution by .the President is in the same position as the Governor of a State or the President of India in the matter of discharge of executive functions conferred upon him and he must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers."}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18869, "end_char": 18880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19231, "end_char": 19233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 74 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19282, "end_char": 19301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19324, "end_char": 19334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19877, "end_char": 19888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20032, "end_char": 20042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21305, "end_char": 21315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1971) 3 S.C.R. 483", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21754, "end_char": 21773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamsher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22700, "end_char": 22714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This basic functional difference in the powers and position enjoyed by the Governor and the President on the one hand and the Administrator on the other is so glaring that it is not possible to Mid on the analogy of the deci .sion in Shamsher Singh' s case that the Administrator is purely a constitutionai functionary bonnd to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers and cannot act on his own."}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22932, "end_char": 22942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, for this additional reason also the submission of Mr. Jethmalani must be rejected."}}, {"text": "Tulsibbai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23057, "end_char": 23066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second submission of learned counsel was to the effect that the statements of labourers Tulsibbai and Mangalbhai of 30th June, 1981, being the earlier'statements of the two labourers were not supplied to the detenu but only the two' statements of !", "canonical_name": "Tulsibhai"}}, {"text": "Mangalbhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23071, "end_char": 23081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second submission of learned counsel was to the effect that the statements of labourers Tulsibbai and Mangalbhai of 30th June, 1981, being the earlier'statements of the two labourers were not supplied to the detenu but only the two' statements of !", "canonical_name": "Mangalbhai Bh~Ia"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23085, "end_char": 23100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second submission of learned counsel was to the effect that the statements of labourers Tulsibbai and Mangalbhai of 30th June, 1981, being the earlier'statements of the two labourers were not supplied to the detenu but only the two' statements of !"}}, {"text": "Tulsibhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23381, "end_char": 23390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st • July; 1981, were supplied and, therefore, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation by which he wanted to controvert the statements of 'Tulsibhai and Mangalbbai.", "canonical_name": "Tulsibhai"}}, {"text": "Mangalbbai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23395, "end_char": 23405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st • July; 1981, were supplied and, therefore, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation by which he wanted to controvert the statements of 'Tulsibhai and Mangalbbai.", "canonical_name": "Mangalbhai Bh~Ia"}}, {"text": "Lalubhai Govan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23666, "end_char": 23680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission was that in their statements recorded on J:st July, 1981, they did not state that during the earlier interrogation on the night of 30th June, 1981, they informed the Customs authorities that they, were employed as labourers .by the detenu and Lalubhai Govan."}}, {"text": "Lallo Govan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23935, "end_char": 23946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, it was contended, the detaining authority bad no material from which to infer that on being first accosted by the customs squad the two labourers gave out that they were engaged in this unlawful activity as wage earners by the detenu and Lallo Govan.", "canonical_name": "Lallu Govan Tande"}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24040, "end_char": 24045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu."}}, {"text": "Fitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24085, "end_char": 24091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu."}}, {"text": "Nani Daman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24333, "end_char": 24343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu."}}, {"text": "D.V. TANDEL", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24459, "end_char": 24470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu."}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24489, "end_char": 24502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission has no merit because there are two statements, one of Customs Inspector, Mr. Patel, and the other of Customs Officer, Mr. Fitter, both of which show that on being interrogated during the night of 30th June, 1981, the aforeme!ltioned two labourers gave out that they were engaged for unloading packages containing contraband goods from the grounded vessel to a .house in Nani Daman by the detenu and Lallo Govan; and there is no dispute that the statemenis of Mr. Patel and Mr. Fitter were given\n\nD.V. TANDEL •• ADMINISTRATOR (Baharul Islam, J.) 563\n\nto the detenu.", "canonical_name": "Baharul Islam"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25953, "end_char": 25962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26592, "end_char": 26601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26668, "end_char": 26698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Devji Vallabhbhai Tande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27024, "end_char": 27047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/ Shri Devji Vallabhbhai Tande!", "canonical_name": "DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC"}}, {"text": "Article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28538, "end_char": 28548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28632, "end_char": 28641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29224, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1980) 4 SCC 427", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29601, "end_char": 29617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29749, "end_char": 29759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30043, "end_char": 30052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30128, "end_char": 30137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thaku Ajwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30795, "end_char": 30807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st October, 1981, one Shri Thaku Ajwani, Advocate for the pe.titioner, sent a telegram to the Administrator.", "canonical_name": "THAKU AJW ANI"}}, {"text": "JAGMOHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30927, "end_char": 30935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in the following 'terms :\n\nORDINARY\n\n\\ -\n\n\"JAGMOHAN\n\nADMINISTRATOR OF GOA\n\nDAMAN & DIU\nCABO RAJ NIWAS\n\nCARANZALER GOA\n\nDETENUS DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL AND\n\nNARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL DETAINED\n\nUNDER COFEPOSA ORDERS DATED liTH SEPTEM-\n\nBER !"}}, {"text": "NARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31043, "end_char": 31072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in the following 'terms :\n\nORDINARY\n\n\\ -\n\n\"JAGMOHAN\n\nADMINISTRATOR OF GOA\n\nDAMAN & DIU\nCABO RAJ NIWAS\n\nCARANZALER GOA\n\nDETENUS DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL AND\n\nNARSINBHAI DURLABHBHAI TANDEL DETAINED\n\nUNDER COFEPOSA ORDERS DATED liTH SEPTEM-\n\nBER !"}}, {"text": "THAKU AJW ANI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31287, "end_char": 31300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THAKU AJW ANI AI'.>VOCATE 22\n\nPANCHSHILA C ROAD CHURCHGATE •\n\nBOMBAY 400 020\n\n\" 11\"-!!l''''\"\"l;;\n\ni>.v.", "canonical_name": "THAKU AJW ANI"}}, {"text": "STATE\n\nTELEGRAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31604, "end_char": 31619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post copy of the reply telegram reads thus : (material portions only) :\n\n\"STATE\n\nTELEGRAM\n\nADVOCATE SHRI THAKU AJWANI\n\nCHAMBERS C/.0 RAM JETHMALANI\n\nADVOCATE SUPREME COJJRT\n\n22 PANCHSHILA C ROAD,\n\nCHURCHGATE, BOMBAY-400 020\n\nEXPRESS\n\n........ No."}}, {"text": "6th October 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33773, "end_char": 33789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advocate of the petitioner was telegraphically informed on 6th October 1981 that the request had been duly considered by the Administrator who had decided that the detenl} could m1ke a representation to the Administrator through the Superintendeqt, Central Jail, Aguada, where he was."}}, {"text": "7th October, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34208, "end_char": 34225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the said telegram sent to the Advocate was also e11dorsedto the detenu and the same was received by him on 7th October, 1981."}}, {"text": "5th October, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35324, "end_char": 35341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5th October, 1981."}}, {"text": "6th October, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35490, "end_char": 35507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th October, 1981, it was examined by the q, Governor and the reply was sent to the petitioner on the same day."}}, {"text": "7th October, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35653, "end_char": 35669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reply was received by the petitioner/detenu on 7th October, 198)\". ·"}}, {"text": "Ajwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36269, "end_char": 36275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu's counsel, Mr. Ajwani, informed the Administrator that the detenu had instructed him to represent his case before the Administrator."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37243, "end_char": 37253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37683, "end_char": 37693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38313, "end_char": 38322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38463, "end_char": 38473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hemlata Kanti/4/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39217, "end_char": 39233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemlata Kanti/4/ Shah ;:-The State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1) have held :\n\n(1)£(1981) 3 Sqile 165?,"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39246, "end_char": 39266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemlata Kanti/4/ Shah ;:-The State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1) have held :\n\n(1)£(1981) 3 Sqile 165?,"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39392, "end_char": 39401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41159, "end_char": 41169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42154, "end_char": 42164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42473, "end_char": 42483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42491, "end_char": 42501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By clause (7) (c) of Article 22, the • Parliament is given the.power to prescribe by law the-procedure to be followed by the."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42695, "end_char": 42705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43606, "end_char": 43616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43638, "end_char": 43648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "fJaharui Isiam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43929, "end_char": 43943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tANbEL v. ni~ ADMiN!stRATOR (fJaharui Isiam, J.) SH • the application of that standard, through the medium of the provisions contained in Article 22 (3) (b)."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44038, "end_char": 44048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44308, "end_char": 44318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44654, "end_char": 44664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44683, "end_char": 44693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44759, "end_char": 44769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45192, "end_char": 45202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45210, "end_char": 45231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45373, "end_char": 45383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45418, "end_char": 45428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45901, "end_char": 45911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46255, "end_char": 46276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47999, "end_char": 48001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48374, "end_char": 48384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49508, "end_char": 49518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49822, "end_char": 49824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51158, "end_char": 51168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51460, "end_char": 51469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52188, "end_char": 52198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53438, "end_char": 53448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54028, "end_char": 54036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd August, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54142, "end_char": 54159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(1) In that case the detenu challenged the validity of clause 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Condition of Detention laid down by the jail administration under an order dated 23rd August, 1975, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the COFE POSA."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54210, "end_char": 54219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 S.C.R. 516", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55030, "end_char": 55049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982j 3", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 55058, "end_char": 55088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982j 3 s.c:ii..\n\nA monthly dnterview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of Wife, children or parents of the detenu ..... \"\n\nThe contention was that the condition in clause 3 (b) (ii) which restricts the interview.to only• o.ne in a month in case of a deteu is unreasonable and arbitrary when contrasted with an undertrial prisoner who was entitled to the faeility of interviews with friends and relatives twice in a week and e'1en thoiigh a detenu stands on a · higher pedestal than an:under-trial prisoner or a convict, the Jimi!atioh of interview to one in a month is utterly ar&ittary."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55266, "end_char": 55274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55987, "end_char": 55995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56559, "end_char": 56569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56666, "end_char": 56675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56725, "end_char": 56735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Coralie Mullin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56864, "end_char": 56878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, Francis Coralie Mullin' s case is not an authority for the proposition and frankly, cannot be one for the putpose of spelling out a right to be represented by a lawyer ..y.hile ~\\)-king representa tion before th~ detaining authority."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57406, "end_char": 57416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57462, "end_char": 57472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57507, "end_char": 57517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57961, "end_char": 57971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mullin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58123, "end_char": 58129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, with respect, the decision in Mullin's case cannot help the petitioner to spell out right to be represented by a fawyer before the detaining authority."}}, {"text": "Aguada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58539, "end_char": 58545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Objection has been taken to the following sentence of the telegram :\n\n\"He (administrator) has decided that the detenus can make representation to the adminimator through Central jail, Aguada, where they are detained\"."}}, {"text": "A.K. Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60524, "end_char": 60532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) This Court in A.K. Roy's case (supra) dealt with the detenu\"s plea of cross-examination, and bas held ;\n\n•• ..... It seems to us difficult to bold that a detenu can claim the right of cross; examination in the proceeding before the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64640, "end_char": 64665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last point raised by Mr. Jethmalani was that the cases of the four cletenus connected with the same incident were reviewed by the Board; after having released one co-detenu, namely; Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai, in pursuance of the Advisory Board's order, it was incumbent on the detaining authority to review the order of detention of the petitio1Jers before us namely; Devji Vallabhbhai Tande(, (petitioner in Writ Peiition No."}}, {"text": "Devji Vallabhbhai Tande", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 64826, "end_char": 64849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last point raised by Mr. Jethmalani was that the cases of the four cletenus connected with the same incident were reviewed by the Board; after having released one co-detenu, namely; Narasinghbbai Durlabhbbai, in pursuance of the Advisory Board's order, it was incumbent on the detaining authority to review the order of detention of the petitio1Jers before us namely; Devji Vallabhbhai Tande(, (petitioner in Writ Peiition No.", "canonical_name": "DEVJI VALLABHBHAI TANDEL ETC"}}, {"text": "Lallubhai Govanbbai Tande", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 64979, "end_char": 65004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 of\n\n1982) and Lallubhai Govanbbai Tande! ("}}, {"text": "Narsinh Vallabhbbai Tande", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 65124, "end_char": 65149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As on a perusal of the report of the Advisory Board, it was found that Narsinh Vallabhbbai Tande!", "canonical_name": "Narsingh Vallabhbhai Tande"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_583_594_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "583 A\n\nUMESH CHANDRA\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nApril 2, 198111\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D.A. 0BSAI AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nRajasthan Children Act, 1970-Material date for determining sge, of delinquent-Is it date of commission of offence or date of trial,?\n\nTndin Evidence Art 1872-S. 35-Relevance of entry in_ schQal reCDrd for proof of age-Should the record be kept by public officer-?·\n\nThe Rajasthan.Children Act, 1970, provides that any person below tho age or i6 years should be presumed to be a child and that a' delinquent child sboiild be fried by a:Children's court in accord_ancc with the procedure laid down -thCrein.\n\nThe appellant was charged\n\nunder ss. 364 and 302, I.P.C., in conneCtion with an occurrence that took_ place in Tonk district on March 12, 1973. A preliminary objection that the Sessions Judge was not competent to try the case :of the appellant as he was a child under the provisions of the Children Act was overruled by the trial court,\n\nThe revision filed by the appellant againt_-the decision of' th~ trial court was dismissed by the High Court which held that the Children Act was not applicable to the appellant as that Act had no, been enforced in Tonk district on the date of the occurrence. The High Court further held that the appellant had failed to prove that be was below the age of 16 years.\n\nOn being directed by thi$- Court to ascertain the actual date of birth, the High Court held that the date of birth of the appellant was September 22, 1956; and. therefore, he was over 16 years on the date of the occurrence. The High Court rejected the documents produced from the first two schools attended by the appellant which showed his date of birth to be June 22, 1957, for the reason that those documents had not been k-ept or made by a pubJic officer; it relied on an affidavit furnished by the father of the appellant while admitting him to the third school in which the date of birth had been changed to September 22, 1956.\n\nThe explanation of the appellant's father that the date of birth had been changed to fulfil the requirement of age under the Rajasthan Board of Secondary Regulations to enable the appellant to appear in the Higher Secondary Examination at the appropriate time wilS not accepted.\n\ni\\llowlog tho appeal,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] .3 s.c.Jl.\n\nHELD: I. (a) The relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 so far as the age of the accused, who claims to be a child, is concerned, is the date of the occurrence and not the date of the trial as is clear from the provisions of ss. 3 and 26 of the Act. [594 CJ\n\n(b) At the tiine of the occurrence, the appellant was undoubtedly a child within the provisions of the Act. [592 H] •\n\n(c) The question whether the appellant could be tried as a child if he had become more than 16 years by the time the case went up to the court, does not survive as the Act has now been enforced in the entire State. A combiri'ed reading of ss. 3 and 26 clearly shows that the statute takes care of contingencies where proceedings in respeci of a child were pending in any court on the date on which the Act came into force. Seclioo 26 in terms lays down that the court should proceed with the case but after having found that the child bas committed the offence it is debarred from passing a:ny sentence but is obliged to forward the child. to the Children's court for passing orders in accordance with the Act. [592 H; 593 A; 593 F-G]\n\n(d) The judgment of the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court be set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur, be directed to try the accused and if he gave a finding that the accused was-.. guilty, he shaJI forward the accused to the ChHdren's court for receiving sentence in accordance with , the provisions of the Act. [594 E]\n\n2. There is no legal requirement under s. 35 of the Evidence Act that the public or other official book should be kept only by a public officer; all that is necessary is that the document should be maintained regularly by a person E whose duty it is to maintain the document. (588 G; 589 CJ\n\nMohd. lkram Husaain v. State of U.P., [1964) 5 S.C.R. 86, 100 & Abdul Majidv. Bharga1•am, A.l.R.19R3 Ker.18 referred to.\n\nThe Rajasthan Children Act being a piece of social legislation is meant for the protection of infants who committ criminal offences_ and, therefore, its provisions should be 1iberaUy an..d meaningfully cons.trued so as . t~ advance -the object of the Act. ~[he Children Act was enacted to protect young children from the consequences of their criminal acts on the footing that their mind at that age could not_ be salld to be mature for imputing mens rea as in the case of an adult. (524 D; 593 H; 594 A]\n\nIn the instant case there are two documents of two different schools showing the date of birth of the appellant as June 22, 1957 and both these documents have been signed by bis father and were ih existence ante /item motam. Hence, there could be no ground to doubt the genuineness of these documents. At the time when the age of the appellant was first mentioned in the admission form, there was absolutely no dispute about the date of birth and there could not have been any motive on the part of the parents to give a false date of' birth because it was his first admission to a school at a very early age.\n\nThe school \\o which the appellant was admitted enjoyed ¥ood reputatioQ of uthnticity. If\n\nIii ;:;!\n\n,~,~\n\nUMESH CHANDRA v. RAJASTHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 585\n\nthre had been any.element of susPicion, the admission register and the scholar's register would have been coirected by the headmistress of the school.\n\n ~1mo:mm\n\nM/\" Gannon Dunker/ay & Co, Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1972] 3 S.C.C. 443 referred to.\n\n3. The appellant's father has given a cogent reason for changing the date of birth and there is no reason for not accepting his . explanation particularly be:ause the offence was committed seven years after changing the date of birth. [592 CJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 439 of 1976.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd April, 1976 of the Rajasthan High Court in Criminal Revision No. 300 of 1974.\n\nK.K. Venugopal, S. s,, Khanduja, and G. C. Mishra for the\n\nAppellant.\n\nB.D. Sharma for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated June 29, 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court overruling I!- preliminary objection taken by the accused before the Sessions Judge to the effect that the Sessions Judge, Tonk was not competent to try the case as the accused Umesh Chandra was a child as contemplated by the provisions of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') on the date of the alleged occurrence. This Act appears to have been passed by the Rajasthan Legislature, but after receiving assent of the President was enforced in various districts from time to time. Under the provisions of the Act any person below the age of 16 (sixteen) would be presumed to be a child and the trial of a delinquent child was to be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. ' The objection taken by the appellant was that as he was below the age of 16 ai the time of the occurrence on 12.3.1973, he could not be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk or the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur city, tq 111'.h.om. tile case was transferred 011\n\n17.10.73. .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.~.\n\nThe Sessions Judge overruled the objection. taken by the accused and therefore he filed a revision to the Rajastban High Court against the Order. The High Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the Act was not applicable. to the' appellant for two reasons-(!) that it was not brought into force in Tonk at the time of the offence, and (2) that it was not proved by the accused that he was below the age of 16 on 12.3.1973, the dat~ of the occurrence. The accused was charged for offences punishable under sections 364 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the Order of the High Court, the appellant moved this Court in special leave and at the time of granting special leave, this Court directed the High Court to return a finding of fact on the actual date of birth of the accused so that this Court may determine the applicability of the Act to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe High Court after reappra1smg the entire evidence.:_oral and documentary-by its Order dated 18.11 76 came to a clear finding that the age' of Umesh Chandra at the time when the offence was committed wa!i 16 years 5 months and 20 days and that the exact date of birth of the appellant was proved to be 22.9.1956.\n\nAfter the finding of fact called for from the High Court was sent to this Court, the appeal was placed for hearing before us.\n\nIn support of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the finding of the High Court-that the age of the appellant was above 16 years-and it was contended that the High Court bas based its decision on wholly irrelevant material and has also committed errors of law in appreciating important documentary evidence.\n\nAnother point that was argued before us was as to the application of the Act to Tonk, where the offence was committed. As, however, the Act has now been enforced in the entire State, this question no longer survives because where a situation contemplated by s. 26 of the Act arises, an accused, who is found to be a child, has to be forwarded by the Sessions Court to the Children's court which can pass appropriate sentence.\n\nWhere however proceedings against a child am pending before Sessions Judge, s. 26 of the Act enjoins a duty ori the Court in which the proceeding in respect of the child is pending on the date on which the Act is extended to the area to act in the manner therein prescribed. In this eventuality, fhe <;:ourt is under an obligation \\9 proceed with the trial and record\n\n' -\n\nr . ._:s..\n\n'. UMESH CHANDRA v. RAJAS'rHAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 587\n\n,_ ,\\ : - - . \"'-, a finding as if the Act does not apply. But after concluding the . . trial and recording a finding that the child had committed an offence, the Court cannot pass any sentence but the Court is under a statutory obligation to forward the child to the Children's court which shall pass orders in respect of. that child in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as if it has been satisfied on inquiry under . the Act that the child bas committed the offence. In view of this provision, s. 21.would be attracted and the Children's court will have to deal with the child under s. 21. ·\n\nThus, the main point for consideration in this case is as to what is the exact date of birth of the appellant, Umesb Chandra. . The High Court appears to have brushed aside the documentary\n\nevidence . produced by the appellant mainly on the ground that subsequent documents clearly proved that the father of the accused\n\nbad not correctly mentioned the date of birth in the previous schools. attended by him (accused) and later corrected his date of birth by an affidavit which was accepted by _the High Court to be the correct date. The High COurt also rejected _the oral . evidence addueed by the appellant as also the horoscope produced by his father.\n\nWe agree with th~ High Couri that in cases like these, ordi~ narily the oral : evidence can hardly . be useful to determine \"the . correct age of a person, and the question, therefore, would largely depend on the documents and 'the nature of their authenticity. Oral . evidence may have utility if no documentary evidence is forthcoming.\n\nEven the horoscope cannot be reliable because it can be _prepared . . at any time to suit the needs of a particular situation. To this extent, we agree with the approach made by the High Court. ··\n\nComing now to the facts on the basis of which the appellant sought protection to be tried only under. the Act; according to the testimony of the father of the appellant he was born on 22.6.57 and was aged 15. years 9 months on 12.3.1973-the date of the \"r occurrence.\n\nIt is, however, not disputed that at. the time when the appellant was born, his father was posted in a small village (Dausa) where the maternal grandfather of the appellant bad lived .and perhaps he was not meticulous enough to .report the birth of his children.: There is nothing to show the birth of the appellant nor any evidence has been produced on this aspect of the matter. .There is also µothin!! to show that. fh~. dates of t>irt4 of t'1e _otqr hiJdr~Q of\n\n. B\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.il\n\n' ·. ' ' \\ ' . - Gopal (the father) were registered in any Municipal register or in •· chowkidar's register .. We 'have mentioned this fact because the \\High Cort seems to have laid. special . stress and great emphasis on the non-production of any reliable record to prove that the birth of the appellant had been entered . therein. It is common knowledge that in villages people are not very vigilant in reporting either births -or deaths and, therefore, an omission of this type cannot be taken. to be a most damaging. circumstance to . demolish the case of the •. appellat regarding his actual date of birth.\n\n------- - -\" - . i .\n\n. . . The first document wherein; the. age of the appellant was clearly_. entered is Exi. D-1 which is the admission. form under which he was admitted io class III in. St:· Teressa's Primay School, Ajmer. in the admission form, the -date f birth of the appellant has been shown as 22.6.1957.' 'The f oim 'is signed by\" Sister Stella who was the Headmisiress. -The ro; m aiso contains the seal of the school.\n\nDW; Ratilal Mehta, who. proved the'.admission :form, has clearly stated that the form was maintained in the . ordinary course of business aiid was signed only by the parents: The evidence of Ratilal Mehta (DW I) is corroborated . by the• evidence of Sister Stella (DW 3) herself who has also .endorsed --the' -fact of the date of birth having been mentioned in the admission form and has also clearly .. stated OD oath that the forms Were maintained in regular course and that they were signed by her •. She -has also stated that at the\n\ntime when the appellant was first admitted she was the headmistress of St.Teressa.· Primary. School,- Ajmer •. The .. High Court seems to have rejected' this document._ by adopting a very peculiar process of reasoning which apart from being unintelligible is also legally erroneous: The. High. Court seems to think . that the admission forms as also the School's. register (Ext. D-3) both of which Were, -according. to the evidence,. maintained in due course of business, ft\n\nwere not admissible in evidence because they were not kept or made . by any publfc officer. 'Under s. 35 of the Evidence Act, all that is ..,,-- necessary is that the document should be maintained regularly by a person whose duty it is to maintain the document and there is no legal requirement . that . the document should be . maintained by a public officer only. The .High Court. seems to have confused the\n\nprovisicins of sections 35, 73 and. 74 f the Evidence Act in inter-. preting the documents which were admissible not as public documents . .\n\nA r doumnt~ lll'.'!t~!ne4 hr public servants under sections 34, 73\n\n2 r'\n\n. I\n\nIJi.illSH CHANi:>RA v. RAiASTHAN (Pazal Aii, J.) 589\n\nor 74 but which were admissible under s. 35 of the Evidence Act A which may be extracted as follows:\n\n\"35. Relevancy of entry in public record made in performance of duty\n\nAn entry in any public or other official . book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such books, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours) C\n\nA perusal of the provisions of s. 35 would clearly reveal that there is no legal requirement that the public or other official book should be kept only by a public officer but all that is required is that it should be regularly kept in discharge of her official duty.\n\nThis fact has. been clearly proved by two independent witnesses, viz., DW I. Ratilal Mehta and DW 3, Sister Stella. The question does not present any difficulty or complexity as in our opinion the section which would assist in this behalf is s. 35 of the Evidence Act which provides for relevancy of entry in the public record. In this connection we may refer to a decision of this Court in Mohd. lkram Hussain v. State of U.P.,(') where Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed as under :\n\n\"In the present case Kaniz Fatima was stated to be under the age of 18. There were two certified copies from school register which show that on June 20, 1960, she was under 17 years of age. There was also the affidavit of the father (here evidence on oath) stating the date of her birth and the statement of Kaniz Fatima to the police with regard to her own age. These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act and the entries in the school registers were made ante /item motam.\"\n\nThis topic has been elaborately dealt with particularly in regard to the entries in School Register and the admission forms in the c, ase of-Abdul Majid v. Bhargamm('). In these circumstances,\n\n(I) [1964) 5 S.C, R. 86 at 100.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1963 Kerala J8.\n\nS9o SUPREME COUltt RBPORts [1982) 3 s.c.tt.\n\nthe view of the High Court with regard to s. 35 \\is plainly untenable and ss. 73 and 74 are utterly irrelevant.\n\nFurther, the High Court was of the view that as the documents produced by the Teressa Primary School were kept in loose sheets, no reliance can be placed on them. This fact is admitted but the headmistress has explained that the admission forms were bound much after the date of birth was recorded and hence it cannot be presumed that the documents were not kept in the regular course of business.\n\n~ Moreover, the School where the documents were maintained was an English public school and the record maintained by it was undoubtedly unimpeachable and authentic and could not be sus peeled or presumed to be tampered with. At the time when the age of the appellant was first mencioned in the admission form, there was absolutely no dispute about the date of birth or for that matter the exact date on which he was born and th.ere could not have been any motive on the part of the parents of the accused to give a false date of birth because it was his first admission to a school at a very early age. Further, the school to which the appellant was admitted being a Public School enjoyed good reputation of authenticity.\n\nIn M/s. Gannon Dunker/ay & Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') this Court made the following observations :\n\n\"In fact, if the register bad been prepared at one sitting for purposes of these cases, the Company would have taken care that no suspicious circumstance comes into~ existence and, if, by chance, any error was committed, it . i could have prepared another register in lieu of Ext C-1 ( The fact that this was not done shows that this register is ( \"-•' the register kept in the course of business and, hence, there is no reason to doubt the entries made in it.\" \\\n\nThese observations fully apply to the facts of the present case because if , there had l:leen any element of suspicion in giving the date <if birth, the admiss.ion register and the Scholar's register would have been corrected by the headmistress of the school.\n\n(I) [1972] 3 s.c.c. 443.\n\nlJMllSI! Cl!ANbRA v. RAJASTHAN (Pazal Ali, J.) 59i\n\nExts. D-1 and D-2, mentioned above, are corroborated by A subsequent documentary evidence. It appears that an 1.7.65, the boy was admitted to 3rd standard (equivalent to 5th class) in St.\n\nPaul's school, Jaipur after the appellant's father was transferred from Ajmer to Jaipur. Here also the document shows that the date of birth given was the same, namely, 22.6.1957.\n\nThus, consistently on two occasions, starting from 1963 and ending in 1965, the date of birth was mentioned in the relevant documents as 22.6.1957. This Court in Mohd. lkram Hussain v.\n\nState of U. P. & Ors. (Supra) has held that copies of school certificates or the affidavit of the father constitute good proof of age, vide observations extracted herein-before.\n\nIn the instant case also there are two documents of two different schools showing the age of the accused-appellant as 22.6.57 and both these documents have been signed by his father and were in existence ante /item motam.\n\nHence, there could be no ground to doubt the genuineness of these documents and the High Court committed a serious error of law in brushing aside these important documents.\n\nAnother circumstance which weighed with the High Court was that when the boy was admitted in St. Paul's school, no transfer certificate appears to have been taken. This by itself is not sufficient to dislodge the case of the appellant unless a transfer certificate was taken and it had shown that the date of birth given there did not tally with the documents (Exts. D-1 to D-4).\n\nIt appears that as the father of the appellant was subsequently transferred from Jaipur sometime in June 1966 to Dhausa and he was admitted to the Sanskrit Pathshala in Dhausa, for the first time in this school the date of birth of the appellant was changed from 22.6.57 to 22.9.56. The explanation given by his father is that as by this time the boy had become almost 10 years of age and as clause IO of Chapter XVIII of the Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education Regulations required that no candidate could take the Higher Secondary Examination until he had attained the age of 15 years on the !st of October of the )'Car in which the Examination was held, he had to give an affidavit to . change this fact in order to enable his son (appella.nt) to appear in the Higher Secondary Examination. This position was not disputed by the State. The High Court seems to have made much of this lacuna and has gone\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOltTs [t9szi :\\ s.c.fi.\n\nto the extent of labelling Gopal Sharma, appellant's father, as a liar having gone to the extent of making a false affidavit. Here also, we think the High Court has taken a most artificial and technical view of the matter. In our country, it is not uncommon for parents sometimes to change the age of their children in order to get some material benefit either for appearing in examination or for entering a particular service which would be denied to a child as under the original date of birth he would be either underaged or ineligible.\n\nThus, the appellant's father has given a cogent reason for changing the date of birth and there is no reason not to accept his explanation particularly because the offence was committed seven years after changing the date of birth, and, therefore, there could be no other reason why Gopal Sharma should have gone to the extent of filing an affidavit to change the date, except for the reason that he bas given.\n\nIt was also argued that in the insurance policy, the appellant's mother bad shown his age as 10 years without giving the exact date of birth. The age of the appellant was given as a rough estimate in the insurance policy but as the policy was not in the name of the appellant, nothing turns upon this fact particularly because by and large giving allowance for a few months this way or that way the hoy was about 10 years old when the policy was taken. The High Court, therefore, was wrong in attaching too great au importance to this somewhat insignificant fact.\n\nFor these reasons we are satisfied that these circumstances also do not put the case of the appellant out of court.\n\nThese are the main reasons given by the High Court for\n\n----.....__ -\n\ndistrusting what, in' our opinion, seems to be unimpeachable docu- >-·-- mentary evidence produced by the appellant to show that his exact date of birth was 22.6.57 and not 22.9.56 as altered by his father G later.\n\nAnother question argued at the Bar was as to what is the material date which is to be seen for the purpose of application of the Act.\n\nIn view of our finding that at the time of the occurrence the apoellant was undoubtedly a child within the provisions of the Act, the further question if he could be tried as a child if he had become more than 16 years by the time the case went up to the\n\n- ,~\n\nUMESH CHANDRA v. RAiASTHAN' (Fazal Ali, J.) 593\n\ncourt, does not survive because the Act itself takes care of such a A contingency. In this connection sections 3 and 26 of the Act may be extracted thus :\n\n\"3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of child who has ceased to be child\n\nWhere an inquiry has been initiated against a child and during he course of such inquiry the child ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a child.\n\nxx xx x\n\n26. Special provision in respect of pending cases.\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the child has , committed an offence, it shall record such finding and, instead of passing any sentence in respect of the child, forward the child to the children's court which shall pass orders in respect of that child in accordance with the provision of this Act as if it has been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that the child has committed the offence.\"\n\nA combined reading of these two sections would clearly show that the statute takes care of contingencies where proceedings in respect of a child were pending in any court in any area on the date on which the Act came into force.\n\nSection 26 in terms lays down that the court should proceed with the case but after having found that the child has committed the offence it is debarred from passing any sentence but would forward the child to the children's court for passing orders in accordance with the Act.\n\nAs regards the general applicability of the Act, we are clearly of the view that the relevant date for the applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence takes place. Children Act was enacted to protect young children from the consequences of their\n\n594 SUPl!.llM13 cotJIJ.'r kl!Pok'l:S [1~~~13 s.c.a.\n\ncriminal acts on the footing that their mind at that age could not be said to be mature for imputing mens rea as in the case of an adult.\n\nThis being the intendment of the Act, a clear finding has to be recorded that the relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence takes place. It is quite possible that by • the time the case comes up for trial, growing in age being an involuntary factor, the child may have ceased to be a child. Therefore, ss. 3 and 26 became necessary.\n\nBoth the sections clearly point in the direction of the relevant date for the applicability of the Act as the date of occurrence. We are clearly .of the view that the relevant date for applicability of the Act so far as age of the accused, who claims to be a child, i's concerned, is the' date of the occurrence and not the date of the trial.\n\nThe High Court bas failed to take notice that the Act being a piece of social legislation is meant for the protection of infants who commit criminal offences and, therefore, its provisions should be liberally and meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. Bearing this in mind we have construed the documents in the instant case.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the appeal to the extent that while setting aside the judgment of the Sessions Judge, as affirmed by the High Corrt, we direct the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur; to try the accused and if be gives a finding that the accused is guilty, he shall forward the accused to the Children's court for receiving sentence in accordance with the provisions of s. 26 of the Act.\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeai allowed.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nUMESH CHANDRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UMESH CHANDRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 198111", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "583 A\n\nUMESH CHANDRA\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nApril 2, 198111\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D.A. 0BSAI AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nRajasthan Children Act, 1970-Material date for determining sge, of delinquent-Is it date of commission of offence or date of trial,?"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 1872", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "statute": "Rajasthan Children Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "S. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "statute": "Rajasthan Children Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Children Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 364 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Children Act, 1970", "statute": "Children Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tonk district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 and 302, I.P.C., in conneCtion with an occurrence that took_ place in Tonk district on March 12, 1973."}}, {"text": "relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2328, "end_char": 2395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2565, "end_char": 2577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "statute": "The relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2957, "end_char": 2969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970", "statute": "The relevant date for applicability of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "592 H; 593 A; 593 F-G]\n\n(d) The judgment of the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court be set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur, be directed to try the accused and if he gave a finding that the accused was-.. guilty, he shaJI forward the accused to the ChHdren's court for receiving sentence in accordance with , the provisions of the Act. ["}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3838, "end_char": 3843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964) 5 S.C.R. 86", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4129, "end_char": 4147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K.K. Venugopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6188, "end_char": 6202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, S. s,, Khanduja, and G. C. Mishra for the\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "Khanduja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6211, "end_char": 6219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, S. s,, Khanduja, and G. C. Mishra for the\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6225, "end_char": 6237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, S. s,, Khanduja, and G. C. Mishra for the\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "B.D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6259, "end_char": 6270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D. Sharma for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated June 29, 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court overruling I!- preliminary objection taken by the accused before the Sessions Judge to the effect that the Sessions Judge, Tonk was not competent to try the case as the accused Umesh Chandra was a child as contemplated by the provisions of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') on the date of the alleged occurrence.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act appears to have been passed by the Rajasthan Legislature, but after receiving assent of the President was enforced in various districts from time to time."}}, {"text": "12.3.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7297, "end_char": 7306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection taken by the appellant was that as he was below the age of 16 ai the time of the occurrence on 12.3.1973, he could not be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk or the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur city, tq 111'.h.om."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7337, "end_char": 7368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection taken by the appellant was that as he was below the age of 16 ai the time of the occurrence on 12.3.1973, he could not be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk or the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur city, tq 111'.h.om."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur city", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection taken by the appellant was that as he was below the age of 16 ai the time of the occurrence on 12.3.1973, he could not be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk or the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur city, tq 111'.h.om."}}, {"text": "17.10.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7461, "end_char": 7469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tile case was transferred 011\n\n17.10.73. ."}}, {"text": "Rajastban High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7619, "end_char": 7639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "taken by the accused and therefore he filed a revision to the Rajastban High Court against the Order."}}, {"text": "Tonk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7858, "end_char": 7862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was not brought into force in Tonk at the time of the offence, and (2) that it was not proved by the accused that he was below the age of 16 on 12.3.1973, the dat~ of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "sections 364 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8065, "end_char": 8085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8110, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "22.9.1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8752, "end_char": 8761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court after reappra1smg the entire evidence.:_oral and documentary-by its Order dated 18.11 76 came to a clear finding that the age' of Umesh Chandra at the time when the offence was committed wa!i 16 years 5 months and 20 days and that the exact date of birth of the appellant was proved to be 22.9.1956."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9485, "end_char": 9490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9730, "end_char": 9735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10597, "end_char": 10602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10686, "end_char": 10691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Umesb Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10807, "end_char": 10820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the main point for consideration in this case is as to what is the exact date of birth of the appellant, Umesb Chandra. ."}}, {"text": "22.6.57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12073, "end_char": 12080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Act; according to the testimony of the father of the appellant he was born on 22.6.57 and was aged 15."}}, {"text": "Dausa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12276, "end_char": 12281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the time when the appellant was born, his father was posted in a small village (Dausa) where the maternal grandfather of the appellant bad lived .and perhaps he was not meticulous enough to .report the birth of his children.:"}}, {"text": "Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12687, "end_char": 12692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal (the father) were registered in any Municipal register or in •· chowkidar's register .. We 'have mentioned this fact because the \\High Cort seems to have laid."}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St:· Teressa's Primay School, Ajmer."}}, {"text": "Stella", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13631, "end_char": 13637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The f oim 'is signed by\" Sister Stella who was the Headmisiress."}}, {"text": "Ratilal Mehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13718, "end_char": 13731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DW; Ratilal Mehta, who."}}, {"text": "Stella", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13971, "end_char": 13977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the• evidence of Sister Stella (DW 3) herself who has also .endorsed --the' -fact of the date of birth having been mentioned in the admission form and has also clearly .. stated OD oath that the forms Were maintained in regular course and that they were signed by her •. She -has also stated that at the\n\ntime when the appellant was first admitted she was the headmistress of St.Teressa.·"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14827, "end_char": 14832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 35, 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15154, "end_char": 15169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 34, 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15332, "end_char": 15347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15452, "end_char": 15457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15986, "end_char": 15991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. Ratilal Mehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16298, "end_char": 16314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DW I. Ratilal Mehta and DW 3, Sister Stella."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16466, "end_char": 16471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lkram Hussain v. State of U.P.,(') where Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed as under :\n\n\"In the present case Kaniz Fatima was stated to be under the age of 18."}}, {"text": "Kaniz Fatima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16745, "end_char": 16757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lkram Hussain v. State of U.P.,(') where Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed as under :\n\n\"In the present case Kaniz Fatima was stated to be under the age of 18.", "canonical_name": "Kaniz Fatima"}}, {"text": "June 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16868, "end_char": 16881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two certified copies from school register which show that on June 20, 1960, she was under 17 years of age."}}, {"text": "Kaniz Fatima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17032, "end_char": 17044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also the affidavit of the father (here evidence on oath) stating the date of her birth and the statement of Kaniz Fatima to the police with regard to her own age.", "canonical_name": "Kaniz Fatima"}}, {"text": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17087, "end_char": 17143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17469, "end_char": 17471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17556, "end_char": 17561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 73 and 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17588, "end_char": 17601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "These amounted to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Teressa Primary School", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17705, "end_char": 17727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the High Court was of the view that as the documents produced by the Teressa Primary School were kept in loose sheets, no reliance can be placed on them."}}, {"text": "Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19636, "end_char": 19645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl!ANbRA v. RAJASTHAN (Pazal Ali, J.) 59i\n\nExts.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "St.\n\nPaul's school, Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19840, "end_char": 19866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that an 1.7.65, the boy was admitted to 3rd standard (equivalent to 5th class) in St.\n\nPaul's school, Jaipur after the appellant's father was transferred from Ajmer to Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Dhausa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21282, "end_char": 21288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that as the father of the appellant was subsequently transferred from Jaipur sometime in June 1966 to Dhausa and he was admitted to the Sanskrit Pathshala in Dhausa, for the first time in this school the date of birth of the appellant was changed from 22.6.57 to 22.9.56."}}, {"text": "22.9.56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21443, "end_char": 21450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that as the father of the appellant was subsequently transferred from Jaipur sometime in June 1966 to Dhausa and he was admitted to the Sanskrit Pathshala in Dhausa, for the first time in this school the date of birth of the appellant was changed from 22.6.57 to 22.9.56."}}, {"text": "IO of Chapter XVIII of the Rajasthan Board of Secondary Education Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21568, "end_char": 21645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gopal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22148, "end_char": 22160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the extent of labelling Gopal Sharma, appellant's father, as a liar having gone to the extent of making a false affidavit."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24591, "end_char": 24608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another question argued at the Bar was as to what is the material date which is to be seen for the purpose of application of the Act", "statute": "Another question argued at the Bar was as to what is the material date which is to be seen for the purpose of application of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25997, "end_char": 26007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27065, "end_char": 27077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28165, "end_char": 28170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.L.C.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28184, "end_char": 28190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.L.C.\n\nAppeai allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_58_60_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA\n\nLT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.\n\nJanuary 20, 1982\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND\n\nA.P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nClemency jurisdiction-Power of President to grant pardon etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases-Constitution of India, 19,01 C Article 72, scope of the power.\n\nDismissing the petition, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 of the Constitution, the only sentence which can J)ossibJy be imposed upon the petitioner i_n the instant case, is that of death and D no circumstances exi~ for interference with that sentence. Not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the Pesident to interfere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner in view particularly ot the considerations mentioned in K.S. Rattga v. Union of India and Anr., [1981] 3 S.C R. 512. Therefore, in refusing to commute the sentence the death imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence the President has not in any aiaoner transgressed his discretionary power under Article 72. [59 D-E 1 60 BC) E\n\n2. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in aii appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a Court into a lesser sentence. But the question as to whether the case is appropriate for ithe exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti .. cular case. [59 E, CiJ.\n\n3. After all the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing tit. Therefore, no uaeful purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by ensuring the imposition of any seve1'e, judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of a case may require. [59. H, 60 A]\n\nJames Shewan & Sons v. United States, 69 L. Ed. 527 at 535, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 8193A , of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for\n\nfh~ Petitionr-,,-Rang~,\n\n' .... .,.\n\n. ' I\n\nKUUIT SINGH v. LT. GOVERNOR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 59\n\nR. K. Jain and P. K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.\n\nN. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Attorney General.\n\nK. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M. K. Banerji, Additional Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India.\n\nN. Nettar for the State of Krnataka.\n\nRaju Ramachandran for Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal_ Aggarwal.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J.\n\nThe question as regards the scope of the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly is not that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by article 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon' the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon tb, e petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President has in any manner . transgressed his discretionary power under article 72.\n\nUndoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a .court into a lesser sentence ayd as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v United States('), the \"executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law\" and that the administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. But the question as to whether the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti- .c:ular case. The necessity or the justification for exercising that power has therefore to be judged from ¢ae to case. In fact, we do not see what useful purpose will be 11i; qieved by tqe petitioner by\n\n(I) 69 L Ed. 527 at 535.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nensuring the imposition of any severe, judicially evolved constraints oo the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of a case may require.\n\nAfter all, the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing it.\n\nWe need.not, however, go into that question elaborately because in so far as this case is concerned, we are quite clear that not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the President to interefere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner, in view )larticularly of the considerations mentioned by us in our judgment in Kuljeet Singh @ Ranga v. Union of India & Anr.('). We may recall what we said in\n\ntht judgment that \"the death of the Chopra children was cau.sed by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning . which bears a professional stamp\", that the \"survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of per'°ns like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security'', and that \"they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society\".\n\nThe petition is accordingly dismissed. •\n\nWe have heard Shri R. K. Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused Billa.\n\nWe see no substance in Shri Jain's contentions also.\n\nThe order of stay of execution of the death sentence which we had passed in favour o.f the accused Ranga and Billa as also the general order of stay are hereby vacated. If in any specific case or cases there is an express crder of stay, it will not be affected by the order which we are passing today.\n\nS, R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(1) [1981) 3 S.C.R. sq.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 20, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 20, 1982\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., 0."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 261, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 292, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1981] 3 S.C R. 512", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1514, "end_char": 1524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2038, "end_char": 2048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for\n\nfh~ Petitionr-,,-Rang~,\n\n' .... .,.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "V. J. Frqncis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2050, "end_char": 2063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for\n\nfh~ Petitionr-,,-Rang~,\n\n' .... .,."}}, {"text": "Suni/ Kumar Jain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2065, "end_char": 2081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for\n\nfh~ Petitionr-,,-Rang~,\n\n' .... .,."}}, {"text": "D. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2086, "end_char": 2096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nR. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for\n\nfh~ Petitionr-,,-Rang~,\n\n' .... .,.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOVERNOR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 59\n\nR. K. Jain and P. K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "P. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2214, "end_char": 2224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOVERNOR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 59\n\nR. K. Jain and P. K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "N. C. Talukdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2252, "end_char": 2266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2271, "end_char": 2283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2307, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Attorney General."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Attorney General."}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2383, "end_char": 2395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M. K. Banerji, Additional Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India."}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2416, "end_char": 2429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M. K. Banerji, Additional Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India."}}, {"text": "N. Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2504, "end_char": 2513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Nettar for the State of Krnataka."}}, {"text": "Raju Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2542, "end_char": 2559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju Ramachandran for Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal_ Aggarwal."}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal_ Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju Ramachandran for Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal_ Aggarwal."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2652, "end_char": 2663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J.\n\nThe question as regards the scope of the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion."}}, {"text": "article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Taft", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a .court into a lesser sentence ayd as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v United States('), the \"executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law\" and that the administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt."}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4039, "end_char": 4049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4570, "end_char": 4580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may recall what we said in\n\ntht judgment that \"the death of the Chopra children was cau.sed by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning ."}}, {"text": "Billa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5210, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may recall what we said in\n\ntht judgment that \"the death of the Chopra children was cau.sed by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning ."}}, {"text": "Ranga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which bears a professional stamp\", that the \"survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of per'°ns like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security'', and that \"they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society\"."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Shri R. K. Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused Billa.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We see no substance in Shri Jain's contentions also."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_595_606_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "' i '\n\n,\\'\n\n\\\"· '\n\nS95 A\n\nHANUMANT DASS\n\nVINAY KUMAR & ORS.\n\n, Apri~ 5, \"1982\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\n' Party to an appeal against coNViction/acquittal-Necessary party-Occurrence of offence taking place in the te\"itorial limits of_ one State, but' the trial C takeJ place in anather State, pursuant to an order of transfer by the Supreme Court-In the aPpeal by the accused before the High Court, whichis _ the necessary ,.... party respondent-Public Prosecutor of the State where the-offence 'took p/Oce or of the State __ where_ the trial took place-Code of Criminal ~Procedure, 1973,\n\nsections 2(4), 24_, 224, '178, 38S and 432(7), scope of. ' . - ' . . - Records, summanlng of-Whfther non-summoning of f.ecords itiates the order in appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 section 385(2), exp/ained- Setting aside OJ the judgment i.r not passible unless tM ingredients of section 465 , Criminal Procedure Code are sati3fted • .-· ·\n\nVinay Kumar, the husband of the deceased Asha and his mother Chhano Devi were charged; convicted' for the offence of burning alive the deceased and sentenced to life ia:iprisonment on a complaint by Hanumant .Dass ' the father of the deceased _and the 3.ppellant in Criminal Appeal 4S of 1982 by -the Sessions Judge. Gurdaspur, Punjab. The Offence is alleged -to have been\n\nCommitted within th~· territorial limits or the State Of Himachal . Pradesh. but on an application of the complainant the case was transferred by an order Or the Supreme Court inasmuch as the accused were the brother-in-law and ni.other-in- . law of a Judge. of the High Court of. Himachal Pradesh. lo appeal by the accused the High Court of Punjab issued. oa 22-6-1981, noiice for 6-7-1981 to the Advocate General of Punjab only aad on that date heard the appeal and acquit- ted both the accused. Hence the appeal by the complainant and the special leave by the State of Himachal Pradesh. ·\n\nDismissing the appeal and tbC Scil Leave Petition, the -Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The charge levelled against the High Court that it 'was in\n\na bot ha.Ste to decide the appeal at the earJiest possible is incofrect inview of the G order dated 22-6-1981 passed by the High Court of Punjab. (600 BJ\n\n. 2:1. Section . 385 or . the de of -Crimnal Prdur~ is a ndatorf provisionand the requirement of the section must be satisfied. Jn the appeal before tho High Court -State of P.unjab was made a party and notice of the appcafwas also given to the Advocate General of Punjab •. From sections 2(4).\n\n24. 225. 378 and 432 it is tevident that there shall be a Public Prosecutor fOr - -conducting an~ prosecution appeal or other proceedi:r; ig on behalf of the Central\n\n596 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 11982) 3 s.c.il.\n\nGovenment or State GovCrnment in the High'eourt •. r notice h1s been given to the Public Prosecutor, namely, the Advocate-General of_ Punjab the require-_ ment of law has _been fulfilled. (601 Jl.C, 603 C-D] .\n\n-: 2:2. Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code: defines ••approptjate\n\nGoVem.me:Ot~' as meaning (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under_ any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;· (b) in other cases, the Government of the St3.te within which the offender iS sentenced or-tbC-said otder is passed.· -According to this section the appropriate Government is the Government of the State of conviction and not the Government of the State where the offence was Committed. L603 C-D]\n\n' State of Madhya Praduh v. Ratan Singh & Ors., (1976] Supp. S.C.R.\n\nSS:Z. applied.\n\n- 3. TO contend that the High Court disPOsed or the appeal CveD without sumt:D.onirig the record is incorrect. No specific allegation has been made in the Special Leave Petition that the. record waS not summonCd.~- The tenor or_ the judgment of the High Court indicates that the record must have been there before the High Court. There is copious reference to the materials On. the record which could be. possible only when the record was there biefore the court.\n\nBcsid.;:s, the counsel for the appellant made a statement before thecourt that on the finding of fact recorded by the High Court he was entitled to an-· acquitial and in this view of the matter even if the record had not been summoned that would not be fataL- Further -proviso. to sub--section (2) of section 38S itself provides.-•.. the court may dispose of the apPeal without sending for the record:• in a cCrtain- -situation; The rigou'r of sub-sCction- (Zj ofsection 385, which provides that \"the Appellate Collrt shall then send for the record of the case •• ~:· has been taken away by the proviSo in a- -cCrtain situation. If the api)Cuant him self says that the appeal can be allowed on the findings recorded by the Sessions Judge, tho non-summoning of the record,.ifit was at all so. wouJd not be fatal.\n\nThe complainant was present with his counsCI, the State Advocaie-General was also present. If there had been any grievance about _the rCcord, they would havo raised an objection. Their non-objection on this point is also an\" indicator that the -record was there or in any case, the summoning of the record was not thought to be necessary by the parties. (604 EH, 60S A-Bl\n\n4. On merits also there is no case for the appellants . since each and every aspect of the matter has been ihorougbly discussed by the High Court which has referre~ to the error committed by the Sessions Judge in the approach of the case and also in making unwarranted assumptions. There is no eye witness.\n\nThe fate of the case hinges upon the circumstantial evidence. The High Court has dealt with the two dying declarations, one recorded by the Doctor and the other by the Assistant Sub-Inspector. _The High Court also took into considera .. tion the oral dying-declaration on which the prosecution strongly relied. But even that declaration does not implicate the accused. [605 G~H, 606 A .. B],..:\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 45. of 1982.\n\nHANUMANT DASS v. VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 597\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 9th July, 1981 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 333-DB of 1981. ,\n\nAND\n\nS, L.P. (Cr/.) No. 2948 of 1982.\n\nR.L. Kohli and R. C. Kohli for the Appellants.\n\nT.U. Mehta and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondent No. 1.\n\nN.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 3.\n\nN.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner in S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2498/81.\n\nD. D. Sharma for the State.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. The appeal as well s the special leave petition are directed against the judgment of. the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 9th July, 1981. Criminal appeal has been filed by the complainant while the special leave petition has been filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh. Vinay Kumar and his mother Chhano Devi were convicted for the murder of Asha, the wife of Vinay Kumar by burning her alive and sentenced to life imprisonment by the learned Sessions flldge, Gurdaspur. On appeal by the accused, the High Court acquitted them by the impugned judgment.\n\nThe prosecution case set up at the trial was that the deceased Asha was married with Vinay Kumar in July, 1972. The marriage was an arranged marriage. It did not prove to be a success, the apparant cause for the failure of marriage was that Asha was only a matriculate and not cultured enough to move about in th~ society with the husband. To make up this deficiency the deceased again resumed her studies , and started attending college at Nagrota Bhagwan. While prosecuting her studies she was rebuked and abused and sometimes even thrashed, whenever she visited the house of her-in-laws. She however, kept on suffering in the vain hope that in due course of time things might improve. There was, however,\n\n110 improvement and she was fedup wit[J the m!lltreatment and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\ncruelty meted out to her in the in-laws house. She left the matri monial home and started living with her parents sometime in the year 1975 or early 1976.\n\nIn 1977 Vinay Kumar filed a petition in the court of the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the dissolution of his marriage with the deceased on various grounds including one of desertion. The District Judge in the first instance tried for reconciliation between the spouse and as an interim arrangement Asha returned to her-in-laws house in June 1978 on trial basis, while divorce petition was kept pending and adjourned to July 29, 1978.\n\nAs the parties did not appear in the Court on the date fixed, it was presumed that they were living happily and the proceedings were, therefore, consigned to the record.\n\nOn 5th of August, 1978 at about 11 a.m. Kanwal Nain P.W. 4, Bil Bhandur P.W. 14, employee of the Post Office, which was just in front of the house of the accused at a distance of 10/12 feet, and a number of other persons saw smoke coming out of the window of the house of the accused.~ When Bil Bhandur and others went to the house, they found the outer door locked. There was no other means of ingress to the house. After a short while one Raj brought the key from Chhano Devi accused with which the lock was opened and entry gained into the house. Asha was found burning and after extinguishing the fire, she was removed to the local hospital.\n\nDr. 0. P. Dutta attended her and sent an intimation of the incident to the Incharge local Police Post. He recorded the statement of Asha on the out-patient register Ex. PL. Meanwhile Kesar Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, arrived there and after getting a certificate from Dr. Dutta, he also recorded her statement Ex. PU.\n\nFrom Civil Hospital, Kangra Asha was removed in a truck to a Civil Hospital in Dharamshala (H.P.) where .she breathed her last.\n\nIn her statements recorded by Dr. Dutta and Kesar Singh, the deceased disclosed that her clothes caught fire, while she was preparing tea. The police suspected no foul play and did not register any case. The father of the deceased Hanumant Dass, however, made a report on 7th August, 1978 and a case was registered on that basis. The accused were sent up for trial. When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province. The case was transferred to a Court of competent jurisdiction at Gurdaspur in Punjab. The Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur convicted both the accused under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. This conviction was based only on the circumstantial evidence. Accused went up in appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court in its turn set aside the order of conviction and acquitted the accused of the charge.\n\nThe complainant has filed the present appeal. Shri Kohli appearing for the complainant has strenuously contended that the appeal before the High Court bas been allowed in the absence of the State of Himabal Pradesh and without any notice to that State\n\nand as such the impugned judgment of the High Court is a nullity and should be set aside 'on that ground alone.\n\nThe accused had impleaded only the State of Punjab as a party and the High Court has issued notice to the Advocate-General of Punjab. As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record. Thus the High Court was in a hot haste to dispose of the appeal even without reasonable opportunity being afforded to the counsel for the State and without impleading the appropriate State as a party to the appeal and without notice to tbe counsel for th~ State of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nWe may first deal with the criticism of the learned counsel about the undue haste _in the disposal of the appeal by the High Court. It appears that Shri M.R. Mahajan, counsel for the appellants while moving the application for bail made a statement. before the High Court and it is on his statement that the case was posted for bearing at the earliest possible. This will be apparent from the order dated 22.6.1981 passed by the High Court while disposing of the application for bail. The order insofar as it is material for consideration of the point reads :\n\n\" ... Mr. Mahajan, Advocate states that on the findings of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge, the conviction of the appellants can110\\ be sµs(aiued.\n\nNotice for 6.7.81,\n\n~UPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nto the Advocate-General, Punjab.\n\nCopy of the grounds\n\n1 of appeal and the judgment rendered by the learned trial Judge be delivered in the office of the A. C. Punjab within two days, The case is likely to be disposed of on that date ............... \"\n\nTherefore, the charge levelled against the High Court that it was in a hot haste to decide the appeal at the earliest possible appears to be uncalled for.\n\nThis leads 'us to the main contention raised by Shri Kohli that the transfer of the case from Dharamshala lying within the teqitorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to Gurdaspur lying within the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, does not change the parties and the 'parties remain the same even after the transfer of the case from Dharamshala to Gurdaspur. In this view of the legal position, the State of Himachal Pradesh where the offence was committed was a necessary party and should have been impleaded in appeal.\n\nIn the absence of the State of Himachal Pradesh as a party and in the absence of notice to the counsel for the State of Himachal Pradesh, the High Court was not justified in disposing of the appeal and its judgment is only a nullity.\n\nThis contention is based on section 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Insofar as it is material for the purpose of the case it reads:\n\n\"385(1) : If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given-\n\n(i) to the appellant or his pleader;\n\n(ii) to such officer as the State Government my appoint in this behalf;\n\n(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case instituted up'on complaint, to the complainant;\n\n(iv) if the appeal is under section 377 qr section 378, to the accused, and shall also furnish such officer, complainant and accused with a copy of the grounds of appeal.\n\n• - __ _,,,,.-''\n\nr--1\n\n,'-\n\n. -' r\n\nHANUMANT DASS v. VINAY KUMAR ((Misra, J) 601\n\n(2) The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already available in that Court, and hear the parties :\n\nProvided that if the appeal is only as to the extent or the legality of the sentence, the Court !)lay dispose of the\n\nappeal without sending for the record. . 8\n\n(3) ........................... .\n\nThere is no denying the fact that section 385 of the Code is a mandatory provision and the requirement of the section must be satisfied. In the appeal before the High Court, State of Punjao was made a party and notice of the appeal was also given to the Advocate-General of Punjab. According to Shri Kohli this does not satisfy the requirement of law.\n\nIt would be appropriate at this stage to refer to other relevant provisions of the Code :\n\nSection 225 provide~ that-\"In every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.\"\n\nSection 2(4) defines public prosecutor-\"Public Prosecutor means any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person acting under t.he direction of a public prosecutor.\"\n\nSection 24 deals with \"Public Prosecutors in the High Court\" :\n\n\"24. Public Prosecutors :-(I) For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal .or other proceeding on bebalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be'\n\n\" ............ ········· ......... ······ I ,.\n\nSection 378 talks of an appeal in case of acquittal. Insofar as it is material it reads thus :\n\n\"378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject \\o thQ provisio11~ <:>f sl\\b-sections (3) and (5)1\n\n602 I 1982) s.c.ll.\n\nthe State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to jlresent an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal p11$Sed by any Court other than a High Court, (or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of SessiOn in revision).\n\n(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code; the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) to the High Court from the order of acquittal . .. ... ... . .. ········· ........ .\n\nSection 432 authorises the appropriate Government to suspend or remit sen fences.\n\n\"432(1) : When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution, of his \"sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment 'to which he has been sentenced.\n\n(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension for remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion........................... ·\n\n(3) .................. (4) ..................... (5) .......................... .\n\n(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him 9r bis property,\n\nHANUMANT DASS v. VINAY ltUMAR (Misra, J.)\n\n(7) In this section and Sin section 433, the expression ·\"appropriate Government\" means-\n\n(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;\n\n(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed.\n\nFrom the various provisions extracted above it is evident that there shall be a Public Prosecutor for conducting any prosecution appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government in the High Court. If notice has. been given to the Public Pro.secutor viz. the Advocate-Ge?eral of Punjab the requirement of law to our mind has been fulfilled.\n\nShri Kohli, however, contends that occurrence in the instant case took place within the territorial limits of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nThat State, therefore, will continue to be a necessary party in the\n\napiital irrespective of the fact that the appeal was file!! in the Punjab E High Court.\n\nI Section 432(7) extracted above defines \"appropriate Government\". \"Appropriate Government\" means-(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in subse<:tlon (6}'is passed under any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;\n\n....._ -(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or th~ said order is passed.\n\n According to this section the appropriate Government is the Government of the State of conviction and not the Government of the .State where the offence was committed. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration in the State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. Ratan Singh & Ors.,(') where the respondent was convicted and'\n\ntenced to imprisonment for life by a court in the State of Madhya Pradesh. At his request he Wa& tr1111sferred to a jail in the State\n\n604 SUPltEME COUR1 REPORTS ;\n\n(!982] 3 S.C.11. .\n\nof Punjab, to which State he belonged.\n\nHe applied io the Government of Punjab that under the Punjab Jail Manual he is entitled to be released since he had completed more than 20 years of imprisonment. The application was sent to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, which rejected it. In a V<rit petition filed by him the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the State of Punjab was the appropriate authority to release him and directed the State of Punjab to consider the matter; This Court in appeal observed \"a perusal of this provision clearly reveals that the test to de, termine the appropriate Government is to locate the State where the accused was convicted ahd sentenced and the Government of that State would be the appropriate Government within the meaning of sec. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus since the prisoner in the instant case was tried, convicted and sentenced in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Madhya Pradesh \\'ould be the appropriate Government to exercise the discretion for remission of the sentence under sec. 401{1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...... , ..... \" That wd a case based on section 40 I of the old Criminal Procedure Code, but the Code o( Criminal Procedure, 1973 has put the matter completely beyond any controversy and reiterated the provisions of section 402(3) in sub-section (7) of section 432.\n\n, Lastly it was contended that. the appeal was disposed of by the High Court\\ even without summoning the record. There is no warrant for this assumption. No specific allegation bas been made in the special leave petition that the record was not summoned. We have perused the judgment of the High Court and the tenor of the judgment indicates that the record must have been there before the court. There is copious reference to the materials on the record which could be possible only when the record was there before the court. Besides, .. the counsel for the appellant made a statement ~· before the court that on the finding of fact recorded by the High- , Court he was entitled to an acquittal and in this view of the matter even if the record , had not been summoned (for which there is no basis) that would not be fatal, Proviso to sub section (2) of section 385 itself provides \" ... the court may dispose of the appeal without sending for the record.\" in a certain situation.\n\nThe rigour of subsection (2) of sec. 385, which provides that \"the Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case ... \" has been taken away by the proviso in a certain situation. If the 1appellant himself says\n\nthat the appeal can be allowed on the findings recorded by the ::>essions Jud?f, the non-summonin~ of the record, if it was at all so, r •\n\nliANUi.iANt bAss v. VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.i\n\n1 605\n\nwould not to our mi.nd be fatal. The complainant was present with his counsel, the State Advocate-General was also present. If there had been any grievance about the record, they would hav~ raised an objection. Their non-objection on this point is also an indicator that the record was there or in any case, the summoning of the record was not thought to be necessary by the parties.\n\nAssuming for the sake of argument, .that there were certain irregularities in the procedure the judgment of the High Court could not be set aside unless it was shown by the appellant that there has 'been failure of justice, as will be evident from section 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads :\n\n\"465. Finding or sentence-when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity-\n\n(I) Subject to the provisions herein before contained no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceed- . ings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of . that Court, a failure of justice has in fact .been occasioned thereby.\n\n(2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the 'Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should .have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.\"\n\nWe have perused the judgment of the High Court which was G placed before us in full. It shows that each and every_ aspect of the matter has been thoroughly discussed and the High Court has also referred to the error committed .by the Sessions Judge in the approach of the case and also in making unwarranted assumptions.\n\nOn merits we fully agree with the appraisal of the. evidence made by the High Court. It is not necessary to repeat the same\n\nstJl'ki!Mil cotJkt ltili'Oiltt\n\nOYer again. There is no eye witness. The fate of the ase hinges upon the circumstantial evidence. The High Court has dealt with the two dying declarations, one recorded by tbe Doctor and the\n\noilier by the Assistant Sob-Inspector. The High Court also took into consideration the oral dying declaration on which the prose ' cution strongly relied. But even that declaration does not implicate the accused. The reason given by the High Court for acquittal in our opinion is cogent and plausible. ' ·\n\nFor the foregoing discussion, the criminal appeal and the special leave petition must fail and they are accordingly dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal & Petition dismissed.\n\n---~\n\n--~-", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "S95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 22, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VINAY KUMAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VINAY KUMAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 2(4), 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 385(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 795, "end_char": 809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 908, "end_char": 931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vinay Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Records, summanlng of-Whfther non-summoning of f.ecords itiates the order in appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 section 385(2), exp/ained- Setting aside OJ the judgment i.r not passible unless tM ingredients of section 465 , Criminal Procedure Code are sati3fted • .-· ·\n\nVinay Kumar, the husband of the deceased Asha and his mother Chhano Devi were charged; convicted' for the offence of burning alive the deceased and sentenced to life ia:iprisonment on a complaint by Hanumant .Dass ' the father of the deceased _and the 3.ppellant in Criminal Appeal 4S of 1982 by -the Sessions Judge.", "canonical_name": "VINAY KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Asha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Records, summanlng of-Whfther non-summoning of f.ecords itiates the order in appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 section 385(2), exp/ained- Setting aside OJ the judgment i.r not passible unless tM ingredients of section 465 , Criminal Procedure Code are sati3fted • .-· ·\n\nVinay Kumar, the husband of the deceased Asha and his mother Chhano Devi were charged; convicted' for the offence of burning alive the deceased and sentenced to life ia:iprisonment on a complaint by Hanumant .Dass ' the father of the deceased _and the 3.ppellant in Criminal Appeal 4S of 1982 by -the Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "Chhano Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Records, summanlng of-Whfther non-summoning of f.ecords itiates the order in appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 section 385(2), exp/ained- Setting aside OJ the judgment i.r not passible unless tM ingredients of section 465 , Criminal Procedure Code are sati3fted • .-· ·\n\nVinay Kumar, the husband of the deceased Asha and his mother Chhano Devi were charged; convicted' for the offence of burning alive the deceased and sentenced to life ia:iprisonment on a complaint by Hanumant .Dass ' the father of the deceased _and the 3.ppellant in Criminal Appeal 4S of 1982 by -the Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "by Hanumant .Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1151, "end_char": 1168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANUMANT DASS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1491, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but on an application of the complainant the case was transferred by an order Or the Supreme Court inasmuch as the accused were the brother-in-law and ni.other-in- ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lo appeal by the accused the High Court of Punjab issued."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1747, "end_char": 1753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oa 22-6-1981, noiice for 6-7-1981 to the Advocate General of Punjab only aad on that date heard the appeal and acquit- ted both the accused."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1892, "end_char": 1917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the appeal by the complainant and the special leave by the State of Himachal Pradesh. ·"}}, {"text": "High Court -State of P.unjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the appeal before tho High Court -State of P.unjab was made a party and notice of the appcafwas also given to the Advocate General of Punjab •. From sections 2(4)."}}, {"text": "sections 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2938, "end_char": 2949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code: defines ••approptjate\n\nGoVem.me:Ot~' as meaning (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under_ any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;· (b) in other cases, the Government of the St3.te within which the offender iS sentenced or-tbC-said otder is passed.·"}}, {"text": "Government of the St3.te", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3279, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code: defines ••approptjate\n\nGoVem.me:Ot~' as meaning (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under_ any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;· (b) in other cases, the Government of the St3.te within which the offender iS sentenced or-tbC-said otder is passed.·"}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-According to this section the appropriate Government is the Government of the State of conviction and not the Government of the State where the offence was Committed."}}, {"text": "section 38S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HANUMANT DASS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HANUMANT DASS v. VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 597\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 9th July, 1981 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Hanumant .Dass ' the"}}, {"text": "R.L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6291, "end_char": 6301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.L. Kohli and R. C. Kohli for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. C. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6306, "end_char": 6317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.L. Kohli and R. C. Kohli for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "T.U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.U. Mehta and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A.G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6354, "end_char": 6370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.U. Mehta and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "N.C. Talukdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Sharma for the State."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6600, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. The appeal as well s the special leave petition are directed against the judgment of.", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 9th July, 1981."}}, {"text": "Vinay Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vinay Kumar and his mother Chhano Devi were convicted for the murder of Asha, the wife of Vinay Kumar by burning her alive and sentenced to life imprisonment by the learned Sessions flldge, Gurdaspur.", "canonical_name": "VINAY KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "court of the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1977 Vinay Kumar filed a petition in the court of the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the dissolution of his marriage with the deceased on various grounds including one of desertion."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8254, "end_char": 8264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8272, "end_char": 8290, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 29, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8628, "end_char": 8641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge in the first instance tried for reconciliation between the spouse and as an interim arrangement Asha returned to her-in-laws house in June 1978 on trial basis, while divorce petition was kept pending and adjourned to July 29, 1978."}}, {"text": "5th of August, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8818, "end_char": 8837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th of August, 1978 at about 11 a.m. Kanwal Nain P.W. 4, Bil Bhandur P.W. 14, employee of the Post Office, which was just in front of the house of the accused at a distance of 10/12 feet, and a number of other persons saw smoke coming out of the window of the house of the accused.~ When Bil Bhandur and others went to the house, they found the outer door locked."}}, {"text": "Kanwal Nain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th of August, 1978 at about 11 a.m. Kanwal Nain P.W. 4, Bil Bhandur P.W. 14, employee of the Post Office, which was just in front of the house of the accused at a distance of 10/12 feet, and a number of other persons saw smoke coming out of the window of the house of the accused.~ When Bil Bhandur and others went to the house, they found the outer door locked."}}, {"text": "Bil Bhandur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8875, "end_char": 8886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th of August, 1978 at about 11 a.m. Kanwal Nain P.W. 4, Bil Bhandur P.W. 14, employee of the Post Office, which was just in front of the house of the accused at a distance of 10/12 feet, and a number of other persons saw smoke coming out of the window of the house of the accused.~ When Bil Bhandur and others went to the house, they found the outer door locked."}}, {"text": "Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9256, "end_char": 9259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short while one Raj brought the key from Chhano Devi accused with which the lock was opened and entry gained into the house."}}, {"text": "P. Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9469, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Dutta attended her and sent an intimation of the incident to the Incharge local Police Post."}}, {"text": "Kesar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9645, "end_char": 9656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile Kesar Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, arrived there and after getting a certificate from Dr. Dutta, he also recorded her statement Ex."}}, {"text": "Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9738, "end_char": 9743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile Kesar Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, arrived there and after getting a certificate from Dr. Dutta, he also recorded her statement Ex."}}, {"text": "Kangra Asha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9806, "end_char": 9817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Civil Hospital, Kangra Asha was removed in a truck to a Civil Hospital in Dharamshala (H.P.) where .she breathed her last."}}, {"text": "Dharamshala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Civil Hospital, Kangra Asha was removed in a truck to a Civil Hospital in Dharamshala (H.P.) where .she breathed her last."}}, {"text": "Hanumant Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10145, "end_char": 10158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The father of the deceased Hanumant Dass, however, made a report on 7th August, 1978 and a case was registered on that basis.", "canonical_name": "Hanumant .Dass ' the"}}, {"text": "7th August, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10186, "end_char": 10202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The father of the deceased Hanumant Dass, however, made a report on 7th August, 1978 and a case was registered on that basis."}}, {"text": "Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province."}}, {"text": "llANUMANT DASS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10427, "end_char": 10441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province.", "canonical_name": "Hanumant .Dass ' the"}}, {"text": "VINAY KUMAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10445, "end_char": 10456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province.", "canonical_name": "VINAY KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province.", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in\n\nftimachl Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \\o th~\n\n• • -\n\nllANUMANT DASS '\" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599\n\nSupreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to some other province."}}, {"text": "Gurdaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10624, "end_char": 10633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was transferred to a Court of competent jurisdiction at Gurdaspur in Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur convicted both the accused under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10765, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11070, "end_char": 11075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kohli appearing for the complainant has strenuously contended that the appeal before the High Court bas been allowed in the absence of the State of Himabal Pradesh and without any notice to that State\n\nand as such the impugned judgment of the High Court is a nullity and should be set aside 'on that ground alone."}}, {"text": "State of Himabal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11209, "end_char": 11233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kohli appearing for the complainant has strenuously contended that the appeal before the High Court bas been allowed in the absence of the State of Himabal Pradesh and without any notice to that State\n\nand as such the impugned judgment of the High Court is a nullity and should be set aside 'on that ground alone."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11420, "end_char": 11435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused had impleaded only the State of Punjab as a party and the High Court has issued notice to the Advocate-General of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sbri Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11578, "end_char": 11588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record."}}, {"text": "15th June, 198J", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record."}}, {"text": "22nd of June, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11702, "end_char": 11720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record."}}, {"text": "6th of July, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11755, "end_char": 11772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11861, "end_char": 11875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a second limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on 9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record."}}, {"text": "M.R. Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12348, "end_char": 12360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Shri M.R. Mahajan, counsel for the appellants while moving the application for bail made a statement."}}, {"text": "22.6.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This will be apparent from the order dated 22.6.1981 passed by the High Court while disposing of the application for bail."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12766, "end_char": 12773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order insofar as it is material for consideration of the point reads :\n\n\" ... Mr. Mahajan, Advocate states that on the findings of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge, the conviction of the appellants can110\\ be sµs(aiued."}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13617, "end_char": 13646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This leads 'us to the main contention raised by Shri Kohli that the transfer of the case from Dharamshala lying within the teqitorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to Gurdaspur lying within the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, does not change the parties and the 'parties remain the same even after the transfer of the case from Dharamshala to Gurdaspur."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of the State of Himachal Pradesh as a party and in the absence of notice to the counsel for the State of Himachal Pradesh, the High Court was not justified in disposing of the appeal and its judgment is only a nullity."}}, {"text": "section 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14202, "end_char": 14213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14221, "end_char": 14247, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 377", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14730, "end_char": 14741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15335, "end_char": 15346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Punjao", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15475, "end_char": 15490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeal before the High Court, State of Punjao was made a party and notice of the appeal was also given to the Advocate-General of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Section 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15745, "end_char": 15756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15875, "end_char": 15887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15966, "end_char": 15976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16056, "end_char": 16066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16559, "end_char": 16570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17175, "end_char": 17209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code; the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. ("}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17232, "end_char": 17276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17604, "end_char": 17615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab E High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19849, "end_char": 19868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Punjab E High Court."}}, {"text": "Section 432(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19873, "end_char": 19887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20548, "end_char": 20571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A somewhat similar question came up for consideration in the State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. Ratan Singh & Ors.,(')"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where the respondent was convicted and'\n\ntenced to imprisonment for life by a court in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20883, "end_char": 20903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He applied io the Government of Punjab that under the Punjab Jail Manual he is entitled to be released since he had completed more than 20 years of imprisonment."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was sent to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, which rejected it."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21145, "end_char": 21177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a V<rit petition filed by him the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the State of Punjab was the appropriate authority to release him and directed the State of Punjab to consider the matter; This Court in appeal observed \"a perusal of this provision clearly reveals that the test to de, termine the appropriate Government is to locate the State where the accused was convicted ahd sentenced and the Government of that State would be the appropriate Government within the meaning of sec."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21192, "end_char": 21207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a V<rit petition filed by him the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the State of Punjab was the appropriate authority to release him and directed the State of Punjab to consider the matter; This Court in appeal observed \"a perusal of this provision clearly reveals that the test to de, termine the appropriate Government is to locate the State where the accused was convicted ahd sentenced and the Government of that State would be the appropriate Government within the meaning of sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21601, "end_char": 21609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21617, "end_char": 21643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21884, "end_char": 21892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21903, "end_char": 21929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21971, "end_char": 21981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21995, "end_char": 22018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 402(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22147, "end_char": 22161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22184, "end_char": 22195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23054, "end_char": 23065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23214, "end_char": 23222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24230, "end_char": 24241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_607_627_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "_.,.\n\n60'1\n\nMAHA!UR ll, JlASAb VilRMA\n\nDR. SURINDER KAUR\n\nApril 7, I 982\n\n[R.S. PATHAI: AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.)\n\nLandlord and tenant-East Pun/ab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949-Section 13(2} (ii) (a)-Scop• of-Sub-tenant-inducttd In a portion oftheprtmJses with the permission of landlord-Whether such subletting became unlawful on dlt1rminatlon of tenancy-Tenant, if liable to be evicted.\n\nEvid111a-Tape rorded nidence oly corroborative in nature . •\n\nSection 13(2) (ii);(a) of the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act 1949 provides that.if a tenant has, aft•r the coauncnccmcnt of the Act, without .the written consent of the landlord sub-Jot tho entiro build inc or any portion the roof\n\ntlio tenant shall be liable to be evicted on the ground of such sub-letting.\n\nThe Act ·- ma4e applicable to tbe Union Territory of Chandiprb from\n\nNovember 1972.\n\n/The respondent landlady fild a petition beforo the Rent Controller alleging that the 'tenaJ:J.t bad sublet.a portion of the premises under his occution in breach of section 13(2) (ii) (a) of the Act and. that therofore he was liable to be evicted. The Rent Controller ordered bis eviction. The tenant's appeal to tho Appellate Authority and later revision petition to the High Court were dismissed.\n\nIn the tenant's special leave petilion, this Court directed the Rent Controller to record a finding whether the tenant had sub-Jet any porlion .of the .prc- 111ises after April 1974. The Rent Controller found that a portion of the premises was sub-let by the tenant in May 1974.\n\nOn I.he question (1) whether the exi<tence of the sub-tenant in the premises after the expiry of the contractual tenancy necessarily rendered the sub-Jetting illegal and furnished a ground for <0viction within the meaning of section 13(2) (ii)\n\n(a) ol the Act (2) whethenhe sub, letting by the tenant with the written consent of the land-lady during the currency of the tenancy became unlawful and illegal on.the determination of the 'tonancy and furnished a ground for evictionwithin the meanins of the section.\n\n608 (I 98iJ 3 s.c.ft..\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD: 1. There is no evidence on record to justify the finding of the Rent Controller that the tenant had sub-let a portion of the premises in May\n\n1974. [623 E]\n\n2. The tenant has not sub-let any portiQn of premises without the con .. sent of the land-lady after the commencement of the Act and therefore the landlady had no ground for Cviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting within the meaning of the section. In the instant case the written consent to sub-let a portion of the premises as required by the statute had been given by the landlady to the tenant and, it was in terms of that authority that the tenant had inducted a sub-tenant' in April 1974 when the contractual tenancy was subsisting.\n\nTherefore the sub-letting did not afford any ground for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. [626 F-H]\n\n3. The crux of the matter is that if after the commencement of the Act, the tenant bas lawfully .sub-let a portion of the premises with the .written.consent of the landlord, the sub-tenant becomes a lawful su~-tenant and becomes a \"tenant\" within the meaning of the Act with the tenant as his landlord and continues to enjoy all the protection available to a tenant under the Act. The tenant who inducts such sub-tenant is not entitled to evict him as landlord of the subtenant except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. [624 B-G]\n\n4. The argument of the land-lady that on the expiry of the month of April her 'consent bad stood withdrawn is of no consequence because in the ins .. tant case the tenant has sub-let a portion of the premises in April 1974 when ad~ mittedly .the wrihen consent of the land-lady was in existence. The continuance,, in. possession of such sub-tenant in a portion lawfully iet out to him on the expiry of the month of April did not amount to or have the effect of any fresh sub-letting by the tenant at the end of April. A lawful sub-letting on the basis of the provisions of the Act does not become unlawful merely because the contractual tenancy of the tenant comes to an end. [625 F-H]\n\n5 (a). Tape-recorded conversation between the husband of the-landlady and the tenant on which the Rent Controller had relied could only be corroborative evidence of conversation deposed to by any of the parties. In the absence of any such evidence the tape-recorded conversation cannot be proper evidence and cannot be relied upon. [623 E-F]\n\n(b) That apart, the tape-recorded evidence indicated that on the expiry\n\nof the term of the tenancy, the land-lady had not merely accepted tile ent but had manifested her intention of continuing the tenancy notwithstanding the expiry, of the term. The evh:lence also showed that the husband of the land-lady asked the tenant to induct suitable persons as sub-tenants under him. [623 G-H]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1830 of 1978.\n\n.-~~· •\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD v. SURINDER KAUR (A.N. Sen, 1.) 609\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 19th September, A 1978 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 1398 of 1978.\n\nV.M. Tarkunde an<I H.K. Puri for the appellant.\n\nT:U. Mehta, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Garg and S.K. Bislf'lia for the respondent.\n\nT.he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, J. Whether on a proper construction of the terms of tenancy and th.e provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the appellant is liable to be evicted from the premises in his occupation as tenant, on the ground of wrongful sub-letting of the premises, is the question which falls for consideration , in this appeal by special leave granted by this Court. .\n\nThe appellant came into occupation of the shop-cum-flat No. 48, Sector 3-C, Chandigarh on and from 1st of April, 1974 as a tenant under the respondent who happens to be the owner of the said premises on terms anq conditions contained in the rent-note dated 2 4.1974. For the sake of convenience we shall describe the appellant as the' tenant and the respondent as the landlady of the premises.\n\n, The landlady filed her present petition (R.A. No. 163 of 1977) in the Court of Rent Controller Chandigarh, under S. 13 ol the Easi Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Aet) for the eviction of-the tenant on two grounds, namely, non-payment of rent and sub-letting of the flat portion and Barsati portion of the premises.\n\nOn the said petition of the landlady the Rent Controller, Chandigarh passe.d an order of eviction of the tenant on 17.IL1977. only on the ground of sub-letting. The other ground, namely noh,-payment of rent by the tenant, did not succeed.\n\nAgainst the order of the Rent Controller, the tenant filed an appeal under S. 15 of the Act before the Appellate Authority, The Appellate Authority by its judgment dated 9.8.1978 dismissed the appeal of the tenant and upheld the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.\n\n.610 stJi>ilEMil cotJkt llU!l>okts tl<>Al 1 s.t.l.\n\nAgainst the judgment and order of the appellate authority, the tenant filed a revision petition under S. rs of the Act before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Courv by its judgment dated 19.9. 78 dismissed the said petition.\n\nAggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court, the tenant has filed this appeal with special leave granted by this Court, challenging the correctness of the decision ordering the eviction of the tenant from the said premises on the. ground -0f\n\n.,_. sub-letting.\n\nBefore we proceed to consider the arguments advanced from the Bar, it will be convenient to set out the terms of tenancy contained in the rent note da; ed 2.4.1974 and also the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nThe relevant terms contained in the rent note read as follows:-\n\n\"I That the period of tenancy shall be one month commencing from the 1.4.1974 to 30.4.1974.\n\nThat rent hereby fixed shall be Rs.· 450/- pm.\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\nThat the possession of the said premises bas already been received by the tenant from •the owner.\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\nThat the tenant has a right' to sub-let the flat portion G and Barsati portion of this said SCP above mentioned, ,\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\n14. At the expiry of the tenancy the tenant shall redeliver the vacant possession of the said premises to the\n\nMAtiA11.i\n\n0 PRASAb v. SURINDER KAUR (A.tv. Sen, J;) 611\n\nowner in the original condition failing which he shall be liable to pay the mesne profits.\"\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act are contained in S. 13 of the Act, the material provisions of which may be noted :\n\n\"13. (1) A tenant in possession of bnilding or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an order mad~\n\nunder section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction\n\nAct, 1'947, as subsequently amended.\n\n(2) A•landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied-\n\n(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rooted land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable;\n\nProvided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for jectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears o( rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent\n\nwithfo the time aforeaid. ·\n\n(ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of tllis\n\nAct without the written consent of the landlord-\n\n(a) transferred bis right under the lease or sub-let the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS / 1982] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nentire building or rented land or any portion thereof; or\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\nIn the instant case, there is no dispute that the tenant had sub-Jet the Flat portion and Barsati portion of said premises to sub-tenants.\n\nThere is, however, a dispute as to when the sub-tenants were inducted by the tenant. As no clear finding had been recorded in the judgment of the Rent Controller or of the Appellate Authority or the High Court as to when the subtenants were inducted, and as there is no finding as to whether the tenant had sub-let any portion after the month of April, 1974, this Oourt passed an order on the 24th of November, 198 I remitting the following issue to the Rent Controller, Chandigarh for a\n\nfinding:~\n\n\"Whether any one or more of the sub-tenancies alleged by the Landlady-respondent were created_by the tenant appellant during the month of April, 1974 or it was only thereafter that the sub-letting took place?\"\n\nThis. Court while passing the said order, further directed that the Rent ControHer would permit the parties to lead evidence on the point and would render his findings after taking into consideration the evidence 11lready on record and any additional evidence that might be led.\n\nPursuant to the said order passed by this Court, the Rent Controller after taking further evidence had recorded his finding on this issue. The finding of the Rent Controller is that there was sub-Jetting of a small bed-room in the flat portion and also of the Barsati portion by the tenant also in the month of May. This finding of the Rent Controller has been disputed before us by the\n\ntet. . .\n\nMr. Tarkunde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, has submitted that in view of the express authority given to the tenant as contained in cl. 8 of the rent note to sub-let the flat portion and the Barsati portion which portions had, in fact, been\n\n- •\n\n......\n\n• MAHAJUR PRASAQ v. SURINDER KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 613\n\nsub-Jet by the tenant, there can be no question of wrongful and illegal sub.Jetting by the tenant of the said portions, as the sub-Jetting is with the written consent of the land-lady; and the provisions contained in S. 13 (2) (ii) (a) can have no application and there can be no ground or cause of action for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting within the meaning of the said prov1s1on.\n\nMr. Tarkunde has argued that the Act was made applicable_ to Chandigarh from\n\n4. l l.1972 and the tenancy was created in April, 1974 long after the Act bad come into operation in Chandigarh and had become applicable to the premjses in question.\n\nIt is Mr. Tarkuride's argument that in view of the prohibition on sub-lettig without the consent of the landlord in tvriting contained in the Act, the landlady in the instant case has in writing expressly authorised the tenant to sub-let the flat portion and the Barsati portion of the said premises, so that the tenant does not come within the mischief of the said provision. Mr.\n\nTarkunde contends that it is not in dispute that the tenant had sub-Jet the flat portion and the Barsati portion of the premises in termlr of the authority given to. the tenan( in writing an<l as the sub-letting has been done by. the tenant with the written consent of the landlady after the commencement of the Act and of the portions the tenant ws authorised to sub-let, there can be no violation of the provisions of S. 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act. It is the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that as the subletting was done by the tenant in terms. of the _written authority given by the la.nlady to te tenant.' te sublettmg can consttttite no ground for ev1ct1on of the tenant w1thm the meaning of the said section of the Act and there can be no order of eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting by the tenant.\n\nMr. Tarkunde has submitted that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the sub-tenants had continued in occupation after the month of April, 1974, and as the terms of contrac'.\n\ntual tenancy ended on the expiry of the month of April, 1974, the continuance of sub-tenants inducted with the written consent of the landlady after th~ month of. April, became unauthorised and illegal and resulted in subletting without the written consent of the landlady and as such the provision contained in S. 13 (2) (ii) (a) became applicable and the tenant became liable to eviction on the ground of wrongful sµbletting within the meaning of the said provision.\n\nMr: Tarkunde, in this connection, has commented that the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is that if the\n\nsub-tnants, though lawfully inducted, continue to b~ in possssioq\n\nSUPRBAIE COURT RBPORTS. ( 1982] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nafter the expiry of the lease of the tenants, such sub-letting becomes unlawful and furnishes a ground for eviction of the tenant. In this connection, Mr. Tarkunde has referred to the following observations of the learned Judge in this case :\n\n\"In Kartar Singh & Others v. Tarlok Singh & Others('} Pandit, J. held that the permission given by the landlord to the tenant to have sub-tenants during the currency of the lease is of no avail after the termination of the tenancy and if the sub-tenants continue on the property even after the expiry of the lease, the tenant was guilty of sub-letting without the written permission of the landlord\".\n\nMr. Tarkunde has submitted that this view of the High Court on the basis of which the order for eviction has been upheld is clearly erroneous. Drawing onr attention to the relevant provisions contained in S. 13 (2) (ii} (a) of the Act, Mr. Tarkunde has submitted that the statute only forbids sub-lettiog without the written consent of the landlord after the commencement of the Act and by necessary implication the statute ilermits sub-letting by the tenant with the written consent of the landlord.\n\nMr. Tarkunde contends that if the sub-tenants are inducted by the tenant with the written consent of the landlord, the sub-letting is authorised and legal and the continuance of the sub-tenant thereafter cannot. be considered to be unlawful or illegal on the ground that the tenancy of the tenant had come to end, as the sub-tenants continue to enjoy possession in their own right as sub-tenant and the tenant who has inducted the subtenants cannot and does not enjoy any power or authority of evicting the sub-tenant except in due process of law. In this connection Mr. Tarkunde has drawn our attention to the definition of 'landlord' and also of 'tenant' as given in S. 2 (c) and (i) of the Act.\n\n• The definition of the landlord as given in S. 2 (c) is as G follows:\n\n\" 'landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the H benefit, of any other person, or administrator for any other\n\n(1) !1973) Punj. L.R,. 824 (P.<;:, l\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD v. SURINDBR KAUR (A..N. Sen, J.) 615\n\nperson, and includes a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land .in the manner .hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord\" .\n\nThe definition of tenant as mentioned in S. 2 (i) reads :\n\n\" 'tenant' means any person by whom. or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a . person placed in occupation of a buildioi; or rented land by its tenant, unless .with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, car-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed. out or leased by a municipal town or notified area committee\".\n\nMr. Tarkunde argues that the definition of landlord clearly indicated that a 'landlord' wihio the meaning of the Act includes a tenant who sub-lets with lawful authority and the definition of 'tenant' within th.e meaning of the Act also ioludes a sub-tenant who has been lawfully inducted. Referring to these definitions Mr. Tarkuode has submitted that as soon as the tenant has lawfully sub-let the portions. to the sub-tenants the tenant in the instant case becomes a 'landlord' 'within the meaning of the Act and the sub-tenant lawfully inducted becomes a tenant under him within the meaning of this Act and the provisions of the Act are applicable to them. Mr.\n\nTarkunde argues that by virtue of the aforesaid definitions, a tenant continues to be in possession after the termination of the tenancy in bis favour, remains a tenant within the meaning of the • Act and con.tinues to enjoy all the benefits of the Act.\n\nIt is the argument of Mr. Tarkund.e that the sub-tenants lawfully inducted must, therefore, be considered to be in lawful possession under the tenant as the landlord and the sub-tenant must also be lleld to be entitled to remain in possession after the expiry of the term and the termination of the tenancy, whether of the tenant or of the subtenant, by virtue of the provisions of the Act.\n\n. Mr. Tarkunde has next contended that though in the instant case the tenancy was granted for the month of April, the tenant on the expiry of the id period i1 entitled to Q011ti11~ to rmtin in\n\nII'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.ll.\n\npossession and enjoyment of the premises by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act. It is the contention of Mr. Tarkunde, that even on.the expiry of the contractual period of tenancy, the tenancy continues under the provisions of the Act and the tenancy continues on the same terms and conditions. In support of this contention Mr. Tarkunde has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of V. Dhanapa/ Chettiar .v. Yesodai Amma/(1) and has placed particular reliance on the fllowing observations at p. 351-352: '\n\n\"This is exactly the reason why we have thought it fit to review all the decisions and lay down a uniform Ia w for all the States. Section I 0 (I) of the Andhra Pradesh Act provided that \"A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or ections I 2 and 13. \"A special provision in the Andhra Act was contained in section JO (7) which says :\n\n'Where an ..application under sub-section (2) or subsection (3) for evicting a tenant has been rejected by the Controller, the tenancy shall, subject to the provi sions of this Act' be deemed to continue OD the same terms and conditions as before and shall not be terminable by the landlord except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) or sub-section\n\n(3) .\"\n\n, This special provision is.provided by way of abundant precaution only.\n\nEven without this a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the contractual tenancy and until an eviction order is passed against him continues OD the same terms and conditions as before and he cannot be evicted unless a ground is made out for the evic!ion according to be the State Rent Act.\"\n\nRelying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Tarkunde has argued , that even on the expiry of the contractual tenancy in the month of April, the tenant continues to be a tenant under the statute on the same terrns and conditions as a statutory tenant\n\n(l) ~1980) I SCR 334.\n\n- •\n\n'•'\n\n...\n\n' -\n\n' .\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD v. SURIND)lR KAUR (A, N. Sfn, J.) 617 ·\n\nand be continues to enjoy the authority of subletting of the fiat portion and the barsati portion of the said premises in terms of the agreement originally entered into by and between the tenant and the landlady.\n\nIt is the argument of Mr. Tarkunde that contractual tenancy in the instant case is determined by efilux of, time but, the tenant is protected against bis eviction by statute and as a statutory tenant, the tenant continues to enjoy the same right of sub-letting which he had as contractual tenant and the said right of the tenant is not lost on the determin!ltion of the contractual tenancy. In this connection, Mr. Tarkunde has referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Damadilal and others v. Parashram and Others,(') and he has relied on the following observations at pp. 653-654 :-\n\n\"We find it difficult to appreciate how in this country\n\nYie can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose contractual . tenancy bas determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute, has no right of property but only a personal right to remain in occupation, without ascertaining what his rights are under the statute. The concept of a statutory . tenant having no estate or property in the premises which he occupies is derived from the provisions of• the English. Rent Acts. But it is not clear how it can be assumed that the position is the same in this country without any reference to the provisions of the r, elevant statute. Tenancy has its origin in contract. There is no dispute th.at a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy, and heritability is an incident of the tenancy. It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination of the tenancy bis status of irremovability and not the estate be bad in the premises in his occupation. It is not possible to claim that the 'sanctity' of contract cannot pe touched by legislation. It is, therefore, . necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to find out whether the r6spondents' predecessors-in-interest retained a heritable interest in the disputed premises even after the termination of their tenancy.\n\n(I) (1976J Suppt ~·~·~· 64~,\n\nI - F\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nSection \"2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control. Act, 1961 defines 'tenant' to !llean, unless the context otherwise requires :\n\n'a pcyson by whom or .on .':'hose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation' 1s, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include\n\nany person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made·. ·\n\nThe definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless after a decree or order for eviction bas been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists.\n\nThe incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must therefore be the' same unless any provision of the ct conveyed a contrary intention. i:hat under the Act such a tenant retains an interest in the premises, and not merely a personal right of occupation, will also appear from section 14 which contains provisions restricting the tenant's powe; of sub-letting. Section 14 is in these terms :\n\n' 'Sec. 14. Restrictions on sub-letting:-(!) No tenant shall, wit.bout the previous consent in wrfting cir the landlord-\n\n(a) sub-let the wholC or 8JlY part of the accCi>mmodation\n\nheld by him as a tenant; or\n\n(b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in any part thereof.\n\n(2) No landlord shall claim or receive the payment of any sum as premium or pugrce or claim or. receive any consideraion wbatsoeyer in cash or in kind for giving his consent to the sub-letiing of the whole or any part of the accommodation held by the tem1nt,'\n\nMAHAhlk PRASAD v. !iuRINDll KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) M~\n\nThere is nothing to suggest that this .section does not. apply to all teants as defined in section 2(i). A contractual tenant has an estate or interest in premises from which be carves out what be gives to the sub-tanant. Section 14 ·read with section 2 (i) makes it clear that .the so-called statutory tenant has the right to sub-let in common with a contractual tenant and this is because he also has an interest in the premises occupied by him.\"\n\ni\\ Mr. Tarkunde has further submitteo that in the instant case the question of any sub-letting• by the tenant on the expiry of the term of tenancy does not really arise, as the tenant had sub-let the fiat portion and also the barsati portion in the month or April in terms of the written consent of the landlady, while the contractual tenancy was subsisting and in force. It is his submisssion that the finding of the Rent Controller that the tenant bad sub-let one • bed room in the fiat portion and also the barsati portion in -the month of May, in aswering the issue remitted to him by this Court, is clearly erroneous and not borne out by the evidence on record.\n\nMr. Tarkunde has argued that the Rent Controller in arriving at this finding has mainly relied on the tape.recorded conversation between the tenant arid landlady's husband who also happens to hold the power of attorney of the landlady. He bas argued . - . that rendering of the tape-recorded conversation can be legal evidence bY way Of corroborating the statement of a person who deposes that the other speaker and he carried on that conversation or even of the statement of a person who deposs that he over-heard the conversation between the two persons and what they actuaJly stated, had been tape-recorded. It is his argument that tape-recorded conversation may be useq only as a corrobora.tive evidence of such conversation deposed to by any of the ·\n\nparties to the conversation and in the instant case in the absence of any such evidence the tape-recorded conversation is indeed no evidence and cannot be relied upon.\n\nMr. Tarkunde, in support of this argument has relied on the decision of this Court in the.case of S. Pratap\n\nSingh v. The Srate of Punjab.(') Mr. Tarkunde bas further argued that even if relianee is to be placed on the tape-recorded. conversation, it must then be held on the basis of the evidence recorded therein that the contractual tenancy had continued beyond tb'e period of the\n\n(I) [1964) 4 SCR 733.\n\nSUPREME coullt f!.EPOUS fl982l 3 s.c.~\n\nmonth of April. According to Mr. Tarkunde, in the present case the landlady had not merely accepted the rent which the landlady had . in fact done; on the expiry of the contractual period of tenancy, but the tape-recorded conversation clearly indicates that the tenancy was treated as continuing between the parties, notwithstanding the expiry of the pericd and the tenant was recognised as tenant with lawful authority to sub-let even after •the expiry of the month of April, 1974.\n\nMr. Tarkunde on the basis of the aforesaid contention has submitted. that the order of eviction against the tenant on the ground of subletting in the instant case is erroneous and should be set aside.\n\nMr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlady, has submitted that the tenancy, in the instant case was created\n\nonly for the month of April, 1974.\n\nHe submits that on the expiry of April, 1974, the tenancy by efflux of time stands determined and the agreement between the pariies comes to an end.\n\nHe has argued tjiat though under the terms Of tenancy, the tenant had been given the necessary permission and authority to sub-let, such consent or authority would remain valid only for the month of April and there could lawfully be any sub-tenants only for the 'month of April.\n\nHe contends t!Jat on the expiry of the month of April when the co.ntractual tenancy comes to an end, the possession of any sub-tenant of any portion of the said premises would be ,.uniiuthorised and illegal. It is his contention that it is not open to the tenant to creat by way of sub-tenancy or otherwise any interest in any other person larger than the interest which the tenant himself enjoys.\n\nAccording to Mr. Mwta, the tenant on the terms and conditions of the tenancy enjoyed the right of a tenant only for the month of April and the tenant could only, the1efore, induct any subtenant on the basis of the terms and conditions of the tenancy only for the month of April; and the enjoyment or possession of any portion of the said premises by any suhtenant after the month of April would necessanly be a case of wrongful and illegal subletting without any written consent as the consent must necessarily be con; sidered to have stood revoked on the expiry of the month of April.\n\nMr. Mehta has drawn our attention to clauses 1 and 14 of the rent note and has argued that the said clauses clearly indicate that the contract of tenancy was valid only for the month of April and the\n\n•, --\n\nMAllAlllR PRASAb v. st!RINbEll KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 611\n\n\\, dthority of subletting was also only valid for the said month and on expiry of the said month the tenant Wll, S to make over vacant possession to the owner of the premises in the original, condition, It is his argument that the contract of tenancy clearly contemplates that' !here will be no sub-tenants in the premises on the expiry of the monfh of April. Mr. Mehta submits that existence of any subtenants in the premises after the month of, April, whether subtenants were inducted in the month of April or thereafter, brings the case within the mischief of S.13 (2) (ii) (a) and renders the tenant liable to eviction on the ground of illegal sub-letting; It is his , submission that if there be any sub-tenants in occupation or possession of any, portion of the said premises after the co11tractual tenancy had come to an end the subletting must be held to be without the written consent of the landlord and as such wr:>ngful and illegal to enable the landlord to evict the tenant on the ground of such subletting.\n\nMr. Mehta has submitted that this view which has been consistently held by the High Court of P¥njab and Haryana, bas also been followed by the Hi_gh Court in the instant case. In support of this submission Mr. Mehta has referred to the decision in the case of' Kartar Singh and Others v. Tarlok Singh and Others(') which has_ •been referred by the/learned Judge in the judgment under appeal.\n\nMr. Mehta has also relied on the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Shri Kidar Nath v. Smt. Kartar Kumar,(') and also in the case of Gurdas Ram v. Hans. Raj.(') According fo Mr. Mehta, this view has held the field in Punjab and Haryana all thee years and this is the settied law in the State.\n\nMr. Mehta further submits that as sub-tenants have continued to remain in possession after the month of April, the subletting must be held to be without any written consent and illegal to furnish a valid ground for the eviction of the tenant and all the cour.ts including the High Court have properly ordered the eviction of the tenant.\n\nMr. Mehta has next contended that in the instant case subletting of a bed room in the fiat portion and also of the barsati portion had been done by the tenant in the month of May, 1974 as found by the Rent Controller after the remand of the issue by this Court to the Rent Controller. Mr. Mehta submits that the Rent\n\n(I) [1973) P.L.R. 424.\n\n(2) [1969] 71 P.L.R. 186.\n\n(3) [1974) Rent Control Journal, Short Notes of cases p, 1.'\n\n~U!>ltl!Mll cotJkt REl>oktS tl98~J 3 s.c.k\n\nController had correctly come to the conclusion on the evidence on record after allowing the parties opporfunity of adducing further evidence.' Mr. Mehta has argued that as the tenant had sub-let in the month of May after the expiry of the period of tenancy, the subletting must be held to be illegal . and wrongful as the consent in writing by the landlady contained in the renl note was only for the month of April. '\n\nMr. Mehta argues that on the expiry of the month of April when the contractual tenan_cy .comes \\o an end and the tenant continues to remain in possession by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the tenant does not enjoy any power or authority to sub'let, even if such authority had been granted to the tenant to sublet during the period of contractual tenancy. It is the argument of Mr. Mehta that on the expiry of the contractual tenancy, the terms and condi tions on the basis of which the tenancy had been created, come to an end and the statutory tenant who may enjoy protection against eviction by virtue of the statute does not have any authority to induct ay sub-tenant. In support of this contention Mr. Mehta has , referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji Ka/yanji f:edhi & Ors.(') and he has relied on the following observations at pp. 917 : ..\n\n\"A statutory tenant is, as we have already observed, a person who on determination of his contractual right, is permitted to remain in occupation so long as he observes and performs the conditions of the tenancy and pays the standard rent and permitted increases. His personal right of occupation is incapable of being transferred or assigned and he having no interest in the property there is no estate on which subletting may operate.\"\n\nMr. Mehta has commented that this decision of this Court was not . considered by this Court in the case of Damadi Lill and Ors. v.\n\nParasram-and Ors.(supra). . . M~. Mehta bas_ further argued tbat it is well settled that mere acceptance of rent on the determination of the contractual tenancy by effiux of time or otherwise does not in the absence of some\\hing more have the effect of creating a fresh tenancy or continuing the\n\n(I) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 892 ..\n\n .. I\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD v. SURINDER KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 623\n\n' contractual 'tenancy afready dete.rmined; and it is his argument that\n\nii cannot be said tbat a fresh tenancy was created or the tenancy was allowed to .continue on the expiry of the month of April merely . because the lan.dlady had accepted the rent from the tenant on . the expiry of the period_ of the tenancy after the month of April. ,.\n\nMr. Mehta, therefore, submits that in the imtant case the order for eviction has been rightly passed and this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nBefore we proceed to consider the main q'uestion involved in this appeal, namely, whether tlie existence of sub, tenants in tbe premi-\" ses after the expiry of the term of contractual tenancy, necessarily ren~\n\nders the subletting illegal and furnishes a ground for eviction within the meaning of S. 13(2) (ii) (a) of the Act, we propose to dispose of the other questi11n as to whether there was any subletting by tbe tenant in the month of May. On a careful consideration of the report of the Rent Controller on the issue remitted to him by this Court, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Rent Con- .troller that the tenant had sub-let one 'bed room in the flat portion : and the .barsati portion in the month of May, 1974 js. not justified, as there.was no proper evidenceor material before the Rent Controller to come to the said !hiding. This findingof the Rent controller is bas\"d essentially on the tape-recorded conversation between the tenant the husband of the landlapy. Tape recorded conversation can only be relied upon as corroborative evidence of conversation deposed by any of the parties to the conversation and in the absence of evidence of any such conversation, the tape recorded conversation is indeed no proper evidence and cannot be relied upon. In the instant case, there was no evidece of any\" such conversation between the tenant and the husband of the landlady; and in the absence of any such conversation, the tape-recorded conversation could be no proper evidence.\n\nWe may further add that the tape-recorded conversation, even if the same could be relied upon, would b~ of no particular heip to the landlady, as the tape-recorded conversation clearly indicates that the landlady on the expiry of the term of tenancy had not merely accepted the rent but had manifested\n\nthe intention of continuing the tenancy, notwithstading the expiry of the terms; and the tape recorded conversation goes to show that the husband of the landlaoy as asking the tenant to induct suitable persons as sub-tenants under him.\n\nB .1\n\n624 SUPREME COlTRT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nAs there is no proper evidence to show that any sub-tenant was inducted after tbe expiry of the contractual period of tenancy, it does not become becessary for us to consider whether the tenant who; on the detemination of the contractual tenancy, continues to remain in possession by virtue of the provisions of the statute as statutory tenant, is entitled to sub-Jet and he continues to remain in possession on the same terms and conditions on which he became a tenant.\n\nThe CruJ( of the question, therefore, is whether the subletting by the tenant with the written consent of landlord during the\n\ncurrency of the tenancy becomes unlawful andillegal on the deter- .-~ mination of the tenancy and furnishes a ground for eviction within the meaning of S. 13(2) (ii) (a) of the Act. ·\n\nS. 13(2) (ii) (a) which we have earlier set out lays down that if a tenant after the commencement of the Act has without written consent of the landlord transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any portion thereof, the tenant shall be liable to be evicted on the ground of such subletting.\n\nThe requirement of the section, therefore, is that after the commencement of the Act there has to be subletting by the tenant without the written consent of the landlord to enable the landlord to recover possession . of the premises on the ground of subletting. It, therefore, necessarily follows that if after the commencement of the Act, the tenant has sublet with the written consent of the landlord, such subletting will not furnish any ground or cause of action for the eviction of the tenant by the landlord.\n\nIt is to be noted that after the tenant has lawfully sublet with the written consent of the landlord, the sub-ten• ant becomes a lawful sub-tenant; and as su.ch' he becomes a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act under the tenant as his landlord and contil)ues to enjoy all the protection available to a 'tenant' under the Act and the tenant who inducts such sub-tenant is not entitled to evict him as landlord of the sub-tenant except in accordance with provisions of . the Act. As the tenant enjoys protection against eviction in terms of the provisions of the Act and is not liable to be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act notwithstanding determination of his tenancy by the landlord, the sub-tenant lawfully inducted equai!y enjoys the same protection a8ainst eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act; and the sub-tenant\n\nl_\n\nMAHABIR PRASRi> v. SURINDER ltAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 625\n\ncan only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act in th'e same way as a tenant can be evicted. In spite of the sub tenancy being determined by the tenant as his landlord, the subtenant by virtue of the protection against eviction afforded to him by the Act is entitled to continue in possession of the portion let out to him by the tenant as his landlord; and it is just not possible for the tenant as landlord to get rid of any sub-tenant at his will.\n\nIn the instant case, the tenant had the authority to sublet and the written consent, as required by the statute, had been given by the landlady. In terms of the authority granted to the tenant and with the consent in writing of the landlady, the tenant had inducted sub-tenants in the month of April, when the contractual tenancy admittedly subsisting. The subletting by the tenant in the instant case could, therefore, afford no tground to the landlady or furnish any cause of action for her to evict the tenant on the ground of subletting on the basis of the provisions contained in S. 13 (2) (ii)\n\n(a) of the Act. The sub-tenants lawfully inducted came to be in lawful possession of the portions let out to them by the tenant with the authority and consent in writing of the landlady and such sub letting afforded a complete safeguard to the tenant against eviction and would not con:ie within the mischief of sec. 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act.\n\nWe have already held that the creation of any sub-tenancy in the month of May is not borne out by any proper evidence on\n\nrecoi\\I. The case of the landlady that there was any sub-letting on the expiry of the month of April without the written consent or the landlady has not been established. In the instant case, the tenant has sublet with the written consent of the landlady in the month of April and has not sublet any portion on the expiry of the month of April. The argument of the learned counsel for the land lady that on the expiry of the month of April, the consent of the landlady in writing stands withdrawn is of no consequences. In the instant case, the tenant has sublet in the month of April, 1974, when admittedly the written consent of the landlady was'there. The continuance in possession of such subtenants in the portions lawfully let out to them on the expiry of the month of April does not amount to or have th.e effect of any fresh sub letting by the tenant on the expiry of the month of April; and, it cannot be said that the tenant \"has sublet\" afresh on the expiry of the month of April. The right 'of possession that the sub-tenao\\$ Qajoy on the basi$ of lawful iqduc\n\n.626 SUPREME cou1n R!lPOllTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\ntion as s.ub-tenants is assured to the sub-tenants 11s a \"tenant\" within .the meaning of the Act.\n\nAs a tenant in spite of the determination of his tenancy con.tinues the right to remain in possession as a statutory tenant and enjoys the protection against eviction by . ' . virtue of the provisions contained in the statute, a sub-tenant who is lawfully inducted, is also recognised by the st!l(ute to be a \"tenant' within the meaning of the Act and he must necessarily enjoy the protection ligainst e.viction afforded to a tenant bY. the Act. A lawful sub-letting on the basis of the provisions of the Act does not become unlawful merely because the contractual tenancy of the tenant comes to an end.\n\nA. tenant incurs the liability to be evicted,\n\n- if the tenant after the commencement of the Act sub-lets without the written consent of the landlord; and the tenant who baslafully sublet with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground. Subletting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy bas come to an end. Sub-letting to constitute a valid ground for eviction must be without the consent in writing of the landlord at the time when. the tenant rnb-let_s any portion to the subtenant.\n\nE .\n\nA sub-letting by the tenant with the consent in writing of the landlord does not become unlawful on the expiry of the contractual tenancy of the tenant, unless there is any fresh sub-letting by the ten3nt without the written consen~ of the landlord. Mere continuance in possession of a sub-tenant lawfully inducted does not amount to any fresh or further sub:letting. We are, therefore, satisfied that F in the instant case the terlant has not sub-let any portion without the written corlsent of the landlady after the commencement of the Act.\n\nAs the tenant has not sub-let any portion after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the landlady, th.e landlady does not have any proper ground for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting within the meaning of S. 13 (2) (ii) (a).\n\nG Mere continuance of possession bY, the sub-tenants lawfully inducted by the tenant with the written consent of the landlady contained in rent note does not afford any ground to the landlady for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting, as the tenant bas not sub-let after che commencement of the Act any portion without the consent\n\n·, II in writing of the landlady.\n\n' ..\n\n\"\"\"' '\n\nMAHABIR PRASAI> V. SURINDBR KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 627\n\nThe appeal, therefore, succeeds. The Judgment or the High Court affirming the decision of the lower courts and the order of eviction, are hereb¥ set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs.\n\nP.B.R .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n' ' '", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "SURINDER KAUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURINDER KAUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 7, I 982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SURINDER KAUR\n\nApril 7, I 982\n\n[R.S. PATHAI: AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13(2} (ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 488, "end_char": 531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act 1949"}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "623 G-H]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde an<I H.K. Puri for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T:U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5222, "end_char": 5232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T:U. Mehta, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Garg and S.K. Bislf'lia for the respondent."}}, {"text": "N.D. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T:U. Mehta, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Garg and S.K. Bislf'lia for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rajiv Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T:U. Mehta, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Garg and S.K. Bislf'lia for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S.K. Bislf'lia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5260, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T:U. Mehta, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Garg and S.K. Bislf'lia for the respondent."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5810, "end_char": 5820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48, Sector 3-C, Chandigarh on and from 1st of April, 1974 as a tenant under the respondent who happens to be the owner of the said premises on terms anq conditions contained in the rent-note dated 2 4.1974."}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48, Sector 3-C, Chandigarh on and from 1st of April, 1974 as a tenant under the respondent who happens to be the owner of the said premises on terms anq conditions contained in the rent-note dated 2 4.1974."}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6244, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Easi Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17.IL1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6603, "end_char": 6612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the said petition of the landlady the Rent Controller, Chandigarh passe.d an order of eviction of the tenant on 17.IL1977."}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6803, "end_char": 6808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Easi Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Easi Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7189, "end_char": 7235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the judgment and order of the appellate authority, the tenant filed a revision petition under S. rs of the Act before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8998, "end_char": 9008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th of November, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As no clear finding had been recorded in the judgment of the Rent Controller or of the Appellate Authority or the High Court as to when the subtenants were inducted, and as there is no finding as to whether the tenant had sub-let any portion after the month of April, 1974, this Oourt passed an order on the 24th of November, 198 I remitting the following issue to the Rent Controller, Chandigarh for a\n\nfinding:~\n\n\"Whether any one or more of the sub-tenancies alleged by the Landlady-respondent were created_by the tenant appellant during the month of April, 1974 or it was only thereafter that the sub-letting took place?\""}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant, has submitted that in view of the express authority given to the tenant as contained in cl.", "canonical_name": "Tarkuride"}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12357, "end_char": 12362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkuride", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12801, "end_char": 12810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is Mr. Tarkuride's argument that in view of the prohibition on sub-lettig without the consent of the landlord in tvriting contained in the Act, the landlady in the instant case has in writing expressly authorised the tenant to sub-let the flat portion and the Barsati portion of the said premises, so that the tenant does not come within the mischief of the said provision.", "canonical_name": "Tarkuride"}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13593, "end_char": 13598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14489, "end_char": 14494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14722, "end_char": 14751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr: Tarkunde, in this connection, has commented that the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is that if the\n\nsub-tnants, though lawfully inducted, continue to b~ in possssioq\n\nSUPRBAIE COURT RBPORTS. ("}}, {"text": "SUPRBAIE COURT RBPORTS. ( 1982] 3 s.c.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr: Tarkunde, in this connection, has commented that the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is that if the\n\nsub-tnants, though lawfully inducted, continue to b~ in possssioq\n\nSUPRBAIE COURT RBPORTS. ("}}, {"text": "Pandit", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15176, "end_char": 15182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Mr. Tarkunde has referred to the following observations of the learned Judge in this case :\n\n\"In Kartar Singh & Others v. Tarlok Singh & Others('} Pandit, J. held that the permission given by the landlord to the tenant to have sub-tenants during the currency of the lease is of no avail after the termination of the tenancy and if the sub-tenants continue on the property even after the expiry of the lease, the tenant was guilty of sub-letting without the written permission of the landlord\"."}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15729, "end_char": 15734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16695, "end_char": 16699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17103, "end_char": 17109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "824 (P.<;:, l\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD v. SURINDBR KAUR (A..N. Sen, J.) 615\n\nperson, and includes a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land .in the manner .hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord\" ."}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17344, "end_char": 17348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkuode", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18243, "end_char": 18251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to these definitions Mr. Tarkuode has submitted that as soon as the tenant has lawfully sub-let the portions.", "canonical_name": "Tarkuride"}}, {"text": "Tarkund.e", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18865, "end_char": 18874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the argument of Mr. Tarkund.e that the sub-tenants lawfully inducted must, therefore, be considered to be in lawful possession under the tenant as the landlord and the sub-tenant must also be lleld to be entitled to remain in possession after the expiry of the term and the termination of the tenancy, whether of the tenant or of the subtenant, by virtue of the provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Tarkuride"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23522, "end_char": 23568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24960, "end_char": 24970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25044, "end_char": 25054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25079, "end_char": 25086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25764, "end_char": 25776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25895, "end_char": 25905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25917, "end_char": 25926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964) 4 SCR 733", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28106, "end_char": 28122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28855, "end_char": 28860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlady, has submitted that the tenancy, in the instant case was created\n\nonly for the month of April, 1974.", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "Mwta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29862, "end_char": 29866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Mwta, the tenant on the terms and conditions of the tenancy enjoyed the right of a tenant only for the month of April and the tenant could only, the1efore, induct any subtenant on the basis of the terms and conditions of the tenancy only for the month of April; and the enjoyment or possession of any portion of the said premises by any suhtenant after the month of April would necessanly be a case of wrongful and illegal subletting without any written consent as the consent must necessarily be con; sidered to have stood revoked on the expiry of the month of April."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30436, "end_char": 30441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mehta has drawn our attention to clauses 1 and 14 of the rent note and has argued that the said clauses clearly indicate that the contract of tenancy was valid only for the month of April and the\n\n•, --\n\nMAllAlllR PRASAb v. st!RINbEll KAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 611\n\n\\, dthority of subletting was also only valid for the said month and on expiry of the said month the tenant Wll, S to make over vacant possession to the owner of the premises in the original, condition, It is his argument that the contract of tenancy clearly contemplates that' !", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "S.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31259, "end_char": 31263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of P¥njab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31797, "end_char": 31829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mehta has submitted that this view which has been consistently held by the High Court of P¥njab and Haryana, bas also been followed by the High Court in the instant case."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32355, "end_char": 32361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According fo Mr. Mehta, this view has held the field in Punjab and Haryana all thee years and this is the settied law in the State."}}, {"text": "[1964] 4 S.C.R. 892", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35439, "end_char": 35458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36303, "end_char": 36311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38851, "end_char": 38859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38884, "end_char": 38892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40612, "end_char": 40620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the tenant enjoys protection against eviction in terms of the provisions of the Act and is not liable to be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act notwithstanding determination of his tenancy by the landlord, the sub-tenant lawfully inducted equai!y enjoys the same protection a8ainst eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act; and the sub-tenant\n\nl_\n\nMAHABIR PRASRi> v. SURINDER ltAUR (A.N. Sen, J.) 625\n\ncan only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act in th'e same way as a tenant can be evicted."}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41685, "end_char": 41690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42013, "end_char": 42020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45439, "end_char": 45444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_61_65_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "CHAMPALAt P00NJA1I SHAH\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 27, 1982\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SBN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.)\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure 1973, S. 428-Person-Preventively detained for different periods under MISA, COFEPOSA-Later prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment-Period spent under preventive detention- Whether can be 'setoff' agaiiist sentence of imprisonment.\n\nThe Presidency Magistrate convicted the [!petitioner for offences under sec. lion 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with section 135 of and Customs Act and Rule 126P(2) (ii) and (iv) of the Deience of India Rules 1962 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for various periods ranging from two years to four years and t6 payment of fine.\n\nThe conviction and sentence was set aside by the High Court, but this Court in appeal by the State set aside the judgment of acquittal by the High Court and restored that of the Presidency Magistrate. The petitioner was alBo preventively detained for various periods first under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act and afterwards under the Conservation of Foreign Bi:chaoge and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974.\n\nIo the review petition and writ petition to this Court it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that : (1) though ii was argued in the appeal to this Court that the periods during which the petitioner had been preventively detained should be 'set off' against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him this\n\ncout had not touched upon the point; and (2) this court's decision in Goyernment of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1977 SC 1096,\n\nenabled the petitioner io claim the total of the three periods of detention to be 'set off' against the sentence of imprisonment.\n\nDismissing the review and writ petition.\n\nHELD: 1. It was not argued that the petitioner was entitled to a 'set off' but that the period of his detention might be taken into account in considering the question of the appropriate sentence be imposed on him. [62 H, 63 A]\n\n2(i) In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Venkateswara Rao, this Court negatived the contention that the expression period of detention in Section 428, G Code of Criminal P'rocedure 1973 included the detention under the Preventive\n\nDetention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. [63 F-G]\n\n(ii) Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be 'set -off' against the tenp of imprison .. ment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigatio_n, enquiry, or trial in connection with the 'same case' in which he has been convicted. (64 A-Bl\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS [19821 3 s.c.i\n\n(iii) Ooly in circumstances where the petitioner would have unquestionably been in detention in connection with a criminal case if he had not been preven tively detained. his preventive detention might be reckoned as detCntion as an undertriitl prisoner or detention pursuant to conviction, for the puqoses of Section 428, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. [64 G]\n\nIn the instant case the petitioner had been acquitted by the High Court J:>efore any of the orders of detention were m.ade against him. There can, there~ fore, be no question of the detention being considered as detention pursuant to conviction nor can the detention be treated as that of an undertriaJ. [64 F]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 7207 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of tlie Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner. ' . .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nD CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. This petition for review and the petition\n\nfor the issue of Writ under Article 32 were argued by Sbri Jethmafani with; what appeared to us to be more than his customary vehemence and emotion. Nonetheless, we confess, we are not impressed.\n\nBy our judgment dated August 12, 1981 (1), we bad set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Bombay and restored that of the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, convicting the petitioner under different beads of charges and sentencing him to suffer imprison ment for various terms ranging from two years to four years and to the payment of fine of Rs. I 0,000/· on each of different counts.\n\nShri Jethmalani contended that though he ha.d argued that the period during which the petitioner had been preventively detained under the Maintenance 'of Security Act and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act should be 'set off' against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him, we had not touched upon the point. He also drew our attention to a reference tci set off' in the written submissions given to us after the bearing of the case. We may mention that what was argued before us was not that the petitioner was entitled to a 'set off' but that the period of bis detention might be taken into\n\n(1) (1982] l SCR 299.\n\n-+ .•\n\ntl!AMPALAL v. MAfilRAslrtkA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 63\n\naccount in considetlng the question of the appropriate sentence to A be imposed on the petitioner, which question was considered by us.\n\nBut, we will 1et that pass, accept Mr. Jethmalani's word for it and proceed to consider the question straightaway.\n\nIt appears that the petitioner was detained first under the provisions of the MISA and later under the provisions of the COFEPOSA. The periods of detention were Septeµiber\n\n17, 1974 to April 18, 1975, July I, 1975 to November 21, 1975 and Ma.y 20, 1976 to March 22, 1977.\n\nWe are told that the orders of detention, which have not been produced before us, were based on facts which were the vary subject-matter of the criminal case. The learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate had convicted the petitioner by bis judgment dated December 13, 1971 but that was set aside by the High Court by their judgment dated April 20, 1974. The State of Maharashtra filed an application for special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution on November 30,\n\n1974 and special leave was granted by this Court on April 15, 1975.\n\nIt was noticed by this Court at the time of granting special leave that the petitioner was then in preventive detention and it was directed that in case he was released from detention but rearrested in connection with the.case he should be released on bail on the same terms as those on which bail had been previously granted by the High Court. The submission of Shri Jethmalani was that the total of the three periods of detention should be \"set off' against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him.\n\nHe r:lied upon the decision of this Court in Govt. of Antlhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Anne\n\nVenkateswara Rao etc. etc.(1)\n\nWe are . unable to agree with the submission of Sbri Jethmalani. Jn the very case cited by the learned counsel, the Court negatived the contention that the expression 'period of detention' in Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure included the detention under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. It was observed :\n\n\"It .is true that the section speaks of the period of detention undergone by an accused person, but it expressly says that the detention mentioned refers to the detention during the investigation, enquiry or trial of the\n\n(I) AIR 1977 SC to96-[1977] 3 SCR 7.\n\nSUPREM• COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.tt.\n\ncase in which the accused person has been convicted. The section makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on.the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, enquiry or trial in connection with the 'same case' in which he has been convicted.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the High Court that the period during which the Writ Petitioners were in preventive detention cannot be set off under section 428 against the term of imprisonment imposed on them\".\n\nAfter holding that the period during which the petitioners therein were in preventive detention could not 'set off' under Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure against the term of imprisonment imposed on them, the Court went on to consider whether the period during which the petitioners were in preventive detention could for any reason be considered as period during which the petitioners were in detention as undertrial prisoners or prisoners serving out a sentence on conviction.\n\nIn the case of the prisoner A. V. Rao the Court held that the period commencing from the date when be. would have normally been arrested pursuant to the First Information Report registered against him should be reckoned as period of detention as an undertrial prisoner. In the case of another prisoner Krishnaiab it was held that the period during which be was in preventive detention subsequent to the conviction and sentence imposed upon him should be treated as detention pursuant to conviction and sentence. The case before us is altogether different.\n\nThe petitioner bad been acquitted by the High Court before any of the orders of detention were made against him. There can be no question of the detention being considered as detention pursuant to conviction; nor can the detention be .treated as that of an undertrial.\n\nIt is only in the circumstances where the prisoner would have unquestionably been in detention in connection with a criminal case if be bad not been preventively detained, his preventive detention might be reckoned as detention as an undertrial prisoner or detention pursuant to conviction, for the purposes of Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nShri Jethmalani next contended that the petitioner had not been give!' an opportunity to argue on the question of sentence.\n\nThat is hardly fair to us.\n\nA substantial part of the argument of Shri Jethmalani on tilat occasion was on the question of sentence\n\ndEIAMPALAL v. MAHARA~HTRA (Chinnappa keddy, J.) 65\n\nand, in the judgment pronounced by us, we did consider the argu- ment advanced by the learned counsel on the question of sentence.\n\nIt was also contended before us that the Court was not justified in holding that the petitioner was responsible for the long delay that had been caused in the disposal of the case and that the Court was wrong in holding that it was for the accused to show that be had been prejudiced by the delay.\n\nWe see no merit in these contentions.\n\nThe application for review is therefore dismissed. No separate arguments were advanced in the Writ Petition which is also dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 27, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHAMPALAt P00NJA1I SHAH\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 27, 1982\n\n[0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Deience of India Rules 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1116, "end_char": 1159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 1096", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1610, "end_char": 1626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3010, "end_char": 3021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3451, "end_char": 3461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3470, "end_char": 3491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of tlie Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner. ' . .", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of tlie Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner. ' . .", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "D CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nD CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. This petition for review and the petition\n\nfor the issue of Writ under Article 32 were argued by Sbri Jethmafani with; what appeared to us to be more than his customary vehemence and emotion.", "canonical_name": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3698, "end_char": 3708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sbri Jethmafani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nD CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. This petition for review and the petition\n\nfor the issue of Writ under Article 32 were argued by Sbri Jethmafani with; what appeared to us to be more than his customary vehemence and emotion.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Jethmalani contended that though he ha.d argued that the period during which the petitioner had been preventively detained under the Maintenance 'of Security Act and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act should be 'set off' against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him, we had not touched upon the point."}}, {"text": "Security Act and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 13, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5839, "end_char": 5856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate had convicted the petitioner by bis judgment dated December 13, 1971 but that was set aside by the High Court by their judgment dated April 20, 1974."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5942, "end_char": 5962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Maharashtra filed an application for special leave under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 30,\n\n1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution on November 30,\n\n1974 and special leave was granted by this Court on April 15, 1975."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution on November 30,\n\n1974 and special leave was granted by this Court on April 15, 1975."}}, {"text": "Sbri Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "unable to agree with the submission of Sbri Jethmalani.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6978, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7344, "end_char": 7358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure included the detention under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure included the detention under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure included the detention under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure included the detention under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8071, "end_char": 8097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. V. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8451, "end_char": 8460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the prisoner A. V. Rao the Court held that the period commencing from the date when be."}}, {"text": "Krishnaiab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8725, "end_char": 8735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of another prisoner Krishnaiab it was held that the period during which be was in preventive detention subsequent to the conviction and sentence imposed upon him should be treated as detention pursuant to conviction and sentence."}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9561, "end_char": 9572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9573, "end_char": 9599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_628_669_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A 628\n\nK. RAJENDRAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF TAMIL NADO & ORS.\n\nApril 15, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, E.S. VENICATARAMIAH AND\n\nA. VARADARAJAN, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article1 14. 19 (I) (g), 32 and 311 (2) & Tamil ~\n\nNadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act 1981, Ss,2 (•), 3 and 5.\n\nState enactment-Abolition of civil po1ts-Posts of'part-time' village offictr1 abollshtd-lntroduction of whole-time village administrative o.ffictr1-Whethtr valid\n\n. D and legal.\n\nCivil Servic~Civil post-Abolition f Polt-Whether 'govtrnmen.t has a right-Abolition of post and abolttion of cadrt-Di.stinction-Rights of the incum bent of the post.\n\nIn the State of Tamil Nadu the administration was carried on at the village level by 3. chain bf officers in regular gradation one above the Other since the comlnencement Or the Christian era. This system .known as the barabaluti system consisted of twelve functionaries : (i) headman, (2) kamam or acc®ntant, (3) shroff or notazar; ( 4) nirganti, (5) toty or taliary, (6) potter, (7) smith, (8) ieweller ..\n\n(9) carpenter, (!O) barber, (II) washerman and (12) astrologer. The first five rendere.d service to the Government. By the end of the ninCteenth century, two Acts were enacted for the purpose of regulating the work of these village offices.\n\nThe Madras Proprietary States' Village Service Act, 1894 (Madr's Act No.11of1894) dealt.with three classes of vihage officers viz. village accountants, village headman and yiJlage watchman. It provided for their appointment, remuneration and summary punishment of misconduct or neglect of duty. The Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act 1895 (Madras Act No. Ill of 1895) regulated the succession to certain other hereditary village offices and provided for the appointment of persons to bold such offices and the control or the holders thereof. Under both these statutes, the village offices devolved on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to i(l)partible zamidaris. Io cases to which the aforesaid two 'Statutes. were inapplicable provision was made by the Standing Orders promulgated by the Board of Reveoile, which were known as the Board's Standing Orders for appointing village offi:ers on a hereditary basis.\n\nk. RAIENDRAN V. TAMIL NAbU (Venkataralniah, J.) 629\n\nThe distinctive features of the service conditions of the village officers appointed under the a:foresaid two Acts or the Board's Standing Orders were that they were parttime employees of th~ Government, tbey fiCre appointed direct1y by the Revenue Officer, the records maintained by them could be retained in their frouses, no fixed hours of duty were prescribed, they were not constituted into any distinct service, could not be transferred outside their district, and that they were paid honorarium for the services that they dis~ charged. The Fundamental Rules applicable to all other State Government employees, the Pension Rules, and the Leave Rules were not applicable. to these village officers.\n\nThis Court in Gazula Daaaratha Rama Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [1961] 2 SCR 931 having held that section 6 (1) of the Madras Act No. 3 of 1895 was void as it contravened Article 16 (2) of the Constitution, instructions .,.were issued by the Board of Revenue on March 12, 1962 that -in respect of future vacancies in village offices governed by the Madras Act No. 2 of 1894, and the Madras Act No., 3 of 1895, the appointments should be made on a temporay basis, and the State Legislature enacted the Madras Proprietary Estates' Village Service and the Madras 'Hereditary Village Offices '(Repeal) Art, 1968 repealing the 1894 and 1895 Acts. Pursuant to section 3 of this Act, the State Government promulgated that Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 which provided for tbe constitution of the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service, consisting of (i) Village ileadman, additional village headman, (ii) village kamam, additional village karnam, and\n\n(iii) taJayari and nirganti and the method of recrUitment to the said posts.\n\nIn the year 1973, the Administrative Reforms Commission set up by the State Government recommended that the existing part-time village officers should\n\n_l-- be replaced by regular whole-time transferable public servants who should form part of the Revenue hierarchy. The State Government accepted this recommenda1ion and promulgated on May 17, 1975 tho Tamil Nadu ViJlage Officers (appoirited under B, S, Os) Service Rules 1974. Thereaf1er on October 9, 1978 the - Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules 1978 were issued fixing the age of retirement of village of6cCrs at 60 years. ~.\n\nOn November 13, 1980, the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1980 was promulgated abolishing the posts of parttime village officers in the State. The Ordinance was later replaced by the Tamil Nadu abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers 'Act 1981, which provided for _the d.Ppointmcnt of Village Administrative Officers. By section 3 of the Act, the posts of part-time village officers were abolished with effct from November 14, 1980.and every officer holding a post so abolished ceased to hold such post, and secl!On 5 provided for payment of compensation to those who ceased to be part-time villas• officers.\n\nThe petitioners in their writ petition to this Court contended that the\n\n-'-..\n\nOrdinance and the Act were violative of Article 19 (1) (g); Article 311 (2), and H contravened Article 14 of the Con, titution, The State Government contested the p6titions and contended that the State, Government being of the opinion that the\n\nB ,\n\n63() 8ln>IU!Mli .couat REJ.'Oat~ !l 9S2i 3 s.c.t\\..\n\nsystem of parttime Village-Officers was outmoded and did not fit in with the modem needs of village administration, after careful consideration taken the policy decision to abolish all tho posts of part•time village offii:ers on grounds of administrative necessity and to introduce a system of whole-time officers to be incharge of the village administration.\n\nTo achieve this, the Ordinance was promulgated on November J4, 1980 which was later, replaced by the Act. It Was further contended, that since b)\"tho Ordinance and the Act, certain posts had been abolished, the petitioners who were incumbents of tho abolished posts could nottaiso any of the grounds raised by thorn •.\n\nDismissing the petitions.\n\nHELD : 1. (I) Tho power to abolish a civil post is inherent in tho right to create it. The Government bas alwaysthe power, subject to the consti tutional provisions to reorganise a department to provide cfficiency1 and to bring about economy. It can .abolish an office or post in gopd faith. The action to abolish a post should not be just a pretence taken to got rid of an inconvenient incumbent, (643 OJ\n\nAmerican Jurisprudene1 2d vo/.63 p, §48·649: H. Eliot Kap/a,,...., The Law of D Civil Service pp 214-215 referred to.\n\nIn tho instant case tho abolition of the posts of village officers 'was sought to be achieved by a piece of legislation passed by the State Legislature, namely tho Tamil Nadu.Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981. Want of good faith or ma!afides cannot be attributed to tho Legislature. (646 A]\n\n(ii)· Tho Act is ot violative or Article 19 (I) (g) as it does not affect the rfght of any of the incumbents of the posts to carry on any oecupation of their choice oven though they may not be able to stick on to tho posts which they wore holding. (647 CJ\n\nFertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.} Sindri & Ors. v. Union of lnilia & Ors, (1981] 2 SCR 52, referred to. ,.,,.-·\n\n2. (i) The doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 cannot be con trolled by any legislation; but the exercise of that power by the President or tho _,.._ Governor, is however made subjecl to the other provisions of the Constitution, one of them being Article 31 t, which is not made subject to any other provision of tho Constitution and is paramount in tho field occupied by it. (648 D-BJ \\ .\n\n(ii) The terminatiOn of service of a Government servant consequent upon the abolition of posts does not involve punishment at all and therefore doeA not attract Article 311 (i). (654 B; 654B] ·\n\nH Parashotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958] SCR 828 at 841, Motl ).- Ram Dtka ttc. v. Gt1,1tral Manag1r, N.E.F., Railwy1, Maligaon, Pandu 1tc.\n\nIt. kAlilNbRAN v. tAMli.'NAbu {tlenkatariimiah, J.) 63t\n\n[1964]SSCR683andP.V. Naik & Ors. v. State ofMaharashtra&Anr., AIR ,, 1967 Born, 482, referred to.\n\n(iii) If a post is not a special post and Its incumbent is a member of a cadi-e his rights as a member of the cadre should be considered before deciding whether he has ceased to be a government empioyee on the abo!ition of the post ..\n\nOn such scrutiny it is likely that.the services of .another member of the· cadre may have to be terminated or Some other member of the cadre may have to be reverted to a lower post from which hC may have been promoted to the cadre in question by the application of the principle of 'last come, first go'. If, however, where the post abolished i,\"a special post or where an entire cadre is abolished and there is no lower cadfe to which the members of the abolished cadre can. reasonably be reverted, the application Of this principle may not rise at all.\n\n[6S3 C, DJ\n\nState of Mysore'v. H. Papanna Gowda & Anr. etc. [1971) 2 S.C.R. 831, --r-- referred to.\n\n(iv) in modern administration, it is necessary to recognise the existence of the poWer with the legislatute Or the Ell:e'cutive to-create or abolish posts in the civil services-of the State. The volume of administrative work, the measures of economy and the need . for streamlining the administration to make it more efficient may induce the State Government to make alterations in the staffing 1\n\npatterns of the civil service necessitating either the_ increase or the decrease in tbe number of posts. This power is inherent in the very concept of governmental administration. To deny that P, owef to the GoverD.ment is to strike at the very\n\nroots' of proper public administration. This power to abolish a post which may' • result in the holder thereof ceasing to be a Government servant has got to be recognised; but any action legislative or executive taken pursuant to that power is always subject to judicial review. (,6S6 A J)\n\nM. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kera/a & Anr. (1974) I S.C.R. SIS, Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India [1964J S S.C.R.- .190, Salish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (1953) S.C.R. 6S5, Shyam Lal v. State of\n\nU, P, and Union of India [19SS] l S.C.R. 26, State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar & Anr. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 1034, referred to.\n\n/ Abdul Khalik Renzu & Ors. v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir , AJf-. , 1965 J & K 15. overruled.\n\nIn thtl instant case it cannot be said that tho State Act by which the villaie officers in the' State of Tamil Nadu were abolished; contravenes Article 311, (2).\n\n[657 F]\n\n(v) The posts of village olfic\".'s which were governed by the Madras Act II of 1894, the Madras Act iii Qf 1895 and the Board's Standing Orders were feudalistic in character and the appointment to these posts were governed by the 1aw of primogeniture; the family in which the applicant was born, the village in which be was born, atid the fact whether be owned any property in the village or not. Thoee factors are , alien to modern-administrative service and clearly\n\n' A\n\nJil\n\n632 SUPRiiMll COURT RiiP<iats [19S1]'3 s.C.&.\n\nopposed to Articles 14 and 16. The Administrative Reforms Commission rightly recommended their abolition and reorganisation of the village service. . [657 µ; 658 AC]\n\n(vi) Having regard to the abolition of similar village offices in the neighbouring States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and the agitation in the State of Tamil Nadu for reorganisation of vilJage service, the decision to aboliSh the village offices which wcr~ feudalistic in character nd a~ anachronism in the modern age cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [660 CJ\n\nBR. Shankaranarayana & Ors. v. The State OJ. Mysore & Ors. A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 1571, B.H. Honnalige Gowda v. State of Mysore & Anr., A.LR. 1964 Mysore 84, referred to.\n\n3. (i) Any classification under Article 14 should satisfy two tests : (i) that there exists an intelligibJe differentia between those who are grouped together and those who are not included in the group, and (ii) that there exists a reasonable nexus between the differentia and the object for which c1ussification is made.\n\n[662 I'] •\n\n(ii) Upto December 16, 1970 all appointments to Village Officen were being made under the two Madras Acts and the Board's Standing Orders on the basis of factors dealt with therein, but after December 16, 1970 recruitment was made in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970. By these rules a new service of part-time Village Officers was constituted and the persons who were appointed were paid a fixed amount every month by way of remuneration. Under the Act of 1981 and the Rules framed thereunder the Village Administrative Officers were to be appointed and to be recruited directly.\n\nThe posts were no longer treated as Part-time posts and holders thereof were full time goverr.ment officials entitled to draw salary every month. Even though the Viilage Officers appointed after December 16, 1970 were in a way different from the village officials appointed prior to that date the two cannot be equated with the new Village Officers who were to be appointed under the 1981 Act and the • rules made thereunder. It cannot therefore be stated that Article 14 of the Cons .. titution has been violated in abolishing the posts held by those appointed after December 16, 1970. [662 H; 663 A-E; 663 H; 664A]\n\n4 (i) The State Government will give effect to the memorandum filed on its behalf in the case/of those who possess.the minimum gen_eral qualification prescribed under the Att and the Rules. The State Governmen.t shall re-employ all such persons who have not crossed the age or' superannuation and who are selected in the new cadre. UntiJ they are so selected they wiJI not be paid any remuneration. Even if they are re-employed the amount paid to them pursuant to the interim orders will not be recovered. [668 G-H; 669 A)\n\n(ii) The compensation, if any payable by the State G_overnment under section S of the Act to those who cease to be village officers shall be adjusted against the amount paid pursuant to the interim orders, and any amount in. exss of the compensation, shall not be recoverable. [669 B-C]\n\n'-...\n\nIt, Jl.AJ6NDll.AN v, 'fAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 63~\n\nORIGINAL JURJ~DICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 5880-82, 6176-\n\n77. 5921, 5922, 6220, 6426-27, 6355-56, 6264-70,6276, 6178-79, 6191, 1718 of 1980 arid 220-22, 2113 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nK. K. Venugopal, (6355-56 of 1980) (In W.P. Nos. 6212, 6427 8 & 5880-82/80), F.S. Nariman, (In W.P. Nos. 6264-70/80) R.K. Gargo, (In W.P. Nos. 6191 & 6426/80), S.N. Kackar, (In W.P. Nos. 5921/80\n\n& 220/81 and G.L. Sanghi, (In W.P. No. 1718/81) for the Petitioners.\n\nC.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners.\n\nLal Narayan Singh, Attorney General (In W.P. No 5880/80) .\n\nM.K. Banerjee, Addi. Solicitor General (In W.P. No. 6355/80) R. Krishnamoorthy, Adv. Genl. T.N. (In W.P. Nos. 1718 & 6276/\n\n1980) for the Respondents.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chitale, (In W.P. No. 6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212 .of 1980) for the Respondents ..\n\nA. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH. J, In these writ petitions, the petitioners who were holders of posts of part-time village officers in the St'\\'te of Tamil Nadu or associations of such persons have questioned the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of parttime Village Officers Ordinance, 1980 Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. IO of\n\n1980) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance') and the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981\n\n(Tamil Nadu Act No. 3 of 1981) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act) which replaced the Ordinance. The total number of posts abolished • by the Act is 23,010.\n\nIn Tamil Nadu, as in other parts of India, the village has been the basic unit of revenue administration from the earliest times of\n\nwhich we have any record. The administration was being carried H on at the lowest l.evel by a chain of officers in regular gradation one above the other at the commencement of the Cluistian era. The\n\n{i982] 1 s.c.i.\n\nsame system has been in vogue uptil now. It was generally known as the borabaluti system ordinarily consisting of twelve functionaries.\n\nIn Tamil Nadu, these. functionarie> were known as (I) headl\\lan,\n\n(2) karnam or accountant, (3) shroff or notaiar, (4) nirganti, (5) toty or taliary, (6) potter, (7) smith, (8) jeweller, (9) carpenter, (10) barber, (II) washerman and (12) astrologer. Of them, the first five only rendered service to Government.\n\nThe headman who goes. by various names such as monigar, potail, naidoo, reddy, peddakapu etc. i2 an important officer. He represented the Government in the village, collected the revenue and had also magisterial and judicial powers of some min or nature.· As a magistrate he could punish persons for petty offences and as a Judge could try suits for §Ums of money or other personal property upto Rs. 10/- in value, there being no appeal against his decision.\n\nWith the consent of the parties, he could adjudicate civil claims upto Rs. JOO/- in value. The headmati has been generally one of the largest landholders in the village having considerable influence over its inhabitants. The karnam or the village accountant maintained all the village accounts, inspected all fields in the village for purposes of gathering agricultural statistics, fixation of assessment and prevention and penalisation of encroachments, irregular use of water and verification of tenancy and enjoyment. The nirgantis guarded the irrigation sources and regulated the use of water.\n\nThe toty or taliary assisted the village acc0untant in his work.\n\nBy the end of the ninetellllth century', two Acts Were brought into force in the Presidency of Madras for the purpose of regulating the work of some of the village officers.\n\nThe Madras Proprietary Estates' Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act No. II of 1894) dealt with three classes of village officers viz. village accountants, village headmen and village watchmen or police officers in permanently settled estates, in unsettled palaiyams and in inam villages.\n\nIt provided for their appointment and remuneration and for the prevention and summary punishment of misconduct or neglect of duty on their part and generally for securing their efficiency.\n\nThe Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act No. III of\n\n1895) regulated the succession to certain other hereditary village offices in the Presidency of. Madras; for the hearing and disposal of claims to such offices or the emoluments annexed thereto; for the appointment of persons to hold such offices and the control of the holders thereof. The village officers dealt with by this Act were (i).\n\n. It. 11.AlllNDRAW v, TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiak, J,)\n\n6JS\n\nvillage munsifs, ·(ii) potels, monigars and peddakapus, (iii) karnams, A\n\n(iv) nirgantjs, (v) vettis, totis and tar dalgars and (vi) talayariS inryo'twari villages or inam villages, which for the purpose of village administration, were grouped with. ryotwari villages.\n\nUnder both these statutes, the village offices were considered as hereditary in character and the succession to all hereditary village offices devolved on a single heir according to the general ci.stom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamin .\n\ndaris in Southern india. When the person who would otherWise be entitled to succeed to a hereditary village office was a minor, such minor was being registered as the heir of the last holder and some other person qualified u11der the statutes in question to discharge the duties of the office was being appointed to discharge the duties of the office until the person registered as heir on attaining majority or within three years thereafter was qualified to discharge the duties of the office himself when he would be appointed thereto. If the person registered as heir remained otherwise disqualified for three years after attaining majority, he would be deemed to have forfeited his rii/ht to office and on such forfeiture or on his death, the vacancy had to be filled up in accordance with the provisions of the statute~\n\nas if he was the last holder of, the office. It is stated that in cases to which the above two statutes were inapplicable, provision had been tt1ade by the Standing Orders promulgated by the Board of Revenue\n\nwhich were known as the Board's Standing Orders tor appointing village officers again generally on a hereditary basis. Some of the other distinct features of the service conditions of the village officers appointed under the Madras Act No. II of 1894 of the Madras Act No. III of 1895 or the Board's Standing Orders were that they were\n\npart-time employees of the Government; that the rt!cords maintained by them were allowed to be retained in their houses that there was no attendance register and no fixed hours of duty were prescribed in their case. They were appointeCI directly by the Revenue Division8' Officer and against his order, an appeal lay to the District Revenue Officer and then a revision to the Board of Revenue and a second revision to Government. They were not constituted into any distinct service, There was no provision for reservation of posts of village officers for Scheduled Castes/SCheduled Tribes and backward classes. There was no miniinum general qualification (prescribed ptior to the year\n\n1970 for persons to be appointed as village officers under the said statutes or the Board's Stnding Ordes. It was enough if they were able to read and to write.\n\nNo period of probation was pres-\n\n636 SlJ!>kEME cotJkr REPORTS [198.2] 3 s.c.k.\n\ncribed after they were appointed. The Fundamental Rules appli cable to all other State Government servants, the Pension Rules and the Leave Rules were not applicable to these village officers. They could take up part-time work ot occupation after securing necessary permission Jrom the concerned Revenue authorities. There was no age of superannuation fixed in their case and they were not entitled to retirement benefits such as gratuity .and 'pension. All village head men including those who belonged to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had to furnish security in the form of property or cash the estimated value of which was not less than half the amount of land revenue and loan demand of the village. They could not be transferred outside their district.\n\nIn fact \"very rarely they were transferred. During the period of leave, no honorarium was paid to them and during the period of suspension, no subsistence allowance was paid. The honorarium paid to them was a fixed amount with no element .of dearness allowance.\n\nIn M.\n\nRamappa v.\n\nSangappa & Ors.(') where this Court had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908 which contained provisions similar to the provisions of the two Madras Acts referred to above were qualified for being chosen as members of the State Legislative Assembly, it was held that such officers who were appointed to their offices by the Government, though it might be that the Government had no option in certain cases but to appoint an heir of the last holder, held offices of profit under the State Government since they held their office by reason of appointment made by the Government and they worked under the control and supervision of the Government and that their remuneration was paid by the Government out of the Government funds and assets.\n\nAccordingly this Court came to the conclusion that such village officers were disqualified under Article 191 (l)(a) of the Constitu\n\ntion from contesting at an election to the State Legislative Assembly.\n\nIn Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. The State of Andhra Pra desh & Ors,(') this Court held .that section 6(1) of the Madras Here ditary Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act . No. 3 of 1895) whiCh\n\nprovided that in choosing persons to..fill the new village offices of\n\n(1) [J959J'2 S.C.R. 1167.\n\n(2) [19611 2 s.c.R.931.\n\n.>-\n\nK. RA!ENDRAN 'TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 637\n\nan amalgamated village under that Act, the Collector should select the persons whom he considered to be the best qualified from among the families of the last holders of the offices in the villages which bad been abolished as a consequence of such amalgamation was void as it contravened Article I 6 (2) of the Constitution. After the above decision, instructions were iss.ued by the Madras Board of Revenue on March 12, 1962 to the effect that in respect of future vacancies in village offices governed by 'the Madras Act No.II of 1894 and the Madras , Act No. III of 189S, the appointments should be made on temporary basis only following the procedure prescribed under the Board's Standing Order No.\n\n156. Since it was felt that the above two Madras Acts which contained provisions providing for appointment to village offices on hereditary basis we~ violative of Article 16 of ihe Constitution in view of the pronouncement of this Court in Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao's case (supra), the State Legislature pass\n\ned the Madras Proprietory Estates' Village Service and the Madras Hereditary Village Offices (Repeal) Act, 1968 (Madras Act No.20 of\n\n1968) repealing the above two statutes viz. the Madras Act )'fo. II of 1894 and the Madras Act No. III of 1895. The said Act was brought into force with effect from December l, 1968. It extended to the whole of the State of Madras, except the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunelveli district (vide section 1 (2) of the Madras Act No. 20 of 1968). Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of that Act, however, provided that every holder of a village, offiice, appointed under the Acts rpealed by it would, notwithstanding the repeal continue to bold office subject to such rules as may be made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Section 3 of that Act directed that any vacancy arising after the date of the commencement of that Act in the village office referred to in sub section (3).. of section 2 thereof should 1 be filled up in accordance with the provisions of the Rules made under the proviso. to Arti cle 309 of the Constitution. On December 1, 1968, the Governor of Tamil Nadu promulgated a Rule under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution providing that \"the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue applicable to non hereditary village offices shall apply to every holder of a village office to which the Madras' Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act No. II of 1894) or the Ma.; Iras Hereditary Village Offices. Act, 1895 (Madras Act No. III. of 1895) was applicable immediately before the !st day of December, I 968\" on which date the Madras Act No. 20. of 1968 came into force.\n\nPursuant to ' section 3 of the Madras Act No. 20 of 1968, the Governor of Tainil Nadu\n\n638 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.ll.\n\npromulgated under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution the TamiJ Nadu Village officers Servii; e Rules, 1970 providing for the constitutioµ of the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service consisting of (i) village headman, additional village headm11n, (ii) village karnam, additional village karnam and (iii) tal11yari and nirganti and the method of recruitment to the said posts~ The said Rules came into force on December I 6, 1970 and they extended to the whole of the State of Tamil Na<lu except the Kanyakumari District and the Shenootah taluk of the Tirunelveli district. and. the city of Madras.\n\nRule I 8 of the said Rules, however, .stated that nothing contained in them would apply to persons, who on the date of coming into\n\nforce of the said Rules, were holding the posts of village lieadman or additional village headman, village karnam or additional village katnam either temporarily or permanently. Consequently the said Rules were not applied to the holders of village offices who had been appointed temporarily or permanently under the two repea- led Acts and under the Board's Standing Orders before the date on which the said Rules came into force.\n\nThese Rules prescribed that every person who made an application for apppoint- .meot the post of village headtna11 or' additional village headman or village kitrnam or additional _village karnam should possess the following qualifications, namely (i) he sl)ould have completed the S.S.L.C. Examination held by the Government of Tamil Nadu and (ii) he should have secured a pass in the special tests specified in cl. (2) of the table given in Rule 5 thereof in respect of the posts specified in column (1) thereof.\n\nOn the same date, the Tamil Nadu Village Officers (Classification, Contro.1 and Appeal) Rules, 1970 and the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Conduct Rules, 1970 promulgated under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution by the Governor of Tamil Nadu came into force. These Rules were applicable not merely to the village officers appointed after that date but also to those who had been appointed under the. repealed Acts and under the Board's Standing Order prior to December I 6, 1970. The Tamil Nad~ Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules dealt with the disciplinary proceedings that might be instituted against the village officers governed by the them.\n\nThe Tamil Na.du Village Officers Conduct Rules provided that the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1960 as amended from time to time would apply to the village officers subject to the modification specified in rule 3 thereof which provided that the village officers being part-time Government servants might take up part-time worlc or occupation\n\n.)._ .\n\n..,,..,.----- .\n\nK. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 639\n\nprovided that (I) such part-time work or occupation did not interfere with their legitimate duties as village officers and (2) the previous permission in writing had been applied for and obtained from the Revenue Divisional Officer concerned if the work or occupation was confined to the charge village and from the District Collector concerned if the work or occupation extended beyond the charge vill'age. .From November l~, 1973 all the three sets of Rules which came into force on December 16, 1970, as stated above, became applicable to the village officers in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirun.elveli district also.They, however, continued to be inapplicable to the city of Madras.\n\nIn the year 1973, the Administrative Reforms Commission headed by Mr. T.A. Verghese,. I.C.S. recommended that the existing parttime village officers should be replaced by regular whole-time transferable public servants and that they should form part of the Revenue hierarchy, disciplined in the tradition of that department and motivated by the incentive of career advancement a\\'llilable in that department. They also recommended that 16,585 survey. villages in the State of Tamil Nadu should be grouped into 11,954 revenue groups. The Commission further recommended that the 11,954 revenue groups should be regrouped into larger village panchayats with a population of about 5,000 and the annual panchayat tax demand of the order of Rs. 5,000. The Commission envisaged .that with some marginal adjustment the\n\nenlarged village panchayat would be of the order of 4,000 in the State of Tamil Nadu and that there should J>e a village officer, a village clerk and a village peon in respect of each such enlarged village panchayat and on appointment to these offices, the holders of village offices appointed under the two repealed statutes and the Board's Standing Orders should be removed and the former village offices should be abolished since the Commission felt that \"the administration at the grass-root level, provided by the present generation of village officers with feudal traditions, is inconsistent with the egalitarian principles aimed at in our democratic constitution\". The Commission further felt that \"the reform of village administration has high priority, as it would benefit the whole mass of rural population.\" The Commission, however, took note of the fact in paragraph 2. rI of its Report that the Government had, in the recent years, attempted to remedy the situation by repealing the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 and by framins a]set\n\n64() SUPREME COURT REl>ORTS (19.821 3 11.c.a.\n\n' of new service rules for village establishment under Article 309 of the Constitution. But it was of the opinion that the said Rules, however, did !lot go far enough as they were not applicable to the existing set of village officers. It was of the view that full-time officers could be expected to service a much larger area than the existing villages or groups of v!llages and such regroupin11 ofvillages into larger groups had to be done carefully taking into account\n\nlqcal conditions such as compactness of the grjlup, easy inter communications, nature of land, nuber of hldings etc. The Commission, however, was of the view that such of those among the existing village headmen and karnams, who had passed th1: S.S.L.C. Examfoation might be considered for the posts of the village officers and village clerks on their past performance. Similarly as regards village officers working in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunel veli district which came over to the State of Tamil Nadu from Kerala in I 956 on the reorganisation of States, the CommissiQll observed that most of the village officers of those trans ferred territories who were qualified and fulltime Government servants should be absorbed in the new set up as envisaged by the Commission; On May 17,1975, the Governor of Tamil Nadu. promulgated the Tami) Nadu Village Officers (appointed under B.S. Os) Service Rules, 1974 under the proviso to Rule 309 of the Constitution in respect of the village officers appointed prior to December 16, 1970. The above Rules were, however, kept in abeyance by an order made on July 1, 1975 on receipt of representations from the village' officers in regard to the fixation of the age of superannuation at 55 years.\n\nOn August 24, 1977, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu announced on the floor of the Legislative Assembly that the Government proposed to set up a Committee to .\n\n1:xamine whether the posts of karnams could be dispensed with.\n\nThereafter on October 9,1978, ihe Tamil Nadn Village Officers (appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules, 1978 were issued _fixing the age of retirement of the village officers at 60 years.\n\nSub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the said R.ules stated that the said Rules would apply to all village officers holding the posts of village headman or additional . village headman, village karnam or additional village karnam, talay ari, vetti or nirganti either permanently or temporarily on December 16, 1970 provided that at the time of their appointment, they were qualified under the Board's Standing Orders. The Government thought that the _said Rules . would be applicable to all village officers who were holding village offices on December_ 16,1970 refer\n\n' )\n\nK. RAIENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 641\n\nred to in Rule I (2).\n\nBut some of the holders of the village :offices who had been appointed under the Madras Act No. III of 1895 prior to the decision of this Court in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao's case (supra) which as rendered on December 6, 1960, filed writ petitions on the file of the High Court of Madras stating that the Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under the B.S.Os) .Service Rules, 1978 which fixed the age of superannuation of village officers. at 60 years were not applicable to them since on a true construction of the said Rules, they were inapplicable to them. The High Court of Madras11llowed the said writ petitions by its judgment dated August 18, 1980 holding: \"We have already extracted sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of the rules. That rule expressly states that the rules will apply to village officers, who, at the time of their appointment, were qualified under the Board's Standing Orders applicable to them and .their appoi!'.ltment had been made by the authority competent under the Board' S• Standing Orders. In respect of these petitioners,· who were appointed under the provisions of Madras Act 3 of 1895 before 6th December, 1960, there was no question of their being qualified to be appointed to the village office under the Board's Standing Orders applicable to them, and their qualifications and . appointment rested solely on the pro'visions contained in Section lO of the Act. Consequently the petitioners herein. will not answer the description contained in sub'.rule (2) of rule (I) of the rules. If they do not answer the description contained in sub-rule (2) of rules, the rules are not applicable tothem and therefore, they can not be required to retire under rule 4 (I} of the ru!es.\". ,• ··-\n\nIt would appear that some of the other village officers to whom the said Rules had been made\"applicable had also filed writ petitions on the file of the High Court questioning the validity of the Rules on the ground that the said Rqles made a discrimination betw6en them and the ' village officers who were holding office prior to December 16,1970 to whom the said Rules were held to be inapplicable by the judgment of the High Court delivered on August 18, 1980 and those petilions were posted for hearing during the first week 'of December, 1980. Before the said petitions were taken up for hearing the Governor of Tamil Nadu issued the Ordinance on November 13, 1980 abolishing the posts of part-time village officers in, the State of Tamil Nadu. Immediately after the promulagation of the Ordinance; steps were taken to take posses sion .of all the records with the village officers who were holding pJfices on that day and. to replac~ tl!em by'officers appoillted under . ' . . - \"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nI I 982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nS•ection 14 of the ordinance. Immediately after the promulgation of the said Ordinance, some of the village officers' who were affected by it questioned its validity before this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 5880•82 of 1980 and 5921 of 1980.\n\nThe other connected writ petitions came to be filed thereafter. fa the meanwhile the Tamil Nadu State Legislature pdssed the Act which is impugned in these petitions replacing the Ordinance.\n\nThe petitioners have challenged in these writ petitions the Act also by seeking appropriate amendment of their petitions.\n\nThe broad features of the Act are these: The object of the Act is set out in its preamble. Because the State Government was of the opinion 'that the system of part-time village officers was outmoded and did not fit in with the modern needs of village administration and the State Government had after careful consideration taken . a policy decision to abolish all the posts of part-time village officers on grounds of admillistrative necessity and to introduce a system of whole-time officers to be incharge of village admininistration, the Act came to be enacted• with effect from November 14, 1980 in the place of the Ordinance. The Explanatory Statement attached to the Ordinance also contained a statement to the same / effect indicating the object of the Ordinance. The expression 'parttime village officers' is defined in section 2 (e) of the Act as village h<, adman (including additional village (headman village) karnam (including chief karnam and additional village karnam) or Triu11e officer (who was exercising functions of •three different village officers) appointed under the Madras Act II of'I 894, the Madras Act III of 1895, the Board's Standing Orders, the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970 Officers Kuvalar, or any other law but does not include; Orama Kavalar Orama Paniyalar and Pasana Kavalar. Village Administrative. Officer means an officer appointed under section 4(1) of the Act. By sec. 3 of the Act, the posts of part-time village officers wc:re abolished with effect from November 14, 1980 and every officer holding post so abolished ceased to hold such post. The Act provided for appointment of Village Administrative Officers.· Section 5 of the\n\nAc:t provided for payment of compensation Jo those who ceased to be parttinie village officers calculated in accordance with the formula mentioned in it. Section 10 of the Act provided that the Act would not apply to the posts of karnams which were held by whole-time Government servants in the city of Madras and the posts\n\n.. of village officers and village assistants which were held by the whole\n\n\n- •\n\n. K. RAIENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah,.J.) 643\n\ntime Government servaut in the Kayakumari district and Sheitcottah taluli of the Tirunelveli districts .\n\nThree principal points are urged before us by the petitioners in these petitions (i) that the Ordinance and the Act are violative of\n\nArt.19(J)(g) of the Constitution, (ii) that they are violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and (iii) that they contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. The State Government contends that since by the Orpinance and the Act, certain posts have been abolished, the officials who were incumbents of the abolished posts cannot raise\n\n-~ _....-.- any of the grounds raised by them • . _./ .\n\nEntry 41 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution confers the power on the State Legislature to make laws with respect to State public services subject to the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 309 of the Constitution provides that subject to the pro vi- . sions of the Constitution, the State Legislature may regulate the\n\nrecruit111ent ancj conditions of service of persons appointed to public\n\nservicea'!d posts in connection with tl!e affairs of the State. Article 311 (2) of the Constitution states that no person who is a member · of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a Civil service of a State or bolds a civil post under the State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after .an inquiry in which be bas been informed of the charges against him .and given a reasonable opportunity of being beard in respect of those charges.\n\nArticle 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It is not disputed that any law\n\n- that is passed in relation to-1! Government employee should not contravene any of these provisions-Article 19 (l)(g), Article 311 (2) ---.__ and Article 14 of the Constitution. We shall now proceed to exa- • mine the case with reference to each of, them.\n\nThe power to abolish a civil post is inherent in the right to create it. The Government h.as always the power, subject, of course, to the ccmstitutional provisions, to re-organise a department to provide efficiency and to bring about economy. It can abolish .an office or post in good fa_ith.\n\nThe action to abolish a post should not be just a pretence taken to get rid of an inconvenient focumbent.\n\nWe have the following statement of the t&w in American lurisprudence 2nd, Vol. 63 at Pages 648-649 ;\n\n' i\n\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"37. Manner, sufficiency, validity, and effect.\n\nIt is not always easy to determine wheter a public office has been abolished~!! is not sufficient merely to declare that a particlar office is abolished, if in fact it is not abolished, and the. duties thereof are continued. An office is abolished wlien the act creating it is.repealed. But .. the repeal of the statute creating an office, accompanied by the re-enactment of the substance of it, does not abolish the office. Abolition .of an ofti'ce may also be brought about by a constitutional provision, or by a new constitu tion or a constitutional amendment.\n\nA nonconstitutional office may be indirectly abolished as by legislating away the duties and emoluments of the office.\n\nThe legislature may not evade constitutional provisions by a sham or .pretended abolition of an office, as .where there is mere colorable abolition of the office for the purpose of getting rid of its incumbent.\n\nThis may happen where an office is. abolished in terms and promptly recreated under the same or a different name, provided the legislature does not attach duties and burdens to the new office of a character such as to make it in reality a different office.\n\nWhere an office is duly abolished by the legislature or'tbe people, it ceases to exist and the incumbent is no longer entitled to exercise the functions thereof, or to claim compensation for so doing; unless be is under contract with the state so as to come within the protection of the constitutional inhibition against impairment of the obligation of contract. Since a de jure offi9e i's generally essential to the existence of a de fr.cto officer, persons cannot act as de facto officers of an office which has been abolished.\"\n\nH. Eliot Kapla6 writes in bis book entitled \"The Law of Civil Service\" at pages 214-115 thus:\n\n\"8. \"Good Faith\" in Abolition of Positions-'-There of course, is no vested right to employment in the public service. The notion>' much too prevalent, that any one who bas been appointed :ifter aompetitive examination is entitl ~\n\n~ - ~·'\n\n/ ' \" k. RAJENl'>RAN I'. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n64S\n\nled td be retained in the service is erroneous. where there is any reasonable justification for eliminating positions in the public seivice, even where such abolition of positions may be subject to judicial review, the inclination of the.Courts . is not to interfere, avoiding substitution of judicial wisdom or judgment for that of the adminitrator.\n\nA position is not lawfully, abolished solely because it has been left vacant for a short period of time and subsequently filled by another appointee than the one laid off and entitled to re-employment.\n\n Good _faith of a head of, department in abolishing a position on alleged grounds of economy has often been challenged.\n\nMost courts' have held that the issue of good faith on ihe part of an administrative official.is one of law solely for 'the court to pass on, and not an issue of fact which may be oubmitted to a jury for determination. The jury may determine the facts, which the court in turn may find as a matter of law constitute bad faith; but a.verdict by a jury that a department head had acted in bad faith in abolishing a positron was set aside as a conclusion of law,\n\n1 and not properly finding of fact.\n\nWhat constitutes bad fajth as a matter of law 'in abolishing positions must be determined by the precise facts in each case .. As a general rule, where positions are purported to be eliminated and incumbents laid , off, and thereafter identical or similar positions are re-established and . the positions filled , by\n\nothers not entitled undeflthe civil. service law and rules to such employments, the' courts will not hesitate to order re-emplo}ment of the laid off employees;\"\n\n\\ / The above passages sum up the. law on the question Of abolition of posts in, civil service as it prevails'.in United States of An\\erica ..\n\n' In England too ther~ is provision for compulsory premature retirement in the public interest on structural grounds, grounds of limited efficiency and redundancy. (Vide paragraph 1303, Vol. 8 Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn.)\n\nsbPl1.i!MI! CObkt il.BPoRTS [19821 j s.c.lt.\n\nIn the instant case, the abolition of the posts of village officers is sought to be achieved by a piece of legislation passed by the State Legislature. Want of good faith or malafides cannot be attributed to a Legislature. We have only to see whether the legislation is a colourable one lacking 'in legislative competeneeor whether it transgresses any other constitutional limitation.\n\nSo far as the. argument based on Article 19 (!) (g) of the Constitution is concerned, we are bound by the view expressed by\n\nth~ Constitution Ben9h of this Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd), Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.(1) in which Chandrachud, C.J. has observed at pages 60-61 thus :.\n\n\"The right to pursue a calling or to carry on an occupation is not the same thing as the right to work in a particular post under a contract of employment. If the workers are retrenched consequent upon and on account of the sale, it will be open to them to pursue their rights and remedies under the Industrial Liiws. But the point to be noted is that the closure of an establishment in which a workman is for the time being employed does not by itself infringe his fundamental right to carry on an occupation which is guaranteed by Article 19 (!) (g) of the Constitution.· Supposing a law were passed preventing a certain category of workers from accepting employment in a fertiliser factory, it would be possible to contend then that the workers have been deprived of their right to carry on an occupation. Even assuming that some of the workers may eventually have to be retrenched in the instant case, it will not be possible to say .. that their right to carry on an occupation has been violated. It would be open to them, though undoubtedly it will not be easy, to find out other avenues of employment as industrial workers.\n\nArticle 19 (I) (g) confers a broad and general right which is availble to all persons to do work of any particular kind and of their choice. It do.es not confer the right whold a particular job or to occupy a particular post of one's choice.\n\nEven under Article 311 of the Constitution, the right to continue in service falls with the abolition of the post in\n\n(I) [1981] 2 S.C.R, 52.\n\n.._ I\n\nk. RAJENbRAN V. tAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 641\n\nwhicli the person is working. The workers in the instant case can no more complain of the infringement of their fundamental right under Article 19 (I) (g) than can a Government servant complain of' the termination of his employment on the abolition of his post. The choice and freedom of the workers to work as industrial workers is not affected by the sale. The sale may at the highest affect their locum, but it does not affect their locus, to work as industrial workers. This is enough unto the day on Art. 19 (I) (g).\"\n\nIn view of the above ruling, it is not possible to hold that the Act violates Article 19 (I) (g) as it does not affect the right of any of the incumbents of the posts to carry on any occupation of their choice even though they may not be able to stick on to the posts which they were holding. '\n\n\\ We shall next examine the argument based on Article 311 (2) of the 9onstitution. We have already seen in the Fertili1er Corporation Kamgar Union's case (supra) the observation to the effect : 'Even under Article 31 t of the Constitution, the right to continue in service falls with the 'abolition of the post in which the person is working.' It is said that the 'act of removing a person from a chair. is different from the act of removal of the chair itself' . although the incumbent loses the chair in both the cases. Since it is strenuously urged before us that there is some amount of contradiction in some of the rulings of this Court, we shall review the legal position' to the extent necessary before reaching our own conclusion on . the question. k The doctrine that the tenure of a holder of a civil post is . ,,. dependent upon, the pleasure of the Crown is peculiar to English I i ,., law.\n\nIn India Article'3IO of the Constitution of India provides: . '\n\n\":i!O (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President and every person who. is a member of a civil' .. '\n\nsUUll!ilE COURT Rlll'ORTS [1982] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nservice of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State.\n\n( (2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State, any contract. under which a person, not being a\n\n1 member of a defence service or of an all-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under the Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President\" or the Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary fa order to secure the services of a person having special qualifications, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons. not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post.\"\n\n• While _ the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Atticle 310 cannot be controlled by any legislation; the exercise of that power by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is however made subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, one of them being Article 311, which is, not made subject to any other provision of the Constitution and is paramount in the field occupied by it. The contention urged before us is that every kiQd of termination of employment under Government would attract Article 311 (2) of the Constitution_ and a termination on the abolition of the post cannot be an exception. While construing Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, as it stood then, in Parashotam Lal Dhinra v. Unfon of India,(') Das, C.J. observed:\n\n\"The Government cannot terminate his service unless it is entitled to do so (I) by virtue of a special term of the contract of employment, e.g., by giving the requisite notice provided by the contract or (2) by the -rules governing the conditions of his serVice, e.g., on attainment of the age of superannuation prescribed by the rules, or on the fulfilment of rule conditions for compulsory retirement or subject to certain safeguards, on the abolition of the post or on being\n\n(1) (1958] S.C.R. 828 @ 841.\n\n, J.._\n\n. _,\n\nI .\n\nIt. 1!.AJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkatarami/ih, J.) 64<f\n\n found guilty, after a proper enquiry on notice to him, of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualifi- ' cation.\" (emphasis added)\n\nAgain at pages 857-858 in the same iu, dgment, the learned\n\nChief Justice observed : B\n\n\"The foregoing conclusion, however, does not solve the entire problem, for it bas yet to be ascertained as to 'when an order for the termination of service is inflicted as and by waY, of punishment and when it is not. It has already been said that where a person is appointed, substan- lively to a permanent post in Government service, he normally acquires a right to hold the post until under the . rules, he attains the age of SU, Perannuation or is compulsorily, retired and in the absence of' a contract, express or implied, or a service rule, he cannot be turned out of his post unless the post itself is abolished or unless he is guilty of misconduct, negligence, .inefficiency or other disqualifications .and\n\nI ' appropriate proceedings are taken under the service rules read with Art. 3 IL (2).\" (emphasis added)\n\nIt may be mentioned here that the' words \"subject to certain safeguards\" found in the earlier extract are not used with reference to abolition of posts in the above extract. Later on, Das, C.J. observed that the Court should apply two tests namely (I) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he had been visited with evil consequences such as loss of pay and allowances, a stigma affect.ing his future career in order to determ.irie whether the removal of 'an officer from a post attracted Article 311 (2). The decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) was reviewed by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Moti Ram Deka etc. v. General Mavager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, Pandu etc.(') Io that case the question which. arose for consideration was whether Rules,.148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Indian Railway Establish- . ment Code violated either Art.icle 311 (2), or Article 14 of the Constitution. Sub-rules (I) and (2) of Rule 148 dealt with temporary railway servants and apprentices respectively. The relevant part of\n\nRule 148 (3) read thus:\n\n(t) 119641 s s.c.R. 61!3.\n\n65() SUPllEMil COtJkT RaPokrs (19821 3 s.c.ll:\n\n\"148' (3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servant :- The service of other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is .not however required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental. or physical incapacity.\"\n\nRule 149 was brought into force in the place of Rule 148 in the case of pensionable servants in November, 1957. Here again, sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 149 dealt with temporary railway servants and apprentices. Rule 149 (3) read thus :\n\n'~149 (3) Other railway servants :-The services of other railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not however, required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and. termination of service due to mental or.physical incapacity.\"\n\nThe majority judgment in this case, however, observed that a Government servant on being appointed to a post permanently acquired a right to hold the post under the. Rules until he attained the age 1of superannuation or was compulsorily retired or was found guilty of an act of misconduct in accordance with Article 311(2) It disapproved the statement found in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case\n\n(supra) at pages 857-858 to the extent it recognised the removal of a permanant Government servant under a contract express or imp lied or a service rule. After referring to one passage at page 841 and. another at page 843 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra' s case, Gajendragad kar, J. (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) observed at pages 718-719 thus:\n\n'Reading these two observation.s together, there can be no doubt that with the exception of appointments held under special contract, the Court took the view that H wherever a civil servant was appointed to a permanent post substantively, be bad a right to hold that post until he reached the age of superannuation or was compulsorjll\". retired,\n\nt. RArnNDRAN v. fAMIL NADU Wenkataramiah, J.) 651 . \\ \\\n\nor. the post was abolished. In all other cases, if the services I . of the said servant were terminated, they would have to be in conformity with the provisions of Art. 311 (2), because termination in such cases amounts to removal. The two statement; of the law to which we have just referred do not leave any room for doubt on this point.\" (emphasis added)\n\nIt may be noticed that removal of a Government servant from a post on its abolition is recognised in the abo've passage as a circnmstance not attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Court after a review of all the decisions. before lt including tbe decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) held that the above two Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) which authorised the removal officers holding the posts substantively by issuing a mere notice infringed Article 311\n\n(2) of the Constitution. The question of abolition of posts did not arise for consideration in this case. The validity of removal of a Government servant holding a permanent post on its abolition was considered by Desai; J. and Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in P. V. ·, Naik & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1) The learned Judges held that the termination of service of a Government servant consequent upon the abolition of posts did not involve punishment at all and therefore did not attract Article 311(2).\n\nSince much reliance is placed by, the petitioners on the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. H. Papanna Gowda & Anr. etc,(')\n\nit is necessary to examine that case in some detail. The facts of that case were these : The respondent in that case was holding the post of a chemical assistant in the Agricultural Research Institute, Mandya in the Department of Agriculture of the State of Mysore.\n\nUnder the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963 which came into force on April 24, 1964, the University of Agricultural Sciences was established. Sub-section (5) . of section 7 of that Act provided: ·\n\n\"7. (5) Every person employed in any of the colleges specified in sub-section (I} or in any of the institutions referred to in sub-section (4) immediately before the appointed\n\n(1) AIR 1967 Bom. 482. , (2) [1~71 J 2 s.c, R. 831. .\n\n, A\n\n65~ strJ>kllMll cotrR.t klll>OR.ts fl 982) j s.c.lt\n\nday or the date specified in the order under sub-section (4), as the case may be, shall, as from the appointed day or the specified date, become an employee of the University on such terms and conditions as may. be determined bythe State Government in consultation with the Board.\"\n\nThe Board referred to in the above sub-section was the Board of Regents of the University. By a notification dated September 29, 1965 issued under section 7(4) and (5) of that Act, the control and management of a m, unber of research and educational institutions under the Department of Agriculture were transferred to the University. Alongwith them, the Institutdn which the respondent was working was also transferred to the lfniversity. The result was that the respondent ceased to be an employee of the State Government and became an employee of the University. Thereupon he questioned •he validity of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 7 of the said Act on the ground that they contravened Article 311 (2) of the Constitution befqre the High Court of Mysore, which upheld his plea. The . State Government questioned the decision of the High Court before this Court in the above case.\n\nThis Court affirmed the decision of the High Court holding that Artide 311(2) of the Constitution had been contravened as the prospects of the respondent in Government service were affected. In this case the parties proceeded\n\nOD the basis that there was no abolition of post as such as can be seen from the judgment of the High Court. The only ground was whether when the post continued to exist though under a different master, in this case it being the University, it was open to . the State Government to transfer its employee to the control of a new master without giving an option to him. to state whether he would continue as a Government employee or not. The court was not concerned about the consequences of abolition of a post as 'such in this case.\n\nAs can be seen from the judgment of the High Court in this case (vide Papanna Gowda v. State of Mysore(') one serious infirmity about the impugned provisiorls was that. whoever was holding the post in any of the institutions transferred to the University automatically ceased to be the Government servant. Even if the case was one where abolition of the post was involved, the law should have made provision for the determition of the employees in the cadre in question who would cease to he\n\n(I) (1969] S.L.R. 50 @ 59.\n\nK. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 653\n\nGovernment employees with reference to either the principle of 'last come, first go' or any other reasonable principle and given them an option to join the service under the new master instead of just tr, ansferring all the employees who were then working in the insti- . tutions to the University. The impugned provisions were not rules dealing with the age of superannuation or compulsory retirement.\n\nNor the ca5e was dealt with on the principle of ab.olition of posts.\n\nThe decision in this case !ilk.es its colour from the peculiar facts involved in it. One principle that may be deduced from this aecisfon\n\nis that ifa post is not a special post and its incumbent is a member of a cadre his rights as a member of the cadre should be considered before decidipg whether he has cased to be a government employee on the abolition of the post. It is likely that on such scrutiny the1 services of another member of the cadre may have to be terminated. on its ab9lition or some other member of the cadre may have to be reverted to a lower post from which he may have been promoted to the cadre in question by the application of the principle of 'last come,'first go', If, however, where the post abolished is a special post or where an entire cadre is abolished cadre and there is no lower cadre to which the members of the abolished can reasonably be reverted, the application of this principle may not arise at all. In the circumstances, the petitioners cannot derive' much assistance from this decision.\n\nThe question whether Article 311 (2) would be contravened if.\n\nGovernment servant holding a civil post substantively lost his employmeot by reason of the abolition of the post held .by him directly arose for consideration before this Court in M. Ramanatha Pillai\n\nv. The state of Kera/a & Anr.(1) Two poipts were examined in that case: (i) whether the Government had a right to abolish a post in a service a.nd (ii) whether abolition of a1 post was dismissal or removal withinthe meaning of rticle 311 of the Constitution. The Court held that a post could be abolished in good faith but the order abolishing the post might lose its effective character if it was established to have been made arbitrarily, mala fide or as a mask of some penal action within the meaning of Article 311 (2).\n\nAfter consi' dering the effect of the decisions in Parashotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra), Champakial Chiman/a( Shah v. The Uion of India,('-)\n\n11) [I974J l!S.il.R. 515.\n\n\n' )\n\n654 llUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS\n\n{1982J R, t '• ' Motl Ram Deka' s case (supra), Satish Chandra Anand v. The 1ffnion of India (') and SI.yam Lal v. State of U.P. and Union of India.(\") }his Court observed in this case at page 526 thus:\n\n\"The abolition of post may have the consequence of ter:nination of service of government servant. Such termi nation is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. The opportunity of showi'ng cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal or , removal does not therefore arise in th.e case of abolition of post. The abolition' of post is not a personal' penalty against the government servant. The abolition of post is an executive policy decision. Whether after aolition of the post, the Government servant. who was holding the post would or could be offered any employment under the State would therefore be a matter of policy decision of the Government because the abolitio'n of post does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold the post.\".\n\nThe true effect of the decision in Moti Ram Deka' s case (supra) on the question of applicability of Article 311 (2) of the Constitu tion to a case of abolition of post has bee'n clearly explained in this case and we have very little to say anything further on it. Suffice it to say that the Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is no authority for the proposition that Article 311 (2) would be attracted in such a case.\n\nThe above view was followed by this Court in State of Haryana,\n\nv. Des Raj Sa'ngar & Anr.(1) to which one of us (Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.) was a party. Khanna, J. speaking for the Court observed at pages 1037-38 thus : .\n\n\"Whether a post should be retained or abolished is; j essentially a matter for the Government to decide. As lo~. as such decision of the Government is taken in good faith ' the same cannot be set asid~ by the court. It is not open to the court to go behind the wisdom of the decision and substitute its own opinion for that of the Government on the point as to whether a post should or should not be\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. 655. (2lj[l955] 1 S.C.R. 26. ..\n\n(3) (1976],2.S.C.R, .10~4. t\n\n:>··\n\n• ..\n\nK. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramlah, J.) 655\n\nabolished. The decision to abolish the post should, however, as already mentioned, be taken in good faith and be\n\nnot used as a cloak or pretence to terminate the services of a person holding that post. fo case it is found on consi- deration of the facts of a case that the abolition of the post was only a device to terminate the services of an employee, the aboliiion of the post would suffer from a serious infirmity and would be liable to be set aside. The termination of a post in good faith and the consequent termination of the services of the incumbent of that post would not attract Article 311.\" ·\n\nBefore concluding our discussion on this topic, it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Abdul Kha/ik Renzu & Ors. v, The State of Jammu and Kashmir(') to\n\n.. which one of us (Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. (as he then was) was a party in w)lich the validity of the abolition of posts constituting the special police squad of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was questioned. In that case, the High Court while recognising the power of the State Govetnment to abolish the posts and to terminate the ' . services of the incumbents of such posts held that such action could be validly taken only subject to certai'n safegu1;1rds anp in the absence of any such safeguards the abolition Wa5 bad. The High Court did not clearly spell out the nature and extent of .safeguards referred to therein. The High Court relied on the words 'subject to certain safeguards, on the atiolition of posts' in the passage occurring at page 841 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) which is extracted above to reach the conclusion that unless the abolition of posts was accompanied by such safeguards, Article 311 would be infringed.\n\nWith respect, it should be stated that the High Court did not notice that in another passage at pages 857-858 in the same decision, which is also.extracted above, the abolition of posts referred to tkerein, was unqualified. In this passage there is no reference to any safeguards at all.\n\nProbably the 'safeguards' referred to in the passage at page 841 in Parshotam Lal Dhlngra' s case (supra) meant an abolition of posts which was in good \"faith and not a pretence of abolition • of a post resorted to in order to get rid of its incumbent and the creation of tlte same post with a different form or name with a new\n\nincumbent. The above view of the lligh Court of Jammu and 'Kashmir is however, in conflict with the decision in Ramanatha\n\n(1) AIR 1965 J & K U.\n\nl.l\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 3 s.c.k.\n\n/ Pillai' s case (supra) and hence must be considered as having been overruled by this Court. In modern administrations, it is necessary to recongnise the existence of the power with the Legislature or the Executive to create or abolish posts in the civil service of the State. The volume of administrative work\\ the measures of economy and the need for streamlining the administration to make it more efficient may induce the State Government to Il)ake alterations in the staffing patterns of the civU service necessitating either the increase or the decrease in the, number of posts. This 1power is inherent in the,-very concept .of governmental administration. To deny that power to the Government is to strike at the very roots of proper public administration.\n\nThe power to abolish a post which may result in the holder thereof ceasing to be a Government servant has got to be recognised. But we may hasten to add that any action legislative or executive taken pursuant to tha_t power is always subject to judicial review.\n\nIt is no\\ doubt true. that Art, icle' 38 and Article 43 of the\n\ni Constitution insist that the State, should endeavour to find .sufficient work for the people so that they may put their capacity to work into economic use and earn a fairly good living.\n\nBut these articles do not mean that every body should be, provided with a job in the civil service of the State and if a person is provided with one he should not be asked to leave it even for a just cause. If it were not so, there would be no justification for a small percentage of the population being in Government service and in receipt of regular income and a large majority of them . remaining outside with no guaranteed means of . living. It would certainly be an .ideal state of affairs if work could be found\n\n1 for all the able bodied men and women and everybody is guaranteed the right to participate in the production of national wealth and to enjoy the fruits thereof. But we are today far away from .that goal. The question whether a person who ceases to be a Government servant according to law should be rehabilitated by giving an. alternative employment is, as the law stands today, a matter of policy on which the Court has no voice.\n\nOn a fafr construction of the provisions of ArtiCle 311 (2) of the Constitution . and a considetati6n of the judii:ial precedents having a bearing on the question, we are of the vie\\V that it is not possible to hold that the termination of ervie llrouiiht about ht '\n\n. ..____\n\nK. RAJBNDRAN v. TA .. IL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 657\n\nthe abolition of a post effected in good faith attracts Article 311 (2).\n\nAn analysis of Article 311 (2) shows that it guarantees to a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post the right to defend himself in any proceeding leading to his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It requires that in such a case an inquiry should precede any such action, at that inquiry be should be informed of the charges against him and given a rasonable opportunity of being heard in respect ofthose charges. Where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such 'penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed.\n\nThe second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution sets out the circumstances when that clause would not apply. These provisions show that Article 311 (2) deals with the dismissal, reoval, or reduction in rank as a measure of1penalty on proof of an'act of misconduct on the part of the -official concerned. This fact is emphasised by the introduction of the words 'an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him' in Art. 311(2) when it was substituted in the place of the former clause (2) of Article 311 .\n\nby the Constitution (Fifteentb. Amendment) Act, 1963 which came into force on October 5, 1963. In the cir6umstances, it is difficult to hold that either the decision in Motl Ram Deka' s case (supra) or the decision in Papanna Gowda' s case (supra) lays down that the provisions of Article 3 H (2) should be complied with before the services of a Government servant are terminated as a consequence of the abolition of the post held by him for bona fide reasons. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the Act impugned in these petitions by which the village offices in the State of Tamil Nadu were abolished contravenes Article 311(2) of the Constitution.\n\nWe have now to consider the submission based on Article 14 of the Constitution. This aspect of the case bas to be examined from two angles- (i) whether the step taken by the Legislature to abolish the village offices in question is so arbitrary asto conflict with Article 14 of the, Constitution and (ii) whether unequals have been treated as equals by the Legislature.\n\nWhile dealing with the first point it is to be observed that the H posts of village officers which were governed by the Madras Act II of 1894, the adras Act III qf 1895 ~1!4 the ord's Standin~ Ordr~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nwere feudalistic in character and the appointments to those posts were g_verned by the law of primogeniture, the family in which the applicant was born, .the village in which he was born, and the fact whether he owned any property in the village or not. 'fhose factors are alien to modern administrative service and are clearly opposed to {\\rticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. No minimun educational qualifications had. been prescribed. It was enough if the applicants knew reading and writing in the case of some of them. The posts were not governed by the regular service rules applicable generally to all officials in the State service. Rightly therefore, the Administrative Reforms Commission recommended their abolition and reorganisation of the village service. The relevant part of the Report of the Administrative Reforms Commission reads thus:\n\n\"The concept of service was conspicuously absent in this relationship. Village officers were part-time employees and not subject to normal civil service discipline. They do not function from public offices where they were expected to receive people and transact public business.\n\nAll accounts, survey and registry records were in their private custody.\n\nVillagers had to go to the residences of Village officers and await the latter's convenience for referring to public records or for getting extracts from them. This reduced the accessibilty particularly of \"high caste\" village officers to the poor farmers of the \"backward and untouchable\" communities. Their emoluments for the part-time service, were meagre and appeard to be an honorarium rather than a living wage. Communications and living conditions in villages being difficult, subordinate inspecting officers were dependent on the private hospitality of village officers during their official visits. These factors led to the village officers developing an attitude of condescension in their dealings with villagers.\n\nEven though the hereditary principle was held to be unconstitutional recently, the members of their famlies still get preferential treatment, even if informally, in filling up vacant offices. In recent times, village officers have generally ceased to be leading and affluent ryots and are reduced to earn their livelihood Jar!lely through the misuse. of their position.\"\n\nK. RAJENDRAN •• TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 659\n\nThe problems involved in the reorganisation of Revenue villages in Tamil Nadu were also discussed in the Report of Mr.S.P.\n\nAmbrose, I.A.S. submitted to the State Government in January,\n\n1980. In the ourse of the Report, he observed:\n\n\"4.2 Re-organisation of Revenue Villages\n\n4.2.1. In view of the considerable increases in the total beriz of villages, particularly those with extensive irrigated areas, new rules , for the regulation and distribution of water in the project areas and in old ayacut areas, and the reduced work and responsibilities of the talayaris on account of the increase in the strength of the regular Police establishments the norms, for determining the strength of the villagee establishment, as laid down in B.P.\n\nMs. No. 324, dated the 9th December 1910, read with B.P. , Ms. No. 231, dated the 23rd February 1921, no longer held good.\n\n' 4.2.2. The size of the survey villages vary widely; 4.77 hectares is 'the extent of the smallest village and 20,947 hectares is the extent of the biggest village. In terms of population, the smllest has population of 33, while the largest has a population of 12, 777.\n\nEven though survey villages have been grouped to form convenient revenue groups for purposes of village administration, the size of revenue groups also vary widely. With the increases in the area cultivated, area irrigated (both from Government and private sources) and the number of pattas the work load in most villages has increased considerably now. The question for consideration is whether a comprehensive exercise to reorganise the revenue villages into convenient and viable village administrative units with reference to the existing work load should be attempted, and thereafter to revise the strength of the village establishment by laying down fresh norms for determing its strength. This will be a major administrative exercise.\n\nIf convenient village administrative units with, more or less, equal work load are to be constituted, several factors like area cultivated (gross and net), area irrigated, crop pattern, population, number of pattadars and beri~ Q§Ve to be taken into acco11nt '· • •• , lo•·, I\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nBefore this is attempted, the major\n\n0policy issue is whether to continue the present part-time system of village officers or to have regular, transferable Government servants as Village Officers in charge of bigger administrative nnits as recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission.''\n\nHaving regard to the abolition of similar village offices in the neighbouring States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and the agitation in the State of Tamil Nadu for reorgapisation of village\n\nservice, it cannot be said that the decision to abolish the village - offices which were feudalistic in character and' anachronisms in the ·-.I..~ modern age was arbitrary or unreasonable.\n\nAnother aspect of the same question is whether the impugned legislation is a colourable one passed with the object of treating the incumbents of village offices in an unjust way .. A similar contention was rejection by this Court in B.R. Shankaranarayaiia and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors.(1) in which the validity of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act (14 of 1961) which tried to achieve more or less a similar object arose for consideration, with the following observation.s at pages 1575-1576:\n\n\"(13) As pointed out by this Court in Gajapati Narayan Deo's case, AIR 1953 S.C. 375, the whole doctrine of colourable legislation .resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular Jaw. If the legislature is competent to pass the particular law, the motives which impel it to pass the law are really irrelevant. It is open to the Court to scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the legislature by device, purports to make a law which, though in formappears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it.\n\n(14) Beyond attempting the argument that the impugned Act is a piece of colourable legislation, learned Counsel for the appellant has not succeeded in substantiating bis contention that the Act and the rules made thereunder are merely a device for removing the present incumbents from their office.\n\nThe provisions of the Act and the\n\n()) AIR 1966 ~.C. !~7!.\n\n....\n\nk. kAIENbkAN v. TAMIL NAbiJ (Venicataramiah, J,) 661\n\nrules made thereunder plainly provide for the abolition of hereditary village offices and make those offices stipendiary posts. The Act makes no secret of its intention to abolish the hereditary posts.\n\n(15) It is argued that even after abolition, the same posts are sou.ght to , be continued. It is no doubt true that the names of the offices have not been changed but there is a basic structura) difference between the posts that have been abolished. The posts created by the new Act are stipendiary posts. They carry salaries according to the grades created by the rules. The incumbents are transferable and their service is pensionable. Different qualifications are prescribed for the new posts. From a consideration of the incidents attaching to the new posts it is clear that the old posts have been abolished and new posts have been created and that the whole complexion of the posts has been changed. ·\n\n(I~) The result is that in our op1mon the impugned Act cannot be held to be a piece of colourable legislation and as such invalid.\" -\n\nI E\n\n' A learned discussion on all the points raised in the above case is foqnd in the judgment of the High Court of Mysore in B.H.\n\nHonna/ige Gowda v. State of Mysore and Anr.(1) Hence the above contention has to be rejected.\n\nThe next contention of the petitioners which is of some subs- -..__ tance and which is based again on Artie.le 14 needs to be examined\n\n-here. It is seen from section 2 (e) of the Act that the expression 'part-time village officer' is defined as follows :·\n\n\"2. (e) \"part-time village officer\" means Village G Headman .(incluing Aditional Village Headman, Village Karnam (ll)Cludmg Chief Karnam and Additional Village Karnam) or Triune Officer appointed under -\n\n(I) AIR 1964'Mysore 84\n\n662 . Stll>RllME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.C.R •\n\n(i) the Madras Proprietary Estates') Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act II of 1894) or the Madras. Hereditazy Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act III of\n\n1895) ;\n\n(ii) the Boa.rd's Standing Orders ;\n\n(iii) the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or any other rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution ; or\n\n(iv) any other law,\n\nbut does not include Grama Kuvalar, Grama Paniyalar and. Pasana Kavalar;\"\n\nBy section 3 of the Act, the posts held by the part-time village . officers, as defined above, are abolished. As a consequence of the above provision not merely posts of officers appointed under the Madras Act No. II of 1894, the Madras Act No. III of 1895 and the Board's Standing Orders prior to December 16, 1970 but also the posts held by officers appointed after that date under the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution i.e. The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or any other rule made by the Governor have been abolished. It is argued that the abolition of posts ofofficials appointed after December 16, 1970 under the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We ha.ve given our anxious consideration to this submission. Any classification should satisfy two tests-(i) that there exists an inielligible differentia between those who arc grouped together and those who are not included in the group and (ii) that there exists a reasonable nexus between the differentia and the object for which classification is made. As stated earlier the object of the impugned legislation is to abolish posts which were part-time in nature and which had come into existence under laws which were feudalistic in character and to replaceithem by posts held by new incumbents who are recruited under it. The question for consideration is whether the grouping together of the part-time posts mentioned in section 2 (e) of the Act is unconstitutional. There is no dispute that upto Decem - ber 16, 1970 all appointments to village offices were being made under the two Madras Acts referred to above and the Board's\n\n-- _-.--...._ ~-\n\n\"\"\" >-- /\n\nk, llAJEN!>RAN V. TAMIL NAl>U (Venkataramiah, ).) 663\n\nStanding Orders on the basis of factors pealt w!th above. But after December 16, 1970, recruitment was being made in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 By the said Rules a new service of part-time village officers was constituted. Rule 5 thereof prescribed the minimum educational qualification and the tests which an applicant had to be eligible for being appointed. T.he Rules fixed the age of superannuation at 55 years. But even under these Rules, the persons who were appointed were part-time village ?fficers who were paid a fixed amount every month by way of remuneration. The nature of duties performed by them and the responsibilities they had to discharge were also the same. The posts held by them were non pensionable posts. Under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the village administrative officers to be appointed are to be recruited directly.\n\nNo person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of a village administrative officer unless he possesses the mininium general educational qualification referred to in Rule 12 (a) (i) of Part II of the Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Services Rules and prescribed Schedule I to the said Part II. Every person appointed to the post has within a 'period of one year from the date on .which he' joins duty to undergo the training and pass the tests prescribed by Rule 9 of the Rules made under the Aci. Every person appointed as -a village administrative officer is liable to be transferred from one place to another. The age of superannuation is fixed at 58 years. The said posts are no longer part-time posts and the holders thereof are full time Government officials entitled to draw salary every month in L\n\n~, the scale of Rs. 350-10-420-15-600 and other allowances and these posts are pensionable posts. It is also to be seen from the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission and other material placed before us that the revenue village will be reorganised\n\nI ·---._ so as to form viable administrative units which would require the , -------- services of a whole time village administrative officer. The area under a village administrative officer is much larger than many of the existing revenue villages. When such reorganisation of the village administration iS contemplated, it would not be poss, ible to allow charges of diverse sizes to continue to remain in any pa; t of the State of Tamil Nadu. In these circumstancs. even though the village officers appointed after December 16, 1970 are in a way different from the village officials appointed prior to that date, they too cannot be equated with the new village administrative officers who will be appointed under the Act and the Rules made thereunder.\n\nSUPililME CoUilT ilEl>oil.t~\n\n11982) 3 s.c.ii..\n\nIt cannot,-therefore, be held that Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated in abolishing the posts held by those appointed after December 16, 1970.\n\nThe petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 6191, 6355 and 6356 of 1980 who are holders of village offices in Tiruttani Taluk and Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act on the ground that the State Legislature could not pass the law without the previous approval of Central Government as required by the proviso to sub:section ( 4) of section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959 (Cenral Act 56 of 1959).\n\nThe area in which these petitioners were working as vi11age officials forms part of the transferred territories transferred from Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nand under the aforesaid Act. Their contention is that since they were working as village officials in the said area prior to the commencement of the above said _Act the conditions of their service could not be altered to their prejudice without D obtaining the previous approval of the Cen1ral Government.\n\nSection 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959 reads :\n\n\"43. Provisions relating to services -\n\n(I) Every person, who immediately before the appointed day, is serving in connection with the affairs of Andhra Pradesh or Madras shall, as from that day, continue so to serve, unless he is required by general or special order of the Central Government to serve provisionalr in connection with the affairs of the other State. - /\n\n(2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Central Government shall by general or special order, determine the State to which every person provisionally allotted to Andhra Pradesh or Madras shall be finally allotted for service and the date from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect.\n\n(3) Every person who is finally allotted under the provisions of subsection (2) to Andhra Pradesh or Madras shall, if he is not already serving therein, be made\n\nIt, llAl~NbltAN v. tAMIL NADU (ltenkataramiah, !.)\n\n66S\n\navailable for serving in that State from such date as may be agreed upon between the two State Governments or in default of such agreement ; as may be determined by the 'Central Government.\n\n(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect, after the appointed day, the operation of the provisions of Chapter.I of Part XIV_ of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of Andhra Pradesh or Madras.\n\nProvided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of\n\nany person provisionally or finally allotted to Andhra Pradesh or Madras under this section shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous\n\napproval of the Central Government.\n\n(5) The Central Government may at any time before or after the appointed day give such directions to either\n\nState Government as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provi- E sions of this section and the State Government shall comply with such directions.\"\n\nThe answer of the State Government to the above contention is that the petitioners in these peiitiops are not allotted under section 43 (2) of the above said Act to the State of Tamil Nadu and hence the proviso to sub-section ( 4) of section 43 is not applicable.\n\nThe petitioners have not shown any such order of allotment under section 43 (2). Hence the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 43 is not attracted.\n\nUnder section 43 (4) of the above said Act, the State Government is entitled to deal with all the officials in the areas transferred to them in accordance with Chapter I of Part XIV of 'the\n\nConstitution. The above contention is, therefore, rejected.\n\nIn the course of the hearing on a suggestfon made by the\n\nCourt, the learned Attorney General filed a memorandum which H reads as follows :\n\n666 SlJPllEMR CbtJllt ltl!Pbb.tS [19S2J 3 s.c.11.\n\n\"All the erstwhile Village Olficers who possess the minimum general educational qualification as required under the Abolition Act and irrespective of their age (but subject to the rule of retirement framed under _the Abolition Act and the Rules fi'amed thereunder) will be screened by a Committee to be appointed by the Government.\n\nThey need not make any application and they need not also appear for any test conducted by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission for the post of Village Administrative Officer. Guidelines to the Committee will be a~ follows:-\n\n(I) Punishment\n\n(2) Physical condition.\n\nAll the persons selected by the Committee will be appointed by the competent authorities and relaxation in respect of age will be given. They will be new appointees under the Abolition Act and will be governed by the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Compensation will not be available to those who are so appointed.\n\nThe remaining vaca\"cies will be filled up from among the candidates already selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.''\n\nAfter the above petitions were filed under the interim order passed in these cases all the officials involved in these cases are being paid the honQrarium by the State Government. Those who fail in these petitions would have become liable to repay the amount which they have thus drawn in excess of the compensation, if any, they may be entitled to. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu that the State Government will not take steps to recover such excess amount. The above statement is recorded.\n\nThe attitude displayed by the State Government in filing the memorandum referred to above and in making a statement\n\n, H to the effect that the amount paid pursuant to the interim orders In in excess of the compensation payable the village officials concerned will not be reci>vered is a highly commendable one and we record\n\nIt. kAl~NDltAN v. 'tAl.tlL NAOU (Venkataran#ah, J;) 667\n\nour deep appreciation for the laudable stand taken by the Government.\n\nIt was, however, strenuously urged by Shri R. K. Garg that those who have to vacate the posts would be without any work and some of them have large families and that compensation, if any,\n\n1 payable to them is very inadequate. He nrged that it was the duty of the State Government to make adequate provision pursuant to Article 38 and Article 43 of the Constitution. These Articles are in Part IV of the Constitution. They are not enforceable by the courts but they are still fundamental in the governance of the country.\n\n• The natnre of the relationship that exists or ought to exist between the Government and the people in India is different from the relationship between the ruler and his subjects in the West. A study of the history of the fight for liberty \\bat has been going on in the West shows that it has been a continuous agitation of the subjects for more and more freedom from a king or the ruler who had once acquired complete control over the destinies of his subjects.\n\nThe Indian tradition or history is entirely different. The attitude of an Indian ruler is depicted in the statement or Sri1 Rama in the\n\nRamayana thus :\n\n(Ramayana III-W-3)\n\n(Kshatriyas (the kings) bear the bow (wield the power) in order to see that there is no cry of distress (from ar.y quarter).\n\nThe duty of the administrator, therefore, is that he should promptly take all necessary steps to alleviate the sufferings of the\n\npeopl~ even without being asked to do so.\n\nWhile attending to his duties an administrator should always remember the great saying of the Tamil saint Tiruvalluvar :\n\n668 stri>k~Mil COURT kili>Okts ll98iJ 3 s.C.k.\n\nDo.nought that soul repe.nting must deplore,\n\n' If thou hast sinned, 'its well if thou dost sin no more.\n\n(Let a minister never do acts of which he would have to grieve saying, \"What is this I have done\", (but) should he do (them), it were good that he grieved not.)\n\n(No. 655 in Tirukkural : Translation by Rev. Dr. G.U.\n\nPope and others (Reprint 1970) P• 175).\n\nAn administrator's actions should be such as he is not driven to repent for the mistakes he may have committed.\n\nBut if he has committed any mistakes in the past he shout!! try to avoid a repetition of such mistakes. It is significant that in Tamil language the equivalent of the word 'people' is 'Makkal' which is also sometimes used as the equivalent of 'children'. It is for the State Government to consider what can be done to those who fail in' the petitions.\n\nThis observation is made particularly in regard to those who were recruited after December 16, 1970 under the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution in view of the fact tha.t their recruitment was not made on the hereditary principle. Those who have passed S.S.L.C. examination amongst them come within the si:ope of the statement made by the learned Attorney General.\n\nBut those who have merely completed S.S.L.C. examination but not passed it fall outside the scope of that statement even though they have gained experience while they were in office. We hope and trust that the State Government will look into this matter purely from a humanitarian point of view.\n\nThis is only a suggestion and not a direction.\n\nIn the result the petitions are dismissed subject to the following:\n\n(i) The State Government will give 'effect to the memorandum filed on its behalf which is incorporated in this judgment in the case of those who possess ·.the minimu111 general qualifications prescribed under the Act and the Rules made thereunder and who were holding the posts of part-time village officers immediately before the Act came into force. The State Government shall re-employ ru such persons who have not crossed the age of superannuation and who are selected as per the\n\nK. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 669\n\nmemorandum in the new cadre' within four months from today. Until they are so selected, they will not be paid any remuneration. Even if they are re-employed, the amount paid to them pursuant to the interim orders will not be recovered from them.\n\n(ii) The compensation, . if any, payable by the State\n\nI Government under sectiop S of the Act to those who cease to be village officers shall be adjusted against the amount paid pursuant to the interim orders passed in these cases. The State Government will not recover from thein any amount paid to them pursuant to the interim orders passed. in these cases in excess' of the compensation, if any, payable to them.\n\n(iii) The interim orders stand vacated with effect from April IS, 1982.\n\n(iv) No costs. ·\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed", "total_entities": 274, "entities": [{"text": "628\n\nK. RAJENDRAN & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. RAJENDRAN & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADO & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the State of Tamil Nadu the administration was carried on at the village level by 3."}}, {"text": "Village Service Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1343, "end_char": 1368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1611, "end_char": 1653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "RAIENDRAN V. TAMIL NAbU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2288, "end_char": 2311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k. RAIENDRAN V. TAMIL NAbU (Venkataralniah, J.) 629\n\nThe distinctive features of the service conditions of the village officers appointed under the a:foresaid two Acts or the Board's Standing Orders were that they were parttime employees of th~ Government, tbey fiCre appointed direct1y by the Revenue Officer, the records maintained by them could be retained in their frouses, no fixed hours of duty were prescribed, they were not constituted into any distinct service, could not be transferred outside their district, and that they were paid honorarium for the services that they dis~ charged."}}, {"text": "Venkataralniah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k. RAIENDRAN V. TAMIL NAbU (Venkataralniah, J.) 629\n\nThe distinctive features of the service conditions of the village officers appointed under the a:foresaid two Acts or the Board's Standing Orders were that they were parttime employees of th~ Government, tbey fiCre appointed direct1y by the Revenue Officer, the records maintained by them could be retained in their frouses, no fixed hours of duty were prescribed, they were not constituted into any distinct service, could not be transferred outside their district, and that they were paid honorarium for the services that they dis~ charged.", "canonical_name": "Venkataralniah"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 931", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3121, "end_char": 3137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3155, "end_char": 3164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3228, "end_char": 3238, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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Rules, 1970 which provided for tbe constitution of the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service, consisting of (i) Village ileadman, additional village headman, (ii) village kamam, additional village karnam, and\n\n(iii) taJayari and nirganti and the method of recrUitment to the said posts."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government accepted this recommenda1ion and promulgated on May 17, 1975 tho Tamil Nadu ViJlage Officers (appoirited under B, S, Os) Service Rules 1974."}}, {"text": "Service Rules 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4503, "end_char": 4521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 9, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereaf1er on October 9, 1978 the - Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules 1978 were issued fixing the age of retirement of village 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part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5541, "end_char": 5551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1980", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "November J4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To achieve this, the Ordinance was promulgated on November J4, 1980 which was later, replaced by the Act."}}, {"text": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981", "statute": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "(1981] 2 SCR 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7641, "end_char": 7656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 310", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981", "statute": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7940, "end_char": 7950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981", "statute": "Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8245, "end_char": 8256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1971) 2 S.C.R. 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 S.C.R. 1034", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10727, "end_char": 10747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11096, "end_char": 11117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1894", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1894"}}, {"text": "Administrative Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11595, "end_char": 11628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Administrative Reforms Commission rightly recommended their abolition and reorganisation of the village service. . ["}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12304, "end_char": 12314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12618, "end_char": 12635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[662 I'] •\n\n(ii) Upto December 16, 1970 all appointments to Village Officen were being made under the two Madras Acts and the Board's Standing Orders on the basis of factors dealt with therein, but after December 16, 1970 recruitment was made in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970."}}, {"text": "Village Officen were being made under the two Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12656, "end_char": 12712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13684, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14893, "end_char": 14903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14926, "end_char": 14941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nK. K. Venugopal, (6355-56 of 1980) (In W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "F.S. Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15003, "end_char": 15015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6212, 6427 8 & 5880-82/80), F.S. Nariman, (In W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "R.K. Gargo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6264-70/80) R.K. Gargo, (In W.P. Nos.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Gargo"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kackar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15086, "end_char": 15097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6191 & 6426/80), S.N. Kackar, (In W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15135, "end_char": 15146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5921/80\n\n& 220/81 and G.L. Sanghi, (In W.P. No."}}, {"text": "C.S. Vaidyanathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Vlneet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15211, "end_char": 15223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "B Parthasarathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15225, "end_char": 15240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "A.T.M.\n\nSampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15264, "end_char": 15275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "N.A. Subramanium", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15277, "end_char": 15293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Naresh Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15295, "end_char": 15307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15309, "end_char": 15322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. Srinivasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15327, "end_char": 15340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.\n\nSampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Lal Narayan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15363, "end_char": 15380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Singh, Attorney General (In W.P. No 5880/80) ."}}, {"text": "M.K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15423, "end_char": 15436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Banerjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "R. Krishnamoorthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15484, "end_char": 15501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6355/80) R. Krishnamoorthy, Adv."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15579, "end_char": 15591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale, (In W.P. No."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15616, "end_char": 15629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212 .of 1980) for the Respondents ..\n\nA. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Kant Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15653, "end_char": 15670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212 .of 1980) for the Respondents ..\n\nA. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15675, "end_char": 15683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212 .of 1980) for the Respondents ..\n\nA. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. V, Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15733, "end_char": 15745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212 .of 1980) for the Respondents ..\n\nA. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH.", "canonical_name": "Venkataralniah"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16132, "end_char": 16152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16223, "end_char": 16292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16295, "end_char": 16309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16490, "end_char": 16495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tamil Nadu, as in other parts of India, the village has been the basic unit of revenue administration from the earliest times of\n\nwhich we have any record."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18474, "end_char": 18480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the end of the ninetellllth century', two Acts Were brought into force in the Presidency of Madras for the purpose of regulating the work of some of the village officers."}}, {"text": "Village Service Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18586, "end_char": 18611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19039, "end_char": 19082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Southern india", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20059, "end_char": 20073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "daris in Southern india."}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24314, "end_char": 24325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908", "statute": "Court had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24515, "end_char": 24527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908", "statute": "Court had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Madras Here ditary Village Offices Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24535, "end_char": 24579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. RA!ENDRAN 'TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24744, "end_char": 24768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".>-\n\nK. RA!ENDRAN 'TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 637\n\nan amalgamated village under that Act, the Collector should select the persons whom he considered to be the best qualified from among the families of the last holders of the offices in the villages which bad been abolished as a consequence of such amalgamation was void as it contravened Article I 6 (2) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24770, "end_char": 24783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".>-\n\nK. RA!ENDRAN 'TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 637\n\nan amalgamated village under that Act, the Collector should select the persons whom he considered to be the best qualified from among the families of the last holders of the offices in the villages which bad been abolished as a consequence of such amalgamation was void as it contravened Article I 6 (2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Venkataralniah"}}, {"text": "Madras Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25178, "end_char": 25201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the above decision, instructions were iss.ued by the Madras Board of Revenue on March 12, 1962 to the effect that in respect of future vacancies in village offices governed by 'the Madras Act No."}}, {"text": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25503, "end_char": 25550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25661, "end_char": 25671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act", "statute": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25738, "end_char": 25763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Acts which contained provisions providing for appointment to village offices on hereditary basis we~ violative of Article 16 of ihe Constitution in view of the pronouncement of this Court in Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao's case (supra), the State Legislature pass\n\ned the Madras Proprietory Estates' Village Service and the Madras Hereditary Village Offices (Repeal) Act, 1968 (Madras Act No.20 of\n\n1968) repealing the above two statutes viz.", "canonical_name": "Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao"}}, {"text": "Kanyakumari district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26185, "end_char": 26205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It extended to the whole of the State of Madras, except the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunelveli district (vide section 1 (2) of the Madras Act No."}}, {"text": "Tirunelveli district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26238, "end_char": 26258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It extended to the whole of the State of Madras, except the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunelveli district (vide section 1 (2) of the Madras Act No."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26265, "end_char": 26274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act", "statute": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26333, "end_char": 26342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act", "statute": "Since it was felt that the above two Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26570, "end_char": 26581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26603, "end_char": 26612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26764, "end_char": 26773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26915, "end_char": 26931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 1, 1968, the Governor of Tamil Nadu promulgated a Rule under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution providing that \"the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue applicable to non hereditary village offices shall apply to every holder of a village office to which the Madras' Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act No."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27000, "end_char": 27011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27206, "end_char": 27251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27508, "end_char": 27517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894", "statute": "Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Governor of Tainil Nadu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27556, "end_char": 27579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1968, the Governor of Tainil Nadu\n\n638 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27659, "end_char": 27670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894", "statute": "Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "December I 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28046, "end_char": 28064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "promulgated under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution the TamiJ Nadu Village officers Servii; e Rules, 1970 providing for the constitutioµ of the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service consisting of (i) village headman, additional village headm11n, (ii) village karnam, additional village karnam and (iii) tal11yari and nirganti and the method of recruitment to the said posts~ The said Rules came into force on December I 6, 1970 and they extended to the whole of the State of Tamil Na<lu except the Kanyakumari District and the Shenootah taluk of the Tirunelveli district."}}, {"text": "Standing Orders before the date on which the said Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28726, "end_char": 28781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29114, "end_char": 29138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Rules prescribed that every person who made an application for apppoint- .meot the post of village headtna11 or' additional village headman or village kitrnam or additional _village karnam should possess the following qualifications, namely (i) he sl)ould have completed the S.S.L.C. Examination held by the Government of Tamil Nadu and (ii) he should have secured a pass in the special tests specified in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Village Officers Conduct Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29423, "end_char": 29470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29504, "end_char": 29515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Conduct Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Conduct Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Village Officers Conduct Rules provided that the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30010, "end_char": 30109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tirun.elveli district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31053, "end_char": 31074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".From November l~, 1973 all the three sets of Rules which came into force on December 16, 1970, as stated above, became applicable to the village officers in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirun.elveli district also."}}, {"text": "T.A. Verghese", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31218, "end_char": 31231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1973, the Administrative Reforms Commission headed by Mr. T.A. Verghese,."}}, {"text": "Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32956, "end_char": 32999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33124, "end_char": 33135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895", "statute": "the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "Tirunel veli district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34018, "end_char": 34039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly as regards village officers working in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunel veli district which came over to the State of Tamil Nadu from Kerala in I 956 on the reorganisation of States, the CommissiQll observed that most of the village officers of those trans ferred territories who were qualified and fulltime Government servants should be absorbed in the new set up as envisaged by the Commission; On May 17,1975, the Governor of Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34063, "end_char": 34082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly as regards village officers working in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunel veli district which came over to the State of Tamil Nadu from Kerala in I 956 on the reorganisation of States, the CommissiQll observed that most of the village officers of those trans ferred territories who were qualified and fulltime Government servants should be absorbed in the new set up as envisaged by the Commission; On May 17,1975, the Governor of Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34088, "end_char": 34094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly as regards village officers working in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunel veli district which came over to the State of Tamil Nadu from Kerala in I 956 on the reorganisation of States, the CommissiQll observed that most of the village officers of those trans ferred territories who were qualified and fulltime Government servants should be absorbed in the new set up as envisaged by the Commission; On May 17,1975, the Governor of Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34465, "end_char": 34484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34676, "end_char": 34688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above Rules were, however, kept in abeyance by an order made on July 1, 1975 on receipt of representations from the village' officers in regard to the fixation of the age of superannuation at 55 years."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34818, "end_char": 34833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 24, 1977, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu announced on the floor of the Legislative Assembly that the Government proposed to set up a Committee to ."}}, {"text": "October 9,1978,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35054, "end_char": 35069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on October 9,1978, ihe Tamil Nadn Village Officers (appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules, 1978 were issued _fixing the age of retirement of the village officers at 60 years."}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35127, "end_char": 35146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36012, "end_char": 36037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "III of 1895 prior to the decision of this Court in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao's case (supra) which as rendered on December 6, 1960, filed writ petitions on the file of the High Court of Madras stating that the Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under the B.S.Os) .Service Rules, 1978 which fixed the age of superannuation of village officers.", "canonical_name": "Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao"}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36228, "end_char": 36247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras11llowed", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36431, "end_char": 36459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras11llowed the said writ petitions by its judgment dated August 18, 1980 holding: \"We have already extracted sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of the rules."}}, {"text": "August 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36506, "end_char": 36521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras11llowed the said writ petitions by its judgment dated August 18, 1980 holding: \"We have already extracted sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of the rules."}}, {"text": "6th December, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36985, "end_char": 37003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of these petitioners,· who were appointed under the provisions of Madras Act 3 of 1895 before 6th December, 1960, there was no question of their being qualified to be appointed to the village office under the Board's Standing Orders applicable to them, and their qualifications and ."}}, {"text": "December 16,1970 to", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37910, "end_char": 37929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear that some of the other village officers to whom the said Rules had been made\"applicable had also filed writ petitions on the file of the High Court questioning the validity of the Rules on the ground that the said Rqles made a discrimination betw6en them and the ' village officers who were holding office prior to December 16,1970 to whom the said Rules were held to be inapplicable by the judgment of the High Court delivered on August 18, 1980 and those petilions were posted for hearing during the first week 'of December, 1980."}}, {"text": "Before the said petitions were taken up for hearing the Governor of Tamil Nadu issued the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38128, "end_char": 38227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38936, "end_char": 38964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fa the meanwhile the Tamil Nadu State Legislature pdssed the Act which is impugned in these petitions replacing the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39748, "end_char": 39765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a policy decision to abolish all the posts of part-time village officers on grounds of admillistrative necessity and to introduce a system of whole-time officers to be incharge of village admininistration, the Act came to be enacted• with effect from November 14, 1980 in the place of the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39994, "end_char": 40003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act III of 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40285, "end_char": 40307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40342, "end_char": 40380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orama Kavalar Orama Paniyalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40438, "end_char": 40467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression 'parttime village officers' is defined in section 2 (e) of the Act as village h<, adman (including additional village (headman village) karnam (including chief karnam and additional village karnam) or Triu11e officer (who was exercising functions of •three different village officers) appointed under the Madras Act II of'I 894, the Madras Act III of 1895, the Board's Standing Orders, the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970 Officers Kuvalar, or any other law but does not include; Orama Kavalar Orama Paniyalar and Pasana Kavalar."}}, {"text": "Pasana Kavalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40472, "end_char": 40486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression 'parttime village officers' is defined in section 2 (e) of the Act as village h<, adman (including additional village (headman village) karnam (including chief karnam and additional village karnam) or Triu11e officer (who was exercising functions of •three different village officers) appointed under the Madras Act II of'I 894, the Madras Act III of 1895, the Board's Standing Orders, the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970 Officers Kuvalar, or any other law but does not include; Orama Kavalar Orama Paniyalar and Pasana Kavalar."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40553, "end_char": 40565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40581, "end_char": 40587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40831, "end_char": 40840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41003, "end_char": 41013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu village Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Kayakumari district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41341, "end_char": 41360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.) 643\n\ntime Government servaut in the Kayakumari district and Sheitcottah taluli of the Tirunelveli districts ."}}, {"text": "Art.19(J)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41550, "end_char": 41562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41616, "end_char": 41627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41683, "end_char": 41693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41976, "end_char": 41992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42155, "end_char": 42166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42430, "end_char": 42441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42842, "end_char": 42852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43076, "end_char": 43086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43095, "end_char": 43106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43122, "end_char": 43132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H. Eliot Kapla6", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45495, "end_char": 45510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Eliot Kapla6 writes in bis book entitled \"The Law of Civil Service\" at pages 214-115 thus:\n\n\"8. \""}}, {"text": "k. RAJENl'>RAN I'. TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45836, "end_char": 45865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notion>' much too prevalent, that any one who bas been appointed :ifter aompetitive examination is entitl ~\n\n~ - ~·'\n\n/ ' \" k. RAJENl'>RAN I'."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47660, "end_char": 47673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "law on the question Of abolition of posts in, civil service as it prevails'.in United States of An\\erica ..\n\n' In England too ther~ is provision for compulsory premature retirement in the public interest on structural grounds, grounds of limited efficiency and redundancy. ("}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47695, "end_char": 47702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "law on the question Of abolition of posts in, civil service as it prevails'.in United States of An\\erica ..\n\n' In England too ther~ is provision for compulsory premature retirement in the public interest on structural grounds, grounds of limited efficiency and redundancy. ("}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48386, "end_char": 48396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48613, "end_char": 48624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Union of India & Ors.(1) in which Chandrachud, C.J. has observed at pages 60-61 thus :."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49201, "end_char": 49211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49800, "end_char": 49810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50054, "end_char": 50065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. tAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50206, "end_char": 50219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".._ I\n\nk. RAJENbRAN V. tAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 641\n\nwhicli the person is working."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50381, "end_char": 50391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50750, "end_char": 50757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50847, "end_char": 50857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51111, "end_char": 51122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fertili1er Corporation Kamgar Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51176, "end_char": 51211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already seen in the Fertili1er Corporation Kamgar Union's case (supra) the observation to the effect : 'Even under Article 31 t of the Constitution, the right to continue in service falls with the 'abolition of the post in which the person is working.'"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51271, "end_char": 51281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51997, "end_char": 52018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53590, "end_char": 53601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53829, "end_char": 53840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53954, "end_char": 53965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54056, "end_char": 54059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While construing Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, as it stood then, in Parashotam Lal Dhinra v. Unfon of India,(') Das, C.J. observed:\n\n\"The Government cannot terminate his service unless it is entitled to do so (I) by virtue of a special term of the contract of employment, e.g., by giving the requisite notice provided by the contract or (2) by the -rules governing the conditions of his serVice, e.g., on attainment of the age of superannuation prescribed by the rules, or on the fulfilment of rule conditions for compulsory retirement or subject to certain safeguards, on the abolition of the post or on being\n\n(1) (1958] S.C.R. 828 @ 841."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55689, "end_char": 55695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56244, "end_char": 56255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56277, "end_char": 56298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) was reviewed by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Moti Ram Deka etc.", "canonical_name": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56629, "end_char": 56639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57229, "end_char": 57240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57929, "end_char": 57940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58389, "end_char": 58403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendragad kar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58729, "end_char": 58744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "another at page 843 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra' s case, Gajendragad kar, J. (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) observed at pages 718-719 thus:\n\n'Reading these two observation.s together, there can be no doubt that with the exception of appointments held under special contract, the Court took the view that H wherever a civil servant was appointed to a permanent post substantively, be bad a right to hold that post until he reached the age of superannuation or was compulsorjll\"."}}, {"text": "Moti Ram Deka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58806, "end_char": 58819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "another at page 843 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra' s case, Gajendragad kar, J. (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) observed at pages 718-719 thus:\n\n'Reading these two observation.s together, there can be no doubt that with the exception of appointments held under special contract, the Court took the view that H wherever a civil servant was appointed to a permanent post substantively, be bad a right to hold that post until he reached the age of superannuation or was compulsorjll\".", "canonical_name": "Moti Ram Deka"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59436, "end_char": 59444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59784, "end_char": 59798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60095, "end_char": 60106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60322, "end_char": 60327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of removal of a Government servant holding a permanent post on its abolition was considered by Desai; J. and Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in P. V. ·, Naik & Ors."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60610, "end_char": 60624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61039, "end_char": 61091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 24, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61117, "end_char": 61131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963 which came into force on April 24, 1964, the University of Agricultural Sciences was established."}}, {"text": "University of Agricultural Sciences", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61137, "end_char": 61172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963 which came into force on April 24, 1964, the University of Agricultural Sciences was established."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61211, "end_char": 61220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963", "statute": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "September 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61934, "end_char": 61952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated September 29, 1965 issued under section 7(4) and (5) of that Act, the control and management of a m, unber of research and educational institutions under the Department of Agriculture were transferred to the University."}}, {"text": "section 7(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61966, "end_char": 61978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963", "statute": "Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62453, "end_char": 62462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62515, "end_char": 62526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 62562, "end_char": 62582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon he questioned •he validity of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 7 of the said Act on the ground that they contravened Article 311 (2) of the Constitution befqre the High Court of Mysore, which upheld his plea."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65572, "end_char": 65583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66322, "end_char": 66333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parashotam Lal Dhingra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66391, "end_char": 66413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After consi' dering the effect of the decisions in Parashotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra), Champakial Chiman/a( Shah v. The Uion of India,('-)\n\n11) [I974J l!S.il."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66915, "end_char": 66926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67661, "end_char": 67672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Deka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67857, "end_char": 67865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice it to say that the Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is no authority for the proposition that Article 311 (2) would be attracted in such a case."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67922, "end_char": 67933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Murtaza Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68087, "end_char": 68104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above view was followed by this Court in State of Haryana,\n\nv. Des Raj Sa'ngar & Anr.(1) to which one of us (Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.) was a party."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68123, "end_char": 68129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khanna, J. speaking for the Court observed at pages 1037-38 thus : ."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69331, "end_char": 69342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 69442, "end_char": 69470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before concluding our discussion on this topic, it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Abdul Kha/ik Renzu & Ors."}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69507, "end_char": 69533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v, The State of Jammu and Kashmir(') to\n\n.. which one of us (Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. (as he then was) was a party in w)lich the validity of the abolition of posts constituting the special police squad of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was questioned."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70456, "end_char": 70467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parshotam Lal Dhlngra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70846, "end_char": 70867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Probably the 'safeguards' referred to in the passage at page 841 in Parshotam Lal Dhlngra' s case (supra) meant an abolition of posts which was in good \"faith and not a pretence of abolition • of a post resorted to in order to get rid of its incumbent and the creation of tlte same post with a different form or name with a new\n\nincumbent.", "canonical_name": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra"}}, {"text": "lligh Court of Jammu and 'Kashmir", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 71140, "end_char": 71173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above view of the lligh Court of Jammu and 'Kashmir is however, in conflict with the decision in Ramanatha\n\n(1) AIR 1965 J & K U.\n\nl.l\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 3 s.c.k."}}, {"text": "Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71299, "end_char": 71305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/ Pillai' s case (supra) and hence must be considered as having been overruled by this Court."}}, {"text": "Article 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72371, "end_char": 72381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73922, "end_char": 73933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73955, "end_char": 73966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74753, "end_char": 74764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74877, "end_char": 74888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75175, "end_char": 75186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75252, "end_char": 75263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75345, "end_char": 75360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amendment) Act, 1963 which came into force on October 5, 1963."}}, {"text": "Motl Ram Deka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75436, "end_char": 75449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the cir6umstances, it is difficult to hold that either the decision in Motl Ram Deka' s case (supra) or the decision in Papanna Gowda' s case (supra) lays down that the provisions of Article 3 H (2) should be complied with before the services of a Government servant are terminated as a consequence of the abolition of the post held by him for bona fide reasons.", "canonical_name": "Moti Ram Deka"}}, {"text": "Papanna Gowda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75485, "end_char": 75498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the cir6umstances, it is difficult to hold that either the decision in Motl Ram Deka' s case (supra) or the decision in Papanna Gowda' s case (supra) lays down that the provisions of Article 3 H (2) should be complied with before the services of a Government servant are terminated as a consequence of the abolition of the post held by him for bona fide reasons."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75548, "end_char": 75557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75896, "end_char": 75910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75981, "end_char": 75991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76197, "end_char": 76207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78868, "end_char": 78878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. RAJENDRAN •• TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 659\n\nThe problems involved in the reorganisation of Revenue villages in Tamil Nadu were also discussed in the Report of Mr.S.P.\n\nAmbrose, I.A.S. submitted to the State Government in January,\n\n1980."}}, {"text": "S.P.\n\nAmbrose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79022, "end_char": 79035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. RAJENDRAN •• TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 659\n\nThe problems involved in the reorganisation of Revenue villages in Tamil Nadu were also discussed in the Report of Mr.S.P.\n\nAmbrose, I.A.S. submitted to the State Government in January,\n\n1980."}}, {"text": "9th December 1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79667, "end_char": 79684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "324, dated the 9th December 1910, read with B.P. , Ms. No."}}, {"text": "B.P.", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 79696, "end_char": 79700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "324, dated the 9th December 1910, read with B.P. , Ms. No."}}, {"text": "23rd February 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79726, "end_char": 79744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "231, dated the 23rd February 1921, no longer held good."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 81062, "end_char": 81099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Gajapati Narayan Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82330, "end_char": 82350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State of Mysore and Ors.(1) in which the validity of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act (14 of 1961) which tried to achieve more or less a similar object arose for consideration, with the following observation.s at pages 1575-1576:\n\n\"(13) As pointed out by this Court in Gajapati Narayan Deo's case, AIR 1953 S.C. 375, the whole doctrine of colourable legislation .resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular Jaw."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84723, "end_char": 84732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Village Service Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85137, "end_char": 85162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85164, "end_char": 85185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hereditazy Village Offices Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85202, "end_char": 85238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act III of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85240, "end_char": 85257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85315, "end_char": 85362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85408, "end_char": 85419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Grama Kuvalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85488, "end_char": 85501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hereditazy Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act III of\n\n1895) ;\n\n(ii) the Boa.rd's Standing Orders ;\n\n(iii) the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or any other rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution ; or\n\n(iv) any other law,\n\nbut does not include Grama Kuvalar, Grama Paniyalar and."}}, {"text": "Grama Paniyalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85503, "end_char": 85518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hereditazy Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act III of\n\n1895) ;\n\n(ii) the Boa.rd's Standing Orders ;\n\n(iii) the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or any other rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution ; or\n\n(iv) any other law,\n\nbut does not include Grama Kuvalar, Grama Paniyalar and."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85545, "end_char": 85554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85962, "end_char": 85973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86003, "end_char": 86050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86240, "end_char": 86251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86288, "end_char": 86298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87046, "end_char": 87055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "statute": "The Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970"}}, {"text": "Decem - ber 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87122, "end_char": 87142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute that upto Decem - ber 16, 1970 all appointments to village offices were being made under the two Madras Acts referred to above and the Board's\n-.--.... ~-\n\n\"\"\" >-- /\n\nk, llAJEN!>RAN V. TAMIL NAl>U (Venkataramiah, ).)"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87477, "end_char": 87524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part II of the Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Services Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88433, "end_char": 88491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88507, "end_char": 88517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Services Rules", "statute": "Part II of the Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Services Rules"}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89745, "end_char": 89764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When such reorganisation of the village administration iS contemplated, it would not be poss, ible to allow charges of diverse sizes to continue to remain in any pa; t of the State of Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "SUPililME CoUilT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90076, "end_char": 90092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPililME CoUilT ilEl>oil.t~\n\n11982) 3 s.c.ii..\n\nIt cannot,-therefore, be held that Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated in abolishing the posts held by those appointed after December 16, 1970."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90160, "end_char": 90170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tiruttani Taluk and Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90388, "end_char": 90455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90553, "end_char": 90571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6191, 6355 and 6356 of 1980 who are holders of village offices in Tiruttani Taluk and Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act on the ground that the State Legislature could not pass the law without the previous approval of Central Government as required by the proviso to sub:section ( 4) of section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959 (Cenral Act 56 of 1959)."}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90622, "end_char": 90632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tiruttani Taluk and Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act", "statute": "Tiruttani Taluk and Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90640, "end_char": 90702, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nand under the aforesaid Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90858, "end_char": 90910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cen1ral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91169, "end_char": 91187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their contention is that since they were working as village officials in the said area prior to the commencement of the above said _Act the conditions of their service could not be altered to their prejudice without D obtaining the previous approval of the Cen1ral Government."}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91190, "end_char": 91200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nand under the aforesaid Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nand under the aforesaid Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91208, "end_char": 91270, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93419, "end_char": 93429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93528, "end_char": 93538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93624, "end_char": 93634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93680, "end_char": 93690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93716, "end_char": 93726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94582, "end_char": 94618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They need not make any application and they need not also appear for any test conducted by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission for the post of Village Administrative Officer."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96253, "end_char": 96263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, strenuously urged by Shri R. K. Garg that those who have to vacate the posts would be without any work and some of them have large families and that compensation, if any,\n\n1 payable to them is very inadequate.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Gargo"}}, {"text": "Article 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96530, "end_char": 96540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96545, "end_char": 96555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97322, "end_char": 97326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attitude of an Indian ruler is depicted in the statement or Sri1 Rama in the\n\nRamayana thus :\n\n(Ramayana III-W-3)\n\n(Kshatriyas (the kings) bear the bow (wield the power) in order to see that there is no cry of distress (from ar.y quarter)."}}, {"text": "Ramayana III", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 97353, "end_char": 97365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attitude of an Indian ruler is depicted in the statement or Sri1 Rama in the\n\nRamayana thus :\n\n(Ramayana III-W-3)\n\n(Kshatriyas (the kings) bear the bow (wield the power) in order to see that there is no cry of distress (from ar.y quarter)."}}, {"text": "Tiruvalluvar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97777, "end_char": 97789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While attending to his duties an administrator should always remember the great saying of the Tamil saint Tiruvalluvar :\n\n668 stri>k~Mil COURT kili>Okts ll98iJ 3 s.C.k."}}, {"text": "Tirukkural", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 98121, "end_char": 98131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "655 in Tirukkural : Translation by Rev. Dr. G.U.\n\nPope and others (Reprint 1970) P• 175)."}}, {"text": "G.U.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98158, "end_char": 98162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "655 in Tirukkural : Translation by Rev. Dr. G.U.\n\nPope and others (Reprint 1970) P• 175)."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98813, "end_char": 98824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_66_74_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "LINGO SULPHJTfj CORPORATiON OF\n\nINDIA LTD. & ORS.\n\nU.P. STATE SUGAR CORPORATION LTD.,\n\nUNIT, BIJNOR & ORS.\n\nJanuary 27, 1982\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.j\n\nUttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No. 24 of 1964), sections 8 and 9 read. with rule 22( 1) and 22(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Niyamavali, 1974-Scope of-Classification made wilh regard io molasses co•ered under rule 22( I) and 22(2} is reasonable and does not offend Article 14 of tM Constitution-Esto_pptl by conduct-Here, thert is no question of contracting out of/aw.\n\nMolasses, the basic raw.material for the manufacture of lingo-suJphite, basic refractories, steel plants, cement factories. carbon black plants and many other important industries and also used for distillation, bas become a valuable commodity on account of its multiuse.\n\nThe preservation, distribution and. prices of the molasses were, .therefore, controlled by the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act 24 of 1964) and also the rules made thereunder called Vttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran NiyamavaJi, 1974.\n\nSection 8 of tho Act authorised the Controller to direct the occupier of any sugar factory to sell and supply in the prescribed manner sucb quantity of molasses to such persons as may be specified in the order and the occupier shall notwithstanding any contract comply with the order. Section 10 provided that the occupier of a sugar factory shall sell molasses in respect of which an order under section 8 has been made at a price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule attached to section IO. '\n\nUnited Commercial Syndicate, Allahabad is .the purchasing agent of M/s.\n\nLingo Sulphite Corporation and M/s. Audubon Trading and Export Corporation of Allahabad and Calcutta, entered into an agreement with the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. whereunder the latter agreed to sell 28,300 quintals of molasses of 1977-78 production at the statutory price of Rs .. 9 per quintal and dlities etc. provided the former agreed to pay the total amount of Rs. 3 lacs being the total cost of molasses as estimated at the said statutory price. It was further stipulated that in case the said _price was not valid in Jaw, The United.\n\nCommercial Syndicate will have to pay the price at the rate of Rs. 25-10 per quintal inclusive of administrative charges and other taxes and duties etc. as agreed to by the Syndicate.\n\nA sum of Rs. 2 lacs had been paid in pursuance of the agreement and the balance of Rs. 1 lac was to be paid at the earliest.\n\nThe Sugar Corporation however sought to calcutate the price of the molasses in question at the rate of Rs. 25-10 per quintal on the ground that the molasses agreed upon was not covered by an order under section 8.\n\nSyndicate filed two petitions in the High Court of Allahabad for a writ of mandamus or any other\n\n·.·-{\"\n\ni :\n\n' / l\n\n_ _. ,,.\n\n...\n\ni.INOO SULPHAtll OORPN. V. U.P.S.S. CoRPN. 61\n\nappropriate writ or direction declaring that Corporation was not entitled; o charge the price for the molasses in excess of the price fixed by the Act, .namely, Rs. 9 per quintal.\n\nThe High Court by its order dated 21st October, 1979 dismissed the petitions in limine.\n\nHence the appeal by special leave _by the Syndicate and the writ petition by the principal M/s. Lingo Sulphite Corporation.\n\nDismissing the appeal and the writ petition, the Court,\n\nHELD : I. Sections 3 to 8 and 10 of the Adhiniyam and Niyamavall 12, 13, 22, 23 and 24 make it clear that the occupier of a sugar factory can sell molasses to a person specified in the order of the Controller at the cont!olled price. The occupier of every sugar fa, ctory has to give an estimate of the mola~ to be produced in the sugar factory as also the estimateof requirement of molasses for distillation and industrial purposes.\n\nIf there is any surplus after meeting the requirements of the persons in whose favour there is an order of the Controller, the same will bo released in favour of tho occupier. [71 H, 72 A-BJ\n\n2. Section 10 makes it clear that the occupier of a sugar factory is obliged to sell molasses at the price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule only in respect-of which an order under'section 8 has been made. But sub-clause (2) of rule 22 authorises the Controller to release any stock of molasses in favour of an occupier of a sugar factory only when the same is not required for distilleries or for other purposes of industrial development. If a certain quantity of molasses has been released in favour of the occupier, because the same was not required for distilleries or for other purposes of industrial development, it M; open to the occupier to sell that quantity of molasses in free market to any person at a price\n\nprevalent in the market. Section 10 of the Act requires an occupier of a suga.r factory to sell molasses at a price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule only in respect of which an order under section 8 has beCn made. No limitation or fetter bas been put on the occupier of a sugar factory to sell molasses which was released in his favour. It was, therefore, open to the occupier to sell the molasses released in his favour at the free market price. [73 BEl\n\n3. The classification made with regard to molasses covered under rule 22(1) or rule 22(2) is a reasonable classification.\n\n[73 BJ\n\n4. The Syndicate entered into an agreement with the Corporation and agreed to pay the price of the molasses at the rate of Rs. 25-10 per quintal.\n\nHaving entered into such an aggreement with its eyes wide open it cannot now turn turtle and contdnd that it was liable to pay only at the rate of Rs. 9 per quintal, the statutory price. [73 F-G]\n\nS. It is true that the parties cannOt be allowed to contract themselves out of lw.\n\nIt is not the law that no molasses released in favour of the occupier of the sugar factory could be sold at a price higher than the controlled one.\n\nThe controll'1d price was applicable only to the molasses for which an order bad been passed by the Controller in favour of a specified person either for the purpose of distillation or for other industrial purposes. But so far as the molassh released in favour of the occupier/of a sugar factory is concerned, there is no requirement of the law that the occupier should sell it only at the controlled price.\n\n[73 GH, 74 ABJ\n\n68 SUl'RSMB couRt RbP<lkTS (1~8~] 3 s.c.l.\n\n6. Tho terms of the agreement between the parties entitles the Corporation for administrative charges. [74 B-C]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 391 of 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeal No. 651 of 1980\n\n(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.\n\nWrit No. 8091 of 1979)\n\nR. K. Garg, Pramod Swarup and D. R. Gupta for the Petitioner in Writ Petition.\n\n0. P. Rana and P.K. Pillai for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in WP.\n\nG. N. Dikshil and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 5 in W.P.\n\nMubarak Mazdoor Appellant in person in C.A.\n\nG. N. Dikshil, B. P. Maheshwari and Miss Asha Jain for the Respondent in Civil Appeal.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. Writ petition No. 391 of 1980 under Article 32 of the Constitution and Civil Appeal No. 651 of 1980 by special leave raise common question of law and, therefore, we propose to dispose them of by a common judgment.\n\nThe circumstances leading to the writ petition and the appeal lie in a narrow compass. The appellant, United Commercial Syndicate, is the purchasing agent of M/s. Lingo Sulphite Corporation, the petitioner in writ petition No. 391 of 1980 and M/s. Audubon Trading and Export Corporation of Allahabad and Calcutta, who are the manufacturers of lingo-sulphite in India.\n\nMolasses is the basic raw material for the manufacture of lingo-sulphite which is an essential raw material for all basic refractories, steel plants, cement factories, carbon-black plants and many\n\nLINOO SULPHATE CORPN. v. U.P.s. s. CORPN. (Misra, 1.) 69\n\nother important industries. Molasses is also used for distillation.\n\nOver the years molasses has become a -valuable commodity on account of its multi-use. The preservation, distribution and prices of the molasses were, therefore, controlled by a legislation, the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No. 24 of 1964), hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nUnited Commercial Syndicate used to purchase molasses for their principals from the open niarket. Later on it decided to make direct purchase from the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., Unit Bijnor (A State Government Undertaking). It entered into an agreement with respondent No. 1, the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., whereunder respondent No. 1 agreed to sell 28,300 quintals of molasses of 1977-78 prodnction at the statutory price of Rs. 9/- per quintal and duties etc. provided the appellant agreed to pay the total amount of Rs. 3 lakhs, being the total cost of molasses as \" estimated at the above statutory price. It was further stipulated that in case the above price was not valid in law, the appellant will have to pay the price at the rate of Rs. 25.10 per quintal inclusive of administrative charges and other taxes and duties etc., as agreed to by the appellant. There were other terms of the agreement but it is not necessary for the purposes of disposal of these cases to refer to them. A sum of Rs. 2 lakks ha<! been paid in pursuance of the agreement and the balance of Rs. 1 lakh was to be paid at the earliest. The respondent No. 1, however, sought to calculate the price of the molasses in question at the rate of Rs. 25.1 O per quintal. The appellant felt aggrieved and it took the stand that the respondent No. 1 could not charge more than the statutory price in spite of the fact that the appellant had offered the price of Rs. 25.10 per quintal to respondent No. I. The appellant filed two petitions in the High Court for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction declaring . that respondent No. I was not entitled to charge the price for the molasses in excess of the price fixed by the Act. The High Court by its order dated 31st of October, 1979 dismissed the petitions in limine. The appellant has come up in appeal by special leave to challenge the order of the High Court. M/s. Lingo Sulphite Corporation of India Ltd. has also tiled a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the same relief on the same grounds as in the aforesaid appeal.\n\nIn order to appreciate the points involved in the case it would be appropriate to refer to th~ material provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder,\n\n, J!l\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nSection 3 of the Act authorises the State Government to constitute an Advisory Committee to advise on matters relating to the control of storage, preservation, gradation, price, supply and disposal of molasses. Seclion 4 provides for the appointment of a person as Controller of Molasses for the purpose of exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Controller of Molasses.\n\nSection 5 enjoins every occupier of a sugar factory to take precautions for preservation of molasses. Section 6 prohibits the occupier of a sugar factory to adulterate or allow to be adulterated any molasses produced or held in stock by him.}Section 7A(I) enjoins any person, who requires molasses for his distillery or for any purpose of industrial development to apply in the prescribed manner to the Controller specifying the purpose for which it is required. Sub-section (2) of section 7 A authorises the Controller to make enquires in the matter as he may think fit and to pass an order under section 8 with due regard to the factors enumerated in sub-section (3) of section 7A.\n\nSection 8(1) authorises the Controller to direct the occupier of any sugar factory to sell and supply in the prescribed manner such quantity of molasses to such persons as may be specified in the order and the occupier shall, notwithstanding any contract, comply with the order. Sub-section (2) (a) of section 8 enjoins that the occupier shall supply, molasses only to a person who requires it for his dlstillery or for any purpose of industrial development and subclause (aa) of sub-section (2) directs the person specified in the order of the Controller to utilise the molasses supplied to him in pursuance of an order of the Controller for the purpose specified in the application made by him under sub-section (I) of section ?A and to observe all the restrictions and conditions as may be pres- -cribed. Section 10 provides that the occupier of a sugat factory shall sell molasses in respect of which an order under section 8 has been made at a price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule attached to section 10.\n\nRule 12 of the U.P. Sheera Niyantran Niyamavali, 1974 enjoins the occupier of every sugar factory to submit to the Con- G !roller by August 31 each molasses year a statement in form M.F. 9 specifying an approximate estimate of the quantity of molasses to be produced in a sugar factory during the molasses year following, along with such other information as is required under that form.\n\nRule 13(1) provides that every distillery in U.P. shall by August 31 H each year submit to the Controller a statement in form M.F. 8 specifying.its estimated requirement of molasses for the purposes\n\npf distillation during the molasses year following along with such\n\n---....\n\nLINGO SULPHATE CORPN. v. U.P.s.s. CORPN. (Misra, J.) 71\n\nother information as may be required under that form. Likewise, rule 13(2) requires the Director of Industries to furnish the Controller by August 31 each year the estimated requirement of molasses for industrial purposes within the State relating to the molasses year following :\n\nRule 23 provides :\n\n\"(!) All stock of molasses produced in a sugar fac- , tory shall be deemed to have been reserved for supply to distilleries or other persons requiring it for purposes of industrial development. and no stock of molasses produced in a sugar factory shall be sold or otherwise disposed of by the occupier of any sugar factory except in accordance with an order in writing from the Controller.\n\n (2) The Controller shall release any stock of molasses in favour of occupier of a sugar factory only when the\n\nsame is not required for distilleries or for other purposes D\n\n~-.\n\nof industrial development.\"\n\nRule 23(1} provides :\n\n\"(I) The State Government may levy administrative charges exclusive of the price payable to a sugar factory on the molasses released for sale by the Controller towards meeting the cost of establishment for supervision of control over molasses at such rate or rates as may be notified from time to time.\"\n\nRule 24(1) provides :\n\n\"(t) Save in pursuance of an order of the Controller, no person shall purchase any molasses . from any sugar factory, or transport or possess any molasses purchased from such sugar factory, unless the said molasses has been released by order of the Controller as not required for distilleries or other purposes of industrial development and a declaration to that effect in form M.F. 13 has been obtained from the occupier of the sugar factory concerned.\"\n\nA perusal of the relevant provisions of the Act and rules aforesaid makes it clear that the occul'ier of a su, ar fa<; torr caq\n\nsell molasses to a person specified in the order of the Controller at the controlled price. The occupier of every sugar factory has to give an estimate of the molasses to be produced in the sugar factory as also the estimate of requirement of molasses for distillation and industrial purposes. If there is any surplus after meeting the requirements of the persons in whose favour there is an order of the Controller, the same will be released in favour of the occupier.\n\nThe question for consideration in the instant case is whether the molasses released in favour of the occupier by the Controller is also to be sold at the controlled rate or it can be sold at the market price as a free commodity.\n\nSbri Garg, senior counsel contends that from the schome of the Act and the rules it is evident that the entire production of molasses is to be controlled by the Controller appointed under the Act, at every stage. He is to take into account the estimated supply and the estimated demand of the commodity. Thereafter, he is to allot the commodity to a particular person for a particular purpose at the controlled statutory price fixed by the schedule to the Act.\n\nThe Act and the rules further provide . that nobody will store, sell, transport or use the said commodity without the order of the Controller and the price and distribution of molasses both are controlled by the Act and the contravention of the provisions of the Ac:t have been madepenal and the High Court has gone wrong in assuming that certain quantity of molasses which are covered by rule 22(2) are irnmune from the restrictions and fetters o( the Act and the said rules, which is erroneous and indefensible in law inasmuch as such a construction as has been put by the High Court will defeat the very purpose and object of the said Act and the rules.\n\nAs a second limb to this argument it was contended that the classification made between molasses covered by rule 22(1) on the one hand and rule 22(2) on the other is wholly irrational and the very purpose of the Act is defeated.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, it makes no difference whether the molasses are covered by rule 22(1) or 22(2) inasmuch as the object of the present legislation is to ensure that the sale and the distribution of molasses is controlled in an equitable manner and, therefore, to hold that section 8 is applicable to rule 22(1) and not to rule 22(2) is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.\n\nShri Rana appearing for respondent No. I on the otber ha.nd bas contended that on a correct interpretation of the relevant proj\n\nLINGO SULPHATE CORl'N. v. U.P.s.s. CORPN, (Misra, J.) 73\n\nvisions of the Act and the rules the interpretation put by the High Court is fully warranted.\n\nSection 10 of the Act which has been referred to above enjoins the occupier of a sugar factory to sell molasses in respect of which an order under section 8 has been made at a price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule.\n\nA plain reading of the section makes it clear that the occupier of a sugar factory is obliged to s.ell molasses at the price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule only in respect of which an order under section 8 has been made.\n\nBut sub-clause (2) of rule 22 authorises the Controller to release any stock of molasses in favour of an occupier of a sugar factory only when the same is not required for distilleries or for other purposes of industrial development. If a certain quantity of molasses has been released in favour of the occupier, because the same was not required for distilleries or for other purposes of industrial oevelopment, it is op'en to the occupier to sell that quantity of molasses in free market to any person at a price prevalent in the market. Section 10 of the Act requires an occupier of a sugar factory to sell molasses at a price not exceeding that prescribed in the schedule only in respect of which an order under section 8 has been made.\n\nNo limitation or fetter has been put on the occupier of a sugar factory to sell molasses which was released in his favour.\n\nIt was, therefore, open to him to sell the molasses released in his favour at the free market price.\n\nThe contention that the classification made with regard to molasses covered under rule 22(1) or rule 22(2) is an unreasonable classification cannot be accepted. There have been other enactments in which similar provision bas been made, for example, the levy sugar was to be sold only at the controlled rate but free sugar was to be sold by the factories at a free market price and that bas been always accepted as a valid classification. The appellant entered into an agreement with respondent No. I and agreed to pay the price of the molasses at the rate of Rs. 25.10 per quiotal. Having entered into such an agreement with its eyes wide open it cannot now turn turtle and contend that it was liable to pay only at the rate of Rs. 9/- per quintal, the statutory price. It is true that the parties cannot be allowed to contract themselves out of law. If the law was that no molasses released in favour of the occupier of the sugar factory could be sold at a price higher than the controlled one, than the contention of the appellant would be correct. On an analysis of the relevant provisions of t!!e Act we are quite clear tba, t\n\nthe controlled price was applicable only to the molasses for which an order had been passed by the Controlfor in favour of a specified person either for the purpose of distillation or for other industrial purposes. But so far as the molasses released in favour of-the occupier of a sugar factory is concerned, there is no requirement of the law that the occupier should sell it only at the controlled B price.\n\nIt was further contended that the respondent was not entitled to administrative charges. This contention loses sight of the terms of the agreement between the parties which includes administrative charges also.\n\nFor the foregoing discussion we find no force either in the appeal or in the writ petition under Article 32. They are accor dingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as tq costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal and Petition dismissed.\n\n, __ _", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "LINGO SULPHJTfj CORPORATiON OF\n\nINDIA LTD. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LINGO SULPHITE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE SUGAR CORPORATION LTD.,\n\nUNIT, BIJNOR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "U.P. STATE SUGAR CORPORATION LTD., UNIT, BIJNOR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 27, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 27, 1982\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.j\n\nUttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No."}}, {"text": "S. 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Writ petition No.", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United Commercial Syndicate", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, United Commercial Syndicate, is the purchasing agent of M/s. Lingo Sulphite Corporation, the petitioner in writ petition No."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "391 of 1980 and M/s. Audubon Trading and Export Corporation of Allahabad and Calcutta, who are the manufacturers of lingo-sulphite in India."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8700, "end_char": 8733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., whereunder respondent No."}}, {"text": "31st of October, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its order dated 31st of October, 1979 dismissed the petitions in limine."}}, {"text": "Lingo Sulphite Corporation of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10345, "end_char": 10385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Lingo Sulphite Corporation of India Ltd. has also tiled a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the same relief on the same grounds as in the aforesaid appeal."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10418, "end_char": 10428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10725, "end_char": 10734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11112, "end_char": 11121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11214, "end_char": 11223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7A(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11354, "end_char": 11367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11710, "end_char": 11719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11797, "end_char": 11809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12099, "end_char": 12108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12717, "end_char": 12726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12810, "end_char": 12820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16090, "end_char": 16094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Garg, senior counsel contends that from the schome of the Act and the rules it is evident that the entire production of molasses is to be controlled by the Controller appointed under the Act, at every stage."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17724, "end_char": 17733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17814, "end_char": 17824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17832, "end_char": 17836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Rana appearing for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17999, "end_char": 18004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CORPN, (Misra, J.) 73\n\nvisions of the Act and the rules the interpretation put by the High Court is fully warranted.", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18109, "end_char": 18119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18256, "end_char": 18265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18550, "end_char": 18559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19116, "end_char": 19126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19292, "end_char": 19301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21396, "end_char": 21406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_670_680_EN", "year": 1982, "text": ".BALDBV SAHA! BANOIA\n\nR.C. BHASIN\n\nApril 16, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958-S. J4(J)(d)-Appllcotion for ejectment of tenant-Tenant ceasing to resid1 In premises. for ver six months-Whan maintainable.'\n\nWords and phrase;,-'Members of faml/y'-Who are-S. T4(JJ(d) .of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.\n\nA landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises Jet for residential purpose under s. 14(l)(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, if he can show that neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application.\n\nThe appellant took the house in question on Jease in May, 1961 and E lived there with his parents, sisters and a brother. He went to Canada in 1971~ leaving behind in. the house, his mother nd brother, who continued to pay the rent.\n\nThe landlord filed an application for ejectment of tenant under s. 14(1)(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in September. 1972 contending that with the migration of the tenant to Canada, his mother 11nd brother i:ould not be treated as members of the ap'pellant's family. Tbe application was dismissed by the Rent ControJler who found that t.be mother, brother and sister of the appellant were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises along with the appellant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for ejectmentwas brought.\n\nThe landlord's appeal against the order of the Rent ControJJer was a11owcd by the Rent Control Tribunal which ordered eviction of the family members of the appellant from the tenanted house.\n\nThe appeal of the family members against the order of eviction was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that after the exit of the main tenant to Canada, neither the mother nor the brother or the sister could be legally termed as a member of the family of the appellant.\n\nAJ1owin$ the appeal,\n\n' -\n\nB.S. BANGIA V. R.C. BHASIN 611\n\nHELD : I. (a) The Act affords intrinsic evidence to show that the nonapplicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the misration of the main tenant' to Canada would make no difference. [674 HJ\n\n(b) The term 'family' [has to be given not a restricted but a wider\n\nmaning. There are abundant authorities to show that the term 'family' should always ho liberally and broadly lccnstrued so as to include near relations of tho\n\nhead of the family. A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so B as to advance the object of tho Act. [676 F; 678 El\n\nPrice v. Gould and Ors., [1930].Vol. 143 Law Times 333; G. V. Shukla v.\n\nShri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass Ojha, [1963]' P.I.R. (Vol. LXV) 256; Govlnd . Dass and Ors. v. Ku/dip Singh, A.J.R.1971Delhi151 and Hira Lai and Ors. v.\n\nBanarsi Dass, [1979] I R.L.R. 466 referred to.\n\n(c) The Act has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment.\n\nTho definition of 'tenant' inserted in s~ 2(1) of the Act by the Amending Act 18 of 1976 expressly included 'parents' in sub-clause (iii) thereof and also indicated that .apart from the heirs 'of the tenant s., Ccificd therein, even those persons who had been ordinarily 1ivina: in the premises with the tenant would be treated as members of the family. [675 B; 677 H; 678 A]\n\n2. (a) The legislature has advisedly provided that any member of the rami1y residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a tenant.\n\nThe stress is not so much on the actual presence o( the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises. Clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act is a special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession C\\nly where the tenanted premises have been compltely vacated by the tenant. ·\n\n[676 G-H; 677 A]\n\n(b) The landlord bad failed to prove the essential ingredients of clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant. It could not be said that when the appellant migrated to Canada, he bad severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family. Such an interpretation is against our\n\nnational heritage and could never have been contemplated by the Act.\n\n(680 B; 675 B]\n\n.i.._:.\n\n-~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1533 of 1980.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 20th February, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in S.A.O. 149 of 1979.\n\nSJ(. Meh, ta for the Appellant.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for\n\nthe Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS .\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated February 20, 1980 of the Delhi' High Court decreeing the landlord's suit for ejectment of the tenant.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the present litigation are summarised in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court and need not be .repeated.\n\nShorn of details, the positi9n seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs. 95/-. At the time when the tenancy started, the tenant was living in the tenanted house with his father, mother, two sisters and a brother. The tenant himself was at that time a bachelor but seems to have married subsequently.\n\nOne of his sisters was married in this very house.\n\nAs it happened, in 1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife and children. It is alleged that after having gone to Canada, the husband alongwith his wife took up some employment there. Admittedly, the tenant did not return to India after 1971.\n\nWhile leaving for Canada the tenant had left his mother and brother in the house who were regularly paying rent to the landlord.\n\nThere is some controversy as to whether or not the mother and. brother, who were left behind, were being supported by the tenant or were living on their own earnings or by the income of the property left by the tenant in India. Such a controversy however, is of no consequence in deciding the question of law which arises for consideration in this case.\n\nOn September 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for\n\nejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and - non-residence of the tenant under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section ~~ (!)of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter .._~ referred to as the 'Act'). The fundamental plea taken by the landlord was that with the exit of the tenant from the house it became vacant and his mother and brother who were left behind could not be treated as members of the family.\n\nHence, in the eye oflaw the tenanted premises must be deemed to have fallen vacant.\n\nThe suii was resisted by the mother, brother and sister of the tenant who averred that even if th\"e tenant alongwith his wife and children had shifted to Canada, the non-applicants were continuing to live in the tem1nted premises an4 as they had been paying reQt\n\n- B.S. BANGIA v. R.C. BHASIN (Fazal Ali, J.) 673\n\nto the landlord regularly, who hd been accepting the question or the tenancy becoming vacant arose.\n\nsame, no •\n\n• ThUi, .the entire case hinges.on the . interpretation of the word\n\n! .. , II 'family' as also clausesJd) and (e) of s. 14(1) of the Act. So far as\n\n- .!1if clause (e) js concrned, .both the courts below found as a fact that the landlord was not able to prove his bona fide necessity. Therefore, as far as ground (e) is concerned, the same no longer survives in view of.the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The only questionthatremains to be considered is whether the landlord - ,,.,.,,-- can bring.his case for evictfon within the ambit of clause'(d) of _..---- s. 14(1) which may J>e extracted thus:\n\n! -·(\n\n~.·\n\n;;;;!\n\n. '\n\nI '+\n\n\"14 (I) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law. or contract, no order or decree for the. recovery of possession of any premises 'shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the. landlord against a tenant: ·\n\nProvided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery iJf possessi.on of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :\n\nxx xx xx\n\n, (d) that the premises were. let .for use as a residence and neither thll' tenant nor any member or bis family bas been residing therein for a period of six months imqiediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof; ·\n\nA close analysis of this provision would reveal that before the landlord can succeed, be must prove three essential ingredients- •\n\n(l) that the premises were let out for use as a residence,\n\n{2) that the tenant after having taken the premises has\n\nteased to reside, and\n\n(3) that apllrt from the tenant no member of his family also bas been residing for a period of six months immediately berOre the d3te Qf the filing of the\n\napplication for ejectment.\n\n674 SUPREME COURT REPOllTB\n\n(!982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nIt is manifest that unless the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the landlord cannot succeed in getting a decree for ejeetment. 19, the instant case, while it is the admitted case of the parties that the tenant had shifted to Canada alongwith bis wife and children, yet he had left Ws mother, brother and ister in the house, hence the\n\nsecond essential condition of clause (d) continues to apply with full force.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the mother, brother and sister were undoubtedly living with the tenant And so long as they continued to reside in the tenanted premises, there could be no question of the premises falling vacant.\n\nTo this, the counsel for the landlord coun iered that neither the mother, nor the brother nor the sister could in law be treated as . . members of the family of the tenant after be had himself shifted to a country outside India. Even though while be was I iving in Delhi, he was in Government service.\n\nThus, it was argued that in the eye of law, the )o-calledjfamily members would lose their status as members of the family of the tenant and would be pure trespassers or licensees or 'squatters . '\n\nWhile the suit of the landlord .was dismissed by th-e Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal allowed the appeal and directed eviction of the family members of the tenant under clause\n\n(d) of s. 14(1) of the Act. The family members of the tenant then went up in appeal to the High Court which also affirmed the findings of the Tribunal and upheld the order of eviction passed by it.\n\nThe High Court was also of the view that after the exit of the main . tenant from India to Canada, neither the mother, nor the brother, nor the sister could be legally termed as a membe.r of the family of\n\nthe tenant.\n\n- ,,,,->\n\n• W.e have heard counsel for the parties and given our anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter and we feel that the High Court has taken a palpably wrong view of the law il)regard to the interpretation of the term 'member of Cthe family' as used in clause\n\n(d) of s. 14(1) lof the Act.· In coming to its deci.sion, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the dominant purpose and the main object of the Act which affords several intrinsic and -\n\nextrinsic evidence to show that tlie non-applicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the migration of the main tenant to.Canada, would make no· difference. The word 'family' has been defined in various lesaI 9iction.aries and several .\n\n. ...\n\n;,..\n\nL •\n\nB.S. BANGIA v. R.C. BHASIN (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\n61S\n\nauthorities-of various courts and no court has ever held that mother or a brother or a sister who is living with the older member of the family would not constitute a family of the said member. Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination. that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Cafladit, he had severed all his connections with his -mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family.\n\nSuch an interpretation is aainst . our national heritage and, as we shall show, could never have been contemplated by the Act which has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment.\n\nComing now to [the definitions, we find that in Word~ and Phrases (permanent Edition-volume 16) at pp. 303-311 the word 'family' b.as been defined thus :\n\n\"The father, the mother, and the children ordinarily constitute a \"family\".\n\n• A\n\n\"The word \"family\" embraces more than a huband\n\nD and wife and includes _children.\"\n\n\"A \"family\" constitutes all who live in one house under one head.\"\n\n\"Father and mother of two illegitimate children; and children themselves, all living together under one roof, constituted a \"family.\"\n\n(pp. 303-304)\n\n\"The word \"family\" . fa . statute authorizing use of incQme for support of ward and \"family\" is not restricted to those individuals to .whom ward owes a legalduty of support, but is an expression of great flexibility and is liberally construed, and includes brothers and sisters in ·\n\npoor financial circumstances for whom the insane ward, if\n\ncomptent, would make provision.\"\n\n(p. 311)\n\n\"The general or ordinarily accepted meaning of the word \"family\", as used in Compensation Act, means a group, comprising immediate kindred, consisting of the parents llllQ !bir children,· whethr qtually living together or not:'\n\n(p. 343) ·(Emphasis ours)\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nSimilarly, in Webster's Third New International Dictfonary, the word 'family' is defined thus :\n\n\"Family-household including not only the servants but also the head of the hous, ehold and. all persom in it related to him by blood or marriage ...... a group of persons of common ancestry.'' (p. 821) (Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (New. Edition 1972), the word 'Family' has been de'fined thus.;\n\n\"family-the household, or all those who . live i.n one house (as parents, children, servants) : parents and their + children)\"··\n\n.In Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition), the same D definition appears to have been given of the word 'family\" which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"family-Members of a household, parents, children, servants, etc. set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not; persons children. All descendants E of common ancestor.\"\n\nA conspectus of the connotation of the term 'family' which emerges from a reference to the aforesaid dictionaries clearly shows that the word 'family' has to lie given not a restricted but a wider . meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all .•\n\nembers or descendants from the common ancestors who are - actuallyliving with the same head. More particularly, in our country, blood relations do not evaporate merely because a member of the famiiy-the father, the brother or the son-leaves his household and goes out for some time. Furthermore, in our opinion, the legislal!lre has advisdly used the term that any mem_ber of the family residing therein for a period. of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a\n\ntenant. The stress is not so much on the 11ctual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members\" of the family actually live' and reside in the tenanted premises. In fact, it seems to us that clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act is a special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession only where the tenanted premises have\n\nii.§. liANGlA v. il.c. BHASJN (Paza/ Aii, J.) 67;\n\n been completely vacated by th( tenant if he/ceased to exercise any control over the property either through himself or through his blood relations.\n\nIn fact, a controversy arose as to what would happen to the members .of thtl' family of the tenant if while residing in the premises\n\n1 be dies and in order to resolve this anomaly the legislature fl!!me-\n\n' diately stepped in to amend certain provisions of. the Act and J defined the actual connotation of the term 'members of the family' .\n\n. By virtue of Act I 8 of 1916 t])e definition of \"Tenant\" was inserted so as to include various categories of persons. S.ub-clause (iii) of clause (i) of section 2 of the Act actually mentions the persons who could be regarded as tenant even if main tenant dies. This subclause may be extracted thus :\n\n\"(I) \"tenant\" means any person . by wom or on whose accQunt or behalf the rent of any premises is, or •. but for a speciliI contract, wcluld be, payable and includes- . .\n\n(i) a sub-tenant;\n\n(ii) any person continuing in possession after the terminatibn of his tenancy; and·\n\n(iii) in the event of the death of the person. continuing in . possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectiyely, in Explanation I and Explanation II to. this clause such of the aforesaid person's-.\n\n(a) spouse, r ··~.\n\n(b) son or daughter or, where there are' both son and ·\n\ndaughter, both of them,\n\n(c) parents,\n\n(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-\n\ndeceased son, G\n\nas had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of .his death, but does noHnclude, ......... \"\n\n. It would appear that parents were expressly included in sub~ clause (iii). It bas also been provided that apart from the heirs\n\n. /\n\nSbPilEMli C<ibit RB!'OllTS (198~11 s.c.k.\n\nspecified in clauses (a) to (d) (extracted above), ~Ven those persons who had been ordinarily Jiving in the premises with the tenant would be treated as members of the family. The statemen~. of objtcts arid reasons for this amendment may J>e extracted thus :\n\n\"There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to COD ferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by lan-dlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants. in case the landlord re quires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation.\n\nFurther, Government decided.on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who own$ his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975. Government .con sidered that in the circumstances, the Act required to be amended urgently.\" . ,\n\nIf this was the intention of the legislature then clause (d) of section 14( 1) of the Act could not be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat the very object of the Act. It is well setth:d that a bene ficial provision must 'be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act, and curing any lacuna or defect appearing in the same. There are abundant authorities to show that the term \"Family\" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family.\n\nIn Hira Lal & Ors. v. Banarsi Dass(') even the learned Judge who decided that case had observed at page 472 that the term \"members of the family\" on the facts and circumstances of the case should not be given a narrow construction.\n\nlnGobind Dass & Ors. vs. Ku/dip Singh(') a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H.R. Khanna,, C.J .. (as be then was) and Prakash Narain, J. while recognising , the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word \"family\" observed as follows :\n\n\"I hold that in the section now under consideration the word .. family\" includes bf others and sister~ of the deceased\n\n(I) 1979 (I) R.L.R. 46~. <1) AIR 1971 Delhi IS\\.\n\n11.S. llANGIA v. it:c. ill!AslN (Fozai Ali, J.) 619\n\nliving with her at the time of her death.\n\nI think that that meaning is required by the ordinary acceptation of the word in this connection and that the legislature has used the wod \"family\" to introduce a flexible and wide term.\"\n\nIn Mr8. G. V. Shukla v. Shri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass -\n\n• Ojha(1) Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed as follows: B\n\n\"Therefore, it must be held that\" the word 'family' is . . -,.\n\ncapable of wider interpretation, but that interpretation must have relation to the existing facts and circumstances proved on the record in each case.\" c\n\nliven as far back as 1930, Wright, J. in Price v. Gould & Ors(') (a King's Bench decision) had clearly held that the. word \"family\" included brothers and sisters and in this connection observed as follows :\n\n\"I find as a fact that the brothers and sisters were D residing with the deceased at the time of her death ..... ..\n\nIt has been laid down tb.at the primary meaning of the word \"family\" is children, hut that primary meaning is clearly susceptible of wider interpretation, because the cases decide that the exact scope of the word must depend on the context and the other provisions of the will or deed E\n\nin view of the surrounding circumstances.\"\n\n\"Thus, in Snow v. Teed (1870, 23 L.T. Rep. 303; L. Rep. 9 Bq. 622) it was held that the word \"family\" could be extended beyond not merely children but even beyond the statutory next of kin.\"\n\nJn view, however, of the very clear 'and plain. language of + clause (d) of section 14(1) of the Act itself, we do not want to burden this judgment by multiplying authorities.\n\nOn a point of fact, we might mention that €he Rent Controller had given a clear finding that te mother, younger brother ·, (Davinder .. Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises alongwith the main\n\n(1) 1963 P.L.R. (vol. LXV) 256.\n\n(2) 1930 (vol. 143) Law Times 333.\n\nF -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS I 198~1 j s.c.k\n\ntenant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for ejectment was brought.\n\nIn these circumstances, we are satified that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and cannot be supported. The landlord has miserably failed to prove the essential ingredients of B clause (d) of section 14(1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant.\n\nWe therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and dismiss the plaintiff's ; action for ejectment and restore the judgment of the Rent Controller. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.\n\nH.L.C .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n' ,", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "C. BHASIN\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.C. BHASIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BANOIA\n\nR.C. BHASIN\n\nApril 16, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 317, "end_char": 345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 809, "end_char": 815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went to Canada in 1971~ leaving behind in."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 974, "end_char": 985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi at New Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated the 20th February, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in S.A.O. 149 of 1979."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for\n\nthe Respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Bana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4585, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for\n\nthe Respondent."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for\n\nthe Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4712, "end_char": 4721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated February 20, 1980 of the Delhi' High Court decreeing the landlord's suit for ejectment of the tenant.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Baldev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5093, "end_char": 5105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shorn of details, the positi9n seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shorn of details, the positi9n seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the tenant did not return to India after 1971."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6198, "end_char": 6216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for\n\nejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and - non-residence of the tenant under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section ~~ (!)"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suii was resisted by the mother, brother and sister of the tenant who averred that even if th\"e tenant alongwith his wife and children had shifted to Canada, the non-applicants were continuing to live in the tem1nted premises an4 as they had been paying reQt\nB.S. BANGIA v. R.C. BHASIN (Fazal Ali, J.) 673\n\nto the landlord regularly, who hd been accepting the question or the tenancy becoming vacant arose.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7793, "end_char": 7801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10040, "end_char": 10045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though while be was I iving in Delhi, he was in Government service."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10471, "end_char": 10479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cafladit", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12037, "end_char": 12045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Cafladit, he had severed all his connections with his -mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13533, "end_char": 13569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bir children,· whethr qtually living together or not:'\n\n(p. 343) ·(Emphasis ours)\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15464, "end_char": 15472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16289, "end_char": 16298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17778, "end_char": 17857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9th September, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18204, "end_char": 18223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, Government decided.on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who own$ his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18352, "end_char": 18371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, Government decided.on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who own$ his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975."}}, {"text": "section 14( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18535, "end_char": 18549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "H.R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19311, "end_char": 19322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vs. Ku/dip Singh(') a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H.R. Khanna,, C.J .. (as be then was) and Prakash Narain, J. while recognising , the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word \"family\" observed as follows :\n\n\"I hold that in the section now under consideration the word .. family\" includes bf others and sister~ of the deceased\n\n(I) 1979 (I) R.L.R. 46~. <1) AIR 1971 Delhi IS\\.\n\n11.S. llANGIA v. it:c. ill!AslN (Fozai Ali, J.) 619\n\nliving with her at the time of her death."}}, {"text": "Prakash Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19353, "end_char": 19367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vs. Ku/dip Singh(') a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H.R. Khanna,, C.J .. (as be then was) and Prakash Narain, J. while recognising , the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word \"family\" observed as follows :\n\n\"I hold that in the section now under consideration the word .. family\" includes bf others and sister~ of the deceased\n\n(I) 1979 (I) R.L.R. 46~. <1) AIR 1971 Delhi IS\\.\n\n11.S. llANGIA v. it:c. ill!AslN (Fozai Ali, J.) 619\n\nliving with her at the time of her death."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20003, "end_char": 20010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. V. Shukla v. Shri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass -\n\n• Ojha(1) Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed as follows: B\n\n\"Therefore, it must be held that\" the word 'family' is . . -,."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20302, "end_char": 20308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nliven as far back as 1930, Wright, J. in Price v. Gould & Ors(') (a King's Bench decision) had clearly held that the."}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21200, "end_char": 21213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Davinder .. Kumar Bangia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21425, "end_char": 21449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a point of fact, we might mention that €he Rent Controller had given a clear finding that te mother, younger brother ·, (Davinder .. Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises alongwith the main\n\n(1) 1963 P.L.R. (vol."}}, {"text": "Vijay Lakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21463, "end_char": 21476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a point of fact, we might mention that €he Rent Controller had given a clear finding that te mother, younger brother ·, (Davinder .. Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises alongwith the main\n\n(1) 1963 P.L.R. (vol."}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21972, "end_char": 21985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_681_699_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "• ,.<.,\n\n0. :N. BHATNAGAR\n\nv.,\n\nSMT. RUKIBAI NARSINDAS & ORS.\n\nApril 2 I; /982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A.P. SEN AND\n\nE.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.)\n\nMaharashtra C'oofllrative Societies Act, 1960 Section 91(1)-'~Dispute touch ing the business of the Society\"-Whtther a claim for ejectment by a Hous/116\n\nCOopeTtiliv~ Socity o,, r. an occupant of a lflat who had been let i1'to pOssession of the premises under an agreement of leave and licence executed between him and a member of tM Society is a \"dispute\" referable to section 91(1) oftM Act read with bye/aw• 66 & 68(a).\n\nBombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 Sections D 5(4A), 13, ISA and 28, (Scope of-WhetMr the \"non-obstante\" clauJe In Section 28 of the Rent A.ct has an overriding effect ove'r the non-obstante clau1e in Section 91(1) of Sockti•s Act. Applicability of Section 15A of the Rent Act Re:!}udlcata -Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nShyam Cooperative Housing Society Limited is constituted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 as a tenant copartnership type housing society. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Rukibai N. Bhayoaoi who is a copartoer tenant member of llat No. 52 in building SA in the housing colony known as \"Sbyam , Niwas'~ situate at Warden Road, Bombay, iriducted the appellant in the said fiat under an Agreement of Goa ve and Licence dated November 28, 1961 after the appellant was accepted by the Society as a'\"nominal member\". , The agreement was renewed from time to time and tho period of the Jut agreement expired on February 28, 1965.. By her notice dated March 31, 1965;, rcspondoot NO'. I called upon the. appellant to vacate the premises as bis occuP.tioo of the promises had become unlawful after .termination of the licence.\n\nThe appellant failed to comply with the demand and therefore, respondent No. I preferred the claim f0r posso1Sion before tho cooperative court which by its judgment dated April 28, 1978 made an Award against the appellant for possession .. r the fiat in dispute and for arrears of rent and mesoo profits amounting to Rs. 30,000 against (tho awar.d )tho appellant filed an appeal before . the cooperative Appellate Court but it was dismissed in January 1979. Thereafter ihe appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court in February 1979 and it was dismissed in March 1981. Tho Letters patent Appeal preferred by tho appellant was also rejected. Hence the appeal by.special !eave.\n\nDism; uiog the appeal, the Court, .\n\nHBLD '\" (!) Tho claim by the society together with SUCb member for eject tnent of a person who was permitted to otcllPY having become a ominal member\n\nSUPREME Cl>UllT RSl'<>RTS II ~~21 3 s.c.li.\n\nthereof, uponrevocation of 1iccnce, is a \"dispute\" falling within the purview of Sec. (I) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. [696 D-E]\n\nDeccan Merchanrs Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand lugraj Jain & Ors. [1969] I SCR 887, distinguished. ·\n\n2:1 The proceedings under section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 were not barred by the 'provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging. House Rates Control Act, 1947. The two Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act should apply. But, where the parties admittedly do not stand in tho-jural relationship of landlord an.d tenant, as here the dispute would be governed by Section 91(1) of the Societies •Act. The appellant by virtue of his being a nominal member, acquired a riRht to occupy the fiat as a licensee, but his rights were inchoate. [697 B-D]\n\nSabharwa//Jrothers and Another v. Smt, Guna Amrit Thandani of &Jmbay,\n\n[1973] l SCR 53 discussed and distinguisljed. ~\n\n2:2 The two enactments deal with two distinct and separate fields and therefore the nan-obstante clause in s. 91(!) of the Act and that ins. 28 of the Rent Act ope.rate in two different planes. The two legislations rertain to different topics oflgislation. It will be noticed that s. 28 of the Rent Act proceeds on the basis that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on certain courts to decidei all questions or claims under that Act as to parties between whom there is or was a relationship of landlord and tenant. It doea not invest those courts with exclusive power to try questions of title, such as between the rightful owner and a trespasser or a licensee, for such questions do not arise under the A~. The appe1lant having raised a plea in the nature of dmurrer, the question of jurisdiction had to be determined with 4dvertence to the allegations contained in the\n\ntatement of claim made by the respondent No. 1 under s. 91(1) of the Act and those allegations must be taken .to be true. The respondent No. I unequivocally asserts that tbe parties stood in the relation of licensor and licensee and that . ' fact is clearly borne out by the terms of the agreement of leave and licence as between the parties. The burden was on the appellant to establish that he hid the status of a \"tenant\" within the meaning of s. S(ll) ofthe Rent Act, as it then stood, and that burden he has failed to discharge. If, therefore, plaintiff l in the plaint does not admit a.relationship .which would attract any of the provi~ ~-/- sions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given ins. 28 depends, the ,. defendant cannot by his plea force the plaintiff' to go .to a \"forum where on averments the claim does not lie. [689 A-El\n\n• 3:1 Upon the terms of Sections 5(4A) and 15A of the Rent Act, it is clear that the appellant is not Cotitled to the protection of Section ISA. The sine qUa non for the applicability of s. 15A of tbe Rent Act is that a licensee must be in oi::cupation as on Feb. 1, '73 under a subsisting li'cence. It is not diiputed that the appe1Jaot does not answer tha't dCscripti'on since the _agreement of leave and-:::.\n\nlicce in his favour admittedly stood terminated by the notice of the respondent No. I dated March 31, 1965. That being so, tho appellant is nothing but a rank trespasser and is not entitled to the protection of s. 15A of the Rent Act and cannot therefore plead tho bar of s. 28(1) thereof •. [G90 F-H]\n\n' .\n\nb. N. llllA'l'NAl'.lAll ~. RUklllAI 683\n\n3:2 As a result of the introdilction of s. ISA and. s. S(4A). of the Rent Act A by Maharashtra Act J.7 of 1973, the licensee of any wemi!iOs or any part thereof in a building vstingjn or leased to a cooperating housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Act, who was in occupation of such premises under\" a subsisting licence as on Feb. 1, 1973, is by a legal fiction, deemed to be a tenant add thus has the prOtectioo, of the Rent Act. In such a case, the dispute between a licensor and a licensee relating to possession of the premises of a flat would attracts. 28 read with ss. !SA and S(4A) of the Rent Act and fall outside\n\n. B the purview of the Regis.trar's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such dispute under s. 91(1) of the Societies Act. In the instant case the question does not arise. [691. A-Cl .\n\n3:3 A bare reading of the agreement of leave and licence is clearly indi .. cative of the fact that the appellant was a licensee. Admittedly his occupation Of the fiat was not as a tenant but as a Jicensee. The question whether or not\n\n-the appellant was a licensee Of the fiat or a tenant thereof was directly and substantially ill issue between the parties in the suit. The finding that he wasot a tenant{but had only the status of 8: licensee operates as resjudicata between the par.ties. The appellant having failed in his suit for declaration of his alleged status of a tenant brought in the court of small causes cannot be perlnitted to reagitate the same question in these proceedings and (iii) tho licence of the appellant having been terminated by respondent No. 1, by hr notice dated March 31, 1965, the appellant was not in occupation of the fiat on Feb. I, 1973 under a subsisting licence and therefore did noi acquire the status of a tenant under 8ection ISA and is, not protected 11nder section 13 of the Rent Act.\n\n[691 B-H; 692 A)\n\n4. The respondent NQ. 2-Society being a copartnership type housing society, having let fiat no. S2 to the respondent no. I as a copartner tonantmember, wa_s vitally interested in ettsuring that no stranger is in unauthorised occupation of tbe fiat after the expiry of the terni of tho licence. It was therefore rightly transposed as a co-disputant in the proceedings under section 91(1) of the Societies Act, .and could raise a dispute regarding the unauthorised occupation of the premises by the appellant after the revocation of the licence. [693 D-G)\n\nC1VIL APPilr.LATB Jua1so1CT10N : Civil Appeal No. 1843 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order -dated the2lst April, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 168 of 1981. ·\n\nH.H.\n\nAdvai, P.R. Ramasesh and Manu lyanger for the Appellant.·\n\nS.N. Kackar, V.K. Panwani and Girish Chandra for .the\n\nRespondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\" F\n\n' 684 StJPk~MB CObRt ki!l>()kts [1982! 3 s.c.i.\n\nSEN, J. This appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated April 21, 198 I raises a qµestion of some importance. The question is whether a claim for ejectment by a housing cooperative society, of an occupant of a flat who bad been let into possession of the premises under an agreement of leave and licence executed between him and a member of the society, by virtue of bis being a nominal member thereof, is a 'dispute touching the business of the society' within the meaning of sub-s. (I) of s. 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act,\n\n1960 (for short 'the Act').\n\nThe material facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows.\n\nThe respondent No. 2 herein, Sbyam Cooperative Housing Society Limited is constituted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 as a tenant co-partnership type housing society to which Regulations in Form-A apply vfz. Regula- . tions relating to tenancies to be granted by the society to members in respect of houses held by the society. It owns and manages two bousing'colonies known as 'Sbya_m Niwas' and 'Navik Niwas' at Warden Road, Bombay. The society on_tinues to be governed by Regulations in Form-A ever since they were adopted by it after approval by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies in 1950. It appears that in 1954 the Directors passed a resolution for the intro duction of Regulations in .Form-B but it was never implemented.\n\nThe respondent No. I Rukibai N. Bhavnani is a' co-partner tenant member of flat No. 52 in building No. 5-A in , the housing colony known as 'Shyam Niwas' situate at Warden Road, Bombay .. The respondent No. 1 inducted the appellant in flat No. 52 under an\n\nagrement of leave and licence dated Novell!ber 28, 1961. The byelaws of the society provide that no member can part with his\n\npossesion of the flat under an agreement of leave and licence to another except with the approval of the .society and unless such licensee becomes a nominal member thereof. The respondent Nq. I and the appellant accordingly appiied to the society on December 8, 1961 for accepting the appellant to be a nominal member. The respondent No. society passed a resolution N, o. 90 on December 15, 1961 , accepting the appellant as a nominal member. The leave and licence agreement executed by the respondent No. I was renewed from time to time and the last agreement was executed on January 10, 1965, the term of which was to expire on February 28, 1965 .. By her notice d!lted March 31, 1965 the respondent No. I called upon the appellant to vacate the premises as his occupation\n\n. '\n\n---- \"'-\n\n0. N. BHATNAGAR v. RUKIBAI (Sen; I.) 685.\n\nof the premises .had become unlawful after termination of the licence. The appellant failed to comply with the demand and has remained in unauthorised occupation of the fiat for all tbese years ..\n\nAfter termination of the agreement, in May 1965, the respondent No. J Smt. Ruklbai N. Bhavnani <:!aiming to be a co-partner. tenant mmber of the society and as such holder of fiat No. 52, brought proceedings against the appellant before the District Deputy\n\nRegistrar Cooperative Societies Bombay under s. 91 (I) of the Act for his eviction and for recovery of arrears of compensation and mesne profits, impleading the society as Opponent No .. 3. On re ceipt of the claim under s. 91(1) the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies issued notice to the appellant for the purpose of satisfying himself that a dispute under that section existed.\n\nThe appellant however did not appear before the Assistant Registrar who was seized with th.e matter but instead filed an application before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay for fixing stand.ard rent of the flat in disput.e. These proceedings were stayed pending adjudication of\n\nth~ dispute by the Assistant Registrar. The Assistant Registrar in the meanwhile proceeded with' the inqqiry and after holding that such a dispute exist he referred the case to the Registrar's 1,1ominee for adjudication. The appellant did not challenge the decision of the Assistant Registrar.\n\nBefore the Registrar's nominee the appellant filed his written statement and thereafter evidence of the parties was recorded. It appears tht when the proceedings before the nominee were about to end he returned the papers to the Registrar as he did not want to proceed further in the matter. When the Registrar's nominee returned the papers, the • Registrar assigned the case to a retired District Judge as an Officer on Special Duty to adjudicate upon the dispute under s. 91 of the Act, as by then the old system of suh adjudication by the Registrar's nominees had been replaced by the appointment of Officers on Special Duty.\n\nBefore the Officer on Special Puty the appellant made a demand for a de novo trial which was granted. Again, the Jvidence of both the parties was recorded and the matter reached the stage of argument but in the meanwhile, in April, 1970, the appellant brought a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay for a declaration that he was a tenant of respondent No. 3 in respect of the flat in dispute and obtained a temporary i0junction restraining respondent No. I .from. proceeding with her case before \\he Officer on Special Duty. Thus, the proceedings before the Officer on Special Duty remained stayed till\n\n• E\n\n686 SUPREMB COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R •.\n\nApril, 1972, when the.suit filed by the appellant in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay was dismissed both on merits as well as on the ground that it was barred by limitation.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the suit brou\"ght by the appellant, the proceedings before the Officer on Special Duty were revived in 1972.\n\nMeanwhil~. the case bad been assigned to another Officer on Special Duty, a retired Preside'ncy Magistrate, for adjudication.\n\nBefore him the appellant again demanded a de novo trial which was granted and therefore evidence had to be recorded afresh. During the stage of of evidence, respondent No. 2 applied for and obtained leave to be transposed as a \"disputant\" as the Bombay High Court took the view that unless the societ)' was a disputant the Registrar would have no judsdiction to proceed under s. 91 ( l) of the Act. The O.fficet on Special Duty by his order dated August.27, 1973 rejected the application for transposition made by respondent No. 2.\n\nThereupon; respondent No. 2 perferred a revision before the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Tribunal which by its order dated February 8, 1974 allowed its application for transposition as a codisputant. The appellant tried to assail the order of the Tribunal by a writ petition but a-Qivision !lench of the High Court by its judgment dated January 9, 1976 d.eclined to interfere. By this time the system of Officers on Special Duly was again replaced, now by the setting up of Cooperative Courts.\n\nAfter tlie dismissal of the writ petition, the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 were assigned to a Judge of the Cooperative Court, Maharashtra. Before him the original plaint was amended making necessary averments with respondent No. 2 as a co-disputant. Again the appellant asked for a de novo trial, but in view of the provisions of s. 9.lA(4) bis application was rejected Respondent No. 1 was however resummoned for further cross examination and thereafter the appellant's evidence was recorded. In August, 1977 there was a change of the\n\nJdge of the Codperative Court and the appellant repeated his prayer for a de novo trial but this application of his also rejected.\n\nThe learned Judge of the Cooperative Court by his judgment dated April 18, 1978, made an award against tbe appellant for -possession of the flat is dispute and for arrears of rent and mesne profits amounting to Rs. 30,000.\n\nAgainst the award the appellant filed an appeal before the Cooperative Appellate Court but it was dismissed in January, 1979. Thereafter the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court in February, 1979 and it was dismissed in March,\n\n1981 by a learned single Jude. The appellant unsuccessfully\n\n:::;\n\n~- '- •\n\nO.N. BHATNAGAR v. ll.UKIBAI (Sen, J.) 687\n\npreferred a Letters Patent Appeal wich was dismissed by a Division Bench on April 21, 198 L\n\nThere are three questions to be determined in the appeal.\n\nThey arc : (!) Wheter having regard to the fact that the parties .\n\nstood in the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of fiat No. 52, the remedy of the rspondent No. 1 lay by way of a suit for eviction, before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay and not by . . - II refcreocc to the Registrar under s. 91 (I) of the Act ? It is urged that the agreement of leave and licence was. merely a colourable transaction for what in reality, was a lease and therefore the appellant was entitled to the protection from eviction under s. 1J of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House. Rates Control Act, .1947 (for short 'the Rent Act' which is a special. law dealing with the relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore the forum for trial , is the Court of Small Causes which is a court of exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, It is said that the non-obstante clause in s. 28 of that Act •has an overriding effect over the nonobstante clause ins. 91(1) of )he Act. (2) Whether the respondent No. 2-society had any locus standi to make an application for trans. position, even assuming that the appellant was not a tenant but a licensee : It is urged that the appellant was entitled to question the legality and propriety of the order of transposition made in revision by the Maharashtra State Cooperative Tribunal permitting the society to be impleaded as a co-diputant so as to bring the dispute within the purview of s. 91(~) of the Act. It is said that. the respondent No. 2-society without first terminating the nominal membership of the appellant could not make a claim for his eviction from the fiat in\n\n1 question (3)' Whether a claim for ejectment of an occupant of a fiat by a housing cooperative society having been let into pqssession of the' premises under an agreement of leave and licence executed between him and a member of the society, by virtue of his being a nominal mem)Jnhereof, is a 'dispute touching the busines~ of the society' within the meaning of s. 91(1) of the Act? We proceed to deal with these questions in turn.\n\n. The statutory provisions bearing upon these questions are set out below. The relevant provision of sJb-s. (l) ofs. 91 of the Act, prior to its amendment, provides :\n\n\" \"91 ( l) Notyvithstanding anythi.ng contained in any other law for the time being in force, any-dispute touching the .. ,.,, business of a society, shall. be referred by any of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.~.\n\nthe parties to the dispute ......... to the Registrar if both .. the parties thereto are one or other of the following :.\n\n(a) a society ............. ..\n\n(Ii) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member ............... \"\n\nSection 91(2) of the Act lays down that when any question arises whether for the purpose of sub-s. (I) any matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not, the question shall be considered by the Registrar whose decision shall be final.\n\nThe Registrar is, therefore, required to.decide as a preliminary issue the question whether the dispute is of the kind as between. the parties in sub-s. (I). Unless he finds that the dispute falls within s. 91(1) of the Act he will have no jurisdiction to decide it. It also a.ttaches finality to the decision of the Registrar on the preliminary issue. Section 91 (3) states that save as otherwise provided under s. 91 (3) of the Act, nci civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit' or other proceeding in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-s. {I).\n\nSection 28(1), of the Rent Act insofar as material, reads:\n\n\"28(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding . that by reason of the amount of the claim or for an:v other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction .\n\nI Bombay, the Co.urt of Small Causes {a) in Greater\n\nBombay,\n\n{aa) xx xx xx\n\n(b) xx xx xx\n\nshall have jurisdiction to entertain and try .f apy suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating \\p the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply ... and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or qucsiion arising out of this Act or any of its provisions and ... no other court shall have jurisdiction to' entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to !le!ll with such claim or question.''\n\n..(, c\n\n-;,.\n\n.r ~--- ,\n\n~ ,;\n\n• ..\n\n.~·\n\nO.N. BHATNAOAll. v. 11.UIJBAI iSen, i.) 68~\n\nTile two nactw~!lt$ 9e~I wi!h !)Iv,() distiqct an9 sellifrate fielcjf and iher.tfm~ the rwnosfq\"fl/G .c; l11µs~ ii) ,. 91(1) of the Act and that ins. 28. of the Rent Aci operateop two different planes. the two legislations pertain to dift\"ernt 'topics of legisla.tion. It will be noticed that s. 28 of the Rent Act prjl,(lj:e~J oP ll!e bJsis that exclusi:ve juri&diction is confuri:ii en cer.t.ail! .c; qµr11 t9 lll\\Cide all questions or claims under that Act .as to parti~J lwlW~I! whom there .is or was a relationship of landlord and tenant. It does not invest those courts with exclusive power to try questions 'of title, 1ll9J! .II! bfwe.q /l' ri~tff1) onf ~~~ , a trep~ser or a !ices~~· for such questions do not arise under the Act: The appellant having raised a plea in the nature of demurrer, the question of jurisdic\\jop ~114 b~ ~!Fftpipr<I i!q ~YFf!,~'l,~ tq tlj~ allegations 1 contained in the statement of claim mar. gy t~~ rsppde9~ No. I under s. 91(1) of the Act and those allegations must be taken to be\n\ntru~.. The ~JP<>ll4en! tfo, IJl1~9µivpj:ally fs.ens t)/~I the parties sto111! i11 ti\\~ i~WjQJ .of li!; e11or ,1µ19 !ipel!Sil'e , lllld tt fact is clearly bol'l!e l!Jll l>Y !hg terl!lS gf t~ llSF~~J!le111 of le.ave ap, cj )icence as\n\nbetl}'ll lb¢ JlllT#!ll• 'fhe tnn<len ~~.s Pll te appellnt to establish th-1 he l)a~ ~~~ 11t11t11• qf a \"!~111.1.111'; witbil! t.be lll~~11ins of s. 5(11} or tit~ Re11t 4RI• as ii t).t, en ,100~. pn~ 1\"81 Jmrd, e, I! !, le has failed to\n\ndis~])arse. If, lh•Q:f\\lr~, pliiiff!itf jn !~~ p)i!!t docs not admit a relationship whi\\:l1 w.01114 !iltT, aqt @!If pf f4~ prQvisi?s of the Act on 1}1'. hich tb .. ~. f .. x. c(1.\".iv,~ j.yr.i .. ~.4ictJol1 jliyn. in s. 2? pe]l!ll)dS, the de(end11nt ~nnqt by !ii~ pie~ fo.rce ~~~ plaintiff to $1> to a forum\n\nwlJ, er.e QJ! @ver111e11ts t!Je claim 4Pes 110, r J1e. ·\n\nIn our opinion, there is a felt need at the very outset to displace .the appellant's apprehensions that the effect of upholding the judgment , of the ijigh f:::ourt would e to throw all licensees of\n\nresidfntj~I ftts. in m?)!i:storeyed b~!ldin.¥s befongfng to cooperative\n\nho!Jmg ~!Jciet1es w1thot aily protection. The apprehensions, ff -. w~ may say SQ, appear to 6e 'wholly unfounded. .The Legislature\n\nws fu)!y aware of the acute paucity of honsirig accommodation in the metropolitan city' of Greter Bombay and other urban areas in the tate, 'll!!d. also the fact' that lessors of ownership flats were\n\nadoptig a device of inductln$ tenants under the garb of an ljgreeinenl of leave arid licence \\Vhfoh left the licenseewitb no protection.\n\nThe Legislature therefore, stepped in and by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973 the foilowing provisions were inserted in tlie Rent Act. Sub-s'.\n\n(1) of s. I SA of the Rent ACt, as introduced now: provides : ' . . '\n\n\"J~A(I) No!wit!ist~4iog WYlhipg co11\\ined elsewher.e in this A9t or anything contrary in any other ·!a1V for th~\n\n690 SUPRllME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\n'fl t.ime being in force, Qr in any contract, where any person is on the I st day of February 1973 in occupation of any premises, or any part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee he shall on that date be deemed to have become, for the purposes of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof, in his occupation;\n\n(2) xx xx xx xx 0\n\n~ The term \"licensee\" as defined in s. 5(4A), msofar as material, reads:\n\n\"5. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or contxt-\n\n(4A) \"licensee\", in respect of any premises or any part thereof, means the person who is in occupation of the premises or such part, as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for licence given for a licence fee or charge; and includes any person in such occupation of any premises . or part thereof in 11 building vesting in or leased to a cooperative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960; .but does not include a paY, ing guest, a member 6f a family residing together, a person in the service or employment of the licensor etc; ......... and the expressions \"licence, \"licensor., and \"premises given on licence\" shall be construed accordingly.\"\n\n...\n\nIt i§ clear upon the terms of these seetions that the appellant is not - entitled to the protection of s. !SA of the Rent Act. The Legis- '· lature in its wisdom has drawn a. line at February I, 1973 and laid ,¥'_..,... down the condition that a licensee in occupation under a subsisting , r • licence as on that date shall. be deemed to be a tenant. The sine qua non for the applicability of s. ISA of the Rent Act is that a licensee must be in occupation as on February 1, 1973 under a subsfsting licence. It is not disputed that the appellant does not answer that description since the agreement of leave and licence .in his favour admittedly stood terminated by the.notice of the respondent No. I dated March 31, 1965. That being so, the appellant is nothing but a rank trespasser and is not entitled to the protection of s .. I SA of the Rent Act and cannot therefore plead the bar of s. 28(1) thereof.\n\n...\n\n0.N. BHATNAGAR v. RUKIBAI (Sen, J.) 691\n\nAs a result of the introduction of s. l 5A and s. 5(4A) of the Rent Act by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973, the licensee of any premises or any part thereof in a building vesting in or leased to a cooperative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Act, who was in oceupation of such premises under a subsisting licence as on February I, 1973, 'is by a legal fiction, deemed to be a tenant and thus bas the protection of the Rent Act.\n\nIn such a case, the dispute between a licensor and a licensee relating to possession of the premises of a flat would: attract s. 28 read witm\n\nss . .15A and 5(4A) of the Rent Act and fall outside the purview of the Registrar's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon sucl:t dispute under s. 91 (I) of the Act.\n\nOnce this aspect is .kept in view, there need be no apprehension \\s expressed by learned counsel for . the appellant that tbe effect of upholding the judgment of the High Court would be t<;> throw all licensees of residential flats in multi-storeyed buildings belonging to cooperative housing societies without any protection.\n\nIt would be convenient to deal with the first two questions together. The submission that the apellant was inducted as a tenant under the agreement of leave and licence is wholly misconceived. The distinction between a lease and a licence is wellknown. A bare reading of the agreement of leave and licence is clearly indicative of the fact that tbe appellant was a licensee.\n\nAdmittedly,' his occupation of the flat was not as a tenant but as a licensee. That apart, the appellknt brought a suit before the Court of Small Causes seeking a declaration, that it was a tenant duly protected by the Rent Act and the agreement of leave and '• licence was only a colourable transaction, The suit was heard on merits and was dismiised by the Court of Small Causes in July\n\n1972. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant preferred an appeal efore the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court but that appeal also 'Was dismissed. The question whether or not the appellant was a licensee of the flat or a tenant thereof was directly and substantially in issue between the parties in , that suit. The finding that be was not. a tenant but had only the status of a licensee\n\nt .\n\noperates as res judicata between the parties. The appellant having fai!ei:I in his suit for declaration of his alleged status of a tenant brought in the Court of Small Causes cannot be permitted to reagitate the same question in these proceedings. Further, the licence - of the appellant having been terminated by the respondent No. I by her notice dated March 31, 1965, the appellant was not in occu pation of the fiat on Februarl/ Ii 1973 '!oder a, stibsistin~ tenancr\n\n692 SpPllBME COURT llEPOllTS l 1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nand did not acquire the status of a tenant under s. 15A and is therefore not protected under s. 13 of the Rent Act.\n\nAs bereinbefore adumbrated, the respon<)ent No. 2-society is governed by the Regulations in Form'.A: It is registered as a copartnership -type housing society. The bye, laws of the society provide, inler-alia, by Bye-law 2 that one of the objects of the society would be .to carry on the trade of buying, selling, hiring, lett!ng and developing land in accordance with cooperative principles. The respondent No. 1 is a co-partner tenant member and holds flat No. 52 in Form-A. The fl; it in question therefore belongs to the society and she is a co-partner tenant member thereof. Paragraph s of FormA reads :\n\n\"S. No ten.ant 4.l)all M§iil!, l!nderlet, vll!late or part ~. with the possssion Qf .tb.e t~Mment gr any Part tbreof without the consent in writing of the society.\"\n\nTl)e two bye_-laws relevant for .qur purp0ses are Bye-laws 66 and 68(a) which prpyide 11s foU.ows :\n\n... 66. WbcnCVl'J' a m, J!lb~ to i, vljoJ!l a tenement, a shop or a godown h; is bjseJI 1!, llptted by the Sqciejy .docs not require the same fpr !)is P.wn µse temporarily or fpr a specific peripd, be may Pifer the same to any Pers.on, as a liceo.see for eJP, porary occup11tion for a specifiel! perjpd, provil!Pd !~~I b.e slJ!lll-(a) sign and under,\n\najcing requited ))y tl)e !!oci.ety; (g) gt such temporary occupant enro)ld l!s a llPminal wember of the society; '•\n\n(c) sl:lall not per111it \"1pb o.pupation before receiYing per-\n\n11111 mission from t4e Society's i:; oi)lmittee to do so, provided ),- such permissiop sha\\J 11pt )), e coµsidere<!, unless the member ~- has paid all his due to the Society 11ptodate, and a11thorizes the Society to recover fr.pm the nominal memQ.er, out of compensation or rent. receivable by him from the 9ominal\n\nmember any amount due from the member to the So.ciety by way -0f , t11xes, general charge& or any other dues.\"\n\n\".68(a) No pern sh.i, I j)e' b, ten~.t or licensee. or lessee etc. Qf the-So, cjy or of; i. member, unless the Com, miltce first ~µtol~ hi!ll '' Nomin11l Member of th.e Society\n\nand he pays Rs. ~OOJ11s a security deposit to tlje Society. for this purpose., h~ bas to apply in a f()rm prescribed. by\n\nb.k illtAtNA<lidt v: iblaoAI (Self, J.)\n\nthe Society. The Sentfty tljloi!if Wlll .M!f iltt ml and will be issued iii the joitlf llllrll~ Of Ille SOiety <Jt t'lle member (as the case may be) 11t1d t~ oecupant and it will be refunded on the ottilpant 'Vlicating 'lft~· lenimlent iii question.\"\n\nThe. respondent No. l couid not have fot the premises to the aj>'pelfant in view of para 5 of the Form-A. All tnat she could do ifshe did not requite the Ila! for lier immediate occupation was to petinit the appellat or sdme one fo occi'.l]fy ilie same under an\n\n~ , L. agreement of leave atid licence. llul fdr thfll iilltPMe both fhe\n\npai'ties had to omply with tire te'qurte'ttteim of By~-lllws 66. abd\n\n68(a). The respondent Na. I l!'!l'd tll~ rtppeffailf accoraing(y t; y 'tb; ir application datedpecember 8, 1961 applied 115 tlie soiety fdt\n\npermission to let the flat on leave and licence and for the issuance of five 'B' shares of Rs. JOO ellCti it! lbefr jlii'llt nlllne's lied \"occu pancy shares\". Tlie te!ponde'nt NO. 2•4(Jtlieti ht it~ teso1utioti d\"ted Decembet Is, 1961 isstlOO Ille sfliir~ ats!)lied tot in their j6frii names tn'd lliso admitted lite irppe!Jant fts a llohlirliil tnember tot tire purpose of occupjlinJi the flirt. At'ler th~ tetinii!iifion'Of the ttgre~· Ynent tif leave an:cl li¢cnce, the aptieffant lrad no tight io remain iii\n\n6ecnpatfoit of the 6:it. t11e eonletl'tton thal tne resjiond'ent No. 2- 9'6'CieTy cannot raise a dipute tegMlliilg his unauthorized occupation of the jitmises ilftef !h'e reVocli!ioil of ilic ficehcc is devoid of tubM'll'tlce. The re!; p'(!nde'!'l! !Ito. 1-Mcly 'being a co-pattnershiJ>\n\ntype libttsilig dcMy, ljilVfog let lia:t N6. 52 to the tcspopdent No. i at a co'jiStfilet te'llaht inel!lbe'r, Vl'as \"<>lf\"ily ltiteresl¢d in ensuring tl\\ai no stranger is in urUiuthorited 6Ccupa'ffon of fue fiat after the expiry of t1re term ofthe fin:ce as it wo'111d teM fo cause annoyance '... and inconvenience to the other co-partner tenant members .of the\n\n--.....__~ !W<liety.\n\nfhre was a determined effort to quJstion the legality and ptopiiety of the order passed by the Maharashira State Cooperative Tribunal allowing the application for transposition made by respondent No. 2\"'.\"'socfoty bl.ft we did not permit the appellan't to do so for obvious reasons. The appellant had challenged the impugned order of the Tribunal by a writ petition in the High Court and\n\neventuaJlyfailed. The appellant ri'ot having questioned the. judgment of the l{igh Court, the order of the Tribunal llowing transpo&itiOll'\n\nof the respondent No. 2-society as a co-disputant bas attained a finality which cannot now be upset.\n\nThe pciings initiated by ~\n\nSUPkilMB t:obu REPoRTS i19s2l 3 s.c.a.\n\nthe respondent No. 1 under s. 91(1) of the Act could not go on after the High Court had taken the view in certain, cases that unless the cooperative housing society is a disputant, the claim by a member thereof for possession of the premises o(a fiat against a licensee would not be a dispute falling within, the _ambit of_ s. 91(1) _of the Act. That being so, quite apart from technicalities, we are inclined to the view that the High Court was fully justified in not interfering with the impugned order of \"the Tribunal allowing transposition.\n\nThe Tribunal adopted a course which was both eminent and just and was necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. The appellant who is a rank trespasser has no equity in his favour. The contention that the respondent No. 2-society could not be trans posed as a co-disputant in the proceedings under s. 91(1) of the Act must therefore fail.\n\nThe third questio11 is the much vexed question on which the decision of the appeal mus_t turn. It is submitted that the dispute between the licensor and the licensee was not one falling within the purview of s. 91(1) of the Act.\n\nIt is _said that a dispute between a ·•,,.flai-owner and the occupant as regards tenancy cannot be taken cognizance of by the Registrar under s. 91 (1) of the Act, but the remedy of the fiat-owner lies by way of suit for ejectment under s. 28 of the Rent Act. The submission is that the fact that such letting 'was forbidden by a regulation of the society was immaterial. In reply, it is urged that the dispute undoubtedly is a dispute touching !he business of the society and therefore comes within the ambit of s. 91 (I) of the Act. It is further urged that the non-obstame clause in s. 91 (I) of the Act had an overriding effect over s. 28' of the Rent Act, prior to the introduction of s. ISA and s. 5(4A) in that Act.\n\nThere has been a long de1'ate as to the true meaning of the ,.>--- words 'touching the business of the society' occurring in s. 43(1) or the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 and there was a divergence of opinion expressed by different High Courts but it is not necessary to burden the judgment with many citations; .\n\nIn Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain & Ors.,(1) the Court had occasion to construe the meaning of the expression 'touching the business-of a society' occurring ins. 91(1) -of the Act •. It was observed that the answer depends on the words used in the Act and that the non-obstant e\n\n(I) [t969J t s.c.R. 887.\n\n6.14. llHATNAGAk v. kuKIBAI (§en, J.)\n\nclause clearly ousts. thejurisdiction of civil courts if the dispute falls squarely within the ambit of s. 91(1) of the Act. The Courtthen\n\nwent on to enumerate five kinds of disputes mentioned in • s. 91 ( l) : first, disputes louchiog the constitution of a society; secondly, disputes touching election of the office, bearers of a society; thirdly,\n\n- dispu'tes touching the conduct of general meetings of a society; fourthly, disputes touching _the management of a society and fifthly, disputes touching the business of a society. .Io the context, it was said :\n\n\"It is clear that the word 'business' in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of officebearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affairs of a society. In this sub-section th'e word 'business' has been usedin a narrower sense and it means the actual trading. or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and it bye-laws:\"\n\nIo regard to the question whether a dispute touching the assets of a society would be dispute touching the business , of the society, it was observed:\n\n\"Ordinarily, if a society owns buildings .and lets out parts of buildings which it d()es not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But it may be that it is the business pf a society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members.\n\nIn that case letting out property may be part of its business.\"\n\nThs,· the Court adopted the narrower meaning given to the word 'business' as expressed by the Madra8, Bombay and Kerala High Courts in preference to the wider meaning given by the Madhya Pradesh and Nagpur High Courts. According to the view taken in.Deccan Merchant Cooperative Bank's case, supra, the word 'busjoess' in the context means \"any trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the. society\". It was held that the word 'business' in s. 91(1) of the Act has been used in a narrower sense and that it means the actual trading, commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the rules and its bye-laws,\n\n. !J982l 3 s.C.ll.\n\nIn the present ease, thli oclefy is, Ii teilililt lco-piirln6ishij) type liousimg society formed with the object of pro\\>idill~ residential . aCCO!llmodation to its CO' partner tenarlf lii~'nibers. Now' the natute\n\nof. business which a society carries on lias necessarily to he ascertained from the object for which tlie soi:iety is constituted, and it logically follows that whatever the society does ln the nortnal coutse otits activities such as bY initiaiing ptoceedlngs tor temovilig an 'act ot trespass by a stranger, frem a llat atlorteli t'6 .ci!le of n~ 11\\eMbrel's, cannot but be part of its business. It is as much the concern of t'be society formed with the object of prqviding residential accommodation to its members, which normally is its business, to ensure that the fiats are in occupation of its members, in accordance with the bye-Jaws framed'by it, rather than of a person i111an 'unauthorised occupation, as it. is the concern of the member, who lets it o'ut to another under an agreement of leave and licence and wants to secure possessiop of the premises for his own use afier the termination of the licence. lt must, therefore, foif<iw that a claim by the society together with such member for ejectment . of a person who was permitted to occupy having become a nominal member thereof, upon revocation of licence, is a dispute falling within the purview of s. 91(1) of the Act. The decision in Deccan Merchants <::ooperative.\n\nBank's case, supra, ls clearly distinguishable on facts.\n\nThere, the Court was dealing with a society which was a cooperative bank and ordinarily a cooperative bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when lt leis out propdrty o\\Vned by it. If! that case, the dispute was not a dispute ·etwein 'a ~Mity and ii 'membilr or a person claiming througb i lllember.\n\nFurtliC't \\We'll the original owner executed the lease, 11~ was ii6t actil'l'.g a's a l!iitlbef f>\\it as a mortgagor in possession arid tlle'refote tli(coo~'tratiVi: hlink'k 'claim for ejectment orthe Jessee did not fall Wit'b'iti s. 91{1) (b) OtttteA9t.\n\nIt is true that the Court in Deecan Merchanta Cooperative ~\n\nBnk'.s i:ase, sbtlril; 'dedft \\tifli ''Ii! \\\\uifftt Whetlfer on tbe fatli and circiiln'stances 6T tliat case, tlil! Rl!!it Act apilffell tlld accordiugfy the jurisdiction t!f Hie Regis!fa't utl\\ft!r 1. 91(1) l:Sf the Act was ousted aild it was only the Cohrt of Stnall Cattse'S Wliich hlad jll'tisdictioll to evict the tenant. The ddutl rl!femd to the twin' social <!bjectives with which the two , enactb'ltlif9' were dcsignerd and obsetV'ed that wliile s. 9 J(l) <>f the \"Act was il!tended add meant; in the m'llin, to shorten lifig'iifioh, lesl!tn i~ l!o&U iln4' t61roVidc a: wmmaty proecdilte for tlie detetlllill'atio'fl bf 1111' dilplltes rt!lating to the internal management of the soCiefie~. t11e Relit Aet waa i1itdnded to achieve ..\n\n\"\" '\n\ntut BHATNAGAR v. RUKJBAI (Sen, J,)\n\na different social objective i, e. to prevent the eviction of tenants and enhancements of rent, and then went on to say that it was necessarr that a dispute between the lal!dlord and tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of that Act. It then dealt with the inter-relation between the non-obstante clause in s. 91(1) of the Act , and s. 28 of the Rent Act and observed that this special objective under the Act does not impinge on the objective underlying the Rent Act: It seems to us _that the two Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, sliould apply.\n\nBut where the parties admittedly do not stand in the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, as here, the dispute would be governed bys. 91(1) of the Act. - No doubt, the appellant acquired a right to occupy the fiat as 11 licensee, by virtue of his being a nominal melllber, but in the very nature of things, his righlt were inchoate.\n\nIo view of these considerations, we are oi the opinion that the prol!eedings t111der s. 91 (I) of the . Act were not barred by the provisions of s. 28 of the Rent Act.\n\nA great deal of relianee has been placed by the appellant's counsel on the decision fo Sabharwa1 Brothers & ilnr. v. Smt. Guna Amrit Thandani ef lJoinbay .('t) The 'importanee of thaf.ca8e lies in tire fa(!t that it relates to the respondent No, 2 1cici91)11 1UAI tbil diipotant tH11re wzs the owner of a ftat on the Slicdtrd fioor of 1lltlck f4il. 8 \"Shyam Niwas\" • She was 'II meritber '<If the s<lli!ety 'add inrd\n\no.\\red the fiat in qoesticlll, _ 'lvh!Cb Wa&· 'tet oot to th6 ajjjl'ellallt Sllbhatwal Btoihers ntltler an ag1\"9ei*nt ofteaved lice~. wlltdi. #Ifs tene~ !'roln time to 'iinte mid whtn she lffi&d th6 a{llill1t fo\n\n'Vlllla~ as llhe requited the -fiat fdt her lJerBonill occuprtion, llidy did not comply with the demand as a result of which the~ owner ol the fiat filed a statement of clail)l before the Registrar under s. 91(1) of the Act which reqtil'ielt a8, Jlrd'icaiion: .. i'hefe 'was ii challenge to the jurisdiction o't the liolni.riee of ille 'Regiattlir 'to whottr It was referred, and ultimate.ly he made an award that the appellant\n\nSabharwal Brothers hacl occupied 'th.e flat on leave and licence basis and was therefore liable to be evicted. In revisiOn, 'the Dench 'of the Smalt Causes Cou'rt held that the Registrar's 'nominee aid &live jurisdicfion and the lligh 'Court uplicfd the order of 'the Deneb.\n\nAllowing the appeal, this Court observed :\n\n\\i'l t1n:i1 1 s:c.a. , s3.\n\nSUPRlli.iE COIJkt REI'Okts t19Sil 3 s.c.l.\n\n\"With all respect to the Higi} Court, it seems to us that there was a fuadarneutal error in the above approach. No doubt it was the business. of the society to let out premises aild a member had no unqualified right to let out his flat or tenement to another by virtue of the bye-laws and a breach of the bye-laws 'could affect the defaulting member's right to membership. But we are not able to see how letting by a member to another member would touch the business of the society which included in.ter alla the trade of buying, selling, hiring and letting land in accordance with coopera tive principles.\n\nThe letting of flat by respondent No. I was a transaction of the same nature as the society itself was empowered to enter into but and Jetting by itself did not concern the business of the society in the matter of its letting out flats. Nothing was brought to our notice to show that such a letting would affect the buiness of the society once it had sold the flat to the respondent No. I. the position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant of the flat under the society. \"To touch\" means \"to come in contact with\" and it does not appear that there is a point of contact between a letting by the ·· respondent No. and the business of the society when the society was not itself the land.lord of the flat.\" ·\n\nIt is we think, important to remember that this authority decided only one point albeit a point of great importance namely, .that the society . having old th~ flat, like any other vendor of immovable property, the lettmg out of. the flat by the flat-owner was no concern of the society. . There was nothing to show that such letting would .\n\naffect the business of the society once it has sold the flat.\n\nWith respect, we entirely agree with all , that was sid. But then the Court went on to say : '\n\n\"The position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant of the flat under lhe society.\"\n\nG It logically follows, as a necessary corollary, that if the transaction between the society and the holder of the !lat were governed by Regulations in Form-A, as hre,. that is to say, if the society had let out the Ila t to her, the decision of the Court would have been\n\nH otherwise.\n\nThe decision in Sabharwal Brothers' ca.•e, supra, is distinguishable for two reasons. First, there was an outright sale of , the flat by\n\nO.N. BHAtNAOAR v. RtiKlBAI (Sen, !-) 69~\n\nthe society and not tht it had been let out to her under' Regulations in Form-A; and secondly, the society having sold the flat, the letting of the flat by the flat-owner did not in' any way affect the business of the society in the mater of its letti\"ng out the flat. The\n\nobservation made by this Court that the fact that such Jetting was forbidden by a regulation of14e S<?Cfoty . was immaterial did not fall for decision in that case and was , a mere obiter.\n\nIn the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs .\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "0. :N. BHATNAGAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. N. BHATNAGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RUKIBAI NARSINDAS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RUKIBAI NARSINDAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1960", "statute": "Societies Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1960", "statute": "Societies Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 709, "end_char": 719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 795, "end_char": 808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 843, "end_char": 854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "February 28, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1558, "end_char": 1575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was renewed from time to time and tho period of the Jut agreement expired on February 28, 1965.. By her notice dated March 31, 1965;, rcspondoot NO'."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1598, "end_char": 1612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was renewed from time to time and tho period of the Jut agreement expired on February 28, 1965.. By her notice dated March 31, 1965;, rcspondoot NO'."}}, {"text": "April 28, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I preferred the claim f0r posso1Sion before tho cooperative court which by its judgment dated April 28, 1978 made an Award against the appellant for possession .. r the fiat in dispute and for arrears of rent and mesoo profits amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960", "statute": "the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960", "statute": "the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3135, "end_char": 3164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 91(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 5(4A) and 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5517, "end_char": 5539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1, '", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sine qUa non for the applicability of s. 15A of tbe Rent Act is that a licensee must be in oi::cupation as on Feb. 1, '73 under a subsisting li'cence."}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6117, "end_char": 6123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6178, "end_char": 6186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Feb. 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Rent Act A by Maharashtra Act J.7 of 1973, the licensee of any wemi!iOs or any part thereof in a building vstingjn or leased to a cooperating housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Act, who was in occupation of such premises under\" a subsisting licence as on Feb. 1, 1973, is by a legal fiction, deemed to be a tenant add thus has the prOtectioo, of the Rent Act."}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Feb. I, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, by hr notice dated March 31, 1965, the appellant was not in occupation of the fiat on Feb. I, 1973 under a subsisting licence and therefore did noi acquire the status of a tenant under 8ection ISA and is, not protected 11nder section 13 of the Rent Act."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8230, "end_char": 8232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8507, "end_char": 8520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C1VIL APPilr.LATB Jua1so1CT10N", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8689, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "693 D-G)\n\nC1VIL APPilr."}}, {"text": "H.H.\n\nAdvai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8888, "end_char": 8899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.H.\n\nAdvai, P.R. Ramasesh and Manu lyanger for the Appellant.·"}}, {"text": "P.R. Ramasesh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8901, "end_char": 8914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.H.\n\nAdvai, P.R. Ramasesh and Manu lyanger for the Appellant.·"}}, {"text": "Manu lyanger", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8919, "end_char": 8931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.H.\n\nAdvai, P.R. Ramasesh and Manu lyanger for the Appellant.·"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, V.K. Panwani and Girish Chandra for .the\n\nRespondents."}}, {"text": "V.K. Panwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, V.K. Panwani and Girish Chandra for .the\n\nRespondents."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 8997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kackar, V.K. Panwani and Girish Chandra for .the\n\nRespondents."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9120, "end_char": 9123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J. This appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated April 21, 198 I raises a qµestion of some importance."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9653, "end_char": 9658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9666, "end_char": 9703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "I Rukibai N. Bhavnani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10592, "end_char": 10613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Rukibai N. Bhavnani is a' co-partner tenant member of flat No."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11206, "end_char": 11222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and the appellant accordingly appiied to the society on December 8, 1961 for accepting the appellant to be a nominal member."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11334, "end_char": 11351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "society passed a resolution N, o. 90 on December 15, 1961 , accepting the appellant as a nominal member."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11533, "end_char": 11549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I was renewed from time to time and the last agreement was executed on January 10, 1965, the term of which was to expire on February 28, 1965 .. By her notice d!lted March 31, 1965 the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ruklbai N. Bhavnani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12063, "end_char": 12082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ruklbai N. Bhavnani <:!"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12291, "end_char": 12296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12780, "end_char": 12809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant however did not appear before the Assistant Registrar who was seized with th.e matter but instead filed an application before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay for fixing stand.ard rent of the flat in disput.e."}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13107, "end_char": 13110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15184, "end_char": 15201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 applied for and obtained leave to be transposed as a \"disputant\" as the Bombay High Court took the view that unless the societ)' was a disputant the Registrar would have no judsdiction to proceed under s. 91 ( l) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15314, "end_char": 15319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15531, "end_char": 15573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 perferred a revision before the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Tribunal which by its order dated February 8, 1974 allowed its application for transposition as a codisputant."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15599, "end_char": 15615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 perferred a revision before the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Tribunal which by its order dated February 8, 1974 allowed its application for transposition as a codisputant."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15813, "end_char": 15828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lench of the High Court by its judgment dated January 9, 1976 d.eclined to interfere."}}, {"text": "Cooperative Court, Maharashtra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16092, "end_char": 16122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 were assigned to a Judge of the Cooperative Court, Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16315, "end_char": 16319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 18, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16719, "end_char": 16733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge of the Cooperative Court by his judgment dated April 18, 1978, made an award against tbe appellant for -possession of the flat is dispute and for arrears of rent and mesne profits amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17697, "end_char": 17702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17921, "end_char": 17926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17973, "end_char": 17990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18271, "end_char": 18276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rates Control Act", "statute": "Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91(~)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18820, "end_char": 18828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rates Control Act", "statute": "Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19375, "end_char": 19383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 91(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20072, "end_char": 20085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20518, "end_char": 20526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20667, "end_char": 20677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20727, "end_char": 20732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22153, "end_char": 22158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22817, "end_char": 22825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(11} or tit~ Re11t 4RI• as ii t)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23258, "end_char": 23294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23567, "end_char": 23571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(4A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25249, "end_char": 25257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25788, "end_char": 25831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SA of the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26202, "end_char": 26220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ISA of the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26491, "end_char": 26510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SA of the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26928, "end_char": 26946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26985, "end_char": 26993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Rent Act", "statute": "SA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(4A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27097, "end_char": 27105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Rent Act", "statute": "SA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "February I, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27395, "end_char": 27411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\n0.N. BHATNAGAR v. RUKIBAI (Sen, J.) 691\n\nAs a result of the introduction of s. l 5A and s. 5(4A) of the Rent Act by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973, the licensee of any premises or any part thereof in a building vesting in or leased to a cooperative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Act, who was in oceupation of such premises under a subsisting licence as on February I, 1973, 'is by a legal fiction, deemed to be a tenant and thus bas the protection of the Rent Act."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27631, "end_char": 27636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Rent Act", "statute": "SA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27785, "end_char": 27790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Rent Act", "statute": "SA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Februarl/ Ii 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29729, "end_char": 29746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I by her notice dated March 31, 1965, the appellant was not in occu pation of the fiat on Februarl/ Ii 1973 '!"}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29874, "end_char": 29880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29918, "end_char": 29923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34836, "end_char": 34844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35133, "end_char": 35141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35669, "end_char": 35677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35919, "end_char": 35927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36083, "end_char": 36088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36178, "end_char": 36183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36454, "end_char": 36459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36527, "end_char": 36532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36578, "end_char": 36583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(4A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36642, "end_char": 36650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36790, "end_char": 36798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36806, "end_char": 36837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37469, "end_char": 37477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912", "statute": "the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37564, "end_char": 37569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912", "statute": "the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Madra8, Bombay and Kerala High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39054, "end_char": 39091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ths,· the Court adopted the narrower meaning given to the word 'business' as expressed by the Madra8, Bombay and Kerala High Courts in preference to the wider meaning given by the Madhya Pradesh and Nagpur High Courts."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh and Nagpur High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39140, "end_char": 39177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ths,· the Court adopted the narrower meaning given to the word 'business' as expressed by the Madra8, Bombay and Kerala High Courts in preference to the wider meaning given by the Madhya Pradesh and Nagpur High Courts."}}, {"text": "Deccan Merchant Cooperative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39210, "end_char": 39242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deccan Merchant Cooperative Bank's case, supra, the word 'busjoess' in the context means \"any trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the."}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39419, "end_char": 39427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41066, "end_char": 41074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deccan Merchants", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41103, "end_char": 41119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Deccan Merchants <::ooperative."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41733, "end_char": 41738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deecan Merchanta Cooperative", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41787, "end_char": 41815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FurtliC't \\We'll the original owner executed the lease, 11~ was ii6t actil'l'.g a's a l!iitlbef f>\\it as a mortgagor in possession arid tlle'refote tli(coo~'tratiVi: hlink'k 'claim for ejectment orthe Jessee did not fall Wit'b'iti s. 91{1) (b) OtttteA9t.\n\nIt is true that the Court in Deecan Merchanta Cooperative ~\n\nBnk'.s i:ase, sbtlril; 'dedft \\tifli ''Ii!"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42273, "end_char": 42277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42987, "end_char": 42995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43013, "end_char": 43018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43178, "end_char": 43256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43754, "end_char": 43759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act", "statute": "Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43814, "end_char": 43819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act", "statute": "Acts can be best harmonised by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Shyam Niwas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44190, "end_char": 44201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 \"Shyam Niwas\" • She was 'II meritber '<If the s<lli!ety 'add inrd\n\no.\\red the fiat in qoesticlll, _ 'lvh!Cb Wa&· 'tet oot to th6 ajjjl'ellallt Sllbhatwal Btoihers ntltler an ag1\"9ei*nt ofteaved lice~. wlltdi."}}, {"text": "s. 91(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44673, "end_char": 44681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sabharwal Brothers hacl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44898, "end_char": 44921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "roln time to 'iinte mid whtn she lffi&d th6 a{llill1t fo\n\n'Vlllla~ as llhe requited the -fiat fdt her lJerBonill occuprtion, llidy did not comply with the demand as a result of which the~ owner ol the fiat filed a statement of clail)l before the Registrar under s. 91(1) of the Act which reqtil'ielt a8, Jlrd'icaiion: .. i'hefe 'was ii challenge to the jurisdiction o't the liolni.riee of ille 'Regiattlir 'to whottr It was referred, and ultimate.ly he made an award that the appellant\n\nSabharwal Brothers hacl occupied 'th.e flat on leave and licence basis and was therefore liable to be evicted."}}, {"text": "s3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45241, "end_char": 45243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sabharwal Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47553, "end_char": 47571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Sabharwal Brothers' ca.•e, supra, is distinguishable for two reasons."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_700_706_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "UNtON OF INfiIA\n\nIi.\n\nGU~NAM SINGH\n\nMay 3, Ii\n\nr&.s. P>.mAt ANo Its. 'VsNx:>.tARAr.i•Au, iJ .1\n\n High Court Judges' (Conditions of Strvlct) -ict 1954-Section and rules\n\ntt11JiJHTIHl!rtlldtr~Rlll• 2-Scop• of-A Judg< on'retirem<nt-Wheth<rentitleilid cash equiralent of leave salary.\n\nOn his retirement as Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court the re•· pondent claimed cash equivalent 'of leave salary in respect of the unutilised earned leave standing to his redit. His clai'm was rejeCted by the Government.\n\nAllowing his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court l) directed the Government to pay the leave salary claimed by him.\n\nIn its petition for grant of special le&Ye the apellant contended that the High Court Judges' (Conditions of Service) Act 1954 being a complete code govemiDg the conditions of service of High Court Judges it would not be per missible to proceed beyond those provisions. to discover any further rights ia favour of the Judges of tho High Court.\n\nDismissing the petition, ·\n\nHELD~ The High Court was right .in upholding tho respondent's claim tor payment of the cash equivalent of leve salary in respect of the period of unuti lised earned leave at the credit of the Judge on -the date of his retirement in accordance with the provisions of rule 208 of the All India Services (Leave) Rules 1955 read with rule 2 of the High Court Judges R_ulos 1956. [706 Ji.CJ\n\nSection 24(2)(a) of the 1954 Act enables the Central GoV.mment to make rules in respect or, among others, \"any otbei' matter which has to be or could be\n\nprescribed.\" [703 Bl\n\nThe second proviso to rule 2 of the High Court Judges' Rules, 1956 provides that, in the case of a Judge of the High Court oC Punjab and Haryan, if no pro.. vision had been expressly made in the 1954 Act~ as to the conditions of his service, they shall be determined by the rles applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service of thC rank of Joint Secretary to, the Government o! India stationed at New Delhi. Rule 20B of All India Services (Leave) Rules 1955, whiCh is the rule applicable lo a member of the Indian Administrative Service of the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi, entitles him on retirement from service to the cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of unutilised earned leave subject to a maxi mum of 180 days. By virtue of rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules 1956 this ...\n\nUNION l/, GUIUIAM SINGH (Pathak, J,) 701\n\nbenefit \"'°'t \\JO read ·a con<\\itio11 of 110rvi!!O ollio~ by a Ju<!ae of tho High <; our1. [704 B-C, 7ps ABl\n\nThe concept of ''oarned loave\" is ombodded in 'the 1954 Act under which the time spent by S Judge on duty constitutes the primary ingredient in the COD• cept of -\"actual service\" which ;, the reason .t!r crediting JolvC in tl?ie leive a1+ount of a Judge. AJl\\l.ouih !hA llllPJ•iPl! 'lrd !lllY~\" iJ QOt ell!i!loYed iij the !~54 At the fµnd.qieµtal jl!emj~ f~! graql 9f le.ye I~ 8 'J\\l'I\" is t~11-t be\n\nas earned it.\n\nTat a Judge CffD~ the !~•v• w, hic~ (~ f~~!te~ t~ 1!i! !~ve ''copnt is borne outby the proviso to s. 6 of jhe 1951 Ai; t. The CJ>ncept OQ which r, ule 2011 proceeds is familiar to and underlies the statutory sclienie relaiing io\"ieave formulat•d-in the Act. It !?ears a logicil and . reasonable relationship to the\n\n•eptj~ contnt of that s.che~; (lg 11!41 i! !!JU§t bi: rg'lf~~ a.s a prnvi*on absorbed by rule 2 of the High ~Qµrt li!dj!;!i' J}l!I~ l~S~ .iq!q t!Je fii!tfpry structure defining the conditions of service of a Judge of the High Court.\n\n[70S CH, 706AJ\n\nC1y1'< APJ'~LL~T~ ua1sp1cno1:1 : $pci~I ~av, e Petitio!1 No. 416 of 1981.\n\n. From the judgment and order dated te 5th Sptember; 1980 of the Punjab 81\\d Harya'll& High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.\n\n1515 of 1980. ·\n\n~.l!J. iflq, Attorney Aer-', ~:.S (l1inm1apr, tJiy & JJ.N. Poddar\n\nfqqb~ Peii.tjoqer. ·\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\n_PATHAK, J. This petition for special leave to appeal by the P11iop of ln4ia is directe<! gilint t!)e judgment nd or(jer of the\n\nI; Iig~ Ccnm of Punjab an.<! Ifl1rY\\l!ll\\ )loJdiQg !b.e r&S, J?ocjeJll~ a retirE.4 J\\!d!!!' of t, be Hih f::qqrt, entitled tq f.l\\e p, a.yme11t of the fash , ec19ivlent ofleye salary )n respect J>f the pe, rio(j pf citrqed le\\IVc at\n\nbi~ Cfe,4it O~ tb.e (jt~ qf bjs retirement,\n\nThe respondent1 Sbr.i Gurnal)I inb, was a member of the Superior Judicial Service in the State of Haryana.\n\nQn February 24, )972 be was appointed a Judge of the High Court of Punjb, aiid\n\n' •\n\n- •. - • .,. • -· ' . ' ... 'i_ Haryapa 0 11ndh rdetiredf oq. M!frcb lb8, 1980 o~ attaihnind~ tbebge ofd6'2 G years. _n t e ate o ret1rem_ent t. e esponuent a to _ .ts ere .. ti earned leav~ lfhih h:i4 nt bee~ ayailed of by hjm. :He cJairqd\n\n\\a! be Wl\\S entitl, eq o rece1v, e !he Ci!h equiy!flep$ 9f )eave 8\\1)1\\rY . in epept of th~ peripd pf lJDU!j/, ise, d ea.med leave. e ; i)so c!iP), d dearpess all<;>wapce f()r .the period before retir~, ment, :Che claim H\n\n~im: d,~.ni~1 fhe r~p.oodent , i!ppJie!! ~9 th~ ijib fou.ri of Punjab aruj Harj!Qa Io' rFlif 11n\\ler 4rlice 226 of e Coq1titutiou. T/le\n\n7~ . SUPREME, cou)l.T REPORTS' [1982) 3 s.c.11. •\n\nwrit petition was allowed by the High Court by its Judgment and order dated September 5, 1980 and a direction was issued to the\n\nUnion of India to pay the amount claimed. During the course of the hearing the Union of India conceded the claim to dearness allowance in view of the order dated July 3, 1S80 of the Government that the Judges of the High Conrt were entitled to draw dearness allowance from December 1, 1979.\n\nAs to the remaining claim, the High Court held the respondent entitled to the cash equivalent of the leave salary for the period of unutilised earned leave by giving him the benefit of rule 20-B, AIL India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 by virtue of rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956. The order of the High Court is assailed before us.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court is plainly right.\n\nArticle 221 of the Constitution provides for the payment of salaries .and allowances 10 a Judge of a High Court. 'clause (2) of Article 221 declares :\n\n\"(2) Every Judge shall be entitled to . such allowances and fo such rights in respect of leave of absence and pension as may from time to time be determined by or under law made by Parliament and, nntil so determined, to such allowances and rights as are specified in the Second\n\nSchedule :\n\nThe rights in respect of leave of absence to which a Judge is entitled may be determined by or under law made by Parliament. Parliament enacted the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, and sections 3 to 13 of that Act classify the kinds of leave admissible to a Judge, and provide for the maintenance of a leave account, the aggregate amount of leave which may be granted, the commutation of leave on half allowance into leave on full allowance, the grant of leave not due, special disability leave, extraordinary leave, the rate of leave allowances, allowance for joining time, for combining leave with vacation and the consequences of overstaying ]eave or vacation, It also. specifies the authority competent to grant leave.\n\nThe Union of India says that these several provisions constitute a Gomplete code and exhaustively set. forth all the benefits relating to leave to which a Judge of a High Court is entitled, and that it is not permissible to proceed beyond those provisions to discover any further right 'in favour of a Judge.\n\nT.bat submission is inadmissible.\n\nS11b-s. (1) of s. Z4 of the'same Act empowers of\n\n- ,.(\n\nCentral Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. And clause (a) of Sub-s. (2) of s. 24 specifically contemplates rules providing for \"leave of absence of a Judge\". In other words, it is open to the Central Government to adcf to the existing _statutory provisions by making rules in relation to leave of absence. Sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 24 in fact enables the Central Government to make rules in respect of several other matters, such as the pension payable to a Judge, travelling allowances, use of official residence, facilities for medical treatment and other conditios of serv'ice and \"any other matter which has to be, or may be prescribed\". Now the Govern\n\nmept of India enacted the High Court Judges Rules, 1956 and rule 2 comprehensively declares :\n\n\"2. The con?itions of services of a Judge of a High Court for which no express provision has been made in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, shall be, and shall from the commencement of the Constitution be deemed to have been, determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of the State in which the principal seat ' of the High Court is situat~.\n\nProvided that, in the case of a Judge of the High Court of Delhi and a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana the conditions of serviceshall be determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service on deputation to the Government of India holding the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi.\n\nProvided further that, in respect of facilities for medical treatment and accommodation in hospitals the provisions of.the All India Service (Yledical Attendance) Rules, 1954, in their application to a Judge, shall be deemed to have taken effect from the 26th January, 1950.\n\nProvided also that where at the request of the President, any Judge undertakes to discharge any function outside his normal duties in any locality away from of his headquarters, the President may, having regard to th~ nature of such function and locality, determine the facilities toat may be afforded to such judge including accommodation, transport aJ)d telephonQ so long as IJe Qontiques to 4i'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n( 1982] 3 S.~.R.,\n\ncharge such function, either without any payment or at a concessional rate.\"\n\nRqle ~A s forth the rights of a Jµdge who avail' of an ol!icial residence anil Rule 2B proyi<; ls . the ac.ale of its fre futnishing .\n\nIt i~ lear fr9, lJl ll11le fr oft.he J:ligh CR1,1ri Jude~ RJlle.s, !'?56, that the conditions •of rvice qf a !11dge Qf the High ~01!f! oT Pyp)ab\n\n~11~ Hiiry11na, where qot c11preslY proyided l11 the High Coprt Judl!Ps ((; onditjoq5 of Service) A~, j !1?4 m11s, t bi; f!eter111ioe\\I l)y the rllJes governing a member of the Indian . Ac!ipiqifrative $fvie Qf !lie\n\nrak of Joint Secretary to the Government of India •stationed at New Delhi.\n\nThe Al.I lndill rfi<; es (JM.v~) Rules, 1955 copt9in pfpv1s1on for I.eave in relatiop to m.embcrs <If the AU Jnc!i:i Services, iqcluding the Indian 4dmipi, s1rJ1tiv!' ervi~. Po fhe ate when .the r cspondent retir.ed tho~ r\\lles joclude, d 11Jle.WB :w)µch provioes :\n\n\"20-B •.. PaYI11ellt of cas~ equivalent pf 1~11yc sl!lary :-\n\n(I) The Government \\hall suo-moto sanction to a member of the service )Yho retires from the serYice uuder sub-rule (!) of rule I~ of the All Jndia $ervices (J;>eathcum-RetirementBenefiM Rules, 19.58, having attained the age of 58 years 011 Or 11fter tpe ~0th September, I ?77 the cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned Jeaye at bis credit 0n the date of his retirement, subject toa maxim11m of 180 <lays.\n\n. (2) The cash equivalent of leave salary payable to a member of the Service under .sub-rule (I) above shall also include dearness allowance admiss.ible to him on .the leave salary at the rates in force on the date _of retirement, and i_t shall be paid in one lump sum, as a one-.time settlement.\n\n(3) The city compensatory allowance and the house rent allowance<Shall not be included in calculating the cash\n\neqtiivalnt of leave salary under this rule.\n\n( 4) From the cash equivalent so worked out no deduction shall be made PD account of pension and pensionary equivalent of other retirement beneffl; s.\n\nIt is not disputed that Rule 20-B applies to a member. of .the Indian Administrative .Srvice of the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi. The rule en.titles him on retirement from service to the cash. equivlent of leave Ji&larY in respect of the period of unutilised earned leave subject to a.maximum of 180 days, inclusive of dearness allowance. It is. apparent that by virtue of Rule 2 of the High Court Judges R11les, 1956. \\his benefit must be read as a condition of service enjoyed by a .Judge of the High Court. It may be observed that although rule 20-B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 is a provision of a scheme applicable to members of the All India Services, there is nothing in its nature and content which makes it inapplicable mutatis mutan(iis \"'. ..<. ~· to the statutory . scheme pertaining to leave enacted in the H.igh . Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. There is also nothing in the constitutional position of a. Judge of a Iiigh Court which precludes Rule 20-B from inclusion in that scheme. It is true that Rule 20-B .revolves around the concept of earned leave, and the expression \"earned leave\" has been specifically defined by clause (d) of rule 2 of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 as \"leave earned under rule 10\".\n\nBut rule 10 merely lays down the rate arid amount of earned leave. The principle in which \"earned\n\nleave\" is rooted must be discovered from rule 4, which provides that \"except as otherwise provided in these rules leave shall be earned by duty only\".\n\nThe performance of duty is the basis of earning leave.' That concept is also embedded in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954.\n\nUnder that Act, the time spent by a Judge on duty constitutes the primary ingredient in the concept of \"actual service\",(') which is the' reason for crediting\n\nle11-ve in. the. leave account of a Judge.(') Although the expression \"earned leave\" is not employed in the Act, the fundament; il premise t for the grant of leave to a Judge is that he has earned it. He has -- \\...._ earned it by virtue of the time spent by hi; n on actual service. That • '-a Judge earns the leave which is credited to his leave account is borne out by the proviso to s. 6 of the Act, which declares that the grant under s. 6 of leave not du~ will not be mad \"if the Judge is not expected to return to. duty at the end of such leave and earn the leare granted\" (emphasis provided).\n\nThe concpt then on which rule 20-B proceeds is familiar to and underlies the statutory scheme relating to leave formulated in the Act.\n\nIt bears Ji logical and reasonable relationship. to the essential content of that scheme. On\n\n~~~ ·~~~~Q ~'. sub-s. (!) of s. 2.\n\nl!l\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.a.\n\nthat, ii must be regarded as a provision absorbed by rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956 into the statutory structure defining the conditions of service of a Judge of a High Court. We may observe that even as a right to recive pension, although . accruing on retirement, is a condition• of service, so also the right to the paiment of the cash equivalent. of leave salary for the period of unutilised leave accruing on the date of retirement must be consi dered as. a condition of service.\n\nIn our judgment, the High Court is !right in upholding the claim of the respondent to the payment of the cash equivalent of the leave salary in respect of tbe period of earned leave at his credit on the date of retirement in accordance with the provisions of rule 20, B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 read with rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956.\n\nThe Special Leave petition is dismissed.\n\nP.B.R. ' Petition dtsmi$sed,", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "GU~NAM SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURNAM SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court Judges' (Conditions of Service) Act 1954", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 731, "end_char": 782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In its petition for grant of special le&Ye the apellant contended that the High Court Judges' (Conditions of Service) Act 1954 being a complete code govemiDg the conditions of service of High Court Judges it would not be per missible to proceed beyond those provisions."}}, {"text": "High Court Judges R_ulos 1956. [706 Ji.CJ", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1373, "end_char": 1414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the petition, ·\n\nHELD~ The High Court was right .in upholding tho respondent's claim tor payment of the cash equivalent of leve salary in respect of the period of unuti lised earned leave at the credit of the Judge on -the date of his retirement in accordance with the provisions of rule 208 of the All India Services (Leave) Rules 1955 read with rule 2 of the High Court Judges R_ulos 1956. ["}}, {"text": "Section 24(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central GoV.mment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ\n\nSection 24(2)(a) of the 1954 Act enables the Central GoV.mment to make rules in respect or, among others, \"any otbei' matter which has to be or could be\n\nprescribed.\" ["}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India stationed at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "High Court Judges Rules 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2418, "end_char": 2446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "GUIUIAM SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules 1956 this ...\n\nUNION l/, GUIUIAM SINGH (Pathak, J,) 701\n\nbenefit \"'°'t \\JO read ·a con<\\itio11 of 110rvi!!O ollio~ by a Ju<!ae of tho High <; our1. ["}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules 1956"}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\n_PATHAK, J. This petition for special leave to appeal by the P11iop of ln4ia is directe<!"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjb", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qn February 24, )972 be was appointed a Judge of the High Court of Punjb, aiid\n\n' •\n•. - • .,. • -· ' . ' ... '"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5336, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "such allowances and fo such rights in respect of leave of absence and pension as may from time to time be determined by or under law made by Parliament and, nntil so determined, to such allowances and rights as are specified in the Second\n\nSchedule :\n\nThe rights in respect of leave of absence to which a Judge is entitled may be determined by or under law made by Parliament."}}, {"text": "Second\n\nSchedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "sections 3 to 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India says that these several provisions constitute a Gomplete code and exhaustively set."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7542, "end_char": 7545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7599, "end_char": 7667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act", "statute": "Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7818, "end_char": 7836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, it is open to the Central Government to adcf to the existing _statutory provisions by making rules in relation to leave of absence."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act", "statute": "Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "mept of India enacted the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8276, "end_char": 8331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8890, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The con?itions of services of a Judge of a High Court for which no express provision has been made in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, shall be, and shall from the commencement of the Constitution be deemed to have been, determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of the State in which the principal seat ' of the High Court is situat~.\n\nProvided that, in the case of a Judge of the High Court of Delhi and a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana the conditions of serviceshall be determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service on deputation to the Government of India holding the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The con?itions of services of a Judge of a High Court for which no express provision has been made in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, shall be, and shall from the commencement of the Constitution be deemed to have been, determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of the State in which the principal seat ' of the High Court is situat~.\n\nProvided that, in the case of a Judge of the High Court of Delhi and a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana the conditions of serviceshall be determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service on deputation to the Government of India holding the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9120, "end_char": 9139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The con?itions of services of a Judge of a High Court for which no express provision has been made in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, shall be, and shall from the commencement of the Constitution be deemed to have been, determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of the State in which the principal seat ' of the High Court is situat~.\n\nProvided that, in the case of a Judge of the High Court of Delhi and a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana the conditions of serviceshall be determined by the rules for the time being applicable to a member of the Indian Administrative Service on deputation to the Government of India holding the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India stationed at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provided further that, in respect of facilities for medical treatment and accommodation in hospitals the provisions of.the All India Service (Yledical Attendance) Rules, 1954, in their application to a Judge, shall be deemed to have taken effect from the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10754, "end_char": 10756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court Judges R11les, 1956", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12400, "end_char": 12430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "apparent that by virtue of Rule 2 of the High Court Judges R11les, 1956."}}, {"text": "All India Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12573, "end_char": 12591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be observed that although rule 20-B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 is a provision of a scheme applicable to members of the All India Services, there is nothing in its nature and content which makes it inapplicable mutatis mutan(iis \"'. .."}}, {"text": "Judge of a Iiigh Court which precludes Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12965, "end_char": 13008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13629, "end_char": 13680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That concept is also embedded in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14230, "end_char": 14234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14283, "end_char": 14287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14822, "end_char": 14851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15594, "end_char": 15623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_707_718_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "ASHOK KUMAR\n\nDELHI ADMINSTRATION & ORS.\n\nMay 5, 1982\n\n(A.P. SBN, E.S. VBNl:ATARAMIAH AND\n\nR.B. MISRA, JJ .]\n\nNational Security Act 1980, S1. 3 lllld 8 and Con11itution of India 1950 Article 22(5).\n\nDetention Ord1r-Period of detention-Specijkation of-Wheth<r mandatory.\n\n, Ground• of detention-Furnishing of-Delay of two day1-Detention order-Whether rendered Invalid.\n\n\"Public Order''-\" Law and order''-Distinction betwun.\n\nWords & Phrasea-\"As 1001} as may be\"-\" As soon as practicable\"- Meaning of-National Socurity Act 1980; S. 8 ll1ld Constitution of India 1950, Article 22(5).\n\nThe petitioner who was held at the Central Jail in connettion with some of the offences committed by him, was served with an order of detention passed by the Gommissio'ner of Police, under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Secu'rity Act 1980~ stating that his detention was necessary with a view to preventing him from \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public otder.\" Two days later he Was served with the grounds of detention and copies' of documents and statelnents relied upon in the grounds of detention.\n\nThe Commissioner made a report to the Administrator about the passing of the detention order together with thC groutlds of detention.\n\nThe Administrator approved the detention order and sent the report to the CentraJ Government, and also informed the petitioner that the order of detention had ben approved by him and that he had a right to make arepresentation. The case of the petitioner was placed before ttte Advisory Board who wa~ of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for his detention.\n\nThe Administrator confirmed the detention order under sub-section (I) of section 12 and further directed under section 13 of the Act thatlthe petitioner be detained for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention.\n\n' In his petition under Article 32 or the Constitution the petitioner eontended that : (I) the unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the grounds or detention was a denial of the constitutional imperatives of !Art. 22(5) read with , section 8 of the Act which cast a duty on the detaining authority to afford the detenu \"the earliett opportunity of making a representation against th• order of detention\", (2) there was a failure on tll~ rt qf \\be Col'1'1!iio~r I\\'\"'' s t~ •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) S.C.R.\n\nAdministrator to apply their minds and specify the period of detention while making:tbe order of detention under SUbsection (2) of section 3 Of the Act, and\n\n(3) th01\"grounds of detention served were not connected with \"maintenance of public order'', but relate to \"maintenance of law. and order''.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : !. (i) Sub-section (I) of oection 8 of tho Act which is in conformity with Article 22(5) provides that where a person is detained in pursuance, of a detention order made under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, the authority making the Order Shall, \"as soon as may be\", but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later tha'.n ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made.\n\nParliament bas thus by Jaw defined the words uas soon as may be\" occuring in Art. 22(5) as meaning normally a period of five days. [711 F]\n\n(ii) The law is that the detaining authority JllUSt, as soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practicable, communicate to the deteou the grounds on which the order of detention has been made. That period bas been specified by section 8 of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [712 D]\n\nIn the instant case, the petitioner was served with the grounds of detention within a perio~ of two days i.e. within the period allowed by section 8 of the Act and that was)'as 11soon as practicable.'' The order of detention is therefdre not rendered invalid merely because the grounds of detention were furnished two days latef. [712 E-F]\n\n(iii) In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982] I S.C.C. 271 this Court has not laid down that the detaining authority making an order of detention under ...; sub-section (!) or sub-se\"etion (2l of section 3 of the Act or the authority approving of the same, must specify the period of detention in the order. (714 BJ\n\n2. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of detention must necessarily -\n\nvary accordiiig to the exigencies of each c.ase i.e. the nature of tbe prejudicial ~....,,~· activity complained of. It is not that the. period of detention must in all_.........- circumstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as laid down in section'13 of the Act. [714 E] ~\n\n3. (i) The true distinc.tion between the areas of 'public.order' and''JaW and order' lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent ?fits reach upon society .. The distinction between the two oncePts of'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine one bu~ this does not mean that there can be no overlapi)iog. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and thcite'fore touch the problem of 'la~ and. order'. while in another it might affect 'puMic order'. The act. by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of tho act to disturb the even\n\nAsltok KUMAii. v. Dlitiil AbMINIStRATION (Sen, J.) 709\n\ntempo of the life of the community which make it prejudicial to the 'maintenance , of public order.' [71S CBl\n\n(ii) Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to. intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing. Justification for such detention is suspicion.-0r reasonable prpbability and'not criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evi4ence. It follows that any preventive measures, ;.:.eveD.: if they involve some restrain, t or ha'rdship upon individuals, do not partake in any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. [71S FG]\n\n(iii) -The Executive can take recourse to its power of preventive detention in thosercases whe're the CoUrt is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could, possibly'succeed against the detenu because he is a dangero.us person who has\n\noveirrawed .witnesses or d.gainst whom no one is prepared to depose. [716 BJ ·\n\n(iv) What essentially is a P.roblem relating to 'law and order' may due to sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in a metropolitan city result in serious 'public' disorder'. It is the length, magnitude ao.d ill tensity of the terror . wave l unleashed by . a particuiar act of violence: creating disorder tl¥tt distinguishes it as an act affecting 'public order' from that conCerning 'law and order'. Some offences primarily injure specific indiyiduals and.only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure tho public interest, and affect individuals only remotely. [717 DB]\n\nIn the instaDt case the particular acts enumerat:d in the grounds of detentiOn clearly shows that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall Within tho contours of the concept of 'public order'. [717 OJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition ofl981.\n\n(CriminaQ No. 8061\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India.)\n\nDr. N.M. Ghatate for the PetitiQner.\n\n0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nBy this petitiop under Art. 32 of the ConsJitution, one Ashok Kumar seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the order of detention dated August 11, 1981, 1 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi under subs. (2) of g, ;!, of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short 'the Act') on be~''; satisfied that his detention was necessary with a view to preventinf him from \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance rj\n\nSUPRBMB totiat IUiPORfs [ t 9~2i 3 s.C:.k\n\npublic order\". The main issue is as to whether the activities of the petitioner fall within the realm of 'public order' or .'law and order'.\n\nIi appears that on August 12, 1981 while the detenu was held at the Central Jail, Tihar in connection with some of the offences .comlljitted by him, he was served with tbe aforesaid .. rder of deten\n\ntion passed a day earlier i.e. _on August II, 1981. Two days later i.e. on August 14, 1981 he was furnished with the grounds of detention as well as with copies of documents and statements relied upon in the grounds of detention. , It seems that the CommissiOner of Police forthwith made a report to the Ad.ministrator about the. passing of the detention order together with the grounds of detention and all other particulars bearing 'On the same. The said report and the other particulars were considered by the Administrator and he, by his order dated August 20, 1981, approved of the detention order under sub'.s. (4) and sent a report to the Central Government as required under sub-s, (5) of s. 3 of the Act. The Admi\" nistrator by bis order dated Atrgust 20, 1981 informed the petitioner\n\nbat his order of detention had been approved by him and that he had a right to make a representation.\n\nThe case of the p.etitioner was placed before the Advisory Board who was of tb, e opinion t)lat there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner and accordingly the Administrator by his order dated September 15, 1981 confirmed the aforesaid detention order under sub-s. (I) of s. 12 and further directed under s. 13 of the Apt that the petitioner be detained for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention i.e. w.e.f. August 12, 1981.\n\nIn support of the petition, four points are canvassed.\n\nFirst I . of these is that there was a denial of the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) read with s. 8 of the Act which cast a duty on the detaining authority to afford the detenu \"the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention\" inasmuch as there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the ground's. of detention; secondly, there was a failure on the part of the Com mission of Police as well as the Administrator to apply their mind and specify the peril)d of detention while making the order of detention under subs. (2) of s. 3 of the Act and therefore the impugned order of deteption is invalid; thirdly, the grounds of detenti6n served on the detenu are not connected with \"maintenance of.public order\", but they relate to \"maintenance of law and order\" and fourthly, the facts as t out in the grounds of detention did not\n\nAsili'.>K kuMAil. µ, bilLHi ADMINistRATION (Sen, J.) 711 ··\n\nfurnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further .they were vague, irrelevant and Jacking in particulars.\n\nWe are afraid, none of these contentions can prevail.\n\nThere is no substance in the contenti.on that there was denial of the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) read with s. 8 of the Act, because there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the grounds of detention and it was imperative that the detenu should be furnished with the ground's of detention along with the order of detention. It is said that delay even for a day, if it remains ..,. ,,,.: unexplained'. means deprivation of liberty guaranteed under Art. 21,. and this is impermissible except according to procedure established by law. The contention that the constitutional safeguards in Art .\n\n. ...._ 22(5) were not complied with merely because the detenu was not 'simultaneously' furnished with the grounds of detention along with the order of detention and was thereby deprived of the right of being afforded 'the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention' as enjoined by Art. 22(5) read with with s. 8 of the Act, cannot be accepted.\n\nT.l!.e language of Art 22(5).itself provides that where a person is detained in.pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, \"as soon as may be\", com- municate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the oder. Sub-s. (I) of s. 8 of the Act which is in cdnformity with Art. 22(5) provides that when a person is • detained in pursuance of a detention ordet made under sub-s. (I) or sub-s'. (2) of s. 3 of the Act, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in , exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing,\n\n~ •• t later than ten days from .the date of detention, communicate to • him the grounds on which the order .bas l!een made. Parliament\n\n~ bas thus by law defined the words \"as soon as may be\" occurring in Art. 22(5) as meaning normally a period of five days.\n\nThe matter is no longer res integra. Cbandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roy 1v. Union of India(') observed :\n\n\"This argument overlooks that the primary require- •\n\nmen! of s. 8(1) is that the authority making the order of\n\nH .\n\n(1) [1982) 1 s.c.c. 271.\n\nI sVPREMI! COVl!.t Rlll>oiti's (198~1 3 s.c.i.\n\ndetention shall communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu \"as soon as may be\". The normal rule therefore is that-the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu without avoidable delay. It is only in order to meet the practical exigencies of adminislrative affairs that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily and not later than 10 days if there are exceptional circumstances. If there are any such circumstances, the detaining authority is required by s. 8(1) to . record its reason in writing. We do not think that this provision is open to any objection.\"\n\nUnder our constitutional system, therefore, it is not the law that no person shall\n\n1 be detained in pursuance of an order made under a law providing for preventive detention without being informed of the grounds for such detention. The law is that the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practicable, communicate to the detenu the gfOUDdS OD Which the order of detention has been made. That period has been specified by s. 8 of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days depending upon the facts and circu111stances of each case. Admittedly, the detenu here was served with the grounds of detention within a period of two days i.e. within the period allowed by s. 8 of the Act and that was \"as soon as practic!lble\".\n\nThis is not a case where the etenu alleges that his detention was for non-existent grounds. Nor does he attribute any mala ftdes on the part of the]detaining authority in making the order. The - order of detention is therefore not ., rendered invalid merely because ,.. > the grounds of detention were furi4shed two days later. ~_,. . '\n\nI I We find it difficult to conceive of any discernible principle for the second submission. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for the detenu that the right to make a representation under Art. 22(5) 0f the Constitution read with s. 8 of the Act means what it implies, \"the right to make an effeQtive representation\".· It is urged tbft unless !\\le period of detention is specified; there can be no ifneaningful representation inasmuch as the detenu had not only the right of making a representation against the order for bis detention but also the period of detention. On this hypothesis, the contention is that the impugned order of detention is rendered invalid. ' The\n\nASilot tcUMAR v. bllLHiAbMiNISTRATION {Sen, J.\\\n\n'I~\n\nentire submission rests on the following observations of Chandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roys case, supra :\n\n\"We should have.thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of the nature and ser.iousness of the grounds of detention.\n\nThe fact that a person can be detained for the maximum period of 12 months do.es not 'place upon the detaining authority the obligation to direct that he shall be detained for the maximum period. The detaining authority can always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the period of detention.\"\n\nThe majority decision in A.K. Roys case, supra, as pronounced by Cbandrachud, C.J. is not an authqrity for the proposition that there is a duty cast on the detaining authority while making an order of detention under sub-s. (I) or (2) to specify the period of detention. The learned Chief Justice made the aforesaid observations while.repelling the contention advanced by. learned counsel\n\nfortbe petitioner thats. 13 of the Act was violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 read with Art. 14 as it results in arbitrariness in . governmental action in the matter of life ai; id liberty of a citizen. The challenge to the validity of s. 13 of the Act was that it provides for a uniform period of. detention of 12 ' months in all cases, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is passed. In repelling the contention, the learned Chief Justice obsel,'Ved that there was no substance in jthat grievance because, any law of pre-· ventivt detention has to provide for the maximum period of detention, just as any punitive law like the Penal Code has to provide for the maximum sente'!ce which can be imposed for any offence.\n\nIn upholding the validity of s. 13 the learned Chief Justice observed :\n\n\"We should have thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum. period of detention, r&gardfoss of the grounds of detention';.\n\nAnd then went on to say :\n\n\"It must also be mentioned that under the proviso to\n\ns. 13, the appropriate government bas the power to revoke H or modify the order of c:)etention at any earlier point of time.\" ,\n\n114 StiPR~ME coukt il.Bl>Ok'tS [198i 3 s.c.r..\n\nIt would thus be clear that the Court was there concerned with the validity of s. 13 of the Act and it is not proper to build up an argument or by reading out of context just a sentence or two.\n\nThere is no doubt in our mind that the Court has not laid down that the detaining authority making an order of detention under sub-s. (!) or sub, s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act or the authority approving of the same, must specify the period of detention in the order;\n\nIt i.s plain from a t'eading of s. 3 of the Act that there is an obvious fallacy underlying the submission that the detaining authority bad the duty to specify the period of detention. It will be • noticed that sub-s. (!) ofs .. 3 stops with the words \"make an order directing that such person be detained\", and does not go further and prescribe that the detainiQg authority shall also specify the period of detention. Otherwise, there should have been the following wbrds added at the end of this .\"sub-section \"and shall specify the\n\n: . ' - period of such detention\". What is true of sub-s. (!) of s. 3 is aho true of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is not permissible for the courts, by a process of judicial construction, to alter . or vary. the term~ of a section. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of deten.tion must necessarily v.ary according to the exigencies of each case i.e. the nature of the prejudicial activity complained of. It is not that the period of detention must in , all circ.umstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as laid down in s. 13 of the Act.\n\nThe most crucial question on which the decision must turn is whether the activities of the .detenu fall within the d onlain of 'public order' or 'law and order'. The contention is that the grounds of detention, served on the de tenu are not connected with 'maintmance of 'public order' but they relate to 'maintenance of Jaw and order' and therefore the impugned order of de ten ti on purported to have been' passed by the detaining authority in exercise of his powers under sub-s. (2) of s; 3 of the Act is liable to be struck down. It is urged that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention tend to. show that he is engaged in criminal activities and it is an apparent nullification of the judicial process if, in every. case where there is a failure of the prosecution to proceed with. a trial or wbere the case ends with an order of discharge or acquittal, the Executive could fall back on its power of detention because the verdict of the Court goes against it. Put differently, the contention is that resort cannot be had to the Act to direct preventive detention of a person under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act for the Act is not a law for the\n\nAsiloie ltUi.iAR v. bilLJti ADMINiStRATION (Seu, J.) 115\n\npreventive detention of gangsters and notorious bad characters. The detention here, it is said, is not so much for the \"maintenance of public order\" but as a measure for the past criminal activities of the detenu. It is further urged that the grounds of detention have no rational connection with the object mentioned in the Act for\n\nwhia person i; nay be detained. Further, that there is no sufficient nexus between the preventive action and the past activities of the . detenu which are not proximate in point of time but are too reote.\n\nThere is no substance in any of these contentions aclvanced.\n\nThe true distinction between the areas of 'public order' and 'Jaw and order' lies not in the nature or quality of the Act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine. one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping.\n\nActs slmilar in nature hilt committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals _cmly and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the 'potentiality of the act to. disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circum\n\nstances of the present case.\n\nThose who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order. must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish ............... a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it ,..... and to prevent him from doing. J.ustification for such detention i is suspicion or reasonable probability and not .criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It follows that any preventive measures, even if they involve some restraint or har<!ship upon ipdividuals, do not partake in an¥ way of the nature of punish meat, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. It is a matter pf grave concern that in urbanised areas like cities and towns and particularly iµ the metropolitan city of Delhi the law and order situation is wotseaing everyday and the use of knives/ and firearms haS given rise to a new violence. There is a constant struggle to control the criminal activities of the persons engaged in such organised crimes for the maintenance of public\n\nSUPREME cotm.t RE.POkts !19&2) 3 s.C.ft..\n\norder. It is difficult to appreciate the argument that the detention here is with a view to punish the detenu for a series of crimes that he is alleged to have committed, but which the law enforcement agency is not.able to substantiate. There is no reason why the Executive cannot take recourse to its power of preventive dete.ntion in t1w, se cases where the Court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no obe is prepared to depose. ·\n\nThe prejudicial activities of the detcnu leading to public disorder, as revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal record. 'Although the criminal activities of the detenu in the past pertained mostly to breaches of law and order, they have now taken a turn for the worse. From the facts alleged it appears that the detenu has taken to a life of crime and become a notorious character. His main activities are , theft, robbery and snatching of ornaments by the use of knives and firearms. The area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash, Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar.. A perusal of the F.I.Rs. shows that the petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character. This is not a case of a single activity directed against a single individuals.\n\nThere have been a series of criminal activities on the parCof the. detenu and his associates during a span of four years which have made him a menace to the society. It is true that they are facing trial or the matters are still nnder investigation.\n\nThat only shows that they are such dangerous characters that peopie are afraid of giving evidence against them.\n\nTo bring out the gravity of the crimes committed by t!\\e deteou, we would just mention four instances. On November 19, 1979 Smt. Anupam Chander of B-5/10, Safdarjang Enclave reported that she was robbed of her gold-chain near East· of Kailasb and on investigation the petitioner along with bis associates was arrested for this high-handed robbery am! . there is a case registered against them which is pending trial.\n\nJust a month after i.e. on December 11, 1979, one Munna of Lajpat Nagar reported that he was robbed of his wrist-watch and cash by three persons who were travelling 'in a three-wheeler. On investigation, the petitioner and his associate Rajendra Kumar were arrested and the police recovered the stolen property. They are facing trial in these cases. On July 18, 1981,\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (Sen: J.) 717\n\nKumari G. Radha reported that she bad been robbed of her gold cbain and a pair of tops in Lajpat Nagar at the point of knife by persons in the age group -Of 2(/22 years. On investigation, the petitioner and his associate Rajendra Kumar were arrested and the entire booty was recovered. The case is still under investigation.\n\nIt appears that the detenu was enlarged on bail and two days after i.e. on July :W, 1981, he ws again arrested on the. report of Smt.\n\nOzha that slie was robbed of her gold-chain near Shanti Bazar, Khokha Market, Lajpat Nagar by two persons ill the age group of 21-25 years at the point of knife. On investigation, the petitioner and his companign Rajendra Kumar were arrested and she identified them to be the culprits and the booty was recovered from thein.\n\nThe case is under investigation. There have been similar incident¥ of a like nature.\n\nWhat essentially is a problem relating to law and order may due to sudden sporadic and inlermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in the metropolitan city of Delhi result in serious public disorder. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguihes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily 'injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of (the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold-up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area like Greater Kailash, Kalkaji or Lajpat Nagar and persons are deprived of their belongings like a car, wrist-watch or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chain.s or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the acti v1ties of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order.\n\nThe contention that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further that they were vague, irrelevant or lacking in particulars, cannot be accepted. A\n\nbare perusal .of the grounds of detention along, with the particulars\n\n• B\n\n718 SURRBMB cOURT REPORTS (1882] 3 s.c.R. ' of the 36 cases furnished in the accompanying chart, shows that the grounds furnished were not vague or irrelevant or Jacking in parti culars or were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satisfactipn of the detaining authority.\n\nIn the result, the petition must fail and is dismissed .\n\nN.V.K ..\n\nPetition dlsmisied.\n\n' -", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "KUMAR\n\nDELHI ADMINSTRATION & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "National Security Act 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act 1980", "statute": "National Security Act 1980"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act 1980", "statute": "National Security Act 1980"}}, {"text": "Meaning of-National Socurity Act 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 487, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526, "end_char": 530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-National Socurity Act 1980", "statute": "Meaning of-National Socurity Act 1980"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 565, "end_char": 578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CentraJ Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1333, "end_char": 1351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Administrator approved the detention order and sent the report to the CentraJ Government, and also informed the petitioner that the order of detention had ben approved by him and that he had a right to make arepresentation."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1738, "end_char": 1748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2066, "end_char": 2076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2502, "end_char": 2511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2779, "end_char": 2792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2918, "end_char": 2927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3311, "end_char": 3321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3867, "end_char": 3876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4263, "end_char": 4272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7478, "end_char": 7488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7525, "end_char": 7537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N.M. Ghatate for the PetitiQner."}}, {"text": "0.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7559, "end_char": 7568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7573, "end_char": 7584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nBy this petitiop under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7682, "end_char": 7689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7715, "end_char": 7726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the ConsJitution, one Ashok Kumar seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the order of detention dated August 11, 1981, 1 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi under subs. (", "canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR"}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "August II, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8537, "end_char": 8552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ii appears that on August 12, 1981 while the detenu was held at the Central Jail, Tihar in connection with some of the offences .comlljitted by him, he was served with tbe aforesaid .. rder of deten\n\ntion passed a day earlier i.e. _on August II, 1981."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two days later i.e. on August 14, 1981 he was furnished with the grounds of detention as well as with copies of documents and statements relied upon in the grounds of detention. ,"}}, {"text": "August 20, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9056, "end_char": 9071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said report and the other particulars were considered by the Administrator and he, by his order dated August 20, 1981, approved of the detention order under sub'.s. ("}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9148, "end_char": 9166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) and sent a report to the Central Government as required under sub-s, (5) of s. 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9199, "end_char": 9203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atrgust 20, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9255, "end_char": 9271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Admi\" nistrator by bis order dated Atrgust 20, 1981 informed the petitioner\n\nbat his order of detention had been approved by him and that he had a right to make a representation."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the p.etitioner was placed before the Advisory Board who was of tb, e opinion t)lat there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner and accordingly the Administrator by his order dated September 15, 1981 confirmed the aforesaid detention order under sub-s. (I) of s. 12 and further directed under s. 13 of the Apt that the petitioner be detained for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention i.e. w.e.f."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9691, "end_char": 9696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "August 12, 1981."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9999, "end_char": 10009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10020, "end_char": 10024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10493, "end_char": 10497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11174, "end_char": 11184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11195, "end_char": 11199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12010, "end_char": 12020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12036, "end_char": 12040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12093, "end_char": 12102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12469, "end_char": 12473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12513, "end_char": 12523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12640, "end_char": 12644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cbandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13131, "end_char": 13142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cbandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roy 1v.", "canonical_name": "Cbandrachud"}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13257, "end_char": 13264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13934, "end_char": 13941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14487, "end_char": 14491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14740, "end_char": 14744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15334, "end_char": 15344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15375, "end_char": 15379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15928, "end_char": 15939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nASilot tcUMAR v. bllLHiAbMiNISTRATION {Sen, J.\\\n\n'I~\n\nentire submission rests on the following observations of Chandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roys case, supra :\n\n\"We should have.thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of the nature and ser.iousness of the grounds of detention.", "canonical_name": "Cbandrachud"}}, {"text": "A.K. Roys", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15949, "end_char": 15958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nASilot tcUMAR v. bllLHiAbMiNISTRATION {Sen, J.\\\n\n'I~\n\nentire submission rests on the following observations of Chandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roys case, supra :\n\n\"We should have.thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of the nature and ser.iousness of the grounds of detention."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16947, "end_char": 16954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17095, "end_char": 17100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17552, "end_char": 17562, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17672, "end_char": 17677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17933, "end_char": 17938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18189, "end_char": 18194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18601, "end_char": 18605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19170, "end_char": 19174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19634, "end_char": 19639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20759, "end_char": 20763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23263, "end_char": 23268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a matter pf grave concern that in urbanised areas like cities and towns and particularly iµ the metropolitan city of Delhi the law and order situation is wotseaing everyday and the use of knives/ and firearms haS given rise to a new violence."}}, {"text": "Kailash", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash, Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar.. A perusal of the F.I.Rs."}}, {"text": "Kalkaji", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24735, "end_char": 24742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash, Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar.. A perusal of the F.I.Rs."}}, {"text": "November 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25413, "end_char": 25430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 19, 1979 Smt."}}, {"text": "Anupam Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25436, "end_char": 25450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anupam Chander of B-5/10, Safdarjang Enclave reported that she was robbed of her gold-chain near East· of Kailasb and on investigation the petitioner along with bis associates was arrested for this high-handed robbery am! ."}}, {"text": "Kailasb", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25542, "end_char": 25549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anupam Chander of B-5/10, Safdarjang Enclave reported that she was robbed of her gold-chain near East· of Kailasb and on investigation the petitioner along with bis associates was arrested for this high-handed robbery am! ."}}, {"text": "December 11, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25752, "end_char": 25769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just a month after i.e. on December 11, 1979, one Munna of Lajpat Nagar reported that he was robbed of his wrist-watch and cash by three persons who were travelling 'in a three-wheeler."}}, {"text": "Munna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25775, "end_char": 25780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just a month after i.e. on December 11, 1979, one Munna of Lajpat Nagar reported that he was robbed of his wrist-watch and cash by three persons who were travelling 'in a three-wheeler."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25962, "end_char": 25976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On investigation, the petitioner and his associate Rajendra Kumar were arrested and the police recovered the stolen property."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26078, "end_char": 26091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1981,\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (Sen: J.) 717\n\nKumari G. Radha reported that she bad been robbed of her gold cbain and a pair of tops in Lajpat Nagar at the point of knife by persons in the age group -Of 2(/22 years."}}, {"text": "Kumari G. Radha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26145, "end_char": 26160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1981,\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (Sen: J.) 717\n\nKumari G. Radha reported that she bad been robbed of her gold cbain and a pair of tops in Lajpat Nagar at the point of knife by persons in the age group -Of 2(/22 years."}}, {"text": "July :W, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26546, "end_char": 26559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the detenu was enlarged on bail and two days after i.e. on July :W, 1981, he ws again arrested on the."}}, {"text": "Ozha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26606, "end_char": 26610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ozha that slie was robbed of her gold-chain near Shanti Bazar, Khokha Market, Lajpat Nagar by two persons ill the age group of 21-25 years at the point of knife."}}, {"text": "N.V.K", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29038, "end_char": 29043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K ..\n\nPetition dlsmisied."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_719_728_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "• - •\n\nT.N. SAXENA & OTHERS\n\nSTA'TE OF U.P. & OTHERS\n\nMay1, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A, VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Government Servict-Sentorit)!·-Recruilment from.two Jources-Prtr mottf$ appointed first and direct recruits much later-Seniority of prOmotees based on length of service not affected by later induction of direct recruits.\n\nAccording to the relevant orders of the State Government, seniorily in service was generally to be determined. from the date of substantive appoint.\n\nment }n a substantive vacancy but. where appointments to a service were made D both by promotion and direct recruitment, a combined waiting list was to be prepared by taking candidates alternately from the . lists of prorrioted candidates and direct reccuits aod appointments made in accordance with that combined list.\n\nThe posts of Senior Marketing Inspector under the Food & Supplies Department of U.P. were l:'eing filled up entirely by way of promotion from the category of Marketing Inspector. But, with effect fratµ April 15, 1964, the State.\n\nGovernment decided to fill up these posts by way of promotion as well as direct • recruitment in the ratio of 50:50. ·\n\nRespondents 2 to S w; o had entered service as Marketing Inspectors were I promoted as Senior Marketing Inspectors in September, 1964,, in the quota of promotees. The appellants, who were direct recruits to the post of Senior Mar~ keting Inspector were appointed much later but were placed above respdndents ,2 to Sin the sniority list of Senior Marketing Inspectors issued in 1977 which resulted in the reversion df respondents 2 to 5 from the posts of Deputy Market~ ing Region~! Officers to which.they had been further promoted in 1974. .\n\nAllowing the petition of respondents 2 to 5, the High Court quashed tho G seniority list holding that appointments already made by departmental promotion . to fUbstantive posts would not be affected by the direct recruits coming subscqu.ently through tho .Public Service Commission ..\n\nIn appeal, the appellants contended that the direct recruits had to be ad. justed alternately with the proniotees even though the promotees had been\n\nappointe~ in their owp quota Ion~ before the direct l'Cl'ruits join\"!. service, H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD l. The promoteeSiwere CntitJed tO maintain their seniority as from the date of their promotion and it was 'not open to the Government to prepare a seniority Jist by pushing the promotees far below the position of seniority which they would legally occupy merely to accommodate the direQt recruits.\n\nThe rule of alternate seniority does not mean that the genuine seniority based on length of service should be completely overlooked. [726 G] ·\n\n2. The normal rule is that seniority should be measured by the length of continuous officiating service unless a contrary intention appears from the rules.· In this Case, according to the orders issued by the Government, the length of service was the prime criterion for determining seniority. [726 A-B]\n\n~- Promotees regularly appointed durig a particular period within the quota of promotees can claim their .whole lepgfh of service for the purpose' of seniority as against direct recruits who may turn up in succeeding periods. [726 C]\n\nBishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 104 held inapplicable; N.K. Chauhan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [19(7] I S.C.R.\n\nD 1037 and B.S. Yadav & Or~. v. State. of Haryana & Ors., [1980] 1S.C.R.1024 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3148 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th May, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition\n\nNo. 1372 of 1977. \"\"\n\nDr. Y.S. Chita/e and A.K. Srivastaw1 for the Appellant.\n\nR.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 18.S.79 of the Allahabad High Court quashing the impugned seniority list dated 4.4.77 issued by the Government of\n\nU.P. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Government') which resulted in the reversion of respondents 2 to 5 to lower posts.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a narrow com'pass and, in our opinion, seem to be concluded by several decisions of this Court, ,\n\n--- .. --\n\nI T.N. SAXENA v. U.P.. STATll (Fazal Ali, i.) 721 ' Respondents 2 to 5 had passed the High. Scltool Examination llnd entered the service of the Government all Marketing Inspecton\n\nnnder the establishment of Food & Supf1Jies Department on various dates and were later confirmed on these posts. In fitct, lo begin\n\nwith, the Department itself was temporary but was later on made permanent. It may be stated here that the post of Marketing Inspector 'Was exempted from the scope of the Public Service Commission. The . next higher post in the hierarchy of the Depart~ men! was that of Senior Marketing Inspector and previot11 to the . year 1964 these posts were filled entirely by promotion 'from Marketing Inspectors. As respondents 2 to 5 were already confirmed in their original post of Marketing Ifispector, they were pr.omoted to the rank of Senior Marketing Inspectors with effect from September 1964 and since then had been holding the post until their.further promotion as Deputy Marketing Regional Officers in June 1974.\n\nIt appears that right from. 7.12.44 upto Sept. 1964 the criteria for determining the seniority of the afore$aid 'employees was total length of service including identical and high'er s'cafo, of pay. It is !, lOt disputed that respondents 2 to 5 fulfilled botli the criteri~\n\nmentioned above.\n\nSometime in 1964, however, the Government took a policy decision that so far as the cadre bf Senior Mitketing\n\nInspectors was concerned, the posts would Ile fille'd by tlvo sources, viz., (I) promotion ancl'{2) direct recruitinei\\i in !lib ratio of 50:50.\n\nAs a result. of this &Cisiol\\ a very large number of posts were sancti()ned to accommodate the direct recruits who . were , to be appointed through a competitive examination hefd by the Public\n\nService Commission. The Government also ordered that hence- . forward the posts of Senior Marketing Inspectors shoufd be brought within the purview of .the Public Service Commfssion. We have -\"--- mentioned this fact expressly because oneof points that was raised • ' before the High Curt by the appellants was that. respondents 2 to 5 had not been cleared by the Public Service Commission nor were their cases referred to it.\n\nNothing much turns upon this point because it was not argued before us in the appeal.\n\nMoreqver, as respondents 2 to 5 were confirmed hands question of taking the formal sanction of the Public Service Commission would be i; nore or less inconsequential and could be given subsequently with retrospective effect. We might further state another ,.undi.sputed fac!-the posts' of the Senior Marketing Inspector at. the bme f the ew policy taken by the Government wer~ il!9re11:se4 !\\nd respondents 4 tQ\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R; • 5 who had been promoted purely in the quota when the Government decided to recruit the other 50% by direct recruitme11t. This fact is rather important because it distinguishes the present case from some of the decisions of this Court on whiCh heavy reliance bad been placed by the counsel for the appellants.\n\n-~ '\n\n.The principles concerning the recruitment of the promotees and tbe direct recruits were contained in a letter of the Government (Annexure C to the petition) relevant portion of which may be ' extracted thus :\n\n\"I am directed to address ou on the above subject and to say that the post of Senior Marketing Inspector has been placed within the purview of Lok Seva Ayog with effect from 15 April 1964. The recruitment to this post will now therefore he made on the principles indicated below:\n\n(i) 50% of the posts will be filled by promotion from amongst the Marketing Inspectors and the remaining 50% by direct recruitment . through Lok Seva Ayog.\n\n(ii) Educational qualifications for direct recruitment through Ayog will be graduate of a recognised University with preference to graduate in Agriculture.\n\n(iii) Age limit is 21 to 25 years. Age limit for departmental candidate for promotion• will be 40 years. dfficials wbo start officiating as Senior Marketing Inspector before the age of 40 years will, however, be considered for promotion.\n\n(iv) All permanent Marketing Inspectors who have put in 5 years service, permanent an<;! temporary both, will be eligible for promotion. No educational qualification has been prescribed for promotion except that no one who has not got the minimum qualification shall be eligible for promotioJl.\" _\n\nA perusal of this letter would clearly show that the quota of\n\n. \"\" the promoted Senio; Marketing Inspectors was not at all touched or altered and even the age-limit for the candidates who had been\n\n. I\n\n~: •\n\n. --( .\n\nT.N. SAXENA v. b.!>. STATll (Fazai Ali, J.)\n\npromoted was extended upto 40 years and it is not disputed that respondents 2 to 5 were within that age-limit.\n\nRegarding the question of seniority, which is the fundamental point in issue in the appeal, the Rules provide thus :\n\n• \"(xi) Seniority\n\nSeniority: in service shall generally be determined from the. date of substantive appointment to a service or from the date of the order.of appointment in a substantive vacancy. In special cases seniority may be determined in accordance with the conditions which may suit a particular service. If two or more candidates are appointed on the same date, their seniority will be determined according to ' the order in which their names are mentioned in the appointment order.\n\nWhere appointments to a service are made both by direct recuritment and promotion, a combined waiting list_ would be prepared of the candidates recruited by both the sources and appointments made in accordance with that combined list. The combined list is to be prepared by taking candidates alternatley from the lists of promoted\n\ncandidate~ an<l direct recruits.\" ~\n\nThe High Court has rightly construed. the aforesaid Rule of seniority to connote that appointments already made by departmlltltal promotion to substantive posts would not be-affected by the\n\ndirct recruits coming subsequently through the Public Service Commission.\n\nReliance was, however, placed by the appellants on the 2nd paragraph of the Rule which stated that the combined list was to be prepared by taking candidates alternately from the list of promoted candidates and direct recruits. This clause bas to be interpreted rationally so as to advance the real object of the Government which was merely to enlarge the the area of recruitment of Senior Marketing Inspectors without affecting the persons who had already been promoted to the higher post long before even the policy of taking direct recruits through Public Service Commission was ilorn. Unfortunately however after the direct recruits were taken as Senior Marketing Inspectors, sometil!le after . 1970 they were put above respondents\n\n724 stJl>llEMll cotJk't REP6kts (198~) j s.C.k\n\n2 to 5 who, by the time the direct recruits were appointed, had already been promoted even to a higher post, viz., Deputy Marketing Regional Officers. The High Court relied on a Government order setting out guidelines relating to seniority which has already been extracted above.\n\nPerhaps Jhe Government was under the impression that as the quota of 50% was reserved for direct recruits and they had come through competitive examination with higher qualifications, they would have. to take precedence over the promotees even though the promotee bad occupied the post in their own quota long before the direct recruits appeared oi; i. the scence. Under this erroneous impression the Government issued the impugned seniority list of 1977 which has, in our opinion, rightly been quashed by the High Court.\n\nD The first point raised by the counsel for the appellants was\n\nthat in view of the fact that the direct recruits possessed a higher qualification and were recruited through the Public Service Commission, they bad to be given priority in respect of seniority over the promotees.\n\nIt was further argued that as a result of the Government Orders, the direct recruits bad . to be adjusted alternately with . the promotees even thqugh the promotees had been appointed in their own quota long before the direct recruits joined the service.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this somewhat broad and ingenious argument. It is true that where there are two sources of, recruitment and the Rules expressly provide that one source would have precedence over the othe).', then the position as con.tended by the counsel for the appellants would have to be accepted. In the instant case, we are unable to find any such inhi.bition or prohibition in the order passed by the Gov.ernment. In fact in N.K. Chauhan and Ors. v. State of Gujarat anti.Ors. (1) to w.bich one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party, it was clearly laid down that so long as the promotees do. not exceed their quota.they were entitled to maintain their seniority as from the date 0f, their promotion, where this Court made the following observations:-\n\n(!) ,[1977] I S.C.R. 1037.\n\n/ ~/ ..\n\n't.N. SHAii v. U.P. STATB (Pazal Ali, J.i\n\n\"'(_he; qlJp~ ru)~ !Ws not, inevJtablx, iµyoke the\n\nl\\PP.li~1Vi11n. qf; .Qle rota,. ru.le. Tl)e impct of this position is thJt if sufficiontn11mber of direct recruits have not been 'rorthon:iing.in the years since 1960 tq fill in\n\nthe, ratio. due to them and those deficient vacancies h!lye, b~~I) fi!led u, P, by proll)9tees, 11\\ter dir~trecruits\n\nca, qno~ c!ailll 'deerni; d' dJl; t~~ oJ 11ppointme11t for senio\n\nrity in serviee with ~!feet from the time, acc, Qrding to -\n\n1 the rota or tum, the direct recruits vacancy arose.\n\nSepioritY, wjll 4~Pe, t!_4 on te lngtJi of co, ntin119us qljicialti; ig, sc:_cy, ic\\l a,\\l,\\l: cJ!, lµIQt b~ Qlilet by:l, aer, arrivals\n\nfrQJ1lAl~ QRefl.ipAret:s!lo, v, e t9_ th~ exteQt t9, Wi\\ch any\n\nf, es, s, J:lrolii, ote~$,~ ljj\\, v.e; to Iii;. pusl)ed dqwn as indicated earlier. ·\n\n+ + • ;+\n\n'Seniority, normally, is.. mured by length of conti- 0 nuous, officiating service:_the actual is easily accepted as the legal, This doe's not preclude a different prescription, constitutionally tests being satisfied,\n\n+ + + +\n\nProm9J~, re&ula!l1'1 appointed .dµriog, period A in\n\nex~~- Q); thi;..i.li.qll.9!1'. for.- waJ1t1of dire<:t recruits (rea BllOllbly,. sqll&IJbi\" not,. sei; ure.d lll!d:because tarrying lql}l!Fr w.pµtd h, ljurMhe..administration) cap c!aim their whole length 0£, sje for, seniorit~\" even,.against direct recruits who may tum up i)J succeeding periods .\n\nPr11motees w)10 hl)ve been_ fitted into va, c!lDCies beyoµd_ thejr quotadurin11 the perjod B-the year beiqg 1\n\nregr, ded a~ the U)lit-must sufi'.r surviva) a,~ invaJ.id\n\napppinee~ acquiring new life when_ vacan_cies in. thi.r quota fall to be filled up. To that extenttbey willslep down, rather be pushed down as against direct recruits\n\nW, h.<;\\ we~. 11!.lr b11t regl\\ll\\dY appointe.d wi\\bi11; their quQt.11.:' ·\n\nThis case clearly laid down three important p.rincip)e•.\n\n' g\n\n?26\n\n{lii~J 3 S.C.ll..\n\n(1) Normal rule is that seniority should be measured by\n\nthe length of continuous officiating service unless a contrary intention appears from the rules.\n\nWe have already shown from the' Rules framed 6y the Government that the length of service was deter mined as the prime criteria for determining the senio- . rity.\n\n(2) Promotees regularly appointed during a particular period in excess of their quota for want of di.rec! recruits can claim their whole length of service for senio rity even against direct recruits who may turn up in succeeding periods.\n\n(3) Promotees who had exceeded their quota would have to be pushed down to accommodate direct recruits D coming after their appointment.\n\nF ..\n\nThe case of respondents 2 to 5 clearly falls within the first two principles.\n\nThe admitted position is that respondents 2 to 5 bad not exceeded their quota of 50% when they were promoted as Senior Marketing Inspectors. In fact, they were promoted as Senior Marketing Inspectors Jong before tbe Government evolved the policy offilling up the posts of Senior Marketing Inspectors by direct recruits, It is also clear that none orthe respondents had encroacl; i ed on the 50% quota which was reserved for direct recruits under tbe new Rules framed by the Government.\n\nIn these circumstances, tlierefore, it was not open to the Government to prepare a seniority list by pushing the promotees far below 1he position of seniority which they would legally occupy merely to accommodate the direct recruits.\n\nThe rule of alternate seniority does not mean that the genuine seniority based on length of . service .by a previous employee should be completely overlooked or obliterated. . '\n\nReliance was, however, placed on an earlier .decision Of this Court in Bishan Sarup Gupta etc. v. Union of India and Os.(')\n\n(I) (1975] I SCR 104.\n\nT. N; SAXE~A v. U.P. STATB (Faza/ Ali, J.) 727\n\nIn this case also it was clearly held that the promotees could be pushed down only if they had exceeded the quota allotted to 'them.\n\nIn \\he instant case not only the respondents 2-5 did not exceed their quota liut had secured , much higher pr.omotions by the time the direct recruits cameto be recruited and had to be reverted . to lower posts in order to accommodate. the direct recruits. Such a gross injustice, in our opinion, cann6t l\\e countenanced by the rules or orders made by the Govern111ent11or can such a course of\n\naqion be spelt out from Bishan Sarup Gupta's case (supra) .\n\nIn B.S. Yadav and Ors. v. State of Haryana, and Ors.(1) the earlier decision of this CourfTllChquhan's dase (supra) was reiterated 11nd Chandrachud, CJ speaking for the Court orbserved thus :\n\n\"Is it proper and fair to.defer the confirmation of the projilotees merely because direct recruits are not available at that point of time so as to able the High Court to make confirmations from both the sources by rotation ?\n\nThis, precisely, is what the High Court has done by the impugned notification dated 25-8-'1976 and that is the. . reason why it has not confirmed ten more promotees in\n\nPunjab, for whom vacancies are available within the quota of promotees. '\n\nWhat is relevant is the decision of the Court that the quota rule will lie enforced at the time of initial recruitment. and not a:t the time of confirmation? ... .-. Seniority of promotees, according to this decision, .could not be upset by later arrivals from the open market, save to the extent to which any excess promotees have to be pushed down.''\n\nIt is, therefore, clear frqm an ana]ysis of the decisions of this Court cited before us that the quota rule and the rota rule must be applied in a practical fashion so as not to cause injustice to any employee. In the instant case, as the Government by virtue of the impugned seniority list had com'pletely upset the seniority of respondents 2 to 5, the principles governing the order were directly opposed to what has been held and pointed out by this Court.\n\nThe\n\n,.\\- (I) [1980) l S.C.R. 1024.\n\n;. '\n\n728 SUPREME 'c6Ultr REPORTS '11982) 3 s.c.R_.\n\nHigh Court, in our opinion, was fully justified in qushing the '\"°' seniority list. •\n\nLastly, it was contended that the High Court while s!kikiilg down the seniority list has not struck down tlie GoV'etnmeilt 'Orcltr which bad nxed the rota and Wk 'quota rule. As indicate~ above, if the rota and the quota rules are properly interpreted, as h'eld by this Court in the cases cited above,. the Governmeht order canilOt 'be said to be bad or legally invalid. The defect Jay in the Govern' ment itself misconstruing its own order while issuing the seniority list, wbicb error was rightly 'corrected by the High Court. .\n\nThe Government shall now issue a fresh seniority liit lo 'the light of the observations made and principles enunciated by this Court and the High Court so as to avoid any revenioo of promote!s Who had been promoted within their quota as senior Marketing InsJ*ctors or abtlve.\n\nD For the reasons given above, all the contentions raised &y the appellants are overruled and the a\\)peal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' -", "total_entities": 23, "entities": [{"text": "T.N. SAXENA & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T.N. SAXENA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STA'TE OF U.P. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, with effect fratµ April 15, 1964, the State."}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 S.C.R. 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3324, "end_char": 3343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3730, "end_char": 3740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chita/e and A.K. Srivastaw1 for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.K. Srivastaw1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chita/e and A.K. Srivastaw1 for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "G.N. ']", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3794, "end_char": 3801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,"}}, {"text": "V.J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,"}}, {"text": "D.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3824, "end_char": 3833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "S. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3835, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,"}}, {"text": "Ashok Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, G.N. '])ikshit, V.J. Francis, D.K. Garg, S. Dikshit and Ashok Grover for the Respondents. _,"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 18.S.79 of the Allahabad High Court quashing the impugned seniority list dated 4.4.77 issued by the Government of\n\nU.P. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Government') which resulted in the reversion of respondents 2 to 5 to lower posts.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "S.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public\n\nService Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were , to be appointed through a competitive examination hefd by the Public\n\nService Commission."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13069, "end_char": 13078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) to w.bich one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party, it was clearly laid down that so long as the promotees do.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13380, "end_char": 13389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/ ~/ ..\n\n't.N. SHAii v. U.P. STATB (Pazal Ali, J.i\n\n\"'(_he; qlJp~ ru)~ !", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Bishan Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17736, "end_char": 17754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a gross injustice, in our opinion, cann6t l\\e countenanced by the rules or orders made by the Govern111ent11or can such a course of\n\naqion be spelt out from Bishan Sarup Gupta's case (supra) ."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17909, "end_char": 17920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of Haryana, and Ors.(1) the earlier decision of this CourfTllChquhan's dase (supra) was reiterated 11nd Chandrachud, CJ speaking for the Court orbserved thus :\n\n\"Is it proper and fair to.defer the confirmation of the projilotees merely because direct recruits are not available at that point of time so as to able the High Court to make confirmations from both the sources by rotation ?"}}, {"text": "25-8-'1976 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18277, "end_char": 18291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, precisely, is what the High Court has done by the impugned notification dated 25-8-'1976 and that is the. ."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18362, "end_char": 18368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reason why it has not confirmed ten more promotees in\n\nPunjab, for whom vacancies are available within the quota of promotees. '"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_729_754_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "• -\n\n......\n\nSARDAR GOVINDRAO & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.\n\nMay 7, 1982\n\n[D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]\n\nCntriProvlncet & Berar Revocation of Lantf. Reenue Exe;,, ptions Act 1948-Section S(3) {ii)-Grant of money or pension-Persons entitled to-Burden of proving that they were descendants. of a Ruling Chief-Rests upon claimants.\n\nInternational law-Cessid~-Under treaty-Rights of inhabitants-Ho~ , acquired.\n\n• Words atldphrates :-Ruling Chief-Sovereignty-Meaning of.\n\nIn consideration of. the loyal services rendered by them, t_wo remote ancestors of the appellants received in 175] a sanad from tbe Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao by which they were conferred the tit)e of \"Bhuskute\" and were made sur m:andloi and sur kanungo. Tbdy were created watandars with the reservation of sur ct'eshmukhi in respect of certain mahals in Sarkar Handia and in Sarkar Bijagarh, rent ..\n\nfree iii perpetuity with right to retain 4% of t, he revenue.' They remained the Amils or Governors of the Pesbwa at Handia till 1768 A.O. In the mean-time they were e; ranted inams. of certain villages .\n\nAfter th~ defeat of the Maharatta army in the third battle of Panipat in '.1761 A.D. the appellants ancestors lost their position and power a.s sur mandloi and sur kanungo in Sarkar Handia, By tbe sanad of 1777 the Peshwa created them the Jagirdar pf Timarni\" cociiprising of Timami and four other villages . together with the fort with sur deshrnukhi in perpetuity: The sanad of 1798 -permitted them to maintain irregular soldiery for rCcovery 'l!'J __ a.xes and cesses.\n\nThe grant of jagir was tater confirmed. by the Scindias and th.is was continued by the British.\n\nAfter the Scindias ceded the territory in question to the British in 1860, the British Go:vernment undertook to recognise and respect the existing rights and fitles of its new 1ubjects to their lands.\n\nAfter a full inv\"!.tigation into the nature of the estates tratlsferred and the nature of tenurs of their new su.bjects, the British Government declared ff in 1865 that except \"the cbief, the Chief of Makrai, all tb~ zamindars are to be \\ regarded and treated as ordinary British subje1<t~\". The esta\\01 in que$tion, which \\r . r\n\n' '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.a,\n\nwere located in the ditricts of oshangabad and Nimar, were held by the appellants on favourable terms as Jagirdars, Muafidars and Ubaridara in which they enjoyed exemption from payment of land revenue amounting to Rs. 27,895 per annum.\n\n• Having found that there was no justification for continuing the exemption from liability to pay land revenue hitherto enjoyedby certain famlies in the former province of. Central Provinces and Berar, and also _because it resulted in Joss tQ the public exchequer, the -provincial legislature passed the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 by which all prevalent exemptions from liabiJity to pay land revenue were revoked.\n\nIn their application under section 5(3) (ii) of the Act the appellants clai med that th~ \"Bhuskute'' family of Timarni, to which they belonged, were the descendants of a former ruling chief and in that capacity they were entitled to a substantial grant of money or pension for rilaintenance in terms of section 5 (3) (ii).\n\nRejecting their apPlicatiori the State Government held that the ancestors of the appellants were no more than the wat9.ndars of a small territory under the Peshwas and later under the Scindias and with the transfer of sovereignty to the British -they lost their administrative power and retained only their muafi. It accordingly, held that the appellants were not the dsecendants of a former Ruling Chief and so were not entitled to the grant ofAtny amount or pension in terms of section 5(3) (ii) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court declined to intervene with the order of the State Govern ment on the ground that the appellants never enjoyed any status higher than that of a Jagirdar.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Not being the d.escendants of a former Ruling Chief, the appel lants were not entitled to any money or pension in terms of section S (3) (ii) of Central Provinces and.Land Revocation of Land Revenue Act, 1948. [754 D]\n\n. It does not appear from the impugned order of the State Government that there \\\\•as any error of jurisdiction in .refusing to grant money or pension to the appellants under section 5 (3) (ii) of the Act or any incorrect determination of the basic facts on theit part in reaching the conclusion that their ancestors never exercised sovereign powers of a Ruling Chief in relation to tbejagirs of Timarni granted by the Peshwas and later confirmed by the Scindias and conti'- . nued by the British at the request of the Scindias. [738 , H; 739 A-Cl\n\nThe expression \"Ruling Chief\" bas not been defined in the Act and must be understood as the term is understood in common parlance. Normally it connotes \"a person who is endowed with the content of sovereignty and also has !be at\\rib11tes of a soverein\". overeipty, according to its normal legal wnno-\n\n- •\n\nSARDAR GOVINDRAO V. M.P. STATE 731\n\ntation, is the supreme power which governs the body politic, or society w.hich constitutes the Stae, and this power is independent of th{! particular form of Government, whether monarcbial autocratic or democratic. [736 E; 737 A-CJ\n\nAfter a sovereign State has acquired\n\nterrit<;).y, either by conquest or by cession ub.der treaty .or by the occupation of territory theretofor~ unoccupied by the recognised Ruler or otherwise, an inhabitant of1 a territor.Y can enforce in the municipal courts only such properfetary rights as fue sovereign has conferred oi: recognised. Even if a treaty of cession stipulates that certain inhabitants shall enjoy certain rights, that gives them no right which they can so enforce. The meaning of a general statement in a proclamation or a treaty that existing rights would be recognised is _that the Government will recognise such rights as upon investigtion it finds existed. The Government does not thereby\n\n~ _renounce its right to recognise only such titles as it considers should be recognised -• / nor confer upn thC municipal courts any powers to adjudicate in the -• matter. [747 H; 748 A-Cl\n\nVa}esingji Joravarling}I & Ori. v. Secretary of State for India in Council L.R. (1923-24] SI IA 3S7; and Bir Bikram Deo v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L.R.[1911-12] 39 IA 31; and Marland Rao v. Ma/har Rao, L.R. [1927-28]\n\nSS IA 4S, relied on.\n\nl(unwarlal Singh v. Provinbial Government, Central Provinces and Berar. l.L.R, [1944] Nagpur 181, referred to.\n\nThe burden of provin~ that after cession of the terriory by the Scindias t6 the British by the treaty of 1860, the British Government acknowledged or recognised the existence of any sovereign rights with the ancestors of the appel~ Iants, was upon thCm and that burden they have failed to discharge. On the contrary, the British Government decided on the basis of the enquiry that the Zamindars ill the Central Provinces including those of the appellants' ancestors. had to be regarded and treated as ordinary British subjects. [749 B, C]\n\n_...,.\n\nViewed in the hi_$torical perspective the appellants pretensions that their F ancestor's acquired attributes of sovereignty in relation to the jagir of Timarni can\n\n-·-\"'--~hardly stand scrutiny. The tenor of all the sanads gtantedto the ancestors of\n\n• the appellants shows that they were nothing more than Jagirdars of Timarni and that they bad never attained the status of.a feudatory or tributary Ruling Chief 1runder the sovereignty of the Peshwas or the Scindias. The British Government never recognised the appellants' ancestors who like all other Zarnindars and Jagirdars in the Central Provinces, were laying claim to be recognised as a chief- G tain to be a Ruling Chief. After the establishment -0f the British rule, the Governor General came to the conclusion that the ancestors of the appellants had 'to be regarded and treated as ordinary Britiih subjects. [744 C; 74S F; 747 GJ\n\nCIVIL ~PPELLATE JUlllSDICTIQN ; Civil Appe~! No, ~5() H Of 1971.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.il.\n\nFrom the Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh Petition No. 61 of 1967.\n\n. ', and order dated the 9th March, 1970\n\nHigh Court (Jabalpur) in Misc.\n\nV.M. Tarkunde and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants.\n\nGo pal Subramaniam, S.A. Shroff' and D.P. M ohanty for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against the - judgment and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated ' ..\n\nMarch 10, 1970, by which , the High Coutt declined to interfere \\ •• with an order of the State Government. of Madhya Pradesh dated September 9, 1966 disallowing the appellant's claim to the grant of money or pension under cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the , Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revnue Exemptions Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') oh the ground that they a.re noi entitled to the grant of such money or pension not being 'the descendants of a former Ruling Chief' in terms thereof.\n\nAfter the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 was brought into force, the appellants who !ield estates in the districts of Hoshangabad and Nimar on favourable terms as Jagirdar's Muafidars and Ubaridars enjoyed exemption from payment of land revenue amounting to an aggregate, of Rs. 27,895.05p. per annum, made applications to the Deputy • Commissioners of Hoshangabad and Nimar claiming that the members of the Bhuskute family of Timarni to whjch they belonged\n\n....\n\n- were the descendants of a former Ruling Chief and therefore were ,,[// entitled to a substantial grant of money or pension for their suitahle. • maintenance in terms of cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act. It was alleged that although their ancestors had acquired -f the rights of a Ruling Chief by virtue of the. sanads granted by the Peshwas and repognized by the Scindias and were all along treated as such even by the British, they were wrongly recorded as Jagirdars of Timarni in the record of rights which was DO evidence of their real status. The applications were forwarded by the respective Depaty Commissioners to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. The State Government, by its order dated May 13, 1955, rejected their prayer holding tht t!:tey were not\n\n&AllbAll GoVJNbitAo v. M.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 133\n\n'I\" • entitled to he grant of such amount or pension not being the\n\ndescendants of a former Rulin~ Chief within the meaning of cl.'\n\n(ii) ofsub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act.\n\nA Full Bench of the Madhya Prade$h High Court by its 'judgment dated April 20, 1959 declined to interfere on the ground that \\he proceedings under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 qf the Act could not be said to be judical or quasi-judicfal in natute as the use of the word \"may\" in sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act)nade 'the grant of money or pension in the discretion of the\n\nSta~ i3overnment. Disagreeing with the High Court, this Court in Saidar Govindrao & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') held that ~'e word \"may\" used in sub-s. (3) of s. 5 must, in the context, be\n\n constrned to have a compulsive force and therefore on the existence of the condition precedent, the gran~ o( money or pension became\n\n.1. .obligatory on the Government notwithstanding that in sub-s. (2) the\n\nGov, ernment had power to pass such orders as it thought fit. It observed that in passing orders bn the, applications made by the apellants the State Goernment had to act in a' quasi-jtiqicial manner: The appellants therefore had be given an opportunity to state their case and were also ntitled to know why their claim had been rejected.\n\nIn compliance with the directions issued by thi~ Court in Govindrao' s case, supra, the Slate Government afforded th.e appellants an opportunity of hearing on August 6, 1966 to subs- . tantiate their claim for grant of money or pension under cl.\n\n.,,_\n\n(ii) of sub-s. (3)of s. 5 of the Act on the ground that they were ithe descendants of a former Ruling Chief in terms of the > ' ' section. The State Government in the impugned order specifically - mentions that 'the appellants mainly based their claim only on , the sanad issued during. the regime of Chhatrapati Shahu in ' ' <:>..J.177 A.D.\", that is, granted by the Peshwa Madhavrao by w4ich ,_ ' • their ancesto; Ramchandra Bulla! was granted the jagir of Timarni. • _.,.\n\nOn a consttuction of the document, the State . Government held that the sanad did not confer on the grantee the powers of a Ruling Chief. It observed that the later grants by the Peshwas referred to the ancest9rs of the, appellants as sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo and not as a Ruling Chief\" and the grants were in the nature of inams being emoluments appurtenant to their office. It further held!hat even after the suzerainty had passed frpm the Peshwas to the Scindias, the grant of village Piplia and Bhaili to their ancestors by Daulatrao\n\n(I) (196S] 1 $.C.R. 678.,\n\n1'.'\n\n.G '\n\nSUPIUlME COURT IUiPOR'l'S ( 1 ~8~J j S.C.ll.\n\n.,.\n\nScindia by the two sanads of 1802 and 1804 referred to them as , sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo and not as a Ruling Chief, and they\n\n' were conferred no rights except that of a mere inamd11r.\n\nDuring the period of management of the tract by the British on behalf of the Scindias from the years 1844 to 1860, the jagir was continued as a muafi in perpetuity at the desire of the Scindias. As regards the period after the transfer of suzerainty the British never recognized the ancestors of the appellants to be a Ruling Chief. In coming to that conclusion, it relied upon the decision of the Gover nor General in Council conveyed by the letter of the Secretary to the\n\nChief Commissioner .of Central Provinces dated March 3, 1865. Tho. _.,.\n\nState Government taking into consideration all these circumstances ~-- held that the ancestors of the appellants were no more than the . ' watandars of small· territory under the Peshwas and later under > the Scindias and with the transfer of sovereignty to the British, they lost their administrative powers and retained only their muafi.\n\nThe State Government accordingly held that the appellants were not the descendants of a former Ruling Chief and therefore were not entitled to the grant of any amount or pension under cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 qf the Act.\n\nOn a consideration of the material on record; the High Court ' came•to the conclusion that there was no error apparent on the record to warrant interference with impugned order of the State Government. According to the High Court, cl. (ii) of subs. (3) of s. 5 of the Act authorized the State Government to grant money \"\" or pension to those fami_lies alone whose ancestors had been granted remissions in land revenue, not on acount of any services rendered ' by thm but in consideration of the fact that they were deprived of their sovereign powers. It referred to the existence of a . feudal system known as the jagirdari system, prevalea t in the erst; •• l.J~\n\nwhile.State of Gwalior, which was a legacy of the past, nder which • the land revenue of a territory was assigned to a chief or a noble, -I known as the jagirdar, to supp_ort troops, police and for specified\n\nservices.(') It observed that the Legislature has kept the distinc tion in view while enacting cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act.\n\nAfter reterring to the material on record, it came to the same con clusion as the State Government and held that the ancestors of the appellants never enjoyed the powers of a tributary or feudatory chief\n\n(I) V.P. Menon : _The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. p. 224.\n\nSARbAR GOVINDRAO v. M.P. s'rATE (Sen, J.) 13~\n\nunder the Peshwas or the Scindias that they held statusof surmandloi and surkanungo and were holding the lands muafi in perpetuity, being in the nature of service grant. The conferral of rights in them by the Peshwas in favour of a loyal servant and instead of making a cash grant for the services rendered; they were permitted to collect their remuneration from a part of the revenue and maintain them selves from the profits derived from the lands appurtenant to their office. It would thus appear that both the High Court as well as the State Government were of the view that the appellants never enjoyed any status higher than lhat of a jagirdar.\n\nThe whole object and purpose of . the legislation, as reflected in the Preamble, is to revoke all prevalent exemptions from liability to pay land revenue. The Legislature felt that there was no justification for continuing the exemption from liability to pay land revenue hitherto enjoyed causing loss to the public exchequer. Except grants for £pecific purposes, t.he exemptions were mostly in consideration of loyalty and help rendered in the past and there was no reason why they should be allowed to be continued at present and cause unavoidable loss to the Revenue. Where such exemptions were granted for services and it was considered that the services should continue, or where it was considered necessary to continue in individual cases, certain grants made in the past, provision has been made \\o do so by the award of money grants and pensions. Subs. ( 1) ofs. 3 provides : .\n\n\"3. (I) Every estate, mahal, village or land to whatever purpose applied and wherever situate, which was heretofore exempted from payment of the whole or part of land revenue by special grant of, or contract with the Crown, or under the provision of any law or rule for the time being in force or in pursuance of any other instrument, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any such\n\ngrnt, contract, law, rule or instrument, be liable from the agricultural year 1948-49.\n\n(i) In the Central Provinces to the payment of land\n\nrevenue equal to the amount of Kamil-Jama as revised by the Central Provinces Revision of the Land Revenue\n\nof Estates Act,' 1947, or by\\the Central Provinces H.\n\nRevision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act, 194 7, as the case may be.\"\n\n136 , sUPRBMB COURt RBPO!lts t1982) :l S.C, tl.\n\nThe Legislature however thought it fit to mitigate the rigour in certain specific cases by making a provision in sub-s. (lJ of s. 5 that any person adversely affected by the provisions of s. 3 may apply to the Deputy Commissioner of the district for the award of a grant of money or pension, and sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall forward the applica\n\ntion to the State Government, which may pass such orders as it deems fit. Sub-s. (3) of s. S of the Act provides :\n\n\"5 (3) The State Government may make a grant of money or _pension :-\n\nI (i) for the maintenance or upkeep Of any religious, charitable -or public institution or service of a like nature, or,\n\n(ii) for a suitable maintenance of any family of a descen- ,\n\ndan t from a former Ruling Chief.\"\n\nIn sub-s. (4) of s. 5 of the Acl, any amount sanctioned by way of grant of money or pension under this section shall 6e a charge on the revenue of the State:\n\nThe expression \"Ruling Chief\" has not been defined in the Act and must therefore be understood as in common parlance.\n\nThe meaning of the word \"Ruler\" as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edn., vol. 2, p. 1867 is : \"one who, or that which, exercises rule, especially of supreme or sovereign kind\".\n\nNormally the expression \"Ruling Chief\" connotes \"a person who is endowed with the content of sovereignty and also has the attributes of a overeign\". According to Blacks' Legal Dictionary, 5th edn., p. 1252 the legal conception of \"sovereignty\" is stat, ed thus :\n\n\"The supreme, abcllute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed; supreme political authority, paramount control of. the constitution and frame of government and its administration; the selfsufficient source of political power from which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent.\"\n\n'-r '\n\n• -\n\n...\n\ni I\n\n§AllDAA ao\\t1NDRAO v. M.P. STATE (Sen; J.) 131\n\n\"Sovereignty\" means \"supremacy in respect of power, 'dominion or rank; supreme dominion authority or rule\". \"Sovereignty\" is the right to govern. The term \"s1>vereignty\" as applied to states implies \"supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power by which any state is governed, and which resides within itself, whether residing in a single individual or a number of individuals; ot in the whole body of the people.\" Thus, sovereignty, according to its normlll legal connotation, is the supreme power which governs the body politic, or society which constitutes the state, and this power is independent of the particular form of government, whether monarchial, autocratic or democratic. ',\n\nAci:ording to Laski in \"A Grammar of Politics'', 1957 Reprint <(hap. II, p. 50\n\n\"The legal aspect of sovereignty is best examined by a statement of the form given to it by John Austin. -In every legal analysis of the State, he argued, it is first of alt necessary to discover in the given society that definite supe- . rior to which habitual obedience is rendered by the mass\n\n, of men. 'that superior must not itself obey any higher authority. Whep we discover the authority which gives commands habitually obeyed, itself not receiving them, we have the sovereign power in the State. In an independent political community that sovereign is determinate and\n\nabsolute. Its will is illimitable because, if it could not be constrained to act, it would cease to be supreme, since it would then be subject to the constraining power. Its will is indivisible because, if power over certain functions or persons is absolutely and irrevocably entrusted to a given body, the sovereign then ceases to enjoy universal supremacy and therefore ceases by definition to be sovereign.\"\n\nIt is not necessary to enter into the concept of sovereignty, one of the most controversial ideas in political science and international law, which is closely related, to the diffic_ult concepts of 'State and Government, of independence 11nd democracy, except to\n\ntouch upon the juristic character of the Indian State to discern the necessary attributes of sovereignty. The Indian States were neither independent nor sovereign but subject to the paramountcy of the British Crown. Sir William Lee Warner, the acknowledged authority on Indian States, in his work , \"The Native States of India; 1910\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'rS tJ982) 5 S.C.R.\n\ncharacterizes them as \"semi-sovereign\". There . is no question that there was a paramount power in the British Crown, but perhaps it is better understood and not explained. The indivisibility of the sovereignty on which Austin insists, did not belong to the Indian system of sovereign states ..\n\nThe degree of sovereignty exerced by the different rulers\n\nvaried greatly as the areas under their dominion. The greater , princes administered the internal affairs of their states with almost complete independence, having revenues and armies of their own, and the power of \"life and death over their subjects. At the other end of the scale were petty chiefs with a jurisdiction hardly higher ........_~• than that of an ordinary magistrate and between. these extremes lay much gradation. The authority of. each ruler was determined by treaties or engagements with the British Government or by practice -~ that had grown up in the course of their relations with British India.\n\nThe paramount power was with the British Crown and it had never parted with any of its prerogatives. As Sir Henry Maine said :\n\n\"There may be found in India every shade and variety of sovereignty, but there is only one independent sovereign, the British Government. .., The mode or degree in which sovereignty is distributed between the British Government and any Native State is always a question of fact which has to be separatcily decided in each case, and to which no general rules apply.\"\n\nAfter the constitution of the Central Provinces in 1861 A.O., fifteen of the Zamindaris were considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant their being constituted Feudatory States. They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar. These fifteen Feudatory States are specified i, the First Schedule to the Government of India Act,\n\n1935. Timarui was not so listed in the.First Schedule as it was a Jagir and not a Feudatory State.\n\nThe cardinal question on which the decision of the appeal must turn is whether the appellants are the descendants of a former Ruling Chief within the meaning of cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act and are therefore entitled to the grant\"of money or pension in\n\n~Ali.bAli. oovtN}iwH. M.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 1391\n\nterms of the section. That depends on whether the ancestors of the appellants had acquired the attributes of sovereignty in relation to the jagir of Timarni granted by the Peshwa Madhavrao to two of their ancestors Naroo Bulla! and his brother Ramchandra Bullal's grandson Madhav Rao in 1717 A.D. As hereinbefore adumbrated, the appellants rested their case before the State Government on the sanad of the Peshwa in 1777 A; D. in respect of the jagir of Timarni.\n\nIt does not appear from the impugne~ order of .the State Government that there is any error of jurisdiction in refusing to grant money or pension to the appellants under cl. (ii) of subs. (3) of s. 5 of the Act or any incorrect determination of the basic facts on their part in reaching the conclusion that the appellants' ancestors never exercised sovereign powers of a Ruling Chief in relation to the jagir of Timarni granted by the Peshwas and later confirmed by the Scindias and continued by the British at the request of the Scindias.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the ancestors of the appellants D exercised considerable power and authority in the Narbada Valley at a certain period of time. The description of the family as 'extracted from the Hoshangabad Gazetteer, 1908, at pp. 97-98, reads :\n\n''The most important Brahman family is that of the Bhuskute, who hold the Timarni Estate as well as considerable property in the Nimar District and in Holkar's terri- . t<)rY.\n\nThe family is about I 50 years old and originaHy came from the Ratnagiri District in the Bombay Presidency.\n\nIts founders were the two brothers, Ramchaodra Balla! and Naro Balla!, who five generations ago, took service under the Peshwas. The brothers subjugated the c; ountry west of the Ganja!, which was. then called the Handia Sarkar, and forced the Makrai Raja to surrender half his territory.\n\nThe sternness with which they repressed the wasting raids of the aboriginal tribes, earned them the name of Bhuskute, or \"Chopper\". Kurhade or axemen, is another name by which the famjly is sometimes Known, and the axes which are said to have been the instruments of execution are still preserved at Khargaon and duly worshipped at the Dasahra festival by the Bhuskute and their retainers. Io reward for these services the brothers received in 1751 the hereditary offices of Sir Mandloi and Sir Kanungo in the\n\nSarkars of Bijagarb and Handia, wit.h villages and tracts of\n\nsuRkEME COURT REPoilrs (1982] j S C.ll.\n\n. land rent-free, percentages on the revenue, a.nd rights of taxation. The Bhuskute proved as successful in peace as they had been in war, keeping the country in order, and settling culiivators from Khandesh in the uninhabited parts.\n\nIn 1777, the Peshwa Madho Jl.ao gave them the fort of Timarni as a permanent jagir. Daul! Rao Sindhia subse quently added two neighbouring villages and two more were acq.uired either _by force or gift from the Raja or Makrai, the five villages forming a semi-independent jagir.\n\nUntil the thirty years' settlement, the ki/edar or \".hoer of the fort\" at Timarni exercised jurisdiction in civil, criminal, revenue and other petty cases. These powers were-with- . drawn at sett1e111ent, but the estate continued to be held in jagir until the ettlement of 1891-96, when the villages1 were registered as muafi or .revenue-free, though the honorary title of jagirdar was still allowed to be retained.\"\n\nThe history Qf the matter goes to the middle of the 18th century. In 1742 A.D., the Peshwa. Balaji Bajirao infaded the lmcient kingdom of Garha-Mandla and exacted the tri.bute Q, f chauth or one-fourth of the revenue, amounting to 4 Iakhs of rupees. He took the fort and killed the Ruler of Garha-Mandla. From this ·\n\ntime the Mandia kingdom lay .at the mercy of the Marahtas.\n\nThe Peshwa marched up the valley on his way from Burhanpur to attack Mandia and subdued Han.dia Paragana. (') The predatory Maratha troops plundered, burnt and looted . the entire Narbada valley. Col. Sir W.H. Sleeman remarks that :\n\n\"By this dreadful invasion of the Peshwa with his host of fqllowers, the whole country east of Jubbidpur was made waste and de-populate.\"\n\nThe Mughal power was effectively driven out and we hear no more of a Muhammadan Governor of Harda Handia; but his place. was taken by the two brothers Naroo. Bulla! and. Ramchandra Bulla!, who were left by the Peshwa in charge of the Handia Sarkar, which had been rendered desolate in consequence of the inroads of maraders and dacoits and were abounding in dense thick jungles. \"(hey were the Amils of the Peshwa and held the Harda\n\n(I) Imperial Gazetteer of!ndia, Vpl. 13, 1908; p. 181.\n\nI .\n\n......\n\n...\n\n-( •\n\nSARDAR GOVINDRAO v. M.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 741\n\nHandia tract on Amanat system remitting to. the headquarters the whole collection, minus expendi\\ure. It seems that they picked up a quarrel with' the Ruler of Makrai and as be was unable to make any resistance they forced him to sign a treaty in 1750 A.D. giving up half his dominion.(') They appeared to have dQJ1e loyal , and good services to the Peshwa by their administrative abilities in keeping the territory in good order and in settling cultivators from , Khandesh in the uninhabited parts by clearing the jungles.\n\nIn reward for their loyal services, the two brothers, Naroo Bulla! and Ramch; mdra Bulla!, received in ! 75JA.D. a sanad from the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao by which they were conferred the title of \"Bhuskute\" and were made sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo. They were created watandars with the reservation of sur-deshmukhi in respect of 22 mahals in Sarkar Handia rent-free in perpetuity with right to retain 4% of the revenue: 2.5% on account of sur-mandloiship and J.5% OD aCCOUDt Of SUfkanungoship, and rights Of taxation .etc. By a separat~ sanad of 1751 A.D. the Peshwa appointed them sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo and created watandars in respect of 32 mahals in Sarkar :Bijagarh, with the reservation of surdeshmukhi, with the .same percentage of revenue and similar rights.\n\nThey appeared to have done good service to the Peshwas not only in shearing Ruler of Makrai but in keeping the country in .. good ordeyand in settling cultivators from Khandesh in the uninhabiteq parts. Both these sanads show that the Peshwa 11/ade the grants in recogniti9n of their loyal services. The documents' contain a recital more or less to the. effect that :\n\n\"The two brothers presented themselves at the court of the Peshwa and petitioned for grant of watans as a reward as they had by thei.r military skill and courage and also by their administrative abilities cleared these tracts which had been rendered ·, desolate in consequence of in roads of marauders and dacoits and were abounding in dense thick.\n\njungles, and made them safe for, habitation.\"\n\nIt appears that Naroo Bulla! and Ramchandra Bulla! remained\n\n(I) Sir Charles Elliot: Report on the Lane! Revenue System of the District\n\nof Fjoshanabad, Central Provinces; 18~5. pp .. 28, '.19,\n\n742 SUPREME COURt REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R. .. the Amils or Governors of the Peswha at Handia till 1768 A, D.(1) and in the meanwhile they were granted by the Pesl:twa Balaji Bajirao in ams of villages Pokharni and Masangaon by two sanads in 1754 A.D., and similar inams of village3 Dhupkaran, Underkuch and Samarda by three sanads of 1759 A.D. from. out of the 431 villages .surrendered by Ruler of Makrai.\n\nThere was a twilight zone after 1750 A.O. and very little is known about the Harda Handia tract. It will presently be seen that the sanad of 1777 A.D. granted by Pesbwa Madhavrao and the subsequent sanads of 1798 and. 1800 A.O. granted by Peshwa Bajirao II on which the appellants strongly rely are of little or no assistance as by then the supremacy of the Pesbwa over the Narbada valley was on the decline.\n\nIt' appears that the Narbada valley bad gone out of the control of the Peshwas by 1797 A.O. With the.fluctuating fortunes of the Peshwas the ancestors of the appellants were virtually denu ded of all their powers. The annihilation of the Maratha army at the hands of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, followed by the premature death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in the same year seemed to foreshadow the immediate dissolution of the Maratha empire. There followed a sudden revolt against the Maralha domination everywhere in Hindustan. The eclipse of the Maratha power naturally cast its . shadow on the Barda Handia tract; and the Ruler of Makrai thought to improve the occasion by driving out the Amils of the Peshwa out of Handia, but he was himself repulsed and ki)led by a force of Goshains.\n\nI In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal. Hostilides between the Bhopal and i Nagpur rulers commenced in 1795 and lasted with little intermission for twenty years.\n\nHosbangabad was in that year taken by the\n\n. Nagpur troops; but was retaken in 1802 by Wazir Muhamad,\n\n(I} Sir Charles Elliot: Report on the Land Revenue System of the District of Hosbangahad Central Provincei: 1865, p. 35\n\n,,,._ •\n\nSARDAR GOVINDRAO ~. M.P .. STATE (Sen, J.) 743.\n\nthe celebrated minister of Bhopal. The Bhopal dominions north f the Narbada were finally lost to the Marathas in 1808. During these wars the Pindaris, first summoned by Wazir Muhammad to his assistance, but afterwards deserting to his enemies, plundered the country impartially in all directions.. It is estimated that not a single village escaped being burnt once or twice during the fifteen years for which their depredations lasted, and- the greater part of Sarkar Handia wa.s entirely depopulated. The Pindaris were extirpated in 1817; and in 1818 the portions of the district belonging to the Nagpur kingdom were ceded, under an agreement subsequently confirmed by the treaty of 1826. In 1844 the Harda Hadia trct was made over by the Scindia in part payment for the Gwalior Contingent, and in 1860 it was permanently transferred and became British territory:(')\n\nAfter the crushing .defeat of the Maratha army by Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761 A. D. the Pesbwas never crossed the Narbada valley. There was an intense st, ruggle between Mahadji Scindia and. Jaswantrao Holkar to gain control over the valley. In Central India, these two military leaders alternately held the pre-eminency.\n\nMahadji Scindia utilised the fiction of his sovereignty created by the Treaty of Salbai in 1781 A.D. to gain his supremacy.\n\nBy 1792 A.D. be had established bis ascendancy and his power in Northern India reached its meridian splendour .\n\nDuring this turbulant period, the Harda Handia tract passed through several hands. There is not much history attaching to it.(2) It appears that between 1769 and 1782 A.D., Rudraji Khunderao was the Amil ?r Governor of the Harda Handia tract. Between ·· 1782 and 1789 A.D. he was succeeded in that office by Unna Sahib.\n\nFrom 1790 to 1796 A.D.\n\nDaulatrao Scindia made his servant Jaswantrao Sewajee the Amil or Kamavisdar of the Harda\n\nHandia tract. It appears that the Peshwas were successful in G installing the appellants' ancestor Krishna Rao Ramchandra\n\n(I) Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. 13, 1908 p. 181, 182.\n\n(2) Sir Charles Elliot : Report on the Land Revenue System of the Dist- H ti\\; t of fl:oshanabad, p. 38.\n\n) E\n\n744 SUPllEMB COUllT llEPOllTS\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nas his Amil from. 1797 .to 1799 A.D., but there was a break in 1800 A.D. In 1800 A.O., Balaji Chimanjee was the Govrnor.\n\nBetween 1801 A.D. and 1802 A.D.1 the Scindia's servant Jaswantrao Sewajee again became his Governor.'(1). The reason for the change is apparent. In 1801 A.D. Jaswantrao Holkar appears to have burnt and plundered Harda but in 1803 A.D. Daulatrao Scindia halted at Handia for the whole rainy season. In the same year i.e. in 1803 A.D. the territory was ceded by the Peshwa to the Scindia arid called by him as the Panch Mahal.\n\nViewed in this liistorical perspective, the appellants' pretens.ions that their ancestors acquired the attributes of sovereignty in relation to the Jagir of Timarni, can hardly be accepted. It appears 'that the two of the ancestors of the appellants Naroo Bulla! and his brother Ramchandra Bullal's grandson Madhavrao presented themselves at the court of the Peshwa 'Madhavrao after having lost their position and power as sur-mandloi and surkanungo in Sarkar Handia and the Peshwa by the sanad of 1777 A.D. created them the Jagirdar of Timarni with permission to keep ' their gadhi at Timarni. It recites that the Peshwas being pleased with their loyal services Md granted to them watans in Handia Sarkar and that they had renovated the gadhi i.e. fort at Timarni which was lying in a dilapidated state, and it was felt that there should be trong fortress for their use as a residence aq<I therefore they were t:ven the inam of village Timarni together with the gadhi with sur-deshmukhi in perpetuity. As already stated, the appellants' ncestor Krishnarao Ramachandra became the Amil or Governor of the Peshwa between I 797 and 1799' but he was again replaced by Da\\llatrao Scindia's servant Jaswantrao Sewajee\n\nfrom 1801 to 1802. Thereafter, the Harda Handia passed under ,./ the control of the Scindias. ·. ,,..,,\n\nMuch stress is however laid on the two sanads of 1798 1800 A.D. issued by the Peshwa Bajirao II for the submission that the ancestors of the appellants as Jagirdars of Timarni had acquired the status of a feudatory . chief in relation thereto. We are afraid the contention cannot be accepied. By 1797lA.D. the\n\n(I) Sir Charles Elliot : Report on the Land Revenue Systems of the Dist•\n\n. rict of Hoshangabad, Central Provinces : 1865, p. 38 ·\n\nSARDAR cioVlNDARAO v. M.P. STATS (Sen, J.) . 145 • Scindias had made an inroad into the Harda Handia tract and evidently the appellants'\" ancestors found it difficult to administer the ternitory. The sad of 1798 A.O. issued_ by the Peshwa Bajirao II permitted them to maintain Shibandi irregular soldiery• and sipahis equipped with chapdas (breast plates) armed with\n\nweapons~ for making recovery of taxes and cesses,. but the grant was with' the condition that in both the mahals the irregular soldiery in any case .should not exceed 100 in number without permission.\n\nThis only showed the grant f permission to keep a chowkidari\n\nfoce for collection of revenue. The subsequent sanad of 1800 A.O. contains a recital that the ancestors of the appellants presented themselves at the court of the Peshwa Bajirao II and complained that the Scindia had deployed his own officers in Sarkar Handia and creaicd several muafidars, inamdars and saranjamis who were creating .obstructions to the enjoyment of their rights\n\nand on their protest they bad been ordered to get a confirmatory letter from the Peshwa.\n\nAfter the sovereignty had passed to th~ Scindias, Daulatrao Scindia by the two sanads of l.802 and 1804 A.O. described the appellants' ancestors as sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo and granted them an inam of villages Piplia and Bhaili as Nankar by way of maintenance, in recognition of t!Jeif loyal seryices:\n\n' The tenor, of all these sanads clearly shows th!lt the ancestors of the appellants were nothing mote than the Jagirdars of Timarni comprising qf Timarni and four other villages viz. Piplia, Bhaili, Samarda, and Underkuch, and that they had never attained ihe status of a feudatory or'a tributary Ruling -Chief under the sovereignty of t.he PeshWas or the Scindias.\n\nAfter the power of the Scindias wa~ completely destroyed by the Britisli, Daulatrao Scindia signed the treaty of Sarje ,-\\njengaotl on December 3,0, 18.03 by which he was ·obliged io give up his possessions between the Jamuna and the Ganges etc. i.e. including 'the Hard a Han di a tract known as ihe Pan ch Mahals, and soon\n\ntllereafter by the t, reaty of Burhanpur signed on February, 27, , 1804 he agreed to maintain a subsidiary force of the. British. to be paid for out of the revenues of the te1ritory ceded b)' him. In 1844 the Barda Handia tract was mad.e over by the Scindia in part -pay- . men'! for the Gwalior contingent and in 1860 it wa.s permanently\n\ntransferred and became British territory .. ,\n\nff'\n\n/ I\n\nr A\n\nSUPREME COUU REPORTS\n\n11982) 3 s.c.k.\n\nDuring the period of management of the territory by the British, the jagir of Timarni held by the ancestors of the appellants was continued at the request of the Scindia as would be clear from tbe • following letter from Scretary to the Government of No!th-Western Provinces io the Secretary to the Southern Board of Revenue, North-Western Provinces dated July 24, 1860, which is in these terms:\n\n\"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 564, dated the 4th instant, submitting copies of a corresP, ondence, relative to the Temurnee Jageer, situated in the Pergunah of Harda in Hoshaogabad and held by the Bhooskutta, Kishen Row Madho, with the Boards recommendation, that the Jageer may be continued rent free in perpetuity.to the, family of the present incumbent, in' compliance with a request to that effect made by the Gwalfor Durbar, by whom it was originally granted.\n\nIn reply I am desired to intimate that the Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that, in a matter of this kind this Government is to a certain extent bound to confirm to the wishes of Maharaja Scindia, the country in which the rent free holding is situated\n\nbeing not assigned-and not ceded to the British. ·\n\nAs MaharajaScindia, had expressed a wish that the Jageer of Timurnee should be continued rent free in ' perpetuity to the Bhooskutta and as perpetuation\n\n,. seems to be in accordance with the 2nd of the revised rules for Barda 'Handia, dated 30th May 1834. His Honour has been pleased to confirm the exemption of / the Jageer in question from demand of revenue in < perpetuity.\"\n\nOn December 12, 1860, the Scindia ceded this territory to the British Government by a treaty of which Art. 3 is as follows : \"The Maharaja transfers to the British Government in full sovereignty the . wh1Jle of His Highness possession in the Pancli Mahals and to he\n\nsouth of the Fiver Nar0ada also Pargana Kumghar on dfe Betwa river on. the following conditions : (1) That for the lands transferred by His Highness, the British Gove.rnment shall give in exchange )ands of equ.a! v; ilu~ ~lu.l11teQ qq l)o!li skies on the pre~ll! 11ross\n\n- .. / ..__,--/\n\n--~ -\n\n. SA!.DAR OOVINDRAO v. M.P. STATB (Sen, J.) 747\n\nrevenue ..... (3) That each Government shall respect the conditions of exisiting leases until their expiry, and that in order that this may be made clear to all concerned, each Government .shall give to its . new subjects leases for the same terms of years and on the same conditions as those which they at present enjoy. (4) That each Government shall give to its new subjects sanads in perpetuity for the rent-free lands-the jagirs the perquisites and the hereditary claims i.e. haqs and watans) which they enjoy at present under the other Government.\"\n\nAfter the cession of the territory by the Scindia in 1860, the Govetnment set itelf to inquire what were the estates transferred and what were the tenures. of their new subjects. This was necessary, first of all, becau8e as land of equal value elsewhere was to be ceded to the SciJJdia, it was necessary to note the exact value of what had been taken over, and also because undoubtedly the Government wished to give effect to the terms of the treaty above quoted and in particular to .the fourtli bead of cl. 3. There was Jong and detailed. inquiry by the Government as to the precise position of the Jagirdar of Timarni. The inquiry dragged on for some years, but after a full investigation the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Central ' \\ \" Provinces by his Jetter dated March 4, 1865 conveyed'tbe decision of tile Governor General-in-Council to the effect :\n\n\"The GovernorGeueral in-Council has been pleased to rule on the Chief Commissioner's 'recommendations that with the exception of the Chief, the Chief . of Makrai, all the Zamindars are to be regarded and treated as ordinary British subject.\n\nSo far as the Chief Commissioner is aware there is nothing in the past history or present circumstances of any of the Pargunna Officials or Jamindars of Nemar which would in any way be entitled to exercise their estates any degree.of sovereign power.'' ' .\n\nIt would thus appear that the Britih Government never\n\nrecooised the appellants' ancestor Krishnarao Madho, who like all other Zamindars and Jagirdars in the Central Provinces, were fayin~ claim to be recognised as a chieftain, to be a Ruling Chief.\n\nAfter a soeverigo state has acquired territory, either by conquest or by cession under'treaty or by th~ oupatioq. qf trritory\n\nF ,\n\n. E\n\n748 SUPREME COURT ill!roRTS {I i)82) 3 S.C.R.\n\ntheretofore unoccupied by the recognized Ruler o.r otherwise, an i.nhabitant of a territory can enforce in the municipal Courts only such proprietary rights as the sovereign has conferred or recognized.· Even if a treaty of cession . stipulates that certain inhabitants shall enjoy certain rights, that gives them no rig)1t which they can so enforce. The meaning of a general statement. in a proclamation or a\n\n(rety that existing rights would. be recogn\\sed is that the Govern- . ment will recognize such right; as upon investigation it finds existed.\n\nThe Government does not thereby renounce its right to recognize only. such titles as it considers should be recO'gnized nor confer upon the municipal courts any powers to adjudicate in the. matter. Tbe principle is so well-settled that it is not necessary to burMn the judgment with many citations.~\n\n• In Vajesingji Joravarsingji & Ors. v. Secretary of State for Indra in Council l'l Lord Dunedin in a somewhat similar claim of a taluqdar of the Pan ch Mahal.s which was in the ominion of the Scindia ceded to the British Government by the treaty dated December 12, 1860, negatived the clahn of the. taluqdar to proprie\n\ntary rights qbservlng :\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for. the first time that is an act of state. It matters not how the acquisition has been. brought about. It may be by con: quest, it may be by cession following on treaty. it may be ; • by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognized ruler. In all cases the resnlt is the same. Any in\n\nhabitant o'f the territory can make good in t.he municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his, officers, recognized. Such tights as he hac! under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\n\nNayote, even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal courts. The right to enfor<; e remaiqs only with the high contracting pariies.\n\nTliis is made quite cl.ear by Lor<! Atkinson when, citing the Pongoland case of Cook v. Sprigg L.R. 42 IA 229, 268 he says : \"It was held that the annexation of territory/made a)1 'act of state and that any obligation assured under the\n\n\\l} L.R, (1923-24J' 51 !A 3.571\n\n, Y .\n\nsAii.DAii ooviNDttAo v. i.i.i>. STATE (Sen, J.) 749 '\n\ntreaty with the ceding state either to the sovereign or the individuals is not one wb1ch municipal Courts are autho rize<Yto enforce.''\n\nThe burden of proving that after cessatio.n of the. territory by the Scindiils to the British by the treaty of December 12, 1860 the\n\nB. titish Goyernment acknowledged or recognize4 the existence of any\n\nMvereirlghts with the ancestors of the appellants ws upon them and that burden they have f)liled to discharge. ·\n\n\"\"\" / The historical material on which reliance is placed is not of ....- ~' much legal significance. {n the Central Provinces, the Zamindari or Jagirdari estates had nothing to do with Revenue-farming.\n\nThey were simply the estates of chiefs or \\barons of the old Gond king doms. when these kingdoms were conque; ed by the Mara\\has, the main portions became the Khalsa, or directly managed lands; of the conquerors. The old, 'baronial'. territories being in the\n\n hills on the outskirts of the Maratha domain, were not prdductive .of milch revenue; they were therefore iet alone, the chiefs being\n\nmade to pay a moderate tribute. T4is position was maintained )lllder the .British Governm.e11t. The estates. were subjected 'to a\n\ngeneral kind of Revenue Settfement, which varied in form (and in\n\n~ . - •' . . ' . degree of detail) in different distJicts, and according 'to the rank and circumstances of the chief or landlord.(1)\n\ni The Settlement of 1863 by Sir Richard Temple, Chief Commis sioner of .€entral Provinces recognised the Mlllg11zafs as virt11aliy landlords. The recognition of proprietary rights was absolute and - unreserved. It was not the creation of a new. right, but the -recog .-~ nition, by the Government, of the state of things which had existM '- in practice. The principle so clearly established fn'the 'Settleinent ·of 1863 was subsequently departed from and al\\hougli the Malguza:rs were treated to be proprietors and . they became illere intermediaries to whom the Government looked for collection of land revenue.\n\n. . '\n\n.. The historical ateriai .t>~/aining to the peiod ' from 1844,' t<l 189QA.D. when the Scipdia. had' ceded the territory to the British and the period ihereafier i.~. the perf6d frpin 1860\n\ntiltbe settlement of te Hoshangabad :District fo 1865 i§ of no\n\n(I) Ji.H. Baden-Powell-A' Short Account of the Land Ii.evenue and its Administration in British India 1907, at pp.112.lf3. -\n\n sul>ui.ts col.Jilt kiit>ollti r\n\niI9At 1 s.e.&.\n\nlegal consequence. They are undoubtedly historical documents of great importance but are not sufficient to form a basis for the conclusion that the. ancestors of the appellants were the Ruling Chiefs . qf Timarni. First of these was the letter of Lt. Col.\n\nSir W.H. Sleeman, Agent to the Governor General, dated June 3,\n\n1847 treating the Jagirdar of Timarni at. par with the Chief of MakraFstf¥'1)y which he ordered that there should not be any interference with the revenue management of the Makrai and Timarni estates and all questions relating to transfer of leases, suits for rents, ejectments etc. should be left to the Chiefs as hithertofore. This was a letter written when the territory was placed under the Deputy Commi&sioner of Hoshangabad subject to the control of Agent to the Governo1 General. Next is a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshangabad dated July 16, 1860 on a complaint by the kiledar. of the Bhuskutes direeting the Settle ment-Officet that he would cause the survey, and if any commenced, to be <liscotitinued, \"as we cannot in any way interfere with the Bhuskute Jagir\". We have already referred to the important letter dated July 24, 1860 from the Secretary to the Government, North western Provinces to the Secretary to the Southern Board . of Revenue, North-Western Provinces, which brings out the real status of the ancestors of the appellants as a Jagirdar. \"\n\nJn Sir Richard Temple's \"Report on the Zamindaris and other petty Chieftains in the Central Provinces\" submitted\n\n·..;\n\nby him to the Government of India in 1863, there is a letter by .l Hector Mackenzie, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the ,, Central Provinces addressed to the Government of India dated oeiober 31, ,1863. He traced the history of the aneestors ...- of the appellaptsand then went on to say that they ruled /'. /' over the territ()ry. We think it necessary to extract the relevan~ . . \" - I portion thereof which. runs as follows:\n\n\"The title of Bhooscutta was given by the Peshwa to . officers sent to clear jungles and cultivate waste lands, and one of these the founder of the family under notice was sent to Hurda where he brought much land unCler cultivation, and was high officer ·\n\nIt appears-that in Peshwa's lime the BhooSc:utta 'rule(j' in Hurdah, and when Scindia obtained possession he gave\n\n. , ..\n\n§ARbAll G0VINbRA6 v. M.i>. STATE (:S-en, J,\\\n\n?S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. .\n\nWhen Hurdah was ceded, Timurni was placed under the Deputy Commissioner of Hoshangabad, .subject to the 1 Commissioner of these territories, . and the late Commissioner and Agent to lhe Governor General Sir W. Sleeman, ordered that the Bhooscutta should not be interfred with in any way except.in heavy criminal cases an.d such is still the practice:\"\n\n;..\n\nHis subsequent lettbr to th'i Commissioner Saugar Division dated December 2, 1863 reads :\n\n\"I am directed by the officiating Chief Commissioner to inform you, that the Timurnee Estate being held in Zamin daree ten'bre, i.e. it is a petty chieftaincy the villages comprised in it need no~ be measured by the .settlement Officer, nor should any cesses be levied. This Estate forms one of three Muckrai; .Timurnee, Pitera, Jn your Divisions which are petty Chieftaincies and in respect o( which the orders of the Government have been solicited jn detail, when they are received they will be communicated.\"\n\nThen there is the letter from the Settlement Commissioner, Central Provinces to the Settlement 'officer, Hohangabad date.d August 4, 1865 directing him to take the necessary measures for completing the 17gular settlement of the Timarni jagir with all practical despatch. It was .mentioned that although the jagir bad been: released in perpetuity, the chief object of making the •uessment was • io fix the Jamas on which the percentage due on ccount of cesses and other taxes ere to be fixed.\n\nThis was . followed by a letter from the officiating settlement Officer to the\n\napelf~11ts' aqstor . Krisbtiarao Madho dated August 19, 1865 informing liim that there should be no apprehension about the settlement operation in progress, that the object of the Government\n\nwas only to ascertain the area and capacity of the :Jllages.\n\nSir Charles Elliot's Settlement Report of the Hoshangabad District of 1865 records that Naroo B11llal and Ramcband.ra ull\\11\n\nsui>REMS coiJRt iuii>ol:rs (i982j 3 s.c.a.\n\nmade surmandloi and sur-kaimngo by' the Peshwa of the whole 22 paraganas of the Handia Sarkar i.e. they were paragana officials.\n\nHe went on to observe that , the appellants' ancestor Krishenarao Madf10 was a \"semi-dependent\" jagirdar of Timarni comprising of five villages, bUtas regards rest of his holdings a service muafidar.{'J\n\nHe states that all of ·.these villages were given 'to . the appellants' ancestors rent-free in perpetuity to meet expenses incurred for the office of sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo which t!ie Peshwa baa bestowed on him .\n\n. After ii full investigation into title, the Governor General '---- • in Council came to a decision that all Zamindars in the Central ---..\n\nProvinces, including the ancestors of the appellants, had to.be regarded and treated as ordinary British subjects. .A\n\nIt is abundantly clear from whl!t has been set forth above that although the Government officials took great pains to determine O what 'was the positio'n of the jagirdar of Timarni, the Government. ultimately came to the 9onclusion that be held the status of an ordinary British subject and was nota Feudatory Chief exercising .\n\nany sovereign powers.\n\nln Kunwarlal Singh v. Provincial Government, Central Provinces & Berar,('} similar, contentions were raised. In that case, the plaintiffs who \"were the Zamindars of Kamtha, Wadad and Deori Kishori known as Wainganga Zamindars and that of Palasgarh governed by what was known as the Chanda Patent, challenged the validity of .the Central Provinces and Berar Revision of the Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939 which provided for an increase in the levy of takoli as beyond the legislative competence of the then Provincial Llgislature since it amounted to acquisition of Jarid withput payment of compensation-.\n\nThey claimed that they' enjoyed sovereign or quasi-sovereign status. and takoli was in the nature of a tribute. Both the contentions were rejected. It was held by Vivian Bose,' ). that tako/i was land revenue nd that the Zamindars were nothing more than ordinary British subjects and there.fore liable to pay land revenue like any other subject.\n\n(1) Sir Charles Elliot: Report on the Land Revenue System.of.the Distrlct\n\nof Hoshangabad, Central Provinces : 1865. p. 198\n\n(2) I.L.R. (1944) Nagpur 18\\1 , , .\n\n'J, •\n\nSARf>Ak cmviNbaAo v. l.i.P. sTATB (Sen, J.\\ . 7sa\n\nThe Zamindars of Central Provinces like the appellants here had twice carried th~ matter right upto the Privy Couqcil in assertion of their claim that they were Feudatory Chiefs; but the Judicial Committee clasS'Cd them as ordiQJry British subjects. In Bir Bikram Deo v. Secreiary of State for India in Council(') the Privy Council ·\n\nwas dealing with the -Zamindars in the Raipur [)istrict of the Central Provinces. Their status was the same as that of Jhe, Wainganga Zamindars and they were governed by what was known as the Chanda Patent, which gave them a status higher than that of other Zamindars. In Marland Rao v. Malhar Rao,(') the Judlcial Committee was dealing with Kampta za_mindari in Waingana a'nd the. ___claim was that the estate was in the nature of a Raj. In both the•\n\ncases, 'reliance was placed on certain historical ma1erial, including Sir Richard Temple's \"Report on the Zamindaris and. other Petty Chieftains in the Central Provinces\" where he described Wainganga Zamindars governed by the Chanda Patent; generally as \"Dependent 'Chiefs\".· The Judicial_ Committee while rejecting the contention thafthe zamindars were petty Chieftain liaving attributes of ove reignty, observed :\n\n\"It appears, moreover, from Sir Reginald. Craddoc)£'s note, that after a good deal of correspondence between Sir R. Temple, as Chief Commissioner of the Cntral Pro\n\nvinces, and the Government of India, it was finally decided\n\nthat only holders of certain estates should be recognized as feudatories, and all others as ordil)ary subjects. Sanads were granted the former,. expressly mentioning that the succession was in their case to be a single heir. Thi provision was omitted in the case of sanads to most Zamindars of the second class, including the Amgaon , zamil)dar, though with regard to some others like Chanda that' provision was'expresSly attached.\" .\n\nWhile coming to that conclusion, the Judicial Committee. observed that:\n\n\"There are passages here and there both in Sir Richard Jenkins report and Sir R. Temple's report which speaks of all the8e zamindaris indiscriminately as chiefs or chieftains, .\n\n(1) L.R. (1911-12), 39 J.A. 31.\n\n(2) L:R. (1927-28) 551, A. 4S.\n\n. sUPREMil coullT ltEPoRtS {1982J j s.C.11..\n\nbut that ............ they could possibly be classed category of sovereign or semi-sovereign chiefs whose possessions were necessarily impartible\".\n\nIn Vajesingji Joravarsingji & Ors. v. Secretary of State for India in Council (supra), Lord Dunedin while dealing with the historical material had said : ·\n\n\"The view of the Officials of the Government as to that wquld intluence .them to make up their minds as to what title should be given or recognized, but even then, as far as their Lordships are concerned, it is what thy did after investigation, not what they thought at investigation, that is matter of moment.\"\n\nfo conclusion, it must be held that the appellants were not entitled to any money or pension under cl. (ii) of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue D Exemptions Act, 1948, not being \"the descendants of a fomer Ruling Chief\" in terms of that section.\n\nThe result therefore is that appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 193, "entities": [{"text": "SARDAR GOVINDRAO & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SARDAR GOVINDRAO & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Panipat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After th~ defeat of the Maharatta army in the third battle of Panipat in '.1761 A.D. the appellants ancestors lost their position and power a.s sur mandloi and sur kanungo in Sarkar Handia, By tbe sanad of 1777 the Peshwa created them the Jagirdar pf Timarni\" cociiprising of Timami and four other villages ."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Land Revocation of Land Revenue Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revocation of Land Revenue Act, 1948", "statute": "Land Revocation of Land Revenue Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, the British Government decided on the basis of the enquiry that the Zamindars ill the Central Provinces including those of the appellants' ancestors."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8284, "end_char": 8297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Go pal Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Go pal Subramaniam, S.A. Shroff' and D.P. M ohanty for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S.A. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8361, "end_char": 8372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Go pal Subramaniam, S.A. Shroff' and D.P. M ohanty for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "D.P. M ohanty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Go pal Subramaniam, S.A. Shroff' and D.P. M ohanty for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8457, "end_char": 8460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against the - judgment and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated ' ..\n\nMarch 10, 1970, by which , the High Coutt declined to interfere \\ •• with an order of the State Government."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revnue Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8846, "end_char": 8920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hoshangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9258, "end_char": 9269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ield estates in the districts of Hoshangabad and Nimar on favourable terms as Jagirdar's Muafidars and Ubaridars enjoyed exemption from payment of land revenue amounting to an aggregate, of Rs."}}, {"text": "Nimar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9274, "end_char": 9279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ield estates in the districts of Hoshangabad and Nimar on favourable terms as Jagirdar's Muafidars and Ubaridars enjoyed exemption from payment of land revenue amounting to an aggregate, of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9802, "end_char": 9806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "After the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Timarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10087, "end_char": 10094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sanads granted by the Peshwas and repognized by the Scindias and were all along treated as such even by the British, they were wrongly recorded as Jagirdars of Timarni in the record of rights which was DO evidence of their real status.", "canonical_name": "Timarni"}}, {"text": "State Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10241, "end_char": 10275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applications were forwarded by the respective Depaty Commissioners to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10318, "end_char": 10330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, by its order dated May 13, 1955, rejected their prayer holding tht t!:tey were not\n\n&AllbAll GoVJNbitAo v. M.P. STATE (Sen, J.) 133\n\n'I\" • entitled to he grant of such amount or pension not being the\n\ndescendants of a former Rulin~ Chief within the meaning of cl.'"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10586, "end_char": 10590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Prade$h High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10624, "end_char": 10649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Madhya Prade$h High Court by its 'judgment dated April 20, 1959 declined to interfere on the ground that \\he proceedings under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 qf the Act could not be said to be judical or quasi-judicfal in natute as the use of the word \"may\" in sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act)nade 'the grant of money or pension in the discretion of the\n\nSta~ i3overnment."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10673, "end_char": 10687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Madhya Prade$h High Court by its 'judgment dated April 20, 1959 declined to interfere on the ground that \\he proceedings under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 qf the Act could not be said to be judical or quasi-judicfal in natute as the use of the word \"may\" in sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act)nade 'the grant of money or pension in the discretion of the\n\nSta~ i3overnment."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10765, "end_char": 10769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11135, "end_char": 11139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Govindrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11773, "end_char": 11782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In compliance with the directions issued by thi~ Court in Govindrao' s case, supra, the Slate Government afforded th.e appellants an opportunity of hearing on August 6, 1966 to subs- ."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11874, "end_char": 11888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In compliance with the directions issued by thi~ Court in Govindrao' s case, supra, the Slate Government afforded th.e appellants an opportunity of hearing on August 6, 1966 to subs- ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11989, "end_char": 11993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhatrapati Shahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the regime of Chhatrapati Shahu in ' ' <:>..J.177 A.D.\", that is, granted by the Peshwa Madhavrao by w4ich , ' • their ancesto; Ramchandra Bulla!"}}, {"text": "Ramchandra Bulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12384, "end_char": 12400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the regime of Chhatrapati Shahu in ' ' <:>..J.177 A.D.\", that is, granted by the Peshwa Madhavrao by w4ich , ' • their ancesto; Ramchandra Bulla!", "canonical_name": "Ramchandra Bullal"}}, {"text": "Piplia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12935, "end_char": 12941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further held!hat even after the suzerainty had passed frpm the Peshwas to the Scindias, the grant of village Piplia and Bhaili to their ancestors by Daulatrao\n\n(I) (196S] 1 $.C.R. 678.,"}}, {"text": "SUPIUlME COURT IUiPOR'l'S ( 1 ~8~J j S.C.ll.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13025, "end_char": 13069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".G '\n\nSUPIUlME COURT IUiPOR'l'S ( 1 ~8~J j S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1865", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to that conclusion, it relied upon the decision of the Gover nor General in Council conveyed by the letter of the Secretary to the\n\nChief Commissioner .of Central Provinces dated March 3, 1865."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14365, "end_char": 14369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Gwalior", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15054, "end_char": 15070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gwalior, which was a legacy of the past, nder which • the land revenue of a territory was assigned to a chief or a noble, -I known as the jagirdar, to supp_ort troops, police and for specified\n\nservices.(')"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15378, "end_char": 15382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.P. Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15605, "end_char": 15615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After reterring to the material on record, it came to the same con clusion as the State Government and held that the ancestors of the appellants never enjoyed the powers of a tributary or feudatory chief\n\n(I) V.P. Menon : _The Story of the Integration of the Indian States."}}, {"text": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17959, "end_char": 18001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18208, "end_char": 18212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act", "statute": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18269, "end_char": 18273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act", "statute": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18884, "end_char": 18888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act", "statute": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20350, "end_char": 20352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laski", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20892, "end_char": 20897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aci:ording to Laski in \"A Grammar of Politics'', 1957 Reprint <(hap."}}, {"text": "John Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21050, "end_char": 21061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II, p. 50\n\n\"The legal aspect of sovereignty is best examined by a statement of the form given to it by John Austin."}}, {"text": "William Lee Warner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22432, "end_char": 22450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir William Lee Warner, the acknowledged authority on Indian States, in his work , \"The Native States of India; 1910\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'rS tJ982) 5 S.C.R.\n\ncharacterizes them as \"semi-sovereign\"."}}, {"text": "Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22807, "end_char": 22813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The indivisibility of the sovereignty on which Austin insists, did not belong to the Indian system of sovereign states ..\n\nThe degree of sovereignty exerced by the different rulers\n\nvaried greatly as the areas under their dominion."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23545, "end_char": 23558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "each ruler was determined by treaties or engagements with the British Government or by practice -~ that had grown up in the course of their relations with British India."}}, {"text": "Henry Maine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23669, "end_char": 23680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sir Henry Maine said :\n\n\"There may be found in India every shade and variety of sovereignty, but there is only one independent sovereign, the British Government. ..,"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sir Henry Maine said :\n\n\"There may be found in India every shade and variety of sovereignty, but there is only one independent sovereign, the British Government. ..,"}}, {"text": "Nandgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24256, "end_char": 24264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Korea", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24266, "end_char": 24271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Bastar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24273, "end_char": 24279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Raigarli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24281, "end_char": 24289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Sarguja", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24291, "end_char": 24298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Khairagarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24300, "end_char": 24310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Kanker", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24312, "end_char": 24318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Jashpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24320, "end_char": 24327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Kawardha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24329, "end_char": 24337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Sarangarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24339, "end_char": 24348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24350, "end_char": 24357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Sakti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24359, "end_char": 24364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Chhuikadan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24366, "end_char": 24376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Makrai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24378, "end_char": 24384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "Changbhakar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24389, "end_char": 24400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were : Nandgaon, Korea, Bastar, Raigarli, Sarguja, Khairagarh, Kanker, Jashpur, Kawardha, Sarangarh, Udaipur, Sakti, Chhuikadan, Makrai and Changbhakar."}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24541, "end_char": 24555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the First Schedule to the Government of India Act,\n\n1935", "statute": "the First Schedule to the Government of India Act,\n\n1935"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24789, "end_char": 24793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the First Schedule to the Government of India Act,\n\n1935", "statute": "the First Schedule to the Government of India Act,\n\n1935"}}, {"text": "Naroo Bulla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25133, "end_char": 25144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That depends on whether the ancestors of the appellants had acquired the attributes of sovereignty in relation to the jagir of Timarni granted by the Peshwa Madhavrao to two of their ancestors Naroo Bulla!", "canonical_name": "Naroo B11llal"}}, {"text": "Ramchandra Bullal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25162, "end_char": 25179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and his brother Ramchandra Bullal's grandson Madhav Rao in 1717 A.D. As hereinbefore adumbrated, the appellants rested their case before the State Government on the sanad of the Peshwa in 1777 A; D. in respect of the jagir of Timarni.", "canonical_name": "Ramchandra Bullal"}}, {"text": "Madhav Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25191, "end_char": 25201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and his brother Ramchandra Bullal's grandson Madhav Rao in 1717 A.D. As hereinbefore adumbrated, the appellants rested their case before the State Government on the sanad of the Peshwa in 1777 A; D. in respect of the jagir of Timarni.", "canonical_name": "Madhav Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25577, "end_char": 25581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narbada Valley", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26034, "end_char": 26048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that the ancestors of the appellants D exercised considerable power and authority in the Narbada Valley at a certain period of time."}}, {"text": "Nimar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26312, "end_char": 26326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97-98, reads :\n\n''The most important Brahman family is that of the Bhuskute, who hold the Timarni Estate as well as considerable property in the Nimar District and in Holkar's terri- ."}}, {"text": "Holkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26334, "end_char": 26340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97-98, reads :\n\n''The most important Brahman family is that of the Bhuskute, who hold the Timarni Estate as well as considerable property in the Nimar District and in Holkar's terri- ."}}, {"text": "Ratnagiri District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26423, "end_char": 26441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t<)rY.\n\nThe family is about I 50 years old and originaHy came from the Ratnagiri District in the Bombay Presidency."}}, {"text": "Bombay Presidency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26449, "end_char": 26466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t<)rY.\n\nThe family is about I 50 years old and originaHy came from the Ratnagiri District in the Bombay Presidency."}}, {"text": "Ramchaodra Balla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26505, "end_char": 26521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its founders were the two brothers, Ramchaodra Balla!", "canonical_name": "Ramchandra Bullal"}}, {"text": "Naro Balla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26527, "end_char": 26537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Naro Balla!,", "canonical_name": "Naroo B11llal"}}, {"text": "Makrai Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26713, "end_char": 26724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "then called the Handia Sarkar, and forced the Makrai Raja to surrender half his territory."}}, {"text": "Khargaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27059, "end_char": 27067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kurhade or axemen, is another name by which the famjly is sometimes Known, and the axes which are said to have been the instruments of execution are still preserved at Khargaon and duly worshipped at the Dasahra festival by the Bhuskute and their retainers."}}, {"text": "Mandloi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27238, "end_char": 27245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Io reward for these services the brothers received in 1751 the hereditary offices of Sir Mandloi and Sir Kanungo in the\n\nSarkars of Bijagarb and Handia, wit.h villages and tracts of\n\nsuRkEME COURT REPoilrs (1982] j S C.ll."}}, {"text": "Kanungo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27254, "end_char": 27261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Io reward for these services the brothers received in 1751 the hereditary offices of Sir Mandloi and Sir Kanungo in the\n\nSarkars of Bijagarb and Handia, wit.h villages and tracts of\n\nsuRkEME COURT REPoilrs (1982] j S C.ll."}}, {"text": "Khandesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27572, "end_char": 27580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bhuskute proved as successful in peace as they had been in war, keeping the country in order, and settling culiivators from Khandesh in the uninhabited parts."}}, {"text": "Timarni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27662, "end_char": 27669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1777, the Peshwa Madho Jl.ao gave them the fort of Timarni as a permanent jagir."}}, {"text": "Daul! Rao Sindhia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27692, "end_char": 27709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daul!", "canonical_name": "Da\\llatrao Scindia"}}, {"text": "Balaji Bajirao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28397, "end_char": 28411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balaji Bajirao infaded the lmcient kingdom of Garha-Mandla and exacted the tri.bute Q, f chauth or one-fourth of the revenue, amounting to 4 Iakhs of rupees."}}, {"text": "Garha-Mandla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28596, "end_char": 28608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He took the fort and killed the Ruler of Garha-Mandla."}}, {"text": "Burhanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28732, "end_char": 28741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peshwa marched up the valley on his way from Burhanpur to attack Mandia and subdued Han.dia Paragana. (')"}}, {"text": "Mandia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28752, "end_char": 28758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peshwa marched up the valley on his way from Burhanpur to attack Mandia and subdued Han.dia Paragana. (')"}}, {"text": "Han.dia Paragana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28771, "end_char": 28787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peshwa marched up the valley on his way from Burhanpur to attack Mandia and subdued Han.dia Paragana. (')"}}, {"text": "W.H. Sleeman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28888, "end_char": 28900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir W.H. Sleeman remarks that :\n\n\"By this dreadful invasion of the Peshwa with his host of fqllowers, the whole country east of Jubbidpur was made waste and de-populate.\""}}, {"text": "Peshwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28951, "end_char": 28957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir W.H. Sleeman remarks that :\n\n\"By this dreadful invasion of the Peshwa with his host of fqllowers, the whole country east of Jubbidpur was made waste and de-populate.\""}}, {"text": "Jubbidpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29012, "end_char": 29021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir W.H. Sleeman remarks that :\n\n\"By this dreadful invasion of the Peshwa with his host of fqllowers, the whole country east of Jubbidpur was made waste and de-populate.\""}}, {"text": "Harda Handia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29148, "end_char": 29160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mughal power was effectively driven out and we hear no more of a Muhammadan Governor of Harda Handia; but his place.", "canonical_name": "Harda Handia"}}, {"text": "Naroo. Bulla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29207, "end_char": 29219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was taken by the two brothers Naroo.", "canonical_name": "Naroo B11llal"}}, {"text": "Ramch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30212, "end_char": 30217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ramch; mdra Bulla!,"}}, {"text": "Bijagarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30807, "end_char": 30815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a separat~ sanad of 1751 A.D. the Peshwa appointed them sur-mandloi and sur-kanungo and created watandars in respect of 32 mahals in Sarkar :Bijagarh, with the reservation of surdeshmukhi, with the .same percentage of revenue and similar rights."}}, {"text": "They appeared to have done good service to the Peshwas not only in shearing Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30913, "end_char": 30993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charles Elliot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31748, "end_char": 31762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "remained\n\n(I) Sir Charles Elliot: Report on the Lane!"}}, {"text": "Harda Handia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32358, "end_char": 32370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a twilight zone after 1750 A.O. and very little is known about the Harda Handia tract."}}, {"text": "Ahmed Shah Durrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32958, "end_char": 32976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The annihilation of the Maratha army at the hands of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, followed by the premature death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in the same year seemed to foreshadow the immediate dissolution of the Maratha empire."}}, {"text": "Panipat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33000, "end_char": 33007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The annihilation of the Maratha army at the hands of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, followed by the premature death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in the same year seemed to foreshadow the immediate dissolution of the Maratha empire."}}, {"text": "Peshwa Balaji Bajirao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33056, "end_char": 33077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The annihilation of the Maratha army at the hands of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, followed by the premature death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao in the same year seemed to foreshadow the immediate dissolution of the Maratha empire."}}, {"text": "Hindustan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33241, "end_char": 33250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There followed a sudden revolt against the Maralha domination everywhere in Hindustan."}}, {"text": "Barda Handia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33320, "end_char": 33332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shadow on the Barda Handia tract; and the Ruler of Makrai thought to improve the occasion by driving out the Amils of the Peshwa out of Handia, but he was himself repulsed and ki)led by a force of Goshains."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33557, "end_char": 33563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Gawilgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33602, "end_char": 33611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Mahadeo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33615, "end_char": 33622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Narbada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33680, "end_char": 33687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33715, "end_char": 33721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I In or.about 1750 A.O. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur overran the whole range of hills from Gawilgarh to Mahadeo, and reduced the country east of Handia and south of the Narbada except the portion held by Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Hosbangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33846, "end_char": 33857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hosbangabad was in that year taken by the\n\n."}}, {"text": "Wazir Muhamad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33933, "end_char": 33946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagpur troops; but was retaken in 1802 by Wazir Muhamad,\n\n(I} Sir Charles Elliot: Report on the Land Revenue System of the District of Hosbangahad Central Provincei: 1865, p. 35\n\n,,,._ •", "canonical_name": "Wazir Muhammad"}}, {"text": "SARDAR GOVINDRAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34079, "end_char": 34095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARDAR GOVINDRAO ~. M.P .. STATE (Sen, J.) 743.", "canonical_name": "SARDAR GOVINDRAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Wazir Muhammad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34297, "end_char": 34311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During these wars the Pindaris, first summoned by Wazir Muhammad to his assistance, but afterwards deserting to his enemies, plundered the country impartially in all directions.. It is estimated that not a single village escaped being burnt once or twice during the fifteen years for which their depredations lasted, and- the greater part of Sarkar Handia wa.s entirely depopulated.", "canonical_name": "Wazir Muhammad"}}, {"text": "Sarkar Handia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34589, "end_char": 34602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During these wars the Pindaris, first summoned by Wazir Muhammad to his assistance, but afterwards deserting to his enemies, plundered the country impartially in all directions.. It is estimated that not a single village escaped being burnt once or twice during the fifteen years for which their depredations lasted, and- the greater part of Sarkar Handia wa.s entirely depopulated."}}, {"text": "Harda Hadia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34830, "end_char": 34841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1844 the Harda Hadia trct was made over by the Scindia in part payment for the Gwalior Contingent, and in 1860 it was permanently transferred and became British territory:(')\n\nAfter the crushing .defeat of the Maratha army by Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761 A. D. the Pesbwas never crossed the Narbada valley.", "canonical_name": "Harda Handia"}}, {"text": "Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34868, "end_char": 34875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1844 the Harda Hadia trct was made over by the Scindia in part payment for the Gwalior Contingent, and in 1860 it was permanently transferred and became British territory:(')\n\nAfter the crushing .defeat of the Maratha army by Ahmed Shah Durrani in the third battle of Panipat in 1761 A. D. the Pesbwas never crossed the Narbada valley.", "canonical_name": "Scindias"}}, {"text": "Mahadji Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35197, "end_char": 35212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an intense st, ruggle between Mahadji Scindia and.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Scindia"}}, {"text": "Jaswantrao Holkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35218, "end_char": 35235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaswantrao Holkar to gain control over the valley."}}, {"text": "Central India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35272, "end_char": 35285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Central India, these two military leaders alternately held the pre-eminency."}}, {"text": "Mahadji Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35350, "end_char": 35365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahadji Scindia utilised the fiction of his sovereignty created by the Treaty of Salbai in 1781 A.D. to gain his supremacy.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Scindia"}}, {"text": "Rudraji Khunderao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35761, "end_char": 35778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is not much history attaching to it.(2) It appears that between 1769 and 1782 A.D., Rudraji Khunderao was the Amil ?"}}, {"text": "Unna Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35896, "end_char": 35906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between ·· 1782 and 1789 A.D. he was succeeded in that office by Unna Sahib."}}, {"text": "Daulatrao Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35933, "end_char": 35950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 1790 to 1796 A.D.\n\nDaulatrao Scindia made his servant Jaswantrao Sewajee the Amil or Kamavisdar of the Harda\n\nHandia tract.", "canonical_name": "Da\\llatrao Scindia"}}, {"text": "Jaswantrao Sewajee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35968, "end_char": 35986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 1790 to 1796 A.D.\n\nDaulatrao Scindia made his servant Jaswantrao Sewajee the Amil or Kamavisdar of the Harda\n\nHandia tract."}}, {"text": "Balaji Chimanjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36455, "end_char": 36471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1797 .to 1799 A.D., but there was a break in 1800 A.D. In 1800 A.O., Balaji Chimanjee was the Govrnor."}}, {"text": "A.D. Jaswantrao Holkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36643, "end_char": 36665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1801 A.D. Jaswantrao Holkar appears to have burnt and plundered Harda but in 1803 A.D. Daulatrao Scindia halted at Handia for the whole rainy season."}}, {"text": "Harda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36702, "end_char": 36707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1801 A.D. Jaswantrao Holkar appears to have burnt and plundered Harda but in 1803 A.D. Daulatrao Scindia halted at Handia for the whole rainy season."}}, {"text": "A.D. Daulatrao Scindia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36720, "end_char": 36742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1801 A.D. Jaswantrao Holkar appears to have burnt and plundered Harda but in 1803 A.D. Daulatrao Scindia halted at Handia for the whole rainy season."}}, {"text": "Naroo Bulla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37166, "end_char": 37177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears 'that the two of the ancestors of the appellants Naroo Bulla!", "canonical_name": "Naroo B11llal"}}, {"text": "Madhavrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37224, "end_char": 37233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and his brother Ramchandra Bullal's grandson Madhavrao presented themselves at the court of the Peshwa 'Madhavrao after having lost their position and power as sur-mandloi and surkanungo in Sarkar Handia and the Peshwa by the sanad of 1777 A.D. created them the Jagirdar of Timarni with permission to keep ' their gadhi at Timarni.", "canonical_name": "Madhav Rao"}}, {"text": "Krishnarao Ramachandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37962, "end_char": 37984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, the appellants' ncestor Krishnarao Ramachandra became the Amil or Governor of the Peshwa between I 797 and 1799' but he was again replaced by Da\\llatrao Scindia's servant Jaswantrao Sewajee\n\nfrom 1801 to 1802."}}, {"text": "Da\\llatrao Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38080, "end_char": 38098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, the appellants' ncestor Krishnarao Ramachandra became the Amil or Governor of the Peshwa between I 797 and 1799' but he was again replaced by Da\\llatrao Scindia's servant Jaswantrao Sewajee\n\nfrom 1801 to 1802.", "canonical_name": "Da\\llatrao Scindia"}}, {"text": "Scindias", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38728, "end_char": 38736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "145 • Scindias had made an inroad into the Harda Handia tract and evidently the appellants'\" ancestors found it difficult to administer the ternitory.", "canonical_name": "Scindias"}}, {"text": "Peshwa Bajirao II", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39472, "end_char": 39489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subsequent sanad of 1800 A.O. contains a recital that the ancestors of the appellants presented themselves at the court of the Peshwa Bajirao II and complained that the Scindia had deployed his own officers in Sarkar Handia and creaicd several muafidars, inamdars and saranjamis who were creating .obstructions to the enjoyment of their rights\n\nand on their protest they bad been ordered to get a confirmatory letter from the Peshwa."}}, {"text": "Bhaili", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40278, "end_char": 40284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Piplia, Bhaili, Samarda, and Underkuch, and that they had never attained ihe status of a feudatory or'a tributary Ruling -Chief under the sovereignty of t.he PeshWas or the Scindias."}}, {"text": "Samarda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40286, "end_char": 40293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Piplia, Bhaili, Samarda, and Underkuch, and that they had never attained ihe status of a feudatory or'a tributary Ruling -Chief under the sovereignty of t.he PeshWas or the Scindias."}}, {"text": "Underkuch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40299, "end_char": 40308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Piplia, Bhaili, Samarda, and Underkuch, and that they had never attained ihe status of a feudatory or'a tributary Ruling -Chief under the sovereignty of t.he PeshWas or the Scindias."}}, {"text": "Daulatrao Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40528, "end_char": 40545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the power of the Scindias wa~ completely destroyed by the Britisli, Daulatrao Scindia signed the treaty of Sarje ,-\\njengaotl on December 3,0, 18.03 by which he was ·obliged io give up his possessions between the Jamuna and the Ganges etc.", "canonical_name": "Da\\llatrao Scindia"}}, {"text": "Sarje", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40567, "end_char": 40572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the power of the Scindias wa~ completely destroyed by the Britisli, Daulatrao Scindia signed the treaty of Sarje ,-\\njengaotl on December 3,0, 18.03 by which he was ·obliged io give up his possessions between the Jamuna and the Ganges etc."}}, {"text": "December 3,0, 18.03", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40589, "end_char": 40608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the power of the Scindias wa~ completely destroyed by the Britisli, Daulatrao Scindia signed the treaty of Sarje ,-\\njengaotl on December 3,0, 18.03 by which he was ·obliged io give up his possessions between the Jamuna and the Ganges etc."}}, {"text": "February, 27, , 1804", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40831, "end_char": 40851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i.e. including 'the Hard a Han di a tract known as ihe Pan ch Mahals, and soon\n\ntllereafter by the t, reaty of Burhanpur signed on February, 27, , 1804 he agreed to maintain a subsidiary force of the."}}, {"text": "Scretary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41442, "end_char": 41450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the period of management of the territory by the British, the jagir of Timarni held by the ancestors of the appellants was continued at the request of the Scindia as would be clear from tbe • following letter from Scretary to the Government of No!th-Western Provinces io the Secretary to the Southern Board of Revenue, North-Western Provinces dated July 24, 1860, which is in these terms:\n\n\"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No."}}, {"text": "Hoshaogabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41818, "end_char": 41829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "564, dated the 4th instant, submitting copies of a corresP, ondence, relative to the Temurnee Jageer, situated in the Pergunah of Harda in Hoshaogabad and held by the Bhooskutta, Kishen Row Madho, with the Boards recommendation, that the Jageer may be continued rent free in perpetuity.to the, family of the present incumbent, in' compliance with a request to that effect made by the Gwalfor Durbar, by whom it was originally granted."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Scindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42296, "end_char": 42312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply I am desired to intimate that the Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that, in a matter of this kind this Government is to a certain extent bound to confirm to the wishes of Maharaja Scindia, the country in which the rent free holding is situated\n\nbeing not assigned-and not ceded to the British. ·", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Scindia"}}, {"text": "MaharajaScindia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42425, "end_char": 42440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As MaharajaScindia, had expressed a wish that the Jageer of Timurnee should be continued rent free in ' perpetuity to the Bhooskutta and as perpetuation\n\n,.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Scindia"}}, {"text": "30th May 1834", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42664, "end_char": 42677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "seems to be in accordance with the 2nd of the revised rules for Barda 'Handia, dated 30th May 1834."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1860", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42805, "end_char": 42822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 12, 1860, the Scindia ceded this territory to the British Government by a treaty of which Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42904, "end_char": 42910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44474, "end_char": 44479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 4, 1865", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44752, "end_char": 44765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The inquiry dragged on for some years, but after a full investigation the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Central ' \\ \" Provinces by his Jetter dated March 4, 1865 conveyed'tbe decision of tile Governor General-in-Council to the effect :\n\n\"The GovernorGeueral in-Council has been pleased to rule on the Chief Commissioner's 'recommendations that with the exception of the Chief, the Chief ."}}, {"text": "Nemar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45236, "end_char": 45241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Chief Commissioner is aware there is nothing in the past history or present circumstances of any of the Pargunna Officials or Jamindars of Nemar which would in any way be entitled to exercise their estates any degree.of sovereign power.'' ' ."}}, {"text": "Britih Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45371, "end_char": 45388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would thus appear that the Britih Government never\n\nrecooised the appellants' ancestor Krishnarao Madho, who like all other Zamindars and Jagirdars in the Central Provinces, were fayin~ claim to be recognised as a chieftain, to be a Ruling Chief."}}, {"text": "Krishnarao Madho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45431, "end_char": 45447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would thus appear that the Britih Government never\n\nrecooised the appellants' ancestor Krishnarao Madho, who like all other Zamindars and Jagirdars in the Central Provinces, were fayin~ claim to be recognised as a chieftain, to be a Ruling Chief.", "canonical_name": "Krisbtiarao Madho"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46720, "end_char": 46727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Secretary of State for Indra in Council l'l Lord Dunedin in a somewhat similar claim of a taluqdar of the Pan ch Mahal.s which was in the ominion of the Scindia ceded to the British Government by the treaty dated December 12, 1860, negatived the clahn of the."}}, {"text": "Pongoland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47924, "end_char": 47933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atkinson when, citing the Pongoland case of Cook v. Sprigg L.R. 42 IA 229, 268 he says : \"It was held that the annexation of territory/made a)1 'act of state and that any obligation assured under the\n\n\\l} L.R, (1923-24J' 51 !"}}, {"text": "L.R. 42 IA 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47957, "end_char": 47971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Richard Temple", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49611, "end_char": 49625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i The Settlement of 1863 by Sir Richard Temple, Chief Commis sioner of .€entral Provinces recognised the Mlllg11zafs as virt11aliy landlords."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1860", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51503, "end_char": 51516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next is a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshangabad dated July 16, 1860 on a complaint by the kiledar."}}, {"text": "Bhuskute Jagir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51719, "end_char": 51733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Bhuskutes direeting the Settle ment-Officet that he would cause the survey, and if any commenced, to be <liscotitinued, \"as we cannot in any way interfere with the Bhuskute Jagir\"."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1860", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51791, "end_char": 51804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the important letter dated July 24, 1860 from the Secretary to the Government, North western Provinces to the Secretary to the Southern Board ."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52165, "end_char": 52184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Sir Richard Temple's \"Report on the Zamindaris and other petty Chieftains in the Central Provinces\" submitted\n\n·..;\n\nby him to the Government of India in 1863, there is a letter by .l Hector Mackenzie, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the ,, Central Provinces addressed to the Government of India dated oeiober 31, ,1863."}}, {"text": "Hurda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52768, "end_char": 52773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "officers sent to clear jungles and cultivate waste lands, and one of these the founder of the family under notice was sent to Hurda where he brought much land unCler cultivation, and was high officer ·\n\nIt appears-that in Peshwa's lime the BhooSc:utta 'rule(j' in Hurdah, and when Scindia obtained possession he gave\n\n. , .."}}, {"text": "Timumi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53045, "end_char": 53051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. ."}}, {"text": "Bbaili", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53053, "end_char": 53059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. ."}}, {"text": "Oondrakutcb", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53061, "end_char": 53072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. ."}}, {"text": "A Samurdha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53074, "end_char": 53084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. ."}}, {"text": "Tupcurn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53090, "end_char": 53097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S)\n\na grant of five villages, Timumi, Bbaili, Oondrakutcb, A Samurdha, and Tupcurn to the family in perpetuity; and until the cession of iiurdab to the British Government, the Bhooscutta was unqer the supervision ; or the Political Agent at Bhopal (Sehore) and quite independent. ."}}, {"text": "Timurni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53321, "end_char": 53328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Hurdah was ceded, Timurni was placed under the Deputy Commissioner of Hoshangabad, .subject to the 1 Commissioner of these territories, .", "canonical_name": "Timarni"}}, {"text": "December 2, 1863", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53721, "end_char": 53737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the late Commissioner and Agent to lhe Governor General Sir W. Sleeman, ordered that the Bhooscutta should not be interfred with in any way except.in heavy criminal cases an.d such is still the practice:\"\n\n;..\n\nHis subsequent lettbr to th'i Commissioner Saugar Division dated December 2, 1863 reads :\n\n\"I am directed by the officiating Chief Commissioner to inform you, that the Timurnee Estate being held in Zamin daree ten'bre, i.e. it is a petty chieftaincy the villages comprised in it need no~ be measured by the .settlement Officer, nor should any cesses be levied."}}, {"text": "Pitera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 54068, "end_char": 54074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Estate forms one of three Muckrai; .Timurnee, Pitera, Jn your Divisions which are petty Chieftaincies and in respect o( which the orders of the Government have been solicited jn detail, when they are received they will be communicated.\""}}, {"text": "Hohangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54365, "end_char": 54375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then there is the letter from the Settlement Commissioner, Central Provinces to the Settlement 'officer, Hohangabad date.d August 4, 1865 directing him to take the necessary measures for completing the 17gular settlement of the Timarni jagir with all practical despatch."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1865", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54383, "end_char": 54397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then there is the letter from the Settlement Commissioner, Central Provinces to the Settlement 'officer, Hohangabad date.d August 4, 1865 directing him to take the necessary measures for completing the 17gular settlement of the Timarni jagir with all practical despatch."}}, {"text": "Krisbtiarao Madho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54854, "end_char": 54871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krisbtiarao Madho dated August 19, 1865 informing liim that there should be no apprehension about the settlement operation in progress, that the object of the Government\n\nwas only to ascertain the area and capacity of the :Jllages.", "canonical_name": "Krisbtiarao Madho"}}, {"text": "August 19, 1865", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54878, "end_char": 54893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krisbtiarao Madho dated August 19, 1865 informing liim that there should be no apprehension about the settlement operation in progress, that the object of the Government\n\nwas only to ascertain the area and capacity of the :Jllages."}}, {"text": "Naroo B11llal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55175, "end_char": 55188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Charles Elliot's Settlement Report of the Hoshangabad District of 1865 records that Naroo B11llal and Ramcband.ra ull\\11\n\nsui>REMS coiJRt iuii>ol:rs (i982j 3 s.c.a.", "canonical_name": "Naroo B11llal"}}, {"text": "Ramcband.ra ull\\11\n\nsui>REMS coiJRt iuii>ol:rs (i982j 3 s.c.a.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55193, "end_char": 55255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Charles Elliot's Settlement Report of the Hoshangabad District of 1865 records that Naroo B11llal and Ramcband.ra ull\\11\n\nsui>REMS coiJRt iuii>ol:rs (i982j 3 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Revision of the Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56753, "end_char": 56830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57196, "end_char": 57207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Vivian Bose,' )."}}, {"text": "Reginald. Craddoc)£", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58837, "end_char": 58856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial_ Committee while rejecting the contention thafthe zamindars were petty Chieftain liaving attributes of ove reignty, observed :\n\n\"It appears, moreover, from Sir Reginald."}}, {"text": "R. Temple", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58918, "end_char": 58927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Craddoc)£'s note, that after a good deal of correspondence between Sir R. Temple, as Chief Commissioner of the Cntral Pro\n\nvinces, and the Government of India, it was finally decided\n\nthat only holders of certain estates should be recognized as feudatories, and all others as ordil)ary subjects."}}, {"text": "Richard Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59587, "end_char": 59602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observed that:\n\n\"There are passages here and there both in Sir Richard Jenkins report and Sir R. Temple's report which speaks of all the8e zamindaris indiscriminately as chiefs or chieftains, ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60574, "end_char": 60578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue D Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60586, "end_char": 60663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_755_768_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "~ /' /,\n\n_._\n\n• ...\n\n\" --~ ...._\n\n...\n\n755 '\n\nTRADE LINKS LTD., NBW DELHI AND ANR. ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ~ND ANR. ETC. ETC.\n\nMay 7, 1982\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., V.0. TULZAPURKAR.,.\n\n0.A. DESAI, 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY AND\n\nBAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.)\n\nUttar Pradesh Excis• ( Amendm1nt) Act 13of1979, constitutional validity of-Whether violatiVI of Artic/11 14, 19 and 31 of the constitution.\n\nUtiar Pradesh Excise Act, 1910, Section 30(2), Proviso to clau•i ( c) and Explanation.I and llto ClauH (c) of Section 41 as amended by (Amendment/ Act l!J of 1919, whether ultra vire• the constitution.\n\nIn exercise of .the power conferred upon hiin under the amended clause\n\n(c) of section 41; the Excise_ Commissioner_ with the previou~ sanction of the State Go'(.trnment framed Rules called tho U.P. Excise (Wholesaland Retail Vend of Foreign Liquor (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1976 by issuing the 'Notific,..,. tion No. 27/Licence-3 dated 14th April 1976, which were brought into force with effect rrom the date of.publication in the Gazette, namely, 14th April W16; by thia Notification the existing Rules 639, 641 and 642 as appearing in Ex~ Manual Vol. (1962 Edn.) were amended; Rule. 639(2) as amended provides that \"Licences in form FL2 shall he settled by tho public avction\" while Rule 641 as amended provides that \"the foefor a licence in form FL-2 shall be the amount of money acc•pted at the auction of the licence a.r 'fixed /et' tog1ther with an \"a.ru1Hd !••\" chart•d on the ba.riu of thuca/eJ of surcharg• fe• prescr/lnd . in\n\nRule 642.\n\nBy tho very notification dated 14th of April, 1976 tho Excise Com missioner added one 111ore condition. in tho form of a proviso to the terms and conditions ofFL;2 Licence and the said addition made after condition No. 1{c),\n\nruns thus:-\n\n. \"Provided that the assessment fee on the sales made on the licence in Ille prescribed manner ai such scales of surchare fee as . may be prescribed by the Government and announced at the . time of the auction, shall also be payable by tho licenceo.\"\n\nRelying. upon, the amlndmonts made in the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 by Act S of 1976 and the amended Rules 639, 641 and 642 and the insertion of the new condition in FL-2 licence, the respondents introduced the auctioli system for tho grant of licence in form FL-2 for wholesale vend of beer and Indian Malk\n\n',{\n\n. G\n\n7s6 [1982) s.c.it.\n\nForeign Liquor and started levying and recovering the \"assessed fee\" in addition to the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) from the gratltces of the licences.\n\nThe Pe.titiooers who were succes.Sful bidders and who had acquired vending rightS in Indian Made Foreign Liquor for the financial years '1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1979~80 challenged the levy nf \"assessed fee\", in addition to , the \"fixed fee\" on the following grounds : (i) U0der Section 30(2) of the Principal Act or 1910 prior to its amendment by U.P. Ordinance No. 4 or 1979 and U.P.\n\nAct 13 of 1979 it WlS open to the respondents to adopt either ooe or the other method or granting FL-2 licences and determine the licence fee payable by the grantee accordingly, that is to -say, the resporidents could grant the licence \"either by' auctio'n or by caI!ing tenders\" 8.nd once 'a particUJar mode was adopted it was incumbent upon hem to apply tl\\e saine f.or the purpo$C of determining the sum payable by the grantee; in other words it was not opens them to adopt a combination of two or more methods and claim \"assessed fee'' in -addition to \"''fixed fee\" dthis would be illegal and without authority of law.\n\nA combination of twQ (!l:f more methods became available to the respondents only\n\nI . . under Section 30(2) as amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 4.of 1979 and by U.P. Act 13 of 1979; (ii) In asmuch as the petitioners were not informed that any \"assessed fee\" had been fixed by the State Government, which would be payable by the successful bidder, the respondent's attempt to tevy and recover the \"\"-\"''assessed fee\" over and above the \"fixed fee\" (aUction money) was unwarranted and ilJegal in as much as the_ respondents could not enhance the petitioners' contrac'tual liability which was limited to tbc payment of auction money and\n\n(iii) as per the newly inserted cOnditions in FL~2 Licence the \"assessed fee\" was required to be ''pre.scribed by ihe Government and <!DQounced at the time Of auction\" but in the instant case such ''assessed fee\" had been. prescribed :bY the Excise Commissioner and not by the State Government and was not announced at'th.e time of the auction aDd for this, 'reason also the same would not be rccoverabJe.\n\nDi.smissing the pCtitions the_ Court,\n\nHELD : ' 1. The levy ana recovery of the \"asse.ssed fee\" over and above the \"fixed fee\" by the respondents for granting .FL-2 iicenccs to _ah tbe petitioners would be legal 1lild valid under the U.P. Excise Act of 1910 as amended by Act 5 of 1976 and the amended: rules framed thereunder. [768 D-E]\n\n2:1. A plain re\"ading of Section 3U(2) qr -the Uttai Pradesh Excise Act 19lb prior to its amendment by U.P. Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 and by l,), P. :, Act No. 13 or 1979 makes it clear that the consideration for the grant of FL-2 , licence could be determined either by auction or by calling tenders or otherwise .\n\n[765 C-B]\n\n\"t-' 2:2. The p_hrase \"or otherwise\" was sufficiently wide , and conferred on its plain grammatical construction, power on the State Government or ihe &:else Commissioner to grant thbi licence either J.ly auction or ~Y tenders _, r partly by auction.and partly by tenders or even by, adopJilll!.yet other. methos lhan by auction or by:invitiog .tend_ers._ ln ot_bcr w.or_s, the phta~ \"or otherws~\"\n\n, .. •\n\n..l\n\n~-•\n\n_,.--\n\n'rkADB LINKS v. U.P. STATB 757 ·- _ enabled tbC Stat~ Government ot the Excise C<>mmissioner to adopt a combi\n\nniition OronC Or oiol'e nlethods for gnintiog the FL-2 licence an, d determine ... the\n\nljtence: fecl_lllccordiagly. Hilvilig. rtgard, fb the phrase \"or c:aberwise\"' occu_rring in t5eProvision it can not be said that only ODC method to the Cxclusion Of the\n\n- others could be.adopted.for granting the licence or that one type of fee -appropriate to that method could alone , be i:harsed- [ 765 E-G]\n\n2:3. Sub-section (2) of Section 3•l as amended by U.P. Ordinance 4 of 1979 or U:P. Act 13of1979 is clarifiCa.toy .. of the Ieial pooition, which obtained under Sec. 30(2) that was operative prior to the said amendment. [765G, 766A-B]\n\n' \"' <\n\n,3:1. The bidders who gave their bids musi be deemed to have knowledge of'\\the prOtisicinsor the reJvant Rules subject tot which the auctions were. held\n\nl!ld therefore, -the bidders including the suocessful bidders whose highest bid\n\n. C was accepted didnot offer their bids believing that only \"fixed fce\"would be charged, since it was to their knowledge that the auctions for the grant of l'l,, Z !icenti> were held UJi<ler the amendd provisions of iiie Act of 1910 by the\n\nAlllendmen_t of 1976 and thl\\t Rule 641 of _Excise Manual clearly provided that the fee for'the FL2 licence'sball be the_ amount ofmoney accepted at the auctioll of the licence as ,·, fixed fee\"_ltogether ith the \"assessed fee\" charged on the scales of surcharge fees prescribed in Rule 642. Further even according to the D petitioner!, the new condition inserted-by the EJtcise Commissioner in the said iicence was read out. -If 8.Gmittedty tho said condition inserted in FL-2 licence w&s read out at the time of auction tben it is clear . that the fact that \"assessed (ce\" on the sales made , on the lice1,1ce -wa_s also payable by the licensee was announced at the time of_ auction._ [i66 oca. 767 B-C] '\n\n... -3:2. 1f once it was announcd at the time of the auction that \"aSsesed E fee'' on the sales affected on lhe licence at the Prescribed Scales shallalso be pay able by -the icensee, then the bidders-were put on enquiry to find out what scS:les\n\nof surcharge fees had been prescribed under the relevant Rule. In other Words the. bfdders presented at th~ auctions had fulJ knowledge that \"assessed feC\" at presctibed rates will also be-charged and it was with fulL knowledge of this position that they gave their. bids. I( that be so, there was . no question of the fcspondeD.ts' attemPting to enhance the conJr'a.ctua1 liabifity of the successful F bidder. Further admittedly, not.only di<Jrthe bidders _know that \"assessed fee\" Would be charged over and above the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) but many of them actually passed on the ~'assessed fee\" at the prescribed rates 10 and\n\nrcovercd the satrie from the retailers to wham \\hey_ effected sales of beer and Indian Made ForeignLiquor. [767 C.FJ\n\n4. Section24B(c) which expresslY decJares that \"the Ecise COrilmissi6neFa$ the head of ExCise Departinent of the State shall be deemed, while\n\nd•terml~(ng o_r realising such fee, t<> act for and on bebalf of the State Govern, Went, makes.Jr claf that the Excise Comrrlissioner..., has. n statlltorily declarc; d lo ile thc, agentofthe State Government am! \"while determining\" .such fees by fftmli\\s the. amen_ded. Rules 642 be \"acted Uo!)and on behalf of the State .\n\n(JoVernmenf.inother words, scales of \"assessed fee\" under- Rule '642 must be\n\nllm•4 \\o hav~ been prescribed by the Stte Goyer0ment. p68 BCJ\n\nH . ,\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 3 a.c.a.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 528-529, 1645,\n\n. 288, 293, ~62, 363, 374, 388, 404-406, SIO, _512-14, 644-46, 647, 663-65, 707, 710, 720 t~ 722, 745, 793, 1037 of 1979, 341-43, 344-47, 5257, 519, 5293, 3531-35, 4322 of 1980, 4824, 4825, 5246, 3236, 2963, 3472-74, 3415-17, 3420, 1363-65, 1327-28, 1337-41, 4101-2, 5326, 4949-50 of 1981 and 311 of 1982. , .\n\n(Under Article 3 2 of the Constitution of India)\n\nG.L. Sanghi, Dr, L.M. Singhvi, S.N. Kacker, Yoge1hwar Prasad, Ashok Grover, /l.N. Koura, S.C. Budhwar, L.K. Pandey, Ravindra Narain, D., N. Mishra, P. Krishna Rao, K. R. Nagaraja, Miss Kamin/ Jaiswal and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for. the appearing Petitioners. ..\n\nL, N. Sinha,, Attorner General, S.C. Maheshwari, Additional A\n\n0 dvocate General, O.P. Malhotra, G: N. Dikshit, H.R. Bhardwaj, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi, Miss Asha Rani Jain, and Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary for'the appearing Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. There is no substance in this group of writ petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution whereby the peti\" tioners, who carry on business, inter alia, of the wholesale vend of , beer .and Indian Made Foreign Liquor at various places in th.e State ' of U.P. on the strength of licences granted to them in Form FL-2 under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910, have challenged the constitutional' validity of ss. 1(2), 3 and (5) of U.P. Excise (Amenclment) Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 as.also the constitutional validity of ss. 1(2), 3 and 5. of U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act No, 13 of 1979 (which replaced the said' Ordinance No. 4. of 1979) as being violative of their funda mental rights under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution; the petitiofiers have also sought a declaration that s, 30(2), proviso to\n\ncl. (c) of s. 41 and Explanations- I and II to. cl. (c) of s. 41 of the\n\nU.P. Excise Act-1910 as amended by ss. '3 and 5 of the said Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 as well as by ss. 3 and 5 of the said Act No. 13 of 1979 and the provisions of sub-s. (2) .of s. I of the said Ordinance (No. 4 of 1979) as well as of the said Act (No. 13 of 1979) are . ultra vires the Constitution and have prayed for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the respondents (the State of U.P., the Excise Commissioner and other officers) either directiy o't through their agents, servants or otherwise from giving\n\neffect to tlie 1111len\\Jed provision,\n\n' .,\n\n.~·\n\n. .i..\n\n'fltAOE LINKS v. u.P. STATE (Tulzapurkar, J.) 759\n\nIt may be stated that 'the aforesaid challenge to the U.P.\n\nOrdinance No. 4 of 1979, the U.P. Act No. 13 of. 1979 and the concerned amended provisions of the U.P. Excise. Act, 1910 has been made solely with a view to avoid the payment of the \"•sse'ssed fee\" which the respondents are seeking to recover from the peti tioners in 11ddition to the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) asand by way of consideration for the grant of licences in Form FL-2 for the wholesale vend of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor, .However,.as it became clear during the hearing that even without the amendments affected in the U.P. Excise Act, 191Q (being the Principal Act) by the said Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 and by the said Act No. 13 of i979 the \"assessed fee\" in addition to the \"fixed fee\" , (auction money) could be and was being recovered under the Principal Act of 1910 as amended by .the U.P, Amending (Re enactment and Validation) Act 5 of 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder, the aforesaid challenge was given up and no arguments in support thereof were at all advanced by' any of the counsel for the petitioners and the contentions centered round the question whether such \"assessed fee\"· in addition to the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) could be levied and recovered under the Principal Act of 1910 as amended by the.Act 5 of 1976. ·\n\nIt was not disputed before us that the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture, supply or sale by wholesale or by retail of liquor was always governed by the provisions of the Principal Act of 1910 and the Rules framed thereunder and that licences for _wholesale vend of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor were granted in Form FL2 which contained the \\ernls and conditions on which sales by wholesale of the said commodities could be effected by the grantees thereof. It appears that prior tq April i976 these fL-2 licences were not se!, lled under any auction system but were renewable from year to year and the licence fee was based on the . quantity of beer and Indian .Made Foreign Liquor ctually sold from the concerned shop and was assessed and charged at the rate of Rs. 5 per quart bottle on spirits and 60 p. per quart bottle ()[I\n\nbeers. But from April 1976 auction system was introduced whereunder FL-2 licences were auctioned under the provisions of para graph 373 of the U.P. Excise Manual Vol. 1 and \"fixed free\" being the highest bid (auction money) accepted at such auction came to ' . be carged for the grant of FL-2 licences and this system was introduced on the strength of the amendments that were made in\n\nthePincipal Act of 1910 by ihe l\\mendin~ (Reenactment and . ,\n\n• E\n\n760 . SUPREME COUR.T lt.EPO!t.TS 1 [1982} 3 S.C.lt. •\n\n Validation) Act 5 of 1976. Three or four amendments made by Act 5 of 1976 are material and we shall refer to 'these presently;\n\n_A new s. 24A dealing with the grant of exclusive or other privilege in respect of foreign liquor was introduced in the Principal\n\nAct, which reads as under : ·\n\n\"24-A. Grant of exclusive or other privilege in respect of foreign liquor. (I) Subject to the provisions of_Section 31, the' Excise Copimissioner. may gr.ant to any person a licence or licences for the exclusive or other privilege:\n\n(a) of manufacturing or of supply by wholesale; or of both; or\n\n(b) of manufacturiag or of supplying by wholesale, or of both and selling by retail; or .\n\n(c) . of selling by wholesaJ~ (to wholesale or , retail ven-\n\n(!ors); or\n\n(d) of selling by retail af'hops (for consumption 'off' the premises);\n\n-E any foreign liquor iQ any Joc11lity.\n\n.• ··.F\n\n(2) The grant of licence or licences under clause (d) of sub.section (!} in relation to any locality shall be without prejudice to the grant of licences for the retail sale of foreign liquor in the same locality in hotels and restaurants for consumption in their premises.\n\n(3)- Where more licences than one .are proposed . to be granted under clause (d) of sub-section (I) in relation to any locality for the same period, advance intimrno'n of the proposal shall be given to the prospective applicants f.Q! every such licence.\n\n(4) Tqe provisions of Section 25, and proviso to Sectio.n 39 shall apply in relation to grant of a Jicenc~ far an exclusive or other privilege (under this section as' they apply iii respect of the grant of a licence for an exclusive\n\nprivilee uQder Stio!I 24,\" ..\n\n• TRADE LINKS ' U.P. STATE (Tulzapurkar J.) 761\n\n'1', Section 24-B which was also introduced by Act 5 of .1976 in the A Principal Act reads thus :\n\n\"24-B. Removal of doubts-For the r, emoval of doubts, it is hereby declared-\n\n(a) that the State Government :has an exclusive right or privilege of manufacture and sale of country liquor and foreian liquor ;\n\n(bl that the amount described as licence fee in clause (c) of Section 41 is in its essence the rental or consideration for the grant of such right or privilege by the ' State Government ;\n\n(c) that the EXcise Commissioner as the head of the Excise\n\nDepartment of the State shall be deemed, while deter mining or realising such fee, to act for and on behalf of the State Government.\" D\n\nBy the same Act section 30 of the Principal Act was amended and the amended s. 30 read thus : .\n\n\"30. (I) Instead of or in addition to any duty leviable under the Chapter the State Government or on its behalf the Excise Commissioner may accept. payment of a sum in consideration of the grant of licence for any exclusive or pther privilege under liection 24 or Section\n\n24-A. .\n\n(2) The sum payable under sub-section. (I) may 'be. determined either by auction or by calling tenders or otherwise.''.\n\nSection 41 of the Princip.al Act which confers power on the Excise Commissioner to make Rules subject to the previous sanction of the State Government touching the matters or topics specified therein was amended by.Act 5 of 1976 by substituting cl. (c) thereby conferring poiTer on the Excise Commissioner to. frame Rules on the substituted matter or topic and the amended cl. (c) runs thus :\n\n\"(C) Prescribing the scale of fees or manner of fixing .the\n\nfees payable for an~ Jiqi; e, ~~!iiit o~ ~~s \\n~\\11dinf\n\n...\n\n'H .\n\n762 SUPREME COUltT RE!'ORrs\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R'\n\nany consideration for the grant of any exclnsive or other privilege granted under Section 24 or Section 24-A or for storing of any intoxicant.\"\n\n In exercise of the power o conferred upon him under the amended cl. (c) of s. 41, the Excise Commissioner with the previous sanction of the State Government framed Rules ca lied the U.P. facise (Wholesale and Retail Vend of Foreign Liquor) (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1976 by issuing the Notification No. 27/Licence-3 dated 14th April, 1976, which wci:e brought into force with effect from the date of publication. in the Gazette, namely, 14th April, 1976, by this Notification th~ existing Rules 639, 641 and 642 as appearing in Excise Mantia! Vol. I (1962 End.) were amended; Rule 639(2) as amended provides that \"licences in form FL-2 shall be settled by public auction\" while Rule 641 as amended provides that \"the fee for a licence in Form FL-2 shall be the amot111t of money accepted at the auction of the licence as 'fixed fee' together with an 'assessed fee' charged on the basis of the scales. of surcharge fee prescribed in the next paragraph following\" and Rule 642 as amended runs thus :\n\n\"642. The scales of licence fee applicable to whole sale licences for the vend of foreign liquor shall be as follows :\n\n(i) For a licence in Form FL.! ......\n\n(ii) Fot a licence in Form FL-2-The fixed fee obtained for the licence at the auction in addition ta the assessed fees according to the following scales :\n\n(a) Spirits, Rs. 5.00per wines, liquors reputed. quart etc. of all bottle-on sale kinds. to licensed vendors.\n\n,(b) Beer, Stout and Re. 0.60per other fermented reputed quart liquors. bottle on sale to licensed vendors.\n\nNote: The fixed fee in respect of licence FL-2 : one fourth of the licnce fee:as obtained in the auction\n\nTRAl>h LINKS v, u.i>, STJO.TB (Tu/zapurkar J.) t61\n\nshalt be payable in adVance i01medfately oil tile 11CcepU1ilce of the bid and' the balance by such\n\n' ' instalments as 01ay be specified iii the licence to\n\nbe granted;''\n\nBy the very notification dated 14th of April, 1976 the Excis\\l Conrmilleionet added one more condition ill the form of a Jftoviso to tbl! terms and co11ditiolis of FL-2 Lice11ce and the said addition mtde afttr condition No. I (c); rllns thus :\n\n \"Providtd that the asse!sment fee on the saies made O.the lieence in the prescribed, manner at such scales of surcharge fee as may be prescribed by the Gbverl!ment and announced at the time of the auction, shall 'also be\n\npayable by thi: licencee.\"\n\ndbviouslyrelying upon the aforesaid amendments made iii tlfe, PtinCipalAct of 1910, by A.ct 5 of 1976 (some of which were\n\nvtn retrospective effect ftom the date of the 9ommencement or till! Piticlpal Act and othets from 16th August 1972) and the said amended Rules 639, 641 and 642 and the insertion of t])e new conliitiob in the' FL-2 Licence (all of which qame into1_force from\n\n14th April, 197~, the respondents inttocllJced the auction system for the gbt of licences in Ft>rm FL-2. for wholesale 'Vend of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor and .started levying and recovering the \"a!9essed fee\" ill addition to the .. fixed fee\" (auction money)\n\nffo1b th~ grantees ofihe licehces. Question raised is whether such le•Y.and tecovtry are legal and valid ?\n\n- Before we deal with the question it ill be desirable to set out F ...._ .\"-' the; Jats giving rile .t~. it . .that !ie itt .a. narrow compass and it ill -..... ___ suffice 1f t])e facts obta1111ng m Writ Petit1on No. 528 Of 1979, be1b~\n\nt)'pically representative of the group, are stated.\n\nThe petitioners iii. that petition are liquor dealers and carry on business inter a/ia of wholesale vevd .; if beer and' Indian Made Foreign Liquor and for that purpose have wholesale dpots in various districts in the State\n\nof U.P. For the financial years !'976-77 and 1977-78 they acquited by, auctien blds wholesale vending rights iri respect of Indilln Mad~ Foreigo Liquor at Agtil1 Meerut, Varanasi, Kanpur; Bareilly and Dehradun; for the financial year 197g,79 they similarly acquired whble1111Je vending rights in Indian Made Foreign Liquor at Agra, Meerut and. Varanaai and for t])e financial year 1979-80 thi!y acquired by auction similar rights at Agra, Meerut, Ghaziabad\n\n764 (1982] 3 s.C.ll.\n\nand Pilibhit. lo other words being the highest bidder at these places for these years licences for the wholesale vend of Indian Made Foreign Liquor in Form FL-2 . were granted to them.' At the time of acceptance of their bids at these auctions the petitioners deposited the entire auction money called the \"fixed fee\" in respect of each of the said years with the resp.ondents.\n\nThe petitioners' case is that thereafter the respondents are seeking to levy and recover from them the \"assessed fee\" at the rate of Rs. 5 per quart bottle on spirits and 60 p. per quart bottle on beers actually sold during each of the financial years by their concerned shops or depots in addition the \"fixed fee\". Such levy and recovery of _the \"assessed feee\" by the respondents is challenged on two or three grounds.indicated hereunder.\n\nIn the first place Counsel for the petitioners have contended that under s. 30(2) of the Principal Act of 1910 prior to its amendment by u:P. Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 and U.P. Act 13 of 1979 it was opento the respondents to adopt either one or the other method of granting FL-2 licences and determine the licence fee payable by the grantee accordingly, that is to say the respondents could grant the licence \"either by auction or by calling tenders\" and once a particular mode was adopted it was incum1>ent upon them to apply . the same for the purpose of determining the sum payable by the grantie; in other . words the contention has been that it was not open to them to adopt a combination of two or more methods and claim \"assessed fee\" in addition to \"fixed fee\" 8J!d therefore the instant attempt on the part of the respondents to levy' and recover the \"assessed fee\" in addition to \"fixed fee\" would be illegal and without authority of law. According to the\n\npetitioners a combination of two or more methods became available - to the respondents only under sec. 30(2) as amended by U.P. ordi- / _.,,- nance No. 4 of 1979 and by U.P. Act 13 of 1979. Secondly, the.--\"' petitioners have averred that at-the time of the aid auctions hel~ < for each of the said .financial years the bidders \\vere not informed ..}. that any \"assessed fee\" had been fixed by the State Government which would be payable by the successful bidder and therefore the persons who gave their bids including the petitioners whose highest bids were accepted were led to believe that no fee over and above the. auction money would be charged and that the successful bidder would be granted FL-2 licence merely on payment o~ the auction money. Counsel for the petitioners have therefore contended that the respondents' attempt to levy and recover the \"assessed fee\" over\n\ntllADB LINltS 1'. U.P. STATE (tu/zapurkar, J.) 165\n\nand above the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) is unwarranted and illegal in as much as the respondents cannot enhance the petitioners' coniractual liability which was limited to the payment .of the alctio'!c money. Yet another contention raised by Counsel for the petitioners has been that as per the newly inserted condition in FL-2 licence the \"assessed fee\" was required to be \"prescribed by Government an4 announced at the time of auction\" but in the instant case such\n\n\"assessed fee'' has been preacribed by the Excise Commissioner and . not by the State Government and was not announced at the time of the auction and for this reason also the same onld not be recoverable: As will be shown presently none of these contentions bas an}' merit and each one is liable to be rejected. '\n\nAs regards the first contention a plaiii reading of s. 30(2) prior to its amendment by U.P. Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 and by U.P.\n\nAct No. 13 of 1979 will show that there is no substance in it. The \\ .said provision ran thus :\n\n\"2. The sum payable under sub-sec. (I) may by determined either by auction or by calling tenders or otherwise.\"\n\n'In other words, the consideration for the grant of FL-2 licence could be determined either by auction or by calling tenders' or otherwise.\n\nThe phras.~ \"or otherwise\" was sufficiently wide and conferred on its plain grammatical construction power on. the State Government or the Excise Commissioner to grant the licence either by auction or by tenders or partly by auction and partly by tenders or even by adopting yet other methods than by auction or by inviting tenders.\n\nIn other words, the phrase \"or otherwise\" enabled the State Govern\n\nment or the Excise Commissioner to adopt a combination of one or more methods for granting the FL-2 licence and determine the licence fee accordingly. Having regard to the phrase \"or otherwise\" occurring in the provision it is impossible to accept the contention 'that only one method to te exclusion of the others could be adopted by the respondents for granting the licence or that one type of fee appropriate to that method could alone be charged. It is true \\hat sub-sec. (2) of s. 30 as amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 4 of 1979 or by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1979 runs thus:\n\n\"2. The sum payable under suJt..sec. (I) may either H be fixed by auction or inviting tenders or otherwise or be assessed on the basis of the sales made or quota lifted\n\n.,.\n\nsbl'!IEMI! cOURT REi>ollts !1982) s.c.tt.\n\nunder the licence. or partly fixed and partly assessed in the aforesaid manner.\"\n\nBut in our view it is manifestly clear that the aforesaid amended provision is clatificatory of the legal position which obtained under sec., 30(2) that was operative prior to the said amendment. lo this view of the matter the first contention has to be rejected. •\n\nThe second contention has been that since at the time of . holding the concerned auctions the bidders were not informed that any. \"assessed fee\" had been prescribed by the State Government whiAh would be payable by the successful bidder and since bids were offered on the representation that the successful bidder would be granted FL-2 licence merely on payment of the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) the respondents' attempt to levy and recover the. \"assessed fee'' over an.d abo\\.e the \"faed fee\" would be unwarranted and illegal because the respondents cannot enhance the contractual liability of the succes&ful bidder which was limited to payment of the auction money. There are two answers to this contention. In the first place it was not disputed before us that to the knowledge of all the bidders these auctions for tho grant of FL-2 licences were held under the provisions of the Principal Act of 1910 as amended by Act 5 of 1976 and the Rules framed. thereunder which were 'then in force. We have already referred to the provisions of the amended Rules 639(2), 641 and 642 which were published in. the Gazette and broagbt into force with effect from 14th of April, 1976 and admit' tedlyall auctions for the financial year 1976,77 were held subl; equent to that date. Under the amended Rule 641 it was clearly provided that th'e fee for the . FL-2 licence shall be the amount' of money accepted at the auction of the licence as \"fixed fee\" together with the \"assessed fee\" charged on the basis of the scales of Surcharge· fee prescribed in the next 'following Rule and the amended Rule 642 prescribed the scales . at which the \"assessed fee\" would be so charged.' In 'other words, the bidders who gave their bids must be deemed to have knowledge of the provisions of the aforesaid Rules subject to which the auctions were held and therefore it is difficult to accept the contention that tb'C bidders including the successftil bidder whose highest bid was accepted offered their bids believing that only \"fixed.fee\" would be charged.\n\nSecondly, the averment of the petitioners that at the time of these auctions the bidders were\n\not intormed .that any \"assessed fee\" bad been .fixed or prescribed which woul!l he payable by the successful bidder is' not quite correct. 'It bas been admitted by the petitioners that. at the time of these\n\n' -\n\n( -\n\n'l'llADB LINKS v. U.P; STATE (Tu/zapurkar J.) 767 ·\n\na.uctions the new condition that was inserted by the Excise Com missioner in the FL-2 licece by bis Notification dl!tcd 14th April, 1976 was read out and thi~ newly inserted condition runs thus :\n\n\"Provided that the assessment fee on the sales made on the licence in the prescribed manner al such scales of surcbarse fee as may be prescribed by the Governm'ent and announced at the timec of 01e auction, shall also. be payable by licensee~· . • If admittedly the aforesaid condition inserted in FL-2 :licence was read out at the time of the auction then it is clear that the fact that \"assessed fee\" on the. sales. made on the licence was also , payable by theJicensee was announced at the time of the auction. The only grievance made by the petitioners bas been that the prescribed scales of surcharge fee (under Rule 642) were not announced but that is neither here nor there, for, if once. it was.announced at the time of\n\nthe auction tha( \"assessed foe\" on sales effected on the licence at the prescribed scales shall also be payable by the licensee. then obviously the bidders were put on enquiry to find out what scales of surcharge fee had been prescribed . under , the relevant: Rule. In other words the bidders present at these auctions had full knowledge that \"assessed fee\" at prescribed rates will also . be charged and it was with'full knowledge of this position that they ga, ve their bids.\n\nIf that be so, there is no question of the respondents' attempting to enhance the contractual liability of the successful bidder. It will Ile interesting to mention in ibis context that the respondents have stated in their counter-affidavirthat not only did the bidders know that \"assessed fee\" would be .charged over and above the \"fixed fde\"\n\n(auction money) but many of the successful bidders to whom FL-2 licences were granted have actually passed on the \"as&essed fee\" at the prescribed rates to and recovered the same from the retailers to whom they have effected sales of ber and Indian Made Foreign Liquor. At least in the case of those petitioners before\n\nus who have done so the aforesaid plea put forward on their behalf cannot be regarded as honest. The second col)tention therefore fails and is rejected.\n\nThe last contention is merely required to be stated to be rejected. In support of that contention reliance was placed on . the newly inserted condition in FL-2 licence which states that the assessed fee \"at such scales ofsurcharge fe1 as may be prescribed by the Government\" shall also be payable by the licensee while\n\n768 SUPREME COUllT Rl!POllTS iI982) 3 s.c.ll. ' ' actually the scales of surcharge. fe~ have been prescribed by the Excise Commissioner by framing the amended Rule 642 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by cl, (c) of 41 qf the P, iincipal Act. Counsel urged that scales of sntcharge fee ought to have been prescribed by th.e Government. In. this connection we might refer to sec. 24B(c) whieh expressly declares that \"the Excise Commissioner as the head of the Excise Department of the State shall be deemed, while determining or realising such fee, to act for and on behalf of the State Government\". It is thus clear. that the Excise Commissioner has been statutorily declared to be the agent of the State Government and \"while determining such fee\" by framing the amended Rule 642 he acted for and on behalf of the State Government. In other words, scales of \"assessed fee\" under Rule 642 must be deemed to have been prescribed by the State Government.\n\nAs regards the alleged non announcement at the time of the auctions we have already dalt with that aspect of the matter while dealing with .and disposing of the second contention.\n\nNo other point was raised. It is therefore clear that the levy .and recovery of the \"assessed fee\" over and above the \"fixed fee\"\n\nby the respondents for .granting FL-2 licences to all the petitioners_ would'belegal and valid under. the U.P. Excise Principal Act of 1910 as amended by Act 5 of 1976 and the amended Rules framed thereunder and all the petitions are liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss all the writ petitions with costs and quantify. the costs payable by each of the._ petitioners separately at Rs. 5000.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n• ,\n\n( ,,~'\n\n..>- -\"{;", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "ETC.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ~ND ANR. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.0. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 190, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 205, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. 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Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9942, "end_char": 9950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L, N. Sinha,, Attorner General, S.C. Maheshwari, Additional A\n\n0 dvocate General, O.P. Malhotra, G: N. Dikshit, H.R. Bhardwaj, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi, Miss Asha Rani Jain, and Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary for'the appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.C. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9971, "end_char": 9986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L, N. Sinha,, Attorner General, S.C. Maheshwari, Additional A\n\n0 dvocate General, O.P. Malhotra, G: N. Dikshit, H.R. Bhardwaj, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi, Miss Asha Rani Jain, and Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary for'the appearing Respondents.", "canonical_name": "S.C. Maheshwari"}}, {"text": "O.P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10021, "end_char": 10034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L, N. Sinha,, Attorner General, S.C. Maheshwari, Additional A\n\n0 dvocate General, O.P. Malhotra, G: N. 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Malhotra, G: N. Dikshit, H.R. Bhardwaj, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi, Miss Asha Rani Jain, and Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary for'the appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10122, "end_char": 10141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L, N. Sinha,, Attorner General, S.C. Maheshwari, Additional A\n\n0 dvocate General, O.P. Malhotra, G: N. Dikshit, H.R. Bhardwaj, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi, Miss Asha Rani Jain, and Pravir ,\n\nChoudhary for'the appearing Respondents."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10218, "end_char": 10229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. There is no substance in this group of writ petitions filed under Art.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10300, "end_char": 10307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 1(2), 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10635, "end_char": 10646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "ss. 1(2), 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10917, "end_char": 10936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11044, "end_char": 11049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11092, "end_char": 11097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11204, "end_char": 11215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11515, "end_char": 11528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ultra vires the Constitution and have prayed for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the respondents (the State of U.P., the Excise Commissioner and other officers) either directiy o't through their agents, servants or otherwise from giving\n\neffect to tlie 1111len\\Jed provision,\n\n' .,"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11738, "end_char": 11749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".i..\n\n'fltAOE LINKS v. u.P. STATE (Tulzapurkar, J.) 759\n\nIt may be stated that 'the aforesaid challenge to the U.P.\n\nOrdinance No.", "canonical_name": "TULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14574, "end_char": 14580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14837, "end_char": 14847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15864, "end_char": 15874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16161, "end_char": 16171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16526, "end_char": 16536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16866, "end_char": 16876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16926, "end_char": 16931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17211, "end_char": 17222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17350, "end_char": 17360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18001, "end_char": 18011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18015, "end_char": 18025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18140, "end_char": 18145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21880, "end_char": 21886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "976-77 and 1977-78 they acquited by, auctien blds wholesale vending rights iri respect of Indilln Mad~ Foreigo Liquor at Agtil1 Meerut, Varanasi, Kanpur; Bareilly and Dehradun; for the financial year 197g,79 they similarly acquired whble1111Je vending rights in Indian Made Foreign Liquor at Agra, Meerut and."}}, {"text": "Bareilly", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21888, "end_char": 21896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "976-77 and 1977-78 they acquited by, auctien blds wholesale vending rights iri respect of Indilln Mad~ Foreigo Liquor at Agtil1 Meerut, Varanasi, Kanpur; Bareilly and Dehradun; for the financial year 197g,79 they similarly acquired whble1111Je vending rights in Indian Made Foreign Liquor at Agra, Meerut and."}}, {"text": "Dehradun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21901, "end_char": 21909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "976-77 and 1977-78 they acquited by, auctien blds wholesale vending rights iri respect of Indilln Mad~ Foreigo Liquor at Agtil1 Meerut, Varanasi, Kanpur; Bareilly and Dehradun; for the financial year 197g,79 they similarly acquired whble1111Je vending rights in Indian Made Foreign Liquor at Agra, Meerut and."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22133, "end_char": 22137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varanaai and for t])e financial year 1979-80 thi!y acquired by auction similar rights at Agra, Meerut, Ghaziabad\n\n764 (1982] 3 s.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22139, "end_char": 22145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varanaai and for t])e financial year 1979-80 thi!y acquired by auction similar rights at Agra, Meerut, Ghaziabad\n\n764 (1982] 3 s.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Ghaziabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22147, "end_char": 22156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varanaai and for t])e financial year 1979-80 thi!y acquired by auction similar rights at Agra, Meerut, Ghaziabad\n\n764 (1982] 3 s.C.ll."}}, {"text": "s. 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23074, "end_char": 23082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24064, "end_char": 24074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "zapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24879, "end_char": 24887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATE (tu/zapurkar, J.) 165\n\nand above the \"fixed fee\" (auction money) is unwarranted and illegal in as much as the respondents cannot enhance the petitioners' coniractual liability which was limited to the payment .of the alctio'!c money."}}, {"text": "s. 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25735, "end_char": 25743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27048, "end_char": 27053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th of April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28862, "end_char": 28881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Gazette and broagbt into force with effect from 14th of April, 1976 and admit' tedlyall auctions for the financial year 1976,77 were held subl; equent to that date."}}, {"text": "sec. 24B(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33041, "end_char": 33052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise Principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34045, "end_char": 34065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_75_80_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "D. RAMASWAMI\n\nSTATB OF TAMIL NADU\n\n• January 28, 1982\n\n(0. Cl!INNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.)\n\nService matter-Fundamental Rule 56 (d}-Government Servant earned quick, promotiona solely on merit-One adverse entry in confidential file-Exonerated after full enquiry-Promoted to selection post-No adverse entry since then-.\n\nCompulsorily retired under F. R. 56 ( d) within a few months thereafter-Validity of.\n\nStarting as a Lower Division Clerk in 1953, by quick successive promotions the appeUant rose to the prCstigious position of a n1ember of the Sales Tax .Appellate Tribunal in 1ess than 25 years of service. His service book showed\n\nthat he had an excelJent record of service, earned several encomiums, commenda- D tions and appreciations. But a solitary entry made .in 1969 in his confidential file stated that his reputation was \"not at all good'' in that he was in lhe habit of threateningdealers and taking money from tl}ern. An enquiry was conducted by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption. After framing charges and obtaining his explanation the full Board of Revenue reported that the charges \"could not be pursued and proved\" and suggested that \"the charges be dropped\".\n\nJn November 1974 the Government dropped the charges. A few months later in E May 1975 he was promoted to the selection post of Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and posted as Member of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nImmediately thereafter in September 1975, invoking F. R. 56 (d), he was compulsorily retired from service:\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : In \"the face of the appellant's promotion a few months before his compulsory retirement under F. R. 56 (d) and nothing even mildly suggestive of ineptitude or inefficiency after his promotion, it is impossible to sustain the order of the Government retiring him from service. (79 G]\n\nWhen the Government exonerated hii:n_ of the chafges levelled against him, the basis of the adverse entry in his confidential file was knocked out. By reason of the proffiotion of the selection post of Deputy Commissioner and posting as a Member of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the effect of the entry was further blotted out. Since then, there was no adverse entry in his service record to discredit him or hinting even remotely that he had outlived his utility as a Government servant. Had there been another adverse entry after his promotion it would have been possible to read them all in conjunction and say that it was time for him to quit Government service. But that was not so. It was therefor€;\n\nodd that he was retired a few months after his promotion. [79 A-CJ\n\n- A\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA11 this is not to say that previous history of a Government servant should be completely ignored once he is promoted. Sometimes past events might help to assess the present conduct, but when there was nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt on the wisdom of the promotion there was llo justi\n\nfication for needless digging into the past. [80 A-Bl\n\nSwami Saran Saksena v, State of U.P., [1980] I SCR 923; Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] I SCR 430; State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, [1970] 3 SCR 694; and Union of India etc. v. M. E. Re#y & Anr., [1980] 1 SCR 736; referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDicnON : Civil Appeal No. 3436 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 19th April, 1978 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 224/78.\n\nM.K. Ramamurthi, and c., s. Vaidyanathan for the Appellant.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chitale and A. V. Rangam for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nAn order of pre-mature retirement following close upon the heels of promotion and appointment to a coveted Selection post is bound to perplex any right thinking man. and make him wonder whether the right hand knows what the left band bas done. If in the month of May a Government servant is found to possess 'such high merit and ability, which naturally includes integrity, as to entitle him not merely to be promoted to a selection post but to be appointed to a very responsible and much desired post in that cadre, what could have happened between May and September to merit his being weeded out altogether from service in September under the rule which enables the Government to retire a Government servant in the public interest after he has attained the age of 50 years or after he has completed 25 years of qualifying service. One would expect that some grave and grim situation bad developed in the interregnum to warrant the pursuit of such a drastic course. But.surprisingly, we found nothing whatsoever had happened in this case during that period. Let us look at the totality of the facts~\n\n't-\n\nJ ,\n\nD. AAMASWAMi v. TAMiL NADU (Chinnapfa Reddy, J.) . 77\n\nThe appellant appears to have had quite a noteworthy career.\n\nStarting at the lowest rung as a Lower Division Clerk in 1953, he was promoted as an Assistant Commercial Tax Officer in 1954, next as a Deputy Commercial Tax. Officer in 1957, then as a Joint Commercial. Tax Officer in 1962, thereafter as a Commercial Tax Officer in-1966, later as an Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in 1972 and finally as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on 7-5-1975. On promotion as Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxe_s he was posted as .Member of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in the same cadre. On September 28, 1975, he was retired under Fundamental Rule 56(d).\n\nHis Service Book shows\n\nthat he had an excellent record of service. He had earned several C encomius, commendations and appreciations.\n\nThe several promotions gained by him reflect his good record of service.\n\nBut there was one dark spot. In 1969 when he was working as Commercial Tax Officer it was noted in his Confidential file by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes as follows :\n\n\"This Commercial Tax Officer is a very intelligent and capable officer who kept the entire district under his control in perfect discipline. Unfortuately, his reputation is not at all good. There were complaints that he used to threaten dealers and take money. The entire matter is under investigation by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department\".\n\nThere was an enquiry qy the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Charges were framed against the appellant by the Board of Revenue. The explanation of the appellant was obtained. The Full Board of Revenue then reported that the charges should be dropped. The Government accepted the report of the Full Board and dropped the charges making the foll owing order on 29-11-1974 :\n\n\"As the preliminary enquiry disclosed a prima facie case of corruption, a detailed enquiry was taken up by the Directoraie of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption. Out of eleven allegations levelled against Thiru D. Ramaswami, seven allegations were not substantiated, in the enquiry made by the Directorate of Vigilence and Anti-Corruption.\n\nThe Government, examined the report of the Directorate\n\nSUPREMB COURT RBPORTS [ ! 9S2] 3 s.c.9..\n\nand considered that there was a prima facie case in respect of certain allegations and this was sufficient to proceed against Thiru D. Ramaswami. The Board of Revenue (CT) was therefore requested to frame charges straightaway as for a major penalty against Thiru D. Ramaswami on the basis of allegations levelled against him. The Board accordingly framed •charges against him in respect of allegations substantiated, obtained his explanation and sent its report thereon. The Full Board considered that all the charges framed against °Thiru D. Ramaswami in consequence of the detailed enquiry conducted by the Vigilence Department cannot be pursued and proved. The Full Board bas therefore expressed the view that the said charges may be dropped. The Government accept the views of the Full Board and direct that all the charges framed against Thiru D. Ramaswami be dropped\".\n\nD The effect of the order of November 29, 1974 of the Government was to grant absolution to the appellant from the repercussions of rthe note of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, made in 1969. If there was any ambiguity about the effect of the Government Order, it was cleared by the circnmstance that, within a few months, on May 7, 1975, he was promoted as Deputy E Commissioner of Commercial Taxes andposted as Member, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, a prestigious post.\n\nIt has to be mentioned here that the post of a Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is a Selection post. Under Rule 36(b) (i) of the Tamil Nadu General Rules for the State and Subordinate Services :\n\nF \"Promotions in a service or class to a selection category or to a selection grade shall be made on grounds of merit and abilify, seniority being considered only where merit and ability are approximately equal\".\n\nUnder Rule 2(b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Rules for Com-\n\nG . mercial Taxes Service :\n\n\"All promotions shall be made on grounds of merit and ability, seniority being considerd only where merit and ability are approximately equal\".\n\nSo, what do we have? There was an adverse entrr in the confidential file of the appellant iin 1969. The basis of the entry\n\nb. ti.AMASWAMI v. TAMIL NAbU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 19\n\nwas knocked out by the Order dated November 29, 1974 of the ' Government; and the effect of the entry was blotted out by the promotion of the appellant as Deputy Commissioner. After his promotion as Deputy Commissioner there was no entry in the service Book to his discredit or hinting even remotely that be bad outlived bis utility as a Govt. snvant. If there was some entry, not wholly favourable to the appellant after his promotion, one might hark back to similar or like entries in the past, read them all in conjunction and conclude that the time bad arrived for the Government servant to quit Government service. But, with nothing of the sort, it is indeed odd to retire .a Government servant a few months after promoting him to a Selection post. In the present case, we made a vain search in Service record of the appellant to find something adverse to the appellant apart from the 1969 entry . . All that we could find was some stray mildly deprecating entries such as the one in 1964 which said :\n\n\"He is sincere and hardworking. He manages his office very well. He exercises adequate control over subordinates. He maintains a cordial relationship with public.\n\nBecause of his stiff attitude some of the assessees complain about him stating that he is rude in his behaviour This perhaps is due to his unbending attitude. With a little more tact he will be an asset to the Department\".\n\nOne curious feature of the case is that while the I 969 entry noted that an enquiry was pending with the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department in regard to the allegations against the appellant, the ultimate result of th! enquiry which was that the charges should be dropped was nowhere noted in the personal file .of the appellant. . One wonders whether the failure to note the result of the enquiry in the personal file led to the impugned order !\n\nIn the face of the promotion of the appellant just a few months earlier and nothing even mildly suggestive of ineptitude or inefficiency thereafter, it is impossible to sustain the order of the Government retiring the appellant from service.\n\nThe learned\n\nCounsel for the State of Tamil Nidu argued that the Government H was entitled to take Into consideration the entire history of the appellant including that part of it which was prior to his promotion.\n\nso SUi>RBMB COURt RBPoRts\n\n(1982) s.c.a.\n\nWe do not say that the previous history of a Government servant should be completely ignored, once he is promoted.\n\nSometimes, past events may help to assess present conduct.\n\nBut when there is nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt on the wisdom of the promotion, we see no ju$tification for needless digging into the past.\n\nThe learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions in Swami Saran Sakstna v. Slate of U.P., (') Baldev Raj Chadha v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors., (2) State of Punjab v. Dewan Chuni Lal, (') while the learned counsel for respo odent relied on the decision in Union of India etc. v. M.E. Reddy & Anr. (') All the decisions have been considered by us in reaching our conclusion. The appeal is allowed.G. 0. Ms. No. 1112 dated September 19, 1975, Commercial • Taxes Religious Endowments Department, Government of Tamil Nadu is quashed. The appellant will be reinstated in service and paid the arrears of salary due to him under the rules. He is entitled to his costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nCll [1980) I SCR 923. (2l r1981J 1 s.c.R. 430.\n\n(3) (1970) 3 S.C.R. 694. (4l [1980] I S.C.R. 736,\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "D. RAMASWAMI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. 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SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 694", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3194, "end_char": 3210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 SCR 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3258, "end_char": 3274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDicnON", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3290, "end_char": 3317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDicnON : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M.K. Ramamurthi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi, and c., s. Vaidyanathan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "s. Vaidyanathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi, and c., s. Vaidyanathan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale and A. V. Rangam for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale and A. V. Rangam for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3621, "end_char": 3636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nAn order of pre-mature retirement following close upon the heels of promotion and appointment to a coveted Selection post is bound to perplex any right thinking man.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "September 28, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5416, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 28, 1975, he was retired under Fundamental Rule 56(d)."}}, {"text": "Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an enquiry qy the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption."}}, {"text": "29-11-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6599, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government accepted the report of the Full Board and dropped the charges making the foll owing order on 29-11-1974 :\n\n\"As the preliminary enquiry disclosed a prima facie case of corruption, a detailed enquiry was taken up by the Directoraie of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption."}}, {"text": "Thiru D. Ramaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6813, "end_char": 6831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of eleven allegations levelled against Thiru D. Ramaswami, seven allegations were not substantiated, in the enquiry made by the Directorate of Vigilence and Anti-Corruption."}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue (CT)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue (CT) was therefore requested to frame charges straightaway as for a major penalty against Thiru D. Ramaswami on the basis of allegations levelled against him."}}, {"text": "November 29, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The effect of the order of November 29, 1974 of the Government was to grant absolution to the appellant from the repercussions of rthe note of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, made in 1969."}}, {"text": "May 7, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there was any ambiguity about the effect of the Government Order, it was cleared by the circnmstance that, within a few months, on May 7, 1975, he was promoted as Deputy E Commissioner of Commercial Taxes andposted as Member, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, a prestigious post."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9210, "end_char": 9225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMASWAMI v. TAMIL NAbU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 19\n\nwas knocked out by the Order dated November 29, 1974 of the ' Government; and the effect of the entry was blotted out by the promotion of the appellant as Deputy Commissioner.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nidu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11357, "end_char": 11376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned\n\nCounsel for the State of Tamil Nidu argued that the Government H was entitled to take Into consideration the entire history of the appellant including that part of it which was prior to his promotion."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12350, "end_char": 12368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1112 dated September 19, 1975, Commercial • Taxes Religious Endowments Department, Government of Tamil Nadu is quashed."}}, {"text": "Commercial • Taxes Religious Endowments Department, Government of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12370, "end_char": 12446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1112 dated September 19, 1975, Commercial • Taxes Religious Endowments Department, Government of Tamil Nadu is quashed."}}, {"text": "(1970) 3 S.C.R. 694", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12652, "end_char": 12671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_769_775_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "ae है et elem i,\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE DUKE 7 4\n\n: . प्र .\n\n| THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU\n\n& ORS' | क्र, 71982...\n\ni | [O. Cumnappa REppy, J]\n\nConservation of Forel; |: ट Pe ff Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities\n\nOS. 8 and 77 and Constitution of india, 1950, Article 22 (5). \"\n\nAdvisory Board-Legal répratehiaiton or 'fr i : न riend} i detenu-Grant of. Sacility-When arises, - ? oe '\n\n. | v\n\nwi Detention order-Representation of the detenu to the Central Governmentat is-Bout De Papiere to Prime Mintster-Petitions memorial to Minister- Whether statutory representation. है\n\nन + * D\n\nThe two petitioners who were British nationals and friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises were detained under the provisions of the Conserva- -\n\n\"on of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 for\n\nsmuggling electronic equipment and goods worth several lakhs of tupees in secret\n\n.compartments and hidden cavities of a Mercedez Benz van.\n\nThe High Court dismissed their petitions for release from detention, ~\n\nIn their writ petitions under Article 32 it was contended that ; (1) the representation made by them to the Centra] Government to revoke the orders of detention as 1008 back as March 1982 remained undisposed of and oa this ground\n\nalone bey were entitled to be released; (2) the Bout De Papier presented to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to England pointing out that the order FR\n\nof detention passed against the petitioners might be lifted and the deteaus be - cither released or charged and brought to trial without delay, had not been dis-\n\n: been denied the right to be represented before the bosed of; and (3) that they bad Te कपिल मत नल सन\n\nAdvisory Bourd by ao Advocate or at least by Mae tio denied a ceanies to make ao appropriate and effective representation to the\n\nAdvisory Board.\n\n: G Dismissing the petitions,\n\nHELD है (1) Representations from whatever source aie we\n\n€ver officer of one or other department of the eon, tao\n\nfepresentations to the Government under the CO A. 4 H\n\nMinister during her visit to he Prime ted to the ry by\n\n(2) The Bout De Papier eT es d to the External Affairs Minist Britain and the subsequent reminder q\n\ngt i ee 0००\n\n'laced and Jined, as it were,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.p.\n\nthe British High Commission are not representations to the Central Government, They were merely diplomatic communications between the Governments of the two countries which will be answered through appropriate diplomatic channels in proper time.\n\nSuch diplomatic communications between one country and another\n\ncannot be treated as representations to the statutory authorities functioning under the COFEPOSA. [771 G-H; 772 A-E] _ *\n\n3(i) The Advisory Board consisting of three Judges of the High Court considered it unnecessary and inadvisable to allow legal representation to the detenus.\n\nThat was a matter for decision of the Advisory Board and this Court - would not be justified to substitute its judgment in place of the Boards judgment, [774 C]\n\n(ii) A 'friendly' representation would have been provided by the Board had it been demanded.\n\nBut it was not for the Advisory Board to offer 'friendly' representation to the detenus without being asked for. [774 D-E]\n\nIn the instant case the order of detention made on January 7, 1982 was considered by the Advisory Board on February 8, 1982 and its report showed\n\nthat the detention was justified. [775 C-D]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION; Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 27!-272\n\nof 1982.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner. |\n\nR.K. Garg and A.V. Rangam, for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van. On examination by the customs authorities. the van was\n\nfound to have secret compartments and hidden cavities: It was\n\nwith all manner of electronic equipment\n\nhs Ms rupees. Richard Beale was interroement. ile was arrested and produced before eed meals Magistrate of Madras. His friend and\n\narrived in lodia Pgs sag Zawadzki, who had separately\n\nwas also intero बाद, | कम दि to contact Richard Beals. siifaa Hlexi 83 66, later arrested and produced before the Metro- Pp Sgistrate.\n\nOrders of detention under the COFEPOSA\n\nand goods worth several Jak gated and made a statemen\n\nark, oem,\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE ४, TAMIL NADU (Chinnoppa Reddy, 2) 79)\n\nwere made against both of them on January 7, 1982 and grounds\n\nof detention were duly served on them.\n\nThe detenus moved the High Court of Tamil Nadu for their release from detention, but\n\ntheir applications were dismissed.\n\nThey have now come ms this\n\nCourt seeking Writs of Habeas Corpus under Art. 32 of the Constitution, The two petitions were argued {together by Shri Jethmalant and they may be convenienty disposed of by & single\n\norder.\"\n\nThe first submission of the learned Counsel was that the representation made by the detenus to the Central Government to _ revoke the orders of detention so long back as March, 1932 remained undisposed of till this day and on that ground alone, the detenus were entitled to be~ released.\n\nShri Jethmalani drew my ' attention\n\n099. 11 of the COFEPOSA which enables the Central Government to revoke or modify an order of detention made by .the State Government or its officers and to the\n\ndecisions of this Court laying down that delay by the Central Government im dealing with representations of the detenu would\n\nalso entail the detention invalidating itself. Apart from the fact\n\nthat there is no proper foundation for the submission, Lam not\n\nsatisfied that there is any merit in the submission.\n\nThe Writ\n\nPetitions were filed on March 12, 1982 and there was then no hint\n\nof this submission.\n\nThe counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of\n\nTamil Nadu was filed on April 5, 1982, Thereafter, the clerk\n\nof the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has sworn to an ellidavit\n\nmentioning the facts giving rise to the present Ppl\n\nappears from the affidavit that wheo the Prime oes ° owe\n\nwas recently in Baglaad, 3 pee cents Pear en a\n\ndelegation accompanying er, © ड़ Duncaa Zawadzki\n\ntion without trial of Richard Be i at 1 गहरे! and We\n\nand suggesting that the oo Te ता डा com tel os cant\n\ndetenus either released oF charged aoe © High Commission in bat the British Hi delay.\n\nIt further appears f dd al Affairs, Sore a India also 8601 De Papiere preseated to India, aad nae pene ia Britain during her visit to that\n\nthe pee iene to Shri Jethmalapi, the Bout De st gel ci op \"Minister\"s delegation in Britaio and the subsequen eee _ सात High Commission constitute a see reminder by t eevee Government demanding their rian tation to the terms of the provisions of the राह सो न nag Saar that a Bout De Papier and the reminder, diplomatic no dou :\n\nHi :\n\ni & पर 172 -\n\n7 # SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 8.¢ ९.\n\ncommunications that they are between the Governments of the 'two countries, will be attended to and answered through appropriate diplomatic channels in proper time and with necessary. expedition. _ But | find it difficult to treat such diplomatic communications between one country and another as representations to the statutory authorities functioning under the\n\nCOFEPOSA, as\n\nrepresentations. which require immediate consideration by the statutory authorities and which if aot considered immediately, would\n\nentitle the detenus to be set at liberty.\n\nNor is it possible to\n\ntreat the countless petitions, memorials and representations which\n\nare everywhere presented to the Prime Minister and other Ministers as statutory appeals or petitions, statutorily obliging them to consider and dispose of such appeals and petitions in the manner\n\nprovided. by statute.\n\nNo doubt the Prime Minister and other: Ministers, as leaders in whom the people have reposed faith and confidence, will deal with such appeals and petitions with due and deserved despatch.\n\nBut quite obviously that will not be because hey are discharging statutory obligations.\n\nIt is not also possible to\n\ntreat representations from whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government as a representation 'to the Government requiring the appropriate authority under the COFEPOSA to consider' the matter.\n\nI do not consider that the Bout de Papiere presented to the Prime Minister during her visit to Britain and the subsequent reminder: addsesed to the External Affairs Ministry by the British High Commission are representations to the Central Government which are required to be dealt with in the manner provided by the\n\nCOFEPOSA ¢\n\nIt was next submitted by the learned Counsel that the Chief Minister, who according to the Rules of Business of the Government of Taniil Nadu, was required to deal with matters telating to preventive detention neither applied his mind to the making of the orders of detention, nor , considered the representation of the detenus himself.\n\nThe relevait files have been produced by the learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and on perusing them, I find no substance in the submission of the 'learned Counsel. -\n\nThe submission which was most strenuously Urged by the learned counsel was that the detenus had been denied the right to\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE vy. TAMIL NADU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 773\n\nbe represented before the Advisory Board by an Advocate or at\n\nleast by a friend and that they were thus denied the right to make a proper and effective representation to the Advisory Board.\n\nThis was sufficient, said the learned Counsel, to vitiate the detention.\n\nThe learned Counsel urgkd that the detenus were foreigh nationals and they-were under a handicap being ignorant of the laws and procedurés of this country. To deny legal representation to them\n\nwas an unreasonable exercise of the discretion vested in the Advisory Board to permit or not to permit legal representation.\n\nAccording\n\nto the learned Counsel, this was a clear case where legal representation should have been permitted. \"In any case, it was urged, the detenus ought to have been offered at least 'friendly' representation,\n\nif not legal representation.\n\nReliance was placed upon the following observations of the Constituyjon Bench ia A.K. Roy vy, Union of India :() |\n\n\"Another aspect of this matter which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal\n\npractitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by 4 friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner.\n\nEvery person whose interests are adversely affected asa result of\n\nthe proceedings which have 8 serious import, is entitled to be heard in those proceedings and be assisted bya friend.\n\nA detenu, taken straight from his cell to the Board's room, may lack the ease and composure to present his point of view.\n\nHe may be \"tongue-tied, nervous, confused or wanting in intelligence' (see Pett\n\nv. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd., 1969, 1 QB 125), and if justice is to he ' done, he must at least have the help of a friend who can\n\n_ assist him to give coherence to his stray and wandering -- ideas, Incarceration makes a man and his thoughts dishevelled.\n\nJust as a pergsgn who is dumb ig entitled, as he\n\nmust, to be represented by a person who has speech, even 80, a person who finds himself unable to present his own case is entitled to take the aid and advice of a person who\n\nis better situated to appreciate the facts of the case © and the language of the law.\n\nYt may be that denial of\n\nlegal representation is not denial of natural. justice\n\n(1) ALR. 1982 S.C. 710.\n\n. ११4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1988] 3 8.०.४. |\n\nper se, and, therefore, if a statute excludes that facility expressly, it would not be open to the Tribunal to allow\n\nit. Fairness, as said-by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard\n\nv. Osmond [197] 1 QB 240, 253, can be obtained without legal, representation.\n\nBut, it is not fair, and the statute | does not exclude that right, that the detenu should not even\n\n\" be allowed to take the aid of a friend.\n\nWhenever demanded,\n\nthe Advisory Boards must grant that facility.\"\n\nIn the present case, the Advisory Board consisting of three Judges of the High Court of Taniil-Nadu considered it unnecessary and inadvisable to allow legal representation to the detenus\n\nIt was a matter for the decision of the Advisory Board\n\nand-I do not think I will be justified in substituting my judgment in the place of their judgment.\n\nThe detenus were heard personally by\n\nthe Advisory Board.\n\nAfter seeing and hearing them personally also,\n\nthe Board did not feel it nécessaryto provide. legal representation\n\nto them which they would certainly have done if they had thought\n\n.that the detenus appeared to require such representation.\n\nRegarding representation by a friend, there was never any such demand by the\n\ndetenus.\n\nA 'friendly' representation would certainly have been provided if-it had been so demanded.\n\nIt was not. for the Advisory Board to offer 'friendly' representation to the detenus even if the\n\nAffidavit of Shri Thiru Bhaskaran that representation not only by a lawyer, but by a friend was also considered not necessary. by the Advisory Board, it was argued that the Advisory Board had, without warrant, refused even friendly representation.\n\nShri Thiru Bhaskaran was speaking for the State of Tamil Nadu and not for the 'Advisory Board.\n\nI have perused the file of the Advisory Board which was produced before mé and I have also perused the communications addressed by the Advisory Board to the Government of Tami Nadu and to the detenus.\n\nI do not find the slightest hint of a demand 07\n\n'friendly' representation or its denial anywhere.\n\nThe Advisory Board was neither asked nor did the Board deny any 'friendly representation\n\nA'charge was made against the Advisory Board that there was inequality of treatment.\n\nIt was said that while. the detaining authority was allowed to be represented by its.officers and advisers, the detenus were allowed no representation.\n\nThere is no substance\n\nlatter did not ask for it.\n\nRelying upon a sentence in the counter-\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE y. TAMIL NADU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 775\n\nin this charge.\n\nFrom the affidavit of the Chairman of the Advisory: Board, I find that all that happened was that some customs officers\n\n_ were allowed to be present in the. corridor'so as to enable them to\n\nproduce the relevant files whenever required for perusal by the Board. The charge of inequality of treatment is, therefore,\n\nbaseless, ay x\n\nYet another submission of the. learned Counsel was that the Advisory Board failed to consider the question whether the detention continued 10 0६. justified on :the date of the report of the Advisory Board, even if it was justified on the date of the making of the order of detention, The order of detention was made on 7.1:82 and the consideration by the Advisory Board was on 8.2.82. The passage\n\nof time was not so long nor had any circumstances intervened to\n\njustify any compartment-wise' consideration of the justification for\n\n~ the detention on the date of the making of the order of detention and on the date of the réport of the Advisory Board.\n\nIn the ciscumstances of the case, I think that the report of the Advisory Board that. there was sufficient cause for 'the detention of Richard -\n\nBeale. and Paui Duncan Zawadzki necessarily implied that the detention was found by the Board to be justified on the date of its report.as also on the date of the making of the order of detention.\n\nA complaint was also made that the. Advisory Board carried on\n\nits correspondence with the detenus through the Government.\" This,\n\nit was stated, gave rise to a suspicion that everything was done by\n\nthe Board at the behest or in 'consultation with the Government.\n\nThis complaint is wholly unjustified.\n\nAs already mentioned by me,\n\nthe Advisory Board consisted of three Judges of the High Court of Tamil Nadu and as explained by the Chairman in his Affidavit, the\n\ncorrespondence etc. is carried.on through the Government because\n\nthe Board has no separate administrative office of its own.\n\nAll the\n\npoints urged on behalf of the detenus fail and the petitions are,\n\ntherefore,. dismissed. ह\n\n_NLV.K, .\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "PHILLIPPA ANNE DUKE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PHILLIPPA ANNE DUKE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Pe ff Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pe ff Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act", "statute": "Pe ff Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "statute": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1371, "end_char": 1376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed their petitions for release from detention, ~\n\nIn their writ petitions under Article 32 it was contended that ; (1) the representation made by them to the Centra] Government to revoke the orders of detention as 1008 back as March 1982 remained undisposed of and oa this ground\n\nalone bey were entitled to be released; (2) the Bout De Papier presented to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to England pointing out that the order FR\n\nof detention passed against the petitioners might be lifted and the deteaus be - cither released or charged and brought to trial without delay, had not been dis-\n\n: been denied the right to be represented before the bosed of; and (3) that they bad Te कपिल मत नल सन\n\nAdvisory Bourd by ao Advocate or at least by Mae tio denied a ceanies to make ao appropriate and effective representation to the\n\nAdvisory Board."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1397, "end_char": 1404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed their petitions for release from detention, ~\n\nIn their writ petitions under Article 32 it was contended that ; (1) the representation made by them to the Centra] Government to revoke the orders of detention as 1008 back as March 1982 remained undisposed of and oa this ground\n\nalone bey were entitled to be released; (2) the Bout De Papier presented to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to England pointing out that the order FR\n\nof detention passed against the petitioners might be lifted and the deteaus be - cither released or charged and brought to trial without delay, had not been dis-\n\n: been denied the right to be represented before the bosed of; and (3) that they bad Te कपिल मत नल सन\n\nAdvisory Bourd by ao Advocate or at least by Mae tio denied a ceanies to make ao appropriate and effective representation to the\n\nAdvisory Board."}}, {"text": "Bout De Papier", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ": G Dismissing the petitions,\n\nHELD है (1) Representations from whatever source aie we\n\n€ver officer of one or other department of the eon, tao\n\nfepresentations to the Government under the CO A. 4 H\n\nMinister during her visit to he Prime ted to the ry by\n\n(2) The Bout De Papier eT es d to the External Affairs Minist Britain and the subsequent reminder q\n\ngt i ee 0००\n\n'laced and Jined, as it were,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.p."}}, {"text": "British High Commission", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the British High Commission are not representations to the Central Government, They were merely diplomatic communications between the Governments of the two countries which will be answered through appropriate diplomatic channels in proper time."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the British High Commission are not representations to the Central Government, They were merely diplomatic communications between the Governments of the two countries which will be answered through appropriate diplomatic channels in proper time."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3312, "end_char": 3327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "774 D-E]\n\nIn the instant case the order of detention made on January 7, 1982 was considered by the Advisory Board on February 8, 1982 and its report showed\n\nthat the detention was justified. ["}}, {"text": "February 8, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "774 D-E]\n\nIn the instant case the order of detention made on January 7, 1982 was considered by the Advisory Board on February 8, 1982 and its report showed\n\nthat the detention was justified. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nRam Jethmalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "|\n\nR.K. Garg and A.V. Rangam, for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A.V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3651, "end_char": 3662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "|\n\nR.K. Garg and A.V. Rangam, for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA Reppy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA Reppy"}}, {"text": "Richard Beale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van.", "canonical_name": "Richard -\n\nBeale"}}, {"text": "Paul Duncan Zawadzki", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3770, "end_char": 3790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van.", "canonical_name": "Paul Duncan Zawadzki"}}, {"text": "of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 4006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4033, "end_char": 4039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van."}}, {"text": "Singapore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4045, "end_char": 4054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n_CHINNAPPA Reppy, J.\n\nRichard Beale and Paul Duncan Zawadzki, two British nationals, said to be friends and collaborators in smuggling enterprises are now under detention under the' Provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention\n\nof Smuggling Activities Act, Richard Beale arrived at Madras from Singapore on December 11, 1981, He brought with hin a Mercedez Benz van."}}, {"text": "Richard Beale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Richard Beale was interroement.", "canonical_name": "Richard -\n\nBeale"}}, {"text": "Richard Beals", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His friend and\n\narrived in lodia Pgs sag Zawadzki, who had separately\n\nwas also intero बाद, | कम दि to contact Richard Beals.", "canonical_name": "Richard -\n\nBeale"}}, {"text": "PHILLIPPA ANNE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orders of detention under the COFEPOSA\n\nand goods worth several Jak gated and made a statemen\n\nark, oem,\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE ४, TAMIL NADU (Chinnoppa Reddy, 2) 79)\n\nwere made against both of them on January 7, 1982 and grounds\n\nof detention were duly served on them.", "canonical_name": "PHILLIPPA ANNE DUKE"}}, {"text": "TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orders of detention under the COFEPOSA\n\nand goods worth several Jak gated and made a statemen\n\nark, oem,\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE ४, TAMIL NADU (Chinnoppa Reddy, 2) 79)\n\nwere made against both of them on January 7, 1982 and grounds\n\nof detention were duly served on them.", "canonical_name": "TAMIL NADU"}}, {"text": "Chinnoppa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orders of detention under the COFEPOSA\n\nand goods worth several Jak gated and made a statemen\n\nark, oem,\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE ४, TAMIL NADU (Chinnoppa Reddy, 2) 79)\n\nwere made against both of them on January 7, 1982 and grounds\n\nof detention were duly served on them.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA Reppy"}}, {"text": "High Court of Tamil Nadu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenus moved the High Court of Tamil Nadu for their release from detention, but\n\ntheir applications were dismissed."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5057, "end_char": 5064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jethmalant", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, The two petitions were argued {together by Shri Jethmalant and they may be convenienty disposed of by & single\n\norder.\"", "canonical_name": "Jethmalant"}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5501, "end_char": 5511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Jethmalani drew my ' attention\n\n099.", "canonical_name": "Jethmalant"}}, {"text": "Jethmalapi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6849, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears f dd al Affairs, Sore a India also 8601 De Papiere preseated to India, aad nae pene ia Britain during her visit to that\n\nthe pee iene to Shri Jethmalapi, the Bout De st gel ci op \"Minister\"s delegation in Britaio and the subsequen eee _ सात High Commission constitute a see reminder by t eevee Government demanding their rian tation to the terms of the provisions of the राह सो न nag Saar that a Bout De Papier and the reminder, diplomatic no dou :\n\nHi :\n\ni & पर 172 -\n\n7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 8.¢ ९.", "canonical_name": "Jethmalant"}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8725, "end_char": 8732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not consider that the Bout de Papiere presented to the Prime Minister during her visit to Britain and the subsequent reminder: addsesed to the External Affairs Ministry by the British High Commission are representations to the Central Government which are required to be dealt with in the manner provided by the\n\nCOFEPOSA ¢\n\nIt was next submitted by the learned Counsel that the Chief Minister, who according to the Rules of Business of the Government of Taniil Nadu, was required to deal with matters telating to preventive detention neither applied his mind to the making of the orders of detention, nor , considered the representation of the detenus himself."}}, {"text": "British High Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8811, "end_char": 8834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not consider that the Bout de Papiere presented to the Prime Minister during her visit to Britain and the subsequent reminder: addsesed to the External Affairs Ministry by the British High Commission are representations to the Central Government which are required to be dealt with in the manner provided by the\n\nCOFEPOSA ¢\n\nIt was next submitted by the learned Counsel that the Chief Minister, who according to the Rules of Business of the Government of Taniil Nadu, was required to deal with matters telating to preventive detention neither applied his mind to the making of the orders of detention, nor , considered the representation of the detenus himself."}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9367, "end_char": 9386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevait files have been produced by the learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and on perusing them, I find no substance in the submission of the 'learned Counsel. -"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9628, "end_char": 9643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TAMIL NADU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 773\n\nbe represented before the Advisory Board by an Advocate or at\n\nleast by a friend and that they were thus denied the right to make a proper and effective representation to the Advisory Board.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA Reppy"}}, {"text": "A.K. Roy vy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed upon the following observations of the Constituyjon Bench ia A.K. Roy vy, Union of India :() |\n\n\"Another aspect of this matter which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal\n\npractitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by 4 friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner."}}, {"text": "Denning M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fairness, as said-by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard\n\nv. Osmond [197] 1 QB 240, 253, can be obtained without legal, representation."}}, {"text": "High Court of Taniil-Nadu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12535, "end_char": 12560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the Advisory Board consisting of three Judges of the High Court of Taniil-Nadu considered it unnecessary and inadvisable to allow legal representation to the detenus\n\nIt was a matter for the decision of the Advisory Board\n\nand-I do not think I will be justified in substituting my judgment in the place of their judgment."}}, {"text": "Thiru Bhaskaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13403, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the Advisory Board to offer 'friendly' representation to the detenus even if the\n\nAffidavit of Shri Thiru Bhaskaran that representation not only by a lawyer, but by a friend was also considered not necessary.", "canonical_name": "Thiru Bhaskaran"}}, {"text": "Thiru Bhaskaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Thiru Bhaskaran was speaking for the State of Tamil Nadu and not for the 'Advisory Board.", "canonical_name": "Thiru Bhaskaran"}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13676, "end_char": 13695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Thiru Bhaskaran was speaking for the State of Tamil Nadu and not for the 'Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "Government of Tami Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13887, "end_char": 13910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have perused the file of the Advisory Board which was produced before mé and I have also perused the communications addressed by the Advisory Board to the Government of Tami Nadu and to the detenus."}}, {"text": "TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14471, "end_char": 14481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon a sentence in the counter-\n\nPHILLIPPA ANNE y. TAMIL NADU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 775\n\nin this charge.", "canonical_name": "TAMIL NADU"}}, {"text": "Richard -\n\nBeale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15649, "end_char": 15665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was sufficient cause for 'the detention of Richard -\n\nBeale.", "canonical_name": "Richard -\n\nBeale"}}, {"text": "Paui Duncan Zawadzki", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15671, "end_char": 15691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Paui Duncan Zawadzki necessarily implied that the detention was found by the Board to be justified on the date of its report.as also on the date of the making of the order of detention.", "canonical_name": "Paul Duncan Zawadzki"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_81_93_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nDEWADAS & ORS.\n\nJanuary 29, 1982\n\n(A.D. KOSHAL, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAK.RISHNA ERADI, JJ.)\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 S. 378 (3)-State Government's application for leave to appeal-Hearing and disposal by Single Judge under r.1 (q),\n\nChapter I, Parl 1 of M.P. High Court Rules-WMther legal?\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provi.des inttra/ia, by sub-s. (3) of s. 3i8 that no appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a lower court shall be entertained under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) except with the leave of the High Court.\n\nA practice was prevalent in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, requiring the State Government or the Central Government, desirous of preferring an. appeal under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 of the Code, to make an application for leave under sub-s. (3) thereof, and it was registered as a Miscellaneous Crimi- , nal Case and treated as a petition and as such placed before a Single Judge for hearing as per r. 1 (q), Chapter I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. It was only when the Single Judge granted leave to appeal under sub-s. (3), that the petition for leave was registered as a Criminal Appeal and placed before a Division Bench for admission under sub-s. (!) of s. 384.\n\nThe State Government of Madhya Pradesh having decided to prefer an appeal under sub-s. (I) of s. 378 filed an application for leave to appeal under sub-s. (3) setting out therein the grounds of appeal and the Single Judge who beard it refused to grant the leave. The State Government made an application for grant of certificate under Ar\\icle 134 (l) (c) of the Constitution. The application was heard by a Division Bench. The contention was that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Single Judge to hear and decide an app, lica tion for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code, inasmuch as under r. 1 (q)\n\n(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, Chapter I, Part I, the matter had to be dealt with by a Bench of two Judges.\n\nThe High Court, following its earlier decision in State of.Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. Narendraslngh, (1974) MPLJ (N) 102, rejected the contention, holding that the State bad to obtain 'leave' of the High Court under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, before an appeal against acquittal was preferred under sub-s. (1) thereof and therefore the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to deal with the application for leave under sub ... (3).\n\n82 strPRl!Mil COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 'S.C.1'.\n\n... In appeal to this Court the State Government contended that the making of an app1ication for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 is tantamount to filing an appeal under sub-s. (1) thereof, that the High Court could grant leave and entertain the appeal at one and the same time inasmuch as an application under sub-s.\n\n(3) would be transmuted into an appeal under sub-s. (1) when leave is granted under sub-s. (3) and, therefore, the application for leave under sub-s. (3) must have been laid before a Bench of two Judges under r. I (q) (ii) of the High Court Rules.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. An application for 'leave' to appeal under oub-s. (3) of s. 378 without which no appeal under sub-s. (J) or sub-s. (2) thereof can be entei1ained, being an integral part of the appeal, must be laid before a Bench of two Judges of the High Court under r .. 1 (q) (ii), Chapter I, Part I of the Madhya Pradesh Higb Court Rules (as it stood before the amendment) and could not be heard and disposed of by a Single Judge of the High Court under r. I (q) of the Rules, as it stood prior to its amendment. [92 E-F; 83 DJ\n\n2. Sub-s. (3) of s. 378 was introduced by Parliament to create a statutory restriction against entertainment of an appeal filed by the State CJ:overnment or the Central Government under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) thereof from an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint. There is a difference in the procedure regulating entertainment of State appeals under sub-s. (!) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 and appeals against acquittals filed by a complainant under suo-s. (4) of s. 378. On a compamon of the language employed in sub-s. (3) and subs. (4) of s. 378, it is clear that in the case of an appeal by the State Government or the Central Government under sub:.s. (l) or sub-s. (2), the Code does not contemplate the making of an application for leave under sub-s.\n\n(3) while making of an application under sub-s. (4) is a condition precedent for the grant of special leave to a complainant under sub-s. (4).\n\nThe difference in language used in sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (4) of s. 378 manifests the legislative intent to preserve a distinction between the two Classes of appeals by prescribing two different procedures in the matter of entertainment of appeals against acquittals.\n\nWhile a period of limitation has been prescribed in subs. (5) of s. 378 for an application of the complainant under sub-s. (4), there is no period of Jirµitation\n\nprescribe-d. for an application for grant of leave to appeal under sub-s. (3), obviously because the Code does not contemplate the making of an application for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378. It, therefore, fo1lows that the State Government or the Central Government may, while preferring an appeal under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 incorporate a prayer in the memorandum of appeal for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) thereof, or make a separate application for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, but the making of such an application is not a condition precedent for a State appeal. [90 F-H; 91 A-C; 88 G-H; 91 C-D]\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh v. Narendra Singh, (1974] MPLJ (N) 102 overruled.\n\nState of Rajasthan v. Ramdeen & Ors. (1977] 3 S.C.R. 139 relied oo.\n\nM.P. STATB v. DBWADAS (Sen. J.) 83\n\nC!l!MINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 278 of 1975.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated, the 16th October, 1974 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.\n\nCriminal Case No. 786 of 197 4.\n\nGopa/ Subramaniam for the Appellant.\n\nP.D .. Sharma, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSEN, J. The short question involved in this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Madhya J>radesh High Court is, whether ari application for 'leave' to appeal under sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), without which no 'appeal under sub-s. (I) or .sub-s. (2) thereof can be entertained, being an integral par! of the appeal, must be laid before a Bench of two Judges of the High Court, under r. 1 (q) (ii), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, or can be heard and disposed of by a Single\n\nJudge of the High Court under r. l (q) of the Rules.\n\nThe material facts giving rise to the appeal are these. The State Government of Madhya Pradesh having decided to prefer an appeal under sub-s. (I) of s. 378 of the Code, filed an application for 'leave' to appeal under subs. (3) thereof, setting out therein the grounds of appeal. According to the practice prevalent in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the application was listed before a Single Judge, as per rule I (q), Chapter I, Prt I of. the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. 'The learned Single Judge refused to grant leave to appeal under subs. (3) of s. 378 on the ground that the judgment of acquittal was based on appreciation of evidence and was not perverse or unreasonable. The State Government applied for grant of a certificate under Art. 134 (1) (cl of the Constitution.\n\nThe application for grant of a certificate was placed before and heard by a Division Bench. The contention on behalf of the State\n\nGovernment was that an application for grant of leave under sub-s,\n\n(3) of s. 378 of the Code must be treated as a part of the appeal preferred by the State Government under subs. (1) thereof, and\n\nsbPRl!Mil coukt llllro!!.Ts (i982] 3 S.C.ll.\n\ntherefore, should have been placed before a Bench of two Judges and consequently the order of the learned Single Judge rejecting the application for grant of leave under subs. (3) of s. 378 of the Code. was a nullity. The Division Bench, following the decision of another Division Bench in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narendrasingh,( 1) rejected the contention of the State that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the application for leave to appeal under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code. It however, noticed the incongruity of the requirement that an appeal under subs. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 should be placed before a Bench of two Judges under r. I (q) (ii) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules and the hearing and disposal of an application for leave under sub-s. (3) thereof should be by a Single Judge, and observed :\n\n\"The matter is being examined by the rule making Committee. It is rather anomalous that under rule 1 (q) item (ii) of Chapter I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, an appeal against acquittal filed by the State Government has to be heard by a Division Bench, still the application for leave under section 378 (3) of the Code should be laid before a Single Judge.\"\n\nAs the case involved an important question relating to pro cedure and practice, and as the correctness of the decision of the High Court in Narendrasingh' s case was open to question, special leave was granted by this Court.\n\nIt appears that a practice was prevalent in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, requiring the State Government or the Central Government, desirous of preferring an appeal under subs. (1) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 of the Code, to make an application for leave under sub-s. (3) thereof, and it was registered as a Miscellaneous Criminal Case and treated as a petition and as such placed before a Single Judge for hearing as per r. 1 (q), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. It was only when the Single Judge grante<l leave to app-.al under sub-s. (3), that the petition for leave was registered as a Criminal Appeal and placed before a Division Bench for admission under sub-s. (I) of s. 384 of the Code.\n\n(I) (1974) MPU (N) 102.\n\nM.R. STATE v. DEVADAS (Sen, J.) 85\n\nThe contention that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of a Single Judge to hear and decide an application for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code and, therefore, the proceedings were null and void is based on the provisions contained in r. J (ql(ii), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, which read as follows :\n\n\"I. The following matters shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone:\n\nxx xx xx xx\n\n(q) An appeal, petition or reference under the Code of Criminal Procedure, other than ;\n\nxx xx xx xx\n\n(ii) an appeal by the Provincial Government nnder section 417 of the Code from an order of acquittal.\"\n\nThe heading of Chap. I in which the rule fin ls pla<:e is \"Jurisdiction of a Single Judge and of Benches of the Court.\" It is urged that any breach of the rule would render the judgment a nullity. Rule 4 of the said Rules provides that 'Save as provided by law or by rules or by special orders of the Chief Justice, all mattrs shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges'. By reason of s. 8 (2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reference to an appeal against acquittal under s. 417 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old Code') by the Provincial Goverment has to be read as an appeal against acquittal by the State\n\nGovernment under sub-s. (I) of s. 378.\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the State Government that the making of an application for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code is tantamount to filing an appeal under subs. (I) thereof, and the High Court can grant leave and entertain the appeal at one and the same time, inasmuch as such an application by the State\n\nGovernment under sub-s. (3) is transn)uted into an appeal against acquittal under sub-s. (1) of s. 378, when leave is granted under sub-s. (3) and, therefore, the application for leave under subs. (3)\n\n)111d to b~ heard by a Beuc4 gf two J ud9es; Jt is urged that a comparison of the language employed in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 378 would make it clear that the Parliament never intended, in the case of an acquittal, that the State Government should first make an application for leave under sub-(3) of s. 378, and then, if leave is granted, present an appeal under sub-s. (I) of s. 378. It is further urged that the jurisdiction of a Single' Judge is limited by the words 'other than' in r. 1. (q) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, and an appeal preferred by the State Government under sub-s. (I) of s. 378 of the Code could be heard and decided only by a Bench of two Judges as required by r. I (q) (ii) of the Rules.\n\nThe submission advanced on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, is that the introduction of the new provision in suh-s. (3) of s. 378 and the use. of the words 'leave of the High Court' and the word 'entertained' clearly indicates the legislative intent to prescribe for two different stages : (I) the making of an application for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, and (2) then, if leave is granted, presenting the petition of appeal under s. 382 of the Code. It is urged that the State Government must obtain- 'leave' of the High Court under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, before an appeal against acquittal is preferred under sub-s: (I) thereof, as in the case of a private_ complainant under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 78, and the difference in language in sub-s. (3) and subs. (4) is of little con sequence.\n\nJn Narendrasingh' s case, the State Government being desirous of preferring an appeal against acquittal under sub-s. (I) of s. 378, made an application for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) and the proposed memorandum of appeal was annexed thereto. An application was filed on behalf of the State Government stating that the prayer for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) be treated as a part of the appeal itself and not separately. It was further prayed that the case, which had originally been registered as a Miscellaneous Criminal Case relating to the grant of leave, should be registered as a 'Criminal Appeal'. The matter was, therefore, placed before a Division Bench. The learned Judges of the High Court referred to the report of the Law Commission(') and observed that the legislative object in re-enacting the provisions of s. 417 of the old Code with the addition of the new provision contained in sub-s. (3)\n\n(1) 48th Report, Vol. !I, Chapters 30-57, paras 28-34, at pp. 810-81.l,\n\nM.P. STATE v. DEWADAS (Sen, J.) 87\n\nof s. 378 of the Code, was that there had to ha a further scrutiny of a State appeal by the Court even prior to the stage of admission, requiring the Court to eonsider at the very outset whether the appeal should be entertained or not. It wa~ only after the appeal was entertained with the 'le ave' of the Court that it had to be heard for admission and it may be dismissed summarily without J!Otice to the other side. It was further observed that the legislature brought about the change while accepting the recommendation of the Law Commission to retain the power of the High Court to dismiss State appeals summa. ily without notice to the respondents.\n\nIn substance, the decision in Narendrasingh's case, as expressed in the words of the learned Judges, may be thus stated :\n\n\"(A)t the very outset on an appeal against acquittal being lodged by the State, the High Court is to consider whether leave should be granted or not. I.t is only when leave is granted under section 378(3) that the appeal is entertained. On the appeal being so entertained as a consequence of the grant of leave, it is to be listed for admission and in case it is not dismissed summarily under section 384 (I) notice is to be issued to the accused under section 385 (I) (iv).\n\nxx xx xx xx\n\nThe appeal being entertained only on the grant of leave under sec. 378 (3), the matter relating to grant of leave has to be ordinarily heard and disposed of by a Single Bench of this Court accoding to Rules. The appeal itself bein-g entertained only when leave is granted, there is, in fact, no appeal as such till the leave is granted, even though it may have been lodged while praying for leave. The matter has, therefore, to be initially registered only as a 'Miscellaneous Criminal Case' and it is only when the leave is. . granted resulting in the appeal being entertained that it can be registered as a criminal appeal. Thereafter it has io be listed before the Division Belich for admission.\"\n\nIn making these observations the learned Judges appear to have been wayed by a practice which was prevalent in their Co11rt.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.n.\n\nA The jurisdiction of the Court in these matters is, however, statutory and the Court is not entitled to go outside the provisions of a statute but must interpret them as they are.\n\nThe answer to the question involved must tum on a proper construction of sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code.\n\nSection 378 of the Code corresponds to s. 417 of the old Code, as amended in 1955.\n\nSub-s. (I) of s. 378 of the Code is in terms the same as sub-s. (I) of s. 417 of the old Code and it provides that 'Save as otherwise provided in sub-s. (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-ss. (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor. to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by a court other than a High Court'. Sub-s. (2) of s. 378 corresponds to sub-s. (2) of s. 417 and confers the right of appeal on the Central Government in certain class of cases subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) from such an order of acquittal. Sub-s. (3) of s. 378 is a new provision inserted to implement the recommendation of the Law Commission made in its 48th Report on Appeals against Acquittals, and pro vides that:\n\n\"3. No appeal under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.\"\n\nSub-s. ( 4) and sub-s. (5) deal with an. order of acquittal passed in any case instituted upon a complaint. Sub-s. (4) provides that if an order of acquittal is passed in such a case, and the High Court on an application made to it by the complainant in that behalf, grants 'special leave' to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. Sub-s. (5) provides for two distinct periods of limitation. No application under sub-s. (4) for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal in a complaint case shall be entertained by the High Court at the expiry of six months where the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in other cases computed from the date of the order Qf acquittal. There is no period of limitation prescribed for presenting an application for jlrant of leave to appeal under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 from an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint, obviously because the Code does not contemplate the making of an application for leave µoder sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code: Thus, the period of limita-\n\n, '\n\nM.P. STATB v. DEWADAS (Sen, J.) 89\n\ntion in such a case, is for an appeal from an order of acquittal under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 of the Code, as prescribed by Art. 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation prescribed therefor is sixty days from the date of the order appealed from. ·\n\nUnder the scheme of the Code, the State Government or the Central Government may prefer an appeal under subs. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378 of the Code, but such appeal shall not be entertained unless \\he High Court grants 'leave' under sub-s. (3) thereof .. The words 'No appeal under subs. (1) or sub-s.\n\n(2) shall be entertained' used in sub-s. (3) of s. 378 create a qualified bar to the entertainment of an appeal filed by the State Government or the Central Government under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) from an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted otherwise than upon a complaint. The Code, by enacting sub-s. (3) of s. 378, therefore, brought about a change in that there is no longer an unrestricted right of appeal against the orders of acquittal passed in such cases. The making of an application for grant of leave to appeal by the State Government or the-Central Government under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 is, however, not a condition precedent to the entertainment of such an appeal. The prayer for grant of leave under subs. (3) may, as it should, be contained in the petition of appeal filed under s. 382 of the Code.\n\nThere is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court in Narendrasingh's case that the legislative object in re-enacting the provisions of s. 417 of the old Code with the addition of the new provision contained in sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code, was that there was to be a preliminary scrutiny of a State appeal by the Court even prior to the stage of admission, requiring the Court to consider at the very outset whether the appeal should be entertained or not, and that it was only after the appeal was entertained with the leave of the Court that it was to be heard for admission under sub-s. (I) of s. 384 read with subs. (I) of s. 385 of the Code. The High Court appears to rest its decision more on the Report of the Law Commission than the actual language of sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code, in coming to the conclusion that sub-s. (3) contemplated two stages.\n\nSubs. (3) of s. 378 is not susceptible of any such construction.\n\nTh~ Law Commission in its 48th RepQft hd ol; lrved : ' • • • - I '\n\n\"While one may grant that cases of unmerited acquittals do adse in practice, there must be some limit as to the nature of cases in which the right should be available.\"\n\nAnd, keeping in view the general rule in most common law countries not to allow an unrestricted right of appeal against acquittals, it B recommended :\n\n\"With these considerations in view, we recommend that appeals against acquittals under s. 417, eveu at the instance of the Central Government or the State Government, should be allowed only if the High Court grants special leave.\n\nIt may be pointed out that even now the High Court can summarily dismiss an appeal against an acquittal, or for that matter, any criminal appeal. (Setion 422, Criminal P.C.). ·\n\nTherefore, the amendment which we are recommending will not be so radical a departure as may appear at the first sight. It will place the State and the private complainant on equal footing.\n\nBesides this, we ought to add that under s. 422 of the Code, it is at present competent to the appellate Court to dismiss the appeal both of the State and of the complainant against acquittal at the preliminary hearing.\"\n\n' The recommendations of the Law Commission were not, however, fully carried into effect. Sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code was introduced by Parliament to create a statutory restriction against entertainment of an appeal filed by the State Government or the Central Government under sub-s. (I) or subs. (2) of s. 378 from an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted otherwise than upon complaint.\n\nAt the same time, Parliament re-enacted sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 417 as subss. (4) and (5) of s. 378, which deal with an order of acquittal passed in any case instituted upon a complaint. The result of this has been that there is a difference in the procedure regulating entertainment of State appeals against acquittals under sub-s. (1) or suh-s.\n\n(2) of s. 378 and appeals against acquittals filed by a complainant under sub-s. (5) of s. 378.\n\nOn a comparison of the language employed in sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (4) of s. 378, it is clear that the\n\nJeislature bas chosen to treat State appea, ls in a manner jffre!!i\n\n'>(\n\nM.P. STATB ~. DBWADAS (Sen, J.) 91\n\nfrom appeals by a complainant in the matter of preferring appeals against acquittals. In the case of an appeal from an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted otherwise t&an upon complaint preferred by the State Government or the Central Government under sub-s. (I) or sub:s. (2) of s 378, the Code does not contemplate the making of an application for leave under sub-s. (3) thereof, while the making of an application under sub-s: (4) of s: 378 is a condition precedent for the grant of 'special leave' to a complainant under suli-s. (5). The difference in language used in sub.s. (3) and sub-s. (4) of s. 378 manifests the legislative intent to preserve a distinction between the two classes of appeals by prescribing two different procedures in the matter of entertainment of appeals against acquittals.\n\nIt, therefore, follows that the State Government or the Central Government may, while preferring an appeal against acquittal under sub -s. {I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 378, incorporate a prayer in the memorandu111 of appeal for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) thereof, or make a separate application for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 78, but the making of such an application is not a condition precedent for a State appeal.\n\nIn the State of Rajasthan v. Ramdeen & O~.<., (1) this Court dealt with a case where the Rajasthan High Court granted the State Government leave to appeal under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code, but dis111issed the appeal filed thereafter on the ground that it bad not been filed within ninety days fro111 the judgment appealed from and was therefore barred by limitation under Art. I 14 of the Limita tion Act, 1963.\n\nThe application for grant of leave under sub-s. (3) contained all the requisites of a memorandum of appeal and had been filed within ninety days from the date of order of acquittal but was not acompanied by a petition of appeal.\n\nIt was held that an <ippeal under sub-s. (I} of s. 378 was an integral part of an application for leave to appeal under sub-s (3).\n\nAccordingly, the order passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal as barred by limita tion was set aside. In dealing with the question, it was observed :\n\n\"Under the law it will be perfectly in order if a com posite application is made giving the necessary facts and circumstances of the case along with the grounds which may be urged in the appeal witb. a i>rayer for leave to enter-\n\n(I) [1977] 3 S.C.R. 139.\n\ntain the appeal .. It is not necessary, as a matter of law, that an application for leave to entertain the appeal should be lodged first and only after grant of.leave by the High Court an appeal may be preferred against the order of acquittal.\n\nIf such a procedure is adopted, as above, it is likely, as it has happened in this case; the appeal may be time-barred if the High Court takes more than ninety days for disposal of the application for leave. The possibility that the High Court may always in such cases condone the delay on application'filed before it does not, in law, s_olve the legal issue.\n\nThe right conferred by section 378 (1), Cr. P.C., upon the State to prefer an appeal against acquittal will be jeopardised if such a procedure is adopted,· for in certain cases it may so happen that the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretion to condone the delay. The right conferred under the section cannot be put in peril by an interpretation of section 378 Cr. P.C., which is likely to affect adversely or even perhaps to destroy that right,\"\n\nThe view expressed by the High Court in Nqrendrasingh's case being in conflict with the. decision of. this Court in Ramdeen' s case must be overruled.\n\nIt must accordingly be held that the learned Single Judge bad no competence to entertain, hear '.lr dispose of the question of grant ofleave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, as it had virtually entailed dismissal of the appeal preferred by the State Government UI\\der sub-s. (I} thereof.\n\nThe matter should have been dealt with by a Bench of two Judges in terms of r. 1 (q) (ii), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules.\n\nThe question at issue has now become academic.\n\nAs already stated, the High Court while refusing the grant of certificate of fitness, bad adverted to the fact that the matter was being examined . by the Rule-Making Committee. It has since amended r. 1 (q) and made a distinction between appeals from orders of acquittals under sub-s. (I) of s: 378 in respect of: (J) offences punishable with senience of death or imprisonment for life and triable by Court of Sessions, and (2) other offences.\n\nAll appeals falling under category (1), together with applications for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, have to be beard by a Bench of two .Judges, and other appeals falling under category (2), together with applications for leave under sul)-~,\n\n(3) of s. 378, are to be heard by a Sinle Judge.\n\n- .\n\n• I\n\n.----r- ,.\n\n' _,\n\nid.I>. stATE v. l>EWAl>AS (Sen, J.) 9:\\\n\nIn the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The order passed by the High Court, dismissing the application for leave under sub-s. (J) of s. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,\n\nfiled by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh, is set_ aside, and it is directed that the application shall be dealt with by a Bench of two Judges as required by r. I (q) (1i), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Corut Rules, prior to its amendment.\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEWADAS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEWADAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 29, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 29, 1982\n\n(A.D. KOSHAL, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAK.RISHNA ERADI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "A.D. KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. 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(I) of s. 378 filed an application for leave to appeal under sub-s. 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(3) of s. 378 was introduced by Parliament to create a statutory restriction against entertainment of an appeal filed by the State CJ:overnment or the Central Government under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. 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Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.D .. Sharma, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSEN, J. The short question involved in this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Madhya J>radesh High Court is, whether ari application for 'leave' to appeal under sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), without which no 'appeal under sub-s. (I) or .sub-s. (2) thereof can be entertained, being an integral par!", "canonical_name": "SEN"}}, {"text": "Madhya J>radesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6240, "end_char": 6266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSEN, J. The short question involved in this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Madhya J>radesh High Court is, whether ari application for 'leave' to appeal under sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), without which no 'appeal under sub-s. (I) or .sub-s. (2) thereof can be entertained, being an integral par!"}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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{"in_sentence": "As the case involved an important question relating to pro cedure and practice, and as the correctness of the decision of the High Court in Narendrasingh' s case was open to question, special leave was granted by this Court.", "canonical_name": "Narendrasingh"}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules", "statute": "Chapter I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10704, "end_char": 10730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10809, "end_char": 10820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11261, "end_char": 11265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11277, "end_char": 11302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11351, "end_char": 11357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11369, "end_char": 11401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11565, "end_char": 11571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the 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{"document_id": "1982_3_94_113_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "' A\n\nBABU LAL\n\nHAZA RI LAL KISH ORI LAL & ORS.\n\nJanuary 29, 1982\n\n[A.P. SEN AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nSpecific Relief Ac.I, sections 22 and 28 read with Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, scope of-Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act enacts a rule of pleading in order to avoid mu/tip/i'city of proceedings-When the court has decreed the suit for sptcific relief of execution of the agreement to sale of an immovable property without a separate prayer for possession in the plaint, the decree iJ still executable without recourse to another separate suit for possession-Powers of the High Court to grant the relief in execution application.\n\nPursuant to an agreement for sale of certain plots for Rs. 15, 500 M/s.\n\nHazari Lal Kishori Lal respondent No. 1 atongwith respondents 2 to 5 had paid a sum of Rs. 1500/- as earnest money to respondents Nos. 6 to 9. The sale deed was to be executed within 15 days of the agreement. Respondents 6 to 9, how ever, executed a sale deed in favour of Habu Lal, the petitioner, in respect of the same property for Rs. 20,000 on 7th August, 1967. Under ithe circumstances, respondents 1 to 5 filed a suit (No. 10 of 1968) in tho court of Civil Judge, Aligarh, for specific performance of the contract of sale. The petitioner resisted the claim on the ground that the sale in his favour was in pursuance of a prior agreement dated 8th July, 1967. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner started raising construction on the disputed plot after demolishing the old one.\n\nRespondents I to 5 applied for injunction restraining, the petitioner from doing so. The petitioner, however, gave an undertaking on 25th. March, 1968, before the Trial Court that he was making the construction at bis own peril and would demolish the same and restore the land to its original position in case the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed. The trial court dismissed the suit but on appeal the additional District Judge decreed the suit and in second appeal the High Court confirmed the judgment and decree Of the First Appellate Court ana directed the petitioner and respondents 6 to 9 to execute the sale deed in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 5.\n\nThe petitioner, however, did not handover possession and remove the construction raised by him despite his undertaking dated 25th March, 1968. The decree-holders, therefore, applied for execution of the decree. The judgment~ debtor-petiti_oner filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Proce dure taking all possible pleas to defeat the execution. His objections were three~ fold : (i) The decree was tnexecutable 'as the decreeholders did not claim a relief for possession in the suit itself and consequently there was no decree fOr\n\nBABi.JL•L v. HAZARI LAL 95\n\nPossession with the result that the application for execution by delivery of posses sion was Hable to be dismissed in view of secton 22 (2) of the Specific Relief Actj\n\n(ii) the Urban Land Ceiling Act having come into force it was incumbent on the decree-holders to obtain thC permission as required under sections 26 and 27 of the CeiJin~ Act and in the absence of a, ny such permission the application for execu tion was not maintainable; and (iii) the vendors were not impleaded as parties originally and they were impleaded as parties only after the coUrt had directed the vendors to execute the sale deed. As the vendors were not partieS in the execution application it was not maintainable and it was not open to the execution court to implead a person who was not originally impleaded in the application.\n\nThe execution court allowed the objection of the judgment debtor in part inas much as it directed the execution of the sale deed in pursuance of the decree. It, however, refused to grant the relief of possession with the observatioi:i that the remedy of the decree.holders for possession was by means of a separate suit and not by execution proceedings. Objections (ii) and (iii) were overruled .. The order of the execution court was confirmed in appeal by the First Additional District Judge. Aligarh, dated 21st of February, 1977. The High Court allowed the appeal of the decree-holders and modified the order of the court below to the effect that the decreeholders shall be entitJed to possession also. Hence the peti tion by special leave by judgment debtorpetitioner.\n\nDismissing the petition, the Court.\n\nHELD : 1. A decree for specific performance of a contract includes everything incidental tc be don~ by one party or another to co1np!ete the sale transaction, the rights and obligations of the parties in such a matter being gover~ ned by section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. (1031'-G]\n\nKartik Chandra Pal v. Dibakar Bhattaeharjee. A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 362; Hakim Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan & Anr., A.J.R.; 19J8 All. 432; Ranjit Singh v. Kalidasi J)evi, 37 Cal. 57; Madanmohan Singh v. Gaja Prasad Singh, 14 C.L.J. 159; Dtonandan Prasad v. Janki Singh. 5 Pat. L.J. 314; Atal Behary v.\n\nBarada Prasad, A.l.R. 1931 Pat. 179; Balmukand v. Veer Chnd, A.T.R. [1954] All. 643; Janardan Kishore v. Girdhari Lal, A.J.R.1957 Pat. 701; Subodh Kumar\n\nv. Hiramoni Dasi,'A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 267; Mohammed Ali Abdul Chanimomin v.\n\nBi.lhemi Kom Abdulla Saheb Momin & Anr.,\n\nA.I.R: 1973 Mysore 131, discussed.\n\n2:1. Section 22 enacts a rule of plea4ing. The purpose of 5ection 22 is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to enable the plaintiff to claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance without being hampered by procedu rat cOmplications, even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when suit for specific perfornl3.nce is decreed, and empowers the cofirt to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consiciration money within ihe given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession. [104 E-F]\n\n2:2. Though sub-section (2) of section 22 recognised in clear terms the well-established rule or procedure that the court should not entertain a ~!aim of\n\n96 SUPREME COURT lEPoRTS [1982] 3 s.c.B..\n\nthe plaintiff unless it bas been pecifica!ly pleaded by the plaintiff and proved by him to be Jegally entitled to, by its proviso it provides that where the plaintiff has not specifically claimed appropriate reliefs like possession, partition or separate possession including the Specific performance in bis plaint, in the initial stages of the suit, the court shall permit the plaintiff at any stage of the procedings, to include one or more of the said reliefs, by means of an amendment of the plaint on such terms as it may deem proper. (105 A~C]\n\nMahender Nath Gupta v. M/s. Moti Ram Rattan Chand & Anr., A.LR. 1975 Delhi 155; M/s. Ex.Servicemen Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh, A.l.R. 1976 Delhi 56; Rameshwar Nath v. UP. Union Bank, A.J.R. 1956 All. 586, approved.\n\n2:3. The expression \"in an appropriate case\" only indicates that it is not always incumbent on the plaintiff to claim possessiori or partition or separate possession in a suit for specific perforn1ance of a contract for the transfer of the immoveable property. That has to be done where the circumstances demanding the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale embraced within its atribit not only the execution of the sale deed but also possession over the pro perty conveyed under the sale deed. It may not always be necessary for the plaintiff to specifically claim possession over the property, the relief of possession being inherent in the re1ief for specific performance of the contract of sale.\n\nBesides, the proviso to subsection (2) of section 22 provides for amendment of the plaint on such terms as may be just for includ).ng a claim for such relief \"at any stage of the proceedings\". [106 G-H, 107 A-Bl\n\n2:4. The term ''proceedings'' is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a Jegal right. It is not a technical expreS!ion with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word ''proceediilg\" in section 22 includes execution proceedings also. It is 8. term giving the widest freedom to a court of Jaw so that it may do justice to the parties in the case. Execution is a stage in the legal proceedings. It is a step in the judicial process. Itmarks a stage in litigation. Ii is a step in the ladder. In the journey of litigation there are various stages. One of them is execution. The Legislature bas given ample power to the court to allow amendment of the plaint at any stage, including the execution proceedings. In the instant case, the High Court rightly granted the relief of possession. [107 C-E. 109 B-CJ\n\nG Rameswar Nath v.'Uttar Pradesh Union Bank, A.l.R. 1956 AU. 586;\n\nMahender Nath Gupta v. M/s. Moti Ram Rattan Chand & Anr., A\".I.R. 1975 Delhi 155; Ba/mukand v. Ve., Chand, A.l.R. 1954 All. 643; M/s. &-Servic.men Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh, AI.R. 1976 Delhi 56, approved.\n\n3:1. If once the legal position is accepted that neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific perfOrmance of the contract gives any right or title to the decreeholder and the_ right and the title passes to him only on the execution of the deed of sale either by the judsment-debtor himseff or\n\n' \\-\n\n·.··.' • t:\n\nliAllULAL v. HAZAill LAL 91\n\nby the court itself in case he fails to execute the sale deed, no valuable right can be said to have accrued to the petitioner judgmentdebtor by lapse of tiine, merely because a decree has been passed for the specific performance of the con. tract. The limitation would start against the decree.holders only after they had obtained a sal.! in respect of the disputed property. Section 22 has been enacted only for the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings which the law courts always abhor. [109 DF]\n\n3:2. The only amendment to be made in the plaint was to add a relief for possession necessitated because of the provisions of section 22, which is only an enabling provision. In the instant case, the objection of the petitioner requiring the decree-holders to file a separate suit for possession is hyper-technical.\n\nThe-execution court has every jurisdiction to allow the amendment. _The mere omission of the High Court to allow an amendment in the plaint is not so fatal as to deprive the decree-holders of the benefits of the decree when section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act authorises the transferee to get possession Jn pursuance of a sale deed. It was open to the Court to allow an amendment, on the basis of section 22 indeed, it bas allowed delivery of possession i.Q pursuance of the decree passed in the case. [109 F-G, H, 110 AB, El\n\n3:3. Further, sub-section (3) of section 28 clearly contemplates that if the D purchaser or lessee pays the purchase n1oney or other sum which be is ordered to pay under the decree, the Court may on .application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to. Sub-clause\n\n(b) of sub-section (3) of section 28 contemplates tho delivery of possession or partition and separate possession of-the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. Sub-section (4) of section 28 bars the filing of a separate suit for any relief which may be claimed under .section 28. [112 AC]\n\n3:4. The High Court had amended the decree passed by the first appellate court and passed a decree for possession not only.against the transferors but also against their transferc~, that is, the petitioner. A court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed .. Procedure is meant to advance the cause of justice and not to retard it. [112 G-H, 113 A]\n\nHungerford IW1estment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas MundhraJ & Ors., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1826, reiterated.\n\n' G\n\nC1YIL A, PPELLATE JuRts1>tcT10N : Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 7771 of 1981.\n\nFrom the Judgment and order dated the 2nd September, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Execution second Appeal Nos. 1001 & 1720 of 1977 and Civil Revision No. 1447 of 1978.\n\nSUPREME cOURT REi>bRts (1982] 3 s.c.i.\n\nR.K. Jain for the Petitioner.\n\nMrs. S. Bhandare for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by\n\nMISRA J. This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 2nd of September, 1981 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad disposing of Execution Second Appeal No. )001 and 1720 of 1977 and Civil Revision No. 1447 of 1978. The petition was heard on 7th of December, 1981 at some length and after hearing the counsel for the parties we dismissed the same for reasons to be recorded later.\n\nWe now proceed to give the reasons.\n\nThe present petition is a typical ex amp le of the desperate effort of the judgment debtor to ward off the execution of the decree till the bailiff knocks at the door. Respondents Nos. i; to 9 entered into.an agreement with respondents Nos. I to 5 on 30th of July, 1967 for sale of certain plots situate behind their hop for Rs. I 5,500.\n\nRespondents Nos. I to 5 had paid a sum of Rs. I ,500 as earnest money pursuant to the agreement. The sale deed was agreed to be executed within fifteen days of the agreement.\n\nRespondents Nos. 6 to 9, however, executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioner Babu Lal in respect of the same property for Rs. 20,000 on 7th of August, 1967 in defiance of the earlier agreement dated 30th of July, 1967. Under the circumstances respondents Nos. 1 to 5 were obliged to file a suit which was later on numbered as suit No. IO of 1968 in the Crnrt of Civil Judge, Aligarh for specific performance of the contract of sale. The peti- tioner resisted the claim on the ground that the sale in his favour was in pursuance of a prior agreement dated 8th of July, 1967. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the petitioner started construction on the disputed plot after demolishing the old construction.· The plaintiffs, therefore, filed an application for an injunction restraining the petitioner from making any construction.\n\nThe petitioner, however, gave an undertaking on 25th of March, 1968 that he was making the construction at his own peril and would demolish the construction and restore the land to its original position in case the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed. It appears that on the undertaking given by the petitioner the application for injunction was dismissed. The trial court dismissed the suit but on\n\nBABilLAL v. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 99\n\nappeal the Addi. District Judge decreed the suit. In Second Appeal the High Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the first appellate conrt with a slight modification inas' much as the High Court directed the petitioner and respondent Nos. 6 to 9 to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondents Nos. I to 5, to bring it in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Lala Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors. (1) wherein it was held :\n\n\"Ill a suit instituted by a purchaser against the vendor and a subsequent .purchaser for specific performance of the contract of sale, if the plaintiff succeeds, the proper form of the decree to be passd is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the. conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff.\"\n\nThe petitioner, however, did not handover possession and remove constru\"tion raised by him .despite his undertaking dated 25th of March, 1968. The decree holders, therefore, applied for .. ._ execution of the. decree. The judgment; debtor-petitioner filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure taking all possible pleas to defeat the execution. His objectisms were threefold : (!) The decree was inexecutable as the decree-holders did not claim a relief for possession in the suit itself and consequently there was no decree for possession. The application for exe cution by delivery of possession was liable to be dismissed on this score alone in view' of section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act. (2) The Urban Land Ceiling Act having come into foree it was inctiinbent on the decree-holders to obtain the permission as required under sections 26 and 27 of that Act and in the absence of any such permission the application for execution was not maintainable.\n\n(3) The vendors were not implell:ded as parties originally and they were impleaded as parties only after. the court . had directed the vendors to execute th~ sale deed in S:cond Appeal. As the .vendors were not parties in the execution application it was not maintainable and it was not open to the execution court to implead _.a person who was not originally imp leaded in the application. The execution court allowed the objection\n\n(I) [1954] SCR 360.\n\n100 StiPlll!MJ! Cotiilt ilBPoRts t 1982) j s.e.lt.\n\nof the judgme11t-debtor in part inasmuch as it directed the execution . of the sale deed in pursuance of the decree. It, however, refused to grant the relief of possession with the observation that the remedy of the decree-holders for possession was by means of a separate suit and not the execution proceedings. The other two objection were, however, overruled. The order of the execution court was confirmed in appeal by the First Addi. District Judge, Aligarh dated 21st of February, 1977. This order gave rise to two appeals, one by the judgment-debtor, being appeal No. 1720 of 1977, and the other by the decree-holders, being execution second appeal No. 1001 of 1977 to the extent the order went against them. There was yet another revision filed by the judgmentdebtorpetitioner, being civil revision No. 1447 of 1978 against the order dated 15th of March, 1978 whereby the judgment-debtor was directed to execute , a sale deed in favour of the decreeholders without obtaining permission . from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities under sections 26 and 27 of the Act. The appeal as well as the revision filed by the judgment-debtor were dismissed while the appeal of the decree-holders was allowed and the order of the courts below was modified to the effect that the decree-holders shall be entitled to possession also. The judgment-debtorpetitioner has now come to this Court to seek permission to file an appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 2nd of September, 1981. .\n\nOnly one contention has been raised on behalf of the petitioiier by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, senior counsel, that the High Court cou\\d not grant relief in execution application in excess of and outside the framework of the prayer by the plaintiffs in the original main suit. As a second limb . to this argument it was further contended that the High Court has acted in flagrant violation of the provisions of section 22 of the Specific Relief Act in granting the relief of possession. In substance, the main plank of the contention of the petitioner is based on section 22 of the Speci fie Relief Act. As it stands after amendment of 1963, it reads:\n\n\"22( I) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for-\n\n-r.\n\nBABULAL v. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 101\n\n(a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property, in addition to such performance; or\n\n(b) any other relief to .which be may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or made by him, in case his claim for. specific performance is refused.\n\n(2) No relief under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of sub-section\n\n(1) shall be granted by the Court unss it bas been specifically claimed :\n\nProvided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint qn such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief.\n\n(3) The power of the Court to grant relief under Cl.\n\n(b) of sub-section (I) shall be without prejudice to its power to award compensation under Sec. 21.\"\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan was laying emphasis on sub-section (2) of section 22 to contend that the plaintiffs having not claimed any relief for possession in the suit they cannot claim the same relief at a subsequent stage. According to him, in face of the clear mandate of sub-section (2) it was not open to the High Court to have allowed the relief of possession at the execution stage, and in any case without an amendment of the plant.\n\nThe contention at the first flush appears to be alluring and plausible but on a closer scrutiny it cannot be accepted.\n\nIt would be appropriate to refer to the state of law as it existed . prior to the amendment of the Specific Relief Act in 1963.\n\nOne view was that the decree-holder does not acquire title or right to recover possession . unless a sale deed is executed, in execution of the decree for specific performance.\n\nIn Hakim Enayat Ullah v.\n\nKhalil Ullah Khan and Anr.(1) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealing with the question observed :\n\n(I) AIR 1938 All. 432.\n\n102 SUPREME COURT .. REPOl!.TS [19821 3 s.c.R.\n\n\"A decree for specific performance only declares the right of the decree-holder to have a transfer of the property covered by the decree executed in his favour. The decree by itself does not transfer title. That this is so is apparent from the fact that in order to get title to the property ihe decree-holder bas to proceed in execution in accordance with the provisions cif 0~21 of the Code.\n\nSo long as the sale deed is not executed in favour of the dee.rec bolder either by the defendant in the suit or by the Court the title to the property remains vested 'in the defendant and till the execution of the.sale deed the decree-holder has no right to the possession of the property. It is only the execution of the sale deed that transfers title to the property.\"\n\n1n Karlik Chandra Pal v. Dibakar Bhattacharjee(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, however, after reviewing a number of reported cases, viz., Ranjit Singh v. Kalidasi Devi.(') Madanmohan Singh v. Gaja Prasad Singh,(') Deonandan Prasad v. Janki Singh,(') and Atal Behary v. Barada Prasad,(') observed ;\n\n\"It is incontestable that in a suit for specific performance of contract for the sale of land it is open to the plantiff to join in the sale suit two prayers, one for the execution of the deed of transfer and another for recovery of possession of the land in question.\n\nWe ought to remember in this connection that no special form of decree in a suit for specific performance is supplied by the Civil Procedure Code. Chapter II, Specific Relief Act, deals with the various circumstances under which a contract may be enforced specifically and where it cannot be allowed.\n\nWhen a contract. is to be specifically enforced, it means simply this that when the parties do not agree to perform the contract mutually the intervention of the Court is required and the Court will do all such things as the parties would have been bound to do had this been\n\n(1) AIR 1952 Cal. 362.\n\n(2) 37 Cal. 57.\n\n(3) 14 CU 159. (4)15 Pat.[LJI 314. (5J:AIR'l931Pat.179,\n\nbABULAL V. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 10~\n\ndone without the intervention of the Court.\n\nA sale of a property after payment of the consideration and upon due execution of the deed of sale presupposes and requires the vendor to put the purchaser in possession of the property.\n\nIt cannot be suggested that when a party comes to Court for a specific performance of a contract he is to be satisfied with simply the execution of the document on payment of the consideration money. The Ccnrt when allowing the prayer for specific performance vests the executing court with all the powers which are required to give full effect to the decree for specific performance. By the decree for specific performance, the court sets out what it finds to be .the real contract between the parties and declares that such a contract exists and it is for the executing court to do the rest.\n\nIn may be noticed further that a decree in a suit f6i' specificperformance has been considered to be somewhat in the nature of preliminary decree which cannot be set out in the fullest detail all the different steps which are required to be taken to implement the main portion of the order directing specifi~ peformance of the contract. The executing court is in such a case vested with authority to issue necessary directions.\"\n\nIn Balmukand v. Veer Chand(') the decree for specific performance of a contract of sale was silent as to the relief of delivery of possession even though such relief was claimed in the suit. It was held by the Allahabad High Court tliat the executing court was still competent to deliver the possession. It was further held that it was not necessary in a suit for specific performance either to separately claim possession nor was it necessary for the court to pass a decree for possession. A decree for specific performance of a contract includes everything incidental to be done by one party or another to complete the sale transaction, the rights and obligations of the parties in such a matter being. governed by section 55 of the transfer of property Act. In Janardan Kishore v. Girdari Lal(') the\n\nPatna High Court took the view that the relief of prossession is inherent in a relief for specific perform11nce . of contract for lease,\n\n(I) A.J.R 1954 All. 643.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1'157 Pat. 701,\n\nIUPRBME COURT RBPORTS [1982) 3 s.c:.a.\n\nA and the court executing a decree for specific performane of such a contract can grant possession of the property to the decree-bolder even though the decree did not provide for delivery of possession.\n\nIn Subodh Kumar v. Hiramoni Dasi(') the Calcutta High Court took a similar view that the right to recover possession springs out of the contract which was being specifically enforced and not as a result B of the execution and completion of the conveyance, and as such the judgment-debtor was bound to deliver possession to the decrecholder.\n\nIn Mohammed Ali Abdul Chanimomin v. Bishemi Kom Abdulla Saheb Momin Anr.(') the Mysore High Court observed that the liability to deliver possession for specific performance was necessarily implied in a decree for specific performance directing the defendant to execute a sale deed on the principle of clause (f) of sub-section\n\n(I) of section 55 of the Transfer of poperty Act, according to which the liability to deliver possession arises immediately upon execution of sale deed unless by agreement the date for delivery of possession is postponed.\n\nIn this state of the law Legislature intervened and on the basis of the report of the Law Commission enacted section 22 in 1963 as it stands.\n\nSection 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The Legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid mµl!iplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance, even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when suit for specific performance is decreed. The Legislature bas now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiif of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the\n\n~'lain tiff in possession.\n\nThe section enacts that a person in a suit for specific perfor: mance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, may ask for appropriate reliefs, namely, he may ssk for possession, or for partition, or for separate possession including the relief\n\n(1) A.1.R. 1955 Cal. 267.\n\n(~) A.l.R. 1973 Mysore OJ.\n\nBABULAL v. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 105\n\nfor specific performanc~. These _reliefs he can claim, not-withstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908, to the contraty. Sub-section (2) of this section, however, specifically provides that these reliefs cannot be granted by the Court, unless they have been expressly Claimed by the plaitiff in the suit. Sub-section (2) of the section recognised in clear terms the well-established rule of procedure that the court should not entertain a claim of the plaintiff unless it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff and proved by him to be legally entitled to.\n\nThe proviso to this sub-section (2), however, says that where the plaintiff has not specifically claimed these reliefs in his plaint, in the initial stage of the suit, the court shall permit the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings, to include one or more of the reliefs, mentioned above by means of an amendment of the plaint on such terms as it may deem proper. The only purpose of this newly enacted provision is to avoid multiplicity of suits and that the plaintiff may get appropriate relief without being hampered by procedural complications.\n\nThe expression in-sub-section (I) of section 22 'in an appropriate case' is very significant, The plaintiff may ask for the relief of possession or partition or separate possession 'in an appropriate case'.\n\nAs pointed out earlier, in view of Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, some doubt was entertained whether the relief for specific performance and partition and possession could be combined in one suit; one view being that the cause of action for claiming relief for partition and possession could accrue to the plaintiff only after he acquired title to the property on the execution of a sale deed in his favour and since the relief for specific performance of the contract for sale was not based on the same cause of action as the relief for partition and possession, the two reliefs could not be combined in one suit. Similarly, as a case may be visualized where after the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant the property passed iµ possession of a third person. A mere relief for specific performance of the contract of sale may not entitle the plaintiff to obtain possession as against the party in actual possession of the property. As against. him, a decree for possession must be specifically claimed or such a person is not bound by the contract sought to be enforced. In a case where exclusive possession is with the contracting party, a decree for specific performance of the contract of sale simpliciter without specifically providing for delivery of possession, may give complete relief to the decree-holder. In order to satisfy the decree agaiI\\st im comletely he is bound n, ot\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982} 3 s.c.R.\n\nonly to execute the sale-deed but also to put the property in possession of the decree-holder.\n\nThis is no consonance with the provision of section 55 (1) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the seller is bound to give, on being so required, the buyer or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits.\n\nThere may be circumstances in which a relief for possession cannot be effectively granted to tbe decree-bolder without specifically claiming relief for possession, viz., where the property agreed to be conveyed is jointly held by the defendant with other persons.\n\nIn such a case the plaintiff in order to obtain complete i and effective relief must claim partition of the property and possessiou over the share of the defe;1dant. It is in such cases that a relief for possession must be specifically pleaded.\n\nIn the instant case, it is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner D that the possession was not with the respondents Nos. 6 to 9 but\n\nwas with a third person namely, the petitioner, who was subsequent purchaser and, therefore, this was an appropriate case where the ' relief for possession should have been claimed by the plaintiff-respondents Nos. 1 to 5.\n\nIt may be pointed out that the Additional Civil Judge had decreed the suit for specific performance of the contract. The High Court modified decree to the' extent that the sale deed was to be executed by respondents Nos. 6 to 9 together with the petitioner.\n\nIn sbDrt, the decree was passed by the High Court not only against respondents Nos. 6 to 9 but also against the subsequent purchaser i.e .. the petitioner and thus the petitioner was himself the judgrnentdebtor and it cannot be said that he was a third person in possessiou and, therefore, relief fir possession must be claimed. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the relief for possession must be claimed in a suit for specific performance of a contrct in all cases.\n\nThis argument ignores the significance of the words 'in an appropriate case'.\n\nThe expression only indicates that it is not always incumbent on the plaintiff to claim possession or partition or separate possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of the immovable prnperty. That has to be done where the circumstances demanding the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale embraced within its ambit not only the execution of the sale deed but also possessiol\\ over the proper!¥\n\nBABULAL v. RAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 107\n\nconveyed under the sale deed. It may not always be necessary for the plaintiff to specifically claim possession over the property, the relief of possession being inherent in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale.\n\nBesides, the proviso to sub-section\n\n(2) of section 22 provides for amendment of the plaint on such terms as may be just for i!Jcluding a claim for such relief 'at any stage of the proceedings'.\n\nThe word 'proceeding' is not defined in the Act. Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as \"carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process, any act done by authority of a court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party\". The term 'proceeding' is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute .• It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is c'onducted.\n\nThe word 'proceeding' in section 22 includes execution proceedings also. In Rameshwar Nath v. Uttar Pradesh Union Bank(') such a view was taken. It is a term giving the widest freedom to a court of law so that it may do justice to the parties in the case. Execution is a stage in the legal proceedings. It is a step in the judicial process. It makes a stage in litigation. It is a step in the ladder.\n\nIn the journey of litigation there are various stages. One of them is execution.\n\nIo Mahender Nath Gupta v. M/s. Moti Ram Rattan Chand and Anr.(2) the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Balmukand\n\nv. Veer Chand (supra) that where in a suit for specific performance of the contract for' sale relief for possession is not claimed and consequently the decree passed in the suit contains no relief for delivery of possession, the court executing the decree is competent to deliver possession, an order directing delivery of possession being merely incidental to the execution of the deed of sale. The court. however, observed that on March l, 1964 Specific Relief Act of 1963 came into force and this Act altered the law by enacting section 22.\n\nIt made it necessary for the plantiff to ask specifically the relief of possession in suits for specific performance. The Court, however, held that section 22 of the Specific Relief Act of 19(i3 had no appli\n\n'-<: (I) AJ.R. 1956 All. 586. (Z) A.IR. 1955 Delhi 155.\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA cation to that case as the decree was passed when the old Act was in force.\n\nThe same High Court, however. in M/s. Ex-Servicemen Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh(') considered the effect of section 22\n\n(2) with its proviso. In that case the decree did not give the plaintiff the relief of possession.\n\nThe question arose : Was the Court powerless to put him in possession of the property though he had a decree for specific performance ia his favour? The Delhi High Court observed :\n\n''Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance even though strictly speaking the right to possession accrues only when specific performance-is decreed.\n\nThe legislature bas now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself\n\nbat upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession.\n\nIn my opinion the proviso gives ample power to a court to allow the amendment of the plaint even at this stage.\n\nThe proviso says that the amendment of the plaint can be allowed \"at any stage of the proceedings\" on such 'terms as may be just for including a claim for possession where the plaintiff has not claime.d such relief in his original plaint. ·\n\nThe term \"proceeding\" is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right.\n\nIt is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be goveraod by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which Judicial business is conducted.\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1976_Delhi 561\n\n}--\n\nBAliULAL v. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.)\n\nThe word \"proceeding\" in Section 22 in my opinion includes execution proceedings also.\"\n\nThe High Court had relied upon Rameshwar Nath v. UP Union Bank (Supra) for its decision in this case. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court on this case.\n\nIt is thus clear that the Legislature ha~ given ample power to the court to allow amendment of the plaint at any stage, including the execution proceedings. In the instant case the High Court granted the relief of possession and the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner is that this was not possible at the execution stage and in any case the Court should have allowed first an amendment in the plaint and then an opportunity should have been afforded to the petitioner to file an objection.\n\nIf once we accept the legal position that neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance of the contract gives any right or title to the decree-holder and the right and the title passess to him only on the execution of the deed of sale either by the judgment-debtor himself or by the Court itself in case he fails to execute the sale deed, it is idle to contend that a. valuable right had accrued to the petitioner merely because a decree bas been passed for the specific performance of the contract. The limitation would start against the decree-holders only after they had o;>btained a sale in respect of the disputed property. It is, t.herefore, difficult to accept that a valuable right had accrued to the judgment debtor by lapse of time. Section 22 has been enacted o nly for the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings which the law courts always abhor.\n\nThe only amendment to be made in the plaint was to add a relief for possession necessitated because of the provisions of section 22, which is only an enabling provision.\n\nThere has been a protracted litigation and it has dragged on practically for about 13 years and it will be really a travesty of justice to ask the decree-holders to file a separate suit for possession The objection of the petitidner is hyper-technical. The execution court has every jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The only difficulty is that instead of granting a relief of possession the High Court should have allowed an amendment in the J?laint. The mere\n\n!10 SUPREME cob&t RBrollTS [1982] :i s.c.ii;\n\nomission of the High Court to allow an amendment in the plaint is not so fatal as to deprive the decree-holders of the benefits of the decree when section 55 of the Transfer of property Act authorises the transferee to get possession in pursuance of a sale deed.\n\nAs pointed out in the earlier part of the judgment, the petitioner bad started construction and, therefore, the decree-holders sought to injunct him from making construction on the disputed land but they were lulled by undertaking given by the petitioner that he would demolish the construction and restore the land to its original position in case the suit for specific performance was decreed. The undertaking given no doubt is a clever undertaking, but that might have given an impression to the plaintiffs-decree-holders that in the event of success of the suit the construction would be demolished and they would get back possession. Now the judgment-debtor petitioner seeks to take advantage of the expression. used in the undertaking to contend that h~ had undertaken only to demolish the construction and restore the land to its original position.\n\nThe contention now raised is that the petitioner never gave an undertaking to restore back possession of the disputed property to the decree-holders.\n\nIndeed, Mr. Shanti Bhushan stated before the Court that he was -prepared to get the construction demolished but then stops short and says that possession could not be delivered to)he decree-holders unless there was an amendment in the plaint. We are not prepared to take such a narrow view of section 22.\n\nIt was open to the C:iurt to allow an amendment and the Court on the basis of that section has allowed delivery of possession in pursuance of the decree passed in the case.\n\nBefore closing discussion on this point we cann:>t lose sight of section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which reads :\n\n\"28. (I) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property bas been made and the purchaser or lease does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the Court may allow, pay the purchase-money or other sum which the Court bas ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the Court may, by order, rescind the contract\n\n'y\n\nilAilULAL v. HAZARILAL'.(Misra, J.)\n\neither so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.\n\n(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section\n\n(1) the Court-\n\n(a) shall direct the purchaser or _the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor lessor, and\n\n(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the properly from the date on which the possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the cases so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest inoney or deposit in connection with the contract. \"'\n\n(3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the Court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely :\n\n(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor ;\n\n(bl the delivery of possession, or partition, and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.\n\n(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at. the instance\n\ni 12 SUPk£ME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nof a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.\"\n\nSub-section (3) of section 28 clearly contemplates that if the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which be is ordered to pay . under the decree, the Court may on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to. Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 28 contemplates the delivery of possession or partition and separate possession of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. Sub-section (4) of section 28 bars the filing of a separate suit for any relief which may be claimed under this section.\n\nIn Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra and Ors.(') dealing with section 28 (l) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. this Court observed :\n\n\"The Specific Relief Act, 1963, is not an exhaustive enactment and under the law relating to specific relief a Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the d11eree even after the decree had been passed. Therefore, the Court, in the present case, retained control over the matter despite the decree and it was open to the Court, when it was alleged that the party moved against had positively refused to complete the contract, to entertain the application and order rescission of the decree if the allegation was proved.\"\n\nThe reasoning given by this Court with regard to the applicability of sub-section (!) of section 28 will equally apply to the applicapability of rnb-section (3) of section 28.\n\nThis is an additional reason why this Court should not interfere with the eminently just order of the High Court. The High Court had amended the decree passed by the first appellate court G and passed a decree for possession not only against the transferors but also against their transferee, that is, the petitioner.\n\nProcedure is meant to advance the cause of justice and not to retard it.\n\nThe difficulty of the decree-holder starts in getting\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1826-.\n\n--\\.\n\niiAiiutl.l v. HAZARILAL (Misra, i.) 1i3\n\npos_session in pursua!lce of the decre obtained by him. The judgmentdebtor tries to thwart the execution by all possible objections.\n\nIn the circumstances narrated above, we do not find any fault with the order passed by the High Court.\n\nFor the reasons given above the petition for special leave to appeal must fail and it was accordingly dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nBABU LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABU LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 29, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 29, 1982\n\n[A.P. SEN AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 191, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 239, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hazari Lal Kishori Lal respondent", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 721, "end_char": 754, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAZARI LAL KISHORI LAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Habu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 6 to 9, how ever, executed a sale deed in favour of Habu Lal, the petitioner, in respect of the same property for Rs."}}, {"text": "7th August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000 on 7th August, 1967."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Aligarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1179, "end_char": 1199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 of 1968) in tho court of Civil Judge, Aligarh, for specific performance of the contract of sale."}}, {"text": "8th July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1371, "end_char": 1385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner resisted the claim on the ground that the sale in his favour was in pursuance of a prior agreement dated 8th July, 1967."}}, {"text": "25th. March, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1650, "end_char": 1667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, however, gave an undertaking on 25th."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 26 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3061, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Additional District Judge. Aligarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Objections (ii) and (iii) were overruled .. The order of the execution court was confirmed in appeal by the First Additional District Judge."}}, {"text": "21st of February, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aligarh, dated 21st of February, 1977."}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4618, "end_char": 4628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4660, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5286, "end_char": 5296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5908, "end_char": 5918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7611, "end_char": 7621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9819, "end_char": 9829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10494, "end_char": 10504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10512, "end_char": 10536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10837, "end_char": 10847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11322, "end_char": 11332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11411, "end_char": 11421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12311, "end_char": 12322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. S. Bhandare for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12389, "end_char": 12394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by\n\nMISRA J. This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 2nd of September, 1981 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad disposing of Execution Second Appeal No. )", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12519, "end_char": 12556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliv.ered by\n\nMISRA J. This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 2nd of September, 1981 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad disposing of Execution Second Appeal No. )"}}, {"text": "30th of July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13111, "end_char": 13129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 5 on 30th of July, 1967 for sale of certain plots situate behind their hop for Rs."}}, {"text": "Babu Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13458, "end_char": 13466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 to 9, however, executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioner Babu Lal in respect of the same property for Rs."}}, {"text": "7th of August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000 on 7th of August, 1967 in defiance of the earlier agreement dated 30th of July, 1967."}}, {"text": "8th of July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13936, "end_char": 13953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The peti- tioner resisted the claim on the ground that the sale in his favour was in pursuance of a prior agreement dated 8th of July, 1967."}}, {"text": "25th of March, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14273, "end_char": 14292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, however, gave an undertaking on 25th of March, 1968 that he was making the construction at his own peril and would demolish the construction and restore the land to its original position in case the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15026, "end_char": 15039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 5, to bring it in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Lala Durga Prasad & Anr."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15819, "end_char": 15829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15833, "end_char": 15860, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16224, "end_char": 16237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16245, "end_char": 16264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 26 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16404, "end_char": 16422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Addi. District Judge, Aligarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17464, "end_char": 17499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the execution court was confirmed in appeal by the First Addi."}}, {"text": "15th of March, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17885, "end_char": 17904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1447 of 1978 against the order dated 15th of March, 1978 whereby the judgment-debtor was directed to execute , a sale deed in favour of the decreeholders without obtaining permission ."}}, {"text": "sections 26 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18079, "end_char": 18097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd of September, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment-debtorpetitioner has now come to this Court to seek permission to file an appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 2nd of September, 1981. ."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18601, "end_char": 18615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only one contention has been raised on behalf of the petitioiier by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, senior counsel, that the High Court cou\\d not grant relief in execution application in excess of and outside the framework of the prayer by the plaintiffs in the original main suit."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18933, "end_char": 18943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18951, "end_char": 18970, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19086, "end_char": 19096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19241, "end_char": 19270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20259, "end_char": 20266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20331, "end_char": 20341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20923, "end_char": 20942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21211, "end_char": 21231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hakim Enayat Ullah v.\n\nKhalil Ullah Khan and Anr.(1) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealing with the question observed :\n\n(I) AIR 1938 All."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22183, "end_char": 22202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n Karlik Chandra Pal v. Dibakar Bhattacharjee(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, however, after reviewing a number of reported cases, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22853, "end_char": 22872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "bABULAL V. HAZARILAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23370, "end_char": 23390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5J:AIR'l931Pat.179,\n\nbABULAL V. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.) 10~\n\ndone without the intervention of the Court."}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25383, "end_char": 25393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "transfer of property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25401, "end_char": 25425, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25470, "end_char": 25486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Janardan Kishore v. Girdari Lal(') the\n\nPatna High Court took the view that the relief of prossession is inherent in a relief for specific perform11nce ."}}, {"text": "IUPRBME COURT RBPORTS [1982)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25662, "end_char": 25690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "701,\n\nIUPRBME COURT RBPORTS [1982) 3 s.c:.a."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26328, "end_char": 26345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Mysore High Court observed that the liability to deliver possession for specific performance was necessarily implied in a decree for specific performance directing the defendant to execute a sale deed on the principle of clause (f) of sub-section\n\n(I) of section 55 of the Transfer of poperty Act, according to which the liability to deliver possession arises immediately upon execution of sale deed unless by agreement the date for delivery of possession is postponed."}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26583, "end_char": 26593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26908, "end_char": 26918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26942, "end_char": 26952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28096, "end_char": 28119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29181, "end_char": 29191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 2, rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29387, "end_char": 29402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29406, "end_char": 29433, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30948, "end_char": 30958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30970, "end_char": 30994, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33620, "end_char": 33630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34392, "end_char": 34402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34920, "end_char": 34936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Io Mahender Nath Gupta v. M/s. Moti Ram Rattan Chand and Anr.(2) the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Balmukand\n\nv. Veer Chand (supra) that where in a suit for specific performance of the contract for' sale relief for possession is not claimed and consequently the decree passed in the suit contains no relief for delivery of possession, the court executing the decree is competent to deliver possession, an order directing delivery of possession being merely incidental to the execution of the deed of sale."}}, {"text": "March l, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35408, "end_char": 35421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, observed that on March l, 1964 Specific Relief Act of 1963 came into force and this Act altered the law by enacting section 22."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35422, "end_char": 35441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35507, "end_char": 35517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35668, "end_char": 35678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35686, "end_char": 35705, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPRBME COURT REPORTS (1982]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35786, "end_char": 35814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36020, "end_char": 36030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36316, "end_char": 36326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37770, "end_char": 37775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) A.I.R. 1976_Delhi 561\n\n}--\n\nBAliULAL v. HAZARILAL (Misra, J.)\n\nThe word \"proceeding\" in Section 22 in my opinion includes execution proceedings also.\"", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37807, "end_char": 37817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39346, "end_char": 39356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39593, "end_char": 39603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40301, "end_char": 40311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40319, "end_char": 40343, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41719, "end_char": 41729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41971, "end_char": 41981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41989, "end_char": 42014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44166, "end_char": 44176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44479, "end_char": 44489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44648, "end_char": 44658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44831, "end_char": 44841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44853, "end_char": 44878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44908, "end_char": 44933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45547, "end_char": 45557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "The Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45622, "end_char": 45632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "The Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_9_37_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "-.· r\n\nKALLOOMAL TAPESWARI PRASAD (HUF), KANPUR A\n\nTHE C. L T., KANPUR\n\n(AND VICE VERSA)\n\nJanuary 12, 1982\n\n(R. S. PATHAK AND E. S, VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act 1961, S. 171-Scope of,\n\nHindu Undivided Fam(ly-Ora/ panition in respect of immovable proparti~ Properties incapable of physical division in equal shares-Capable of division by apPortionment and equali1alion by payment ofmCJney-.\"dere severa11ce of status-\n\nNor sufficient to record finding of partition-Whether entitles the inclusion of income from an asset which has ceased to belong to the Joint family in the assessment of joint Hindu family.\n\nHindu Law-Partition-What is-How brought about-Partition may be total or partial.\n\nThe assessee, a Hindu Undivided Family was deriving income from various sources ,-such as income from property, income from money-lending business, income from speculaiion business and cloth bttsiness etc. There was a partial partition in the family in the year 1951, which was accepted and acted upon by the Income ta:t department, whereafter the doth business was treated as the business of a ti.Cm consisting of most of the coparceners as partners. On December 1, 1963 which fell within the assessment year 1964.65 there was another. partial partition orally, as a result of which eighteen immovable properties were divided amongst the ten members of the family: who held those properties as tenants-in-common from that date. These eighteen immovable properties were situated in different places and their valuation was about Rs. 7 lacs.\n\nIn the course of assessment proceedings; the assessee claimed that the mem bcrs of the family had commenced to maintain separate accounts with regard to the income from the eighteen immovable properties and to divide the nett profits amongst themselves according to their respective shares at the end of the year. When required by the Income-tax Officer to explain as to why the proper ties were not divided in definite portions as required by section 171 of the Income Tax Act 1961, the assesseestated that physical partition of the properties ainongst the ten members was impossible and th\" only way to partition those properties was to define the respective shares and to enjoy the income from them separately.\n\nIn support of his contention that the properties did not admit of physical division the assesse.e relied on an arbitration award. The Income-tax Officer did not'agrec with the assessce's contention that it was not possible to divide the properties iU definite portions. He rejected the claim of panial partition in respect of the eighteen immovable properties and proceeded to assess the income derived therefrom in the hands of the assessee.\n\n10 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe assessec ft.led an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal the assessec appointed another arbitrator to examine the possibility of physical division of each of the eighteen properties into ten portions. The artitrator by his award stated that the properties were not capable of physical division into ten shares by metes and bounds and that any practical division was that of allocation of proportionate shares in an the eighteen properties. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the case of the assessee that it was not possible to divide the properties physically as untenable and dismissed the appeal.\n\nIn.further appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the contention of the assessec that if the properties had been divided into ten shares they would have been either. destroyed or would have lost their values was not correct, and that the claim of the assessee under section 171 of the Act that there was a partial partition was to b.! rejected.\n\nOn an application by .the asscssee under section 256 ·(l) of the Act, the Tribunal referred two questions to the High Court : (1) Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the properties in dispute were capable of division in definite portions amongst the ten coparceners as contemplated in Explanation (a) (i) to section 171 of the Act, and (2) whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income from the properties in dispute which were accepted to have been partitioned under the Hindu Law but with regard to which an order accepting the claim of partial partition was not made was liable to be included in the computa tion of the assessee•s income '!\n\nThe High Court held : (I) that even though the eighteen properties could not individually be divided into ten Shares without destroying their utility but .after assessing the value of the properties they could be apportioned betwCen the ten members and the difference in the allocations could be equalised by payment of cash amounts by one to the other and in view of clause (a) (i) of the Explanation to section 171, mere severance of status was not sufficient for recording a fin ding of partition; and (2) that tbe income accruing from the eighteen immovable properties after December 11, 1963 was oot liable to be included in the computation of the joint Hindu Family's income.\n\nDismissing the Assessee's appeal and allowing the Department's appeal:\n\nHELD : 1. (i) The law relating to assessment of Hindu undivided family underwent a change when the 1961 Act came into force. Section 171 of the Act provided for the assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided family. [24-I)]\n\n(ii) A finding to the effect that partition bas taken place has to be recorded under section 171 by the Income-tax Officer. He can record such a finding only if the partition in questiOn satisfies the definition of the expression 'partition' round in Explanation to section 171. A transaction can be recognised as a parti tion under section 171 only If, where the property admits of a physical division a physical division of the property bas taken place. In such a case mere physical\n\n'\"' )-\n\nKALLOOMAL V. C.J.T. 11\n\ndivision of the income without a physical division of the property producing income cannot be treated as a partition. Even where the property does not admit of a physical division 1hen such division as the property admits of should take place to satisfy the test of a partition under section 171. Mere proof of severance of status under Hindu Law is not sufficient to treat such a transaction as a parti\n\ntioo. If a transaction doesnot satisfy the above additional conditions it cannoi be treated as a artition under the Act, even though under Hindu Law there has\n\nbeen a partition.total or partial. The consequence will be that the undivided family will be continued to be assessed as such by reason of subsection (1) of section 171. [30.A-D]\n\n(iii) It is common knowledge that in every partition under Hindu Law unless the parties agree to enjoy the properties as tenants-in-common, the need for division of the family properties by metes and bounds arises and in that pro .. cess physical division of several items of property which admit of such physical division does take place. It is not necessary to divide each item into the number of shares to be allocated at a partition. If a large nuOJber of items of property are there, they are usually apportioned on an equitable basis and if necessary by asking the parties to make payments of money to equalise the shares. Such a partition is also a kind of physical division of the properties and is contemplated in the Explanation to section 171. [34-C-E]\n\nIn the instant case no attempt to divide the properties was made. The case clearly falJs under sub.cJause (i) of cJausc (a) of the Explanation to section 171 of the Act but does not satisfy the requirement of that sub-clause as no physi~\n\ncal division of the properties was made even though they could be conveniently so divided. Sub-clause (if,. therefore does not apply to this case. [35-B]\n\n(i) The High Court having held that the assessee was not entitled to to claim that a partial partition had taken place under section 171, fell into an, error in holding that the income of the properties which were the subject-matter of partial partition could not be included in the total income of the assessee by relying upon the decisions which had been rendeRd on the basis of section 2SA of the 1922 Act which bad been construed as not being applicable to partial partition. [35-D]\n\n(ii) The true effect of section 171 (1) is that property, which is the subject-matter of partial partition would continue to be treated as belonging to the family and its income would continue to be included in its total income until such a finding is recorded. [35-G]\n\n. (iii) uh-section (1) of section l 71 contains a 'deeming' prov1s1on. ft says that a Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided shall be deemed for the\n\nurpose of the Ac.t to continue to be a H, indu undivided fa'mily except where and\n\n10 so far as a ~ding of partitin hs been recorded in respect of it undersection\n\n171. The paution referred to 10 the section can include a partial partition also\n\n~1ther s regars the rson~ contituting the undiJ.ided fan:-Uy or the properties\n\n~l~rng , to ,1t or. bohl in .v1w, of the provisions contained in the other subsecuons and the Explapation to the section. (29-F-GJ ·\n\n(iv) Whore there is no claim that a partition-total or partial-had taken place made> or where it is made and disallowed a Hindu undivided family which is hithefto being asseBsed as such will have to be assessed as such notwithstanding the fact a partition bad in fact taken place as per Hindu law. A finding to the effect that partition bad taken place has to be recorded under section 171 by the Income-tax Officer. He can record such a finding only if the partition in ques tion satisfies the definition of the expression 'partition' found in Explanation to section 171. The transaction can be recognised as a partition under section 171 only if where the properties admit of a physical division, a physical division of the property bas taken place. In such a case mere physical division of the income without a_ physical division of the property producing income cannot be treated as a partition. Even where the property does not, admit of a physical division then such a division as the property admits of should take place to satisfy the test of a partition under section 171. Mere proof of severance of status under Hindu Law is not sufficient to treat such a transaction as a partition. If a transac tion does not satisfy the additional condition it cannot be treated as a partition under the Act even though under Hindu Law there has been a partition total or partial. The consequence will be that the undivided family will be continued to be assessed as such by reason of sub-section (1) of section 171. [29 0.H, 30 AD]\n\nGovinddas & Ors. v. Income-tax Officer & Anr., [1976] 193 I.T.R. 123; Charanda1 Haridas & Anr. v. Commissiomr of lncometax, Bombay North, Kutch & Saurashlra, Ahmedabad & Anr., (1960] 39 I.T.R. 203; A. Kannan Chetty v. Commissioner of lm:ome-tax, Madras, [1963] 50 I.T.R. 601; referre>d to.\n\n(v) As long as a finQing is not recorded under section 171 that a partia1 partition had taken place the Hindu undivided family should be decme>d for the purposes of the Act to be the owner of the property which is the subject matter of the partition and also the recipient of the income from such property. The assessment should be made as such and the tax assessed can be recovered as\n\nprovided in the Act. [36 FG] -f\n\n3. Under section 25A of the 1922 Act, a Hindu undivide>d family which had been assessed to tax could be treated as undivided and subjected to tax under the Act in that status unless and until an order was made under ection 25A (1) and if in the course of the assessment proceedings it is claimed by any of the members of the Hindu undivided family that there has been total partition of the family property resulting in physical division thereof as it was capable of, the assessing authority should bold an enquiry and decide whether there has been such a partition or not. If he held that such a partition had taken place, he should proeeed to make an assessment of the total income of the family as if no partition had taken place and then proceed to apportion the liability as stated in see:tion 25A amongst the individual members of the family. If no claim was made or if the claim where it was made was disallowed after the enquiry, the Hindu undivided family would continue to be liable to be assessed as such.\n\n[23 GH, 24 A-CJ\n\n4. Whm Parliament enacted section 171 it took note of tho decisions which had taken the view that a partial partition did not fall within the scope of section 25A. It exprcgly stated in se>etion 171 of the Act that the said provision\n\n- \"\n\n- ~\n\nKALLOOMAL •. C.l.T. 13\n\nwas applicable to both kinds of partitions-total or partial. It has also defined partial partition as one which is partial as regards persons constituting the undi- . Vided family or as regards the properties belonging to the undivided family or both. It deals with aU kinds of partitions, the nature of which sometimos may be difficult to predicate correctly. [31 D-E]\n\nSir Sunder Singh Majithia v. The Commissioner of Income-tax. C.P. & U.P., [1942] 10 I.T.R. 457, Gordhandas T. Manga/das v. Cmmlssloner of income-tax Bombay, [1943] 11 I.T.R. 183, Waman Satwappa Kalghatgl v. Commi8'iontr of incpme-tax [1946]14 I.T.R. 116, M.S.M.S. Meyyappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of income-tax, Madras, [1950] 18 f.T.R. 586, Lakhmtchand Baljnath v. Comm/8'/0ntr of income-tax West Bengal, [1959] 35 l.T.R. 416, Ka/wa Dnadatta and Or1. v.\n\nVnion of india and Ors., [1963] 49 l.T.R. [S.C.] 165, Additional income-tax Officer, Cuddapah v. A. Thimmayya and Anr., [1965] 55 I.T.R. 666, Joint Family of\n\nVdayan Chit:iubhai etc.v. Commisrioner of Income-tax, Gujarat, [1967] 63 I.T.R. 416, referred to.\n\n5. Partition may be several kinds. It may be a total partition or a partial partition. A partition can be caned partial both as regards persons and as regards properties. The next kind of partition may be one where all the members divide amongst themselves only some of the family properties and continue as members of an undivided family owing the remainlog family properties. This is called a partial partition as regards property. Even here the division of the property which is subject matter of partial partition may be groupwise also. In the case of a partial partition a_s regards property, one thing noticeable is that after such partition, the property which is subject-matte! of partition is held by the members of the family as tenants-in-common and the rest of the family properties Continue to be held by them as members of the undivided family.\n\n[31 F-H, 32 A-E]\n\n6. After a partial partition as regards property, the property divided is held by the members or the undivided family_ as divided members with all the incidents flowing therefrom and the pr.operty not so divided as members of an undivided family. Section 171 (I) of the Act can, therefore operate in such a case also because the family which has become divided as regards the property which is the subject matter of partial partition is deemed to continue as the owner of that property and the recepient of the income derived from it except where and in so far.as a finding of partition has been given under\n\nocction 171. [32 F-G]\n\n7. Partition can be brought about, (I) by a father during his life time between himself and his sons by dividing properties equally amongst them, (2) by agreement, or (3) by a suifor arbitration. A declaration of intention of a copar-. cener to become divided brings about severance of status. [27 E]\n\n8. A physical division of tho property which:, is the subject matter of partition is not necessary to complete the process of partition in so Car as the item of property is concerned under Hindu Law. Tho parties to the partition may\n\ncitjoy tho property in question as tenants-in-common. [27 GJ\n\nAppo•i1r v. Rama Subba Aiy1J11 [1866] ll M.I.A, 75, referred to.\n\n9. Hindu Law does not require thal the property must in every case be partioned by metes and bounds or physically into different portions to complele a partition. Disruption of status can be brought about and it is open to the parties to enjoy their shares of property as tenants-in-common in any manner known to law according to their desfre. (28-C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1370/74 and 1768 of 1975.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 29th September, 1972 of the Allahabad High Court in Income-Tax Reference No. 47 of 1971.\n\nS.T. Desai J.B. Dadachanji and K.J. John for the Appellant in C.A. 13;0/74 and for Respondent in C.A. 1768/75.\n\nV.S. Desai, Miss A. Subhashini, K. C. Dua and S. P. Nayar for • the Respondent in CA. 1370/74 and for the Appellant in CA.\n\nD 1768/75.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. These two appeals by certificate-one by the assessee and the other by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Kanpur are filed against the judgment and order dated September 29, 1972 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Income-tax Reference No. 47 of 1971 under section 256(1) of the Income-tax.\n\nAct, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') made by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad (for short '1he Tribunal'). The two questions which were referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of the High Court were :\n\n\"(l) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in holding that the properties in dispute were capable of division in definite portions amongst the 10 coparceners as con temp lated in Explanation (a) (i) to section 171 of the Incometax Act, 1961 and that even otherwise the. mere seve ranee of status was not sufficient to entitle the assessee to succeed in. its claim for partial partition ?\n\n(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. the Tribunal was justified in holding th at the\n\n__,.\n\nI I I i I I ,..\n\n'( ., --=\n\nKALLOOMAL v. c.l.T. (Venkataramlah, J.)\n\nincome from the properties in dispute which were accepted to have been partitioned under the Hindu Jaw .but with regard to which an order accepting the claim of partial prtitic; in was not made was liable to be included in the computation of the assessee's income?\"\n\nThe assessee is a Hindu undivided family known as M/s.\n\nKalloomal Tapeshwari Prasad and the year of assessment is 1964·65.\n\nThe assessee is governed by the Mita ks hara school of law. The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\n\n- I Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram. The assessee (Hindu undivided family) was deriving income from various sources such as income from property, income from money lending business, income from speculation. busi ness and cloth business etc. There was a partial partition in the family in the year 1951 when a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 out of its total capital of Rs. 12,85,423 was divided amongst the coparceners at the rate of Rs. 41,666/10/8 amongst members of Chandoolal's branch and at the rate of Rs. 83,333/5/4 among~ the members of Sitaram's branch. Kripa Devi did not receive any share at that partition.\n\nThe said partial partition was accepted and acttd upon by\n\nl .H\n\nthe Income-tax Department where after the cloth business was treated as the business of a firm consisting of most of the coparceners as partners.\n\nAgain. on December II, 1963 which fell within the previous year relevant for the assessment year in question i.e. 1964-65, according to the assessee, there was another partial partition orally as a result of which its eighteen immovable properties were divided amongst the ten members of the family and that they held those properties as tenants-in-common from that date.\n\nIt was claimed by the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings that the members of the family had commenced to maintain separate accounts with regard to the income from the said eighteen properties and to divide the net profits amongst themselves according to their respective shares at the end of each year.\n\nThe eighteen immevable properties were situated in different places and their valuation was as follows :\n\nS. No.\n\nl. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.\n\nMunicipal number of the property\n\n75/2 76/162 76/169 47/110 47/26 48/203 55/124 55/361\n\n55/37 J . 70/87\n\n71/150 71/89 71/112 63/61 51/68 51/73 86/37\n\n1/301A\n\nValue\n\n1,78,875/-\n\n27,000/- 45,000/- 13,500/· 20,7001- 16,200/-\n\n90,000/-\n\n41,400/· 1,57,500/-\n\n8, 100/- 3,600/- 19,800/-\n\n7,425/- 17,100/- 14,400/- 20,520/- 45,000/-\n\n. 7,26,120/·\n\n• -1-\n\nKALLOOMAL v. 0.1.T. (Vmkataramiah, J.) 17\n\nWhen requiredby the Incometax Officer to explain as to why the properties were not divided in definite portions as required by section 17 l of the Act, the assessee stated that physical division of the properties in question amongst the ten members was impossible and the only possible way to partition those properties was to define their respective shares and to enjoy the income from them separatly.\n\nIn support of the above claim the assessee relied upon a copy of an award dated April 15, 1964 made by one S.B. Tandon which was made into a decree in Suit No. 60 of 1964 on the file of the Court\n\nof the First Civil Judge, Kanpur dated September 21, 1964. In that award the arbitrator had stated that the properties did not admit of physical division. The Incometax Officer did not agree with the asscssee's contention that it wa• not possible to divide the properties in question :n definite portions. Accordingly he rejected the claim of partial partition in respect of the eighteen immovable properties , and proceeded to assess the income derived therefrom in the hands of the assessec. Against the order of the Income-tax Officer, the assessec filed an appeal before the /\\ppellate Assistant Commissioner of Incomelax. During the pendency of that appeal the assessee appointed another arbitrator by the name Lakhsman Swaroop, a retired Chief Engineer to examine the posssibility of a physical division of each of the eighteen properties into ten portions and if that was not possible to suggest any other mode or modes to divide them into ten parts in accordance with the share allotted to each of the parties to the partition. By his award dated February 3, 1965, Lakshman Swarwp stated tl1at the aforesaid properties were \"not capable of physical division into ten shares by metes and bounds and that any practical division is that of allocation of proportionate shares in all the 18 properties in question.\" It may be mentioned here that out of the ten shares, six shares were I/12th each and four shares were I/8th each. Chandoomal and his five sons had been allotted l/ 12th each and Sitaram, his wife and his two sons had been allotted l /4th each. Lakshman Swaroop was also examined as a witness before the Appellate Assistant Com missioner by the assessee and cross-examined by the Incometax Officer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner on a consideration of the material before him including the decree of the court referred to above and the evidence of Lakshman Swaroop held that the case of the assessec that it was not possible to divide the properties physically into ten shares referred to above was not tenable and dismissed the appeal. The assessee, thereafter took up the matter before the Tribunal in appeal. The Tribunal also was of the view that the contention of the assessee that if the properties had\n\nbeen divided into ten shares, they would have either been destroyed or would have lost in value was not correct.\n\nAccordingly tile claim of the assessee under section 171 of the Act that there was a partial partition was rejected. Thereupon on an application of the assessee made under section 256(1) of the Act, the two questions set out above were referred by the Tribunal to the High Court for its opinion.\n\nAfter hearing the parties, the High Court recorded its answer to the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the Department and in reaching that conclusion, it observed thus :\n\n\"We have seen the evidence of the arbitrator as well as the Chief Engineer, and it is apparent there from' that even though the 18 properties could not individually be divided into I 0 shares without destroying their utility but after assessing the value of the properties. they could l>e apportioned between the ten members and the difference in the allocations could be equalised by payment of cash amounts by one to the other. In our opinion, it cannot, in such a situation, be said that. these 18 properties were incapable of physical division in 10 shares, and so, in view of clause\n\n(a) (i) of the Explanation, mere severance of status was not sufficient for recording a finding of partition.\"\n\nThe High Court answered the second question in favour of the assessee holding that the income accruing from the eighteen immovable properties after December 11, 1963 was however not liable to be included in the computation of the joint Hindu family's income.\n\nIn recording this answer, the High Court observed thus:\n\n\"Sec. 171 of the 1961 Act in essence, is a re-actment ·\n\nof Sec. 25A with the difference that it applies not only to cases of toial partition but also to cases of partial partition. There are some incidental changes as well, e.g. sec. 171 applies also for purposes of levying and collecting penalty, fine or interest and in addition requires the Income-tax Officer to record a finding as to the date on which total or partial partition took place. The fact that sec. 171 applies to a partial partition (meaning a partition which is partial as\n\nKALLOOMAL v. C.l.T. ( Venkararamiah, J.) 19\n\nregards the persons or as regards the properties of the family or both) as well shows that a findin11 of partial partition can be recorded and on such a finding being recorded under sub-section (4) the total income of the joint family in respect of the period upto the date of partition is to be assessed .as if no partition had taken place and each member of the family was to be liable, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of sec. I 0, jointly and severally for the tax on the income so assessed. Thus sec. 171, like sec.'25A, seeks to nullify the effect of sec. 10 (2) under which a member was not liable to be taxed on the income received as a member of Hindu undivided family.· The section does not entitle the inclusion of income from an asset which has ceased to belong to the joini family, in the assessment of the joint Hindu family.\n\nIn the present case, on the findings, the position D is that the joint Hindu family stood disrupted in relation to the 18 immovable properties as a result of. the oral partition dated 1 lth December, 1963. Thereafter the income of these properties belonged to the individual members and not to the joint family. It could not be included in the assessment of the family.\" E\n\nAggrieved by the answer to the first question, the assessee has filed Civil Appeal No. 1370 of I 974 and aggrieved by the answer to the second question, the Revenue has filed Civil Appeal No. 1768 of 1975.\n\nIt is necessary to refer to the history of the relevant provisions in order to decide the questions raised before us.\n\nUnder the Indian Income-tax Act, 19i2 (for short 'the 1922 Act') a Hindu undivided family could be assessed on its income. Section 3 of the 1922 Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act enacted that incometax should be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates should be charged for t.hat year in ilccordance with and subject to the provisions of that Act in respect of total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family etc. But section 14 (I) of the 1922 Act provided that no tax was\n\npayble by an individual assessec in respect of any sum which he received as a member of a Hindu undivided. family w4ere such sum had been paid out of the income of 'the family.\n\nSection 25-A was\n\n20 SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS\n\n[ 1982] 3 S.C.R;\n\ninserted in the 1922 Act in the year 1928 providing for the machi- .nery for assessmdnt after partition of a Hindu undivided family.\n\nThat section immediately before the repeal of the 1922 Act read as follows:\n\n\"25A. Assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided family-(!) Where, at the time of making an assess ment under section 23, it is claimed by or on behalf of any memper of a Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided that a partition has taken place among the members of such 'family, the Income-tax Officer shall make such inquiry there-into as he may think fit, and, if he is satisfied that the joint family property has been partitioned among the various members or groups of members in definite portions he shall record an order to that effect :\n\nProvided that no such order shall be recorded until notices of the inquiry have been served on all the members of the family.\n\n(2) Where such an order has been passed, or where any person has succeeded to a business, profession or vocation formerly carried on by a Hindu undivided family whose joint family property bas been partitioned on or after the last day on which it carried on such business, profession or vacation, the Incometax Officer shall make an assessment of the total income received by or on behalf of the joint family as such, as if no partition had taken place, and each member or group of members shall, in addition to any income-tax for which he or it may be separately liable and notwithstanding anything contained in sob-section (I) of section 14, be liable for a share of tbe tax on the income so assessed according to the portion of the joint family property alloted to him or it; and the Income-tax Officer shall make assessments accordingly on the various members and groups of members in accordance with the provisions of section 23 :\n\nProvided that all he members and groups of members whose joint family property has been partitioned\n\n-('\"\"\"\n\n-t\n\nl:ALLOOM.l.L v. C.I T. (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nshall be liable jointly has severally for the tax assessed on the total income received by or on behalf of the joint family as such.\n\n(3) Where such an order has not been passed in respect of Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided, such family shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to continue to be a Hindu undivided family\".\n\nSection 25-A of the 1922 Act as it stood then (subsequent modifications in it being immaterial for the purposes of this case) came up for consideration by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sir Sunder Singh Majithia v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. and U.P.(') The Privy Council held that section\n\n25-A[ of the 1922 Act provided that if it be found that the family property bad been partitioned in definite portions, assessment might be made, notwithstanding section 14(1) on each individual or group in respect of bis or its share of the profits made by the undivided family, while holding all the members jointly and severally liable for the tax. It was further held that if, however, though the joint Hindu family bad come to an end, it be found that its property bad not been partitioned in definite portions then the family was to be deemed to continue-that is, to be an existent Hindu family upon which assessment could be made on its gains of the previous year. But it was of. the view that section 25-A bad nothing to say about any Hindu undivided family which continued in existence never having been disrupted. Such a case was held to fall outside sub-section (3) of sectiOn 25-A and in effect, it held that the said section did not apply to cases of partial partition.\n\nIn (Jordhandas T. Manga/das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay,(') Kania, J. (as be then was) who agreed with Beaument, C.J. explained the scheme of section 25-A of the 1922 Act (as it stood then) in his concurring judgment thus :\n\n\"It is material to bear in mind the scheme of the Income-tax Act, in the first instance. Under sections 2 and 3 the different units stated therein are' liable to be taxed as such. One of them is a joint Hindu family.\n\nIn order to avoid double taxation, Section 14 lays down\n\n(I) [1942] 10 I.T.R. 457.\n\n(2) [1943] 11 I.T.R. 183.\n\nthat when the individual member is being assessed, his income as a member of a joint family should not be assessed again.\n\nThen comes the stage, what happens when a family, which has once been so assessed, comes to a partition. To meet that contingency, Section 25-A has been enacted. In the section, as it existed before the amendment of 1939, in terms the Income-tax Officer required proof, (i) that a separation of the members of the joint family bad taken place and (ii) that the joint family property had been partitioned amongst the various members or groups of members in definite portions. On being satisfied on those points he had to record an order to that effect. The effect of such a recording was that the joint family income would be assessed and recovered in terms of sub-section (2).\n\nIn the absence of such order, under sub-section (3) the joint family continued to be assessed as before.\"\n\nThe same view was followed in Waman Satwappa Kalghatgi\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax(') and in M.S.M.S. Meyyappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras.(\")\n\nThis Court had to consider the true meaning of section 25-A of the 1922 Act in Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal.(') Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking for the Court observed in the above case thus :-\n\n\"Now, when a claim is made under section 25-A, the points to be decided by the Income-tax Officer are whether there bas been. a partition in the family, and if so, what the definite portions are in which the division had been made among the members or groups of members. The question as to what the income of the family assessable to tax under section 23 (3) was would\n\nbe foreign to the scope of and enquiry . under section 25-A. That section was, it should be noted, intro duced by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1928 (3 of 1928) for removing a defect which the\n\n(I) (1946] 14 l.T.R. 116.\n\n(2) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 586.\n\n(3) [1959] 35 I.T.R. 416.\n\n~1 ,.\\ ', -\n\nltALLOOM~L v. C.l.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 23\n\n. working of the Act as enacted in 1922 had disclosed.\n\nUnder the provisions of the Act as they stood prior to the amendment, when the assessee was an undivided family, no assessment could be made thereon if at the time of the assessment it had become divided, because at that po(nt of time, there was no undivided family in existence which could be taxed, though when the income was received in the year of account the family was joint. Nor could the individual membe.rs of the family be taxed in respect of such income as the same is exempt from tax under section 14 (1) of the Act.\n\nThe result of these provisions was that a joint family which had become divided at the time of assessment escaped tax altogether. To remove this defect, section 25-A enacted that until an order is made under that section, the family should be deemed to continue as an undivided family. When an order is made under that section, the family sh.mid be deemed to continue as an undivided family. When an order is made under that section, its. effect is that while the tax payable on the total income is apportioned among the divided members or groups, all of them are liable for the tax payable on the total income of the family.\n\nWhat that tax is would depend on the assessment of income in proceedings taken under section 23, and an order under section 25-A would have no effect on that assessment.''\n\nThe above view was reiterated by this Court in Ka/wa Devadattam and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.(') in Additional In.come-tax\n\nOffier, Cuddapah v. Thimmayya and Anr.(') and in Joint family of Udayan Chinubhai etc. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat.(') The substance of all these decisions was that under section 25-A of the 1922 Act a Hindu undivided family which had been assessed to tax could be treated as undivided and subjected to tax under the-Act in that status unless and \\lntil an order was made under section 25-A (!)and ifin the course of the assessment proceedings it is claimed by any of the members of the Hindu undivided family th11t there\n\n(I) [1963) 491.T.R. (SC} 165.\n\n(2) [196S]'55 I.T.R. 666.\n\n(3) [1967] 63 I.T.R. 416.\n\n' ; H\n\nhas been total partition of the family property resulting in physical division thereof as it was capable of, the assessing authority should hold an enquiry and decide whether there had been such a partition or not. If he held that such a partition had taken place, he should proceed to make an.assessment of the total income of the family as if no partition had taken place and then proceed to apportion the liability as stated in section 25A amongst the individual members of the family. If no claim was made or if the claim where it was made was disallowed after enquiry, the Hindu undivided family would continue to be liable to be assessed as such.\n\nThis was the legal position under the 1922 Act.\n\nThe law relating to assessment of Hindu undivided j family, however, underwent a change when the Act came into force.\n\nSection 171 of the Act which corresponds to section 25-A of the 1922 Act reads thus :\n\n\"171. (I) A Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to continue to be a Hindu undivided family, except where and in so far as a finding of partition has been given under this section in respect of the Hindu undivided family.\n\n(2) Where, at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or section 144, it is claimed by or on behalf of any member of a Hindu family assessed as undivided that a partition, whether total or partial, has taken place. among the members of such family, the Income-tax Officer shall make an inquiry tbereinto after giving notice of the inquiry to all the members of the family. ·\n\n(3) On the completion of the inquiry, the Income-tax Officer shall record a finding as to whether there has been a total or par\\ial partition of the joint family property, and, if there has been such a partition, the date on which it has taken place.\n\n(4) Where a finding of total or partial partition has been recorded by the Income-tax Officer under\n\nkALLOOMAL v,. C1l.'I'. ( Venkat\"romlalr, i.)\n\nthis section; and th.e partition. took place during the previous year :\n\n(a) the total income or the joint family in respect or the period up to the-date of partition shall be assessed ai ir no partition had taken place; and\n\n(b) each member or group or members shall, in\n\n addition to any tax for which he or it may be separately -liable ad ntwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) or section IO, be jointly and severally liable for the tax on the income so assessed.\n\n(5) Where a finding or total or partial partition has\n\nbten recorded-· by the Income-tax Officer under thM section; and the• pactition took place arter the expiry of the• previous year, the total income or tilt previo111 year. or the joint farnily shall be assessed as if no partitionhaMaken place, and the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (4) shall, so\n\nfir a•maybei apply to the case.\n\n(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section\n\nif-the .Income.tax. Oftlcer findthafter completion of the assessment of a Hindu undivided family that the family has already effected a partition, whether total or partial, the Income-fax, Ofllcer shall proceed to recover the tax, from every person who was a member of the family before and partition, and every such person shall< be jointly and severally liable forthe tax on the<incomeso a!l6essed.\n\n(7) For the purposes. of this. section, the several liability of any member or group. of members thereunder shall be computed according to the portion of. the jqirit family property allotted to him or it at the partition, whether total -0r partial.\n\n(Ii). The provisions of tbi~ section shall, so far as may . be, apply in-relation to the levy.and colleotion, of\n\n[1982] :i s.c.fl.\n\nany penalty, interest, fine or other s.um in respect of any period up to the date, of the partition, whether total or partial, of a Hindu undivided family as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of tax in .respect of any such period.\n\nExplanation- In this section-\n\n(a) \"partition\" means-\n\n(i) where the property admit of a physical <livision, a physical division of the property, but a physical division of the income without a physical division of the property producing the income shall not be deemed to be a partition; or\n\n(ii) where the property does not admits of a physical division then such division as the poperty admits of, but a mere severance of status shall not be deemed to be a partition;\n\n(b) \"partial partition\" means a partition which is partial as regards the persons constituting the Hindu undivided family, or the properties belonging to the Hindu undivided family, or both.\"\n\nSection 4 (I) of the Act which levies the charge of income-tax states that where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, income-tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case may be, of every person. The expression 'person' is defined in section 2 (31) of the Act as including within its meaning a Hindu undivided family.\n\nIn order to. avoid double taxation of the same income under the Act, any sum received by an individual s a member of a Hindu undivided family where such sum has been paid out of the income of the family is required by section 10 (2) of the Act not to be included in computing the total income of a previous year of any person. This requirement, however, is subject to section 64 (2) of the Act with effect from April I, 1971. Then follows section 171 of the Act which\n\n< .\\ '\n\nkAi.tooMAL v. C i.T. (Venkataramiqh, 1.)\n\nprovides for the assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided A family.\n\nUnder Hindu law partition may be either total or partial. A partial partition may be as regards persons who are members of the family or as regards properties which belong to it.\n\nWhere there has been a partition, it is presumed that it was a total one both as to the parties aad property but when there is a partition between brothers, there is no presumption that there has been partition between one of them and his descendants. It is, however, open to a party who alleges that the partition has been partial either as to persons or as to property to establish it. The decision on that question depends on . proof of what the parties intended whether they intended the partition to be partial either as to persons or as to properties or as to both. When there is partial partition as to property, the family ceases to be undivided so far as properties in respect of which such partition has taken place but continues to be undivided with regard to the remaining family property. After such partial partition, the rights of inheritance and alienation differ accordingly as the property in question belongs to the members in their divided or undivided capacity .. Partition can be brought about (l) by a father during his lifetime between himself and his sons by dividing proper ties equally amongst them, (2) by agreement or (3) by a suit or arbitration. A declaration of intention of a coparcener to become divided brings about severance of status. As observed by the Privy Council in Appovier v. Rama Subba Aivan(1)\" when the members of an undivided family agree among ihemselves with regard to a particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership, in certain defined shares, then the character of undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken away from the subject-matter\n\nso agreed to be dealt with, and in the estate each member thenceforth a definite and certain share, which he may claim the right to receive and to enjoy in severalty, although the property itself has not been actually severed arid divided\". A physical division of the property which is the subject-matter of partition is not necessary to complete the process of partition in so far as that item of proper4y is concerned under Hindu Jaw. The parties to the partition may enjoy the property in question as teaots in common. In Approvier's case (supra)· the Privy Council further laid down that \"if there be a conversion of the joint tenancy of an\n\n(l) [1866] 11 MIA 75.\n\n28 SUl'RBMB Couat, RBPOllTS [1!182] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nundivided .family into a tenancy in common of the members of that undivided family, the undivided family becomes a divided family• with reference to the property that is the subject of that agreement, and that is a separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by de facto actual division of the subject matter. This may, at any time, be claimep by virtue of the separate right.\"\n\nIt is thus clear that Hindu Jaw does not require that the pro perty must in every case be partitioned by metes and bounds or physically into different portions to complete a partition. Disrup lion of status can be brought about by any of the modes referred to above and it is open to the parties to enjoy their share of pro perty as tenants-in-common in any manner known to law according to their desire. But the income-tax law introduces certain conditions of its own to give effect to the partition under section 171 of the Act. ·\n\nSection 171 of the Act applies to a case Vi here there is a Hindu undivided family which had been assessed as such under the Act until a claim is made under section 171(2) that there has been a partition-total or partial in it. The partition contemplated under section 171 of the Act may be either total or partial. Here there is a departure made f.om section 25A of the 1922 Act which wa.s concerned with a total partition only. In sub-sections (2) to (5) and (8) of section 171 of the Act, the word 'partition' is qualified by words 'total or partial'. The Explanation to section 171 of the\n\nAct to which we shall revert again also defines the expression 'partial partition' as meaning a partition which is partial as regards the persons constituting the Hindu undivided family, or the properfies belonging to the Hindu undivided family, or both.\n\nSubsection (2) of section 171 provides that where at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or section 144 of the Act it is claimed by or on be1ialf of any member of a Hindu undivided family assessed as undivided that a partition, whether total or partial, has taken place among the members of such family, the Incometax Officer shall make an inquiry into the said claim after giving notice to all the members of the family, On the completion of the inquiry, the Income-tax Officer is required by sub-section (3) of section 171 to record a finding as to whether the claim of partition, total or partial is true or not and if tl. ere has been such a partition, the date on which it has taken pla, e.\n\nSub-section (4). of section 171 states that when a finding of total or partial partition bas been\n\n--..\n\n~· '\n\nKALLOOMAL v. c.E.T. ( Venkatarmiah, J.) 29\n\nrecorded by the Income-tax Officer and the partition had taken place during the previous year the total income of the joint family in respect of the period upto the date of partition shall be assessed as if no partition had taken place and each member or group of members shall in addition to any tax for which he or it may be separately liable and notwithstanding anything contained in clause\n\n(2) of section 10 be jointly and severally liable to the tax on the income so assessed Where the finding recorded is that the partition had taken place after the expiry of the previous year then the joint family has to be assessed under sub.section .(5) of section 17 J as if no partition had taken place and the tax shall be recoverable mutatis mutandis as provided in clause (b) of sub-section ( 4) thereof. The several liability of a member or a group of the undivided family has .to be determined under sub-section (7) of section 171 according to the share of family property allotted to him or to the group, as the case may be. Sub-section (8) of section 171 extends the above rules of assessment and liability to levy and collection of any penalty, interest, fine etc. payable by the family upto the date of partition. Sub-section (6) of section 171 which contains\n\n-11non ob&tante clause empowers the Income-tax Officer to recover the tax due from a family from e.very member of the family before the partition even if he finds after the completion of assessment that the family has undergone a partition already. The true effect of this provision is discussed in Govinddas & Ors. v. Income-tax Officer & Anr, (1)\n\nNow we come to sub-section (I) of section 171 of the Act which contains a 'deeming' provision. It says that a Hindu family hitherto assessed as undivided shall be deemed for the purposes of the Act to continue to be a Hindu undivided family except where and.in.so far•as a finding of partition has been recorded in respect of.it under.section 171. Partition referred to here can obviously include a partial partition also either as regards the persor; s constituting .the undivided family or the properties belonging to it or both, in view of the provisions contained in the other sub-sections in and the Explanation to section 171.\n\nWhere there is no claim that a partition-total or partial had taken place made or where it is made and disallowed a Hindu undivided family which is hitherto being assessed as such will have to be assessed as such notwithstanding the fact a i:>art\\tion had jq fapt taken place\n\n, (I) (1976] 103 ITR 123.\n\nas per Hindu law.\n\nA finding to the effect that partition had taken place has to be recorded under sectionjl 71 by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nHe can record such a finding only if the partition in question satisfies the definition of the expression 'partition' found in Explanation to section 171.\n\nA transaction can be recognised as a partition under section 171 only if, where the property admits of a physical division, a physical division of the property has taken place.\n\nIn such a case mere physical division of the income without a physical division of the property producing income cannot be treated as a partition. Even where the property does not admit of a physical division theri. such division as the property admits of should take place to satisfy the test of a partition under section 171.\n\nMere proof of severance of status under Hindu law is not sufficient to treat such a transaction as a partition. If a transaction does not satisfy the above additional conditions it cannot be treated as a partition under the Act even though under Hindu law there has been a partition total or partial.\n\nThe consequence will be that the undivided family will be continued to be assessed as such by reason of sub-section (1) of section 171.\n\nAt this stage one contention urged on behalf of the assessee needs. to be considered.\n\nIt is asserted on behalf of the assessee that the fiction contained in section 171 ( 1) of the Act does not at all apply to an undivided family which continues to be in fact an undivided family even after a partial partition as regards some of its properties had taken place. The argument is that a 'deeming' provision can operate only where the real state of affairs is different from what the law deems as existing and it can not where the real state of affairs is the same as the one which law by a fiction treats as existing. It is urged that since the undivided family in fact continues ev :n after a partial partition as regards property, there is no need to enact a rule declaring that it shall be deemed to continue as an undivided family.\n\nHence section 171(1) of the Act cannot be construed as being applicable to such a case.\n\nIn other words;· it is urged that where all the members of an undivided family continue to be members of such family owning the remaining properties which are yielding income after a partial partition as regards some properties has taken place, the undivided family is liable to be assessed as such only in respect of the income derived by it from the remaining items of property owned by it and the income derived properties which have gone out of the ownership of the family by reason of the partial partition should be excluded from the total jncome of the family.\n\nReliance is placed on the following obser•\n\n-r·\n\nKALLOOMAL v. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 31\n\nvations of the Privy Council in the case of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia (supra) where sub.section (3) of section 25A of the 1922 Act arose for consideration :\n\n\"!he section has nothing to say about t4e Hindu undivided family which continues in existence never having been disrupted. Such a case is outside sub-sectiori (3) because it is not within the section at all. No sub-section is required to enable an undivide'1 family which has never been .broken up to be deemed to continue. But it need not have the same assets or the same income in each year and it can part with an item of its property to its individual members if it takes the proper steps.\"\n\nIt is not necessary to make any comment on these observa- \\ions as they had held the field until the Act came into force with section 171 inserted in it. The Parliament enacted section 171 a(ter taking note of the above decision and several other decisions f qllowing it which had taken the view that a partial partition did not fall within the scope of section 25-A. It expressly stated in section 171 of the Act that the said provision was applicable to bo.th kinds of partitions-total or partial, It has also defined partial partition as one which is partial as regards persons constituting the undivided family or .as regards the properties belonging to the undivided family or both. Virtually the preseat provision deals with all kinds of partitions the nature .of which sometimes may be difficult to predicate correctly. Take a joint family consisting of a father, his sons and grandsons as shown in the following genealogical tree :\n\nI I I I I I I I B c D I I I I I I I I I '1 I I I I E F G H I J\n\n. When a partition takes place in the above family there may be a partition when all of them-A. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J . . . .\n\n32 SUPRBMI! COURT 4UlPOR1S • (1982) 3 S.C-ll.\n\nbecome divided each of them taking •.hit rightfill sharc in• therfitnily property. 'In this case there is a total partition. The llellOlld kind of partition may be amongst four \"groups, the first coaslitiug of A only, the second consisting of B, E and F, the third consisting of C, G and H and the fourth consisting of D, land J . each croup taking one fourth share in all the pto\"perties a:tid the<brao.bh of B, the branch of C, and the branch of D continuing af utidivided\n\nfamilies. The third kind of partition may be a pittition where any one of the three branches the branch of ''B, or the branch of C, or the branch of D separates from the rest of the family taking its share thus te1Ulting in two undivided families one_ family which bas gone out of the family and the other consisting of the remaining members. In these cases the l)llrtition can be call:d partial both as regards persons and as regards properties. The next kind of part'ition may be one where al£ themembers divide amongst themselves only Sollie of the family propcrtles'arld continue asmembers of an undivided family owning the remainitig family properties.\n\nThis is called a partial partition \"as regrids property. Even here the division of the property whieb is subt matter of partial partition may be groupwise also. In the case ofa partial partition as regards property, one thing noticeable is that after such partition, the properly whieh is the subject matter of partition is held by the members Of the family as tenants-in'common and the rest of the family properties continue to be held by them as members of the undivided family.\n\nThis is the very principle \\i/hichis expounded by the Privy Council in Appovler' s case (supra) in lhc two passages extracted above.\n\nAfter a partial partition as regards property, the property divided is held by the members of the undivided family as divided members with all the incidents flowing therefrom and. the property not so 1 divided as member; or an undivided family.\n\nThe fiction enacted in section 171(1) of the Act con, therefore, operate in such a case also because the family whihb has become divided as regards the• property which is the subject-matter of partial partition is deemed to continue as the owner of that property and the recipient of the income derived from it except where and in so far as a finding of partition has been given under section I 71.\n\nIn such acase it is obvious the real state of affairs is in fact different from what is created by the fiction and it cannot be said that there is no occasion for the fidtion -to operate. Thal'is the true meaning , of 'Rllli<>n 171 (I) 'of' the' Act. ! Iaivicw i>f'the°'8ubstaatial cllanses: thatrare1\"roa1ilt\n\n• ' )\n\n• ICALLOOMAL v .. -0.1.T, (Jllfkalaromiah, J.)\n\nabout in section 171, we find it impos&ible to accept the contention that the fiction in section 171 (I) or the Actdoes not operate in the case of partial partitions as regards property where the composition\n\nofthefamily has remained unchanged.\n\nThe answer to the first question referred to the High Court by the Tribunal depends upon the true construction of sub-clause (i) of claU!ie (a)''of the l!xplanatio11 to eeetion 171• of the Act. The subject rnltt.er of partial partition as I1ietitioned\"earlier, consisted of eighteen •items of i!llml>table property. 'The value of each of them is given in . the ellrlier p'1't of: this •judgment. Under the • partial partition in\n\n.question, six penons were \"allo'ttdd I/ £2th share each in these :eJgtiteen:proptrtie1fand four pei'lk!ds•wereallotted ]/8ih share each.\n\n>The; totlll value of the'i!i&hn properties \\\\tas1Rs. 7;26, 120. Six of the membera•were, therefore,• entitled to properties of the value of 'Rs. fiO; SIO/\" each atid four orthdtn wewentitllid' to properties or the\n\nvalueiof Rs. 91),705-eaeh. Before the Tribunaltwo snbmissions were made on •behalf of the astessee in support of the ple1fthat the arrange ment entered into llmongsf the parties providing for division of the income of the properties in uestioo without Teiorting to physical <livisioo of the properties was a partition as defined by the Bxplanadon to section 171 of the Act. The first'Sublllission was that the -.Votd 'protierty' occurring in clause .(a) (i} of the Bxplanation to\n\nset'!ion 171 refettc!d to an individual item of property which is 'divided and not to all the properties which are divided at the partition-total or partial-arid hence as it had been accepted by the\n\nDepartment that each of the eighteen items •of property could not be divided conveniently oiiito 1en portionwithout destroying its utility ii had to 'be held 'that 'the properties did not admit of physical 'division. The secdrid sublllissi~ whicb\"Was urged in the alternative .was that even if it was posble to distribute 1he said properties\n\neqliitlibly-amotlgst the 'shares by asking them to make necessary m<mbtary adjustment to equalise the shares as the Explanation to seetion 171 did not contempleteany .such monetary adjustment, the a.ssessee could nbt 'be denied under section 171 the recognition of the 'ji&.rtial p$rtition which bad taken place as per Hindu law.' In support\n\nof this plea the a'ssessee depended •upon' the opinion Of the arbitrator 'Tandon, on the basis of wlrose award the decree had been passed atld also the evidence bf Lakshman Swaroop tendered before the 'Appellate Assistant ComttliSsiotier. Taking into consideration all 'the ma:te-rillf'herore themand having tegard to the shares allotted to each of the members, the ma, r]\\et vi1lue, sitqation1 sie ; and the ae\n\nof each of the items of the,-property in question, the tax payable in respect of each of them and also the fact whether an item of property is in the occupation of a tenant or .not, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was possible to divide the properties in question physically into different lots so 'that each member could take his rightful share in them. The High Court also has expressed the same opinion.\n\nOn the facts and in the circumstances. of the case, we approve of the above view of the High Court.\n\nWe feel that the properties involved in this case admit\\ed of physical division into the required number of shares and such division would not have adversely affected their utility. It is common knowledge that in every partition under Hindu law unless the parties agree to enjoy the properties as tenants in-common, the need for division of the family properties by metes and bounds arises and in that process physical division of several items of property which admit of such physical division does take place. It is not necessary to divide each item into the number of shares to be allotted at a partition. If a large number of items of property are .there, they are usually . apportioned on an equitable basis having regard to all relevant factors and if necessary by a•king the parties to make payments of money to equalise the shares. Such apportionment is also a kind of physical division of the properties contemplated in the Explanation to section 171. Any other view will be one divo1ced from the realities of life.\n\nThe case before us Is not a case where it was impossible to make such a division.\n\nNor is it shown that the members were not capable of making payment of any amount for equalisation of shares.\n\nWe are of the view that there is no material iµ the case sb, owing that the assessee ever seriously attempted to make a physical division of the property as required by law. All that was attempted was to rely upon the arbitrator's award and Lakshman swaroop's evidence which were rightly held to be insufficient by the Tribunal to uphold the claim of the assessee. The assessee cannot derive any assistance from the decision of this Court in Charand1s Haridas Anr. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North. Kutch and Saurarhtra, Ahmeda- . bad, and Anr.(1) There the item of asset which had to be partitioned was the right in certain managing agency agreements. The Court upheld the arrangement of division of commission amongst the members among whom the said right was divided as a partition satisfying the test laid down by the income-tax law as it was of the view that any physical division ol that right meant the dissolution of\n\n(I) (1960) 39 I.T.R. 203.\n\nKALLOOMAL v. C.l.T. (V'enkataramiah, J.) 35\n\nthe managing agency firms and their reconstitution which was not altjgether in the hands of the 'karta of the family.\n\nThe Court also was satisfied that the family took the fullest measure possible for dividing the joint interest into separate interests. In the present case we are satisfied that no such attempt to divide the properties was made. This case clearly falls under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of the Explanation to section 171 of the Act but does not satisfy the requirement of that sub-clause as no physical division of the properties was made even though they could be conveniently so divided.\n\nSub-clause (ii) thereof does not apply to this case at all.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the answer given by the Higli Court to the first question in the affirmative. The appeal of the assessee is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.\n\nHaving held that the assessee was not entitled to claim a partial partition had taken place under section 171, the High Court . fell into an error in holding that the income of the properties which were the subject matter of partial partition could not be included in the total income of the assessee by relying upon the decisions which had been rendered on the basis of seetion 25-A of the 1922 Act which had been construed as not being applicable to partial partitio'!s. We have already held that section I'll of the Act applies to all partitions-total and partial-and that unless a finding is recorded under section 171 that a partial partition has taken place tbe income from the properties should be included in the total income of the family by virtue of sub-section (I) of section 171 of the Act. To put it in other words what would have been the position of a Hindu undivided family which had claimed in an assessment proceedings under the l 922 Act. that a total partition had taken place and had (ailed to secure a finding to that effect in its favour under section 25-A thereof would be the position of a Hindu undivided family which has failed to substantiate its plea of partial partition as regards property under section 17 l of the Act. The property which is the subject-matter of partial partition would continue to be treated as belonging .o the family and its income would continue to be included in its total income until such a finding is recorded. That is .the true effect of section 171 (l}. It was, however, urged on the analogy of the income from a family property alienated by a karta in favour ofa stranger that the income which was not iJ, Ctually received by the f<111!ilY col!ld not be taxed l!nd in support of . ' -. ,-\n\nD .\n\n36 SUPRBMB COURT lllll'ORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.11.\n\nA this plea reliance was placed on a decision of the Madras High Court 'in A. Kannan Chetty v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(!)\n\nIn. that decision it is observed thus : •\n\n'.'For instance, if the karta.of a f!lmily effects an alieoa tion or even makes , a gift. in so far as tho tuing department is concerned it is the income of the members of the Hindu undivided family that can be assessed, and if by reason of an alienation, whether it is binding upon the members of the joint family or not, an item of property ceases to be in the hands of the joint family, it would not be open to the department to say that they would ignore such an alienation, notwith standing that the possession of the properties and its income may pass into the hands of a stranger. It may be different in cases where the joint \\family deals with one or more items of property or converts it into a different estate retaining both possession and income in its own hands.\n\nThat may properly be a case where the departmnt may ignore such a transaction.\"\n\nIt is significant that in the passage extracted above the Madras High Court has distinguished the case of an alienation in favour of a stranger from the case where the joint family deals with one or more items of property or converts it into a different estate retaining both possession and income in its own hands. We do not consider that such a plee is available to the assessee because the acceptance of such a plea would lead to the nullification of the scheme of section 171 of the Act itself. As long as a finding is not recorded under section 171 holding that a partial partition had taken place the Hindu undivided family should be deemed for the purposes of the Act to be the owner of the property which is the subject matter of partition and also the recipient of the income from such property.\n\nThe assessment should be made as such and the tax assessed can be recovered as provided in the Act. Io the circumstances, the decision of the High Court on the 'second question has to be reversed. We accordingly record our answer to the second question in the affirmative and in favour of.the Department.\n\n. (IJ [19631 SO {.T.R.. 601, .\n\nv---' '\n\nltALLOOMAL V. C.I.T. ('Venkataramiah, J,) 37\n\nIn the reeult, CiviLAppeal. No. 1370. of 1914is dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 1768 of 1975 is.l!llowed. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Department. Hearing fee one set.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nCivil Appeal 1370(1974 dismissed and Civil Appeal 1768/1975 allowed.", "total_entities": 174, "entities": [{"text": "r\n\nKALLOOMAL TAPESWARI PRASAD (HUF), KANPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALLOOMAL TAPESWARI PRASAD (HUF), KANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1152, "end_char": 1168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 1, 1963 which fell within the assessment year 1964.65 there was another."}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 1994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3682, "end_char": 3693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4839, "end_char": 4850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 11, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held : (I) that even though the eighteen properties could not individually be divided into ten Shares without destroying their utility but .after assessing the value of the properties they could be apportioned betwCen the ten members and the difference in the allocations could be equalised by payment of cash amounts by one to the other and in view of clause (a) (i) of the Explanation to section 171, mere severance of status was not sufficient for recording a fin ding of partition; and (2) that tbe income accruing from the eighteen immovable properties after December 11, 1963 was oot liable to be included in the computation of the joint Hindu Family's income."}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KALLOOMAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such a case mere physical\n\n'\"' )-\n\nKALLOOMAL V. C.J.T. 11\n\ndivision of the income without a physical division of the property producing income cannot be treated as a partition.", "canonical_name": "KALLOOMAL"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7593, "end_char": 7604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8222, "end_char": 8232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8353, "end_char": 8364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9774, "end_char": 9785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10283, "end_char": 10294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10714, "end_char": 10725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11082, "end_char": 11093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11464, "end_char": 11475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12497, "end_char": 12507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whm Parliament enacted section 171 it took note of tho decisions which had taken the view that a partial partition did not fall within the scope of section 25A. It exprcgly stated in se>etion 171 of the Act that the said provision\n\"\n~\n\nKALLOOMAL •. C.l."}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12516, "end_char": 12527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12641, "end_char": 12652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14970, "end_char": 14981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.T. Desai J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16575, "end_char": 16601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai J.B. Dadachanji and K.J. John for the Appellant in C.A. 13;0/74 and for Respondent in C.A. 1768/75."}}, {"text": "K.J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16606, "end_char": 16615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai J.B. Dadachanji and K.J. John for the Appellant in C.A. 13;0/74 and for Respondent in C.A. 1768/75."}}, {"text": "V.S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16687, "end_char": 16697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Miss A. Subhashini, K. C. Dua and S. P. Nayar for • the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Miss A. Subhashini, K. C. Dua and S. P. Nayar for • the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16719, "end_char": 16728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Miss A. Subhashini, K. C. Dua and S. P. Nayar for • the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16733, "end_char": 16744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai, Miss A. Subhashini, K. C. Dua and S. P. Nayar for • the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16867, "end_char": 16880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. These two appeals by certificate-one by the assessee and the other by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Kanpur are filed against the judgment and order dated September 29, 1972 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Income-tax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "section 256(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17150, "end_char": 17164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17246, "end_char": 17303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') made by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad (for short '1he Tribunal')."}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17673, "end_char": 17684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Incometax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17692, "end_char": 17711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandoolal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Chandoolal"}}, {"text": "I Bishambhar Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18664, "end_char": 18681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram."}}, {"text": "Sitaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18740, "end_char": 18747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram."}}, {"text": "Gopalji Ramji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18795, "end_char": 18808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Gopalji Ramji"}}, {"text": "Jagat Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18812, "end_char": 18824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Jagat Narain"}}, {"text": "Roop Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18828, "end_char": 18839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Roop Narain"}}, {"text": "Kripa Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram."}}, {"text": "Swamp Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19022, "end_char": 19034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Swamp Narain"}}, {"text": "Shyam Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19036, "end_char": 19048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Swamp Narain"}}, {"text": "Bimal Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19053, "end_char": 19065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree represents the relationship amongst the\n\nmembers of the family : C\n\nI I Chandoolal (His wifo Rampiari died on 17.9.63)\n\nPhakki Lal\n\nI I Bishambhar Nath (died issueless in 1940-wife 1 predeceased him)\n\nI I\n\nI I Sitaram (wifeKripa\n\nDevi)\n\nI I I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I\n\nGopalji Ramji\n\nI Jagat Narain\n\nI Roop Narain\nI Swamp Narain\n\nI I Sh yam Bimal Narain Narain\n\nDuring the relevant previous year, the family consisted of Chandoolal, Sitaram and his wife Kripa Devi, Jagat Narain, Roop Narain, Swamp Narain, Shyam Narain and Bimal Narain who were the five sons of Chandoolal and Gopalji and Ramji, the two Sons of Sitaram."}}, {"text": "December II, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19944, "end_char": 19961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on December II, 1963 which fell within the previous year relevant for the assessment year in question i.e. 1964-65, according to the assessee, there was another partial partition orally as a result of which its eighteen immovable properties were divided amongst the ten members of the family and that they held those properties as tenants-in-common from that date."}}, {"text": "KALLOOMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21154, "end_char": 21163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7,26,120/·\n\n• -1-\n\nKALLOOMAL v. 0.1.T. (Vmkataramiah, J.) 17\n\nWhen requiredby the Incometax Officer to explain as to why the properties were not divided in definite portions as required by section 17 l of the Act, the assessee stated that physical division of the properties in question amongst the ten members was impossible and the only possible way to partition those properties was to define their respective shares and to enjoy the income from them separatly.", "canonical_name": "KALLOOMAL"}}, {"text": "Vmkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21175, "end_char": 21187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7,26,120/·\n\n• -1-\n\nKALLOOMAL v. 0.1.T. (Vmkataramiah, J.) 17\n\nWhen requiredby the Incometax Officer to explain as to why the properties were not divided in definite portions as required by section 17 l of the Act, the assessee stated that physical division of the properties in question amongst the ten members was impossible and the only possible way to partition those properties was to define their respective shares and to enjoy the income from them separatly.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21324, "end_char": 21334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.B. Tandon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21708, "end_char": 21719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the above claim the assessee relied upon a copy of an award dated April 15, 1964 made by one S.B. Tandon which was made into a decree in Suit No."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21837, "end_char": 21855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60 of 1964 on the file of the Court\n\nof the First Civil Judge, Kanpur dated September 21, 1964."}}, {"text": "Incomelax", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22414, "end_char": 22423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of the Income-tax Officer, the assessec filed an appeal before the /\\ppellate Assistant Commissioner of Incomelax."}}, {"text": "Lakhsman Swaroop", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22514, "end_char": 22530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of that appeal the assessee appointed another arbitrator by the name Lakhsman Swaroop, a retired Chief Engineer to examine the posssibility of a physical division of each of the eighteen properties into ten portions and if that was not possible to suggest any other mode or modes to divide them into ten parts in accordance with the share allotted to each of the parties to the partition.", "canonical_name": "Lakhsman Swaroop"}}, {"text": "February 3, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22853, "end_char": 22869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated February 3, 1965, Lakshman Swarwp stated tl1at the aforesaid properties were \"not capable of physical division into ten shares by metes and bounds and that any practical division is that of allocation of proportionate shares in all the 18 properties in question.\""}}, {"text": "Lakshman Swarwp", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22871, "end_char": 22886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated February 3, 1965, Lakshman Swarwp stated tl1at the aforesaid properties were \"not capable of physical division into ten shares by metes and bounds and that any practical division is that of allocation of proportionate shares in all the 18 properties in question.\"", "canonical_name": "Lakhsman Swaroop"}}, {"text": "Chandoomal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23231, "end_char": 23241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandoomal and his five sons had been allotted l/ 12th each and Sitaram, his wife and his two sons had been allotted l /4th each.", "canonical_name": "Chandoolal"}}, {"text": "Lakshman Swaroop", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23361, "end_char": 23377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshman Swaroop was also examined as a witness before the Appellate Assistant Com missioner by the assessee and cross-examined by the Incometax Officer.", "canonical_name": "Lakhsman Swaroop"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24191, "end_char": 24202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 256(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24318, "end_char": 24332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25650, "end_char": 25658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25709, "end_char": 25717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25879, "end_char": 25887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26111, "end_char": 26119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26755, "end_char": 26763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26811, "end_char": 26818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1 lth December, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27279, "end_char": 27299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the oral partition dated 1 lth December, 1963."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27812, "end_char": 27826, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27918, "end_char": 27927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "laid down that where any Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27945, "end_char": 27981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28286, "end_char": 28296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act", "statute": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28521, "end_char": 28531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act", "statute": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS\n\n[ 1982] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28542, "end_char": 28582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 25-A was\n\n20 SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS\n\n[ 1982] 3 S.C.R;\n\ninserted in the 1922 Act in the year 1928 providing for the machi- .nery for assessmdnt after partition of a Hindu undivided family."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28911, "end_char": 28921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act", "statute": "Act\n\nlaid down that where any Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30109, "end_char": 30119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30400, "end_char": 30410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30551, "end_char": 30564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L v. C.I T. (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nshall be liable jointly has severally for the tax assessed on the total income received by or on behalf of the joint family as such.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30913, "end_char": 30923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31221, "end_char": 31232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31391, "end_char": 31404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31930, "end_char": 31940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beaument", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32326, "end_char": 32334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In (Jordhandas T. Manga/das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay,(') Kania, J. (as be then was) who agreed with Beaument, C.J. explained the scheme of section 25-A of the 1922 Act (as it stood then) in his concurring judgment thus :\n\n\"It is material to bear in mind the scheme of the Income-tax Act, in the first instance."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32365, "end_char": 32375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32498, "end_char": 32512, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32543, "end_char": 32559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32701, "end_char": 32711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33031, "end_char": 33041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33898, "end_char": 33908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33998, "end_char": 34015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking for the Court observed in the above case thus :-\n\n\"Now, when a claim is made under section 25-A, the points to be decided by the Income-tax Officer are whether there bas been.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34112, "end_char": 34122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34423, "end_char": 34433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34496, "end_char": 34506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35349, "end_char": 35359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35530, "end_char": 35540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36089, "end_char": 36099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36120, "end_char": 36130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36489, "end_char": 36499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36696, "end_char": 36706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37364, "end_char": 37375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37755, "end_char": 37766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37799, "end_char": 37809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38170, "end_char": 38181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38185, "end_char": 38196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41528, "end_char": 41537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41989, "end_char": 41998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42292, "end_char": 42302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42442, "end_char": 42452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42513, "end_char": 42524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Approvier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44998, "end_char": 45007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Approvier's case (supra)· the Privy Council further laid down that \"if there be a conversion of the joint tenancy of an\n\n(l) [1866] 11 MIA 75.", "canonical_name": "Approvier"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46102, "end_char": 46113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46129, "end_char": 46140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46286, "end_char": 46300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46390, "end_char": 46401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46481, "end_char": 46492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46597, "end_char": 46608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46703, "end_char": 46714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46997, "end_char": 47008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47071, "end_char": 47082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47086, "end_char": 47097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47507, "end_char": 47518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47711, "end_char": 47722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48248, "end_char": 48258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48498, "end_char": 48508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48767, "end_char": 48778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48893, "end_char": 48904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49085, "end_char": 49096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49497, "end_char": 49508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49798, "end_char": 49809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50083, "end_char": 50094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50683, "end_char": 50694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50750, "end_char": 50761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51190, "end_char": 51201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51629, "end_char": 51640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51801, "end_char": 51812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52485, "end_char": 52499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sir Sunder Singh Majithia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53274, "end_char": 53299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is placed on the following obser•\nr·\n\nKALLOOMAL v. C.I.T. (Venkataramiah, J.) 31\n\nvations of the Privy Council in the case of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia (supra) where sub.section (3) of section 25A of the 1922 Act arose for consideration :\n\n\"!"}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53333, "end_char": 53344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54010, "end_char": 54021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54061, "end_char": 54072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54238, "end_char": 54248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54275, "end_char": 54286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Appovler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56758, "end_char": 56766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the very principle \\i/hichis expounded by the Privy Council in Appovler' s case (supra) in lhc two passages extracted above.", "canonical_name": "Approvier"}}, {"text": "section 171(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57090, "end_char": 57104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ICALLOOMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57787, "end_char": 57797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iaivicw i>f'the°'8ubstaatial cllanses: thatrare1\"roa1ilt\n\n• ' )\n\n• ICALLOOMAL v .. -0.1.T, (Jllfkalaromiah, J.)\n\nabout in section 171, we find it impos&ible to accept the contention that the fiction in section 171 (I) or the Actdoes not operate in the case of partial partitions as regards property where the composition\n\nofthefamily has remained unchanged."}}, {"text": "Jllfkalaromiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57812, "end_char": 57826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iaivicw i>f'the°'8ubstaatial cllanses: thatrare1\"roa1ilt\n\n• ' )\n\n• ICALLOOMAL v .. -0.1.T, (Jllfkalaromiah, J.)\n\nabout in section 171, we find it impos&ible to accept the contention that the fiction in section 171 (I) or the Actdoes not operate in the case of partial partitions as regards property where the composition\n\nofthefamily has remained unchanged."}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57842, "end_char": 57853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57922, "end_char": 57933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59214, "end_char": 59225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60122, "end_char": 60133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62113, "end_char": 62124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshman swaroop", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62626, "end_char": 62642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that was attempted was to rely upon the arbitrator's award and Lakshman swaroop's evidence which were rightly held to be insufficient by the Tribunal to uphold the claim of the assessee.", "canonical_name": "Lakhsman Swaroop"}}, {"text": "Saurarhtra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 62906, "end_char": 62916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kutch and Saurarhtra, Ahmeda- ."}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63824, "end_char": 63835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64336, "end_char": 64347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64849, "end_char": 64860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65018, "end_char": 65029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65306, "end_char": 65316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65466, "end_char": 65476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65736, "end_char": 65747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 66095, "end_char": 66112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A this plea reliance was placed on a decision of the Madras High Court 'in A. Kannan Chetty v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(!)"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67545, "end_char": 67556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67619, "end_char": 67630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_2_272_364_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "A. K. ROY, ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.\n\nDecember 28, 1981\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P.N. BHAGWATJ A.C. GUPTA,\n\nV.D. TULZAPURKAR AND D.A. DESAI, JJ. )\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Constitution (Fortyforth Amendment) Act, 1978-Power conferred on exeoetive to appoint different dates for different provisions of the Act-If amou/l/s to transfer of legislative power to executive.\n\nOrdinance-Whether law-Whether President has power to issue Ordinances- ' National Security Ordinance-Validity of-Constitution of Advisory Boards under section 9 of the Act-Validity of.\n\nNatural Justice-Detenu under National Security Act-If entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner before Advisory Board-Detenu, if has a right to consult a lawyer, or be assisted by a friend before the Advisory .(Joardlf could cross-examine witnesses-If could present evidence before the Advisory Board in.rebuttal of o/legations against him-Duties and functions of Ad1•isory Boards-Proceedings of Advisory Board, if open to public.\n\nSection 1(2) of the Constitution (Fortyfourth Amendment) Act 1978 provides that \"It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act.\" Section 3 of the Act substituted a new clause (4) for the existing sub-clause (4) of Article 22. By a notificat:on the Central Government had brought into force all the sections of the Fortyfourth Amendment Act except section 3.\n\nJn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance 2 of 1980 which later became the National Securi1y Act 1980.\n\nThe petitioner wa s detained under the provisions of the Ordinance on the ground that he was in dulging in activities prejudicial to public order. In his petition under Article 32 of the Constilution the petitioner contended that the power to issue an Ordinance is an executive power, not legislative power, and the'refore the Ordinance is not law.\n\nHELO : [per Chandrachud, C.J., Bhagwati & Desai, JJ]\n\n[Gupta and Tulzarurkar, JJ dissented on the question of bringing into force section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Fortyfourth Amendment Act .. Gupta J, ?issented on the question whether or<li/1ance islaw].\n\n...\n\n, '-'\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA 273\n\nThe power of the President to issue an Ordinance under Article 123 of the A Constitution is a legislative and not an executive power.\n\nFrom a conspectus of the provisions of the Constitution it is clear that the Constituent Assembly was of the view that the President's power to legislate by issuing an Ordinance is as necessary for the peace and good government of the country as the Parliament's power to legislate by passing laws. The mechanics of the Presidents legislative power was devised evidently in order to take care of urgent situations which cannot brook delay. The Parliamentary process of legislation is comparatively tardy and can conceivably be time-consuming. It is true that it is not easy to accept with equanimity the proposition that the executive can indulge in legislative activity but the Constitution is what it says and not what one would like it to be. The Constituent Assembly indubitably thought, despite the strong a11d adverse impact which the Governor-General's Ordinancemaking power had produced on the Indian community in the pre-independence era, that it was necessary to equip the President with legislative powers in urgent situations. [290 E-G)\n\nR.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530, 559, referred to.\n\nThe contention that the word 'law in Article 21 must be construed to mean a law made by the legislature only and cannot include an Ordinance, contradicts directly the express provisions of Articles 123 (2) and 367 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nBesides, if an Ordinance is not law within the meaning of Article 21, it will stand released from the wholesome and salutary restraint imposed upon the legislative power by Article 13(2) of the Constitution. [292 G-H)\n\nThe contention that the procedure prescribed by an Ordinance cannot be equated with the procedure established by law is equally unsound. The word E 'established' is used in Article 21 in order to denote and ensure that the procedure prescribed by law must be defined with certainty in order that those who are deprived of their fundamental right to life or liberty must know the precise extent of such deprivation. f293 A-BJ\n\nThe argument of the petitioner that the fundamental right conferred by Article 21 cannot be taken away by an Ordinance really seeks to add a proviso to Article 123(1) to the effect: \"that such Ordinances shall not deprive any person of his right to life or personal liberty conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution.\" An amendment substantially to that effect moved in the Constituent\n\n~-s_\"_mbly was rejected by the <;:on.s!itµyl)t As~\"mbl~. [293 D-E]\n\nA.K. Gopala11 (1950) SCR 88, Sant Ram, [1960] 3 SCR 499, 506, State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh [1966] 3 SCR 830, 851, 852, Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (1975) 3 SCR 946, 955-56, Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Asstt.\n\nCollector of Customs, Bombay & Anr. [1967) 3 SCR 926, 928-931 and Pandit\n\nM.S.M. Sharma v.\n\nShri Sri Krisna Sinha & Anr. [1959) Supp. 1 SCR 806, :860-861, referred to.\n\nSince the petitioners have not laid any acceptable foundation for holding that no circumstances existed (lf ~Q!l)d heve, xisted which ren dere<:! it pei; essary\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n( 1982} 2 S.C.R\n\nA for the President to take immediate action by promulgating impugned Ordinance, the contention that the Ordinance is unconstitutional for the reason that the pre-conditions t<> the exercise of power conferred by Article 123 are not fulfilled, has no force. (298 DJ\n\nThere can be no doubt that personal liberty is a precious right. So did the founding fathers believe at any rate because, while their first object was to give unto the people a Constitution whereby a Government was established, their second object, equally important, wa< to protect the people against the Government. That is why, while conferring extensive powers on the Government like the power to declare an emergency, the power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights and the power to issue Ordinances, they assured to the people a Bill of Rights by Part III of the Constitution, protecting against executive and legislative despotism those human rights which they regarded as fundamental.\n\nThe imperative necessity to protect those rights is a lesson taught by all history and all human experience. And therefore, while arming the government with large powers to prevent anarchy from within and conquest from without, they took care to ensure that those powers were not abused to mutilate the liberties of the people. [300 B-D]\n\nSection 1(2) of the Fortyfourth Amendment Act is valid. There is no internal contradiction between the provisions of Article 368(2) and those of section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act. Article 368(2) lays down a rule of general application as to the date from which the Constitution would stand' amended in accordance with the Bill assented to by the President, section 1(2) of the Amendment Act specifies the manner in which that Act or any of its provisions may be brought into force. The distinction is between the Constitution standing amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill assented to by the President\n\nand the date of the coming into force of the Amendment thus introduced into the Constitution. For determining the date with effect from which the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill, one has to turn to the date on which the President gave, or was obliged to give, his assent to the Amendment. For determining the date with effect from which the Constitution. as amended, came or will come into force, one has to turn to the notification, if any, issued by the Central Government under section 1(2) of the Amendment Act. [310 D-F]\n\nThe contention raised by the petitioners, that the power to appoint a date for bringing into force a constitutional amendment is a constituent power and therefore it cannot be delegated to an outside agency is without force. It is true. that the constituent power, that is to say, the power to amend any provision of the Constitution ·.:by way of an addition, variation or repeal must be exercised by the Parliament itself and cannot be delegated to an outside agency. That is clear from Article 368(1) which defines at once the scope of the Constituent power of the Parliament and limits that power to the Parliament. The power to issue a notification for bringing into force the provisions of a Constitutional amendment is not a constituent power because, it does not carry with it the power to amend the Constitution in any manner. It is, the1efore, permissible to the Parliament to vest in an outside agency the power to\n\n)>rin~ a Co.nst_i.tuti9na) .mf!)dment ipto force. [312 C-E]\n\nA.k:. llOY v. i.JNiON OF iNDiA\n\nAlthough the 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President on April 30, 1979 and more than two and a half years have already gone by without the Central Government issuing a notification for bringing sectinn 3 of the Act into force, this Court cannot intervene by issuing a mandamus to the Central Government obligating it to bring the provisions of section 3 into force. The\n\nParliament having left this question to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government it is not f, ir th' Court to compel thc]Government to do that which according to the mandate of Parliament, lies in its discretion to do when it considers it opportune to do it.\n\nThe executive is responsible to the Parliament and if the Parliament considers that the executive has betrayed its trust by not bringing any provision of the Amendment into force, it can censure the executive. It would be quite anomalous that the inaction of the executive should have the approval of the Parliament and yet the court should show its disapproval of it by against mandamus.\n\n(314 G-H)\n\nIn leaving it to the judgment of the Central Government to decide as to when the various provisions of the 44th Amendment should be brought into force, the Parliament could not have intended that the Central Government may exercise a kind of veto over its constituent will by not ever bringing the Amendment or some of its provision into force.\n\nThe Parliament having seen the necessity of introducing into the Constitution a provision like section 3 of the 44th Amendment, it is not open to the Central Government to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy of that section. If only the Parliament were to lay down an objective standard to guide and control the discretion of the Central Government in the matter of bringing the various provisions of the Act into force, it would have been possible to compel the Central Government by an appropriate writ to discharge the function assigned to it by the Parliament. (316 B-D]\n\nExpressions like 'defence of India', 'security of India' security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers', mentioned in section 3 of the Act, are not of any great certainty or definiteness. But in the very nature of things they are difficult to define. Therefore provisions of section 3 of the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of their vagueness and certainty. However, since the concepts are not defined, undoubtedly because they are not capable of a precise definitions, courts must strive to give to those concepts a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest. While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act, care must be taken to restrict their application to as few situations as possible.\n\nIndeed, that can well be the unstated premise for upholding the constitutionally of clauses like those in section 3, which are fraught with grave consequences to personal liberty, if construed liberally.\n\n[324 E-H]\n\nG What is said in regard to the expressions 'defence of India', security of India', 'security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers' cannot apply to the expresssion \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community\" which occurs in section 3(2) of the Act. The particular clause in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act is capable of wanton abuse in that, the detaining authority can place H under detention any person for possession of any commodity on the basis that the authority is of the opinion that the maintenance of supply of that commodity\n\n276 stiPkEME cotJR'r REPORTS\n\n(1982J 2. S.C.R.\n\nis essential to the community. This particular clause is not only vague and uncertain but, in the context of the Explanation, capable of being extended cavalierly to supplies .. the maintenance of which is not essential to the community; To allow the personal liberty of the people to be taken away by the application of that c<ause would b~ a flagrant violation of the fairne<s and justness of procedure which is implidt in the provisions of Article 21.\n\nThe power given to detain persons under section 3(2) on the ground that they are acting in any manner prejuuicial 10 the mJintenance of supplies and services essential to the community cannot however be struck down because it is vitally necessary to ensure a steady flow of supplies and services which are essential to the community, and if the State has the power to detain persons on the ground; mentioned in section 3(1) and the other grounds mentioned in section 3(2), it must also have the power to pass ordor of detention on this particular ground. No person can be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community unless, by a law order or notification made or published fairly in advance, the supplies and services, the maintenance of which is regarded as essential to the community and in respect of which the order of detention is proposed to be passed, are made known appropriately, to the public. [325 A-C; 326 BC, FH]\n\nR. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970] 3 SCR 530, 559, Haradhan Saha, D [1975] l SCR 778, Khudiram, [1975] 2 SCR 832, Sambhu Nath Sarkar, (1974] 1 SCR I and Maneka Gandhi, ll\\.78] 2 SCR 621, explained.\n\nLaws of preventive detention cannot, by the backdoor, introduce procedural measures of a punitive kind.\n\nDetention without trial is an evil to be suffered, but to no greater extent and in no greater measure than is minimally necessary in the interest of the country and the community. It is neither fair nor just that a detenu should hav.e to suffer detention in \"such place\" as the Government may specify. The normal rule has to be that the detenu will be kept in detention in a place which is within the environs of his or her ordinary place of residence.\n\n[330 E-F]\n\nln order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should conform to the mandate of Article 21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness, it is imperative that immediately after a person is taken in custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his househo Id, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken in custody. Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention, including the place wbere the detenu is transferred from time to time. This Court has stated time and again that the person who is taken in custody does not forfeit, by reason of his arrest, a 11 and every one of his fundamental rights. It is, therefore, necessary to treat 1he detenu consisten1ly with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour.\n\n(331 C-D]\n\nSince section 3 has not been brought into force by the Central Government in the exercise of its powers under section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act, that section is still not a part of the Constitution. The question as to whether section 9 of the National Security Act is bad for the reason that it is inconsistent with the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act, has therefore to be decided on the basis that section 3, though a part of the 44th Amendment Act, is not\n\nA.k. ROY v. tiNiON OF INDiA\n\na part of the Constitution. If section 3 is not a part of the Constitution, it is difficult to appreciate how, the validity of section 9 of the National Security Act can be tested by applying the standard laid down in that section. It cannot possibly be that both the unamended and the amended provisions of Article 22(4) of the Constitution arc parts of the Constitution at one and the same time. So long as section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act has not been brought into force, Article 22(4) in its unamended form will continue to be a part of the Constitution and so long as that provision is a part of the Constitution, the amendment intro- B duced by section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act cannot become a part of the Constitution. Section 3 of the 44th Amendment substitutes a new article 22(4) for the old article 22(4). The validity of the constitution of Advisory Boards has therefore to be tsted in the light of th~ provisions contained in Article 22(4) as it stands now and not according to the amended article 22(4). [335 D-H]\n\nOn a combined reading of clauses (1) and (3)(b) of Article 22, it is clear C that the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practioner of one's choice, which is conferred by clause (1), is denied by clause (3)(b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Thus, according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself, no person who is detained under any law, which provides for preventive detention, can claim the right to consuli a legal practioner of his choice or to be defended by him. It is therefore difficult to hold, by the application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considera- D tion that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. [339 D-E]\n\nYet the fact remains that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. The reason behind the provisions contained in Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the _Advisory Board for any party. The Constitution does not contemplate thl!t the detaining authority or the Government should have the facility of appearing before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practioner but that the said facility should be deni!d to the detenu. In any case, that is not what the Constitution says and it would be wholly inappropriate to read any such meaning into the provisions of Article :l2.\n\nPermitting the detaining authority or the Government to appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser would be in breach of Article 14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. Therefore if the detaining authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner. [344 H; 345 A-CJ\n\nThe embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner. Every person whose interests are adversely affected as a result of the proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to be heard in those proceedings and be assisted by a friend.\n\nA detenu, taken straight from his cell to the Board's room, may lack the ease and composure to present his point of view. He may be \"tonguetied, nervous, confused or wanting in intelligence\" (see Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd.), and if justice is to be done he must at least have the help of a friend who can assist\n\nhim to give coherence to his stray and wandering ideas. [345 G-H]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.C.R.\n\nA In the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detenu has no right to\n\ncross-examine either the persons on the basis of whose statement the order of detention is made or the detaining authority.\n\n[352 DJ\n\nNew Prakash Transp?rt Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., [1957] SCR 98, 106, Nagendru Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, ( 1958] SCR 1240, 1261, State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, [1966] Suppl. SCR 401, 415, Union of.India v. T.R. Verma, [1958] SCR 499, 507 and Khen. Chand v. Union of India [19 59] SCR 1080, 1096, held inapplicable.\n\nThere can be no objection for the detenu to lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegation made against him before the Advisory Board. Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act contains any provision denying such a right to the detenu. The detenue may therefore offer oral and documentary evidence before the Advisory Board in order to rebut the allegations which are made against him. (352 EF]\n\nIt is not possible to accept the plea that the proceedings of the Advisory Bo3rd should be thrown open to the public. The right to a public trial is not one of rhe guaranteed rights under our Constitution. [354 C-D)\n\nPuranlal Lakhanpa/ v. Union of India, [1958) SCR 460, 475 and Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, (1952] SCR 612, 626, referred to.\n\nYet the Government must afford the detenus all reasonable facilities for an existence consistent with human dignity. They should be permitted to wear their own clothes, eat their own food, have interviews with the members of their fami- E lies at least once a week and, last but not the least, have reading and writing material according to their reasonable requirements. (355 B-C)\n\nPersons who are detained under the National Securty Act must be segregated from the convicts and kept in a separate part of the place of detention. It is hardly fair that those who are suspected of being engaged in prejudicial conduct should be lodged in the same ward or cell where the convicts whose crimes are established are lodged. [355 DJ\n\nSunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1980] 3 S CR 557 and Sampat Prakash\n\nv. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1969] 3 SCR 754, referred to.\n\n[per Gupta and Tulzapurkar, JJ dissenting]\n\nSection I (2) of the Constitution (Fortyfourth Amendment) Act 1978 cannot be construed to mean that Parliament ha~ left it to the unfettered discretion or judgment of the Central Government when to bring into force any provision of the amendment Act. After the President's assent, the Central Government was under an obligation to bring into operation the provisions of the Act within a reasonable time; the power to appoint dates for bringing into force the provisions of the Act was given to the Central Government obviously because it was not considered feasible to give affect to all the provisions immediately. But th\"'\n\n...\n\n...\n\nA.It. ROY v. UNION OF iNDiA 2.79\n\nCentral Government could not in its discretion keep it in a state of suspended animation for any length of time it pleased. [358 A-Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act to be made effective as early as possible. When more than two and half years have passed since the Amendment Act received the assent of the President, it is impossible to say that any difficulty should still persist preventing the Government from giving effect to section 3 of the Amendment Act. A provision like section 1(2) cannot be said to have empowered the executive to scotch an amendment of the Constitution passed by Parliament and assented to by the President. That Parliament is competent to take appropriate steps if it considered that the executive had betrayed its trust does not make the default lawful or.relieve this Court nf its duty. [359 B-C]\n\n[per Gupta. J. dissenting.]\n\nNormally it is the legislature that has the power to make laws. The nature of the legislative power of the President has to be gathered from the provisions of Article 123 and not merely from the heading of the chapter, \"Legislative Powers of the President\". When something is said to have the force and effect of an Act of Parliament that is because it is not really an Act of Parliament. Article 123(2) does not say that an ordinance promulgated under this article shall be deemed to be an Act of Parliament to make the two even fictionally identical.\n\nWhile an ordinance issued under Article 123 has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, under Article 357(l)(a) Parliament can confer on the President the power of the legislature of a State to make laws. The difference in the nature of power exercised by the President under Article 123 and under Article 357 is clear and cannot be ignored. [360 B, 361 B-C] .\n\nThe word \"establish\" in Article 21 as interpreted by this Court \"implies some degree of firmness, permanence and general acceptance\". An ordinance which ceases to operate on the happening of one of the conditions mentioned in Article 123(2) can hardly be said to have that \"firmness\" and \"permanence\" that the word \"establish\" implies. It is not the temporary duration of an ordinance that is relevant; what is relevant is its provisional and tentative character which\n\nis apparent from Article 123(2). [362 G] F\n\nA.K. Gopalan v. State [1950] SCR, 88, relied on.\n\nA significant difference between the law made by the President under Article 357 and an ordinance promulgated by him under Article 123 is that while a law made under Article 357 continues to be in force until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority, an ordinance promulgated under Article 123 ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks of reassembly of the Parliament at the latest. [363 BJ\n\nThe argument that since Article 367(2) provides that any reference in the Constit1Jtion to Acts of Parliament should be construed as including a reference to an ordmance made by the President, an ordinance should be equated with an ll Act of Parliament is without substance because an ordinance has the force and effect only over an area where it can validly operate. An invalid ordinance can\n\n280 StlPREME couR.i ilEPORts ii9s2J 2 s.c.tt\n\nhave no force or effect and if it is not 'law' in the sense the word has been used Article 21, Article 367(2) cannot make it so. [363 E]\n\n[On all other points His Lordship agreed with the conclusions of Hon'ble the Chief Justice].\n\n[Hon'ble Tu lzapurkar J. agreed with the majority on all other B points]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos 5724, 5874 & .,..,-- 5433 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nC R.K. Garg, V.J. Francis and Su11il K. Jain for the Petitioners in WP. 5724 & 5874 and for internners 3-12.\n\nN.M. Ghat ate, S. V. Deshpande and Shiva Pujan Singh for the petitioner in WP. 5433.\n\nD L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,\n\nM.K. Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General, K.S. Gurumurthi Miss A. Subhashini and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 1 in all the WPs.\n\nSubbash C. Maheshwari, Additional, Advocate General, 0.P.\n\nRana, Hansraj Bhardwaj and R.K. Bhatt for Respondents 2 & 3 in WP. 5874/80.\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General, Ram Balak Mahto, Additio!!al Advocate General, K.G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for Respondents 2 & 3 in WP. 5724/80.\n\nF For Jnterveners :\n\nV.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Miss Manik Tarkunde and R.N, Karanjawa/a for Intervener No. I.\n\nBhim Singh intervener No. 2 (in person)\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, Anand Prakash, S.N. Kackar, G. Mukho()', B.B. Sinha, A.K. Srivastava, Randhir Jain, M.L. Lahoty, Kupil Sibal, L.K. Pandey and S.S. Khanduja for Intervener No. 13.\n\nMrs. Subhadra Joshi for Intervener No. 14.\n\nRam Jethma/ani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for Intervener No, 15.\n\n-,_,\n\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNION OF iNDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 281\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General and Altaf Ahmed for Inter- A vener No. 16.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This is a group of Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the National Security Ordinance, 2 of 1980, and certain provisions of the National Security Act, 65 of 1980, which replaced the Ordinance.\n\nWrit Petition No. 5724 of 1980 is by Shri A. K. Roy, a Marxist member of the Parliament, who was detained under the Ordinance by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad, on the ground that he was indluging in activities which were prejudicial to public order. Ten mem, bers of the Parliament, one an Independent and the others belonging to various political parties in opposition applied for permission to intervene in the Writ Petition on the ground that since the Ordinance-making power of the President is destructive of the system of Parliamentary democracy, it is necessary to define the scope of that power. We allowed the intervention.\n\nSo did we allow the applications for intervention by the People's Union of Civil Liberties, the Supreme Court Bar Association and the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is interested in the upholding of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.\n\nShri R.K. Garg argued the Writ Petition, respondents being represented by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General.\n\nAfter the Ordinance became an Act, more writ petitions were filed to challenge the validity of the Act as well.\n\nThose petit10ns were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Dr N. M. Ghatate, Shri Ram Jethmalani, Shri Shiv Pujan Singh and Shri Kapil Sibal.\n\nShri V.M. Tarkunde appeared in person for the People's Union of Civil Liberties and Dr. L.M. Singhvi for the Supreme Court Bar Association.\n\nBroadly, Shri Garg concentrated on the scope and limitations of the ordinance-making power, Shri Ram Jethmalani on the vagueness and unreasonableness of the provisions of the Act and the punitive conditions of detention and Dr. Gh_atate on the effect of the 44.th Constitution Amendment Act and the validity of its section 1 (2).\n\nShri Tarkunde dwelt mainly on the questions relating to the fulfilment of pre-conditions of the exercise of the ordinance making power, the effect of non-implementation by the Central Government of the provisions of the 44th Amendment regarding the composition of the Advisory Boards and\n\n282 sUl>llEME coUlt't llE!>OkTS [i981J 1 s.c.k.\n\nA the broad, undefined powers of detention conferred by the Act.\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi laid stress on the need for the grant of minimal facilities to detenus, the nature of the right of detenus to make an effective representation against the order of detention and the evils of the exercise of the power to issue ordinances.\n\nThe National Security Ordinance, 1980, was passed in order \"to provide for preventive detention in certain cases end for matters connected therewith.\" It was made applicable to the whole of India except the State of Jammu & Kashmir and il came into force on September 23, 1980.\n\nThe Parliament was not in session when it was promulgated and its preamble recites that it was being issued because the \"Prerident is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action\".\n\nShri R.K. Garg, appearing for the petitioners, challenges the power of the President to issue an Ordinance depriving any person of his life or liberty. He contends :\n\n(a) The power to issue an Ordinance is an executive power, not a legislative power;\n\n(b) Ordinance is not 'law' because it is not made by an agency created by the Constitution for making laws and no law can be made without the intervention of the legislature;\n\n(c) There is a marked shift towards distrust of power in order to preserve the people's rights and therefore, liberty, democracy and the independence of Judiciary are amongst the principal matters which are outside the ordinance-making power;\n\n(d) By Article 21 of the Constitution, a person can be deprived of his life or liberty according only to the procedure established by law. Ordinance is not 'law' within the meaning of Article 21 and therefore no person can be deprived of his life or liberty by an Ordinance;\n\n(e) The underlying object of Article 21 is to wholly deny to the executive the power to deprive a person of his life or liberty. Ordinance-making power, which is\n\n...\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 283\n\nexecutive power, cannot therefore be used for that purpose. The executive cannot resort to the power to make ordinances so as or in order to remove the restraints imposed upon it by Article 21;\n\n(f) The procedure prescribed under an Ordinance is not procedure established by law because, Ordinances have a limited duration in point of time. The procedure prescribed by an Ordinance is neither firm nor certain by reason of which the procedure cannot be said to be 'established'. From this it follows that no person can be deprived of bis life or liberty by procedure prescribed by an Ordinance;\n\n(g) The power to issue an Ordinance is ordaining power of the executive which cannot be used to liberate it from the discipline of laws made by a democratic legislature.\n\nTherefore, the power to issue ordinances can be used, if at all, on a virgin land only.\n\nNo ordinance can operate on a subject which is covered by a law made by the legislature ;\n\n(h) Equating an Ordinance made by the executive with a law made by the legislature will violate the principle of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution; and\n\nIi) Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution will be reduced to a dead letter if the executive is permitted to take away the life and liberty of the people by an Ordinance, lackig the supportfjof a law made by the legislature.\n\nThe Ordinance-making power must, therefore, be construed barm'oniously with those and other provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThis many-pronged attack on the Ordinance-making power has one central theme : 'Ordinance is not law.' We must therefore consider the basic question as to whether the power to make an ordinance is a legilative power as contended by the learned Attorney\n\nGeneral or whether it. is an executive power masquerading H as a legislative power, as contended on behalf of the petitio11ers,\n\n.284\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nIn support of these submissions Shri Garg relies on many texts and decisions which we need not discuss at length since, primarily, we have to consider the scheme of our Constitution and to interpret its provisions in order to determine the nature and scope of the ordinance-making power.\n\nCounsel drew our attention, with great emphasis, to the statements in Montesquieu's Esprit des lois\n\n(1748) and Blackstone's Commentaries on the laws of England'\n\n(1756) which are reproduced in 'Modern Political Constitution's by C.F. Strong (8th edition) at page 291.\n\nAccording to Montesquieu, \"when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body of persons there can be no liberty, because of the danger that the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws and execute them in a tyrannical manner.\" Blackstone expresses the same thought by saying that \"wherever the right of making and enforcing the law is vested in the same man or one and the same body of men, there can be no public liberty\". Reliance was also placed on views and sentiments expressed to the same effect in Walter Bagehot's 'The English Constitution' (1867). Wade's Admin.istrative Law' (3rd edition) pages 323-324, 'Constitutional Laws of the British Empire' by Jennings and Young, 'Law and Orders' by C.K. Allen\n\n(1945) and Harold 'Laski's Liberty in the Modern State' (1961).\n\nAccording to Laski (pages 42-43).\n\n\" ... if in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it.\n\nThey are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and, in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance qftheir power.\n\nLiberty always demands a limitation of political authority, and it is never attained unless the rulers of a state can, where necessary, be called to account.\n\nThat is why Pericles insisted that the secret of liberty is courage.\"\n\nFinally, counsel drew on Jawaharlal Nehru's Presidential Address to the Lucknow Congress {April 19, J 9J6) in which he referred to the rule by ordinances as \"the humiliati0n of ordinances\" (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, volume 7, page 183).\n\nWe are not, as we cannot be, unmindful of the danger to people's liberties which comes in any community frqm wliat iSi\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) . 285\n\ncalled the tryanny of the majority.\n\nUncontrolled power in the executive is a great enemy of freedom and therefore, eternal vigiiance is necessary in the realm of liberty.\n\nBut we cannot transplant, in the Indian context and conditions, principles which took birth in other soils, without a careful examination of their relevance to the interpretation of our Constitution.\n\nNo two Constitutions are alike, for it is not mere words that make a Constitution. It is the history of a people which lends colour and meaning to its Constitution.\n\nWe must therefore turn inevitably to the hi8torical origin of the ordinance-making power conferred by our Constitution and consider the scope of that power in the light of the restraints by which that power is hedged.\n\nNeither in England nor in the United States of America does the executive enjoy anything like the power to issue ordinances.\n\nIn India, that power has a historical origin and the executive, at all times, has resorted to it freely as and when it considered it necessary to do so.\n\nOne of the larger States in India has manifested its addiction to that power by making an overgenerous use of it-so generous indeed, that ordinances which lapsed by efflux of time were renewed successively by a chain of kindred creatures, one after another.\n\nAnd, the Ordinances embrace everything under the sun, from Prince to pauper and crimes to contracts.\n\nThe Union Government too, so we are informed, passed about 200 Ordinances between 1960 and 1980, out of whieh 19 were passed in 1980.\n\nOur Constituent Assembly was composed of famous men who had a variegated experience of life.\n\nThey were not elected by the people to frame the Constitution but that was their strength, not their weakness.\n\nThey were neither bound by a popular mandate nor bridled by a party whip.\n\nThey brought to bear on their task their vast experience of life-in fields social, economic and political.\n\nTheir deliberatior, :, which run into twelve volumes, are a testimony to the time and attention which they gave with care and concern to evolving a generally acceptable instrument for the regulation of the fundamental affairs of the country and the life and liberty of its people.\n\nThe Constituent Assembly had before it the Government of India Act, 1935 and many of its members had experienced the traumas and travails resulting from the free exercise of the ordinance-making power conferred by that Act.\n\nThey were also aware that such a power was not claimed by the Governments of two\n\nJadin~ democrcies of the world, the English and the American,\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.tt.\n\nAnd yet, they took the Government of India Act of 1935 as their model, Section 42 of that Act ran thus :\n\nPower of Governor General to promulgate ordinances during recess of Legislature.\n\n\"42 (1) If at any time when the Federal Legislature is not in section the Governor-\n\nGeneral is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require :\n\nProvided that the Governor-General-\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n(2) An ordinance promulgated under this section shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General, but every such ordinance-\n\n(a) shall be laid before the Federal Legislature and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Lagislature, or, if before the expiration of tbat period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Chambers, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions;\n\n(b) shall be subject to the provisions of this Act relating to the power of His Majesty to disallow Acts as is it were an Act of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-\n\nGeneral; and\n\n(c) may be withdrawn at any time by the\n\nGovernoi:-General.\n\n...\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 287\n\n(3) If and so far as an ordinance under this A section makes any provision which the Federal Legislature would not under this Act be competent to enact, it shall be void\".\n\nSection 43 conferred upon the Governor-General the power to issue ordinances for the purpos~ of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he was by or under the Act required to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgment.\n\nArticle 123, which confers the power to promulgate ordinances, occurs in Chapter III of Part V of the Constitution, called \"Legislative Power of the President\". It reads thus :\n\nPower of \"123 (I) If at any time, execpt when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.\n\nPresident to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament,\n\n(2) An Ordiance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance-\n\n(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions; and\n\n(b) may be withdraw11 at any time hr\n\nthe President. ...... - .. _.,. ____ ,\n\n\n{I 982) 2 S.C.R\n\nExplanation-Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.\n\n(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.\"\n\nArticle 213, which occurs in Part VT, Chapter IV, called \"Legislative Power of the Governor\" confers similar power on the Governors of States to issue ordinances.\n\nAs we have said earlier while setting out the petitioner's case, the thrust of his argument is that the power to issue an ordinance is an executive power, not a legislative power, ancl consequently, is not law.\n\nIn view of the clear and specific provisons of the Constitution bearing upon this question, it is quite impossible to accept this argument. The heading of Chapter III of Part V is 'Legislative Powers of the President\".\n\nClause (2) of Article 123 provides that an ordinance promulgated under Article 123 \"shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament\". The only obligation on the Government is to lay the ordinance before both Houses of Parliament and the only distinction which the Constitution makes between a law made by the Parliament and an ordiance issued hy the President is that whereas the life of a law made by the Partiament would depend upon the terms of that law, an ordinance, by reason of sub clause (a) of clause (2), ceases to operate at the expiration of six \\\\eeks from tl1e reassembly of Parliament, unless resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses before the expiration of that period.\n\nArticle I 3 (2) provides that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III and any law made in contravention of this provision shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Clause (3) of Article 13 provides that in Article 13, \"law\" includes, inter alia, an ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires.\n\nIn view of the fact that the context does not otherwise so require, it must fotlow from the combined operation of clauses (2) :11Pd (3) of Article 13 that' an ordinance\n\n.. -\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrarfiud, C.J.) 289\n\nissued by the President under Article 123, which is equated by clause (2) of that article with an Act of Parliamcn t, is subject to the same constraints and limitations as the latter. Therefore, whether the legislation is Parliamentary or Presidential, that is to say, whether it is a law made by the Parliament or an ordinance issued by the President, the limitation on the power is that the fundamental rights conferred by part III cannot be taken away or abridged in the exercise of that power.\n\nAn ordinance, like a law made by the Parliament, is void to the extent of contravention of that limitation'\n\nThe exact equation, for all practical purposes, between a law made by the Parliament and an ordinance issued by the President is emphasised by yet another provision of the Const tutinn. Article 367 which supplies a clue to the \"[nterpretation\" of the Constitution provides by clause (2J that-\n\n\"Any reference in this Cnnstitution to Acts or laws\n\nof, or made by, Parliament, or to Acts or laws of, or made D by, the Legislature of a State, shalt be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the President or, to an Ordinance made by a Governor, as the case may be.\"\n\nIt is clear from this provision, if indeed there was any doubt about the true position, that the Constitution makes no distinction in principle between a law made by the legislature and an ordinance issued by the President.\n\nBoth, equalty, are products of the exercise of legislative power and, therefore, both are equally subject to the limitations which the Constitution has placed upon that power.\n\nIt may sound strange at first blush that the executive should possess legislative powers, but a careful -look at our Constitution will show that the scheme adopted by it erivisages the exercise of legislative powers by the executive in stated circumstances.\n\nAn ordinance can be issued by the President provided that both Houses of the Parliament are not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it ne('essary for him to take immediate action An ordinance which satisfies these pre-conditions has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. Article 356 empowers the President to issue a proclamation in case of\n\nfailure of constitutional machinery in the States.\n\nBy Article 357 H (I) (a), if by a proclamation issued under Article 356 (I) it has been declared that the power~ 9f the Legislature of the State shall be\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nexercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it is competent for the Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State to make Jaws.\n\nIndeed, by the aforesaid clause (a), the Parliament can not only confer on the President the power of the State Legislature to make laws but it can even authorise the President to delegate the power so conferred to any autho\n\nrity to be specified by him in that behalf. The marginal note to Article 357 speaks of the \"Exercise of Legislative powers\" under the proclamation issued under Article 356.\n\nThere cannot be the slightest doubt that not only the power exercised by the President under Article 357(1)(a) but even the power exercised by his delegate under that clause is legislative in character. It is therefore not true to say that, under our Constitution, the exercise of legislative power by the legislature properly so called is the only source of law. Ordinances issued by the President and the Governors and the Jaws made by the President or his delegate under Article 357 (I) (a) partake fully of legislative character and are made in the exercise of legislative power, within tl1e contemplation of the Constitution.\n\nIt is thus clear that the Constituent Assembly was of the view that the President's power to legislate by issuing an ordinance is as necessary for the peace and good government of the country as the Parliament's power to legislate by passing laws.\n\nThe mechanics of the President's legislative power was devised evidently in order to take care of urgent situations which cannot brook delay. The Parliamentary process of legislation is comparatively tardy and can conceivably be time-consuming.\n\nIt is true that it is not easy to accept with equanimity the proposition that the executive can indulge in legislative activity but the Constitution is what it says and not what one would like it to be.\n\nThe Constituent Assembly indubitably thought, despite the strong and adverse impact which the Governor- General's ordinance-making power had produced on the Indian community in the preindepence era, that it was neeessary to equip the President wi1h kgislative powers in urgent sitrJations.\n\nAfter all, the Constitution makers had to take into account life's realities.\n\nAs observed by Shri Seervai in 'Constitutional Law of India' (2nd Ed., p. 16).\"Grave public inconvenience would be caused if on an Act, like the Bombay Sales Tax Act, being declared void no machinery, existed whereby a valid law could be promptly promulgated to take the pl~~\\! of the Jaw declared void\". Speaking for\n\n...\n\nA.IC. ROY v. tJNiON OF INDIA (chandrachud, C.J.) 291\n\nthe majority in R.C. Cooper v. Union of lndia(1), Shah J. said : \"The President is under the Constitution not the repostory of the legislative power of the Union, but with a view to meet extraordinary situations demanding immediate enactment of laws, provision is made in the Constitution investing the President with power to legislate by promulagating Ordinances.\" The Constituent Assembly therefore conferred upon the executive the power to legistate, not of course intending that the said power should be used recklessly or by imagining a state of affairs to exist when, in fact, i! did not exist; nor, indeed, intending that it should be used ma/a fide in order to prevent the people's elected representatives from passing or rejecting a Bill after a free and open discussion, which is of the essence of democratic process. Having conferred upon the executive the power to legislate by ordinances, if the circumstances were such as to make the exercise of that power necessary, the Constituent Assembly subjected that power to the self-same restraints to which a law passed by the legislature is subject.\n\nThat is the compromise which they made between the powers of Government and the liberties of the people. Therefore, in face of the provisions to which we have already referred, it seems to us, impossible to accept Shri Garg's contention that a ordinance made by the Preident is an executive and not a legislative act.\n\nAn ordinance issued by the President or the Governor is as much law as an Act passed by the Parliament and is, fortunately and unquestionably, subject to the same inhibitions. In those inhibitions, lies the safety of the people. The debates of the Constituent Assembly (Vol. 8, Part V, Chapter III, pp 201 to 217) would show that the power to issue ordinances was regarded as a necessary evil. That power was to be used to meet extra-ordinary situations and not perverted to serve political ends. The Constituent Assembly held forth, as it were, an assurance to the people that an extra-orninary power shall not be used in order to perpetuate a fraud on the Constitution which is conceived with so much faith and vision. That assurance must in all events be made good and the balance struck by the founding fathers between the powers of the Government and the liberties of the people not disturbed or destroyed.\n\nThe next contention of Shri Garg is that even assuming that the power to issue ordinances is legislative and not executive in character, ordinance is not 'law' within the meaning of Article 21 of\n\n(I] [1970] 3 SCR 530, 559,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.tt.\n\nthe Constitution. That article provides that \"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law'\". It is contended by the learned counsel that the decision of this Court in A. K. Gopu,'an( 1 ) establishes that the supremacy of the legislature is enshrined in Article 21 as a fundamental right in order to afford protection to the life and liberty of the people against all executive powers and, therefore, the supremacy of the legislature cannot be replaced by making the executive supreme by allowing it to promulgate ordinances which have the effect of depriving the people of their life and liberty. The extent of protection afforded to the right conferred by Article 21 consists, accocding to counsel, in the obligation imposed upon a democratic legislature to devise a fair, just and reasonable procedure for attenuating the liberties of the people. Since the very object of Article 21 is to impose restrains on the power of the executive in the matter of deprivation of the life and liberty of the people, it is absurd, so the argument goes, to concede to the executive the power to deprive the people of the right conferred by Article 21 by issuing an ordinance. The argument, in other words is that the executive cannot under any conditions or circumstances be permitted to liberate itself from the restraints of Article 21.\n\nShri Garg says that if ordinances are not excluded from the precious area of life and liberty covered by Article 21, it is the executive which will accquire the right to trample upon the freedoms of the people rather than the people accquiring the fundamental right to life and liberty. It is also urged that by elevating ordinances into the status of laws, the principle of separation of powers. which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, shall have been violated. An additional limb of the argument is that an ordinance can never be said to 'establish' a procedure, because it has a limited duration and it transient in character.\n\nIn one sense, these contentions of Shri Garg stand answered by what we have already said about the true nature and character of the crdinance making power. The contention that the word 'law' in Article 21 must be construed to mean a law made by the kgistature only and cannot include an ordinance, contradicts directly the express provisions of Articles 123 (2) and 367(2) of the Constitution. Besides, if an ordinance is not law within the meaning of Article 21, it will stand released from the wholesome and salutary restraint imposed upon the legislative power by Article 13(2) of the Constitution.\n\n(I) [1950] SCR 88.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandraciwd, Ci.) 293\n\nThe contention that the procedure presribed by an ordinance A cannot be equated with the procedure established by law is equally unsound. The word 'established' i~ used in Article 21 in order to denote and ensure that the procedure prescribed by the law must be defined with certainty in order that those who are deprived of their fundamental right to life or liberty must know the precise extent of such deprivation. The decision of this Court in State of Orissa v.\n\nBhupendra Kumar Bose(1), and Mohammadbhai Khudabux Chhipa & Anr. v. The State of Gujarat & Anr(2), illustrate that enduring rights and obligations can be created by ordinances. The fact that any particular law has a temporary duration is immaterial for the purposes of Article 21 so long as the procedure prescribed by it is definite and reasonablly ascertainable. In fact, the Preventive Detention laws were in their inception of a temporary character since they had a limited duration. They were only extended from time to time .\n\nThe argument of the petitioner that the fundamental right conferred by Article 21 cannot by taken away by an ordinance really seeks to add a proviso to Article 123(1) to the following effect :\n\n\"Provided that such ordinances shall not deprive any person of his right to life or personal liberty conferred by Article 21 of the Consttution.\"; An amendment substaintially to that effect was moved in the Constituent Assembly by Shri B. Pocker Sahib, but was rejected by the Constituent Assembly, (see Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 8, p. 203). Speaking on the amendment moved by Shri Pocker\n\nDr. Ambedkar said : \"Clause (3) of Article 102 lays down that any law made by the President under the provisions of Article 102 shall be subject to the same limitations as a law made by the legislature by the ordinary process. Now, any law made in the ordinary process by the legislature is made subject to the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rights articles of this Draft Constitution. That being so, any law made under the provisions of Article I 02 would also be automatically subject to the provisions relating to fundamental rights of citizens, and any such law therefore will not be able to over-ride those provisions and there is no need for any provision as was suggested by my friend, Mr. Pocker in his amendment No. 1796\" (page 214). It may be mentioned that Draft Article 102 corresponds to the present Article 123 of the Constitution.\n\n(1) (1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 380, 398-400\n\n(2) (1962] Supp. 3 SCR 875.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nAnother answer to Shri Garg's contention is that what Article 21 emphasise is that the deprivation of the right to life ot liberty must be brought about by a State-made law and not by the rules of natural law (see A.K. Gopalan (supra) at pages 111, 169, 199, 229, 236 and 308, 309). Reference may usefully be made in this behalf to a few representative decisions which illustrate that Article 21 takes in laws other than those enacted by the legislature. In Re : Sant\n\nRam(1), the Rules made by the Supreme Court; in State of Nagaland\n\nv. Ratan Singh,(2) the Rules made for the governance of Nagaland Hills District; in Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.(3) the Regulations made under the Police Act; in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v.\n\nAsstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay & Anr.,(4) the Rules made by the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution; and in Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri SriKrishna Sinha & Anr.(5), the Rules made by a House of Legislature under Article 208, were all regarded as lying down procedure established by 'law' for the purposes of Article 21.\n\nWe must therefore reject the contention that Ordinance is not D 'law' within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThere is no substance in the argument that the ordinance-making power, if extended to cover matters mentioned in Article 21, will destroy the basic structure of the separation of powers as envisaged by the Constitution. In the first place, Article 123(1) is a part of the Constitution as originally enacted; and secondly, our Constitution does not follow the American pattern of a strict separation of powers.\n\nWe may here take up for consideration some of the submissions made by Shri Tarkunde on the validity of the National Security Ordinance. He contends that the power to issue an ordinance under Article 123 is subject to the pre-conditions that circumstances must exist which render it necessary for the president to take immediate action. The power to issue an ordinance is conferred upon the President in order to enable him to act in unusual and exceptional circustances. Therefore, according to Shri Tarkunde, unusual and exceptional circumstances must be show to exist, they must be relevant on the question of the necessity to issue an ordinance and\n\n(1) (1960] 3 SCR 499, 506.\n\n(2) (1966] 3 SCR 830, 851-852.\n\n(3) [1975] 3 SCR 946, 955-56.\n\n(4) f1967] 3 SCR 926, 928-931.\n\n(5) [1959] Supp. I SCR 806, 860-861.\n\nt ·~\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNiON OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 295\n\nthey must be such as to satisfy a reasonable person that, by reason thereof, it was necessary to take immediate action and issue an ordinance. The . legislative power to issue an ordinance being conditional, the question as regards the existence of circumstances which compelled the issuance of ordinance is justiciable and it is open to this Court, says Shri Tarkunde, to determine whether the power was exercised on the basis of relevant circumstances which establish the necessity to take immediate action or whether it was exercised for a collateral purpose. In support of this contention, Shri Tarkunde relies on the circumstance that foe amendment intro duced in Article 123 by the 38th Constitution Amendment Act, 1975, was deleted by the 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1978.\n\nSection 2 of the 38th Amendment Act introduced clause (4) in Article 123 to the following effect :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (I) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground.\"\n\nThis amendment was expressly deleted by section 16 of the 44th Amendment Act.\n\nShri Tarkunde says that the deletion of the par ticular clause is a positive indication that the Parliament did not consider it safe or proper to entrust untrammelled powers to the executive to issue ordinances. It therefore decided that the President's satisfaction should not be \"final and conclusive\" and that it should be open to judicial scrutiny. Shri Tarkunde added that the exercise of a conditional power is always subject to the proof of conditions and no distinction can be made in this regard between conditions imposed by a statute and conditions imposed by a constitutional provision. Relying on section 106 of the Evidence Act, Shri Tarkunde says that circumstances which necessitated the passing of the ordinancebeing especially within the knowledge of the executive, the burden lies upon it to prove the existence of those circumstances.\n\nIt is strongly pressed upon us that we should not avoid the decision of these points on the plea that they involve political questions. Shri Tarkunde distinguishes the decision in the Rajasthan Assembly Dissolution casee) on this aspect by saying that Article 356 which was under consideration in that case uses language which\n\n(I) [1978] 1 SCR I.\n\nSUl>R.BME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nis much wider than that of Article 123.\n\nHe relies on Seervai's observation in the Constitutional Law of India' (2nd Edition, Volume III pages 1795 and 1797) to the effect that \"there is no place in our Constitution for the doctrine of the political question\", since that doctrine is based on, and is a consequence of, a rigid separation of powers in the U.S Constitution and our Constitution is not based on a rigid separation of powers.\n\nReliance is placed by Shri Tarkunde on the decision in the Privy Purse case(1) in which Shah, J. observed that \"Constitutional mechanism in a democratic polity does not contemplate existence of any function which may qua the citizens be designated as politi..:al and orders made in exercise whereof are not liable to be tested for their validity before the lawfully constituted courts\". In the same case Hegde J., said that ''There is nothing like a political power under our Constitution in the matter of relationship between the executive and the citizens\".\n\nWe see the force of the contention that the question whether the pre-conditions of the exercise of the power conferred by Article 123 are satisfied cannot be regarded as a purely political question.\n\nThe doctrine of the political question was evolved in the United States of America on the basis of its Constitution which has adopted the system of a rigid separation of powers, unlike ours. In fact, that is om: of the principal reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to give advisory opinions.(2) In Baker v. Carr(3) Brennan J. said that the doctrine of political question was \"essentially a function of the separation of powers\". There is also a sharp difference in the position and powers of the American President on one hand and the President of India on the other. The President of the United States exercises executive power in his own right and is responsible not to the Congress but to the people who elect him. In India, the executive power of the Union is vested in the President of India, but he is obliged to exercise it on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers.\n\nThe President's \"satisfaction\" is therefore nothing but the satisfaction of his Council of Ministers in whom !be real executive power resides.\n\nIt must also be mentioned that in the United States itself, the doctrine of the political question has come under a cloud and bas been the subject matter of adverse criticism.\n\n(1) [1971] 3 SCR 9, 75, 168-169\n\n(2) See Seervai on Constitutional Law of India, Vol. III, p. 1796, Foot Notes 64 & 65. (The Constitution of the United States. Congressional Edition, 4th ed., pp. 649-50)\n\n(3) 7 L. ed. 2d p. 663, 685-86,\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 291\n\nIt is said that all that the doctrine really means is that in the exercise of the power of judicial review, the courts must adopt a 'prudential' attitude, which requires that they should be wary of deciding upon the merit of any issue in which claims of principle as to the issue and claims of expediency as to the power and prestige of courts are in sharp confiict. The result, more or less, is that in America the phrase \"political question\" has become \"a little more than a play of words\".\n\nThe Rajasthan case is often cited as an authority for the proposition that the courts ought not to enter the \"polical thicket\".\n\nIt has to be borne in mind that at the time when that case was decided, Article 356 contained clause (5) which was iuserted by the 38th Amendment, by which the satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (1) was made final and conclusive and that satisfaction was not open to be questioned in any court on any ground.\n\nClause (5) has been deleted by the 44th Amendment and, therefore, any observations made in the Rajasthan case on the basis of that clause cannot any longer hold good. It is arguable that the 44th Constitution Amendment Act leaves no doubt that judicial review is not totally excluded in regard to the question relating to the President's satisfaction.\n\nThere are. however, two reasons why we do not propose to discuss at greater length the question as regards the justiciabilty of the President's satisfaction under Article 123 (I) of the Constitution.\n\nIn the first place, the Ordinance has been replaced by an Act.\n\nIt is true, as contended by Slui Tarkunde, that if the qustion as regards the justiciability of the President's satisfaction is not to be considered for the reason that th~ ordinance has become an Act the occasion will hardly ever arise for considering that question, because, by the time the challenge made to an Ordinance comes up for consideration before the Court, the ordinance almost invariably shall have been replaced by an Act.\n\nAll the same, the position is firmly established in the field of constitutional adjudiction that the Court will decide no more than needs to be decided in any particular case. Abstract questions present interesting challenges, but it is for scholars and text-book writers to unravel their mystique. 'It is not for the courts to decide questions which are but of academic importance.\n\nThe other reason why we are not inclined to go into the question as regards the justiciability of the President's satisfaction under\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.R.\n\nArticle 123 (I) is that on the material which is placed before us, it is impossible for us to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.\n\nWe are not sure whether a question like the one before us would be governed by the rule of burden of proof contained in sec:tion 106 of the Evidence Act, though we are prepared to proceed on the basis that the existence of circumstances which led to the passing of the Ordinance is especially within the knowledge of the executive. But before casting the burden on the executive to establish those circumstances, at least a prima facic case must be made out by the challenger to show that there could not have existed any circumstances necessitating the issuance of the Ordinance.\n\nEvery casual or passing challenge to the existence of circumstances, which rendered it necessary for the President to take immediate action by issuing an ordinance, will not be enough to shift the burden of proof to the executive to establish those circumstances. Since the petitioners have not laid any acceptable foundation for us to hold that no circumstances existed or could have existed which rendered it necessary for the Presid.!nt to take immediate action by promulgating the impugned Ordinance, we are unable to entertain the contention that the Ordinance is unconstitutional for the reason that the pre-conditions to the exercise of the power conferred by Article 123 are not fulfilled. That is why we do not feel called upon to examine the correctness of the submission made by the learned Attorney General that in the very nature of things, the \"satisfaction\" of the President which is the basis on which he promulgates an Ordinance is founded upon materials which may not be available to others and which may not be disclosed without detriment to public interest and that, the circumstances justifying the issuance of the Ordinace as well as the necessity to issue it lie solely within the President's judgment and are, therefore, not justiciable.\n\nThe two surviving contentions of Shri Garg that the power to issue an ordinance can operate on a virgin land only and that Articles 14, 19 and 21 will be reduced to a dead letter if the executive is permitted to take away the life or liberty of the people by an ordinance, need not detain us long.\n\nThe Constitution does not impose by its terms any inhibition on the ordinance-making power that it shall not be used to deal with a subject matter which is already covered by a law made by the Legislature. There is no justification for imposing any such restriction on the ordinancemaking power, especially when an ordinance, like any law made by the Legislature, has to comply with the mandate of Artice 13 (2)\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 299\n\nof the Constitution.\n\nBesides, legislative activity, properly so called, has proliferated so enormously in recent times that it is difficult to discover a virgin land or a fresh field on which the ordinancemaking power can operate, as if on a clean slate.\n\nTo-day, there is possibly no subject under the sun which the Legislature has not touched.\n\nAs regards Articles J 4, 19 and 2 l being reduced to a dead letter, we are unable to appreciate how an ordinance which is subject to the same constraints as a law made by the Legislature can, in its practical operation, result in the obliteration of these articles.\n\nThe answer to this contention is again to be found in the provisions contained in Article 13 (2).\n\nThat disposes of the contentions advanced by the various parties on the validity of the ordinance.\n\nWe must mention that in a recent\n\njudgment dated October 20, I 98 I delivered by a Constitution Bench D of this Court in Writ Petition No. 355 of 1981 (the Bearer Bonds case(1), the question as regards the nature and scope of the ordinance-making power has been discussed elaborately.\n\nWe adopt the reasoning of the majority judgment in that case.\n\nThe argments advanced on behalf of the various petitioners can be broadly classified under six heads: (I) The scope, limits and justiciability of the ordinance-making power; (2) The validity of Preventive Detention in the light of the severe deprivation of personal liberty which it necessarily entails; (3) The effect of the non implemention of the 44th Amendment in so far as it bears upon the Constitution of the Advisory Boards; (4) The vagueness of the provisions of the National Security Act, authorizing the detention of persons for the reasons mentioned .in section 3 of the Act; (5) The unfairness and unreasonableness of the procedure before the Advisory Boards; and (6) The unreasonableness and harshness of the conditions of detention.\n\nWe have dealt with the first question fully though the impugned ordinance has been replaced by an Act, since the question was argued over several days and arises frequently-as frequently as ordinances are issued. All that needs have been said was said on that question by the various counsel and the relevant data was fully placed before us.\n\nWe will now turn to the\n\n(I) p982) 1 SCR 947.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA second question relating to the validity of Preventive Detention as a measure for regulating the liberties of the sul:>ject.\n\nThere can be no doubt that personal liberty is a precious right.\n\nSo did the founding fathers believe at any rate because, while their first object was to give unto the people a Constitution whereby a Government was established, their second object, equally important, was to protect the people against the Government. That is_ why, while conferring extensive powers on the Governments like the power to declare an emergency, the power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights and the powe1 to issue Ordinances, they assured to the people a Bill of Rights by Part III of the Constitution, protecting against executive and legislative despotism those human rights wl1icil they regarded as fundamental.\n\nThe imperative necessity to protect those rights is a lesson taught by all history and all human exeperience. Our Constitutionmakers had lived through bitter years and seen an alien government trample upon human rights which the country had fought hard to preserve.\n\nThey believed like Jefferson that \"an elective despotism was not the government we fought for.\" And therefore, while arming the government with large powers to prevent anarchy from within and conquest from without, they took care to ensure that those powers were not abused to mutilate the liberties of the people.\n\nBut, the liberty of the individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people.\n\nTherefore, acting in public interest, the Constituent Assembly made provisions in Entry 9 of List I and Entry 3 of List III. authorising the Parliament and the State legislatures by Article 246 to pass laws of preventive detention.\n\nThese entries read thus :\n\nEntry 9, List I:\n\n\"Preventive detention for reasons connected with Defence, Foreign Affairs, or the security of India 'persons subjeckd to such detention.\"\n\nEntry 3, List Ill:\n\n\"Preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of a State, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; persons subjected to such detention:·\n\nA.I<.. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 301\n\nThe practical need and reality of the laws of preventive detention find concrete recognition in the provisions of Article 22 of the Cons titution.\n\nLaws providing for preventive detention are expressly dealt with by that article and their scope appropriately defined.\n\n\"The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity deter mine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirma tively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power. and if it violates 'no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited ..... , it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions\" (see The Queen v. Burah(1).\n\nThe legislative power in respect of preventive detention is expressly limited to the specific purpose mentioned in Entry 9, List I and Entry 3, List III. It is evident that the power of preventive detention was conferred by the Constitutio!l in order to ensure that the security and safety of the country and the welfare of its people are not put in peril. So long as a law of preventive detention operates within the general scope of the affirmative words used in the respective entries of the union and concurrent lists which gie that power and so long as it does not violate any condition or restriction placed upon that power by the Constitution, the Court cannot invalidate that law on the specious ground that it is calculated to interfere with the liberties of the people.\n\nKhanna J., in his judgment in the Habeas Corpus case(') has dwelt upon the need for preventive detention in public Interest.\n\nThe fact that England and America do not resort to preventive detention in normal times was known to 0ur Constituent Assembly and yet it chose to provide for it, sanctioning its use for specified purposes. The attitude of two other well-known democracies to preventive detention as a means of regulating the lives and liberties of the people was undoubtedly relevant to the framing of our Cons\n\ntitution.\n\nBut the framers having decided to adopt and legitimise it, we cannot declare it unconstitutional by importing our notions of what is right and wrong.\n\nThe power to judge the fairness and\n\n(I) L.R. 5 I.A. 178, 193-194 per Lord Selborne. (2) [1976] Supp. SCR m, 29l-29'.<l, 494-~9(j,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\njustness of procedure established by a law for the purposes of Article 21 is one thing : that power can bi;: spelt out from the language of that article.\n\nProcedural safeguards are the handmaids of equal justice and since, the power of the government is colossal as compared with the power of an individual, the freedom of the individual can be safe only if he has a guarantee that he will be treated fairly.\n\nThe power to decide upon the justness of the law itself is quite another thing : that power springs from a 'due process' provision such as is to be found in the 5th .1nd 14tl:. Amendments of the American Constitution by which no person can be deprived of ..\n\nlife, liberty or property \"without due process of law\".\n\nIn so far , as our Constitution is concerned, an amendment was moved .by Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava to draft Article 15, which corresponds to Article 21 of the Constitution, for substituting the words \"without due process of law\" for the words \"except according to procedure established by law\".\n\nMany members spoke on that D amendment on December 6, 1948, amongst whom were Shri K.M.\n\nMunshi, who was in favour of the amendment, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar who, while explaining the view of the Drafting Committee, said that he was \"still open to conviction\".\n\nThe discussion of the amendment was resumed by the Assembly on December 13, 1948 when, Dr. Ambedkar, who too had an open E mind on the vexed question of 'due procern', said :\n\n\" ... I must confess that I am somewhat in a difficult position with regard to article 15 and the amendment moved by my friend Pandit Bhargava for the deletion of the F words \"procedure according to law\" and the substitution of the words \"due process\".\n\nG ''.The question of \"due process\" raises, in my judgment, the question of the relationship between the le, islature and the judiciary. In a federal constitution, it is always open to the judiciary to deicide whether any particular law passed by the legislature is ultra vires or intra vires in reference to the powers of legislation which are granted by the Constitution to the particular legislature .... The 'due process' clause, in my judgment, would give the judi\n\n_,...\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 303\n\nciary tbe power to question the Jaw made by, the legislature on another ground. That ground would be whether that Jaw is in keeping with certain fundamental principles relating to tbe rights of the individual.\n\nIn other words, the judiciary would be endowed with the authority to question the law not merely on the ground whether it was in excess of the authority of the legislature, but also on the ground whether the law was good law, apart from the question of the powers of the legislature making the Jaw ... The question now raised by the introduction of the phrase 'due process' is whether the judiciary should be given the additional power to question the laws made by the State on the ground that they violate certain fundamental principles.\n\n\" .. There are dangers on both sides.\n\nFor myself I cannot altogether omit the possibility of a Legislature packed by party men making laws which may abrogate or violate what we regard as certain fundamental principles affecting the life and liberty of an individual. At the same time, I do not see how five or six gentlemen sitting in the Federal or Supreme Court examining laws made by the Legislature and by dint of their own individual conscience 'or their bias or their prejudices be trusted to determine which law is good and which law is bad. It is a rather a case where a man has to sail between Charybdis and Seylla and I therefore would not say anything. I would leave it to the House to decide in any way it likes.\" (See Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII, pp. 999-1001)\n\nThe amendment was then put to vote and was negat.ved. In view of this background and in view of the fact that the Constitution, as originally conceived and enacted, recognizes preventive detention as a permissible means of abridging the liberties of the people, though subject to the limitations imposed by Part Ill, we must reject the, contention that preventive detention is basically impermissible under the Indian Constitution.\n\nThe third contention centres around the 44th Constitution Amendment Act, J 978, with particular reference tQ ection I (2) and m:tioJJ thereof. Section I reads thus :\n\n~ • ·• - • • • . ; ' .. • • I\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R\n\n\"I. Short title and commencement.-\n\n(I) This Act may be called the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.\n\n(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act.\"\n\nSection 3 reads th us :\n\n\"3. Amendment of article 22.-In article 22 of the Constitution. -\n\n(a) for clause (4), the following clause shall be sub\n\nstituted, namely :\n\n\"(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than two months unless an Advisory Board constituted in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of two months that there is in its opinJon suflicient cause for such detention :\n\nProvided that an Advisory Board shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, and the Chairman shall be a serving Judge of the appropriate High Court and the other members shall be serving or retired Judges of any High Court :\n\nProvided further that nothing in this clause shall autho rise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (a) of clause (7).\n\nExp/anation.-In this clause, 'appropriate High Court' means,\n\n(i) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detentio11 made by tbtJ Government of\n\n'\"T\"'\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, c J.) 305\n\nIndia or an officer or authority subordinate to that Government, the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi;\n\n(ii) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detention made by the Government of any State (other than a Union territory), the High Court for that State; and\n\n(iii) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detention made by tl1e administrator or a Union territory or an Officer or authority subordinate to such administrator, such High Court as may be specified by or under any law made by Parliament in this behalf\".\n\n(b) in clause (7),-\n\n(i) subclause (a) shall be omitted ;\n\n(ii) sub-clause (b) shall be re-lettered as sub-clause (a); and\n\n(iii) sub-clause (c) shall be relettered as sub.clause\n\n(b) and in the sub-clause as so-relettered, for the words, brackets, letter and figure \"sub-clause\n\n(a) of clause ( 4)'', the word, brackets and figure \"clause (4)\" shall be substitued.\"\n\nClause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution to which the above amendment was made by the 44th Amendments reads thus :\n\n\"22.\n\n(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless-\n\n(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons\n\nwho are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion. ~µfflfint f!!-µs~ f9r such detention ;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or\n\n(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses\n\n(a) and (b) of clause (7) .\"\n\n• Clause (7) of Article 22 to which also amendment was made by the 44tb Amendment reads thus-\n\n\"22. (7) Parliament may by law prescribe-\n\n(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtainiag the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of subclause (a) clause (4);\n\n(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of case be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and\n\n(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).\" ·\n\nThe 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President under Article 368 (2) on April 30, 1979.\n\nMost of the provisions of the 44th Amendment were br,•ught into force with effect from June 20, 1979 by a notification issued by the Central Government 0n June 19. 1979.\n\nThe rest of the provisions of the Amendment were brought i 111.0 force with effect from August I, 1979 except section 3 whereby Article 22 was amended, which bas not yet been brought into force. The position, as it stands today from the Government's point of view, is that advisory Boards can be consttuted to consist of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (4) (a) in Its original form, The amendment made to that article by §i)Ction 3 of the 44th Amendment not\n\n...\n\nA.ic ROY v. UNiON OF INDIA (chandrachud, c.i.) 307\n\nhaving been brought into force by the Central Government by issuing a notification under section 1 (2), it is not necessary, according to the Union Government, to constitute Advisory Boards in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court and consisting of a Chairman and not less than two other Members. the Chairman being a serving Judge of the appropriate High Court and the other Members being serving or retired Judges of any High Court.\n\nBefore adverting to the arguments advanced before us on the question of the 44th Amendment, it must be mentioned that the National Security Ordinance which came into force on September 22, 1980 provided by clause (9) for the constitution of Advisory Boards strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act, in spite of the fact that the aforesaid section was not brought into force. The National Security Act was passed on December 27, 1980 replacing the Ordinance retrospectively. Section 9 of the Act makes a significant departure from clause (9) of the Ordinance by providing for the constitution of Advisory Boards in accordance with Article 22( 4) in its qriginal form and not in accordance with the amendment made to that article by section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act.\n\nThe arguments advanced before us by various counsel, bearing on the 44th Amendment have different facets and shall have to be considered separately. The main thrust of Dr. Ghatate's argument is that the Central Government was under an obligation to bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment into force within a reasonable time after the President gave his assent to the Amendment and since it has failed so far to do so, this Court must, by a mandamus, ask the Centrat Government to issue a notification under section I (2) of the .\n\nAmendment, bringing it into force without any further delay. Alternatively, Dr. Ghatate contends that clause (2) of section 1 of the 44th Amendment is ultra vires the amending power conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368 of the Constitution. He argues : The power to amend the Constitution is vested in the Parliament by Article 368, which cannot be delegated to the executive. By such delegation, the Parliament has created a parallel constituent body which is impermissible under the terms of Article 368. Sub-section\n\n(2) of section l of the 44th Amendment Act vests an uncontrolled power in the executive to amend the Constitution at its sweet will, which is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. Section\n\nl!I\n\n(i'\n\n30S SUPllEME cOiJRt itill>ORtS tl981J i s.c.il.\n\nI (2) is also bad because by conferring an unreasonable, arbitrary and unguided power on the executive, it violates Articles 14 and 19 which arc in integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nShri Tarkunde does not ask for a mandamus, compelling the Central Government to bring section 3 of the 44 th Amendment Act into force.\n\nHe challenges the Central Government's failure to bring section 3 into force as mala fide and argues : By refusing to bring section 3 into force within a reasonable time without any valid reason, the Central Government has flouted the constituent decision of the Parliament arbitrarily, which is violative of Article 21. No law of preventive detention can be valid unless it complies with Article 22 of the Constitution, particulary with clause (4) of that Article.\n\nSince the National Security Act does not provide for the constitution of Advisory Boards in accordance with section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act, the whole Act is bad.\n\nThere was an obligation upon the Central Government to bring the whole of the 44th Amendment into force within a reasonable time, since section 1 (2) cannot be construed as conferring a right of veto on the executive . to nulify or negate a constitutional amendment.\n\nThe bringing into force of a constitutional amendment when such power is left to the executive, may be conceivably deferred for reasons arising out of the inherent nature of the provisions which are to be brought into force. Rut the executive cannot defer or postpone giving effect to a constitutional amendments for policy reasons of its own which are opposed to the policy of the constituent body as reflected in the constitutional amendment.\n\nThe fact that the National Security Ordinance provided by clause (9) for the constitution of Advisory Boards in accordance with the provisions of the 44th Amendment shows that no administrative difficulty was envisaged or felt in bringing the particular provision into force.\n\nThe National Security Act dissolves the Advisory Boards Constituted under the Ordinance in accordance with the 44th Amendment and substitutes them by Advisory Boards whose composition is contrary to the letter and spirit of that Amenement.\n\nShri Jetharnalani, like Shri Tarkunde, relies upon the provisions of the 44th Amen<lment in regard to the constitution of Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act is bad for not compliance with section 3 of the Amendment, desipite the fact that the said section has not been brought into force.\n\nNo Act passed by a legislature, accor<ling to Shri Jethamalani, can flout the constituent view or decision of the Parliament, whether or not\n\n...\n\n\n....\n\nA.it. ROY v. UNION OF INt>lA (ChandrachuJ, C.J.) 309\n\nthe Constitutional Amendment has been brought into force.\n\nIn any event, contends the learned counsel, even if section 3 of the 44th\n\nAmndment Act has not been brought into force, the wisdom of that Amendment, in so far as it bears on the composition of Advisory Boards, is available to the Court. The view of the C0nstituent body on that question cannot but be regarded as reasonable, and to the extent that the provisions of the impugned Act run counter to that view, that Act must be held to be unreasonable and for that reason, struckdown.\n\nBoth Dr, Ghatate and Shri Garg contend that despite the provisions of section I (2) of the 44th Amendment Act, Article 22 of the Constitution stood amended on April 30, 1979 when the 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President and that there was nothing more that remained to be done by the executive. Section 1(2) which, according to them is misconceived and abortive must be ignored and served from the rest of the Amendment Act and the rest of it deemed to have come into force 011 April 30, 1979.\n\nIn so far as the arguments set out above bear on the reason- D ableness of the provisions of the National Security Act, we will consider them later when we will take up for examination the contention that the Act is violative of Articles 19 and 21 on account of the unreasonableness or unfairness of it> provisions and of the pro cedure prescribed by it. At this juncture we will limit ourselves to a consideration of those arguments in so far as they bear upon the interpretation of section l (2) of the 44th Amendment Act, the consequences of the failure of Central Government to issue a notification under that provision for bringing into force the provisions of section 3 within a reasonable time and the question as to whether, despite the provisions contained in section I (2), the 44th Amendment Act must be deemed to have come into force on the date on which the President gave bis assent to it. The point last mentioned raises the question as to whether section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act is severable from the rest of its provisions, if that section is bad for any reason.\n\nThe argument arising out of the provisions of Article 398 (2) may be considered first. It provides that when a Bill whereby the Constitution is amended is passed by the requisite majority, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill, \"and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill.\" This provision shows that a constitutional amendment cannot have any effect unless the President gives his assent to it and secondly, that nothing more than the President's assent to an amendment duly passed by the Parliament is required,\n\n1-J\n\n310 SUPREME cotJil.t REPORTS [ l 982j 2 s.c.it\n\nin order that the Constitution should stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. It must follow from this that the Constitution stood amended in accordance with the terms of the 44th Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act on April 30, 1979.\n\nWe must then turn to that Act for seeing how and in what manner the 'Constitution stood thus amended. The 44tb Amendment Act itself prescribes by section I (2) a pre-condition which must be satisfied before any of its provisions can come into force. That pre-condition is the issuance by the Central Government of notification in the official gazette, appointing the date from which the Act or any particular provision thereof will come into force, with power to appoint dilferent dates for different provisions.\n\nThus, according to the very terms of the 44th Amendment, none of its provisions can come into force unless and until the Central Government issues a notification as contemplated by section I (2).\n\nThere is no internal contradiction between the provisions of Article 368(2) and those of sec ti on 1 (2) of the 44th Amendment Act.\n\nArticle 368(2) lays down a rule of general application as to the date from which the constitution would stand amended' in accordance with the Bill assented to by the President. Section 1 (2) of the Amendment Act specifies the manner in which that Act or any of its provisions may be brought into force. The distinction is between the Constitution standing amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill assented to by the President and the date of the coming into force of the Amendment thus introduced into the Constitution. For determining the date with effect from which the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill, one has to turn to the date on which the President gave, or was obliged to give, his assent to the Amendment. For determining the date with effect from which the Constitution, as amended, came or will come into\n\nfore. one has to turn to the notification, if any, issued by the Central Government under section I (2) of the Amendment Act.\n\nThe Amendment Act may provide that the amendment introduced by it shall come into force immediately upon the President giving his assent fo the Bill or it may provide that the amendment shall come into force on a future date. Indeed, no objection can be taken to the Constituent body itself appointing a specific future date with effect from which the Amendment Act will come into force, and if that be so, different dates can be appointed by it for bringing into force different provisions of the Amendment Acst. The\n\n...\n\n...\n\n__\\.\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNiON OF INDIA (Chandraciiud, C.J.) 31 i\n\npoint of the matter is that the Constitution standing amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill and the amendment thus introduced into the Constitution coming into force are two distinct things.\n\nJust as a law duly passed by the legislature can have no effect unless it comes or is brought into force, similarly, an amendment of the Constitution can have no effect unless it comes or is brought into force. The fact that the Constituent body may itself specify a future date or dates with effect from which the Amendment Act or any of its provisions will come into force shows that there is no antithesis between Article 368(2) of the Constitution and section I (2) of the 44th Amendment Act.\n\nThe expression of legislative or constituent will as regards the date of enforcement of the law or Constitution is an integral part thereof. That is why it is difficult to accept the submission that, contrary to the expression of the constituent will, the amendments introduced by the 44th Amendment Act came into force on April 30, 1979 when the President gave his assent to that Act.\n\nThe true position is that the amendments introduced by the 44th Amendment Act did not become a part of the Constitution on April 30, 1979. They will acquire that status only when the Central Governmrnt brings them into force by issuing a notification under section .1(2) of the Amendment Act.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether section 1(2) 0fthe 44th Amendment Act is ultra vires the power conferred of the Parliament by Article 368 to amend the Constitution. The argument is that the constituent power must be exercised by the Constituent body itself and it cannot be delegated by it to the executive or any other agency.\n\nFor determining this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that by 'constituent power' is meant that power to frame or amend the Constitution.\n\nThe power of amendment is conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368(1 ), which provides that the Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, varition or repeal any provision of the Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in that article.\n\nThe power thus confered on the Parliament is plenary subject to the limitation that it cam1ot be exercised so as to alter the basic structure \"or framework of the Constitution. It is well-settled that the power conferred upon the Parliament by Article 245 to make laws is plenary within the field of legislation upon which that power can operate.\n\nThat power, by the terms of Article 245, is subject only to the provisions of the Constitution. The constituent power, subject to the limitation aforesaid, cannot be any the less plenary than the legislative pJwer, especially\n\n312 St.JilRilMil cot.Jilt llili>OR'ts fl982J 2 s.c.R..\n\nwhen the power to amend the Constitution and the power to legislate are conferred on one and the same organ of the State, namely, the Parliament. The Parliament may have to follow a different procedure while exercising its constituent power under Article 368 than the procedure which it has to follow while exercising its legislative power under Article 245.\n\nBut the obligation to follow different procedures while exercising the two different kinds of power cannot make any difference to the width of the power. In either event, it is plenary, subject in one case to the constraints of the basic structure of the Constitution and in the other, to the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThe contention raised by the petitioners, that the power to appoint a date for bringing into force a constitutional amendment is a constituent power and therefore it cannot be delegated to an outside agency is without any force.\n\nIt is true that the constituent power, that is to say, the power to amend any provision of the Constitution by way of an addition, variation or repeal must be exercised by the Parliament itself and cannot be delegated to an outside agency. That is clear from Article 368 (I) which defines at once the scope of the constituent power of the Parliament and limits that power to the Parliament. The power to issue a notification for bringing into force the proviions of a Constitutional amendment is not a constituent power because, it does not carry with it the power to amend the Constitution in any manner. It is, therefore, permissible to the Parliament to vest in an outside agency the power to bring a Constitutional amendment into force.\n\nIn the instant case, that power is conferred by the Parliament on another organ of the State, namely, the executive, V; hich is responsible to the Parliament for all its actions. The Par Ii am ent does not irretrievably lose its power to bring the Amendment i_nto force by reason of the empowerment in favour of the Central Government to bring it into force. If the Central Government fails to do what, according to the Parliament, it ought to have done, it would be open to the Parliament to delete section 1 (2) of the 44th Amendment Act by following the due procedure and to bring into force that Act or any of its provisions.\n\nWe need not enter into the muclr debated question relating to the delegation of legislative powers.\n\nIn The Queen v. Burah(1) the Privy Council upheld the delegated power to bring a law into force H in a district and to apply to it, the whole or part of the present or\n\n(1) 51.A. 178,\n\nA.K, ROY v. tiNioN OF iNDIA (Ghandrachud, C.J.) 3!3\n\nfuture laws which were in force in other districts. In Russell v. The Queen(1) it upheld the provision that certain parts of an Act should come into force only on the petition of a majority of electors.\n\nIn Hodge v. The Queen,(2) it upheld the power conferred upon a Board to create offences and annex penalties. The American autho rities on the question of the validity of delegated powers need not detain us because, the theory that a legislature is a delegate of the people and therefore, it cannot delegate its power to another does not hold true under our Constitution. The executive, under our Constitution, is responsible to the legislature and is not independent of it a5 in the United States.\n\nThe three Privy Council decisions to which we have referred above were considered by this Court in Re Delhi Laws Act(3) case, which is considered as a leading autho rity on the question of delegated legislation.\n\nThe Reference made in that case by the President under Article 143(1) of the Constitution to the Supreme Court, in regard to the validity of certain laws, was necessitated by the decision of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. State of Bihar(4) in which it was held by the majority that the power to extend the operation of an Act for a further period of one year with such modification as may be specified was a legislative power and that the provisions of section I (3) of that Act which delegated that power to an outside agency was bad.\n\nOne of the questions which was referred to this Court in Delhi Laws Act case was whether section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 was ultra vires the Legislature which passed that Act. That section provided that the Provincial Government may by a notification extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit to the- Province of Delhi or any part thereof any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\n\nThe difficulty of discovering the ratio of the seven judgments delivered in the Delhi Laws Act case is well-known. There is, however, no diffe rence amongst the learned Judges in their perception and understanding of what was actually decided in the three Privy Council cases to which we have referred and which were discussed by them.\n\nThey read the Privy Council decisions as laying down that conditional legislation is permissible whereby the legislature entrusts to an outside agency the discretionary power to select the time or\n\nplace to enforce the law.\n\nAs stated by Shri H.M. Seervai in his\n\n(I) 7 A.C. 829.\n\n(2) 9 A.C. 117.\n\n(3) (1951] SCR 747.\n\n(4) (1949] FCR 595.\n\n3i4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982j 2 s.c.ti..\n\n\"Constitutional Law of India\" (2nd ed. at p. 1203 : \"The making of laws is not an end in itself, but is a means to an end, which the legislature desires to secure.\n\nThat end may be secured directly by the law itself.\n\nBut there are many subjects of legislation in which the end is better secured by extensive delegation of legislative power\". There are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws contemporaneously with their enactment as also in their uniform extension to different areas.\n\nThose difficulties cannot be foreseen at the time when the laws are made. It, therefore, becomes necessary to leave to the judgment of an ouside agency the question as to when tile law should be brought into fore~ a 1 :I tJ which areas it should be extended from time to time.\n\nWhat is permissible to the Legislature by way of conditional legislation cannot be co1Bidered impermissible to the Parliament when, in the exercise of its constituent power, it takes the view that the question as regards the time of enforcement of a Constitutional amendment should be left D to the judgement of the executive. We are, therefore, of the opinion that section I (2) of the 44th Amendment Act is not ultra vires the power of amendment conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368 {l) of the Constitution.\n\nWe may now take up for consideration the question which was put in the forefront by Dr. Ghatate, namely, that since the Central Government has failed to exercise its power within a reasonable time, we should issue a mandamus calling upon it to discharge its duty without any further delay.\n\nOur decision on this question should not be construed as putting a seal of approval on the delay caused by the Central Government in bringing the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act into force.\n\nThat Amendment received the assent of the President on April 30, 1979 and more tlian two and half years have already gone by without the Central Government issuing a notification for bringing section 3 . of the Act into force.\n\nBut we find ourselves unable to intervene in a matter of this nature by issuing a mandamus to the Central Government obligating it to bring the provisions of section 3 into force.\n\nThe Parliament having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government the question as regards the time for bringing the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force, it is not for the Court to compel the Government to do that which, according to the mandate of the Pariliament, lies in its disceretion to do when it considers it opportune to do it.\n\nThe executive is responsible to the Parliament and if the Parliament considers that the executive has\n\n...\n\n...\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 315\n\nbetrayed its trust by not bringing any provision of the Amendment into force, it can censure the executive. It would be quite anomalous that the inaction of the executive should have the approval of the Parliament and yet we should show our disapproval of it by issuing a mandamus. The Court's power of judicial review in such cases has to be capable of being exercised both positively and negatively, if indeed it has that power; positively, by issuing a mandamus calling upon the Government to act and negatively by inhibiting it from acting. If it were permissible to the Court to compel the Government by a mandamus to bring a Constitutional amendment into force on the ground that the Government has failed to do what it ought to have done, it would be equally permissible to the Court to prevent the Government from acting, on some such ground as that, the time was not yet ripe for issuing the notification for bringing the Amendment into force. We quite see that it is difficult to appreciate what parctical difficulty can possibly prevent the Government from bringing into force the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment, after the passage of two and half year. But the remedy, according to us, is not the writ of mandamus.\n\nIf the Parliament had laid down an objective standard or test governing tl:.e decision of the Central Government in the matter of enforcement of the Amendment, it may have been possible to assess the situation judicially by examining the causes of the inaction of the Government in order to see how far they bear upon the starndard or test prescribed by the Parliament. But, the Parliament has left tbe matter to the judgment of the Central Government without prescribing any objec1ive norms.\n\nThat makes it difficult for us to substitute our own judgement for that of the Government on the question whether section 3 of the Amendment Act should be brought into force.\n\nThis is partcularly so when, the failure of the Central Government to bring that section into force so far, can be no impediment in the way of the Parliament in enacting a provision in the National Security Act on the lines of that section. ln fact, the Ordinance rightly adopted that section as a model and it is the Act which has wrongly discarded it. It is for these reasons that we are unable to accept the submission that by issuing a mandamus, the Central Government must be compelled to bring the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment into force. The question as to the impact of that section which, though a part of the 44th Amendment Act, is not yet a pJrt of the Constitution, will be considered later when we will take up for examination the argument as regards the reasonableness of the procedure prescribed\n\nby the Act.\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nWe have said at the very outset of the discussion of this point that our decision on the question as to whether a mandamus should be issued as prayed for by the petitioners, should not be construed as any approval on our part of the Jong and unexplained failure on the part of the Cetra I Government to bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act into force.\n\nWe have no doubt that in leaving it to the judgment of the Central Government to decide . as to when the various provisions of the 44tb Amendment should be brought into force, the Parliament could not have intended that the Central Government may exercise a kind of veto over its constituent will by not ever bringing the A mendment or some of its provisions into force.\n\nThe Parliament having seen the necessity of introducing into the Constitution a provision like section 3 of the 44th Amendment, it is not open to the Central Government to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy of that section.\n\nIf only the Parliament were to lay down an objective standard to guide and control the discretion of the Central Government in the matter of bringing the various provisions of the Act into force, it would have been possible to compel the Central Government by an appropriate writ to discharge the function assigned to it by the Parliament. In the past, many amendments have been made by the Parliament to the Constitution, some of which were given retrospective effect, some were given immediate effect, while in regard to some others, the discretion was given to the Central Government to bring the Amendments into force. For example, sections 3 (I) (a) and (4) of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 gave retrospective effect to the amendments introduced in Articles 19 and 31 by those sections. The 7th Amendment, 1956, fixed a specific date on which it was to come into force.\n\nThe 13th Amendment, 1962, provide-I by section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Govern· ment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. That amendment was brought into force by the Central Government on December I, 1963.\n\nThe 27th Amendment, 1971 brought section J: thereof into force at once, while the remaining provisions were to come into force on a date appointed by the Central Government, which was not to be earlier than a certain date mentioned in section I (2) of the Amending Act.\n\nThose remaining provisions were brought into force by the Central Government on February 15, 1972.\n\nThe 32nd Amendment, 1973, also provided by section I (2) that it shall come into force on a date appointed by the Central Government. That amendment was brought into force on July I, 1974.\n\nThe 42nd Amendment, 1976. by which the Constitution was recast\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 317\n\nextensively, gave power to the Central Government to bring it into force.\n\nBy a notification dated January 1, 1977 parts of that Amendment were brought into force in three stages (see Basu's Comment tary on the Indian Constitution, Ed. 1977, Volume C, Part III, page 134). Certain sections of that Amendment, which were not brought into force, were repealed by section 45 of the 44th Amendment.\n\nIt is in this background that the Parliament conferred upon the Central Government the power to bring the provisions of the 44th Amendment Act into force.\n\nThe Parliament could not have visualised that, without any acceptable reason, the Central Government may fail to implement its constituent will.\n\nWe hope that the Central Government will, without further delay, bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act into force.\n\nThat section, be it remembered, affords to the detenu an assurance that his case will be con sidered fairly and objectively by an impartial tribunal.\n\nAs regards the argument that section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act is bad because it vests an uncontrolled power in the executive, we may point out, briefly, how similar and even more extensive delegation of powers to the executive has been upheld by this Court over the years. In Sardar Inder Singh v.\n\nState of Rajasthan,(1) section 3 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance provided that it shall remain in force for a period of two years unless that period is further exetended by the Rajpramukh. It was held by this Court that section 3, in so far as it authorised the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the ordinance, fell within the category of conditional legislation and was intra vires.\n\nThe Court dissented from the view expressed in Je1indra Nath Gupta\n\nv. The State uf Bihar, (supra) that the power to extend the life of an enactment cannot validly be conferred on an outside authority.\n\nIn Sita Ram Bis!iambhar Dayal and Ors. v. Stale of U. P. and others,(2) section 3D (1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, which was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation, provided for levying taxes at such rates as may be prescribed by the State\n\nGovernment not exceeding the maximum prescribed.\n\nWhile rejecting the challenge, Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed :\n\n\"However much one.might deplore the \"New Despotism\" of the executive, the very complexity of the modern\n\n(I) [1957) SCR 605. (2)\n\n[1972] 2 SCR 14L\n\n\n{1982] 2 S.C. R.\n\nsociety and the demand it makes on its Government have set in motion force which have made it absolutely necessary for the legislatures to entrust more and more powers to the executive.\n\nText book doctrines evolved in the 19th Century have become out of date\".\n\nIn Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing ( Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner o( Sales Tax,(1) the question which arose for determination was whether the provisions of section 8 (2) (b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation because the Parliament, in not fixing the rate itself and in adopting the rate applicable to the sale or purchae of good inside the appropriate State, had not laid down any legislative 'policy, abdicating thereby its legislative function.\n\nRejecting this contention Khanna, J., who spoke for himself and two other learned Judges observed that the growth of , the legislative power of the executive is a significant development of the twentieth century and that provision was therefore made for delegated legislation to obtain flexibility, elasticity, expedition and opportunity for experimentation. Mathew,\n\n.T. speaking on behalf of himself and Ray, C.J. agreed with the conclusion that section 8 (2) (b) did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power. The d-!cisions bearing on the subject of excessive delegation have been surveyed both by Khanna, J. and Mathew, J. in their respective judgments. In M.K. Pasiah and Sons v. The Excise Commissioner,(2) it was contended for the appellants that the power to fix the rate of Excise Duty conferred by section 22 of the Mysore Excise Act of 1965 on the Government was bad for the reason that it was an abdication by the State legislature of its essential legislative function.\n\nThe Couri, speaking through Mathew, J. upheld the validity of section 22.\n\nWe are unable to appreciate that the constituent body can be restrained from doing what a legislature is free to do.\n\nWe are therefore unable to accept the argument t iat section l (2) confers an uncontrolled power on the executive and is, by .its unreasonableness, violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constition.\n\nWe are also unable to accept Shri Tarkunde's argument that the Central Government's failure to bring section 3 of the 44th\n\n(l) [1974] 2 SCR 879, (;?)\n\n(19751 3 SCR 607,\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 319\n\nAmendment into force is mala fide.\n\nThe Parliament has chosen to A leave to the discretion of the Central Government the determination of the question as to the time when the various provisions of the 44th Amendment should be brought into force.\n\nDelay in implementing the will of the Parliament can justifiably raise many an eye-brow, but it is not possible to say on the basis of such data, as has been laid before us, that the Central Government is actuated by any ulterior motive in not bringing section 3 into force.\n\nThe other limb of Shri Tarkunde's argument that there is an obligation upon the Central Government to bring the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force within a reasonable time has already been dealt with by us while considering the argument that, since the Government has not brought section 3 into force within a reasonable time, it should be compelled by a writ of mandamus to perform its obligation.\n\nThat disposes of all the contentions bearing on the 44th Amendment Act except one, which we will consider later, as indicated already.\n\nThe next question arises out of the provisions of section 3(1) and 3 (2) of the National Security Act which, according to the petitioners, are so vague in their content and wide in their extent that, by their application, it is easy for the Central Government or the State GovernmeBt to deprive a person of his liberty for any fanciful reason which may commend itself to them. Sub-section (!) and (2) of section 3 of the Act read thus :\n\n\"3 (I) The Central Government or the State Government may:-\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to perventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that\n\nwith) view to regulating his continued pre- :sence in India or with a view to making .arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directins !Pat such person be detained,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.11..\n\n(2) The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\nExplanation :-For the purposes of this sub-section, \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community\" does not include \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community\" as defined in the Explanation to sub-section ( !) of section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, and accordingly no order of detention shall be made under this Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be made under that Act,\"\n\nIt is contended by Shri Jethmalani that the expressions 'defence of India' 'relations of India with foreign powers', 'security of India' and 'security of the State' which occur in sub-sections (I)\n\n(a) and (2) of section 3 are so vague, general and elastic that even conduct which is otherwise lawful can easily be comprehended within those expression~, depending upon the whim and caprice of the detaining authority.\n\nThe learned counsel argues: These expressions are transposed from the legislative en tries into the aforesaid two sub-sections without any attempt at precision or definition. ln so for as \".if'fence of \"1dia' is concerned, the legislature could have easily indicated the broad content of that expression by including within it acts like inciting armed forces to rebellion, damaging or destroying defence i11stallations or disclosing defence secrets.\n\nIn the absence of such definition, a statement that corrupt officials are responsible for the purcha>e of defence equipment from a foreign power, may b~ considered as falling within the mischief of that expression. The expression 'acting in any manner prejudifi~I to h~ rell!ot_ions of Jndiit with foreign powers', is particularly\n\n...\n\n-\"\"\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 321\n\nopen to grave objection because, it can take in any and every piece of conduct. In the absence of a preci, e definition it is impossible for any person to know with reasonable certainty as to what in this behalf ae the limits of lawful conduct which he must not tramgress.\n\nEven if a person were to say, in the exercise of the right of his free speech and expression, that a foreign power, which is not friendly with India, is adopting ruthless measures to suppress huma<i liber ties, it would be open to the detaining authority to detain a person for making that statement.\n\nThe vice, therefore, of-section 3 consists in the fact that the governing factor for the application of that section is the passing and personal opinion of ti•e detaining authority in regard to the security and defence of the country and its external affairs.\n\nA cardinal requirement of the rule of law is that citizens must know with certainty where lawful conduct ends and unlawful conduct begins; but more than that, the bureaucrats must know the limits of their power.\n\nThe vagueness of the expressions used in section 3 con ft rs uncontrolled discretion on the detaining, authority to expand the horizon of their power, to the detriment of the liberty of the subject.\n\nEven the right to peaceful demonstration which has been upheld by this Court, may be treated by the detaining authority as falling within the mischief of section 3.\n\nThe circumstance that, if a habeas corpus petition is filed, the Court may release the detenu is hardly any answer to the vice of the section because, the fundamental principle is that a person cannot be d:prived of his liberty on the basis of a vague and uncertain law.\n\nThe provisions of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Pr0visions) Act 1973 (Halsbury's Statutes of England, 3rd edition, Volume 43, page I 235) is an instance of a statute wl1ich delfoes with precision\n\nthe reasons for which a person can be detained. That Act was passed inter alia for the detention of terrorists in Northern Ireland.\n\nSec ti on 10 (I) provides that any constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist. Section 20 of that Act defines the :erms 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' with great care and precision in order that the power of detention may not be abused.\n\nIn support of these propositions Shri Jethmalani relies on the decisions of the American Supreme Court in United States of America v. L. Cohen Grocery Company,(1 ) Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of,' 1he State of Oklahoma,(2) Ignatius\n\n(l) 65 Law Ed. 516, 520.\n\n(2) 76 Law Ed. 1062, 1082.\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Lanzetta v. Srate of New Jersey{1) and David H. Scull v., Commonwealth of Virginia Ex Rel., Commiflee on Law Reform and Racial Activities.(2) The ratio of these cases may be Summed up by reproducing the third head note of the case last mentioned :\n\n\"Fundamental fairness requires that a person cannot be sent to jail for a crime he could not with reasonable certainty know be was committing; reasonable certainty in that respect is all the more essential when vagueness might induce individuals to forgo their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of violating an unclear law.\"\n\nCounsel has also drawn our attention to the decision of this Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Balrko Prasad(3 ) where a law was struck down on the ground, inter alia that the word 'goonda' is of uncertain import, which rendered unconstitutional a law which permitted goondas to be externed\n\nIn this behalf Dr. Singhvi, intervening on behalf of the Supreme Court Bar Association, has drawn our attention to section 8(3) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 6 of 1968, which defines the expressions \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State 'and' acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.' Where there is a will there is a way, and counsel contends that the way shown with admirable precision by the Jammu & Kashmir Legislature is there for the Parliament to follow, provided its intention is, as it ought to be, that before the\n\npeople are deprived of their liberty, they must have the opportunity to regulate their conduct in order to ensure that it may conform to the requirements of law.\n\nIn making these submissions counsel seem to us to haveoverstated their case by adopting an unrealistic attitude. It is true that the vagueness and the consequent uncertainty of a Jaw of preventive detention bears upon the unreasonableness of that law as much as the uncertainty of a punitive law like the Penal Code does. A person cannot be deprived of his liberty by a law which is nebulous and uncertain in its definition and application. But in considering the question whether the expressions aforesaid which are used in\n\nH (t) 83 Law Ed. 888. (2) 3 Law Ed. 2d. 865. (3)\n\n~1961] I SCR 979:\n\n....\n\nA.k. ROY v. tJNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 313\n\nsection 3 of the Act are of that character, we must have regard to the consideration whether concepts embodied in those expressions are at all capable of a precise definition. The fact that some definition or the other can be formulated of an expression does not mean that the definition can necessarily give certainty to that expression.\n\nThe British Parliament has defined the term \"terrorism\" in section 28 of the Act of 1973 to mean \"the use of violence for political ends\", which, by definition, includes 'any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.\" The phrases \"political ends\" itfelf of an uncertain character and comprenends within its scope a variety of nebulous situations. Similarly, the definitions contained in section 8 (3) of the Jam mu and Kashmir Act of 1978 themselves depend upon the meaning of concepts like 'overawe the Government.' The formulation of definitions cannot be a panacea to the evil of vagueness and uncertainty. We do not, of course suggest that the legislature should not attempt to define or at least to indicate the contours of expressions, by the use, of which people are sought to be deprived of their liberty. The impossibility of framing a definition with mathematical precision cannot either justify the use of vague expressions or the total failure to frame any definition at all which can furnish, by its inclusiveness at least, a safe guideline for understanding the meaning of the expressions used by the legislature. But the point to note is that there are expressions which inherently comprehend such an infinite variety of situations that definitions, instead of lending them a definite meaning, can only succeed either in robbing them of their intended amplitude or in making it necessary to frame further definitions of the terms defined. Acts prejudicial to the 'defence of India'. 'security of India', 'security of the State', and 'relations of India with foreign powers' are concepts of that nature which are difficult to encase within the strait-jacket of a definition. If it is permissible to the legislature to enact Jaws of preventive detention, a certain amount of minimal latitude has to be conceded to it in order to make those laws effective. That we consider to be a realistic approach to the situation. An administrator acting bona fide, or a court faced with the question as to whether certain <.cts fall within the mischief of the aforesaid expressions used in section 3, will be able to find an acceptable answer either way. In other words though au expression may appear in cold print to be vague and uncertain, it may not be difficult to apply it to life's practical realities. This process undoudtedly involves the possiblity of error but then, there is hardly any area of adjudicative process which does not involve that possiblity.\n\nF.:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1892] 2 s.c k\n\nThe requirement that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness is regarded as a fundamental concept in criIT\\inal law and must now be regarded as a pervading theme of our Constitution since the decision in Maneka Go 11dhi(1). The underlying Pjinciple is that every person is entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and that the life and liberty of a person cannot be put in peril on an ambiguity.\n\nHowever, even in the domain of criminal law, the processes of which can result in the taking away of' life itself, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty has to be accepted as a fact.\n\nNeither the criminal law nor the Constitution requires the application of impossible standards and therefore, what is expected is that the language of the law must contain an adequate warning of the conduct which may fall within the prescribed area, when measured by common understanding.\n\nIn criminal law, the legislature frequently uses vague expressions like 'bring into hatred or contempt', 'maintenance of harmony between different religious groups' or 'likely to cause disharmony or hatred or ill-will', or 'annoyance to the publi.;'. (see sections I 24A, I 53A(I) (b), I 53B(I ((c), and 268 of tJ-e Penal Code).\n\nThese expressions, though they are difficult to define, do not elude a just application to practical situations.\n\nThe use of language carries with it the inconvenience of the imperfections of language.\n\nWe see that the concepts aforesaid, namely, 'defence of India', 'security of India', 'security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers', which are mentioned in section 3 c.f the Act, are not of any great certainty or definiteness. But in the very nature of things they are defficult to define.\n\nWe cannot therefore strike down these provisions of section 3 of the Act on the ground of their vagueness and uncertainty.\n\nWe must, however, utter a word of caution that since the concepts are not defined,\n\nundoubtedly because they are not capable of a precise definition, courts must strive to give to those concept a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest.\n\nWhile construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act, care must be taken to restrict their application to as few situations as possible. Indeed, that can well be the unstated premise for upholding the constitutionality of clauses like those in section 3, which are fraught with grave ccnsequences to perscnal liberty. if construed liberally.\n\n(1) [1978] 2 SCR 621.\n\n_A.\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNioN OF INDIA (Chandraci1ud, CJ.) 325\n\nWhat we have said above in regard to the expressions 'defence of fndia', 'security of India', 'security of the State' and 'relations of\n\nIndi~ with foreign powers' cannot apply to the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to tne maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community which occurs in section 3(2) of the Act.\n\nWhich supplies and services are essential to the community can easily be defined by the Legislature and indeed, legislations which regulate the prices and possession of essential commodities either enumerate those commodities or confer upon the appropriate Government the power to do so. In the absence of a definition of supplies and services essential to the community', the detaining authority will be free to extend the application of this clause of subsection (2) to any commodities or services the maintenance of supply of which, according to him, is essential to the community.\n\nBut that is not all. The explanation to sub-section (2) gives to the particular phrase in that sub-ection a meaning which is not only uncertain but which, at any given point of time, will be difficult to ascertain or fasten upon. According to the Explanation, no order of detention can be made under the National Security Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be made under the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.\n\nThe reason for this, which is stated in the Explanation itself, is that for the purposes of sub-section (2) \"acting in any ma!lner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community\" does not include ''acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community\" as defined in the Explanation to subsection (I) of section 3 of the Act of 1980 Clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanation to section 3 of the Act of 1980 exhaust almost the entire range of essential commodities. Clause (a) relates to committing or instigating any penon to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community. Clause (b) of the Explanation to section 3 of the Act of 1980 relates to dealing in any commodity which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, or with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (a). We find it quite difficult to understand as to which are the remaining commodities outside the scope of the Act of 1980, in respect of which it can be said that the maintenance of their supplies is essential to the community. The particular clause in sub-seclion (2) of section 3 of the\n\n326 sui•ilili.fE couitr REi>ORrs [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nNational Security Act is, therefore, capable of wanton abuse in that, the detaining authority can place under detention any person for possession of any commodity on the basis that the authority is of the opinion that the maintenance of supply of that commodity is essential to the community.\n\nWe consider the particular clause not only vague and uncertain but, in the context or the Explanation, capable of being extended cavalierly to supplies, the maintenace of which is not essential to the community. To allow the personal liberty of the people to be taken away by the application of that clause would be flagrant violation of the fairness and justness of procedure which is implict in the provisions of Article 21.\n\nIn so far as \"services essential to the community\" are concerned, they are not covered by the Explanation to section 3 (2) of the Act.\n\nBut in regads to them also, in the absence of a proper definition or a fuller description of that or a prior enumeration of such services, it will be difficult for any person to know with reasonable certitude as to which services are considered by the detaining authority as essential to the community.\n\nThe essentiality of services varies from time to time depending upon the circumstances existing at any given time. There are, undoubtedly, some services like water, electricity post and telegraph, hospitals, railways, ports, roads and air transport which are essential to the community at all times but, people have to be forewarned if new categories are to be added to the list of services which are . commonly accepted as being essential to the community.\n\nWe do not, however, prose to strike down the power given to detain persons under section 3 (2) on the ground that they are acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to tht~ community. The reason for this is that it is vitally necessary to ensure a steady flow of supplies and services which are essential to the community, and if the State has the power to detain persons on the grounds mentioned in section 3 (I} and the other grounds mentioned in section 3 (2), it must also have the power to pass orders of detention on this particular ground. What we propose to do is to hold that no person can be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community unless, by a law, order or notification made or published fairly in advance, the supplies and services, the main - tenance of which is regarded as essential to the community and in\n\n...\n\nA.It. ROY v. UNiON OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 321\n\nrespect of which the order of detention is proposed to be passed, are made known appropriately, to the public.\n\nThat disposes of the question as to the vagueness of the provisions of the National Security Act.\n\nWe will now proceed to the consideration of a very important topic, namely, the reasonableness of the procedure prescribed by the Act.\n\nThe arguments advanced on this question fall under three sub-heads : (I) the reasonableness of the procedure which is generally prescribed by the Act; (2) the fairness and reasonableness of the substantive provisions in regard to the constitution of Advisory Boards; and (3) the justness and reasonableness of the procedure in the proceedings before the Advisory Boards. The discussion of these questions will conclude this judgment.\n\nShri Jethmalani attacked the constitutionality of the very National Security Act itself on the ground that it is a draconian piece of legislation which deprives people of their personal liberty excessively .and unreasonably, confers vast and arbitrary powers of detention upon the executive and sanctions the use of those powers by following a procedure which is unfair and unjust. The Act, according to the counsel, thereby violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 and and is therefore wholly unconstitutional.\n\nThis argument, it must be stated, is not to be confused with the fundamental premise of the petitioners that, under our Constitution, no law of preventive detention can at all he passed, whatever be the safeguards it provides for the protection of personal liberty.\n\nWe have already dealt with that argument.\n\nThe argument of Shri Jethmalani against the validity of the National Security Act can be disposed of briefly.\n\nWe need not enter into the controversy which is reflected in the dissenting judgment of Kailasam, J. in Maneka Gmdhi as to whether the major premise of Gopalan' s case really was that Article 22 is a complete code in itself and whether because of that premise, the decision in that case that Article Z 1 excluded the personal freedom conferred by Article 19 (I) is incorrect.\n\nWe have the authority of the decisions in the Bank Natimn/isation case, Haradhan Saha,(1) Khudiram,(2) Sambhu\n\nNath Sarkcr(3) and Maneka Gandhi for saying that the fundamental\n\n(l) [1975] 1 SCR 778. (2)\n\n(19751 2 SCR 832. (3) (1974] l SCR 1,\n\n328 S01>REME COORt REPORTS [ J 982) 2 s.c.Il.\n\nrights conferred by the different Articles of Part III of the ConstitutLm ae not mutually exclusive and that therefore a law of preventive detention which falls within Article 22 must also meet the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21.\n\nSpeaking for the Court in Khudiram, one of us, Bhagwati, J. said :\n\n\"This question, thus, stands concluded and a final seal is put on this controversy and in view of these decisions, it is not open to any one now to contend that a law of preventive detention, which falls within article 22, does not have to meet the requirement of article 14 or article\n\n19.\" (page 847)\n\nBut just as the question as to whether the rights conferred by the different articles of Part III are mutually exclusive is concluded by the aforesaid decisions, the question whether a law of preventive detention is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates the freedoms conferred by Arlicles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is also concluded by the decision in Haradhan Saha.\n\nIn that case the validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was challenged on the ground that it violates these articles since its pro~ visions were discrim'inatory, they constituted an unreasonable infringement of the rights conferred by Article 19, they infringed the guarantee of fair procedure and they did not provide for an impar tial machinery for the consideration of the representation made by the detenu to the Government. The Constitution Bench which heard the case considered these contentions and rejected them by holding that the MISA did not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.\n\nThe MISA was once again challenged in Khudiram, but the Court refused to entertain that challenge on the ground that the question was concluded by the decision in Haradhan Saha and that it was not open to the petitioner to challenge that Act on the ground that some argument directed against the constitutional validity of the Act under Article 19 was not advanced or considered in Haradhan Saha. The Court took the view that the decision in Haradhan Saha must be regarded as having finally decided all questions as to the constitutional validity of MISA on the ground of challenge under Article 19.\n\nWe would like to add that in Haradhan Saha tbe challenge to MISA on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 21 and 22 was also considered and rejected. The question therefore as to whether MISA violated the provisions of these four articles, namely, Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22, must be consi dered as having been finally decided in Haradlwn Saha. Accordingly,\n\nA.k. kOY v. ONION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 329\n\nwe find it impossible to accept the argument that the National Security Act, which is in pari materia with the Maintenance of\n\nInternal, Security Act, 1971, is unconstitutional on the ground that, by its very nature, it is generally violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22.\n\nThough the Act, as a measure of preventive detention, cannot be challenged on the broad and general ground that such Acts are calculated to interfere unduly with the liberty of the people, we shall have to consider the challenge made by the petitioners' counsel, particularly by Shri Jethmalani and Dr. Ghatate, to certain specific provisions of the Act on the ground that they cause excessive and unreasonable interference with the liberty of the detenus and that the procedure prescribed by those provisions is not fair, just and reasonable.\n\nDr. Ghatate has, with particular emphasis, challenged on these grounds the provisions of sections 3(2), 3(3), 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 16 of the Act.\n\nShri Tarkunde challenged the provisions of sections 8 and 11(4) of the Act.\n\nWe have already dealt with the argument arising out of the provisions of section 3(2) read with the Explanation, by which power is conferred to detain persons in order to prevent them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nIn so far as subsection (3) of section 3 is concerned, the argument is that it is wholly unreasonable to confer upon the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police the power to issue orders of detention for the reasons mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3.\n\nThe answer to this contention is that the said power i> conferred upon these officers only if the State Government is satisfied that having regaed to the circums. tances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area witbin the local limits of the jurisdiction of these officers, it is necessary to empower them to take action under sub-section (2).\n\nThe District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police can take action under sub-section (2) during the period specified in the order of the State Government only.\n\nAnother safeguard provided is, that the period so specified in the , rd er made by the State Government during which these officers can exercise the powers under sub-section (2) cannot, in the first instance, exceed three 11101•ths and can be extended only from time to time not exceeding three months at any one time.\n\nBy sub-section ( 4) of section 3, the District Magistrate or the Commissionerjof Police\n\nhas to report forthwith the fact of detention to the State Govern-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) i s.c.R..\n\nment and no such or.der of detention can remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. In view of these in built safeguards, it cannot be said that excessive o.r unreasonable power is conferred upon the District l\\fagistrate or the Commissioner of Police to pass orders under sub-section (2).\n\nBy section 5, every person in respect of whom a deteitnon order has been made is liable- ~·\n\n(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify, and\n\n(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether in the same State, or in another State, by order of the appropriate Government.\n\nThe objection of the petitioners to these provisions on the ground of their unreasonableness is not wholly without substance.\n\nLaws of preventive detention cannot, by the back-door, introduce procedural measures of a punitive kind.\n\nDetention without trial is an evil to be suffered, but to no greater extent and in no greater measure than is minimally necessary in the interest of the country and the community.\n\nIt is neither fair nor just that a detenu should have to suffer detention in \"such place\" as the Government may specify.\n\nThe normal rule has to be that the detenu will be kept in detention in a place which is within the environs of his or her ordinary place of residence. If a person ordinarily resides in Delhi to keep him in detention in a far of place like Madras or Calcutta is a punitive measure by itself which, in matters of preventive detentioin at any rate, is not to be encouraged.\n\nBesides, keeping a person in detention in a place other than the one where he habitually resides makes it impossible for his friends and relatives to meet him or for the detenu to claim the advantage of facilities like having his own food. The requirements of administrative convenience, safety and security may justify in a given case the transfer of a detenu to a place other than that where he ordinarily resides, but that can only be by way of an exception and not as a matter of general rule .. Even when a detenu is required to be kept in or transferred to a place which is other than his usual place of residence, he ought not to be\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 331\n\nsent to any far off place which, by the very reason of its distance, is likely to deprive him of the facilities to which he is entitled. Whatever smacks of punishment must be scruplously avoided in matters of preventive detention.\n\nSince section 5 of the Act provides for, as shown by its marginal note, the power to regulate the place and conditions of detention there is one more observation which we would like to make and which we consider as of great importance in matters of preventive detention. In order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should conform to the mandate of Article 21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness, we consider it imperative that immediately after a person is taken in custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken in custody.\n\nIntimation must also be given as to the place of detention, including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to ti me.\n\nThis Court bas stated time and again that the person who is taken in custody does not forfeit, by reason of his arrest, all and every one of his fundamental rights.\n\nIt is therefore, necessary to treat the detenu consistently with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour.\n\nThe objection of the petitioners against the provision contained in section 8(1) is that it unreasonably allows the detaining authority to furnish the grounds of detention to the detenu as late as five days and in exceptional cases I 0 days after the date of detention. This argument overlooks that the primary requirement of section 8(1) is that the authority making the order of detention shall communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu \"as soon as may be\". The normal rule therefore is that the grounds of detention must be comrni1nicateJ t-i the dctenu without avoidable delay. It is only in order to meet th~ practical exigencies of administrative affairs that detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five c'ays ordinarily, and not later.than 10 days if there are exceptional circumstances. If there are any such circumstances, the detaining authority is required by section 8(1) to record its reasons in writing.\n\nWe do not think that this provision is open to any objection.\n\nSections 9, JO and 11 deal respectively with the constitution of Advisory Boards1 reference to Advisory Boarcls and procedQre of\n\n332 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nAdvisory Boards.\n\nWe will deal with these three sections a little later while considering the elaborate submissions made by Shri Jethmalani in regard thereto.\n\nDr. Ghatate's objection against section 13 is that it provides for a uniform period of detention of 12 months in all cases, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is passed. There is no substance in this grievance because, any law of preventive detention has to provide for the maximum period of detention, just as any punitive law like the Penal Code has to provide for the maximum sentence which can be imposed for any offence.\n\nWe should have thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the grounds of detention. The fact that a person can be detained for the maximum period of 12 months does not place upon the detaining authority the obligathn to direct that he shall be detained for the maximum period.\n\nThe detaining authority can always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the period of detention. It must also be mentioned that, under the proviso to section 13, the appropriate Government has the power to revoke or modify the order of detention at any earlier point of time.\n\nSection 16 is assailed on behalf of the petitioners on the ground that it confers a wholly unwarranted protection upon officers who may have passed orders of detention m'da fide.\n\nThat section provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or a State Government and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against a person, for anything in good faith done or intended to he done in pursuance of the Act.\n\nThe grievance of Dr. Ghatate is that even if an officer has in fact passed an order of detention ma/a fide, but intended to pass in good faith, he will receive the protection of this provision.\n\nWe see a contradiction in this argument because, if an officer intends to pass an order in good faith and if he intends to pass the order ma/a fide he will pass it likewise Moreover, an act which is not done in good faith will not receive the protection of section 16 merely because it was intended to be done in lgood faith.\n\nIt is also necessary that the 11ct complained of m1.1St have been in pursuance of the Act,\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 333\n\nShri Jethmalani also challenged the provisions of section 16 on the ground of their unreasonableness.\n\nHe contends that the expression \"good faith\", which occurs in section 16, has to be construed in the sense in which it is defined in section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, according to which, a thing shall be deemed to be done in \"good faith\" where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.\n\nOn the contrary, sction 52 of the Indian Penal Code provides that 'nothing is said to be done or believed in \"good faith\" which is done or believed without due care and attention. If the delinition contained in section 52 of the Penal Code were made applicable, a suit or other proceeding could have lain against the detaining authrity on the ground that the order was passed carelessly or without a proper application of mind.\n\nCounsel contends that since the General Clauses Act would apply, the detaining authority can defend the order and defeat the suit or other proceeding brought against it by showing merely that the order was passed honestly.\n\nWe do not see any force in this\n\ngrievanc~. lf the policy of a law is to protect honest acts, whether they are done with care or not, it cannot be said th it the law is unreasonable.\n\nIn fact, honest acts deserve the highest protection.\n\nThen again, the line which divides a dishonest act from a negligent act is often thin and, speaking generally, it is not easy for a defendant to justify his conduct as honest, if it is accompanied by a degree of negligence.\n\nThe fact, therefore, that the definition contained in section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act includes negligent acts in the category of the acts done in gJod faith will not always make material difference to the pr0of of matters arising in proceedings under section 16 of the Act.\n\nThat takes us to the last of the many points urged in this case, which relates to the constitution of Advisory Boards and the procedure before tllern.\n\nThree section of the National Security Act are relevant in this context, namely, section 9, 10 and 11. [t may tie recalled that section 3 of the 44th Constitution Amendment Act 1978 made an important amendment to Article 22(4) of the Consti'. tution by providing that-\n\n(i) No law of preventive detention shall authorise the detention of any person for more than two months\n\nunlss an Advisory Board has reported before the expiry of that period that there is in its opinion sulf-\n\n<; int c; us~ for such dtention; ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S\n\n(1982J 2 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) the Advisory Board must be constituted in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court; and\n\n(iii) the Advisory Board must consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, the Chairman being a serving Judge of the appropriate Hi!!h Court and the other members being serving or retired judges of any High Court.\n\nThe main points of distinction between the amended provisions and the existing provisions of Article 22(4) are that whereas, under the amended provisions, (i) the constitution of the Advisory Boards has to be in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court, (i1) the Chairman of the Advisory Board has to be a serving Judge of the appropriate High Court, and\n\n(iii) the other members of the Advisory Board have to be serving or retired Judges of any High Court, under the existing procedure,\n\n(i) it is unnecessary to obtain the recommendation of the Chief Justice of any High Court for constituting the Advisory Board and\n\n(ii) the members of the Advisory Board need not l:Je serving or retired Judges of a High Court : it is sufficient if they are \"qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court\". By Article 217(2) of the Constitution, a citizen of India is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court if he has been advocate of a High Court for ten years.\n\nThe distinction between the provisions of the amended and the unamended provisions of Article 22( 4) in regard to the constitution of Advisory Boards is of great practical importance from the point of view of the detenu.\n\nThe safeguards against unfounded accusation and the opportunity for establishing innocence which constitute the ha! !mark of an ordinary criminal trial are not available to the detenu.\n\nHe is detained on the basis of ex parte reports in regard to his past conduct, with a view to preventing him from persisting in that course of conduct in future.\n\nIt is therefore of the utmost importance from the detenu's point of view that the Advisory Board should consist of persons who are independent, unbiassed and competent and who possess a trained judicial mind.\n\nBut the question for our consideration is whether, as urged by Shri Jethmalani, section 9 of the National Security Act is bad for the reason that its provisions do not accord with the requirements of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, CJ.) 335\n\nWe find considerable difficulty in accepting this submission. Earlier in this judgment, we have upheld the -validity of section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act, by which the Parliament has given to the Central Government the power to bring into force all or any of the provisions of that Act, with option to appoint different dates for the commencement of different provisions of the Act.\n\nThe Central Government has brought all the provisions of the 44th Amendment Act into force except one, namely, section 3, which contains the provision for the constitution of Advisory Hoards.\n\nWe have taken the view that we cannot compel the Central Government by a writ of mandamus to bring the provisions of section 3 into force.\n\nWe have further held that, on a true interpretation of Article 368(2) of the Constitution, it is in accordance with the terms of the 44th Constitution Amendment Act that, upon the President giving his assent to that Act, the Constitution stood amended.\n\nSince section 3 has not been brought into force by the Central Government in the exercise of its powers under section 1 (2) of the 44th Amendment Act, that section is still not a part of the Constitution. The question as to whether section 9 of the National Security Act is bad for the reason that it is inconsistent with the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act, has therefore to be decided on the basis that section 3, though a part of the 44th Amendment Act, it is not a part of the Constitution. If section 3 is not a part of the Constitution, it is difficult to appreciate how the validity of section 9 of the National Security Act can be tested by applying the standard laid down in that section.\n\nIt cannot possibly be that both the unamended and the amended provisions of Article 22(4) of the Constitution are parts of the Constitution at one and the same time.\n\nSo long as section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act has not been brought into force, Article 22(4) in its unamended form will continue to be a part of the Constitution and so long as that provision is part of the Constitution, the amendrr.ent introduced by section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act cannot become a part of the Constitution.\n\nSection 3 of 44th Amendment substitutes a new Article 22(4) for the old Anic[e 22(4).\n\nThe validity of the constitution of Advisory Boards has therefore to be tested in the light of the provisions contained in Article 22(4) as it stands now and not accorcting to the amended Article 22(4).\n\nAccording to that Article as it stands now, an Advisory Board may consist of persons, inler alia, who are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court.\n\nSection l) of the National Security Act provides for the constitution of the Advisory Boards in conformity with that provision. We fipg it impossible \\o hold\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1 S\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthat the prov1s1on of a statute, which conforms strictly with the existing provisions of the Constitution, can be declared bad either on the ground that it does not accord with the provisions of a constitutional amendment which has not yet come into force, or on the ground that the provision of the section is harsh or unjust. The .standard which the Constitution, as originally enacted, has itself laid down for constituting Advisory Boards, cannot be characterised as harsh or unjust.\n\nThe argument, therefore, that section 9 of the National Security Act is bad for either of these reasons must fail.\n\nWe must hasten to add that the fact that section 3 of the 44th Amendment has not yet been brought into force does not mean that the Parliament cannot provide fur the constitution of Advisory Boards in accordance with its requirements.\n\nThe Parliament is free to amend section 9 of the National Security Act so as to bring it in line with section 3 of the 44th Amendment.\n\nSimilarly, the fact that section 9 provides for the constitution of Advisory Boards consisting of persons \"who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court\" does not mean that the Central Government or the State Governments i cannot ~'constitute Advisory Boards consisting of serving or retired Judges of the High Court. The minimal standard laid down in Article 22(4)(a), which is adopted by section 9 of the Act, is binding on the Parliament while making a Jaw of preventive detention and on the executive while constituting an Advisory Board.\n\nThat standard cannot be derogated from.\n\nBut, it can certainly be improved upon.\n\nWe do hope that the Parliament will take the earliest opportunity to amend section 9 of the Act by bringing it in line with section 3 of the 44th Amendment as the Ordinance did and that, the Central Government and the State Governments will consti tute Advisory Boards in their respective jurisdictions in accordance with section 3, whether or not section 9 of the Act is so amended.\n\nWe are informed that some enlightened State Governments have already given that lead. We hope that the other Governments will follow suit.\n\nAfter all, the executive must strive to reach the highest standards of justice and fairness in all its actions, whether or not it is compellable by law to adopt those standards. Advisory Boards consisting of serving or retired Judges of High Courts, preferably\n\nserving, and drawn from a panel recommended by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court will give credibility to their proceedings.\n\nThere will then be a reasonable assurance that Advisory !3011rds will express their opinion on the .sufficiency of the cause for\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNION OF INbIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 331\n\ndetention, with objectivity, fairness and competence. That way, the implicit promise of the Constitution shall have been fulfilled.\n\nNow, as to the procedure of Advisory Boards. Shri Jethmalani laid great stress on this aspect of the matter and, in our opinion, rightly.\n\nConsideration by the Advisory Board of the matters and material used against the detenu is the only opportunity available to him for a fair and objective appraisal of his case.\n\nShri Jethmalani argues that the Advisory Boards must therefore adopt a procedure which is akin to the procedure which is generally adopted by judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals for resolving the issues which arise before them. He assails the procedure prescribed by sections 10 and 11 of the National Security Act on the ground that it is not in consonance with the principles of natural justice, that it does not provide the detenu with an effective means of establishing that what is alleged against him is not true and that it militates against the requirements of Article 2 l.\n\nLearned counsel enumerated twelve requirements of natural justice which, according to him, must be observed by the Advisory Boards.\n\nThose requirements may be summed up, we hope without injustice to the argument, by saying that {il the detenu must have the right to be represented by a lawyer of his choice; (ii) he must have the right to cross-examine persons on whose statements the order of detention is founded; and {iii) he must have the right to present evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him.\n\nCounsel also submitted that the Advisory Board must give reasons in support of its opinion which must be furnished to the detenu, that the entire material which is available to the Advisory Board must be disclosed to the detenu and that the proceedings of the Advisory Board must be open to the public. According to Shri Jethmalani, the Advisory Board must not only consider whether the order of detention was justified but it must also consider whether it would have itself passed that order on the basis of the material placed before it. Counsel says that the Advisory Board must further examine whether all the procedural steps which are obligatory under the Constitution were taken until the time of its report, the impact of Joss of time and altered circumstances on the necessity to continue the detention and last but not the least, whether there is factual justification for continuing the order of detention beyond the period of three months.\n\nCounsel made an impassioned plea that 25 years of the Gopalan jurisprudence have desensitised the community to the perils of preventive detention and that, it is imperative to provide for the maximum safeguards to the detenu in order to preserve and protect his liberty, which can be achieved by\n\n338 SUPREME COURT REPbRTS [1982] 2 s.c.11.\n\nmaking at least the rudiments of due process available to him. How much process is due must depend, according to Shri Jethmalani, on the extent of grievous Joss involved in the case.\n\nThe loss in preventive detention is of the precious right of personal liberty and therefore, it is urged, all >uch procedural facilities must be afforded to the detenu as will enable him to meet the accusations made against him and to disprove them.\n\nFirst and foremost, \\we must consider whether and to what extent the detenu is entitled to exercise the trinity of rights before the Advisory Board : (i) the right of legal representation; (ii) the right of cross examination and (iii) the right to present his evidence in rebuttal.\n\nThse rights undoubtedly constitute the core of just process because without them, it would be difficult for any person to disprove the allegations made against him and to establish the truth. But there are two considerations of primary importance which must be borne in mind in this regard. There is no prescribed standard of reasonableness and therefore, what kind of processual rights should be made available to a person in any proceeding depends upon the nature of the proceeding in 1 elation to which the rights are claimed. The kind of issues involved in the proceeding determine the kind of rights available to the persons who are parties to that proceeding.\n\nSecondly, the question as to the availability of rights has to be decided not generally but on the basis of the statutory provisions which govern the proceeding, provided of course that those provisions are valid.\n\nIn the instant case, the question as to what kind of rights are available to the detenu in the proceeding before the Advisory Board has to be decided in the light of the provisions of the Constitution, and on the basis of the provisions of the National Security Act to the extent to which they do not offend against the Constitution.\n\nTurning first to the right of legal representation which is claimed by the petitioners, the relevant 'article of the Constitution to consider is Article 22 which bears the marginal note \"protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.\" That article provides by clause (I) that no person who is arrested shall be detained in cu.tody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause (2) requires that every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours\n\n--r\n\nA.k. ROY v. tJNiON OF JNDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 339\n\nof such arrest and that no person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.\n\nClause (3) provides that nothing in clauses (I) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or \\b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\n\nIt may be recalled that clause 4(a) of Article 22 provides that no Jaw of preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months unless the Advisory Board has reported before the expiry of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.\n\nBy clause 7(c) of Article 22, the Parliament is given the power to prescribe by law the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in an inquiry under clause 4(a).\n\nOn a combined reading of clauses (1) and (3) (b) of Article 22, it is clear that the right to consult and to be defended by a legal\n\npractitionerof one's choice, which is conferred by clause (!), is denied by clause 3(b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\n\nThus, according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself, no person who is detained under any Jaw, which provides for preventive detention, can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him. In view of this, it seems to us difficult to hold, by the application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, Since the Constitution, as originally enacted, itself contemplates that such a right should not be made available to a detenu, it cannot be said that the denial of the said right is unfair, unjust or unreasonable. It is indeed true to say, after the decision in the Bank Nationalisation case, that though the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in Article 22, the requirements of Article 21 have nevertheless to be satisfied. It is therefore necessary that the procedure prescribed by law for the proceedings before the Advisory Boards must be fair, just and reasonable.\n\nBut then, the Constitution itself has provided a yardstick for the application of that standard,\n\nthrongh the medium of the provisions contained in Article 22(3)(b).\n\nHowsoever much we would have liked to hold otherwise, we experience serious difficulty in taking the view that the procedure of the Advisory Boards in which the detenu is denied the right of legal representation is unfair. unjust or unreasonab'e. If Article 22 were\n\n340 SUPREME COURT Rei>oilts t 1982} i s.c.ll.\n\nsilent on the question of the right of legal representation, it would have been possible, indeed right and proper, to hold that the detenu cannot be denied the right of legal representation in the proceedings before the Advisory Boards. It is unfortunate that courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Article 22(3)(b) read with Article 22(1).\n\nIt is contended by Shri Jethmalani that the provision contained in clause 3(b) of Article 22 is limited to the right which is specifically conferred by clause (I) of that article and therefore, if the right to legal representation is available to the detenu apart from the provisions of Article 22(1), that right cannot of denied to him by reason of the exclusionary provision contained in Article 22(3)(b). Counsel says that the right of legal representation arises out of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 and 22(5) and therefore, nothing said in Article 22(3)(b) can affect that right.\n\nIn a sense we have already answered this contention because, what that contention implies is that the denial of the right of legal representation to the detenu in the proceedings before the Advisory Board is an unreasonable restriction, within the meaning of Article 19(1), on the rights conferred by that article. If the yardstick of reasonableness .is provided. by Article 22(3), which is as much a part of the Constitution as originally enacted, as Articles 19, 21 and 22(5), it would be difficult to hold that the denial of the particular right introduces an element of unfairness, unjustness or unreasonableness in the procedure of the Advisory Boards. It would be stretching the language of Articles 19 and 21 a little too far to hold that what is regarded as reasonable by Article 22(3)(b) must be regarded as unreasonable within the meaning of those articles.\n\nFor illustrating this point, we may take the example of Jaw which provides that an enemy alien need not be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest or detention in custody. If the right of production before the magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest is expressly denied to the enemy alien by Article 22(3)(a), it would be impossible to bold that the said right is nevertheless available to him by reason of the provisions contained in Article 21.\n\nThe reason is, that the answer to the question whether the procedure established by Jaw for depriving an enemy alien of his personal liberty is fair or just is provided by the Constitution it>elf through the provisions of Article 22(3)(a).\n\nWhat that provision considers fair, just and reasonable cannot, for the purposes of Article 21, be regarded as unfair unjust or unreasonable.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 341\n\nTo read the right of legal representation in Article 22(5) is straining the language of that article.\n\nClause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be effective, but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner befoe the Advisory Board merely because, by section IO of the National Security Act, the representation made by the detenu is required to be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration. If anything, the effect of section 11 (4) of the Act, which conforms to Article 22(3) (b), is that the detenu cannot appear before the Advisory Board through a legal practitioner.\n\nThe written representation of the detenu does not have to be expatiated upon by a legal practitioner.\n\nGreat reliance was placed by Shri Jethmalani on the decision of the American Supreme Court in Ozie Powell v. State of Alabama(1), in which it was held that the dght of hearing includes the right to the aid of counsel because, the right to be heard will in many cases be of little help if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by a counsel.\n\nDelivering the opinion of the court, Sutherland. J. said :\n\n\"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small\n\nand sometimes no skiJI in the science of law. If charged E with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.\n\nHe is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.\n\nLeft without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his F defence, even though he have a perfect one.\n\nHe requires the guid:ng hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.\n\nWithout it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how lo estblish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelli- G gence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for ff\n\nP) 77 L.ed. 158,\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nhim, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.\" (page 170)\n\nThe aforesaid decision in Powell is unique in more than one way and has to be distinguished. The petitioners therein were charged with the crime of rape comitted upon two white girls.\n\nAt the trial, no counsel was employed on behalf <'f petitioners but the trial Judge had stated that \"he had appointed all the members of the Bar for the purpcse of arranging the defendants and then of course anticipated that the members of te bar would continue to help the defendants if no counsel appeared\".\n\nThe trial of the petitioners was completed within a single day, at the conclusion of which the petitioners were sentenced to death. That verdict was assailed on the ground, inter alia, that the petitioners were denied the right of counsel. It must be stated that the Constitution of Alaboma provided that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel; and a state statute required that the court must appoint a counsel for the accused in all capital cases where the accused was unable to employ one. It is in tlie\n\nlight of these provisions and as a requirement of the due process clause of the American Constitution that it was held that the right to hearing, which is a basic element of due process, includes the right to the aid of counsel.\n\nThe patent distinction between that case and the matter before us is that , our Constitution, at its very inception, regarded it reasonable to deny to the detenu the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.\n\nSecondly, a criminal trial involves issues of a different kind from those which the Advisory Board has to consider. The rights available to an accused can, therefore, be of a different character than those available to the detenu, consistently with reason and fairplay.\n\nShri Jethmalani also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court which is reported in John J. Morrissey v. Lou B.\n\nBrewer.(1) In that case, two convicts whose paroles were revoked by the Iowa Board of Parole, alleged that they were denied due process because their paroles were revoked without a hearing.\n\nBurger C.J., expressing the view of six members of the court, expressly left upon the question whether a prolee is entitled, in a parole revocation proceeding, to the assistance of counsel.\n\nThe\n\n(1) 33 L.ed. Znd 484,\n\n( '\n\nA.K. ROY I'. U/\\llON OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 343\n\nthree other learned Judges held that due process requires that the parolee be allowed the assistance of counsel in the parole revocation proceeding. It must be appreciated that the American decisions on the right to counsel turn largely on the due process clause in the American Constitution. We cann it invoke that clause for spelling out a right as part of a reasonable procedure, in matters wherein our Constitution expressly denies that right.\n\nIn support of his submission that for detenu is entitl<!d to appear through a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board, Shri Jethmalani relies on the decisions of this Court in Madhav Haywadanroo Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra(1) Hussainara Khatoon\n\nv. Home Secretary, State of Bihar(2) and Francis Coralie Mullin v.\n\nThe Administrator, Union Territory of De/hi(3). Speaking for the Court, Krishna Iyer, J. said in Hoskot :\n\n\"The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation through the court process is lawyer's services. Judicial justice, with procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the carde where such supportive skill is absent for one side. Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal teehnology, compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law,\" Page (204)\n\nIn Hussainara Khatoon, one of us, Bhagwati, J. voiced the concern by saying :\n\n\"It is an essencial ingredient reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is to seek his liberation through the court's process that he should have legal services avail to him.\" (Page I 03).\n\n(I) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 778.\n\n(2) [1975] 2 SCR 832.\n\n(3) [1974] I SCR I.\n\nII.\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThese observations were made in the context of rights available to an accused in a criminal trial and cannot be extended to the proceedings of Advisory Boards in order to dete1mine the rights of detenus in relation to those proceedings The question as regards the kind and nature of rights available in those proceedings has to be decided on the basis of the provisions contained in Article 22 of the constitution and sections I 0 and 11 of the National Security Act.\n\nIn Francis Caralie Mullin, the petitioner, while in detention, wanted to have an interview with her lawyer, which was rendered almost impossible by reason of the stringent provisions of clause 3(b)(i) of the 'Conditions of Detention' formulated by the Delhi Administration. In a petition filed in this Court to challenge the aforesaid clause, inter alia, it was held by this Court that the clause was void, since it violated Articles 14 and 21 by its discriminatory nature and unreasonableness. The Court directed that the detenu should be permitted to have an interview with her legal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking an appointment from the Superintendent of the jail and that the interview need not necessarily take place in the presence of an officer of the Customs or Central Excise Department.\n\nThe Court also directed that the officer concerned may watch the interview but not so as to be within the hearing distance of the detenu and the legal adviser. This decision has no bearing on the point which arises before us, since the limited question which was involved in that case was whether the procedure prescribed by clause (3), governing the interviews which a detenu may have with his legal adviser was reasonable.\n\nThe Court was not called upon to consider the question as regards the light of a detenu to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Adviso'ry Board.\n\nWe must therefore, held, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It is, however, necessary to add an important caveat. The reason behind the provisions contained in Artice 22(4) {b) of the Constitution clarly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 345\n\nBoard for any party. The.Constitution d )CS not contemplate that the detaining authority or the Government should have the facility of appearing before the Advisory .B:iard with the aid of a legal practitioner but that the said facility should be denied to the detenu- In any case, that is not what the Constitution says and it WJuld b~\n\nwholly inappropriate to read any such meaning into the provisions B of Article 22.\n\nPermitting the detaining authority or the GJvernment to appear before the Advisory BJard with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser would be in breach of Article I ~. if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must ]therefore make it clear that if the detaining authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser berore the Advisory C Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a leg.11 practitioner. We are informed that officers of the Government in the concerned departments often appear before the Board and assist it with. a view to justifying the detention orders. If that be so, we must clarify that the BJards should not permit the authorities to do indirectly what they cannot D do directly; and no one shonld be enabled to take shelter behind the excuse that such olpcers are not \"legal practitioners\" or legal advisers, . Regard must be had to the substance and not the form since, especially, in matters like the proceedings of Advisory Bo1rds, whosoever assist or advises on facts or law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser. We do hope toat Advisory Boards E will take care to ensure that the:.Jprovisions of Article 14 are not :violated in any manner in the proceedings before them. Serving or retired Judges of the High Court will have no difficulty in under standing this position.\n\nThose who are merely •qualified to l;>e appointed\" as High Court 6udges may have to do , a little homework inorder to appreciate.\n\nAnother aspect of this matter which needs to be mentioned is that the embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners should not be extended so as to prevent the detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner.\n\nEvery person whose Interests are adversely affected as a result of the proceedings which have a serious import, is entitled to be heard in those proceedings and be assisted by a friend. A detenn, taken straight from ois cell to the Board's room, may lack tbe ease and composure to present his point of view.\n\nHe may be \"tongue~ tied, nervous, confused or wanting in intelligence\", (see Pett v.\n\n346' SUPRlME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1892) 2 S.CR,\n\nGreyhound Racing Association Ltd.)(1), and if justice to be done. he must at least have the help of a friend who can assist him to give coherence to his stray and v.andering ideas. Incarceration makes a man and his thoughts dishevelled. Just as a person who is domb is entitled, as he must, to be represer.ted by a person who has speech, even so, a person who finds himself unable to present his own case is entitled to take the .aid and advice of a person who is better situated to appreciate the facts of the case and the language of the law. It may be that denial of legal representation is not denial of natural justice per se, and therefore, if a statute excludes that facility expressly, it would not be open to the tribunal to allow it. Fairness, as said by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard v. Osmond(\"} can be obtainted without legal rrpresentation.\n\nBut, it is not fair, and the statute does not exclude that right, that the detenu should not even be allowed to take the aid of a friend.\n\nWhenever dema1nded. the Advisory Boards must grant that facility.\n\nD Shri Jetbmalani laid equally great stress on the need to give the detenu the right of cross-examination and in support of his submission in that behalf, he relied on the decisions of the American\n\nSupreme Court in Jack R. Go1dberg v. John Kelly(3), Morrissey, Norvai Goss v. Eileen Lopez(4) and Powell. In Goldberg, Brennan.\n\nJ., expressing the view of five members of the court said that in E almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The learned Judge reiterated the court's observations in Greeny v. McElorey(6) to the following effect:\n\n\"Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where govemmental action seriously injures an individual, and toe reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings. the eviden.ce used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he bas an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose\n\n(1) [1969] 1 Q. B. 125.\n\n(2) [1977] l Q. B. 240, 253.\n\n(3) 25 Led. 2d. 287, 300, 301.\n\n(4) 42 Led. 2d 725.\n\n(5) 3 L.ed. 2d 1377, 13 90, 1391.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF !NOIA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 347\n\nmemory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be prejurers or persons motivated by malice, vinditiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.\n\nWe have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment ...... This Court has been zealous to protect these right from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminanal cases, ......... but also in all types of cases where administrative ......... actions were under scrutiny\".\n\nWelfare recipients whose aid was terminated or was about to be terminated were held entitled to be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department. The right to confront and cross-examine adverseZwitne>ses was upheld in the other American cases also which counsel has cited.\n\nFor reasons which we have stated more than once during the course of this judgment, the decisions of the U.S. Suprme Court which turn peculiarly on the due process clause in the American L. Constitution cannot be applied wholesale for resolving questions which arise under our Constitution, especially when, after a full discussion of that clause in the Constituent Assembly, the proposal to incorporate it in Article 21 was rejected. In U.S.A. itself, Judges have expressed views on the scope of the clause, which are not only divergent but diametrically opposite. For exmple, in Goldberg on which Shri Jethmalani has placed considerable reliance, Black, J., said in his dissenting opinion that the majority was using the judicial power for legislative purposes and that \"they wander out of their filed of. vested powers and transgress into the area constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people\". The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in that case is reported in v Mue Wheeler v. John Montgomery(1), in the some volume. Describing the majority opinion as 'unwise and precipitous\" the learned Chief Justice said :\n\n\"The Court's action today seems anorher manifestation of the now familiar constitionalizing syndrome : once some presumed flaw is observed, the Court then eagerly accepts the inviation to find a constitutionally \"rooted\"\n\n(I) 25 L.ed. 2d 307, 311.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nremedy. If no provision is explicit on the point it is then seen as implicit\" or commanded by the vague and nebulous concept of \"fairness\".\n\nIt is only proper that we must evolve our own solution to problems arising under our Constitution without, of course, spurning the learning and wisdom of our counterparts in comparable jurisdictions.\n\nThe principal question which arises is whether the right of crossexamination is an integral and inseparable part of the principles of natural justice. Two fundamental principles of natural justice are commonly recognised, namely, that an adjudicator should be disinterested and unbiased (nemo judex in cause sua) and that, the parties must be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard (audi a/term partem).\n\nThere is no fixed or certain standard of natural justice, substantive or procedural, and in two English cases the expression 'natural justice' was described as one 'sadly lacking in precision'(1) and as 'vacuous'(2).\n\nThe principles of natural justice are, in fact, mostly evolved from case to case, according to the broad requirements of justice in the given case.\n\nWe do not suggest that the principles of natural justice, vague and variable as they may be, are not worthy of preservation.\n\nAs observed by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin(3), the view that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless\" is tainted by\n\n\"the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist\".\n\nBut the importance of the realisation that the rules of natural justice are not rigid norms of unchanging content, consists in the fact that the ambit of those rules must vary according to the context, and they have to be tailored to suit the nature of the proceeding in relation to which the particular right is claimed as a component of natural justice. fodged by this test, it seems to us difficult to hold that a detenu can claim the right of cross-examination in the proceeding before the Advisory Board. First and foremost, crossexamination of whom ? The principle that witnesses must be confronted and offered for cross-examination applies generally to proceedings in which witnesses are examined or documents are adduced\n\n(l) Local Govt. Boardv. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120, 138. (2)\n\n(1914] 1 K.B.@ 199.\n\n(3) [1964) A.C. 401 64-65.\n\nA.K. ROY V. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachi.d, CJ.) 349\n\nin evidence in order to prove a point.\n\nCross-examination then becomes a powerful eapon for showing the untruthfulness of that evidence.\n\nIn proceedings before the Advisory Board. the question for consideration of the Board is not whether the detenu is guilty of any charge but whether there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned.\n\nThe detention, it must be remembered, is based not on fact proved either by applying the test of preponderance of pr, obabilities or of reasonable doubt. The detention is based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain a particular person in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain stated objects. The proceeding of the Advisory Board has therefore to be structured differently from the proceeding of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, before which there is a /is to adjudicate upon,\n\nApart from this consideration, it is a matter of common experience that in cases of preventive detention, witnesses are either unwilling to come forward or the sources of information of the detaining authority cannot be disclosed without detriment to public interest.\n\nIndeed, the disclosure of the identity of the informant may abort the very process of preventive detention because, no one will be willing to come forward to give information of any prejudicial activity if his identity is going to be disclosed, which may have to be done under the stress of cross-examination. It is therefore difficult, in the very nature of things, to give to the detenu the full panoply of rights which an accused is entitled to have in order to disprove the charges against him. That is the importance of the statement that the concept of what is just and reasonable is flexible in its scope and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.\n\nJust as there can be an effective hearing without legal representation even so, there can be an effective hearing without the right of cross-examination.\n\nThe nature of the inquiry involved in the proceeding in relation to which these rights are claimed determines whether these rights must be given as components of natural justice.\n\nIn this connection, we would like to draw attention to certain decisions of our Court.\n\nIn New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Lu/(1), it was observed that \"the question whether the rules of natural justice have been observed in a particular case must itself be judged in the light of the constitution of\n\n(1) [1957] S.C.R. 98, 106.\n\n\n(1982) 2 S, C, R.\n\nthe statutory body which has to function in accordance with the rules laid down by the legislature and in that sense the rules themselves must vary\". In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam(1), the aforesaid statement was cited with approval by another Constitution Bench.\n\nIn State of Jammu Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed(2), it was argued that the right to hearing included the right to cross-examine witnesses. That argument was rejected by the Court by observing that the right of cross-examination depends upon the circumstances of each case and on the terms of the statute under which the matter is being enquired into. Citing with approval the passage in Nagendra Nath Bora, the Court held that the question as to whether the right to cross-examine was available had to be decided in the light of the fact that it was dealing with a statute under which a Commission of Inquiry was set up for fact-finding purposes and that the report of the Commission had no force proprio vigore.\n\nIn support of his submission that the right of cross-examination is a necessary part of natural justice, Shri Jethmalani relies upon the decisions of this Court which are reported in Union of India v.\n\nT. R. Varma(3) and Khem Chand v. Chand Union of Jndia(4). It was observed, in the first of these two cases that the rules of natural justice require that the party concerned should have the opportunity of adducing the relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, that \"he should be given the opportunity of cross 0 examining the witnessess examined by\" the other side and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. In Khem Chand it was held that if the purpose of Article 311(2) was to give the Government servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one, he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and, \"that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him \"and to examine himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence.\n\nThese observations must be understood in the context of the proceedings in which they are made and cannot be taken as laying down a general rule that the right of cross-examination is\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1240, 1261.\n\n(2) [1966) supp. S.C.R. 401, 415.\n\n(3) [1958] S.C.R. 499, 507.\n\n(4) [1958~ S.C.R. 1080? 109(i,\n\nA.it. ROY v. trnioN OF INDIA ( Chandrachud, C.J.) 3Sl\n\navailable as a part of natural justice in each and every proceeding.\n\nIn both of these cases, the question which arose for consideration of the Court was whether a Government servant, who was dismissed from service, was given \"a reasonable opportunity\" of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, within the meaning of Article 311( 2) of the Constitution. It shall have been noticed that the . emphasis in these cases is on the right to cross-examine the witnesses who are examined by the opposite party.\n\nIn T. R. Varma the right of cross-examination is described as the right in regard to the witnesses examined by the other party while in Khem Chand, the right is described as an opportunity to defend oneself by cross-examining the witnesses produced by the other side.\n\nNo witnesses are examined in the proceedings before the Advisory Board on behalf of the detaining authority and therefore, the rule laid down in the two decisions on which Shri Jethmalani relies can have no application to those proceedings.\n\nIf the debates of the Constituent Assembly are any indication, it would appear that Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, at any rate, was of the opinion that the detenu should be given the right to cross-examine witnesses before the Advisory Board. In his reply to the debate on the procedure of the Advisory Board, he said on September 16, 1949 that a \"pointed question has been asked whether the accused person would be entitled to appear before the Board, cross-examine the witnesses, and make his own statement\". Dr. Ambedkar's answer was that the Parliament should be given the power to prescribe the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board. That is how clause 7(c) came to be incorporated in Article 22 of the Constitution, giving that power to the Parliament. Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava thereafter asked as to what was the position regarding the safeguard of cross-examination. The reply of Dr. Ambedkar, significantly, was :\n\n\"The right of cross-examination is already there in the Criminal Procedure Code and in the Evidence Act. Unless a provincial Government goes absolutely stark mad and takes away these provisions it is unnecessary to make any provision of• that sort.\n\nDefending includes cross examination.\"\n\nx x x x x \"If you can give a single instance right of cross-examination has been\n\nx x in India where the taken away, I can\n\n352 SUPREME COltRT REPORtS [ 1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\nunderstand it.\n\nI have not seen any such case.\" (see Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 9, pages 1561, 1562, 1563).\n\nDr. Ambedkar, unfortunately, was not prophetic and the authors of the various Preventive Detention Acts did not evidently share his view. In fact, the right of cross-examination under the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act, by which Dr. Ambedkar laid great store, has nothing to do with the detenu's right of crossexamination before the Advisory Board.\n\nWith great respect, Dr.\n\nAmbedkar seems to have nodded slightly in referring to the provision for cross examination under those Acts.\n\nWhatever it is, Parliament has not made any provision in the National Security Act, under which the detenu could claim the right of cross-examination and the matter must rest there.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that, in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detenu has no right to cross-examine either the persons on the basis of whose statement the order of detention is made or the detaining authority.\n\nThe last of the three rights for which Shri Jethmalani contends is the right of the detenu to lead evidence in rebuttal before the Advisory Board. We do not see any objection to this right being granted to the detenu.\n\nNeither the Constitution nor the National Security Act contains any provision denying to the detenu the right to present his own evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him.\n\nThe detenu may therefore offer oral and documentary evidence before the Advisory Board in order to rebut the allegations which are made against him.\n\nWe would only like to add that if the detenu desires to examine any witnesses, he shall have to keep them present at the appointed time and no obligation can be cast on the Advisory Board to summon them.\n\nThe Advisory Board, like any other tribunal, is free to regulate its own procedure within the constraints of the Constitution and the statute. It would be open to it, in the exercise of that power, to limit the time within which the detenu must complete his evidence.\n\nWe consider. it necessary to rnake this observation particulary in view of the fact that the Advisory Board is under an obligation under section 11 (I) of the Act to submit its report to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. The proceedings before the Advisory Board have therefore to be completed with the utmost expedition.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA l Chrmdrachud, C.J.) 353\n\nIt is urged by Shri Jethmalani that the Advisory Board \"must decide two questions which are of primary importance to the detenu: One, whether there was sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned and two, whether it is necessary to keep the person in detention any longer after the date of its report. We are unable to accept this contention.\n\nSection 1 I (2) of the Act provides speci fically that the report of the Advisory Board shall specify its opinion \"as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned\". This implies that the question to which the Advisory Board bas to apply its mind is whether on the date of its report there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person. That inquiry necessarily involves the consideration of the question as to whether there was sufficient cause for the detention of the person when the order of detention was passed, but we see no justification for extending the jurisdiction of the Advisory Board to the consideration of the question as to whether it is necessary to continue the detention of the person beyond the date on which it submits its report or beyond the period of three months after the date of deten tion.\n\nThe question as to whether there are any circumstances on the basis of which the detenu should be kept in detention after the Advisory Board submits its report, and how long, is for the detaining authority to decide and not for the Board. The question as regards the power of the Advisory Board in this behalf had come up for\n\nk consideration before this Court in Puranfol Lakhanpal v. Union of India(1).\n\nWhile rejecting the argument that the words \"such deten tion '' which occur in Article 22(4)(a) of the : Constitution mean detention for a period longer than three months, the majority held that the Advisory Board is not called upon to consider whether the detention should continue beyond the period of three months. In coming to that conclusion the majority relied upon the decision in D:ittatraya Moreshwar Pangarka~ v. State of Bombay(2} in which Mukherjea, J., while dealing with a similar question, observed :\n\n\"The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. It is neither called upon nor is it competent to say anything regarding the period for which such person should be detained. Once the Advisory Board expresses its view that there is sufficient cause for detention at the date when it makes its report,\n\n(I) [1958] SCR 460, 475.\n\n(2) [1952] SCR 612, 626.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.~.\n\nwhat action is to be taken subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate Government and it can under s. 11 (I) of the Act confirm the detention order and continue detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.''\n\n* The contention that the Board must determine the question as to whether the detention should continue after the date of its report must therefore fail.\n\nThe duty and function of the Advisory Board is to determine whether there was sufficient cause for detention of 1 the person concerned on the date on which the order of detention was passed and whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of that person on the date of its report.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept the plea made by the learned counsel that the proceedings of the Advisory Board should be thrown open to the public.\n\nThe right to a public trial is not one.of the guaranteed rights under our Constitution as it is under the 6th Amendment of the American Constitution which secures to persons charged with crimes a public, as well as a speedy, trial. Even under the American Constitution, the right guaranteed by the 6th Amendment is held to be personal to the accussed, which the public in general cannot share. Considering the nature of the inquiry which _...i. the Advisory Board has to undertake, we do not think that the interests of justice will be served better by giving access to the public to the proceedings of the Advisory Board.\n\nThis leaves for consideration the argument advanced by Shri Jethmalani relating to the post-detention conditions applicable to detenus in the matter of their detention. The learned counsel made a grievance that the letters of detenus are censored, that they are not provided with reading or writing material according to their requirements and that the ordinary amenities of life are denied to them.\n\nIt is difficult for us to frame a code for the treatment of detenus while they are held in detention.\n\nThat will involve an exercise which calls for examination of minute details, which we cannot undertake.\n\n\\Ve shall have to examine each case as it comes before us, in order to determine whether the restraints imposed upon the detenu in any particular case are excessive and unrelated to the object of detention.\n\nIf so, they shall have to be struck down.\n\nWe would, however, like to say that the basic commitment of our Constitution is to foster human dignity and the well-being of our people. In recent times, we have had many an occasion to alert the authorities to the need to\n\nA.k. ROY v. UNION OF 1NDIA (Chandrachud, C.i.) 355\n\ntreat even the convicts in a manner consistent with human dignity.\n\nThe judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration(1) is an instance in point. It highlights that places of incarceration are \"part of the Indian earth\" and that, \"the Indian Consti tution cannot be held at bay by jail officials 'dressed in a little, brief authority\". We must impress upon the Government that the detenus must be afforded all reasonable facilities for an existence consistent with human dignity.\n\nWe see no reason why they should not be permitted to wear their own clothes, eat their own food, have interview with the members of their families at least once a week and, last but not the least, have reading and writing material according ro their reasonable requirement.\n\nBo Jks are the best friends of man whether inside c r outside the jail.\n\nThere is one direction which we feel called upon to give specifically and that is that persons who are detained under the National Security Act must be segregated from the convicts and kept in a separate part of the place of detention. It is hardly fair that those who are suspected of being engaged in prejudicial conduct should be loged in the same ward or cell were the convicts whose crimes are established are lodged.\n\nThe evils of \"custodial perversity\" are wellk!Jown and have even found a place in our law reports. As observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sunil Batra, the most important right of the person who is imprisoned is to the integrity of his physical person and mental personality.\n\nEven within the prison, no person can be deprived of his guaranteed rights save by methods which are fair, just and reasonable. \"In a democracy, a wrong to some one is a wrong to every one\" and care has to be taken to ensure that the detenue is not subjected to any indignity.\n\nWhile closing this judgment, we would like to draw attention to what Shah, J. said for the Court in Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(2) :\n\n\"The petitioner who was present in the Court at the time of hearing of his petition complained that he is subjected to solitary confinement while in detention. It must be emphasised that a detenu is not a convict. Our Constitution, notwithstanding the broad principles of the rule of law, equality and liberty of the individual enshrined therein, tolerates, on account of peculiar conditions pre-\n\nOJ [1980J 2:scR 557.\n\n(2) [1969] 3 SCR 574, 580.\n\n356 StJPlU!ME cotJR.t REPOllts\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.l.\n\nvailing legislation which is a negation of the rule of law, equality and liberty. But it is implicit in the Constitutional scheme that the power to detain is not a power to punish for offences which an executive authority in his subjective satisfaction believes a citizen to have committed.\n\nPower to detain is primarly intended to be exercised in those rare cases when the large interest uof the State demand that restrictions shall be placed pon the liberty of a citizen curbing his future activities. The restrictions so placed must consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal.\"\n\nIf any of the persons detained under the National Security Act are at present housed in the same ward or cell where the convicts are housed, immediate steps must be taken to segregate them appropriately. \"The Indian human\", whenever necessary, has of course \"a constant companion-the Court armed with the Constitution\" and informed by it.\n\nIn the result, the Writ Petitions shall stand disposed of in accordance with the view expressed herein and the orders and directions given above.\n\nGUPTA, J. I find myself unable to agree with the views expressed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice on two of the points that arise for decision in this batch of writ petitions, one of them relates to the failure of the Central Government to bring into operation the provisions of section 3 of the Constitution (Forty- Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 and the other concerns the question whether an ordinance is 'law' within the meaning of article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 received assent of the President on April 30, 1979. Article 368(2) says, inter alia, that after a Bill for the amendment of the Constitution is passed in each House of Parliament by the prescribed majority \"it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill\". Section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act states that the Act \"shall come into force on such date as the Central Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint,\" and that\n\n\"different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNlON OF-INDIA (Gupta, J.) 357\n\nAct\". Section 3 of the Amendment Act substitutes a new clause for the existing clause ( 4) of article 22 of the Constitution which provides inter alia for the constitution of Advisory Boards. The relevant part of section 3 reads as follows ;\n\n\"Amendment of article 22.-ln article 22 of the Constitution,-\n\n(a) for clause (4), the following clause' shall be substituted, namely :\n\n( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than two months unless an Advisory Board constitnted in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justise of the appropriate High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of two months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention :\n\nProvided that an Advisory Board shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, and the Chairman shall be a serving Judge of the appropriate High Court and the other members shall be a serving or retired Judges of any High Court.\"\n\nThe provision requiring the Advisory Board to be constituted in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court and that the Chairman of the Advisory\n\nBoard shall be a serving Judge of the High Court and the other F members of the Board shall be serving or retired Judges of any High Court is absent in the existing clause (4) under which persons who are only qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court are eligible to be members of the Advisory Board. Many of the provisions of the Act were brought into force on different dates in the year 1979 but the provisions of section 3 were not given effect G to for more than one year and seven months when the hearing of these writ petitions commenced on December 9, 1980. Now though more than two and a half years have passed the provisions of section 3 have not yet been brought into force.\n\nThe question is whether under section 1 (2) the Central Government had the freedom to bring H into force any of the provisions of the Amendment Act at any time it liked.\n\nI do not think that section I (2) can be construed to mean\n\n358 SUPREME COURT REPOil'fS [1982} 2 S.C.lt\n\nA that Parliament left is to the unfettered discretion or judgment of the Central Government when to bring into force any provision of the Amendment Act.\n\nAfter the Amendment Act received the President's assent, the Central Government was under an obligation to bring into operation the provisions of the Act within a reasonab:le\n\ntime; the power to appoint dates for bringing into force the provisions of the Act was given to the Central Government obviously because it was not considered feasible to give effect to all the provisions immediately. After the Amendment Act had received the\n\nPresident's assent the Central Government could not in ii discn::- tion keep it in a state of suspended animation for any length of time it pleased. That Parliament wanted the provisions of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 to be made effective as early as possible would appear from its Objects and Reasons. The following extract from the Objects and Reasons clearly discloses a sense of urgency :\n\n\"Recent experience has shown that the fundamental rights, inciuding those of life and liberty, granted to citizens by the Constitution are capable of being taken away by a transient majority. It is, therefore, necessary to provide adequate safeguards against the recurrence of such a contingency in the future anc! to ensure to the people themselves an effective voice in determining the form of government under which they are to live.\n\nThis is one of the primary objects of this Bill.\n\nx x x x x x x\n\nAs a further check against the misuse of the fanergency provisions and to put the right to life and Ii berty on a secure footing, it would be provided that the power to suspend the right to move the court for the enforcement of a fundamental right cannot be exercised in respect of the fundamental right to life and liberty.\n\nThe right to liberty is further strengthened by the provision that a law for preventive detention cannot authorise, in any case, detention for a longer period than two months, unless an Advisory Board has reported that there is sufficient cause for such detention.\n\nAn additional safeguard would be provided by the requirement that the Chairman of an Advisory Board shall be a serving Judge of the appropriate High\n\nA.K. RO>< v. UNION OF INDIA (Gupta, J.) 359\n\nCourt and that the Board shall be constituted in accor- A dance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of that High Court.\"\n\nI have already said that Parliament must have taken into consideration the practical difficulties in the way of the executive in bringing into operation all the provisions of the Act immediately, and by enacting section I (2) it relied on the Central Government to give effect to them.\n\nNow when more than two and a half years have passed since the Constitution (Forty-Forth Amendment) Act, 1978 received the assent of the President, it seems impossible that any such difficulty should still persist preventing the Government from giving effect to section 3 of the Amendment Act. It is interes\n\nting to note that clause 9 of the National Security Ordinance, 1980 provided for the constitution of Advisory Boards in conformity with article 22 of the Constitution as amended by section 3 of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.\n\nThis makes it clear that non-implementation of the provis!ons of section 3 was not due to any practical or administrative difficulty.\n\nHowever, the National Security Act, 1980 which replaced the Ordinance does not retain the provison of clause 9 of the Ordinance and prescribes the constitution of the Advisory Boards in section 9 in accordance with unamended article 22(4).\n\nI do not think it can be seriously suggested that a provision like section 1 (2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act empowered the executive to scotch an amendment of the Constitution passed by Parliament and assented to by the President.\n\nThe Parliament is competent to take appropriate steps if it considered that the execucutive bad betrayed its trust does not make the default lawful or relieve this Court of its duty.\n\nI would therefore issue a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to issue a notification under section l (2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 bringing into force the provisions of section 3 of the Act within two months from this date.\n\nOn the other point, I find it difficul~ to agree that an ordinance is 'law' within the meaning of article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 reads :\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nThe National Security Ordinance, 1980 has been challenged on a\n\n!lumber of iirounds, one of wb id1 is tl-11t the life and liberty of\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C. R ..\n\nA person cannot be taken away by an ordinance because it is not 'law'' within the meaning of article 21.\n\nNormally it is the legis1ature that has the power to make laws. Article 123 of the Constitution deals with the President's power to promulgate ordinances and the nature and effect of an ordinanue promulgated under this article, Article 123 is as follows : B\n\n\"(I) It at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament\n\nar'~ in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate actien, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.\n\n(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance-\n\n(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions; and\n\n(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.\n\nExplanation-Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purpose of this clause.\n\n(3) If an<l so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not under this Consititution be competent to enact, it shall be void.\"\n\nTo show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance promulgated by the President under article 123 reliance was placed on behalf of the Unioa of India on clause (2) of the article which says that an Ordinance shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. It was further pointied out that chapter III of part V of the Constitution which includes article 123 is headed \"Legislative Powers of the President.\" Reference was made to article 213 which concerns the power of the Governor\n\n.l..\n\nAK. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Gupta, J.) 361\n\nto promulgate Ordiances: article 213 is in chapter IV of part VI of the Constitution which hears a similar decsription : Legislative Power of the Governor.\" From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance under article 123 exercises his legislative power and therefore an ordinance must be regarded as 'law' within the meaning of article 21.\n\nBut the nature of the power has to be gathered from the provisions of article 123 and not merely from the heading of the chapter. It is obvious that when something is saidto have the force and effect of an Act of Parliament, that is beacse it is not really an Act of Parliament.\n\nArticle 123 (2) does say that an Act of Parliament to make the two even fictionally identical.\n\nThe significance of the distinction will be clear by a reference to articles 356 and 357 which are in part XVIII of the Constitution that contains the emergency provisians.\n\nThe relevant part of article 356 reads :\n\n\"(I) If the President, on receipt of a report from the\n\nGavernor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a D situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation-\n\n(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;\n\n(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the\n\nState shall be exercisable by or under th~ authority of Parliament;\"\n\nArticle 357 provides :\n\n(1) Where by a Proclamation issued under clause (I) of G article 356, it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it shall be competent-\n\n(a) for Parliament to confer on the President the\n\npower of the Leislature of the State to make\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nlaws, and to authorise the President to delegate, subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf;\n\n(b) for Parliament, or for the President or other authority in whom such power to make laws is vested under sub-clause (a), to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities ther1;:of;\n\n(c) x .X x x x x\n\n(2) Any law made in exercise of the power of the Legislature of the State by Parliament or the President or other authority referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause ( 1) which Parliament or the President or such other authority would not, but for the issue of a proclamation under article 356, have been competent to make shall, after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other authority.\"\n\nIt will appear that whereas an ordinance issued under article l ?3 has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, under article 357(1) (a) Parliament can confer on the President the power of the legislature of the State to make laws.\n\nThus, where the President is\n\nrequird to make laws, the Constitution has provided for it.\n\nThe difference in the nature of the power exercised by the President under article 123 and under article 357 is clear and cannot be ignored.\n\nUnder article 2 I no person can be deprived of life and liberty except according to procedure established by law. Patanjali Sastri J_, in A. K. Gopalan v. State(1) observed that the word \"established\" in article 21 \"implies some degree of firmness, permanence and general acceptance\".\n\nAn ordinance which bas to be laid before both Houses of Parliament and ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disaproving it are passed by both Houses can hardly be said to ha\\le that 'firmness' and 'permanence' that th( word 'established' implies.\n\nIt is not the\n\ni) p9SOJ SCR 88.\n\nA.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA (Gupta, J.) 363\n\ntemporary duration of an ordinance that is relevant in the present context, an Act of Parliament m ay also he temporary; what is relevant is its provisional and tentative character which is apparent from clause 2 (a) of article 123. On this aspect also the difference between a law made by the President under article 357 and an ordinance promulgated by him under article 123 should be noted.\n\nA law made under article 357 continues in force until altered, repealed or amend ,; : ed by a competent legislature or authority; an ordinance promulr gated under arttcle 123 ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament at the latest. On behalf of the Union of India learned Attorney General referred to article 367 (2) to argue that the Constitution itself equates an ordinance with an Act of Parliament.\n\nArticle 367 (2) reads :\n\n\"Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of, or made by, Parliament, or to Acts or laws of, or made by, the Legilature of a State, shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the President or, to an.Ordinance made by a Governor, as the case may be.\"\n\nAny reference in the Constitution to Acts of Parliament has to be construed as including a reference to an ordinance made by the President as article 367 (2) provides because an ordinance has been given the force and effect of an Act, But clearly an ordinance has this force and effect only over an area where it can validly operate.\n\nAn .invalid ordinance can have no force or effect and if it is not 'law' in the sense the word has been used in article 21, article 367 (2) cannot make it so.\n\nThere is also another aspect of the matter. Article 21 not only speaks of a situation in normal times which left no time for the to think of a situation in normal times which left no time for the President to summon Parliament and required him to promulgate\n\nordinances to take away the life or liberty of persons, unless one G considered life and liberty as matters of no great importance.\n\nHowever, in view of the opinion of the majority upholding the validity of the Ordinance, it is unnecessary to dilate on this aspect.\n\nOn all the other points l agre with conclusions reached by the learned Chief Justice.\n\n364 SUPRBMB COUllT REPORTS (1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. On the question of bringing into force, section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 I am in agreement with the view expressed by my learned brother A. C. Gupta in his judgment. 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Gupta J, ?", "canonical_name": "Chandraciiud"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELO : [per Chandrachud, C.J., Bhagwati & Desai, JJ]\n\n[Gupta and Tulzarurkar, JJ dissented on the question of bringing into force section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Fortyfourth Amendment Act .. Gupta J, ?"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2043, "end_char": 2048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELO : [per Chandrachud, C.J., Bhagwati & Desai, JJ]\n\n[Gupta and Tulzarurkar, JJ dissented on the question of bringing into force section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Fortyfourth Amendment Act .. 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Gupta J, ?", "canonical_name": "Tu lzapurkar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance", "statute": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2151, "end_char": 2163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance", "statute": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance", "statute": "Jn the meantime the Governmint of India issued the National Security Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2693, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From a conspectus of the provisions of the Constitution it is clear that the Constituent Assembly was of the view that the President's power to legislate by issuing an Ordinance is as necessary for the peace and good government of the country as the Parliament's power to legislate by passing laws."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4193, "end_char": 4203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.K. Gopala11 (1950) SCR 88", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4902, "end_char": 4929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An amendment substantially to that effect moved in the Constituent\n\n~-s\"mbly was rejected by the <;:on.s!itµyl)t As~\"mbl~. [293 D-E]\n\nA.K. Gopala11 (1950) SCR 88, Sant Ram, [1960] 3 SCR 499, 506, State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh [1966] 3 SCR 830, 851, 852, Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. ("}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 SCR 499", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4941, "end_char": 4957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 830", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1975) 3 SCR 946", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5066, "end_char": 5082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967) 3 SCR 926", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6807, "end_char": 6819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6924, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7944, "end_char": 7956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 368(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8478, "end_char": 8492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "llOY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 8987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llOY v. i.JNiON OF iNDiA\n\nAlthough the 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President on April 30, 1979 and more than two and a half years have already gone by without the Central Government issuing a notification for bringing sectinn 3 of the Act into force, this Court cannot intervene by issuing a mandamus to the Central Government obligating it to bring the provisions of section 3 into force."}}, {"text": "JNiON OF iNDiA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8993, "end_char": 9007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llOY v. i.JNiON OF iNDiA\n\nAlthough the 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President on April 30, 1979 and more than two and a half years have already gone by without the Central Government issuing a notification for bringing sectinn 3 of the Act into force, this Court cannot intervene by issuing a mandamus to the Central Government obligating it to bring the provisions of section 3 into force."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10507, "end_char": 10516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "316 B-D]\n\nExpressions like 'defence of India', 'security of India' security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers', mentioned in section 3 of the Act, are not of any great certainty or definiteness."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11137, "end_char": 11146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11294, "end_char": 11303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11603, "end_char": 11679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "statute": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "statute": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12357, "end_char": 12366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "statute": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12374, "end_char": 12395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13118, "end_char": 13128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13171, "end_char": 13183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1970] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14194, "end_char": 14210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 832", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14319, "end_char": 14332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "325 A-C; 326 BC, FH]\n\nR. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970] 3 SCR 530, 559, Haradhan Saha, D [1975] l SCR 778, Khudiram, [1975] 2 SCR 832, Sambhu Nath Sarkar, (1974] 1 SCR I and Maneka Gandhi, ll\\.78] 2 SCR 621, explained.", "canonical_name": "Maneka Go 11dhi(1)"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15833, "end_char": 15842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15937, "end_char": 15949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16058, "end_char": 16067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16075, "end_char": 16096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16166, "end_char": 16175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16249, "end_char": 16258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16369, "end_char": 16378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16465, "end_char": 16474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16482, "end_char": 16503, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16646, "end_char": 16659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16747, "end_char": 16756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16816, "end_char": 16829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16992, "end_char": 17001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17070, "end_char": 17079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17120, "end_char": 17133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17146, "end_char": 17159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17283, "end_char": 17296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17347, "end_char": 17360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17424, "end_char": 17434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18345, "end_char": 18361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19057, "end_char": 19067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20931, "end_char": 20985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Persons who are detained under the National Securty Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21953, "end_char": 22008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 S CR 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22335, "end_char": 22352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 754", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22401, "end_char": 22417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22448, "end_char": 22459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[per Gupta and Tulzapurkar, JJ dissenting]\n\nSection I (2) of the Constitution (Fortyfourth Amendment) Act 1978 cannot be construed to mean that Parliament ha~ left it to the unfettered discretion or judgment of the Central Government when to bring into force any provision of the amendment Act.", "canonical_name": "Tu lzapurkar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23664, "end_char": 23673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act", "statute": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23713, "end_char": 23725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act", "statute": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24252, "end_char": 24263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act", "statute": "Bl\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was clear that the Parliament wanted the provisions of the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24482, "end_char": 24496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24679, "end_char": 24690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24752, "end_char": 24769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24934, "end_char": 24945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24956, "end_char": 24967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25044, "end_char": 25054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25246, "end_char": 25260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25507, "end_char": 25521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25653, "end_char": 25664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25707, "end_char": 25718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25894, "end_char": 25905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 367(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26035, "end_char": 26049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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"statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43608, "end_char": 43618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only obligation on the Government is to lay the ordinance before both Houses of Parliament and the only distinction which the Constitution makes between a law made by the Parliament and an ordiance issued hy the President is that whereas the life of a law made by the Partiament would depend upon the terms of that law, an ordinance, by reason of sub clause (a) of clause (2), ceases to operate at the expiration of six \\\\eeks from tl1e reassembly of Parliament, unless resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses before the expiration of that period."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44334, "end_char": 44344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44362, "end_char": 44372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44595, "end_char": 44605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44715, "end_char": 44726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45479, "end_char": 45490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Any reference in this Cnnstitution to Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45588, "end_char": 45629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46866, "end_char": 46877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46992, "end_char": 47003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47049, "end_char": 47060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47626, "end_char": 47637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47721, "end_char": 47732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47828, "end_char": 47845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48209, "end_char": 48220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution makers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49372, "end_char": 49391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, the Constitution makers had to take into account life's realities."}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49456, "end_char": 49463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Shri Seervai in 'Constitutional Law of India' (2nd Ed.,"}}, {"text": "chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49790, "end_char": 49801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ROY v. tJNiON OF INDIA (chandrachud, C.J.) 291", "canonical_name": "Chandraciiud"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49864, "end_char": 49868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the majority in R.C. Cooper v. Union of lndia(1), Shah J. said : \"The President is under the Constitution not the repostory of the legislative power of the Union, but with a view to meet extraordinary situations demanding immediate enactment of laws, provision is made in the Constitution investing the President with power to legislate by promulagating Ordinances.\""}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52339, "end_char": 52349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 52358, "end_char": 52374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopu,'an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52654, "end_char": 52668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended by the learned counsel that the decision of this Court in A. K. Gopu,'an( 1 ) establishes that the supremacy of the legislature is enshrined in Article 21 as a fundamental right in order to afford protection to the life and liberty of the people against all executive powers and, therefore, the supremacy of the legislature cannot be replaced by making the executive supreme by allowing it to promulgate ordinances which have the effect of depriving the people of their life and liberty."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52740, "end_char": 52750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53144, "end_char": 53154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53361, "end_char": 53371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53615, "end_char": 53625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53802, "end_char": 53812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53920, "end_char": 53930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54660, "end_char": 54670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54811, "end_char": 54823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54918, "end_char": 54928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55033, "end_char": 55046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55312, "end_char": 55322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55877, "end_char": 55887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56212, "end_char": 56222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56293, "end_char": 56307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56449, "end_char": 56459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Pocker Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56571, "end_char": 56586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An amendment substaintially to that effect was moved in the Constituent Assembly by Shri B. 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Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57911, "end_char": 57923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R..\n\nAnother answer to Shri Garg's contention is that what Article 21 emphasise is that the deprivation of the right to life ot liberty must be brought about by a State-made law and not by the rules of natural law (see A.K. Gopalan (supra) at pages 111, 169, 199, 229, 236 and 308, 309)."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58082, "end_char": 58092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sant\n\nRam(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58160, "end_char": 58171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Re : Sant\n\nRam(1), the Rules made by the Supreme Court; in State of Nagaland\n\nv. Ratan Singh,(2) the Rules made for the governance of Nagaland Hills District; in Govind v. 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59011, "end_char": 59021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59138, "end_char": 59152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59500, "end_char": 59511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We may here take up for consideration some of the submissions made by Shri Tarkunde on the validity of the National Security Ordinance", "statute": "We may here take up for consideration some of the submissions made by Shri Tarkunde on the validity of the National Security Ordinance"}}, {"text": "(1960] 3 SCR 499", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 59966, "end_char": 59982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1966] 3 SCR 830", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 59994, "end_char": 60010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 946", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60026, "end_char": 60042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1967] 3 SCR 926", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60058, "end_char": 60073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60850, "end_char": 60861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1975", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60874, "end_char": 60906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60932, "end_char": 60964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60967, "end_char": 60976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61028, "end_char": 61039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61301, "end_char": 61311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61950, "end_char": 61961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62448, "end_char": 62459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62614, "end_char": 62625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63431, "end_char": 63436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case Hegde J., said that ''There is nothing like a political power under our Constitution in the matter of relationship between the executive and the citizens\"."}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63710, "end_char": 63721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 64033, "end_char": 64051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, that is om: of the principal reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to give advisory opinions.(2) In Baker v. Carr(3) Brennan J. said that the doctrine of political question was \"essentially a function of the separation of powers\"."}}, {"text": "Brennan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64114, "end_char": 64121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, that is om: of the principal reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to give advisory opinions.(2) In Baker v. 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courts ought not to enter the \"polical thicket\"."}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65988, "end_char": 65999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66437, "end_char": 66463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66757, "end_char": 66768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Slui Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66887, "end_char": 66900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true, as contended by Slui Tarkunde, that if the qustion as regards the justiciability of the President's satisfaction is not to be considered for the reason that th~ ordinance has become an Act the occasion will hardly ever arise for considering that question, because, by the time the challenge made to an Ordinance comes up for consideration before the Court, the ordinance almost invariably shall have been replaced by an Act."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 67815, "end_char": 67852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other reason why we are not inclined to go into the question as regards the justiciability of the President's satisfaction under\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.R.\n\nArticle 123 (I) is that on the material which is placed before us, it is impossible for us to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other."}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67854, "end_char": 67865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69243, "end_char": 69254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69962, "end_char": 69984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71300, "end_char": 71310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 20, I 98", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71466, "end_char": 71482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must mention that in a recent\n\njudgment dated October 20, I 98 I delivered by a Constitution Bench D of this Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72242, "end_char": 72263, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72332, "end_char": 72341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jefferson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74069, "end_char": 74078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They believed like Jefferson that \"an elective despotism was not the government we fought for.\""}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74661, "end_char": 74672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75302, "end_char": 75312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76949, "end_char": 76955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khanna J., in his judgment in the Habeas Corpus case(') has dwelt upon the need for preventive detention in public Interest."}}, {"text": "L.R. 5 I.A. 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 77673, "end_char": 77688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77867, "end_char": 77877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78603, "end_char": 78630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far , as our Constitution is concerned, an amendment was moved .by Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava to draft Article 15, which corresponds to Article 21 of the Constitution, for substituting the words \"without due process of law\" for the words \"except according to procedure established by law\"."}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78640, "end_char": 78650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78673, "end_char": 78683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78870, "end_char": 78886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many members spoke on that D amendment on December 6, 1948, amongst whom were Shri K.M.\n\nMunshi, who was in favour of the amendment, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar who, while explaining the view of the Drafting Committee, said that he was \"still open to conviction\"."}}, {"text": "K.M.\n\nMunshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78911, "end_char": 78923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many members spoke on that D amendment on December 6, 1948, amongst whom were Shri K.M.\n\nMunshi, who was in favour of the amendment, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar who, while explaining the view of the Drafting Committee, said that he was \"still open to conviction\"."}}, {"text": "Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78969, "end_char": 78994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many members spoke on that D amendment on December 6, 1948, amongst whom were Shri K.M.\n\nMunshi, who was in favour of the amendment, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar who, while explaining the view of the Drafting Committee, said that he was \"still open to conviction\"."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79162, "end_char": 79179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discussion of the amendment was resumed by the Assembly on December 13, 1948 when, Dr. Ambedkar, who too had an open E mind on the vexed question of 'due procern', said :\n\n\" ... I must confess that I am somewhat in a difficult position with regard to article 15 and the amendment moved by my friend Pandit Bhargava for the deletion of the F words \"procedure according to law\" and the substitution of the words \"due process\"."}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79354, "end_char": 79364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pandit Bhargava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79402, "end_char": 79417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discussion of the amendment was resumed by the Assembly on December 13, 1948 when, Dr. Ambedkar, who too had an open E mind on the vexed question of 'due procern', said :\n\n\" ... I must confess that I am somewhat in a difficult position with regard to article 15 and the amendment moved by my friend Pandit Bhargava for the deletion of the F words \"procedure according to law\" and the substitution of the words \"due process\"."}}, {"text": "Charybdis", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 81413, "end_char": 81422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a rather a case where a man has to sail between Charybdis and Seylla and I therefore would not say anything."}}, {"text": "Seylla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 81427, "end_char": 81433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a rather a case where a man has to sail between Charybdis and Seylla and I therefore would not say anything."}}, {"text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82073, "end_char": 82099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82560, "end_char": 82569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82602, "end_char": 82612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82617, "end_char": 82627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "statute": "Constitution Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84762, "end_char": 84772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85665, "end_char": 85675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86414, "end_char": 86425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86433, "end_char": 86447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 44th Amendment Act received the assent of the President under Article 368 (2) on April 30, 1979."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86537, "end_char": 86550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the provisions of the 44th Amendment were br,•ught into force with effect from June 20, 1979 by a notification issued by the Central Government 0n June 19."}}, {"text": "June 19. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86605, "end_char": 86618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the provisions of the 44th Amendment were br,•ught into force with effect from June 20, 1979 by a notification issued by the Central Government 0n June 19."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86731, "end_char": 86740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86749, "end_char": 86759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87070, "end_char": 87080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87333, "end_char": 87342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 22, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87903, "end_char": 87921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before adverting to the arguments advanced before us on the question of the 44th Amendment, it must be mentioned that the National Security Ordinance which came into force on September 22, 1980 provided by clause (9) for the constitution of Advisory Boards strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act, in spite of the fact that the aforesaid section was not brought into force."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88031, "end_char": 88040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88148, "end_char": 88169, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88184, "end_char": 88201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The National Security Act was passed on December 27, 1980 replacing the Ordinance retrospectively."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88243, "end_char": 88252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88399, "end_char": 88413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88500, "end_char": 88509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghatate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88710, "end_char": 88717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main thrust of Dr. Ghatate's argument is that the Central Government was under an obligation to bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment into force within a reasonable time after the President gave his assent to the Amendment and since it has failed so far to do so, this Court must, by a mandamus, ask the Centrat Government to issue a notification under section I (2) of the ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88793, "end_char": 88802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centrat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 88995, "end_char": 89013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main thrust of Dr. Ghatate's argument is that the Central Government was under an obligation to bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment into force within a reasonable time after the President gave his assent to the Amendment and since it has failed so far to do so, this Court must, by a mandamus, ask the Centrat Government to issue a notification under section I (2) of the ."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89184, "end_char": 89193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89283, "end_char": 89294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89395, "end_char": 89406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89569, "end_char": 89580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89975, "end_char": 89993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90152, "end_char": 90161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90258, "end_char": 90267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90326, "end_char": 90335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90511, "end_char": 90521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90591, "end_char": 90601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Since the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90669, "end_char": 90700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90777, "end_char": 90786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the National Security Act", "statute": "Since the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90973, "end_char": 90982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the National Security Act", "statute": "Since the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91832, "end_char": 91853, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jetharnalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92074, "end_char": 92086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Jetharnalani, like Shri Tarkunde, relies upon the provisions of the 44th Amen<lment in regard to the constitution of Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act is bad for not compliance with section 3 of the Amendment, desipite the fact that the said section has not been brought into force.", "canonical_name": "Jetharnalani"}}, {"text": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92191, "end_char": 92266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92298, "end_char": 92307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act", "statute": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Jethamalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92451, "end_char": 92462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No Act passed by a legislature, accor<ling to Shri Jethamalani, can flout the constituent view or decision of the Parliament, whether or not\n\n...\n\n....\n\nA.it.", "canonical_name": "Jetharnalani"}}, {"text": "ChandrachuJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92584, "end_char": 92595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ROY v. UNION OF INt>lA (ChandrachuJ, C.J.) 309\n\nthe Constitutional Amendment has been brought into force.", "canonical_name": "Chandraciiud"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92719, "end_char": 92728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act", "statute": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93264, "end_char": 93274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act", "statute": "Advisory Boards in support of the contention that the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93467, "end_char": 93479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "011 April 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93646, "end_char": 93664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 1(2) which, according to them is misconceived and abortive must be ignored and served from the rest of the Amendment Act and the rest of it deemed to have come into force 011 April 30, 1979."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93764, "end_char": 93785, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93896, "end_char": 93914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94333, "end_char": 94342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94630, "end_char": 94642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 398", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94801, "end_char": 94812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95606, "end_char": 95666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96459, "end_char": 96473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act", "statute": "Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act"}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96531, "end_char": 96545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act", "statute": "Amendment Act when the President gave bis assent to that Act"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96708, "end_char": 96717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandraciiud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98083, "end_char": 98095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ROY v. UNiON OF INDIA (Chandraciiud, C.J.) 31 i\n\npoint of the matter is that the Constitution standing amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill and the amendment thus introduced into the Constitution coming into force are two distinct things.", "canonical_name": "Chandraciiud"}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98729, "end_char": 98743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99538, "end_char": 99550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99632, "end_char": 99643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100042, "end_char": 100057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100519, "end_char": 100530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100651, "end_char": 100662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101153, "end_char": 101164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101252, "end_char": 101263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102081, "end_char": 102092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103064, "end_char": 103073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act by following the due procedure and to bring into force that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103090, "end_char": 103167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 143(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104505, "end_char": 104519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "One of the questions which was referred to this Court in Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105000, "end_char": 105071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105089, "end_char": 105098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of the questions which was referred to this Court in Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "One of the questions which was referred to this Court in Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105106, "end_char": 105126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105342, "end_char": 105347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That section provided that the Provincial Government may by a notification extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit to the- Province of Delhi or any part thereof any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification."}}, {"text": "H.M. Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 106044, "end_char": 106056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated by Shri H.M. Seervai in his\n\n(I) 7 A.C. 829."}}, {"text": "(1949] FCR 595", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 106124, "end_char": 106138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitutional Law of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 106189, "end_char": 106216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3i4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982j 2 s.c.ti..\n\n\"Constitutional Law of India\" (2nd ed."}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107445, "end_char": 107456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107934, "end_char": 107943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108175, "end_char": 108184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108369, "end_char": 108378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110022, "end_char": 110031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110766, "end_char": 110775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111017, "end_char": 111038, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111346, "end_char": 111355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cetra I Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 111969, "end_char": 111987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nWe have said at the very outset of the discussion of this point that our decision on the question as to whether a mandamus should be issued as prayed for by the petitioners, should not be construed as any approval on our part of the Jong and unexplained failure on the part of the Cetra I Government to bring section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act into force."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111997, "end_char": 112006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112513, "end_char": 112522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113290, "end_char": 113300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113423, "end_char": 113441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "13th Amendment, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113549, "end_char": 113569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 13th Amendment, 1962, provide-I by section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Govern· ment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113584, "end_char": 113593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December I, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113791, "end_char": 113807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That amendment was brought into force by the Central Government on December I, 1963."}}, {"text": "27th Amendment, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113814, "end_char": 113834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 27th Amendment, 1971 brought section J: thereof into force at once, while the remaining provisions were to come into force on a date appointed by the Central Government, which was not to be earlier than a certain date mentioned in section I (2) of the Amending Act."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114161, "end_char": 114178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those remaining provisions were brought into force by the Central Government on February 15, 1972."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114586, "end_char": 114601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated January 1, 1977 parts of that Amendment were brought into force in three stages (see Basu's Comment tary on the Indian Constitution, Ed."}}, {"text": "Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114671, "end_char": 114675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated January 1, 1977 parts of that Amendment were brought into force in three stages (see Basu's Comment tary on the Indian Constitution, Ed."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114848, "end_char": 114858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115256, "end_char": 115265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115485, "end_char": 115497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115784, "end_char": 115793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116000, "end_char": 116009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116439, "end_char": 116449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116466, "end_char": 116485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 14", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 116879, "end_char": 116894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117351, "end_char": 117360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117376, "end_char": 117403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118050, "end_char": 118056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew,\n\n.T. speaking on behalf of himself and Ray, C.J. agreed with the conclusion that section 8 (2) (b) did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118097, "end_char": 118100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew,\n\n.T. speaking on behalf of himself and Ray, C.J. agreed with the conclusion that section 8 (2) (b) did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118139, "end_char": 118148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118528, "end_char": 118538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Couri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118708, "end_char": 118713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Couri, speaking through Mathew, J. upheld the validity of section 22."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118766, "end_char": 118776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119058, "end_char": 119076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119198, "end_char": 119207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 SCR 879", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 119225, "end_char": 119241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119820, "end_char": 119829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120132, "end_char": 120141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1) and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120438, "end_char": 120456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120468, "end_char": 120489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120792, "end_char": 120801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122210, "end_char": 122219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122227, "end_char": 122318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122486, "end_char": 122496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, and accordingly no order of detention shall be made under this Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be made under that Act,\"\n\nIt is contended by Shri Jethmalani that the expressions 'defence of India' 'relations of India with foreign powers', 'security of India' and 'security of the State' which occur in sub-sections (I)\n\n(a) and (2) of section 3 are so vague, general and elastic that even conduct which is otherwise lawful can easily be comprehended within those expression~, depending upon the whim and caprice of the detaining authority.", "canonical_name": "Jetharnalani"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122675, "end_char": 122684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980", "statute": "the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124326, "end_char": 124335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124817, "end_char": 124826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125130, "end_char": 125139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Northern Ireland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 125727, "end_char": 125743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Act was passed inter alia for the detention of terrorists in Northern Ireland."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125868, "end_char": 125878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commiflee on Law Reform and Racial Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126447, "end_char": 126485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127270, "end_char": 127277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Balrko Prasad(3 ) where a law was struck down on the ground, inter alia that the word 'goonda' is of uncertain import, which rendered unconstitutional a law which permitted goondas to be externed\n\nIn this behalf Dr. Singhvi, intervening on behalf of the Supreme Court Bar Association, has drawn our attention to section 8(3) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 6 of 1968, which defines the expressions \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State 'and' acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.'"}}, {"text": "section 8(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127366, "end_char": 127378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commiflee on Law Reform and Racial Act", "statute": "Commiflee on Law Reform and Racial Act"}}, {"text": "Kashmir Public Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127394, "end_char": 127419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 127707, "end_char": 127734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where there is a will there is a way, and counsel contends that the way shown with admirable precision by the Jammu & Kashmir Legislature is there for the Parliament to follow, provided its intention is, as it ought to be, that before the\n\npeople are deprived of their liberty, they must have the opportunity to regulate their conduct in order to ensure that it may conform to the requirements of law."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128305, "end_char": 128315, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128654, "end_char": 128663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 128998, "end_char": 129016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The British Parliament has defined the term \"terrorism\" in section 28 of the Act of 1973 to mean \"the use of violence for political ends\", which, by definition, includes 'any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.\""}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129053, "end_char": 129063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129431, "end_char": 129440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131135, "end_char": 131144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Go 11dhi(1)", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131773, "end_char": 131791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1892] 2 s.c k\n\nThe requirement that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness is regarded as a fundamental concept in criIT\\inal law and must now be regarded as a pervading theme of our Constitution since the decision in Maneka Go 11dhi(1).", "canonical_name": "Maneka Go 11dhi(1)"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132788, "end_char": 132798, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133183, "end_char": 133192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133370, "end_char": 133379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133698, "end_char": 133774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133966, "end_char": 133975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "statute": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 134069, "end_char": 134085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134461, "end_char": 134473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act", "statute": "While construing laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135377, "end_char": 135398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135527, "end_char": 135552, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135940, "end_char": 135949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136011, "end_char": 136020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136199, "end_char": 136224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136460, "end_char": 136469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136575, "end_char": 136606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136984, "end_char": 136993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137053, "end_char": 137074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137762, "end_char": 137772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act", "statute": "National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137884, "end_char": 137893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "National Security Act", "statute": "National Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138755, "end_char": 138764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139119, "end_char": 139128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139168, "end_char": 139177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139896, "end_char": 139917, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shri Jethmalani attacked the constitutionality of the very National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140491, "end_char": 140571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140925, "end_char": 140947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shri Jethmalani attacked the constitutionality of the very National Security Act", "statute": "Shri Jethmalani attacked the constitutionality of the very National Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141365, "end_char": 141386, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kailasam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141504, "end_char": 141512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need not enter into the controversy which is reflected in the dissenting judgment of Kailasam, J. in Maneka Gmdhi as to whether the major premise of Gopalan' s case really was that Article 22 is a complete code in itself and whether because of that premise, the decision in that case that Article Z 1 excluded the personal freedom conferred by Article 19 (I) is incorrect."}}, {"text": "Maneka Gmdhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141520, "end_char": 141532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need not enter into the controversy which is reflected in the dissenting judgment of Kailasam, J. in Maneka Gmdhi as to whether the major premise of Gopalan' s case really was that Article 22 is a complete code in itself and whether because of that premise, the decision in that case that Article Z 1 excluded the personal freedom conferred by Article 19 (I) is incorrect.", "canonical_name": "Maneka Go 11dhi(1)"}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141568, "end_char": 141575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need not enter into the controversy which is reflected in the dissenting judgment of Kailasam, J. in Maneka Gmdhi as to whether the major premise of Gopalan' s case really was that Article 22 is a complete code in itself and whether because of that premise, the decision in that case that Article Z 1 excluded the personal freedom conferred by Article 19 (I) is incorrect."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141600, "end_char": 141610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141763, "end_char": 141773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Haradhan Saha,(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141865, "end_char": 141881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have the authority of the decisions in the Bank Natimn/isation case, Haradhan Saha,(1) Khudiram,(2) Sambhu\n\nNath Sarkcr(3) and Maneka Gandhi for saying that the fundamental\n\n(l) [1975] 1 SCR 778. (", "canonical_name": "Haradhan Saha,(1"}}, {"text": "Sambhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141896, "end_char": 141902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have the authority of the decisions in the Bank Natimn/isation case, Haradhan Saha,(1) Khudiram,(2) Sambhu\n\nNath Sarkcr(3) and Maneka Gandhi for saying that the fundamental\n\n(l) [1975] 1 SCR 778. ("}}, {"text": "Nath Sarkcr(3", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141904, "end_char": 141917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have the authority of the decisions in the Bank Natimn/isation case, Haradhan Saha,(1) Khudiram,(2) Sambhu\n\nNath Sarkcr(3) and Maneka Gandhi for saying that the fundamental\n\n(l) [1975] 1 SCR 778. ("}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141923, "end_char": 141936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have the authority of the decisions in the Bank Natimn/isation case, Haradhan Saha,(1) Khudiram,(2) Sambhu\n\nNath Sarkcr(3) and Maneka Gandhi for saying that the fundamental\n\n(l) [1975] 1 SCR 778. (", "canonical_name": "Maneka Go 11dhi(1)"}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 SCR 778", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 141974, "end_char": 141990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S01", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142040, "end_char": 142043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142251, "end_char": 142261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142297, "end_char": 142319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khudiram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 142348, "end_char": 142356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the Court in Khudiram, one of us, Bhagwati, J. said :\n\n\"This question, thus, stands concluded and a final seal is put on this controversy and in view of these decisions, it is not open to any one now to contend that a law of preventive detention, which falls within article 22, does not have to meet the requirement of article 14 or article\n\n19.\" ("}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142601, "end_char": 142611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142654, "end_char": 142664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142668, "end_char": 142679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Haradhan Saha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 143069, "end_char": 143082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "page 847)\n\nBut just as the question as to whether the rights conferred by the different articles of Part III are mutually exclusive is concluded by the aforesaid decisions, the question whether a law of preventive detention is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates the freedoms conferred by Arlicles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is also concluded by the decision in Haradhan Saha.", "canonical_name": "Haradhan Saha,(1"}}, {"text": "that case the validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143088, "end_char": 143160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143340, "end_char": 143350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In that case the validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "In that case the validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 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176332, "end_char": 176342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176488, "end_char": 176501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "IO of the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176925, "end_char": 176956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177096, "end_char": 177106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the National Security Act", "statute": "IO of the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Article 22(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177141, "end_char": 177154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the National Security Act", "statute": "IO of the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Sutherland", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177737, "end_char": 177747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delivering the opinion of the court, Sutherland."}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 179039, "end_char": 179045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "page 170)\n\nThe aforesaid decision in Powell is unique in more than one way and has to be distinguished."}}, {"text": "Burger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181128, "end_char": 181134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Burger C.J., expressing the view of six members of the court, expressly left upon the question whether a prolee is entitled, in a parole revocation proceeding, to the assistance of counsel.", "canonical_name": "Burger"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182250, "end_char": 182262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the Court, Krishna Iyer, J. said in Hoskot :\n\n\"The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation through the court process is lawyer's services."}}, {"text": "Hoskot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 182275, "end_char": 182281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the Court, Krishna Iyer, J. said in Hoskot :\n\n\"The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation through the court process is lawyer's services."}}, {"text": "Hussainara Khatoon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182898, "end_char": 182916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal teehnology, compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law,\" Page (204)\n\nIn Hussainara Khatoon, one of us, Bhagwati, J. voiced the concern by saying :\n\n\"It is an essencial ingredient reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is to seek his liberation through the court's process that he should have legal services avail to him.\" ("}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 S.C.R. 778", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 183181, "end_char": 183200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 832", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 183207, "end_char": 183223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183653, "end_char": 183663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183715, "end_char": 183736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Francis Caralie Mullin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183742, "end_char": 183764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Francis Caralie Mullin, the petitioner, while in detention, wanted to have an interview with her lawyer, which was rendered almost impossible by reason of the stringent provisions of clause 3(b)(i) of the 'Conditions of Detention' formulated by the Delhi Administration."}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183925, "end_char": 183939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 183991, "end_char": 184011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Francis Caralie Mullin, the petitioner, while in detention, wanted to have an interview with her lawyer, which was rendered almost impossible by reason of the stringent provisions of clause 3(b)(i) of the 'Conditions of Detention' formulated by the Delhi Administration."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184164, "end_char": 184182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185999, "end_char": 186009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187250, "end_char": 187260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Denning M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189038, "end_char": 189050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fairness, as said by Lord Denning M.R., in Maynard v. Osmond(\"} can be obtainted without legal rrpresentation."}}, {"text": "Jetbmalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 189337, "end_char": 189347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Shri Jetbmalani laid equally great stress on the need to give the detenu the right of cross-examination and in support of his submission in that behalf, he relied on the decisions of the American\n\nSupreme Court in Jack R. Go1dberg v. John Kelly(3), Morrissey, Norvai Goss v. Eileen Lopez(4) and Powell.", "canonical_name": "Jetharnalani"}}, {"text": "Goldberg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189638, "end_char": 189646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Goldberg, Brennan."}}, {"text": "U.S. Suprme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 191657, "end_char": 191674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For reasons which we have stated more than once during the course of this judgment, the decisions of the U.S. Suprme Court which turn peculiarly on the due process clause in the American L. Constitution cannot be applied wholesale for resolving questions which arise under our Constitution, especially when, after a full discussion of that clause in the Constituent Assembly, the proposal to incorporate it in Article 21 was rejected."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191962, "end_char": 191972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 191990, "end_char": 191996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In U.S.A. itself, Judges have expressed views on the scope of the clause, which are not only divergent but diametrically opposite."}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192156, "end_char": 192166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For exmple, in Goldberg on which Shri Jethmalani has placed considerable reliance, Black, J., said in his dissenting opinion that the majority was using the judicial power for legislative purposes and that \"they wander out of their filed of.", "canonical_name": "Jetharnalani"}}, {"text": "Black", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192201, "end_char": 192206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For exmple, in Goldberg on which Shri Jethmalani has placed considerable reliance, Black, J., said in his dissenting opinion that the majority was using the judicial power for legislative purposes and that \"they wander out of their filed of.", "canonical_name": "Blackstone"}}, {"text": "Burger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192502, "end_char": 192508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in that case is reported in v Mue Wheeler v. John Montgomery(1), in the some volume.", "canonical_name": "Burger"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 192937, "end_char": 192974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 194247, "end_char": 194251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin(3), the view that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless\" is tainted by\n\n\"the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist\"."}}, {"text": "A.K. ROY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 195336, "end_char": 195344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. ROY V. UNION OF INDIA (Chandrachi.d, CJ.)", "canonical_name": "A. K. ROY, ETC"}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath Bora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 198681, "end_char": 198699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Citing with approval the passage in Nagendra Nath Bora, the Court held that the question as to whether the right to cross-examine was available had to be decided in the light of the fact that it was dealing with a statute under which a Commission of Inquiry was set up for fact-finding purposes and that the report of the Commission had no force proprio vigore."}}, {"text": "Khem Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 199754, "end_char": 199764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Khem Chand it was held that if the purpose of Article 311(2) was to give the Government servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one, he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and, \"that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him \"and to examine himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199800, "end_char": 199814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311( 2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200942, "end_char": 200957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "T. R. Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 201132, "end_char": 201143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In T. R. Varma the right of cross-examination is described as the right in regard to the witnesses examined by the other party while in Khem Chand, the right is described as an opportunity to defend oneself by cross-examining the witnesses produced by the other side."}}, {"text": "B. R. Ambedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 201728, "end_char": 201742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the debates of the Constituent Assembly are any indication, it would appear that Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, at any rate, was of the opinion that the detenu should be given the right to cross-examine witnesses before the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 201950, "end_char": 201968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his reply to the debate on the procedure of the Advisory Board, he said on September 16, 1949 that a \"pointed question has been asked whether the accused person would be entitled to appear before the Board, cross-examine the witnesses, and make his own statement\"."}}, {"text": "clause 7(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202289, "end_char": 202300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202328, "end_char": 202338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 203220, "end_char": 203244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament has not made any provision in the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 203657, "end_char": 203723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 204279, "end_char": 204333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205228, "end_char": 205238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act", "statute": "Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205890, "end_char": 205899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207242, "end_char": 207258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 207614, "end_char": 207623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to that conclusion the majority relied upon the decision in D:ittatraya Moreshwar Pangarka~ v. State of Bombay(2} in which Mukherjea, J., while dealing with a similar question, observed :\n\n\"The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.~.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 208138, "end_char": 208175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.~.\n\nwhat action is to be taken subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate Government and it can under s. 11 (I) of the Act confirm the detention order and continue detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.''"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208281, "end_char": 208286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bo Jks", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211552, "end_char": 211558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bo Jks are the best friends of man whether inside c r outside the jail."}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 211747, "end_char": 211768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 212183, "end_char": 212194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sunil Batra, the most important right of the person who is imprisoned is to the integrity of his physical person and mental personality."}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 213172, "end_char": 213188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213886, "end_char": 213907, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 214332, "end_char": 214337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA, J. I find myself unable to agree with the views expressed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice on two of the points that arise for decision in this batch of writ petitions, one of them relates to the failure of the Central Government to bring into operation the provisions of section 3 of the Constitution (Forty- Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 and the other concerns the question whether an ordinance is 'law' within the meaning of article 21 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Gupta"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214623, "end_char": 214632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214777, "end_char": 214787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 368(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214914, "end_char": 214928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215240, "end_char": 215252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215569, "end_char": 215578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215657, "end_char": 215667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215776, "end_char": 215785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215820, "end_char": 215830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215835, "end_char": 215845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217197, "end_char": 217206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 217328, "end_char": 217344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many of the provisions of the Act were brought into force on different dates in the year 1979 but the provisions of section 3 were not given effect G to for more than one year and seven months when the hearing of these writ petitions commenced on December 9, 1980."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217418, "end_char": 217427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217497, "end_char": 217506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "After the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217898, "end_char": 217921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218292, "end_char": 218315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220722, "end_char": 220731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220787, "end_char": 220795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Ordinance, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220803, "end_char": 220836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220905, "end_char": 220915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Ordinance, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220950, "end_char": 220959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Ordinance, 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221390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221460, "end_char": 221469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222043, "end_char": 222052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222197, "end_char": 222207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222229, "end_char": 222239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "National Security Ordinance, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 222366, "end_char": 222399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222611, "end_char": 222621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980", "statute": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222688, "end_char": 222699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980", "statute": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222852, "end_char": 222863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980", "statute": "The National Security Ordinance, 1980"}}, {"text": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224008, "end_char": 224095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224131, "end_char": 224142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance", "statute": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224405, "end_char": 224416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance", "statute": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 213", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224488, "end_char": 224499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance", "statute": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 213", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224616, "end_char": 224627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance", "statute": "To show that there is no difference between a law passed by Parliament and an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224748, "end_char": 224834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224841, "end_char": 224852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224960, "end_char": 224970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225043, "end_char": 225054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225253, "end_char": 225264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "articles 356 and 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225417, "end_char": 225437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225544, "end_char": 225555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance", "statute": "From these provisions it was contended that the President in promulgating an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226204, "end_char": 226215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226285, "end_char": 226296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227362, "end_char": 227373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227688, "end_char": 227702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227969, "end_char": 227980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227991, "end_char": 228002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228042, "end_char": 228051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 228150, "end_char": 228166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J_, in A. K. Gopalan v. State(1) observed that the word \"established\" in article 21 \"implies some degree of firmness, permanence and general acceptance\"."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228240, "end_char": 228250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228954, "end_char": 228962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228970, "end_char": 228981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229060, "end_char": 229071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229114, "end_char": 229125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229161, "end_char": 229172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 229434, "end_char": 229448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the Union of India learned Attorney General referred to article 367 (2) to argue that the Constitution itself equates an ordinance with an Act of Parliament."}}, {"text": "article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229486, "end_char": 229497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229589, "end_char": 229600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Any reference in this Constitution to Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 229615, "end_char": 229656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 229900, "end_char": 229940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230042, "end_char": 230053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act", "statute": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230347, "end_char": 230357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act", "statute": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act"}}, {"text": "article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230359, "end_char": 230370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act", "statute": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230439, "end_char": 230449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act", "statute": "Any reference in the Constitution to Act"}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 231053, "end_char": 231064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TULZAPURKAR, J. On the question of bringing into force, section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 I am in agreement with the view expressed by my learned brother A. C. Gupta in his judgment.", "canonical_name": "Tu lzapurkar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231109, "end_char": 231118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231129, "end_char": 231141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 231261, "end_char": 231272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TULZAPURKAR, J. On the question of bringing into force, section 3 read with section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 I am in agreement with the view expressed by my learned brother A. C. Gupta in his judgment."}}, {"text": "P.B.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 231400, "end_char": 231406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.B.R.\n\n,. .."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_2_365_1455_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "SP. GUPTA & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nDecember 28, 1981\n\n[ P.N. BHAGWATI, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au\n\nV.D. TULZAPURKAR, D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND\n\nE.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ. ]\n\n1, Independence of Judiciary, scope and limitations of the concept-Basic. structure of the Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950, Preamble, Articles 124, 216, 217 222 and 224.\n\n2. Public interest litigation-Right to challenge executive order/action os affecting the independence of judiciary by persons other than the aggrieved party- Locus standi of lawyers to raise issues like fixation of strength of Judges in each High Court, appointment and re-appointments, of addtiona/ Judges, short term appointments, transfer, etc. by means of petitions either under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India, explained.\n\n3. Public law-Protection against disclosure of documents claiming privilege-Evidence Act, sections 123 and 162, difference in-Whether the Union of India could claim privilege in respect of the correspondence between the high dignitaries which formed the opinion regarding transfer of Judges/gram of extension to the additional Judges-Constitution of India, Articles 19(1) (a), 14, 217 and 224.\n\n4. Freedom of the press-Disc11ssions based on the disclosed materials on the grounds on which recommendations were made to the President for not granting extension to the additional Judges, when the matter is sub-judice tan/amounts '\\ to trial by press, not authorised by law-Constitution of India, Articles 19( /)(a) and 32.\n\nConsent to be appointed to any of the three preferred High Courts, as a J11dge, by the proposed appointee and the sitting additional Judges-Validity of such a circular letter requiring consent, dated March 18, 1981, of the Law Minister-Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 217 and 222.\n\nConstitution of India, Articles 216, 224, and 226-Appointmnt of High H Court Ju1ge<-Difference between sitti~.~ flcdifi!ional Jl!d!{eI qrf proposed appointee for initial recruitment. explained.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R'\n\n7. Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another-Constitution of\n\nIndia, 1950, Articles 222-Notification dated January 19, 1981 issued by the President of India transferring Mr. K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna to Madras, validity of.\n\n8. Constilution of India, Article 222(1)-Legal effect of an order of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.\n\n9. High Courts-Inter se-status-All High Courts have same status- Constitution of India, Articles 224 ( 4), 139A (2), 214 (2) & ( 3) before deletion in 1956, 222, 366(14) 376, Schedule VII List I Entry 78, discussed.\n\n10. Constitution of India, Article 222 (])-Power to transfer a Judge, nature and extent of use, explained.\n\n11. Constitution of India, Article 222, power to formulate general po/icy of transfers of Judges or Chief Justices from one High Court to another-Article 222 vests such power.\n\n12. Constitution of India, Article 222 (/)-The word \"Chief Justice\" is included in the expression \"a Judge of the High Court\"-Transfer of Chief Justice D of High Court from one State to another, therefore, falls within the purview or Article 222( 1) of the Constitution.\n\n13. Constitution of India, Articles 215, 216 and Proviso (c) to Arlicle 217 (1)-Whether Judges of lhe High Court constitute a single All India cadre for purpose of appointment and transfer.\n\n14. Constitution of India, Article 222-Proposal for transfer of a Judge or\n\nChief Justice of a High Court-The provisions of Article 222 must necessarily be complied wir!z irrespective of the fact which authority initiates the proposal.\n\n15. Constitution of India, Article 222 (2)-Transfer of a High Court Judge/ Chief Justice-Simultaneous fixation of compensatory allowance-Transfer order and an order fixing compensatory allowance need not be simultaneous.\n\n16. Constitution of India, Article 217 (/} proviso (e) and Article 222- Distinction between \"transfer\" and \"appointment\"-Taking afresh oath by a trans feree Judge does not make a transfer a fresh appoil1tment.\n\n 17. Onus probandi-Constitution of India, Article 222 (1) read with Evi dence Act, sections JOI to 104-0nus of justifying transfer of a Judge is upon the State.\n\n18. Constitution of India, Article 222 (1)-Transfer of a Judge-Advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India must, ordinarily, be accepted by the President of India.\n\n19. Transfer af a Judge, on 'mere allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity\n\nwhic~ fqrm, subject-matter of gq(i<m under Article 218 read with Article 224- •1 J J ~\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 367\n\nTransfer of a Judge under the guise of Article 222 is impermissible and liable to A be quashed.\n\n20. Transfer of a Judge, exercise of power under Article 222 of the Constitution, should be in public interest and not by way of punishment-The word \"consent\" in Article 222 is a case of deliberate omission and not casus omissus.\n\n21. Interpretation of statutes and/or constitutional provi.lions-Duty of the Supreme Court-Constitution of India, Article 141 and Preamble.\n\n22. Interpretation of Constitution-Preamble to the Constitution-Court must not bend language of Constitution according to its will.\n\n23. Interpretation of statutes, when language is clear doctrine of casus omissus will cease to be applicable.\n\n24. Interpretation of statutes-External aid, marginal note, reference to legislative debate, etc. as aid to interpretation of uctions, admissibility of.\n\n25. Interpretation of Constitution, rules regarding-Power conferred by Constitution upon authority cannot be denied on grounds of its misuse-Constitution of India, 1950.\n\n26. Interpretation of Constitution-Constitutional conventions scope and\n\n~ its use as an aid to interpretation-Constitution of India.\n\n27. Precedence-Judicial precedence-Value of-Ratio and not the con- E clusion which binds-Constitution of India, Article 141.\n\n28. Constitution of High Courts-Strength of Judges-Whether a writ af mandamus can be issued against Union of India for fixing the strength of Judges in each High Court-Constitution of India, Articles 216, 32, 74 and 226, scope a/- Advice under Article 74 in the matter of appointment of Judges is binding.\n\n29. Constitution of India, Articles 224 (2), 227 (2) and 274 (2)-Additional Judges, their status and functions, explained.\n\n30. Appointment of Additional Judges-Conditions precedent-Power of President when can be exercised-Constitution of India, Articles 217 and 224.\n\n31. Appointment of Judges-Appointment must be made by the Central Government only after effective consultation as required by Articles 124 and 227 read with 74-Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has a primacy.\n\n32. Appointment of additional Judges-Procedure regarding extension of H tenure-Initiation well in time and in advance of proposals of recommendations or otherwise is a must-Constitution of India, Article 217 and 224.\n\n. ..\n\n368 su-Pilllt.til couRt REPokts [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\n33.\n\nWords and phrases-\"Consultation\" -Meaning of-Consultation should be meaningful, purposeful and result-oriented-Constitution, Articles, 217, 222 and 224.\n\n34. Additional Judges-Extension of term-Matters to be considered- Appointment of Judges to High Court being purely an executive function of President, Court cannot declare a sitting additional Judge to be deemed to have become permanent or direct the President to make him permanent.\n\n35. Non-extension of the term of office of Mr. S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, validity of\n\n36. Constitution of India, Articles 217 and 224-Additional Judges, a right to be considered for fresh appointment-Short term extensions, propriety of justiciability of denial to grant extension.\n\n37. Additional Judge-Non-extension of his term-Principle of natural justice-There is no necessity to give him opportunity of hearing.\n\n38. Additional JudJ; e of a High Court-Non-extension of the term of the D Judge as additional Judge of the High Court-Integrity of the Judge doubted by the Chief Justice of High Court as disclosed before the Court--Judge ready to establish his innocence :and seeking opportunity from Supreme Court to do so-Supreme\n\nCourt cannot grant such opportunity in view of its restricted jurisdiction in such cases-Constitution of India, Articles 32, 226 and I 39A jurisdiction of the Supreme\n\nCourt, explained.\n\n39. Appointment of High Court Judges-Initial recruitment-Non-appointment of a person-Non-appointee aggrieved person has no standing and no writ of mandamus will issue at his instance.\n\n40. CollStitution of India, Articles 226 and 32-Courts have no powers to decide questions of pure academic interest.\n\n41. Constitution of India, Article 136-Powers of the Supreme Court to grant Special Leave Petition-High Court rejecring petition under Article 226 in limine on the ground that the petitioner was unable to produce documents beyond his reach on which he wanted 10 place reliance-Rejection of the petition if invalid\n\nS.L.P. could be granted.\n\n42. Constitution o( India, Article 226-Writ proceedings-Pleadings in the form of affidavits, counter-affidavits, rejoinder-affidavits, etc. filed by the parties to a writ petition also partakes of the character oi the evidence in the case.\n\nOn March 18, 1981, Honourable Sri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed a circular letter to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the\n\n,, •\n\nS.P. GuPlA v. UNioN 169\n\nNorth-Eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts. Such consent was also required from persons who had already been proposed or may in the future to be proposed for initial appointment.\n\nThe additional Judges, the proposed and the would-be-proposed for initial appointment were requested to indicate three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed. It was made clear by the said circular letter that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a prefereJilce would not imply any commitment on the part of Government either in regard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance witll the preferences given.\n\nPrior to, as well as after the issuance of the aforesaid circular letter by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981, in several High Courts, including High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi, the President of India acting under C Article 224 granted short-term extensions for three months, six months or a year to sitting additional Judges whose initial terms were about to expire.\n\nRelying on the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was finally not given further appointment. Similarly, Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra. Additional Judge of the same High Court was also not re-appointed after the expiry of his tenure of appointment.\n\nEarlier, in exercise of the power conferred by Ar tide 222 (!)of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices.\n\nSince such short-term extnsions became a frequent phenomenon, particularly after the issuance of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981, it created great consternation in the legal and judicial circles in the country.\n\nThese two actions of the Union Government, namely, the issuance of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions led to legal action being taken challenging their constitutional validity by individual lawyers, by Bar Associations in a representative capacity. Having regard to their high positions as a constitutional functionary all the sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, though agitated by these two actions of the Union Government understandably felt reluctant to adopt legal steps against said circular letter as well as the short-term extensions. Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra,\n\nAdditional Judge of the Delhi High Court, did not join issue when he was dropped outright, while Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar as a party-respondent to the Writ Petition filed in Delhi High Court actively supported the challenge to these actions and also the further action of dropping him outright during the pendency of the petition.\n\nThough the transfer order dated January 19, 1981 in respect of the two Chief Justices was also challenged, Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail refused to take part\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA as a party-respondent and chose to resign his high office, while Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh actively opposed the orders of transfer by transposing himself as petitioner No. 3 to the petition.\n\nDetails of the several cases filed were :\n\n(i) Transferred case No. 19 of 1981 was filed by Sri S.P. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad. While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges.\n\n(ii) Transferred case No. 20 of 1981 was filed by Sri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi assailing the circular and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Sri O.N. Vohra, Sri S.N. Kumar and Sri S.B. Wad for a further period of three months only, It was prayed that the posts of additional Judges in the several High Courts be converted into permanent posts.\n\n(iii) In Transfer Case No. 21 of 1981, Shri J. L. Kalra and a few other advocates filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi, it was prayed that a mandamus be issued to the Union Government to create an adequate number of posts of permanent and additional Judges and to make appointments to those posts.\n\n(iv) Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges.\n\nThese four cases constitute a group raising substantially common points of consideration arising out of interpretation of Articles 124, 216, 217 and 224 of the Constitution.\n\n(v) The Second group also constituted of four cases led by Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Article 32 of the Constitution. She challenged the transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, to Kerala High Court as Chief Justice, Sri M.M. Ismail filed an affidavit stating that he has decided not to proceed to Kerala, nor to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement. Shri M.M. Ismail has resigned since.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 371\n\n(vi) Transfer Case No. 2 of 1981 was filed as a Writ Petition in the High A Court of Madras by one Mr. A Rajappa, an Advocate, praying for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras and Sri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to Madras High Court was void.\n\n(vii) Transferred Case No. 6 of 1981 was another Writ Petition filed by Sri P. Subramaniam praying for similar reliefs as Sri Rajappa in Transfer Case 8 No. 2 of 1981.\n\n(viii) Two Advocates Sri D.N. Pandey and Sri Thakur Ramapathi Sinha, filed Transferred Case No. 24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court at Patna to the High Court of Madras. During the pendency of this Writ Petition, Sri K.B.N.\n\nSingh, who has been impleaded as a respondent was transposed as a petitioner; and\n\n(ix) Special Leave Petition No. 1509 of 1981 filed by Ripudaman Prasad Sinha is directed against an order passed by the . High Court at Patna rejecting in limine the Writ Petition of the petitioner challenging the constitutional validity of the order of transfer of Chief Jusctice K.B.N. Singh, on the ground that he had not been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance.\n\n_,}..\n\nSeveral contentions raised in these Writ Petitions are :\n\n(i) The actions of the Union Government forming part of a scheme constitute a direct attack on the independence of judiciary, which is a basic feature ..... of a constitution .\n\n(ii) The circular dated March 18, 1981, seeks to effect, in substance and reality, a mass transfer of sitting Additional Judges as also the proposed appointees based on a policy decision unilaterally taken by the Law Minister/ Union Government and as such violates the requirements of Article 222(1) of the Constitution as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sankal Chand's case [1978] 1 S.C.R. 423 in as much as such mass transfers on alleged grounds of policy are outside its scope and further it reduces the efficacy of the consultation with the Chief Justice of India contemplated therein to a meaningless formality by presenting a transfer proposal to him as a fait accompli, the same being backed by the consent of the concerned judge or the proposed appointee to his transfer.\n\n(iii) The circular letter was without the authority of law.\n\n(iv) The circular letter, as far as the sitting of Additional Judges are concerned, contains by implication a threat to them (a) that if they do not give their consent they will not be either continued as Additional Judges or confirmed as\n\nPermanent Judgos: (b) that the Government would watch their performance in matters to which the Government, Government bodies and Corporations are\n\nSUPREME COORT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.R\n\nparties before them and would appoint them as Permanent Judges only if they were found to toe the Government line and as such it constitutes gross interference with administration of justice and is subversive of judicial independence.\n\n(v) The circular letter seeks to obtain consent under threat, coercion and duress and also in advance and in abstract and the same would be no consent in law •.\n\n(vi) As regards the proposed appointees it introduces an additional qualification for being appointed as Additional or Permanent Judge not warranted by the Constitution.\n\n(vii) The circular letter was written ma/a fide for a collateral purpose to by pass Article 222 and further to exercise the power of appointing additional judges not for the purpose for which that power has been confirmed but for the purpose of carrying out the so-called \"policy\" of the Government and is therefore malafide in the sense that the power [is being exercised for a collateral purpose foreign to the purpose indicated in Article 224.\n\n(viia) The circular letter under which absolute power and discretion is claimed to the effect that there is no obligation on the part of the Union Government to continue the sitting additional Judges after th€ expiry of their initial term notwithstanding pendency of arrears of work or to make them permanent as and when permanent vacancies become available and to appoint different persons for different periods of additional Judges in the vacancies of sitting additional Judges after their initial terms have expired, is a clear abuse of the power conferred by Article 224 (I) of the Constitution, because the power, being purposive is coupled with a duty to exercise the same when the conditions precedent mentioned in provision exist and the circular letter which claims such absolute power is violative of the provisions of Article 224, in any case the course of action proposed in the said circular letter in exercise of such absolute power claimed thereunder is contrary to the established constitutional convention and practice that has grown over the years in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges and, therefore, bad in law inasmuch as Article 224 (1) has been interpreted and workea having regard to the said convention and practice.\n\n(viii) The circular letter is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes invidious discrimination against those who would be refusing to furnish their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent would stand to gain, it gives to the Government unfettered and unguided power or discretion to pick and choose i.e. select some for being shifted to High Courts other than their home-State High Courts and to retain and appoint other in their home.-State High Courts-which power can be exercised either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism.\n\n(ix) In the appointment of Additional Judges of one High Court as Permanent Judges of another High Court or in the appointments of the members of the Bar practising in one High Court as Additional or Permanent Judges of another High Court pursuant to the consent obtained under the said circular letter, the consultation with the Governor of that other State and particularly with the Chief Justice of that other High Court would be illusory and an empty\n\n-L ..\n\ns.1'. GUPTA v. t.JNioN 373\n\nformality and as such circular letter is violative of Article 217 of the Con- A stitution.\n\n(x) The short-term extensions are directly subversive of the independence of Judiciary and not contemplated by the Constitution.\n\n(xi) A member of th~ Bar who accepts the appointment of an Additional Judge has legitimate expectation that he will be confirmed as Permanent Judge of that High Court when a vacancy occurs and in the past he has been confirmed except in the rarest of cases. The power claimed under Article 224 (I) not to continue the Additional Judges, even if temporary increase in the Court's business persists or pendency of arrears justifies such continuance after the expiry of the initial term and not to make him permanent even if a vacancy of permanent post occurs and to appoint another person as Additional Judge by ignoring the legitimate expectancy of the sitting incumbent whose initial term has expired, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognised and established practice, amounts to breach of faith with the concerned Judge and further to ask such Additional Judge who has given such undertaking to agree in advance to a transfer (or even to accept . fresh appointment) to other High Courts as a Permanent Judge also involves similar breach of faith amounts to a clear abuse of power and the purported exercise of the power in that manner would be illegal and void.\n\n(xii) The claim made by the Government that Article 224 (1) only fixes the maximum period of two years at a time, that the Article does not limit the discretion of the Government in the matter of the period for which an Additional Judge can be appointed except in regard to the ceiling of two years and that the appointment can be for a shorter period and that 'period is not justiciable E is untenable in law and clearly wrong because, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognised and established practice, it introduces an element of insecurity of tenure having serious repercussions on the independence of Judiciary and also undermines people's confidence and faith in it.\n\n(xiii) Article 216 of the Constitution casts a primary obligation upon the President mandatorily to provide adequate strength of Permanent Judges to cope with the normal busines in every High Court so as to ensure its disposal within reasonable time and to review such strength from time to time so that arrears do not acoumulate and justice to litigants is not unduly delayed. When the objective facts unmistakably demonstrate that the increase of business every year or that the arrears have increased and accumulated to an appreciably disturbing level with no reasonable prospects of substantialy reducing the same over a period of years, the President cannot resort to Article 224 (I) but has to increase the permanent strength by making permanent appointments under Article 217. In any case Additional Judges cannot be appointed while keeping permanent posts vacant.\n\n(xiv) To keep a large number of sitting Judges as Additional Judges H would be arbitrary and unconstitutional and a clear case exists for declaring them to be deemed to have become permanent.\n\n374 SUPREME COURT il.Ei>oilis\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\n(xv) Article 222 (I) does not refer to a Chief Justice hence the order dated 19-l-198Jis outside its purview.\n\n(xvi) Since Article 222 (1) properly construed, covers only consensual trans fers, the transfer order dated 19-1-1981 which is admittedly non-consensual, is bad in law.\n\n(xvii) The transfer dated 19-1-1981 was not effected in public interest. 1\"\n\n(xviii) The transfer has been effected without full and effective consulta tion contemplated by Article 222 (1) and therefore the procedure followed in effecting the same did not ensure fairplay in relation to K.B.N. Singh and the transfer is punitive in character.\n\nThe contesting respondents raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the petitions inasmuch as the advocates had no locus standi and as to the request for disclosing certain correspondence in the case of S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge, of the Delhi High Court, the respondents claimed privilege under sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act.\n\nDismissing the petitions, the Court, while agreeing that (a) the petitioners being advocates had a 'standing' to challenge the va!idity of circulars; (b) independence of Judiciary is the founding faith of the Constitution and the power to appoint Judges is executive in the nature and the President is bound by the advice of the Cabinet by virtue of Article 74; (c) As to appointment and extension of Additional Judges, consultation with constitutional functionaries must be meaningful and result-oriented, none of them can exercise veto in the matter and the proposal can emanate from any of them and (d) transfer must be in public interest, not by way of punishment and personeal inconvenience, language problem and other factors should be taken into consideration,\n\nHELD : (Per majority).\n\n(i) The circular letter of the Law Minister dated 18.3.81 is not invalid because it is a document without any legal force and does not by itself of its own force, produce any legal consequence or effect but if any adverse action is taken against an additional judge because he has not given his consent for being appointed a permanent judge in another High Court, such adverse action would be invalid. Since an additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additiona 1 Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term, and in case of a vacancy in a permanent post, for appointment as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, he cannot be discontinued as an additional Judge on the ground that be has not given hi; consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court.\n\nSuch a ground for discontinuing as an additional Judge would be a wholly irrelev2nt ground and if an additional Judge is discontinued on any such ground, the decision of the President discontinuing him would be unconstitutional and void. [Vide opinions of P.N. Bhagwati, S.M. Fazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.]\n\nS.P. GUPTA V, UNION 375\n\n(ii) Among the opinions of the three constitutional consultancies, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not enjoy primacy over the other two opinions in the matter of appointment of Judges. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M.\n\nFazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)\n\n(iii) Non-extension of Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar after the expiry of his term was not invalid. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M. Fazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S.\n\nVenkataramiah, JJ.) B\n\n(iv) \"Consent\" is not necessary for the transfer of a Judge under Article 222, (Vide A.C. Gupta, Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)\n\n(v) The transfer of Sri K.B.N. Singh, the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is in public interest and not vitiated by malafides. (Vide /,, C. Gupta, C V.D. Tulzapurkar, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)\n\n(vi) No privilege could be claimed in respect of documents which constituted material for forming the opinions in the matter of either appointment or transfer of the Judges. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)\n\nPer Bhagwati, J.\n\nI : I. The principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract con ception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitu- .4. tional character and in nourishment and sustenance from the constitutional values. Indian Constitution is a document of social revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch of the State to transform the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all institutions of national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic dstinat ion and a creative function.\n\nIt cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic justice. Therefore, what is necessary is to have Judges who are prepared to fashion new tools, forge new methods, innovate new strategies and evolve a new jurisprudence, who are judicial statesmen with a social vision and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of commitment to the Constitution with an activist approach and obligation for accountability, not to any party in power nor to the opposition nor to the classes which are vociferous but to the half hungry millions of India who are continulaly denied their basic human rights. Only Judges who are alive to the soc10-economic realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear from every eye, who have faith in the constitutional values and who are ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional objectives are needed. And this has to be the broad blue-print of the appointment project for the higher echelons of judicial service. It is only if appointments of Judges are made with these considerations weighing predominently with the appointing authority that we can have a truly independent judiciary commit-\n\n\\d only to the <;:onsti!\\lti<; m an\\! to the people of India.\n\n, ~534' J:I 1 5.35~A-!31 536 f-H 1 537 AJ\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n1 : 2. The concept of the independence of the judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the-task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective.\n\nIt is to aid the judiciary in this task that the power of judicial review has been conferred upon the judiciary & it is by exercising this power which constitutes one of the most potent weapons in armoury of the law, that the judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive and therefore it ls absolutely essential that the judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution. The concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence from executive prssure or influence but it is much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centres economic or p()litical, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong. [537 A-El\n\n1 : 3.\n\nJudges should be of stern stuff and tough fibre, unbending before power, economic or political, and they must uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says \"Be you ever so high, the law is above you.\" This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of real participatory democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable sections of the community, It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which must be kept in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution. [537H, 538A-B]\n\n2 : J.\n\nThe traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and the public law had not been born.\n\nUnder this rule, the court concerned only with the question whether the applicant was an aggrieved person. According to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. This rule in regard to lous standi postulates a right-duty pat!ern. J513A, Sl4A-C,'S15A-BJ\n\n-. ,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 377\n\n2 : 2. But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the [years. They are:\n\n(a) A rate payer of a local authority is accorded standing to challenge an illegal action of the local authority; (b) if a person is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the decision making process culminating in the impugned decision, he would have locus stiindi to maintain an action challenging the impugned decision; (c) the !tatute itself may expressly recognise the locus standi of an applicant, even though no legal right protected interest of the applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to him; and (d) the applicant for judicial redress must have suffered a legal wrong or injury in order to entitle him to maintain an action for such redress. [515B, C, D, F, 516A]\n\n2 : 3. Where a person who ha• suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to apporach the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantanged position, some other person can invoke assistance of the court for the pupose of providing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice is done to him.[517 AB]\n\nEx-parte Sidebotham, 14 Chancery Division 458; Reed Baveri & Comp'lny, 19 Q.B. Division 174, K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality, A.I.R. 1974 SC 2177; Vaidarajan v. Salem Municipality; A.LR. 1973 Mad. 55; Queen v. Bowman (1898) Q.B. 633; J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, 1976 3 SCR 58; Rat/am Municipality v.\n\nVardhi Chand, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1622; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17; 4 L. Ed. 2 d 524; Atwood v. Merry Wether, (1867) 5 Equity 464; Duryappah v.\n\nFernando, (1967) 2 Appeal Cases 337; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249; Law Ed. 1586; Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1579; Dr. Upendra\n\nBaxi v. State of U.P., (1981) 3 Scale 1137, discussed and referred to.\n\n2 : 4.\n\nWhere a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is 'imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons i~\n\nby reason of poverty helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief any member of the public can maintain rn application lor an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons. Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society and who do not have easy access to justice, Supreme Court will not insist on a regular writ petition to be filed by the public spirited individual espousing their cause and seeking relief for them. Supreme Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono publico. It is true that there are rµles made by Supreme c:; ourt prescri\\Jin(l the pr<;>C\\l\\11, lre for movin!I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nSupreme Court for relief under Article 32 and they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach Supreme Court. But, procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The Court would therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public minded individual as a writ petition nd act upon it. But the individual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshhold whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in court. As a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class O\" group of persons or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not en.tertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of a third party, where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take careof such cases. [520 B-H, 521 ~-Fl\n\n2:5. Cases, where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury. (521 H, 522 A]\n\nIf the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of actionable private injury. If the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, and if no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disasterous for the rule of Jaw, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The courts cannot countenance\n\n<uch a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. Therefore, whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of stancting which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public, who is not a mere busy-body or a meddlesome interloper, but who has sufficient interest in the proceedini:. There c1111 be n<;> c;!o\\lbt that the ris!< of Iei:al action ai:ainst the State\n\nS, P, GUPTA V, UNION 379\n\nor a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice. [522 F-H, 523 A-El\n\nRex v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1981) 2 W.L.R. 722 al 740, quoted with approval.\n\n2:6. If public duties are to be enforced and social collective 'diffused' rights and interests are to be protected, the initiative and zeal of public-minded persons and organisations must be utilised by allowing them to move the court and act for a general or group interest, even though, they may not be directly injured in their own rights. It is for this reason that in public interest litigationlitigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be determined by the Court in each individual case. [526 H. 527 A-Bl\n\n2:7. It is not possible for the Court to lay down any hard and fast rule or any straight jacket formula for the purpose of defining or delimiting 'sufficient interest'. The Judge who has the correct social perspective and who is on the same wave-length as the Constitution will be able to decide, without any difficulty and in consonance with constitutional objectives, whether a member of the public moving the court in a particular case has sufficient interest to initiate the action. [527 B, D-El\n\nAny member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering, the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective. But care should be taken to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. [530 D-E, 532 B-C]\n\nData Processing Service v. Camp; 397 U.S. 150: 2d 25 Law Ed. 184; Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, U.S. App. DC. 328; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166; Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490; Attorney General v. Independent Broadcasting, Authority, 1973 1 All England Reports 689; Rex v. Greater London Council; Gouriet v. U.P. W., 1978 Appeal Cases 482, quoted with approval.\n\n2:8. There is a vital distinction between \"locus standi and \"justiciability\" and it is not every default on the p&rt <?f the late or a public authoritr that is\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA justiciable. The Court must take care to see that it does not over-step the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the Court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence whkh demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. [532 D-E]\n\n2:9\" There can be no doubt that the practising lawyers have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if any unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary, they would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such a.:tion The rrofession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They assist the court in dispensing jusitice and it can hardly be disputed that without their help, it would be well nigh impossible for the Court to administer justice. They are really and truly officers of the Court in which they daily sit and practise. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of the judicial s)stem and if the integrity or independence of the judiciary is threatened by any act of the State or any public authority they would naturally be concerned about it, because they are rqual partners with the Judges in the administration of justice. [533 C-F]\n\nThe circular letter, on the averments ruade in the writ petition, did not cause any specific legal injury to an individual, but it caused public injury by prejudicially affecting the independence of the judiciary. The petitioners being lawyers h d sufficient interest to challenge the cons1itutionality of the circular leUer and they were, therefore, entitled to file the writ petition as a public interest litigation. They had clearly a concern deeper than that of a busy body and they cannot be told off at the gates. [533 H, 534 A]\n\nFertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, applied.\n\n3:1. The Court does not decide issues in the abstract. It undertakes determination of a controversy provided it is necessary in order to give relief to a party and if no relief can be given because none is sought. The Court cannot take upon itself a theoretical exercise merely for the purpose of deciding academic issues, howscevcr important they may be. The Court cannot, embark upon an inquiry whether there was any misuse or abuse of power in a particular case, unless relief is sought by the person who is said to have been wronged by such n.isuse or abuse of power. For this reason, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to non-appointment of O.N. Vohra was not relevant to the issues arising for determim1tion in the writ petition and the Union of India could not be required to disclose it. [588 H, 589 A]\n\n3:2. But, since the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term was assailed, firstly, that there has been no full and effective consultation bet ween the Central Government and the constitutional authorities required to be consulted under that Article\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNloN 381\n\nand, secondly, that the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India would be relevant qua both these grounds. [589 E-F]\n\n3:3. Under our Constitution the President is a constitutional Head and is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The decision of the President under Article 224 read with Article 217 not to appoint an additional Judge for a further term is really a decision of the Council of Ministers and the reasons which nave weighed with the Council of Ministers in taking such decision would necessarily be part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President. The Court cannot, having regard to clause (2) of Article 72, embark upon an inquiry as to whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and since the reasons which have prevailed with the Council of Ministers in taking a particular decision not to continue an additional Judge for a further term would form part of the advice tendered to the President, they would be beyond the ken of judicial inquiry. [590 B, E-F, G-H, 591 A]\n\n3:4. There can be no doubt that the advice tendered by Council of Ministers to the President is protected against judicial scrutiny by reason of clause (2) of Article 74. But it cannot be said that the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India on consultation form part of the advice. The advice is given by the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The two Chief Justices are consulted on \"full and identical facts\" and their views are obtained and it is after considering ihose views that the Council of Ministers arrives at its decision and tenders its advice to the President. The views expressed by the two Chief Justices precede the formation of the advice and merely because they are referred to in the advice which is ultimately tendered by the Council of Ministers, thy do not necessarily become part of the advice.\n\nWhat is protected against disclosure under clause (2) of Article 74 is only the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The reasons which have weighed with the council of Ministers in giving the advice would certainly form part of the advice. The material on which the ad, ice tendered by the Council of Ministers is based cannot be said to be part of the advice and the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India which constituted th~ material forming the basis of the decision of the Central Government must accordingly be held to be outside the exclusionary rule enacted in clause (1) of Article 74. [594 E-H. 595 A-Fl\n\nState of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371, overruled.\n\nState of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1978] 1SCR1, referred to.\n\n3:5. Where a society has chosen to accept democracy as its credal faith, it is elementary that the citizons ought to know what their government is doing.\n\nThe citizens have a right to decide by whom and by what rules they shall be governed and they are entitled to call on those who govern on their behalf to account for their conduct.\n\nNo democratic government can survive without H accountability and the basic postulate of ac\"ountability is that the people should have information about the functioning of the government. [598 D-F]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.tl.\n\n3:6. The demand for openness in the government is based principally on two reasons. It is now widely accepted that democracy does not consist merely in people exercising their franchise once in five years to choose their rulers and, once the vole is cast, th:n retiring in p1ssivity and not taking any interest in the government. Today it is common ground that democracy has a more positive content and its orchestration has to be continuous and pervasive. This means inter alia that people should not only cast intelligent and rational votes but should also exercise sound judgment on the conduct of the government and the merits of public policies, so that democracy does not remain merely a sporadic exercise in voting but becomes a continuous process of government-an attitude and habit of mind. But this important role people can fulfil in a democracy only if it is an open government where there is full access to information in regard to the functioning of the government. Now, if secrecy were to be observed in the functioning of government and the processes of government were to be kept hidden from public scrutiny, it would tend to promote and encourage oppression, corruption and misuse or abuse of authority, for it would all be shrouded in the veil of secrecy without any public accountability. But i( there is an open government with means of information available to the public, there would be greater exposure of the functioning of government and it would help to assure the people a better and more efficient administration. There can be little doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of the surest mean nf achieving a clean and healthy administration. [599 A-C, E-G]\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975] 3 SCR 333 at page 360, referred to.\n\n3:7. The concept of an open government is the direct emanation from the right to know which se.ems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands.\n\nThe approach of the court must be to attenuate the area of secrecy as much as possible consistently with 1he requirement of public interest, bearing in mind all. the time that disclosure also serves an important aspect of public interest. .\n\n[602 B-D]\n\n3:8. The court would allow the objection to disclosure if it finds that the document relates to affairs of State and its disclosure would be injurious to public interest, but on the other hand, if it reaches the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure or that the public interest in the administration of justice in the particular case before it overrides all other aspects of public interest, it will overrule the objection and order disclosure of the document. The basic question to which the court would therefore have to address itself for the purpose of deciding the validity of the objection would be whether the document relates to affairs of State or in other words, it is of such a character that its disclosure would be agains 1 the interest of the State or the public service and if so, whether the public interest in it• non-disclosure is so strong that it must prevail over the public interest in the administration of justice and un that account, it should not be allowed to be disclosed. The final decision in regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under section 123 would always be with the court by reason o{ section 162. [607 A-DJ\n\n$.1>. GUt>t A v. UNION 383\n\n3:9.\n\nNow an objection against the disclosure of a document on the ground that it relates to affairs of State may be made before the court either because it would be against the interest of the State or the public service to disclose its contents or because it belongs to a class of document which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, whether or not it would be harmful to disclose the contents of the particular document. Where immunity from disclosure is claimed on the ground that disclosure of the contents of the document would be injurious to the interest of the State or the public service it would not be difficult to decide the claim because it would almost invariably be supported by an affidavit made either by the Minister or by the head of the department and if the Minister or the head of the department asserts that to disclose the contents of the document \"would or might do to the nation or the public service a grave injury, the court will be slow to question his opinion or to allow any interest, even that of justice to prevail over it\" unless there can be shown to exist some factor suggesting either lack of good faith or an error of judgment or an error of law on the part of the minister or the head of the department. But, even in such cases, it is now well-settled that that the court is not bound by the statement made by the minister or the bead of the department in the affidavit and it retains the power to balance the injury to the State or the public service against the risk of injustice, before reaching its decision. But the claim in the present case to withhold disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to continuance of S.N. Kumar is not based on the ground that the contents of these particular documents are such that their disclosure would harm the national interest or the interest of public service. [607 E-H, 609 A-BJ\n\n3 : 10. The court has to balance the detriment to the pubiic interest on the administrative or executive side which would result from the disclosure of the document against the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side which would result from non-disclosure of the document though relevant to the proceeding. The court has to decide which aspect of the public interest predominates or in other words, whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced, outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its function should not be denied access to relevant evidence.\n\nThe court has thus to perform a balancing e•ercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public interest against the other, decide where the balance lies. If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure the court would uphold the objec1ion and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the 01her hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interest lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interesi has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class. [612 G-H: 613 A-CJ\n\n3 : 11.\n\nThere is a heavy burden of proof on any authority which makes the. claim for clas immunity. The claim for class immunity is an extraordinary claim because 1t is based not upon the contents of the document in question but\n\n384 stJi>RilMil cobRT kEPORTs [ 1982] 2 s.c.k.\n\nupon its membership of a class whatever be its contents and therefore the court should be very slow in upholding such a broad claim which is contradictory, if not destructive, of the concept of open government. Secondly, classes of documents which the immunity may be accorded are not closed and in the life of a fast changing society rapidly growing and developing under the impact of vast scientific and technological advances new class or classes of documents may come into existence to which the immunity may have to b~ granted in public interest, but that should only be as a highly exceptional measure. It is only under the severest compulsion of the requirement of public interest that the court may extend the immunity to any other class or classes of document and in the context of our commitment to an open government with the concommitment right of the citizen to know what is happening in the government, the court should be reluctant to expand the classes of documents to which immunity may be granted.\n\nThe court must on the contrary move in the direction of attenuating the protected class or classes of documents, because by and large secrecy is the badge of an authoritarian government. (625 C-G]\n\n3 : 12. In cases of this kind where non-appoinment of a additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge is challenged, the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them, could not at all be said to be injurious to public interest. (628 A-BJ\n\nScience Research Council v. Nasse, 1979 All England Reports p. 673, . ;< quoted with approval.\n\n3 : 13. In a proceeding where the transfer of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court is challenged, no immunity can be claimed in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and the notings made by them,. since, on the balance, the non-disclosure of these documents would cause greater injury to public interest than what may be caused by their disclosure. Further the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes made by them in regard to non-appointment of an additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge cannot be considered to be detrimental to public interest. (631 C-E]\n\n3.14. In these circumstances, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public interest by their disclo sure and hence these documents were liable to be disclosed. (635 G-H; 636 A]\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 385\n\n4: l. There is no constitutional orlegal infirmity or any abuse or misuse of authority on the part of the Law Minister in issuing the circular letter. The circular letter dated March 18, 1981 does not violate the provisions of clause (I} of Article 217 or clause (I) Article 222 nor does it offend against any other constitu tional or legal provision and the challenge against the validity of the circular letter must, therefore, fail. However, since an additional Judge has a right to be consi dered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term, and in case of a vacancy in a permanent post, for appointment as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, he cannot be discontinued as an additional Judge on the ground that he has not given his consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. Such a ground for discontinuing an additional Judge would be wholly irrelevant ground and if on the expiration of his original term, an additional Judge is discountinued on any such gi'ound, the decision of the President discontinuing him would be unconstitut i6nal and void and the Union of India would be liable to be directed to reconsider his case on the basis of relevant considerations after excluding the irrelevant ground. [685 H; 686 A-D]\n\n4:2. The circular letter addressed by the Law Minister is not in the nature of a public order made by a public authority. The Law Minister is undoubtedly a member of the Cabinet and in issuing the circu Jar letter he was acting on behalf of the Central Government but the circular letter does not appear to have been issued by the Law Minister in the exercise of any constitutional or legal power.\n\nThe circular letter has no constitutional or legal sa11ction behind it and non compliance with the request contained in it would not proprio vigore entail any adverse consequence to the additional Judge or to the person recommended for initial appointment, for not complying with such request. It may be that because an additional Judge does not give his consent to be appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court, he may not be appointed as a permanent Judge in his own High Court and may be discontinued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term, though this is not within the intendment of the circular letter and is clearly impermissible, but in that event it would be his non-appointment as a permanent Judge or discontinuance as an additional Judge which would, if at all, given him a cause of action and not the circular letter asking for such consent. The circular letter is a document without any legal force and does not by itself of its own force, create or alter any legal relationship or arrangement or produce any legal consequence or effect. It is no more than a letter addressed to the Chief Minister of each State asking him to obtain the consent of the additional Judges as also of those recommended or to be recommended for inititial appointment for being appointed as Judges in a High Court outside the State The circular letter must be construed from a commonsense point of view having regard to the clarification, if any given by the author of circular letter, namely, the Law Minister. [568 G-H; 569 A-D]\n\nCommississioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanfi, [1952] SCR 135, held inapplicable.\n\n4 : 3.\n\nThe policy of having one third of the Judges in every High Court from outside the State, which the Law Minister is trying to implement by)ssuiog\n\n386 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe circular letter, is nither ill-conceived nor mo/a fide nor subversive of the inde- ..... pendence of rhe judiciary. So long as the policy is evolved by the Government after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and it is not otherwise unconstitutional, the Court cannot pronounce upon the wisdom of the policy or strike it down because it does not appeal to the court. Here the policy of having one third of the number of Judges in each High Court from outside the State has been adopted after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and, in fact, it has his complete approval and the Law Minister did not therefore act unconstitutionally or illegally in relying upon the policy in the first paragraph of the circular letter. 'f Further this is supported by the unanimity of view of all high powered bodies and Law Associations over several years. [573 B-E] l,'\n\n4 : 4. It is clear from the languge of clause (1) of Article 217 that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court can be made by the President c•nly after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India and consultation within the meaning of this Article means full and effective consultations with each of the three constitutional functionaries after placing all relevant material before them.\n\nNow, if a person who is an additional kdge in the High Court in one State or who is practising as a lawyer in that State is to be appointed as a Judge in another State, then obviously his willingness to be so appointed would be a highly relevant factor and that would have to be ascertained and placed before the three constitutional functionaries who are required to be consulted before an appointment can be made. It is obvious that the President cannot appoint JI person to be a Judge of a High Court without first ascertaining his willingness to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court and someone has to make an inquiry in that behalf in order to ascertain his willingness. It is only if the person concerned is willing to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court that the question would arise of processing his name and consulting the three constimtional functionaries in regard to the appointment of such person This inquiry has to be made before the process of consultation can start and the Law Minister therefore by addressing the circular letter requested the Chief Minister of each State to make this inquiry. It is true that the Law Minister did not state in so many terms in the circular letter that the Chief Minister may make this inquiry through the Chief Justice of the High Court but that was clearly implicit in the circular letter, because a copy of the circular Jetter was also sent to the Chief Justice of each High Court with the endorsement \"for necessary action\" and moreover it must he presumed that the necessary inquiry would be made by the Chief Minister only through the Chief Justice of the High Court. Therefore, the obtaining of the consent of the person proposed for appointment in advance for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court can never have the effect of reducing consultation with the Chief Justice of India to a mockery or making it ineffective so as to be violative of clause (I) of Article 217. [575 A-E; 578 G-H]\n\n4: 5. Further, from the mere use of the word 'obtain' in the circular letter, it cannot be inferred that there was an implied threat tot he additional Judges that if\n\nthey do not give their consent for being appo; nted as Judges in another High Court, ..\\. .. they would be visited with adverse consequences. The word 'obtain' is a transi- H tive verb and it is obvious that when the Chief Minister of each State \\\\as asked by the Law Minister by issuing the circular letter to o\\Jtain tlw c; opsent of ttw\n\n• >\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 387\n\nadditional Judges for being appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court what was meant was that the Chief Minister should obtain the consent of each additional Judge if be was willing to give such consent. The use of the wold 'obtain'\n\nca11not possibly be construed to mean that the person from whom the consent is to be obtained must be coerced into giving it. To read the word 'obtain' in the circular letter as meaning that the Chief Minister was expected to coerce the additional Judges into giving their consent or as conveying an implied threat to the additional Judges that if they do not give their consent they might be dropped as additional Judges on the expiration of their term, would, therefore, be nothing short of torturing out of the language used in the circular letter, a meaning which the language does not bear and which could not possibly have been intended by the Law Minister. [579 D-H]\n\n4 : 6. The circular letter deals with two categories of persons; one is the category of persons who are recommended may in future be recommended for initial appointment as Judges and the other is the category of additional Judges who are appointed for a period of two years or less. So far as the first category of persons is concerned, when a person who is recommended or proposed to be recommended for initial appointment as a Judge is a; ked whether he is willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court, no transfer is involved in such process, as such person is not a sitting Judge in any High Court and is appointed for the first time in another High Court. The transfer contemplated\n\nin Article 222 clause (1) is not a mere act of physical locomotion or transfer of residence from one place to another, but it is an act by which a Judge in one High Court is transferred as a Judge of another High Court. Equally there is no transfer involved where an additional Judge is, on the expiration of his term, appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. It is no doubt true that by reason of his appointment as an additional Judge or permanent Judge in another High Court, he has physically to go to that High Court, but it is not while being a Judge of one High Court that he goes over as a Judge of the other High Court. His appointment as an additional Judge of one High Court comes to an end and be is appointed afresh as an additional or permanent Judge in another High Court. It is by virtue of a fresh appointment that he becomes a Judge, whether additional or permanent, of another High Court and he is not transferred from one High Court to another within the meaning of clause (I) of Article 222.\n\n[582 G-H; 583 A-DJ\n\n4 : 7. Further, the circular did not seek to transfer Judges from one High Court to another. The expression \"transfer\" /\"transferred\" happened to be used by the Law Minister in an ex-tempore speech made on the floor of the House and not in a document or letter prepared after much care and dellberation. No undue reliance can therefore be placed on the use of the expression 'transfer' or 'transferred' in the speech of the Law Minister. What was contemplated by the circular letter was not transfer of additional Judge from one High Court to another and it did not therefore, have to satisfy the requirements of clause (l) of Article 222. [584 B, F-G, H; 585 A] .\n\n4 : 8. But quite apart from this consideration, even if the view be taken that what the circular Jetter sought to achieve was transfer of additional Judge from one High Court to another by obtaining consent of the additional Judges in\n\n• ' . ' • • ' ' ,!\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 S.C.tl\n\nadvance, the Law Minister would not be circumventing the majority decision in Sankalchand Sheth's case. [585A-B, G-H]\n\n4 : 9. Even where the consent of the additional Judge has been obtained in advance, the Chief of India would have to consider whether it is in public interest to appoint the additional Judge as a permanent Judge in another High Court and the consent obtained in advance would not pre-empt the consultative exercise with the Chief Justice of India. The advance consent obtained from the additional Judge would have no meaning so far as the Chief Justice of India is concerned, because irrespective whether the additional Judge has given his consent or not, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider whether it would be in public interest to allow the additional Judge to be appointed as a permanent Judge in the other High Court. [585 E-G]\n\nOn a plain reading of Articles 217 (1) and 124 it is clear that the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court and such other Judges of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court as the Central Government may deem it necessary to consult, are merely constitutional functionaries having a consultative role and the power of appointment reside solely and exclusively in the Central Government. It is not an unfettered power in the sense that the Central Government cannot act arbitrarily without onsulting the constitutional functionaries specified in the two Articles but it can act only after consulting them and the consultation must be full and effective consultation. [541 B-D]\n\n6: I. Each of the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under Articles 124 (2) and 217 (1) must ha•e for his consideration full and identical facts bearing upon appointment or non-appointment of the person concerned as a Judge and the opinion of each of them taken on identical material must be considered by the Cenetral Government before it takes a decision whether or not to appoint the person concerned as a Judge. It is only \"consultation\" which is provided by way of fetter upon the power of appointment vested in the Central Government and \"consultation\" cannot be equated with \"concurrence\" [542 D-E]\n\n6: 2. On a proper interpretation of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217, it is open to the Central Government to take its own decision in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a Judge in a High Court or the Supreme Court after taking into account and giving due weight to the opinions expressed by the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under these two Articles. Even if the opinion given by all the constitutional functionaries consulted by it is identical, the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with stich opinion though being a unanimous opinion of all the three constitution functionaries, it would have great weight and if an appointment is made by the Central Government in defiance of such unanimous opinion, it may become vulnerable to attack on ground that it is mala fide or based on irrelevant. grounds.\n\nBut, ordinarily the Central Government would not make an appointment of a Judge in a High Court, if all the three conslitutional functionaries have expressed an opinion aiiainst it. [543 A-Cl\n\n.\"'-· .........\n\ns.1>. GUPtA v. IJNtON 389\n\n6 : 3. The contention that where there is difference of opinion amongst the constitutional funtionaries required to be consulted, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India should have primacy, since he is the head of the Indian Judiciary any paterfamilias of the judicial fraternity, is not sound. On no principle primacy can be given to the opinion of one constitutional functionary, when clause (I) of Article 217 places all the three constitutional functionaries on the same pedestal so far as the process of consultation is concerned and does not make any distinction between one constitutional functionary and another. Each of the three constitutional functionaries occupies a high constitutional office and clause (I) of Article 217 provides that the appointment of a High Court Judge shall be made after consultation with all the three constitutional functionaries without assigning superiority to the opinion of one over that of another. (543 D-F]\n\nIt is true that the Chief Justice of India is the head of the Indian Judiciary and may be figuratively described as paterfamilias of the brotherhood of Judges but the Chief Justice of a High Court is also an equally important constitutional functionary and it is not possible to say that so far as the consultative process is concerned, be is in any way less importal'lt than the Chief Justice of India. In fact under the constitutional scheme, the Chief Justice of a High Court is not subject to the administrative superintendence of the Chief Justice of India nor is he under the control of supervision of the Chief Justice of India. It is only the power of bearing appeals against the decision of the Chief Justice of a High Court that is possessed by the Chief Justice of India and there his superiority over the Chief Justice of the High Court ends. (543 F-H; 544 E] •\n\nLooking at the raison d'etre of the provision for consultation enacted in clause (I) of Article 217, it will be obvious that the opinion given by the Chief Justice of the High Court must have at least equal weight as the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, because ordinarily the Chief Justice of the High Court would be better in a position to know about the competence, character and integrity of the person recommended for appointment as a Judge in the High Court.\n\nThe opinion of the Governor of the State, which means the State Government would also be entitled to equal weight, not in regard to the technical competence of the person recommended and his knowledge and perception of law on which the Chief Justice of the High Court would be the proper person to express an opinion, but in regard to the character and integrity of such person, his antecedents and his social philosophy and value-system, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would be valuable because he would not be affected by caste, communal or other parochial considerations and standing outside the turmoil of local passions and prejudices. he would be able to look objectively at the problem of appointment. There is therefore, a valid and intelligible purpose for which the. opinion of each of the three constitutional functionaries is invited before the Central Government can take a decision whether or not to appoint a particular person as a Judge in a High Court. (544A-E]\n\nThe opinion of each of the three constitutional functionariei; is entitled to equal weight and it cannot be said that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India must have primacy over the opinions of the other two constitutional functionaries.\n\nIf pritnacy were to be given to the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, it would,\n\n396 si:Ji>:REME cotiRt ltEi>oRts (19B2i 2 s.c.il.\n\nin effect and substance amount to \"concurrence\", because giving primacy would mean that his opinion must prevail over that of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the State, which means that the Central Government must accept his opinion. But it is only \"consultation\" and not \"concurrellee\" of the Chief Justice of India that is provided in clause (1) of Article 217.\n\n[544 E-G]\n\nWhere there is a difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries in regard to appointment of a Judge in a High Court, the opinion of none of the constitutional functionaries is cmtitled to primacy but after considering the opinion of each of the constitutional functionaries and giving it due weight, the Contra] Government is entitled to come to its own decision as to which opinion it should accept in deciding whether or not to appoint the particular person as a Judge. So also where a Judge of the Supreme Court is to be appointed, the Chief Justice of India is required to be consulted, but again it is not 'concurrence\" but only \"consultation\" and the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The ultimate power of appointment rests with the Central Government and that is in accord with the constitutional practice prctvailing in all democratic countries. [545 C-E]\n\n6 : 4. Thus the appointment of a Judge belonging to the higher echelons of Judicial service is wholly in the hands of the Executive. This is, of course, not an ideal system of appoi11tment of Judges, but the reason why the power of appointment of Judges is left to the Executive is that the Executive is responsible to the Legislature and through the Legislature, it is accountable to the people who are consumers of justice. The power of appointment of Judges is not entrusted to the Chief Justice of India or to the Chief Justice of a High Court because they do not have any accountability to the people and even if any wrong or improper appointment is made, they are not liable to account t<' anyone for such appointment. [545 G-H; 546 A-BJ\n\n6 : 5. The appointment of a Judgo of a High Court or the Supreme Court does not depend merely upon the professional or functional suitability of the person concerned in terms of experience or knowledge of Jaw. Though this requirement is certainly important and vital and ignoring it might result in impairment of the efficiency of administration of justice, but also on several other considerations such as honesty, integrity and general pattern of behaviour which would ensure dispassionate and objective adjudication with an open mind, free and fearless approach to matters in issue, social acceptability of the person concerned to the high judicial office in terms of current norms and ethos of the society, commitment to democracy and th• rule of law, faith in the constitutional objectives indicating his approach towards the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy, sympathy or absence thereof with the constitutional goals and the needs of an activist judicial system.\n\nThese various considerations, apart from professional and functional suitability, have to be taken into account while appointing a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Conrt and it is on this accotnt that the power of appointment is entrusted to the Executive, subject to the fetter placed upon the power\n\n--._A:,\n\nU'. GUPtA JI. '7NION 391\n\nof appointment by the requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a High Court Judge and with the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. However, so far as appointment of Supreme Court Judge is concerned, it is not consultation with the Chief Justice of India alone that is provided in clause (2) of Article 124, but in addition \"such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts\" as the Central Government deem necessary are also required to be consulted. l546 AH]\n\n6:6. Clause (2) of Article 124, clearly provides for consultation as a mandatory exercise and the only mtter which is left to the discretion of the Central Government is the choice of the Judge of the Supreme Court and the High Courts who may be consulted. The words \"as the President may deem necessary\" qualify only the preceding words \"such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States.\" Which of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted is left to the tliscretion of the Central Government but consultation there must be with one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts. The Central Government must consult at least one Judge out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts before exercising the power of appoint ment conferred by claue (2) of Article 124.\n\nThis requirement is prescribed obviously because the Constitution makers did not think it desirable that one person alone, howsoever high and eminent he may be, should have a predominent voice in the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court. But this requirement is not complied with in making appointments on the Supreme Court Bench presumably under a misconception that it is not a mandatory but only an optional provision.\n\nThe result is that the Chief Justice of India alone is consulted in the matter of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge and largely as a result a healthy practice followed through the years, the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is ordinarily accepted by the Central Government, the consequence being that in a highly important matter like the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge, it is the decision of the Chief Justice of India which is ordinarily, for all practical purposes final. [547 C-H; 548 A]\n\nBut, there are no criteria laid down or evolved to guide the Chief Justice! in this respect nor is there any consultation with wider interests. This is, no a very satisfactory mode of appointment, because wisdom and experience demand that no power should be vested in a single individual, howsoever high and great he may be, and howsoever honest and well meaning. We are all human beings with our own likes and dislikes, our own predilictions and prejudices and our mind is not so comprehensive as to be able to take in all aspects of a question at one time and more over sometimes, the information on which we base our judgments may be incorrect or inadequate and our judgment may also sometimes be imperceptibly influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations.\n\nTherefore, it is unwise to entrust power in any significant or sensitive area to a singal individual howsoever high or important may be the office which he is occupying. There must be checks and controls in the exercise of every power, particularly when it is a power to make important\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.a\n\nand crucial appointments and it must be exercisable by plurality of hands rather than be vested in a single individual. Hence, the Constitution Makers introduced the requirement in clause (2) of Article 124 that one niore Judge out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted in making appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. But even with this provision the safeguard is not adequate because it is left to the Central Government to select any one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts for the purpose of consultation. [548 A-F]\n\nIt is, therefore, suggested that there must be a collegium to make recommendation to the President in regard to appointment of a Supreme Court or High Court Judge. The recommending authority should be more broad based and there should be consultation with wider interests. If the collegium is composed of persons who are expected to have knowledge of the persons who may be fit for appointment on the Bench and of qualities required for appointment and this last requirement is absolutely essential-it would go a long way towards securing the right kind of Judges, who would be truly independent in the sense and who would invest the judicial process with significance and meaning for the deprived and exploited sections of humanity. [548 F-H]\n\n7;1. Article 224 confers power on the President to appoint an additional Judge, if by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Coutt or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the judges of that court should be for the time being increased and in that event he can appoint an additional Judge for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify. The words \"for the time being\" clearly indicate that the increase in the number of judges which the President may make by appointing additional Judges would be temporary with a view to dealing with the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the arrears of work in the High Court. Article 224 clause (!) did not contemplate that the increase in the number of Judges should be for an indefinite duration, the object being that additional Judge should be appointed for a short period in order to dispose of the temporary increase of pending cases. The underlying idea was that there should be an adequate strength of permanent Judges in each High Court to deal with its normal institutions and so far as the temporary increae.in the work or the arrears of pending cases were concerned, additional Judges appointed for a period not exceeding two years should assist in disposing of such work. On a true interpretation of clause (l) of Article 224 it was never intended ihat additional Judges should go on being appointed and reappointed term after term.\"\n\n[554 G-11, 555 B-E, 557 D-E]\n\n7:2: It is obvious that if additional Judges were appointed according to the true intendment of clause (I) of Article 224, they would be temporary Judges appointed for a short duration to dear off the arrears and once the arrears are cleared off, which was expected by Parliament to be achieved within not more than two years they would, on the expiration their term, go back to the Bar or to the District Judicial service. Their tenure being for a short period limited by the ii'me expeeted to be taken in clearing off the arrears-such time, in any event, being hopefully not more than two years they would know that, on the expiration\n\nfl.ll. OtJl>t A v. tJNtON 393\n\nof their term, they Would have to go back. They would have no right to be appointed or even to be c1.msidered for appointment as permanent Judges, because when they accepted appomtment as additional Judges under clause (1) of Article 224, they would have known that they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears. [557 E-H]\n\n7;3. But in practice the true intendment and' purpose of clause (I) of Article 224 was never carried into effect. The strength of additional Judges was not fixed realistically and a much lesser number of additional .Tudges than required for the purpose of clearing off the arrears within a period of about two years were appointed in the different High Courts from time to time with the . result that the arrears continued to increase and the need for additional Judges continued to subsist. The entire object and purpose of the introduction of clause (!) of Article 224 was perverted and additional Judges were appointed under this Article not as temporary Judges for a short period who would goback on the expiration of their term as soon as the arrears are cleared off, but as Judges whose tenure, though limited to a period not exceeding two years at the time of each appointment as an addi1ional Judge, would be renewed from time to time until a berth was found for them in tl1e cadre of permanent Judges.\n\n(557 H, 558 A, E-F, 559 A-CJ\n\n7:4. Therefore, far from being aware that on the expiration of their term, they would have to go back because they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears-which would have been the position if clause (1) of Article 224 had been implemented according to its true intendment and purpose-the additional Judges entered. the High Court judiciary with a legitimate expectation that they would not have to go back on the expiration of their term but they would be either reappointed as additional Judges for a further term or if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge became available, they would be confirmed as permanent Judges. This expectation which was generated in the minds of additional Judges by reason of the peculiar manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 was operated, cannot now be ignored by the Government and the Government cannot be permitted to say that when the term of an additi.onal Judge expires, the Govern- !I)ent can drop him at its sweet will. By reason of the expectation raised in his mind through a practice followed for almost over a quarter of a century, an additional Judge is entitled to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term and if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge becomes available to him on the basis of seniority amongst additional Judges, he has a right to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge in his high Court. [559 D-H]\n\n7:5. On a plain reading of Article 217 clause (1) it is clear that when an additional Judge is to be appointed, the procedure set out in that Article is to be followed. Clause (1) of Article 217 provides that \"Every Judge\" of a High Court shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court. The expression \"Every Judge' mun on a plain natural COl1$tructi<;>Q jQcluqe J:lOt o!llr a !'ermanen\\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [i982] 2 s.c.tt.\n\nJudge but also an additional Judge. Therefore, no additional Judge can be appointed without complying with the requirement of clause (1) of Article 217.\n\n(560 A-B, F]\n\nI 7:6. When the term of an additional Judge expires he ceases to be a Judge and therefore, if he is to continue as Judge, he must be either reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge. In either case, clause (I) of Article 217 would operate and no reappointment as an additional Judge or appointment as a permanent Judge can be made without going through the procedure set out in Article 21 clause (I). [560 F-G]\n\n7.7. An additional Judge has a right to be considered for such reappointment or appointment as the case may be, and the Central Government cannot be heard to say that the additional Judge need not be considered. The additional Judge cannot just be dropped without consideration. The name of the additional Judge would have o go through the procedure clause (I) of Article 217 and after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Central Government would have to decide whether or not reappoint him as an additional Judge or to appoint him as permanent Judge.\n\nBut this is the only right possessed by the additipnal Judge.\n\nThe additional Judge is not entitled to contend that he must automatically and without any further consideration be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge. He has to go through the process of clause (1) of Article 217 and to concede to him the right to be appointed either as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge would be to fly in the face of Article 217 clause (1 ). The only right he has is to be considered for such appointment and this right also belongs to him not because clause (1) of Article 224 confers such right upon him, but because of the peculiar manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 has been operated aII these years.\n\n[560 G-H, 561 A, D-H]\n\n7:8. There are no limitations in the language of clause (I) of Article 217 as to what factors shall be considered and what factors shaII not be, but having regard to the object and purpose of that provision, namely, appointment of a High Court Judge, it is obvious that fitness and suitability, physical, inteilectual and moral, would be the governing considerations to be taken into account in deciding the question of appointment. Public interest requires that only such person should be appointed as a Judge who is physically, inteIIectually and morally fit and suitable to be appointed as a Judge and it would be contrary to public weal to appoint a person, who does not possess the requisite fitneios and suitability. The Central Government would, therefore, be under a constitutional obligation to consider whether the additional Judge, whose term has expired, is fit and suitable to be reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge. Of course, at the time when the question of reappointment of an additional Judge for a further term or his appointment as a permanent Judge comes-up before the Central Government for consideration, the additional Judge would have two weighty circumstances in his favour: one, that he has experience ; is a Judge f9r one term and the other, that it would not be desirable to send an\n\n• ,.. ...\n\nS. P. GUPTA v. UNION 395\n\nadditional Judge back to the Bar. But even with these weighty circumstances in his favour, he would have to satisfy the test of fitness and suitability, physical, intellectual and moral, before the Central Government can, consistently with its constitutional obligation and in public interest, decide to reappoint him as an additional Judge or appoint him as a permanent Judge. [562 C-H, 563 A-Bl\n\n7:9. It is true that the fitness and suitability of the additional Judge must have been considered by the Central Government at thetime of his original appointment, hut when the question again comes-up for consideration on the expiration of his term, the Central Government has. to consider afresh, in the light of the mate1ial then available save and except material which was already with the Central Government at the time of original appointment, as to whether he possesses the requisite fitness and suitability being appointed as a Judge.\n\nThis would not amount to treating his as if he were on probation. An additional Judge is certainly not on probation in the sense that his services cannot be terminated before the expiration of his term, unlike a probationer who can be sent out at any time during the period of probation. It would also not be open to the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Governor of !he State or the Chief Justice of india to sit in judgment over the quality of the work turned out by the additional Judge during his term, because that would be essentially an appellate function which can be discharged only by court entitled to hear appeals from the decisions of the additional Judge. But every other consideration which .bears on the physical, .intellectual and moral fitness and suitability of the additional Judge based on material other than that which was with the Central Government at the time of original appointment can and must be considered and if the Central Government finds, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India that the additional Judge is not fit and suitable for being appointed as a Judge the Central Government may decide not to appoint him an additional Judge for a further .term or as a permanent Judge. [563 B-H]\n\n7: IO. So I ong as tl1e case of the . additional Judge is considered by the Central Government for reappointment or appointment as the case may be, the decision of the Central Government cannot be questioned except on the ground that it was reached without full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Jutice of India or that ' it was based on irrelevant considerations: Where such a challenge is made, the burden is on Central Government to show that there was full and effective consultation and the decision was based on relevant considerations. In fact where an additional Judge is not appointed as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent judge despite the unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, the decision of the Central Government would prima facie be liable to attack and the burden would lie heavily on the Central G wernment to show that it had cogent reasons to disagree with the Chief Justice of the Hil!'1 <;:ourt and the Chif J11stice of India.\n\n[563H, 564 A-C]\n\n' '\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n7:1 I. An additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or in case there is a vacancy in a permanent post, then for appointment as a permanent Judge, and he must therefore, be considered by the Government for such reappointment or appointment as the case may be, and a decision must be taken in regard to him after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India and if it is found that there was no consultation with any of these three constitutional functionaries before the decision was taken by the Central Government not to appoint him or the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, it would not be consideration by the Central Government as required by clause {I) of Article 217 and he would, therefore, be entitled to challenge the decision of the Central Government which is based on what may be called 'non-consideration in law' and to require the Central Government to reqonsider his case in accordance with clause (l) of Article.217. [564 E-H]\n\n7:12. Clause (1) of Article 224 contemplates appointment of additional Judges to augment the strength of existing Judges before additional Judges can be appointed and so long as any post of existing Judges is not filled-up; there can be no question of appointing additional Judges to augment their strength. When there is a-vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge, it must first be filled up before any additional Judge can be appointed under clause (!) of Article 224.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary that the Central Government must periodically review the strength of permanent Judges in each High Court so that there is a proper and adequate strength for the purpose of dealing' with the normal institutions.\n\nSince there are large arrears pending almost in every High Court and it is not humanly possible to dispose of these arrears within a measurable distance of time even by appointment of additional Judges, it is necessary that instead of appointing additional Judges for the purpose of disposing of the arrears, it would be desfrable to increase the strength of permanent Judges because the arrears have come to stay and it is not possible to wipe them out for a long period of time. [565 C-G]\n\n7:13. It is no doubt true that clause (I) of Article 224 fixes the outer limit for the term for which an additional Judge may be appointed, but that has been done because there may be cases where the temporary increase in the business or the arrears of pending cases are so small that it may be possible to dispose them of by appointing additional Judges for. a term less then two years.\n\nThat is why Parliament provided that an additional Judge may be appointed for a term not exceeding two years. But, when arrers of pending cases are so large that it would. not be possible to dispose them of even within a period of ten years, there can be no justification for appointing additional Judges for a period of less than two years and that would be plainly outside the scope of the power conferred under clause (I) of Article 224. When the arrears of pending cases are such that they cannot possibly be disposed of within a period of Jess than two years, additional Judges must be appointed for a tarm of two years and no less. [566 G-H, 567 A-CJ\n\n7:14. The term for which an additional Judge is appointed must not be Jess than two years~ ules~ the temporary inre11c in busipes 9r the arrears of\n\n. ,. .......\n\nS. P. GUPTA v. UNION 397\n\npending cases are so small that they can reasonably be disposed of within a shorter period. [567 C-D]\n\n7:15.. An additional Judge cannot be appointed for a perio~ of three months or six months in order to rnable the Chief Justice of India or tbt;. Central Government to consider whether the additional Judge should be appointed for a further term or as a . permanent Judge. That is a matter on which the Chief Justice of India must come to his opinion well in time and the Government of India llilUSt also reach its decision sufficiently in advance so that the additional Judge would know quite sometime before his term is due to expire whether he is going to be appointed for a further term or is going to be discontinued. There is no power in the Central Government to appoint an additional Judge for a short term in order to enable the Chief Justice of India or the Central Government to make enquiries with a view to satisfying itself whether the additional Judge is fit and suitable for being appointed as an additional Judge or as a permanent Judge. In the instant case, the Chief Justice of India actd under a misconceptim:l of the true constitutional position when he recommended the appointment of 0. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad for a period of six months and the Central Government was also in error in appointing them only for a period of three months. [567 D-H]\n\n8:1. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued against the Union of India for fixing a particular strength of judges in each High Court. The fixation of the strength of judges in each High Court is a purely executive function which is entrusted by Article 216 to the President, that is, the Government oflndia and it is entirely for the Government of India to decide in the exercise of its judgment as to what shall be the strength of judges in each High Court. There are no judicially manageable standards for the purpose~ of controlling or guiding the discretion of the Union of India in that respect nor is it possible for the Supreme Court to lay down any standards or norms on the basis of which it can require the Union of India to appoint a certain number of Judges in a particular High Court. [539 D-E, 540 DJ\n\n8:2. The fixatian of the number of Judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court does not depend upon the.· application of a mathematical formula dividing the number of pending cases by the average rate of disposal per Judge per year. It is singularly complex . problem and merely increasing the number of Judges in a High' Court would not necessarily solve the problem of disposal of pending cases. There would be many policy considerations which would influence the Government of Indi; i in taking a decision as to what number of judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court, like difficulty in getting competent judges, finding court rooms. availability of other strategies to clear the arrears,' etc. It would not be posible to lay down any judicially mangeable standards with reference to which the Government of India could be directed to appoint a particular number . of judges in a High Court.\n\nWhat should be the number of Judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court must essentially remain a matter within the discretion of the Government of India and if the Government of India does not appoint sufficient number uf judges, the appeal !DUS! be to the legislature and not t<;> thQ Court. [539 E-Hi 540 A-DJ ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\n9:1. The decision not to continue S.N. Kumar as an Additional Judge was taken by the Central Government \"after full and effective consultation\" within the meaning of Article 217, with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chjef Justice oflndia and it was not based on any irrelevant consideration. As between two conflicting but perfectly bonafide opinions of the two constitutional authoritles, the Central Government had to choose between them and come to its own decision. Here it chose that of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. As such the decision does not suffer from constitutional infirmity. [668G669 B-C]\n\n9:2. It is not open to the court to hold an inquiry and determine for itself the correctnes.s of the opinion of any of the constitutional authorities required to be consulted by the President. The opinion given by any such constitutional . authority may be mis taken or erroneous but the corrective for such mistake or error is to be found in the constitutional provision itself and it cannot be provided by judicial intervention. The Court cannot take evidence for the purpose of determining whether the facts on which the opinion of a constitutional authority required to be consulted is based are true or not or whether the opinion expressed by such constitutional authority is well-founded or not. That is a function entrusted by the Constitution to the President, that is, the Central Government and it is for the Central Government to judge whether the opinion expressed by the constitutional authority such as the Chief ~Justice of the High Court is well-founded or not and whether it should be accepted or rejected. The court cannot be invited to go into the question whether the facts on which th~ opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi was based were correct or not and whether the op inio~ expressed by him was or was not justified. The court 1s concerned merely to enquire whether there was in fact full and effective consultation. [656C-F, 657 DJ\n\n9:3. Where the name of a person is proposed for appointment as a Judge of the High Court for the first time, he having no right to be considered for such appointment, is not entitled to insist that the proposal for his appointment, whether initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the State Government or the Chief Justice of India, should be subjected to the process of consultation set out in Article 217 and his name can be dropped without any such consultation. But the position is different in c.asc of an additional Judge, for though an additional Judge has no right, on the expiration of his term, to be appointed an additional Judge for a further term or to be appointed a permanent Judge, be has still a right to be considered for such appointment and the Central Government has to decide whether or not to appoint him after consultation with the three constitutional functionaries mentioned in Article 217..\n\n[636 D-G]\n\n9:4. Article 217 does not require that any particular procedure should be followed for full and effective consultation nor does it insist that the relevant facts on which the final decision of the Central Government is based should be conveyed to the other three constitutional functionaries in any particular manner or by the Central Government itself. What is necessary to ensure full and effective consultatin within the meaning of Article 217 is that the Central Qovern!llc; ont as well as eitc~ of the three copstitµtional functiooarie~ require<,\\\n\n.... ;.· -\n\ns.P. GUPTA 11. bNioN 399\n\nto.be consulted \"must have for its consideration full and identical facts which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision\"\n\nand it is immaterial as to how such \"full and identical facts\" are conveyed by one authority to the oth; r. It is sufficient compliance . with the constit~ionl requirement of Article 217 if the self-same facts on which the final dec1s10~ JS taken by the Central Government are placed before each of the three constlt~ tional functionaries required to be consulted and their opinion is taken on the basis of such facts whatever be the manner in which those facts are brought to their notice. '\n\n[637 C-F]\n\n9:5. It is undoubtedly true that it was constitutionally impossible for the Central Government to arrive at the decision not to continue S.N. Kumar as an Additional Judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India as mandatorily required by Article 217~ It was notnecessary that 1he full and identical facts which at once constituted\n\n.'both the source and foundation of the final decision\" of the Central Government should be placed before the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India by the Central Government itself or that they should be brought to their notices in any particular order or by following any particular procedure. What was necessary to constitute full and effective consultation within the meaning of Article 217 was that the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India should have for their consideration \"full and identical facts\" which ultimately, formed the basis of the decision of the Central Government.\n\n[662 G-H, 663 A]\n\n9:6. The charge of conspiracy is at all times a very serious charge and it must not be lightly made more particularly when it is directed against persons holding high offices. Here it is difficult to see any justification at all for levelling a charge of conspiracy against the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Law Minister.\n\nIt may be that on full and detailed investigation through an independent and efficient investigative machinery, the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar might have been found to be unjustified but such a course would have been neither practicable nor desirable.\n\nIn the first place, as pointed by the Chief Justice of Delhi himself, he had no investigative achinery at his disposal and if be wanted the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar to be investigated, be would have bad to ask the Central Government to carry out such investigation through the .Central Bureau of Investigation or the Intelligence Bureau or some such investigating agency and that . would have been clearly subversive of the independence of the judiciary. It would have been most improper for the Chief Justice of Delhi to ask the Central Government to investigate into complaints or doubts against a sitting Judge of his Court.\n\nMoreover, leaving the investigation of complaints and doubts against a sitting Judge in the hands of an investigative agency under the Control of a political Government would not be desirable because, apart from exposing the sitting Judge to unhealthy political pressures, it may not yield satisfactory result in all cases because such an investigation would not have the benefit of the guidance of a mature and experienced person like the Chief Justice who has lived a whole lifetime. in the courts and who is closely and intimately connected with lawyers and Judges in the Court over which he presides. It would indeed be impossible for any one unfamiliar with the legal profession and the functioning of the courts\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a:\n\nto judge the genuineness or veracity of the sources from which information might be obtained in regard to a sitting Judge. It must, therefore, necessarily be left to the Chief Justice of the High Court to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment on the basis of such information as he may gather by making his own inquiries. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have sufficient opportunities for judging the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment, because the additional Judge would be in close contact with the members of the Bar and his own colleagues and if there is anything wrong with the functioning of the Court or the Judges, he would be best in a position to know about it,\n\n[638 F ,640 C-H, 641 A-B]\n\n9:7. Where the complaint against an additional Judge is in regard to his integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court is not expected to hold a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry for the purpose of adjudicating whether the additional Judge is, in fact, lacking in honesty and integrity. Such an inquiry against a Judge whether additional or permanent would not be permissible except in a proceeding for his removal. What the Chief Justice of the High Court has to do is merely to assess the suitability of the additional Judge for farther appointment and where Jack of integrity is alleged against him, the assessment can only by on the basis of his reputation for integrity, The integrity of the person under consideration would undoubtedly be a relevant factor to be taken into account, but in assessing such factor the Chief Justice of the High Court would not be expected to hold a judicial or.quasi-judicial inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the person concerned does, in fact, possess honesty and integrity or is Jacking in these qualities. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have to proceed on the basis of the reputation for honesty and integrity enjoyed by the person under consideration and if, on the basis of the information gathered by him, the Chief Justice of the High Court comes to the view that such person does not enjoy good reputation for integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court would be justified in not recommending such person for appointment. Where a question of honesty and integrity of a Judge is concerned, it is almost impossible to come to a conclusive determination wheiher he is lacking in integrity or not, because experience shows that most persons are not willing to speak if they knew that they may he quoted and that in any event they are not prepared to testify in any judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry.\n\nIt is therefore not enough in order to be able to recommend a person for appointment as a Judge to say that there is no proof of lack of integrity against him, because, if such were the test to be applied, there would be grave danger of persons lacking in integrity being appointed as Judges. The test which must be applied for the purpose of assessing the suitability of a person for appointment as a Judge must be whether the Chief Justice of ths High Court or for the matter of that, any other constitutional authority concerned in the appointment, is satisfied about the integrity of the person under consideration. If the person under consideration does not enjoy reputation for honesty and integrity, it would not be possible for the Chief Justice of the High court to say that he is satisfied about the integrity of such person and in such an event, the Chief iustice of the High Court would be justified is not recommending such person for appointment : in fact, it would be his duty not to recommend\n\n911ch person. The public injury Mlich may be caused by appointment of a Judge Jacking in i11.tegrity would be infinitely more than th~ public injury which may\n\n.....\n\nS.P. GUPtA v. uNlON 401\n\nresuit from non-appointment of a competent Judge possessing integrity. On the A bona fide view taken by him, the Chief Justice of Delhi did what it was his plainest 1 duty in the circumstances to do. When an additional Judge, whose term has expired. and who would, therefore, have to return to the Bar or the subordinate judicial service, is not appointed a permanent Judge or an z.dditional Judge for a further term, he he Is not removed by the Central Government. If he is not appointed a permanent Judge or an additional Judge for a further term, he goes out, but that happens because the term for which he was originally B appointed has come to an end and not because he is renioved. There, is, therefore, no question of giving him an opportunity .o be beard before the decision is taken.not to appoint him as a permanent Judge or an additional Judge. [643 H, 644 A-H, 645 A-D, 669 F-H, 670 A]\n\n9:8. What the Chief Justice of the High Court is required to c!o is to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge for further appointment and he has therefore Lo consider various matters relevant to the question of appointment and give his opinion to the Presi<!ent. He does not hold a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry into the honour and integrity of the additional Judge nor does he arrive at any conclusive finding or determination. l:ll: merely gives his personal opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge in discharge of the constitutional duty laid upon him and there is therefore no question of any opportunity being afforded to the additiOnal Judge before the Chief Justice of the High Court arrives at his opinion. When the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his opinion, it is a confidential communication which would not ordinarily be known to the public and in the case of S. N. Kumar too, but for the disclosure of documents vehemently pressed and passionately sought not only by the counsel for the petitioners but also by the counsel for s. N. Kumar, the world would never have known that the Chief Justice of Delhi has given an adverse opinion against the continuance of S. N. Kumar on the ground that his integrity was doubtful. It is obvious that in cases of this kind where the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his personal opinion or assessment on consultation by the President there is neither adjudication nor condemnation and hence there is no basis or justification for imporcing the requirement of fair play or natural justice. [645 F-H, 646 A-Bl\n\n(Agreeing with D.A. Desai, J.)\n\n10;!. The transfer of Mr. K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court to the Madras High Court as Chief Justice was made by way of punishment an<! not in public interest and hence it is unconstitutional and void. (685 G-H] G\n\n10:2. The power of transfer under Article 222 clause (I) cannot be exercised against a Judge without his consent. It is a highly dangerous power involving great hardship and injury to the Judge transferred including a stigma on his reputation in cases where the transfer is not effected pursuant to any policy but the Judge is packed out for transfer on a selective basis and it makes no difference whether the transfer is made by the Government on its own initiative or it is made 8\n\n4()2\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19s2j 2 s.c.a.\n\n.; .\n\nat the instance of the Chief Justice of India as in the case of Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh. The power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another can be exercised only in public interest and there must be full and effective consultation between the President, that is, the Central Government and the Chief Jilstice of India before the decision to transfer a Judge is taken. [673 B-D, E]\n\nUnion of India v. Sankalchand Seth, [1978] 1 SCR 423 followed.\n\n10:3. When a Judge is transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment, it can never be in public interest for no public interest would counte nance punishment of a Judge except by way of impeachment under proviso (b) to clause (1) of Article 217 read with clause (4) of Article 124. There is a clear antithesis between a transfer by way of punishment and a transfer in public interest and therefore, a transfer by way of punishment must be held to be outside the scope and ambit of Article 222 clause (!). Undoubtedly, when a Judge is transferred by the Government because he does not toe, the line of the Executive or gives decisions against the Executive or has for some reason. or the other fallen from its grace, it would be a transfer by way of punishment. That would be the pli!lnest case of penal transfer. But these are not the only circumstance in which a Judge may be transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment. The element of punishment is not confined merely to the wrath of the Government on account of a Judge being inconveniently independent. There may be cases where a Judge may be transferred because he is not behaving properly or is conducting himself in a manner not befitting the position of a High Court Judge and such a transfer grounded on the conduct or behaviour of the Judge would clearly be punishment, even if it be on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India. It is also possible that the Chief Justice of India may find in a given case that a' Judge of a High Court is promoting the interest of his son or brother in practice or by passive inaction allowing his son or broth1r to exploit his relationship with the Judge for the purpose of advancing his pro fessional interest and in such a case, the Chief Justice of India niay recommend that the Judge should be transferred to another High Court and the Government may accept such recommendation. The transfer in such a case would be clearly by way of punishment. There may also be cases where the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India for transfer of a Judge may proceed from his disagreement with the social philosophy of the Judge or his unhappiness with the manner in which he is deciding cases and the Government may unquestioningly accept such recommendation. This would also he nothing shori of punishment.\n\nWhenever transfer of a Judge is effected for a reason bearing upon the conduct or behaviour of the Judge, it would be by way of punishment and therefore, not permissible under clause (I) of Article 222. Transfer per se is not a punish-\n\n- ment .. It is the reason for which the transfer is made, which makes it penal and if that reason is related to the cond11ct of behaviour of the Judge, the transfer would clearly'be a penal transfer not in public interest and hence outside the scope and ambit of Article 222 clause(!). (67JF-H, 674 A-H]\n\n10;4. When a transfer of a Judge of a High Court is challenged in a court of Law, the burden must lie upon the Government to sustain the validity of the\n\n\n--\n\nS.I'. OUl'TA V, UNION 403\n\ntransfer. The power of transfer is a drastic power to be exercised only in rare case• as it has the effect of destroying the right of the Judge who is transferred,. to continue as a Judge in the High Court to which be-was appointed until be reaches the age of 62 years and removiO.g him to another High Court where Possibly lie would not have agreed to goif be had been asked at the time of his original appointment. When an order of transfer is made, the Judge ha~ a diffi cult choice, either to go to the High Court where he is transferred or to resign and having burrit his boats and given up his proression Jong back, he would be in great difficulty if he chose to resign and therefore, from a practical point of view, he would have no option but to go to thC -other High Court, bo\"'ever inconvenient it may be to him. Moreover, it would be almost impossible' for the Judge to successfully chaUenge the order of transfer if the burden of sbowi1:J.g its invalidity were cast upon him. Even as it is, the Judge would have to wage a tone\n\n,. and unequal battle against the Government when he chatlenges the order of transfer and if the onus of establishing _facts invalidating the order of transfer were thrown-upon him. the battle wouJd be rendered still more ullequal andthe scales would be weighed heavily against him. TbC result . would be that even an invalid order of transfer would pass 'muster on account of the inability of the Judge to discharge the burden of showing the invalidity of the ordef of transfeiand the virtual immunity thUs granted to the order of transfer would seriously impair the independence of the judiciary. (675 B-G]\n\n- I\n\nFurthermore, having regard to the high st:itusand dignity Of 3. Judge of a High Court, it is but fair that when the Governinent is displacing the right of the Judge to continue in his High Court uptO the age . of 62 years, be should be tOtd what are the reasons which have weighed with the Government in transferring him. He must be assured that atl the cOnstitutional requirements have been com-· plied with. Besides, the facts showing that there was fuII and effective consultation between the Governcllent and the Chief Justice of India and the reasons for making thC transfer would be within the special knowledge of the Government and the onus must therefore be upon the Government to prove them •. Thus the burden of sustainin_g the val_idity of the order of transfer must rest on the Government . and this burden is a heavy burden, which must be satisfactorily discharged by the Government. [675 G-H, 676 A-BJ\n\n.10:5. There was no full ·-and effective consultatioO beteen the Ceniral Government and the Chief Justice of India. The burden of showing that there was full and effective consultation rests heavil, r on the Government and it is not possible to say that this burden has been discharged by the Government.\n\nThere is nothing in the correspondence exch.anged between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister which shows that any facts bearing up on the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh were_communicated by tbC Chief Justice of India, who initiated the transfer, to the Lilw Minister .. The counter-affidavits and the. affidavit do not indicate the constitutional functionary on behalf of the PtesiJent, with whom every relevant aspect of the question was discussed. unleSs the name of the person i:J mentioned, the correctness of the statement cannot be verified or challenged by the other side. It is not enough merely to repeat the constitutional formula_ that every aspect of the queston was discussed w~h the ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.tt.\n\nPresident. It is an affidavit which is made by the Chief Justice itnd the affidavit must contain not mereJy the constitutional incantation but facts giving particulars stating with whom the Chief Justice of India bad discussion. The affidavit a1so does not give the date or dates whe~ the discussion took place between the Chier , Justice of India and the President. The statement made in the affidavit is delight .. fulty vague. Without_furnishing the dates of discussion by. the Chief Justice of India with the Prime Minister and indicate the nature of the aspects discussed etc. in the affidavit of Shri K.B.N. Singh cannot meet vague allegations.\n\n[677 E, 681 B-H, 682 A-C]\n\nIt is for the Court to decide whether all relevant facts were diiicussed between the Chief Justice of India and the Central Government so as to constitute full and effective consultation and this enquiry cannot be pre-empted by the Chief Justice of India by asserting in his affidavit that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed by him with the Centr\"a.J Government. It is not for the Chief Justice -of India to decide, but it is for the Court to be satisfied, that - all relevant aspects of the question were discussed by him with the Central Government. It is possible that the Ghief Justice of India might have considered some facts as irrelevant and not discussed thCm '.with the Central Government,' but the Curt may find that such facts were relevant and should have fo'rmed the subject matter of discussion and it is equally possible that some facts might have been discUssCd which the Chief Justice of India considered relevant but the Court\n\n~ might find them to be irrelevant. Absence of these info1mation will lead to the\n\nconclusion that thCre was no fuU and effective consultation betWeen the Chief Justice of India and the cCntral Government: Further the omission. to com- municatc the difficulty which would be experienced by the Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh as a result of transfer. is .sufficient to vitiate the process of consultation.\n\n[682 D-G, 683 D-E]\n\n10:6. To avCr that the transfer Was in pursuance of a \"Government Policy,. is it.correct as it is not borne out by correspondence. Equally the ground of transferi namely, a necessity ofa senior and experienced Chief Justice is disproved in the case of the proposed tr\"ansfer to._ Rajasthan. These grounds were not ·, corr..municate.d to the Law Minister and even assuming that they_were commui . CatCd and it weighed with the Central Government, in making the order of transfer 1 it would have the effect of converting the transfer into a peilal transfer.\n\n• . .\n\n[683;684 C-D, G-H, 685 A]\n\n/ Apart from that, this is not the reason_ which weighied with' the Central' Government in making thC order of transfer against Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh.\n\nThe Central GovernmeD.t stated in_ a note banded over to be Court that the reason\n\n.... ___ why the Central Goverriment madethe oder of trao!)fer was \"(1). it was felt tht\n\n- Ilot agreeing to these transfers may be constued as though _the Government 1s\n\ndeparting from ttie view of having Chief Justices fro_m _outside; (2) the policy aspect could still be pressed into se'rvice later. 0 This eason which. prevailed. with the Central Government was totally different from the reason which induced the Chief JusticC of India to makC his proposal for transfer and there is nothing to show tha( this reaso~ which weighed with the Government of India was com ,\n\n-..\n\n,_,.<.\n\nS.i>. Glii>TA v. UNION\n\n40S\n\nmunicated to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion, There was therefore clearly no full and effective consultation even in regard to this aspect. Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Government did not apply its wind to the question ' whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedient to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, but accepted the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, because it thought that if the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India was accepted and the transfers of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chfef Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh were made, it would be easier for the .Central Government thereafter to press for acceptance of the government policy by the Chief Justice of India. There was clearly abdication of its constitutiona I function by the Central Government. .\n\n[685 B-G]\n\n10:7. The process of consultation whether under Article 217 or under Article 222, must be evidenced in writing so that if at any point of time a disput arises as to whether consultation had in fact taken place or what was the nature and content of such consultation, there must be documentary evidence to resolve such dispute and an ugly situation should not arise where the world of one constitutional authority should be pitted against the word of another and the Court should be called upon to decide which of Kthem is telling the truth. Oral talk or discussion may certainly take place between the Central Government and any other constitutional authority required to be consulted but it roust be record ed immediately either in a note or in correspondence. Besides eliminating future dispute or controversy, the practice of having written communication or record of oral discussion ensures greater care and deliberation in ei.press1on of views and considerably reduces the possibility of improper or unjustified recommendations or unholy confabulations or conspiracies which might be hidden under the veil of secrecy if there were no written record. Moreover, such a practice would tend to promote evenness in society which is the hall-mark of a democratic polity, It would indeed be highly regrettable if, instead of following this healthy practice of having a written record of consultation, the Central Government or the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice 0f India were to carry on the consultation process either on the telephone or by personal discussion without recording it. [592 C-H, 593 A-C]\n\n11 :I. The interpretation of every statutory prov1s1on must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjulltments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with' the requirements of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. The language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in a country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values and aggressive developmental strategies, so must the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is ilot an antique to be taken down, dusted, admired and put bak on the shelf, but rather it is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reasons of clash\n\n406 SUPRSMI! COURT IU31'01tt$ (19Q2] 2 s.c.R..\n\nbetween conflicting interests. It is therefore intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking in!o account the social economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivery of justice. [697 E-H, 698 A-CJ\n\n11:2. The Constitution is an organic instrument intended to endure and its provision must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional objectives and goals and not in the light of how a particular Government may be acting at a given point of time. Judicial response to the pro b!em of constitutional interpretation must not suffer from the fault of emotionalism or sentimentalism which is likely to cloud the vision when Judges are confronted with issues of momentous importance. [500 B-C]\n\nNorthem Security Co, v. United States, (1903] 193 U.S. 197, quoted with approval.\n\nPER GUPTA, J.\n\n1:1. Independence of the judiciary is a cardinal principle ofladiaa Constitution. Independence of the judiciary does not mean freedom of the judges to act arbitrarily; it means that the judges must have freedom in discharging their judicial functions. la order to maintain the independence of the judiciary it has to be protected against interference direct or indirect; it also follows that the coastitutio.aal provisions should not be construed in a manner that would tend to undermine this independence. (686 D-F]\n\n1 :2. The independence of the judiciary depends to a great extent on the security of term or tenure of the judges. If the judge's tenure is uncertain or precarious, it will be difficult for him to perform the duties of his office without fear or favour. The tenure of an Additional Judge is not uncertain or precarious but it is a conditional on the existence of arrears in. the High Court which is an objective condition. [689 F-G]\n\n2:1. The decision not to extend Shri Kumar's term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was invalid and unconstitutional in as much as it was not based on a full and effective consultation, as contemplated in Article 217(1) of the Constitution. [687; 702F]\n\n2:2. When the question before the concerned authorities was whether the term of an Additional Judge should be extended and the volume of work pending in the High Court admittedly require the services of another judge, it was not permissible to refuse extension on the basis of unconfirmed reports. The scheme of the constitutional provisions does not warrant such course of action.\n\n[687 F-G]\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA V, UNION 407\n\n3. It is true that on the expiry of the initial term of an Additional Judge, Article 217(1) is attracted for further appointment. The fitness of the judge having already been considered at the time of bis initial appointment the scope of consultation with the appointment of an Additional Judge for another tenr1 is contemplated is limited to an inquiry as to the volume of work pending in the High Court and the time likely to be required to dispose of the . arrears. If his initial appointment was not made on probation, the judge's capacity and integrity cannot come within the scope of the consultation necessary under Article 217(1)\n\nfor giving him another term on the expiry of his previous term of office.\n\n[690A-C]\n\nA proper reading of Article 224(1) makes it clear that the tenure of an Additional Judge is not uncertain or precarious but is conditional on the existence of arrears in the High Court which is an objective condition of fact. The claim of absolute power for the Government cannot be accepted on the ground that Article 224 only fixes an outer limit of time and the President is, therefore free to appoint additional judges for varying periods of time not exceeding two years without reference to the volume of work pending in the High Court. Such a claim is untenable on the language of Articie 224 and militates against the conception of independence of judiciary. [688 B, 689 D-F]\n\n5:1. If complaints against the judge -are serious and are from a responsible source, they cannot certainly be ignored. But, the allegations cannot be presu!ned or assumed to be true and have to be proved. [690 C-D)\n\nSince the language of Article 224(1) does not permit shqrt term extensions of the tenure of an Additional Judge to enable the authorities to complete investigation into the allegatio, ns against him the only reasonable course open which does not undermine the independence of judiciary is to appoint the judge for another term having a rational nexus with the volume of arrears in the High Court and then proceed with the inquiry into allegations and remove the judge if the allegations were found true, in accordance with the procedure laid down in claµses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Article 218. In the case of Shri Kumar admittedly there has been no real inves ligation in relation to the complaints against him. [690 F-HJ\n\n5:2. From long practice, an Additional Judge has a legitimate expectancy, if not a right to be appointed for another term if the pending business in the High Court require the services of an Additional Judge, or as a permanent Judge when a vacancy is available, if he is the senior most of the Additional Judges.\n\nRefusing to appoint him again when the conditions require an appointment to be made means in substance bis removal. To remove a permanent judge, the prescribed procedure must be followed and the allegations against him proved: dropping an Additional Judge at the end of his initial term of office on the ground that there are allegations against him without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations may be expedient but it is destruotive of the independence of the judiciary. This would be an easy way for tl)e e)(ecutive to get rid of an inconynient judge. [ 691 B-D J ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\n5:3. Even assnming that the scope of consultation under Article 211(1) is the same for the initial appointment of an Additional Judge and also for his appointment for another term, there has been not only no proper consultation in the case of Shri Kumar but also no full and effective consultation as contemplated by Article 217(1) of the Constituiion, inasmuch as the relevant material was withheld from the Chief Justice of India and •his vitiates the decision not to extend his term of office. [691 F, 692 D-F]\n\n5:4. Even assuming that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had informed the Chief Justice of India of the allegation of corruption against Shri Kumar, it is clear that it was not disclosed to Shd Kumar and he was not given an opportunity to explain the charge against him. Consistent with the principles of natural justice Shri Kumar who had undoubtedly suffered an injury by his term of office not being extended should have been given an opportunity to explain the charge of corruption against him. The principles of natural justice apply even to a person who has no legal right. [702 G-H, 703 A-Bl\n\nIn re H.~ (An Infant); [1967] 2 Queens Bench 617, quoted with approval.\n\n6. It is true that under Article 217(1) the President, before appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court has to consult three functionaries, the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court; for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the President bas to consult the Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State. Assuming however they are coordinate authorities in the sense that each of them must be consulted, the scope of consultation is not the same so far as the Governor is concerned. He is certainly not in a position to give any opinion on the legal acumen of the persos proposed to be appointed. His opinion k relevant on matters on which the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India are not expected to have any information. (703 D-E, G]\n\nNormally, the Chief Justice of the High Court is likely to know more about a lawyer practising in that court whose name is proposed for appointment but where the question is whether or not the tenure of an Additional Judge should be extended, if all the relevant materials are before both, the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court cannot be said to be in a better position than the Chief Justice of India to give a correct opinion. The Chief Justice of India being the pater fami/ias of the Indian judiciary, the President should accept the opinion given by the Chief Justice of India in such a case unless the opinion suffers from any obvious infirmity, _he cannot act as an umpire and choose between the two opinions. (703 H, 704 A-C]\n\nShamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 SCR 814, followed.\n\n7. The letter dated March 18, 1981 of the Law Minister is of no consequence legally and canot bind or affect anr of those for whom it was intended. . . . ~~\n\n...\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 409\n\nThe President may transfer a judge from one High Court to another only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The policy '\"may provide the President with a ground to suggest the transfer of a Judge, but the Chief Justice of India must consider in each case whether the proposed transfer in public interest because, even granting the validity of the policy, the question would remain who among the Judges should be transferred and to which High Courts.\n\n(706 C-D]\n\n~ Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr., (1978) 1 SCR 423, referred to.\n\n8. The impugned order of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of\n\nthe Patna High Court as Chief Justice of Madras High Court is valid under C Article 222(1) of the Constitution. [706 G]·\n\nOBSERVATION: An order of transfer even if made for administrative reasons and in public interest is likely to cause some injury to the Judge transferred, though that could not be valid ground for holding that the transfer is by way of punishment; it is the reason behind the order of transfer that should_ determine its nature. It would be only fair not to let the Judge who is being transferred face more difficulties than are absolutely necessary. If the Judge is wholly unfamiliar with the language of the State to which he is transferred, it is possible in some cases that it will affect his efficiency. It is desirable, therefote, to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh to some High Court, consistent with his position as a Senior Chief Justice where the language difficulty will not be so acute. [706 H, 707 A-C]\n\n9. As to foe us standi the petitioners who are practising advocates of different High Courts are competent to maintain the petitions. (707 E]\n\nPER FAZAL ALI, J.\n\n1:1. Independence of judiciary is doubtless a bassic structure of the Constitution but the said concept of independence has to be confined within the four corners of the Constitution and.cannot go beyond the Constitution. While this absolute judicial power has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary, a certain amount of executive control has already been vested in the hlgher judiciary .in respect of the subordinate judiciary. At the same time, the power of appointment of High Court Judges including the Chief Justice or Supreme Court .Tudges, as also the Chief Justice of India, vests entirely in the executive, namely, the President of India, who acts on the advice of Council of Ministers.\n\nHere again, this executive power is not absolute and has to be exercised in consultation with the CJI in the case of appointment of Supreme Court Judges, as also in consultation with the CJI and the Governor of the States concerned in case of the appointment of Chief Justice of the High Courts and in the case .of appointment of High <:; oµrt Judes, the Chief Jt1stic; e qf the concerned Hi!1b\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982} 2 s.c.R.\n\nCourt is also to be consulted.\n\nThe consultation contemplated by the Constitution must be full and effective and by covention the view of the concerned CJ a.ad CJI should always prevail unless there are exceptional circumstances which may impel the President to disagree with the advice given by these constitutional authorities. Thus, in fine, the doctrine of separation of powers so far as our Constitution is concerned, reveals an artistic blending and an adroit admixture of judicial and executive functions.\n\n[776 C-H, 777 A]\n\n1:2. In the American Conslltution by virtue of the fact that the entire judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court or other courts, unlike the provisions of our Constitution where appointments are to be made by the Appointments have to be made by the Supreme Court, the President in consultation both with judicial and excutive authorities as indicated above.\n\nTherefore, in expounding the concept of separation, the essential distinctive features which differentiate our Constitution from the American Constitution must be kept in mind. [778 H, 779 A-BJ\n\n1:3. So far as framers of our Constitution are concerned they had deliberately rejected the theory of complete insulation of the judicial system from the executive control. During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambedkar wanted to give la1ger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President. The Indian Constitution has devised a wholesome and effective mechanism for the appointment of judges which strikes a just balance between the judicial and executive powers so that while the final appointment vests in the highest authority of the executive, the power is subjecMo a mandatory consultative process which by convention is entitled to great weight by the President. Anart from these safety valves, checks and balances at every stage, where the power of the President is abused or misused or violates any uf the constitutional safeguards, it is always subject to judicial review. The power of judicial review, which has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary is the safest possible safeguard not only to ensure independence of judiciary but also to prevent it from the vagaries of the executive, Another advantage of the method adopted by our Constitution that by vesting the entire power in the President, the following important elements are introduced : (i) a popular element in the matter of administration of justice:\n\n(ii) linking with judicial system the dynamic goals of a progressive society by subjecting the principles of governance to be guided by the Directive Principles of State policy: (iii) in order to make the judiciary an effective and powerful machinery, the Constitution contains a most onerous and complicated system by which judges can be removed under Article 124(4), which in practice is almost an impossibility; (iv) in order to create and subserve democratic processes the power of appointment of the judiciary in the eKecutive has been vested so that the bead of the executive which functions through the Council of Ministers, which is a purely elected body, is made ,, ccountable to the people. If absolute powers were to be vested in the judiciary alone for all its spheres of activities (appointments may have crept in, resulting in irreparable harm to the great judicial institution. Another reason why the power of appointment in the judiciary Wa$\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 4ii\n\nnot vested absolutely was to avoid judicial interference in the day-to-day working A of the legislative or parliamentary institutions. [779D-F, 780B-H, 781A-B]\n\n1.:4. The Indian Constitution fully safeguards the independence of Judges as also of the judiciary by a three-fold method : (i) by guaranteeing complete safety of tenure to judge except removal in cases of incapacity or misbehaviour which is not only a very complex and complicated procedure but a difficult and onerous one; (ii) by giving absolute independence to the Judges to decide the cases according to their judicial conscience without being influenced by any extraneous considerati'on and without any interference from the executive. Article 50 clearly provides that the State shall 1 take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public service of the State. This important Directive Principle enshrined in Article 50 has been carried out by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which seeks to achieve complete separation of judiciary from the executive;\n\n(iii) so far as the subordinate judiciary is concerned the provisions of Articles 233-236 vest full and complete control over them in the High Court. Only at the initial stage of the appointment of munsiffs or the District Judges, the Governor 1s the appointing authority and he is to act in consultation with the High Court but in all other matters like posting, promotion, etc., as interpreted by this Court in Shamsher Singh's case [1975) 1 SCR 814, the High Court exercises absolute and unstinted control over. the subordinate judiciary. Promotion, holding of disciplinary inquiry, demotion, suspension of Sub-Judges lie with the High Court .and the Governor has nothing to do with the same. The condition of consultation which the Governor has to exercise implies that he would have to respect the recommendations of the High Court and cannot turn it down without cogent reasons and even if be does so,' it is manifest that his order is always subject to judicial review on the ground of ma la fide or exceeding his jurisdiction.\n\n[781 C-H, 782A-E]\n\nChandra Mohan v. State of UP & Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 77, referred to.\n\n~:l : Re : Disclo1ure of Document and plea of Privilege claimed by the Government-\n\nIf the documents are not disclosed, the petition would not suffer serious prejudice because the undisputed facts show that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had fot reasons given by him opined that the term of Justice Kumar ought not be extended. The CJI, however, expressed a contrary view; It was, therefore, for the President to choose any of the two views. Thus, disclosure of details would have undoubtedly caused serious damage to public interest by exposing not only the petitioner Kumar but also the CJ, Delhi High Court and the CJI to public gaze and criticism which would be highly derogatory to the high position that these high constitutional functionaries hold and would in future deter them from expressing any opinion on the merit of future appointments which might . result in an insoluble stalemate. Thus, balancing the two factors, there can be no doubt that the weight is on the side of the Union of India.\n\nArticle 74(2) of the Constitution and sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act are expressed in a negative form which is the clearest\n\nJ!l,\n\n412 SUPJl.EMB COURt REPORTS\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.I!.\n\npossible proof of the fact that the legislature has incorporated a direct prohibition against the use of documents mentioned in these provisions. Thus, a disclosure can be allowed only in exceptional circumstances where there is no injury to public interest because public interest is always paramount to private interest.\n\nIn fact, these provisions clearly contain four important attributes of the doctrine of disclosure, viz., (i) public interest; (ii) confidentiality; (ii) candour; and (iv) expediency\n\n[831F-H, 832A]\n\nState of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371; Amar Chand Butail v.Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1658; State of U.P. v, Raj Narain & Ors., [1975) sec 428, followed.\n\nDuncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1942) A.C. 624; Henry Greer Robinson v.\n\nStale of South Australia. [1931] A.C, 704; Conway v. Rimmer & Anr., [1968] AC 9l0; Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973] A.C. 388; Sankey v. Whit/am & Ors., 21 Australian L.R. 505; Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 16 Commonwealth L. R. 178; Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd.\n\nv. Customs and Excise Co111missioners, [1974] A.C. 405; United States v. Richard M. Nixon, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1309; United States of America v. Partida J. Rayno/des, 345 US I; Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-persian Oil Co. Ltd., [1916) 1 KB 822/829; Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q.B.D. 509; The Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. The Central Land Board, 1956 Sessions Cases 1/18, D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1977] 1 A.E.R. 589; Sci911ce Research Cowtcil v. Nasse, [1980] A.C. 1028; Burmah Oil Co.· Ltd. v. Bank of England, [1980] A.C. 1090; Neilson v. Laugharne, [1981] 1 All E.R. 829, referred to.\n\n2:2. The doctrine of \"candour\" or \"confidentiality\" propounded by the American Supreme Court cannot be blindly applied to the provisions of the Indian Constitution which has features of its own and substal)tially differel1t from that of the American Constitution. The doctrine of \"confidentiality\" as applied by the American Court is directly opposed to the scope of sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. [835F-G]\n\n2:3. On a parity of reasoning, the statutory provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act as also those of Article 74(2) of the Constitution have 'r fully safeguarded high Government and official secrets and disclosure is prohibited in public interest unless the court is fully satisfied that disclosure will not harm the public interest. Thus the rule or protection against self discrimination as prevalent in the United Kingdom or U.S.A. has never been accepted in India~\n\n[836H, 837A]\n\nBefore importing the doctrines or the liberal trend of modern cases acro's the seven seas, the Court cannot overlook the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, while in England and A.merica the democratic system of Government had been existing for m.ore than\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 413\n\ntwo or three centuries, Indian democracy is only three decades old, which is very small period in the life of a nation and India had yet to develop its law by a process of adaptation and accommodation, rejection or modification or by a trialand error method. The Supreme Court while construing sections 123 & 124 of the Evidence Act was fully alive to the conditions prevailing in the country and the manner in which the public services were run and the Central Government or the State Governments took important decisions. Any revolutionary decisions so as to expose high confidential matters tc) public gaze by following a policy of liberal disclosure of documents ignoring the provisions of sections 123 & 124 of the Act would not only be detrimental to our progress but may cause serious obstruction In the practical running of day to day affairs of the Government or for that matter the Government of the country itself.\n\n[g49FH, 850A-B]\n\n2:4. The cor, ect legal position is tbat whereas mere expediency may not be a ground to claim privilege so as to avoid production of a document which is produced, may defeat the defence where the documents consist of highly confidential matters in respect of constitutional functionaries like Chief Justices or High Court Judges, the Law Minister, the President of India, C.B.I., l, B. and such other Departments the question of public injury, which may be caused, becomes a decisive factor in upholding the plea of privilege. The Court is, however, not powerless to hold its own enquiry in order to test the bona fide of the plea of privilege. One form of such an enquiry may be the inspection-of the documents themselves by the court before disclosure. If after inspe9tion the court finds that the plea of privilege is well grounded and _its disclosure will lead to great public injury, it wiH be justified in upholding the plea of privilege. [839C-E]\n\n2:5. Thui, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned it has chosen to follow the principle of English Law with suitable adjustments and modifications in determining the plea of privilege under ss. 123 & 124 of the Act.\n\nThis is, as it should be, because that since the Evidence Act was enacted during the British rule and we have generally adopted the English system in procedural matters, we should not depart from the basic and essential principles of interpretation as laid down by the English law.\n\nWhile construing ss. 123 & 12~ and applying the principles of English law, we must do so against the background of the socialist State and the egalitarian society which is the goal of our constitution instead of confining the contours of privilege in a strait-jacket; in suitable cases a liberal view can be taken by this Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act.\n\nSo far no case has. ever held that ss. 123 & 124 are unconstituticmal an<I this could not be so because these provi, ions deal with matters relating to great public interest. [8500-G]\n\n2:6; Another important circumstance that has to be taken into consideration is that even after more than three decades of our independence, the Prliament .despite so many socio-economic chan$e~ a, p 9vr tile; world has not thought it\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nadvisable or necessary to amend the provisions of the Evidrnce Act so as to liberalise or widen the scope or the policy of p1ivilege contained in ss. 123 & 124 of the Act by incorporating the principles laid down in the recent English or American cases. This intrinsic circumst a nee demonstiably proves that the view taken by the Supreme Court over the years is correct and does not call for any a'nendment of the Evidence Act by the Parliament. On a parity of reasoninj!, the irresistibl~ conclusion that follows and the natural presumption that arises is that our Jegisfature did not intend to make a departure from the earlier English decisions either by incorporating or adapting tbe principles of American law on the subject.\n\nIt will not be unreasonable to presume that the ft;>unding fathers of the Constitution and the Parliament thr.reafter having been fully aware of the view taken by the American courts in recent decisions has affirmatively chosep to reject the liberal and somewhat dangerous doctrine of candour. [85JB-D l\n\n2:7. Coming to the practical side of the dangerous consequences of the disclosure, and in support of the view that afler inspecting the documents, it was not in public interest to order disclosure of the contents of the documents, the following considerations must be kept in mind : (a) appointment of High Courts Judges are highly confidential matters containing frank and free legal views expressed by the CJ of the High Court, CJI and the Central Government repre sented by the Law Minister and Council of Ministers. These authorities have expressed their views in the secret correspondence on the distinct assurance and belief that for the last two centuries such docu meats have always been treated as secret, confidential and privileged and uni ii today no disclosure of such documents has ever been allowed by any court. Thus, any disclosure of the contents of the documents would be extremely derogatory to the High constitutional position that these Constitutional functionaries enjoy and would in the Jong run prove counter-productive and destroy the sacrosanct consultative process as envisaged by the Constitution.\n\n(b) If disclosure is allowed, it will bring into disrepute the judicial institution itself and lead to a continual process of washing of dirty linen and perpetual mudslinging by allowing the so called wronged persons to make allegations and counter-allegations against the Government and CJ concerned as was sought to be done in this very case. It is true that even after the conteilts of the documents are' disclosed, the petitioners cannot be allowed to travel beyond the material disclosed by the documents but even the material could be exploited and affect the secrecy of such high constitutional officers and raise a controversy which will ultimalely lead to opening a pandora's box which is neither in the interest of the judiciary nor even of the lawyers,\n\n[825F-H, 853A-F]\n\n3.1. Re. Circular letter of the law Minister-\n\nThe circular of Union Law Minister dated March 18, 1981 does not endanger and erode the independence of the judiciary or intend to do any such thing. The circular merely seeks to provide an easy and practical, a rough and ready and an ingenious and scientific mechanism to achieve the policy of taking i:methird of the Judes in a Hih <; our! from outside the State. (8J3F-H, 814A-Bl\n\n. S. P. GUPTA v. UNION 41~\n\n3:2. The circular d_oes not cover Permanent Judges or the High Court at all but it applies Only to two.kinds. or JudgCs;· '(i) persons w!lO are .abOtit tC) be aPPoinied as Additional Judges and (ii) persons who are working as -A-ddltional Jµ'dges and whose term is Jikely to expire. 'The.re is no compulsion On theril to give their conSeD.t. On. the other hand, the circular pfovides an addi~\n\ntional facility t'o the Ji.idges Who may iike to go out or the State !n acCordai:Jc'o with the policy. (814 G-H, SIS FJ . . .. . • ' • 1 • • •\n\n3:3. The tone and the tenor of the circular docs not amount to pressurising the Judges and putting them under coercion to give their consent at the peril of their l?eing droPp(d at' the initial sta'ge.· The ple_a of coercion or undue itiftuence\n\ni~ to be pleaded by persons on wboli undlle influenCe \"r _ Coercic; in is. practised.\n\nNne Of thC Judgis-b.iVe either bY anystaterDent -or affidavitcomPlaine'd thiit the1 h, ld ive'! teir cosent under duress. [81~ F-H] ·- ·\n\n.. I\n\n. 3:4.. The circular does not in any way interfere with the supreme authority of the Chief Justice of India in thC mitter of consultation under Article 222.\n\nThere is no question of presenting a fail accompli to the Chief Justice of Icdia, because he has to consider all the shades~ aspects and problems of the matt.er in its entirety clD.d would also have to consult the Judge concerned and if he feels\n\ntat proper case for transfering the. Additional Judge to other High Court bas not be-n made out, he can refuse to give his consent in which case in all pr<>\"' bability the proposal would die a natural death. [816 F-HJ\n\nJ:5. No ques, ion of transfer is\n\n0 invoied in the mechanism sought to be devised by hC circular as the Addi tionaf Judges have only to be appointed for E the firSt timC in.other High.CoUrts and are not to be transferred. They wOUtd not be transferee Jdges and thCrefore~ not entitled to.the . facilities which are aVailabtC io trans_feree. Judgc:s compenstory allowance. visiting bis home State e•ery.year.· · ··\n\n[817 B-CJ.\n\n3:6. The circular letter issued by the Law Mi~ter is not maridatory but purely directory..' It is open to the Judges to refuse to answer the queries made from them by the Cl in pursu3.nce of the Circular and no adverse inference .\n\nca~ blf taken agaist them, though the law Will take its own course. [817 C-D] ·- .- ...\n\n- . . . . . . . - '' ..\n\n- .\n\n• . 4:1. At; t ~Aamination or the various optntons expressed by the legal lumin3'.r_iCs, StateSffieo, politicians aiid jurists from' 1958 to 1981 makes it clear thai the.idea or the Cetitral Govi:mnient of a uniform Policy of tCanSrCr of .CJs~ . sc; i'that.c'ach Staei bits~ CJ frrll olltside, is a ~.ery essential, u~ful, seti.sible 'arid\n\na wise oe \\vpich CutS at' .the rOots 'Or sO . inaDY Cvils With_ which· nOi\n\nO?tY\"o~.r CNJniry but~ eei; i fhe higher j1:1dicfary is faced.\n\nSendly,\"' sue_~ a uniform policy will be in the betier interest 9f the concerned Judge himself\n\n~Case however disiterested or independrlt e may be, p.C is bo'und t6 'be ~c~-~ Cithr f9RS'£!?~~11r-p~~c~~~~Ir1?~ qt~~-~i~4 ~~o~ whQ. ~~O?~~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.R.\n\n. ' - I .. to exp1oit him even without his .knOwtedge. Such a policy wou!d enhance the prestige or the judiciary, ensure its independence and make the. working of _the head of the judiciary in the State more efficient and generate a greater confidence in the people of the new State where he is transferred .. The language problem also does' not 3ppear to be an insurmountable obstacle because while laying down the polic}r the Government can start with tran5fers of CJs within the Zones as recoinmended by the Law Commission which will minimise the language difficully. (800 DH, 801 A]\n\nc~·\n\n4:2. In making the tranr;.fers,_ there wOuld be no senous objection if the CJ is allowed to indicate his choice regaring the State where be.- would be prepared to be transferi'Cd and the same niay be accepted as far as , practicable. So far as recruitment of One.-third jlldges at the initial st3gC is coricemed, this will no doubt. present some difficulties in the beginOirig because~ several Constitutional authorities would have to be consulted but this difficulty can be overcome either . by the appropriate method adopted by the Circular or any mechanism similar to the same. (801 A-CJ ·\n\nThe Chief Justice of each High Court should be asked to Prepare a 0 panel of suitable persons who are considered for appointment as High Court Judges both from the Bar and from the subordinate judiciary. Before including the narm: Of the persons concerned their previous consent for being . appointed outside the State may be obtained by the CJ. This can be done by determining: the strength of the panel so that it may form one-third of the total strength of permanent judges already fixed by the Presi4ent or as may be fixed from time to time .. The Civil.List of Jndges oftbe Supreme Court and High Courts gives the E sa.nctioned strength of permaiient and Additional Judges. One-third of the strength of the permanent judges according to the vacancies that fa11 should be reserved for the persons found suitable and who are. willing to serve outside the State;- It would be better if the t>ersons whose names are included in the Panel .. are appointed outside the State as permanent judges which would Provide an\n\nattractive offer and give a better impetus. to the persons aspiring for judgeship and would tempt theni to serve outside the State. [801 CF] f-,\n\nID.. fact; iawyers,.Judges9 pol; ticians; jurists, nlembers of the ~Bai and other statesmen h3ye aJ)plied heir minds and expressed .themselves strongly in favour or thepolicysoughttobeevolved_by the Government. In_view, however, of the\n\nbanged circumstances, such a Policy is not oiity proper but essential as being theprime need of the hour. One should nof be blind to the. fissiparous and parochial tendencies that have sta.fted raisillg their heads threatening disintegration of the . country. The dark clouds -of. s1tparatism, conservatism and paroChialisni' haYe-started casting their shadowson the entire\" Country and it is high time that SuCh a sacred and sacrosanct institution like the High Courts should be protected and kept aloof from such evil forces~ It is manifest that a CJ from outside will apply an jndepei:ident approach both in discharging his judicial dUties\n\nas a Judge and in recommending appoiiltment of members of the Bar .:or service io the High Court and his selection will not be inspired or tainted by any local\n\ns. 1>, GUPTA v, tJiON 417\n\nor personal consideration because he would be an outsider in the High Court of a State where he presides. Further, even the litigant would have much greater confidence in such a ci than in a local person. [805 B-E]\n\n4:3. Indeed, if we are really concerned that we should build up an independent judiciary then it is absolutely essential that new talents from outside should be imported in every High Court either to man it or to head it so that they may generate much greater confidence in the people than the local Judges.\n\nThe position of a CJ is indeed a very high constitutional position and our Con- . stitution contains sufficient safeguards to protect both his decision making , process and his tenure. It is a well-known saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. As man is not infallible, so is a Chief Justice, though a person holding a high judicial post is likely to be incorruptible because of the quality of sobriety and restraint that the judicial method contains, even so, if a CJ is from outside the State, the chances of misusing his powers are reduood to the absolute minimum. The power to formulate or evolve this. policy clearly lies within the four comers of Article 222 itself which contains a very wide power conditioned only by consultation with CJI who is the highest judicial authority in the country. It is always open to the President, which in practice means the Central Government. to lay down a policy, norms and guidelines according to which the presidential powers are to be exercised and once these norms _are followed, the powes of the PresiGent would be beyond judicial review. [ 805 H, 806 A-DJ\n\nAs against policy transfer selective transfers of CJs to High Courts other •han the one where they are working or may be appointed, contains the colour of discrimination and arbitrariness because however careful the CJI may be if he starts picking and choosing CJs from outside the High Courts the element of discrimination or arbifrariness cannot be reasonably excluded. On the other band, if a general policy applying to all and sundry (CJs) is evolved by which every state would have a CJ from outside no complaint of discrimination can ever be made. In fact, the very foundation of discrimination would disappear.\n\nThe view taken by the CJI, does not appear to be correct or acceptable and perhaps in his o'wn interest selective transfers should not be made because even if in one or two cases discrimination is made due to oversight or bona fide lapse, it will amount to a great slur on such a high position as the CJI bolds. On the other hand, if a uniform policy of appointing or promoting CJs to High Courts outside the State is followed it will promote national integration. and curb the fissiparoas and parochial tendencies and preserve and protect the purity of judicial administration. [806 E-H]\n\n5:1. Re: Policy of transfer of Judges and Chief Justices:\n\nArticle 222 confers an express power on the President to transfer a judge\n\n(which includes the CJ) fro\"m one State to another. This power is not circumsff cribed or he<lged by any conditions or stipulations excepting that the CJI has\n\n418 stJPRllMl:l coiJRt RllPOkTS (t 982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nto be consulted. Jn determining as to how this power can be exercised, the President undoubtedly possesses an implied power to lay down the norms •. the principles, the conditions and the circumsiances under which the said power is to be exercised so long as ! he does not overstep the limits or confines of the power enshrined under Article 222. Since the implied power lies •with the President it is not at all necessary that this power should be regulated by a legislation or an Act or a Rule or a bye-law or any other instruction. A declaration by the President regarding the nature and terms of the policy which virtually means declaration by the Council of Ministers is quite sufficient and absolutely Jegijl and constitutional to effectuate the policy decided upon. t809C-FJ\n\nSecondly, as the policy is a general one which applies to all and sundry wiihout any discrimination or selection, it cannot be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because the policy will operaie equally on all the Judges or the CJs without any difference or distinction. [809F-G)\n\nThirdly, it is necessary to put the policy beyond the :barge of unreasonableness or arbitrariness that the State policy must be subject to just exceptions which may be very few, so that the exceptions do not become a rule or a ruse to destroy the effect of the main policy itself. For instance, while evolvilig or formulating a general policy the. following exceptions can be made by the President-(i) that where the personal circumstances of a judge, purely on humanitarian grounds, are such as may endanger his life, e.g,, he may be a heart patient and so he may 'not be transferred to a High Court which is situated in a hill station or at a particular height or he may be suffering from such disease which may imperil him there or such other circumstances of a very compelling or pressing nature; (ii) where the judge or the CJ concerned is about to retire and is to serve only for a very short term before retirement, his transfer to some other court would not serve any useful purpose and would be very inconvenient to him-such a period may vary from one day to six months but not more; (iii) where due to some physical infirmity the CJ concerned has become immobile and cannot be moved beyond his home State, this may be a just and humanitarian ground for bringing him under the exceptions to 'the policy; and (iv) such other circumstances, either siinilat to or idehtical with the circumsiances mentioned above, which in the opinion of the CJI or the President requires due consideration on humanitarian grounds. [8090-H, '8JOA-E]\n\nIt Is manifest that even if a Policy has been finally evolved and formulated and transfers are sought to be made in pursuance of the policy, the President has to consult the CJI or where the CJJ initiates the proposal he is to consult the Judge concerned as also the President but the process of consultation would have to 1'c confined to the four cornets of the ju st exceptions and not beyond the same which form part of the Policy laid down by the President. At the same time, . the exceptions should not be so broadly construed as .to destroy the effect and fruitfulness of the Policy.\n\n[8 IOF-G]\n\n....\n\n' .\n\nS. P. GUPTA v. UNION 419\n\n5:2. The President before formulating the Policy should consult theCJI and have his views because the laying down of the Policy would be under Article 222 and consultation with the CH being a necessary concomitant of the said power, even while laying down the Policy, the consultative process is essential. [819 C-D]\n\n6:1. Although it is true that by fixing the strength of permanent and Additional Judges of each High Court, the Central Government appears to have created two parallel lines of recruitment so that the appointment of an Additional Judge was a sort of training ground for being appointed as a Permanent Judge whenever a permanent vacancy arose. [858 D-F]\n\n6:2. If properly read, Article 224 envisages certain conditions precedent before an appointment under Article 224 can be made and also prescribed the nature and the term of the judge appointed. In the first rlace, it requires that an Additional Judge can be appointed only if-(i) there is any temporary increase in the business of a High Court, for instance where by virtue of some new temporary law passed, a spate of litigation crops up but that ends with the duration of the Act or with the completion of the temporary reforms, -etc., contemplated by the statute. Such an appointment is a kind of an emergency appointment which is to last until the temporary increase or arrears are disposed of; (ii) where by reasons of heavy arrears of work it becomes necessary to appoint an Additional Judges, the appointment is made under Article 224. The Article, therefore, contemplates only a tenure appointment to meet a particular contingency and is not meant to be a permanent feature so as to form a training base for recruiting judges from the training base to the permanent cadre. [859 C-F]\n\n6:3. The nature of the appointment under Article'224 is a pure tenure appointment for a fixed period and once the period expires, there is no question of extension of that period or reappointment. In other words, once the time for which a Judge has been appointed expires, the appointment of the Judges ceases to exist. That being so, whenever a judges is sought to be appointed afresh, the constitutional functionary will have to go back to Article 217 even if a judge is to be appointed under Article 224 and the question ol> suitability would be the first criterion. As in the case of initial appointment under Article-217, so in the case of a fresh appointment after the period mentioned in Article 224 expires, there is no leg~! right to be appointed nor does non-appointment give rise to any legal or constitutional infirmity so as to be the subject of a judicial review.\n\nIt is a different.matter that if an additional judge is consici'ered for a permanent appointment afresh, the fact that he has acquired some experience would undoub- 1edly be an important factor to be taken into consideration while judging the suitability of the candidate concerned.\n\nAt the same time, the constitutional functionaries cannot shut their eyes to the facts which may have come to their knowledge either against the Additional Judge or in his favour. [859 H; 860 A-DJ\n\nThus, thcposition is that even if an Add; tional Judge is not appointed afresh and somebody else is appointed, \\lwreisj no q_uestion of ju<;\\; ciat: review\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.~.\n\nA nor is there any question of the non-appointment of an Additional Judge a fresh casting any reflection or aspersion on the reputation or character of an Additional Judge because he was appointed only for a particular period and for a particular purpose and is not on probation. [860 D-EJ\n\n7. Re: Case of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh-\n\nWhere two high constitutional functionaries are involved and have given affidavits and counter-affidavits it is obviously a most difficult and delicate situation. Jn a matter of such a serious magnitude, the Court has to make a very careful and cautious approach having regard to ihe respectability of the persons who have sworn the affidavits. [869 BJ\n\n8. Analysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandran.(JU/eshwar Prasad's case the following necessary concomitants of an effective consultation may be stated : (i) that the consultation contemplated by Article 222 must be full and effective and is an essential ingredient of the exercise of power under Article 222; (ii) that once when the President decides to transfer a judge, he must consult the CJI before transfer, the consultation before transferring a judge is, as it were; a condition precedent to the actual transfer of the judge;\n\n(iii) if the consultation with the CJI has not been dcine before trans• ferring a judge, the transfer becomes unconstitutional; (iv) the President must make the relevant data and the necessary facts available to the CJI o that he (CJI) may arrive at a proper conclusion. In case any facts are wanting the same should be supplied to the CJI and this is an imperative duty or obligation cast on the President who initiates the proposal; (v) the fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation and performance of his duty by the CJI are parts of the same process and after this process is fully complied with, the consultation becomes full and effective and not formal or unproductive, (vi) that sufficient opportunity should be given to the authorities concerned to express their views so as to tender advice as deliberation is the quintessence of consultation;\n\n(vii) afte; the date, facts or materials are placed before the consultee and the consultant, there should be a full and complete application of minds in respect of the subject to enable them to reach a satisfactory conclusion. In other words, the two minds must be able to confer and produce a mutual impact on the identical facts which would §Onstitute both the source and the foundation of the final decision; (viii) the CJI owes a corresponding duty both to the President and to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred to consider every relevant fact before tendering his opinion to the President; (ix) before giving his opinion the CJI must take into consideration all relevant facts and should i;; formally ascertain from the Judge if he bas any personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer is proposed to be made and having done so, must forward the same to the President; (x) consultation or deliberation is not complete until the parties make their points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merit of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal which is not communicated to the proposer, the direction to give effect to the counter-proposal without anythin!J more wilt\n\not alIJount to consultation. ~873 D-ll, 874 A-HJ\n\n. '\n\nS.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION 421\n\nThe .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case . squarely falls within the.ratio laid down in Chandramouleshwar' s case.\n\n[881 C, 882!0-G]\n\nIn view of the circumstances discussed above the consultative process as contemplated by Article 222 is clearly vitiated which renders the order impugned C passed by the Presid_ent constitutionally invalid. [882 H]\n\n10. While Article 222(2) does require that on transfer from one High Court to another, compensatory allowance may be paid, it does not state .that the Pre•idential Order should issue pari passu the order of transfer.\n\nSuch an Order could follow the transfer.\n\nMoreover, as the petitioner never cared to join his new assignment and before he could do so the wr_it petitions were filed and proceedings were stayed, there was no occasion for the President to pass the order directing compensatory allowance to be paid to him until the validity of the transrer; of the petitioner was finally a.diudged by Supreme Court. This is not a case whereJajudge or a~CJ having been transferred had joined his new assignment and started w<;>rking and still no order of compensatory allowance was made by the President. [883 F-H]\n\n11_. The .presumption un, der section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act, that official Acts must .deemed to have been actually done applies only where there is no challenge to the constitutional validity of .an official act.\n\nWhere an act is found to be per se unconstltutional, the question of raising a .presumption does not arise because once it :is '.held, that the consultation did not fulfil the constitutional requirements, the order impugned would become void ab initio and non-est. The order transferring Mr. K.B.N. Singh to Madras to constitutionaily invalid.\n\n[883 B-C, G]\n\nCollector of Customs, Barod~ v. Digvijayasinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (1962] 1 SCR 896 followed.\n\n12:1. A general and unanimous policy of transfer of Judges and Chief Justices of High Courts to promote national integration and suppress fissiparous tendencies, would doubtless be in public interests. Although Art. 222 does not contain the words 'Public interest' in so many words but tbe very exercise of the power, which is not a normal power but an exceptional one, it follows as a logical consequence that public interest is a necessary concomitant of the exercise of this power. It.cannot be said that on a parity of reasoning that 'consent' also should be read as a part and parcel of the exercise of the power under Article 222,\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nbecause if a Judge cannot be transferred without his consent then the power loses its signiikane and becomes an immunity to a judge from transfer by withholding his consent.\n\nThus, a power which is to be exercised by the President can be defeated or stalled by a simple act of the Judge in refusing to give bis consent to the 1ransfer. This could never have been the intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution. [722 H, 723 A-D]\n\n12:2. A perusal of Article 222 unmistakably shows that it is expressed in absolutely clear, I explicit, intelligible, plain and unambiguous language which admits of no vagueness or ambiguity. It is not the function of the court to supply words to suit a particular course of action so as to be acceptable to a particular set of persons as a doctrine of implied consent. The word 'consent' has been dropped by the legislature deliberately or it is a case of deliberate omission rather than casus omissus.\n\nWhenever the Founding Fathers intended that a particular expression should be used in an ArtiCle as a condition precedent to the exercise of a particular power, the same has been mentioned and where no such intention was there the expressions have not been used. [723 H, 724 A-C, 729 CJ\n\nChandra Mohan v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1967] I S.C.R. 77, followed.\n\n12:3. The word 'consent' was never intended to be included ia the powers to be exercised under Article 222.\n\nThere is no provision in the Constitution, empowering the President to appoint for the first time a person as a Judge of a High Court against his consent and even if he is appointed, th~ person so appointed, can refuse to act as a Judge and if he does so the matter ends there and he cannot be compelled to act as a Judge. Once however, the person decides to accept the appointment of a Judge of a High Court he becomes a constitutional functionary and therefore would be subject to the provisions of the Constitution because before deciding to accept the appointment he must be presull).ed to be aware of the constitutional provision contained in the various Articles regarding High Court Judges, viz., the conditions of of service, the salary and other allowances; the date of retirement and also the provision .regarding transfer as provided for in Article 222 which does not contain the word 'consent'.\n\nTherefore no Judge can complain that be bad been transferred against bis consent or plead that had he known this he may not have accepted the office of a High Court Judge. As the word 'consent' is conspicuously absent from Article 222, such a plea cannot in th'e very nature of things be permitted to be taken by the concerned Judge. If he does not want to be transferred, it is always open to him to resign for which also there is a clear provision under Proviso (a) to clause (!)of Article 217. [727 G, 729 G-H, 730 A-DJ\n\nEven at the time when Article 222 was taking its birth there was some talk of making the transfer with the consent of 1be Judge concerned but this was given up when it was pointed out that in the national interest it may be necessary to send a compeient Judge to another High Court and this policy may be stalled by the judge by withholding this consent. In other words, the idea of consent having been conceived, discussed and rejected clearly shows that the Founding Fathers deliberately omitted the word consent from Article 222. . . ·\n\n. [766 C-EJ\n\nS.P. ouPtA v. UNtON\n\n12:4. The plain and unambiguous language of Article 217(c) and Article 222 cannot be stretched to indicate that 'appointment' and 'transfer' are synony mous terms when the constitutional provisions make it very clear that the power of transfer and the power of appointment are two different kinds of powers to be exercised in different ways. [763 A-CJ\n\nKesavananda Bharati Sripadag'alavaru v. State of Kera/a [1973J Supp. S.C.R. 1 explained.\n\n12:5 The coastitution has used the word \"appointed' in the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court and 'transfer' in the case of Jiidge of a High Court. A perusal of the language of Article 217 (c) leads to the irresistible conclusion and logical inference that the Founding Fathers have made a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. It is true that in both cases the office held by a Judge is vacated in a fictional sense because there is a complete change in the life of the Judge but that does mean. that the incidental of both these appointments are the same. A Judge of the High Court when appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be equated .in any respect' with a Judge of the High Court who is transferred to another High Court and continues to\n\npossss the same status, position . and emoluments which is essentially different from a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is true that on being transferred to another High Court a Judge ceases to be a Judge but then he ceases to be a Judge of the transferor court only and does not cease to be a Judge for all times to come so as to make his transfer in the transferee court a fresh appointment.\n\nThis is clear from paragraph 11 (iii) to the Second Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nIt is true that i.n this schedule joining time is mentioned on transfer from a High Court to Supreme Court or from one High Court to another and the word 'appointment' has not been used as such.\n\nThat however makes no difference because this schedule only refers to a small matter of joining time which both the judges. viz., a judge appointed to the Supreme Court and the Judge transferred are entitled to avail. (761 A-HJ\n\n12:6. When a judge was appointed in the original High Court he had taken the oath of his office which bound him to act as a Judge of that. particular High Court. Since by virtue of the transfer, the court is changd. a fresh oath becomes necessary as a clerical formality to indicate that although his appointment as a Judge of a High Court does not cease to exist he discharges his duties as a judge in another court in respect of which be had not taken the oath of office. Io these circumstances, it cannot be said that merely because a transferee Judge has to take a fresh oath the transfer becomes a new or a fresh appointment. Moreover it is doubtful if the taking of a fresh oath is necessary at all because the warrant signed by the President appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court bolds good in the transferee court and the place is indicated by the notification issued under the authority of the President which really means that after the notification the warrant would have to be read to indicate that the judge was transferred to the transferee court where he is to act as a Judge. (762 A-DJ\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\n12:7. T ere is no reason to presume that any order Which is passed by .the President under Article 222 hence forward is bound to be mala fide or colourable and even if it is in a particular case or cases, it is doubtless subject to judicial review. Therefore in all cases, constitutional transfers could not amount to a punishment so as to arm the Government with a weapon to punish a Judge for not toeing the line of Government. [770 C-E]\n\n12:8. Once it is conceded that the power of transfer under Article 222 is to be exercised in public interest then any inconvenience that is felt by the judge would have to yield to the larger interest of the community so as to make the said article workable. Alth_ough Article 222 is an extraordinary power, whenever a person accepts judgeship of a High Court he is fully aware that during his career as a judge the power under Article 222 could be exercised by the President without his consent and if knowing this he accepts the position of High Court Judge, he cannot be heard to say that he ought not to be transferred because be would suffer lot of inconvenience. [770 P-H]\n\n12:9. The very concept of transfer under Article 222 being a punishment is highly derogatory to the high constitutional posit.ion that a High Court judge holds. Such a constitutional appointment, )'llhich makes a judge a constitutional functionary and not a government servant, moreso when he obtains certain special privileges having regard to the high position he holds, is against .the very concept of penalty or punishment. It is manifest that when a person is punished .for an offence or a mistake or an error, then be is to undergo some penal process. In the case of a Judge who is transferred, no such pei; u, d consequence~ are at all visited because on the plain term of Article 222 the Judge _has to get special facilities before being transferred to the transferee High Court. .clause (2) of Art. :222 clearly provides that a trasferred judge is only to receive in .addition to bis salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined such compensatory allowance as the President may fix.\n\nThus, the granting of compensatory allowance to a judge in lieu of transfer completely destroys the concept that the transfer involves a stigma or a punishment. Apart from the allowances, the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act and the Rules mde therein clearly provide that a judge who is transferre.d from one High Court to l!nother can always avail of the specia.1 _Ieave concession rules by visiting his home State, along with his family, at Governinen.t .cost once a year. The Judges Rules, as amended, further enjoin that the Judge must be supplied with a free furnished house. which under the Amendment Act of 1981 is not even to be treated as a perquisite under the Income Tax Act. .It .is true that some of these facilities are available to a Judge in his original High Court also but the totality of the facilities taken into consideration undoubted.ly seek to make him as comfortable as possible in the transferee court also. [771 B-l; I]\n\n12:10. Far from being a punishment the transfer of a judge does not involve any strain or stigma nor even the slightest reflection on his legal functioning or his judicial character or integrity. The transfer of a judge contemplated by Article 222 is in the nature of a response to a call of duty in the larger\n\nbatioiial ifiterest ot ihe country in order to fnaihlai~ ahd ensute absoiute purity oftudieial adm iti istratiob. bn beibg transferred the Judge would find himself free\n\nto .\\Vbrk in at'I ihdependeht ntmosphere untramelled by any provindal or parochial eonsideta:tion, undaunted by any external or internal influences or local pulls or pressures and uninfluenced by the considerati!ins of class, caste or creed. He would also generate much gfea:ter confidence in the people to whom he imparts justice which is bound to enhance his judicial prestige and as a logical result would subserve the concept of independence of judieiary. For a true and conscientious judge there can be no higher honour than to create a feeling that justice is not actually done but also appears to have been done, the latter being more important and fundamental quality of judicial approach.\n\nThe apprehension that a judge on being transferred to another State is likely to face a hostile bar is merely an anathema and an illusion which has either a factual normal legal existence. If the judge's behaviour towards the Bar is polite and courteous and he gives a little accommodation to the Bar he is bound to win laurels of the Bar. In fact, the Bar always welcomes an outside judge who is likely to build uo a new judicial structure and establish a a flawless and unblemished reputation This is not merely a pious wish or an ideal dream out a stark and speaking reality which is evident from the perfor-· mance and reputation of judges who had been transferred outside their States and had proved to be not only successful but memorable judges. [772 B-G]\n\n12:11. Where a judge is transferred because the envirnoment or the atmosphere is not congenial or conducive to administration of impartial justice, he does so as a conscientious judge responding to a call of duty but where his sons or relations follow him in the transferee court then it becomes the most cogent and reliable evidence to show that the judge openly allows himself to be exploited by his sons or relations and this pr se would be conclusive proof of misbehaviour\n\nfor which, he can be impeached under Article 124(4) read with Article 218. If these facts are proved, then he will have to be removed for no court can ever accept a plea of the judge that even after he was transferred to some other court his close relations followed him there without his knowledge. [774 <?-H,775 A-BJ\n\n13. I. The Supreme Court which lays down the law of the land under Art. 141 must be extremely careful and circumspect in interpreting statutes, more so constitutional provisions, so as to obviate the necessity of constitutional amendment every time. which, is extremely onerous task. Having carefully interpreted a particular provision of the Constitution, the Court should as far as possible stick to the doctrine of stare decisis. The function of a- Judge is jus decere and not jus dart-\n\n[731 B-D, E, 737 BJ ·\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. [1955)2 S.C.R. 603: James v. Commenwea/th, 1936 A.C. 578 referred to.\n\n13:2. Where the Words ot the language used in a statute re clear and\n\n~.loµdless, plai.n !iimple and explicit . uncloude~ !ll!cl 1,1n<;>l;>sc:ured! intelliible and'\n\nff\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\npointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids. In such cases, the statute should be interpreted on the face of the language itself without adding, substracting or omitting words therefrom. It is equally well settled that it is not the duty of the court to import words which have been omitted deliberately or intentionally in order to fill up a gap or supply omissions to fit in with the ideology or concept of the Judge concerned. The words and the' language used must be given their natural meaning and interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense. [ 7 43 C-F]\n\nThere may be a third type of cases which may be on the border line-where the language may admit of two interpretations in which case the court may consider the desirability of resorting to external aids in order to catch ond delve into the spirit and object of the statute.\n\nIn construing a statutory or a constitutional provision, the Court should not presume that the legislature has either committed a mistake or has omitted something which was very necessary. It was not for the Court but for others to remedy the defect, if any, found in a statutory provision. To read the word \"consent\" in Art. 222 by supplying the omission, would be violating the cardinal principle of interpretation. (749 G-H, 750 A)\n\n13:3. On a full and complete consideration of the decisions classified under the various categories,· the propositions that emerge from the decided cases of this Court and other foreign courts are as follows:- [754 G-H)\n\n(1) Where the language of a statute is clear and unambigous, there is no room for the application of the doctrine of casus omissus or of pressing into service external aids or in such a case the words used by the constitution or the statute speak for themselves and it is not the intention of the court to and words or expressions merely to suit what the courts think is the supposed intention of legislature. [755 A-BJ\n\n(2) Where, however, the words or expression used in the constitutional or or statutory provisions are shrouded in mystery, clouded with mbiguity and are unclear and unintelligible so that the dominant object and spirit of the legislature cannot be spelt out from the language, external aids in the nature of parliamentary debates, immediately proceeding the passing of the statute, the report of the select committees or its Chairmar,, the s1atement of objects and reasons of the statute, if any, or any statement made by the sponsor of the statute which is in close proximity to the actual introduction or insertion of the statutory provision so as to become, as it were, a result of the statement made, can be pressed into service in order to ascertain the real purport, intent and will of the legislature to make the constitutional provision workable. Such aids may neither be decisive nor conclusive but they would certainly assist the courts in interpreting the statute in order to determine the a.vowd object of t.he Act or the (:onstitution as the case may be. (755 B-EJ ·\n\n' (\n\ns.i>. oui>h v. UNION 427.\n\n(3) Except in the aforesaid cases, a mere speech of any Member made on the floor of the House during the course of a parliamentary or legislative debate would not be admissible at all because the views expressed by the speaker may be his individual views which may or may not be accepted by the majority of the Members present in. the House. [755 F-G]\n\n(4) Legislative history of a constitutional provision though not directly germane for the purpose of consutring a statute may, however, be used in exceptional cases to denote the beginning of the legislative process which; results in the logical end and the finale of the statutory provision but in no case can the legislative history take the place of or be a substitute for an interpretation which is in direct contravention of the statutory provision concerned. [755 G-H, 756 A-B]\n\n(5) Where the scheme of a statute clearly shows that certain words or phrases were deliberately omitted by the legislature for a particular purpose or motive it is not open to the court' to add those words either by confirming to the supposed intention of the legislature or because the insertion or the omission\n\nsuits the ideology of the Judges deciding the case. Such a course of action would D amount not to interpretation but to interpolation of the statutory or constitutional provisions, as the case may be, and is against all the well established canons of interpretation of statutes.\n\nThe main reason behind the principles enunciated above is that the legislature must be presumed to be aware of the expanding needs of the nation, the requirements of the people and above all, the dominant object which the legislation seeks to subserve.\n\nThus where the language is plain and unambiguous the court is not entitled to go behind the language so as to add E or supply omissions and thus play the role of a political [reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. [756 B-E]\n\nHeydo11's case 76 English Reports 637; A. K. Gopala11 v. The State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukan [1958] SCR 360; M.\n\nPentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramal/appa & Ors. [1961]2 SCR 294; N. V. Joshi v.\n\nM. U, Shimpi & Anr. [1961] 3 SCR 986; Hansraj Gordhandasv. N. H. Dae, Asstt. Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat & Two Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 253; Commissioner of Income-Tax, Assam & Nagaland, etc. v. Shri G. Hyatt [1971] 1 sec 466; Senior Superintendent, R. M. S. Cochin & Anr. v. K. V.\n\nGopinath, Sorter [1972] 3 SCR 530; Shri Umed v. Raj Singh & Ors. [1975] 1 sec 76; Anandji Haridas & Co. P. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr, [1975] 3 seR 542; Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1978) 3 sec 248; Powell v. The Kempton Park Racecourse Co. Ltd. [1899] A.C. 143; Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Vadilal Lallubhai etc. [1973] 1 SCR 1058; State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidap [1974) 3 sec 337; Fagu Shaw & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal [1974] 4 SCC 152; Anandji Haridas & Co. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. [1975] 3 sec 862; The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax, My1re [1976) 1 SCC 254; State o/Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malthotra & Ors; [)97o] 1 SCC 834; Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi & Ors. v. Mamachand Ratilal Agarwal & Ors.'\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\n[1980] 3 SCC 162; M/s. Polestar Electronic (Pvt) Ltd. etc. v. Additional Commis sioner, Sales Tax Anr. etc. [197811 SCC 638; Dadafi Alias Dina v. Sukhdeobabu & Ors. [1980] I SCC 621; Malinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors. [1953] SCR 533; Sri Ram Ram Narain M edhi v. State of Bombay [ 1959] Supp.\n\nI SCR 489; Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v National Taj Traders (1980] I SCC 370; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1980] 2 SCC,565; United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Association; Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. (1953] SCR I; State of West Bengal v.\n\nUnion of India [ 1964] I SCR 371; Shyamlal Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat (1965] 2 SCR 457 referred to.\n\nPer Tulzapurkar J\n\n1. In the task of administration of justice, the role of judges and the role of lawyers are complementary to each other and the practising lawyers as ciass are an integral part of justicing 'machinery rendering assistance to the judges in the discharge of their functicin of reaching justice to the litigants appearing before the court; in other words the practising lawyers who are nothing short of partners in the task of administration of justice undertaken by the judges are vitally interested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent judiciary to ensure fair and fearless justice to the litigants. That being the positio~ it can not be said that, in the instant case, the petitioners are either in their individual capacity or as representing some of the Lawyers' Association are wayfarers, interlopers, officious ioterveners or busy bodies without any interest or concern of their own in the subject matter. They have not merely sufficient interest but special interest of their own in the transfer and appointment of judges and, therefore, they cannot be told off at the gates.\n\nThe petitions at their instance are clearly maintainable. (904 F-H, 905 A-CJ\n\nMunicipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand and Ors; [I981] I SCR 97, and Fertilizer Corpn, Kamgar Union v. Union of India [1982] 2 SCR 52 followed.\n\nDw<frkaoas Srl11ivas v. The Sholapur Spg, & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. [1954) SCR 674; Adi P. Gandhi's Case [1971] 1 SCR 863; Dabholkar's Case [1976] SCR 306; Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N:Jie [1961 AC 617], referred to.\n\n2. At the stage of initial recruitment under Art 217(1) no one bas a right G to be appointed a Judge of the High Court nor the right to be!' considered for such appointment, and therefore, a writ of Mandamus at the instance of a~ aggrieved persons would not lie, for the. reasons that Judges of the High Court occupy a high constitutional position and a special machinery is provided for their app9intment. (i) for obvious reasons, the post of a High Court Judge is not .piled in liy. inviting applications through advertisements nor by holding test H '' mtervfows: (ii) .further, the minimum qualifications for appointment as a Judge (Piescribed in sub-Art. (2) of Art. 217) would be possessed by numerious advoeates and by a (air number of service Judges but even so, the special machiriecy\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 429\n\nfor making appointments is indicated in Art. 217 (1), obviously designed to recruit A . persons of great ability, high character and unquestioned integrity to the Bench.\n\n[906 H, 907 A-C]\n\n3:1. The sitting Additional Judges have an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for their continuance either by extending term or making them permanent until the practice that has grown over years is changed and a proper, practice .is introduced which can be done only after having made a complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths of permanent as well as Additional Judges for every High Court, depending upon statistical data to be collected throwing tight on 'normal business a 'temporary increase' and 'arrears of work' after fixing 1'ate of disposal per Judge per year and defining what should be termed as main cases, miscellaneous cases or interlocutory cases etc.\n\n3:2. Unlike a Permanent Judge whose tenure is fixed by reference to his age the tenure of an Additional Judge when appointed under Art. 224 (I) is fixed by the warrant of his appointment and on the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court.\n\nThe continuance as an Additional Judge for any further term or as a Permanent Judge in the vacancy of a permanent post cannot be thought of unless for continuance as Additional Judge either one or the other or both the preconditions mentioned in Art. 224 (1) . obtain in that High Court, and for continuance as a Permanent Judge the normal business of the High Court justifies the filling up of the vacancy in the permanent post. In other words 'pendency of work must justify such continuance-teporary increase in the business of the High Court or arrears of work therein both for extension of his term and normal business (current institutions) for making him permanent. [907 F-H, 908 A] ·\n\nKandaswami Pillai v. Mathvenkatacha/a, [1917] 33 Mad. L. J. 787 approved.\n\n3:3. The very purpose and raison d' etre of Art. 224(1) being the existence of arrears of work and clearance thereof sitting Additional Judges who have already been selecied and appointed for the very purpose must be considered for continued appointments if the arrears obtain and go on mounting in their High Court. Secondly, a comparison of Arts. 216 and 224(1) clearly shows that the former deals with the appointment ofpermanent Judges to dispose of tbe normal business and the latter deals with appointment Additional Judges, whenever tl:rere is either a temporary increase in the normal business of a High Court or arrears of work therein.\n\nThe work in a High Court has been classified into three categories, namely, (a) normal business indicated by the current annual institu- .tions (suits, writs and other proceedings),\n\n(b) sudden temporary increase in business over and above the normal institutions such as filing of hundreds of petitions challenging an enactment, like for instance Money Lenders Act, which will disappear when the validity or otherwise of the enactment is pronounced upon and (c) arrears of work meaning the normal or ordinary work which the permanent strength has not been able to cope with and dispose of within a llll!.soi:iablc or stated period, say one or two ye.w.s and has accumulated; Art. 216\n\n........... ' '~ ........ -. ' \",, • > • • ... )\n\n. F\"·\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nhas to be resorted to for the first category of work and Art. 224(1) for the other two categories. But having construed Article 224(1) and worked by all concerned and resorted to even in situation where Article 216 ought to have been resorted, and in fact after following such practice over the years and thus putting all the Additional Judges into the belief that they will be confirmed in normal course it doas not behove the appointing authority to say that the sitting Additional Judges have no right to be considered for their continuance either for an extended term or for making them permanent.\n\nClearly by reason of the said practice though followed under some misapprehension, they have such a right. In the case of the members of the Bar, if the genesis of the convention or practice as well as the undertaking is nothing but pub lie interest in the sense that public interest is served (a) by not permitting them to revert to the Bar on the expiry or their term, and (b) by not losing or frittering away the experience or expertise gained by them in administering justice during their initial terms, then it is these very aspects of public interest which form the compelling reasons to consider their cases for their continuance either by extending their term or making them permanent in preference to outside or freshers. It is not as if that these two aspects of 'public interest' giving rise to the convention or practice and the undertaking are merely factors to be taken into account while deciding upon their, continuance but along with the disability emanating from the undertaking these aspects confer upon them a legitimate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for such continuance in the High Court.\n\n[9090-H; 910A-D, E, 911 E-H, 912C-E]\n\n4:1. There is a valid classfication between proposed appointees for initial recruitment and the sitting Additional Judges whose cases for their continuance E after the expiry of their initial term are to be decided and the two are not in th~ same position. [915 F-G]\n\n4:2. Constitutional conventions and practices have importance under unwritten as well as written Constitutions and the position that conventions have a role to play in interpreting Articles of a Constitution is clear.\n\nIt is true, that F no constitutional convention or pratice can affect, alter or control the operation of any Article if its meaning is quite plain and clear, but here, Art. 224(1) merely provides for situations when Additional Judges from duly qualified persons could be appointed to a High Court, and at the highest reading of the Article with s. 14 of the General Clauses Act, it can be said that the power conferred by that\n\nAl'licle may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires but on the question as to whether when the occasion arises to make appointment on expiry G of the term of a sitting Adgitional Judge whether he should be continued or a fresher or outsider could be appointed by ignoring the erstwhile incumbent even when arrears continue to obtain in that High Court, the Article is silent and not at all clear. On the other liand, it will be proper to invoke in such a sitution the other well settled principle that in construing a constitutional provision the implications which arise from the structure of the Constitution itself or from its ff scheme may legitimately be ll)ade aQd looking at Art. 224(1) from this angle a\n\n).. -.. -\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNlON 431\n\nwholesome constitutional convention or practice that has grown because of such implications will have to be borne in mind especially when it serves to safeguard one of the basic features which is the cardinal faith underlying our constitution, namely, independence of the judiciary.\n\nIn other words, limitatio11 on the otherwise absolute power and discretion contained in Art. 224cl) is required to be read into it because of the clear implication arising from the said cardinal faith which forms a fundamental pillar supporting the basic structure of the. Constitution, as otherwise the exercise of the power in the aboslute manner as suggested will be destructive of the same. [913 E-F, 914 B-GJ\n\n4:3. The aforesaid convention or practice and the undertaking serve the cause of public interest in two respects and those two aspects of public interest confer upon these sitting Additional Judges recruited from the Bar a legitmate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice or tho appointing authority but to be considered for continuance in that High Court either by way of extending their t1:rm ()r making them permanent in preference to freshers or outsiders.\n\nTherefore, it is impossible to construe Art. 224(1) as conferring upon the appointing authority absolute power and complete discretion in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges to a High\n\nCourt. [915 C-G)\n\nKeJhavananda Bhartl's CaJe [1973] [Suppl] SCR; The Lord Mayor Councilors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne v. The Common Wealth & Anr. (74 C. L.\n\nReports P. 31;]; State of Victoria v. The Common Wealth of Australia [122 C. L.\n\nReports 353J referred to.\n\n4:4. If the sitting Additional Judges have this enforceable right to be considered for their continuance, then the eventual non-continuance, if any, can become a justiciable issue open to judicial review, if such non-continuance is based on extraneous or non-germane consideration or is malaficle in law or in fact, and in that sense it will not be a (case of non-appointment as is the case qua the proposed appointees at the stage of their inital recruitment. [918 F-G]\n\n4:5. Io substance and reality in extending their term or making them permanent in their High Court no 'fresh appointment' in the sense of initial or fresh recruitment is involved, except for the formality of issuing a fresh warrant of appointment and taking a fresh oath.\n\nTherefore, logically speaking the\n\n• E\n\nconsultative process in so far as suitability under Art. 217(1) is concerned is not G attracted at all. [918 G-H, 919 A-BJ\n\nKrishna Gopa/ v. P. C. Sethi [1974] 2 _S~R 206; The Sp/. Courts Bill 1978 [1979) 2 SCR 476 held in applicable.\n\n4:6. Sitting Additional Judges ar(not on probation and cannot be regarded pr dealtl, with as probationer$, Jtl_i~ !rµe tha(they are not probationer~ iq thcr scrn~9\n\n432 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n\nthat they have an indefeasible tenure though for the periods fixed in their warrants of appointment and that during-such fixed tenure, like the Permanent Judges, they can be removed only by following the regular process for it, as -indicated in the Consthution and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, but in the context of their having an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally and to be considered for their continuance, it will not be possible to confine the concept of .probation to these two aspects only.\n\nNor does it. mean that for deciding upon their cont!· nuance they should be treated as on probation. If the Additional Judges are not on probation in any sense of the term their continuance either as additional or Permanent Judges cannot be made to depend upon the evaluation or assessmect of their suitability as emerging from their work, performance and behaviour during their initial term.\n\nIf the misbehaviour or lack of integrity is glaringly self-evident the question of his continuance obviously cannot arise and in all probabilities will not engage the attention of the appointing authority, for, the concerned Judge in such a situatiori would himself resign. But since the question relates to the continuance of a high constitutional functionary like the Additional Judge of High Court it would be jeopardising his security and judicial independence if action is taken on the basis.of merely opinion material.\n\nMoreover, no. machinery having legal sanction-behind it for holding an inquiry disciplinary or otherwise against the concerned Judge on allegations of misbehaviour and/or lack of integrity obtains in the constitution or any law made by the Parliament, save and except the regular process of removal indicated in Art 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. [919C-H, 920A-H;921AB)\n\n4:7. Io the absence ofutisfactory machinery possessing legal sanction to reach a positive conclusion on the alleged misbehaviour or an act of corruption the decision to drop him shall have been arrived at merely on the basis of • opinions, reports, rumours or gossip and apart from being unfair and unjust to him such a course will amount to striking at the root of judicial independence.\n\nThe other alternative, namely, to make him permanent if a vacancy is available and then take action for his removal under regular process indicated in Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 may sound absurd but is inevitable if judicial independence, a cardinal faith of Constitution, is to be preserved and safeguarded.\n\nNot to have a corrupt Judge or a Judge wh_o has misbehaved is unquestionably in public interest but at. the same time preserving judicial independence is of the highst public interest. lt is a question of choosing lesser evil and the inevitable course has to be adopted not for the protection of the corrupt or dishonest judge but for protecting several other honest, conscientious and hardwor.Jcing Judges by preserving their independence; it is a price which the Society has to pay to avoid the greater evil that will ensure if judicial iode~ pendence is sacrificed. Therefore,' while considering the question of continuance of the sitting additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term either as Additional Judge or as Permanent Judge the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Art. 217(1) should not be invoked-at least until such time as proper machinery possessing legal sanction is provided for enabling a proper inquiry against an alleged errant Judge less cumbersome than the near impeachment process contemplated by Art. 124(4) and (5) of the\n\nonstitution. ~921 Ctt; 922 ..\\HJ\n\nS; P. GUPTA v. UNION 433\n\n4:8. Bringing in the suitability test under Art. 217(1) at the state of 'continuance of the Additional Judge will not affect the quality or character of justice administered by the sitting Additional Judges during their initial term or towards the end of their term. In fact, so far on every occasion the consultative process inclusive of the suitabiiity test under Art. 217(1) has been resorted to while considering the question of granting extension to the Additional Judges or making them permanent on the expiry of their initial term, it has not been suggested that because of this their work, performance or behaviour was or has been guided by the anxiety to keep themselves on the right side of the Chief Justice of the High Court. the Chief Justice of India or the Appointing, Authority.\n\nOnly when the basic assumption made while putting forward .the argument is well founded, there will be any question of any violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [922 B-E]\n\n•' 4:9. At the time of deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term the consultative process should be confined only to see whether the preconditions mentioned in Art. 224(1) exist 'or nO-t or whether pendency of work justifies their confirmation or not and the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Article 217(1) cannot and should not be resorted to at all. [924 A-B]\n\n4:10. The consultative process even of Additional Judges at the time of deciding upon continuance of Judges either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges must be full complete and effective as is the case with the consultative\n\nprQCess that is required to be gone through under Ai't. 222(1), when the question of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court is considered.\n\nFurther the procedure to be followed at the time 1>f undertaking such co11sultative process must also ensure fair play qua the concerned sitting Additional_ Judge. Io other words, though the principle of natural justice in. its full vigour is not contemplated, the sitting Additional )udge should not receive a raw deal at the hands of the consulting functionaries and either one or the other or if necessary both should hear him, especially if any adverse material is weighing in their \"minds against him, just as in the case under Art. 222(1) the personal difficulties and other grounds of\n\nobjections of the proposed .transferee are considered by the consulting functionary.\n\nIn other words, the scope and ambit of the consultative process under Art. 217(1) are and must be the same.\n\nThe question whether, in the consultative process contemplated by Article 217(1) if any primacy is intended to be given to the views or advice to be handed by the Chief Justice of India in the matter of a High Court Judge or whether from amongst these consulting functionaries the President (Appointing Authority) is entitled to choose or prefer the views or advice of any one to the view of the other, really arises only° in regard to the views or advice tendered on the suitability aspect and not on the aspeet touching the existence of the pre-conditions of Art. 224(1) or pendency of work justifying confirmation, because the former aspect is a matter of subjective assessment, while th~ latter depends on objective facts over which no difference is likely to arise. The said question cannot at all arise in view of the conclusion that the test\n\nof suitability falling within the consultative process under Art. 217\\:t) cannot and\n\n4~4\n\n(1~82) 2 S.C.R.\n\nshould not be resorted to while deciding upon the continuance of sitting Additional Judges Obviously the question cannot arise in cases of non-appointments qua proposed appointees at the time of initial recruitment, for such non-appointments are cases of nan-sequitur. [919 G-H; 930 A-CJ\n\n5.2. l'\\ssuming it arises the question of primacy has to be considered not only in the light of what this Court has said about the almost binding character of the resultant advice flowing from the consultative process but also by keeping in mind the object or purpose of providing for such consultation. The object of providing for such consultation clearly is that the same should act as a controlling or limiting factor on the discretion vested in the President while performing his executive function of making appointment of High Court Judges and neither the President nor the Chief Justice should have power to veco a proposal.\n\n[925 F-H; 926 D}\n\nSankalchand v. Union af India [1970) 1 SCR. 423;' Sham Sher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975) 1 SCR 714 referred to.\n\n5.3. On the question as to whether any primacy is intended to be accorded to the views or advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India during the consultative process over the views or advice of the other two consulting functionaries (Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court) or whether all the three consulting functionaries are of co-ordinate authority so as to accord equal efficacy to each one's views or advice, article 217 is clearly s.ilent. Mere use of the expression 'Consultation' does not mean that the President has absolute authority or discretion in the matter because 'Consultation• has been provided with the object of limiting the authority 9r discretion of the President. [926 F-H; 927 A]\n\n5.4. In the very nature of things all the three consulting functionaries under Art. 217(1) cannot be regaded as of co-ordinate authority Jor the simple reason that on aspects like capacity, character, merit, efficiency and fitness whieh converge on the suitability of the person proposed for appointment the Governor of the _State will be least informed and will have nothing to say whereas the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of India, being, best informed, are well equipped to express their views and tender advice; further it is an accepted position that ii is because of the financial aspect (Salary and emoluments of a High Court Judge being charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State) and information about the antecedent, local affiliations and like other matters, capable of objective proof, roncemiog the proposed appointee which the State Executive would be possessing, that consultation with the Governor has been provided for. It is, therefore, difficult to regard the Governor of the State as being of Co-ordinate authority with the other two consulting functionaries especially on the aspect of suitability which is the primary thing in the matter of making appointment of High Court Judges. Conferring a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India is entirely different from the primacy being given \"to his views or advice over and above the views or advice of the other coniulting functionaries, as a limiting factor on the Presider; its'. discretion.\n\n[927 F-H; 928 A. C-D~\n\n\\-\n\n.. >\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 435\n\n5.5. Once it is realised that the scope and ambit of full and effective consultation requires that all the material facts and records concerning the proposed candidate must be made available to both these consulting functionaries by placing the same before each during the consultative process and that each consulting functionary must consider the same or identical material and exchange each one's views thereon with the other, it will be clear that the Chief Justice of the High Court does not have a closer opportunity to assess the suitability of the proposed appe>intee; surely it is not a case of watching the demeanour of the witness so as,. to put the assessment of the Chief Justice of the High Court on any higher footing. [928 E-G)\n\n5.6. Article 217 does not expressly suggest that any primacy is to be accor- . ded to his advice during the con, ultative process undertaken in Art.217(1) but, the scheme of consultative process contemplated by that Article envisages consideration of identical facts and materials bearing on the suitability of the candidate by both the consulting functionaries namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, as also an exchange of their views on such material and thereafter placing of the entire material together with each one's views thereon and the tendering of the advice or final recommendation by the Chief Justice of India to the President whose decision should be guided by such advice or final recommendation so tendered. Such being the scheme envisaged by Art. 217(1) clearly by implication primacy is intended to he given to the advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India to. the President.\n\nIn any event, evolving such a scheme regarding the consultative process under Article 217(1) would be in fitness of things as primacy shall have been given to the advice or final recommendation to be tendered by the Chief Justice of India who happens to occupy the highest constitutional position as the head of the Indian Judiciary. Howevec, giving primacy to the advice of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of High Court Judge is not to give power to veto any proposal nor would giving such primacy to his advice mean that the Chief Justice would be enjoying unfettered arbitrary powers, for, if his advice has proceeded on extraneous or non-germane considerations, the same shall be subject to the judicial review just as the President's final decision is so subject if he were to disregard the advice of the Chief Justice of India unless the same is justified for cogent and convincing reasons and construing Art. 217(1) as envisaging such a scheme would go a Jong way in preserving judicial independence rather than not according primacy to Chief Justice of India's advice and permitting the President to act as an arbiter between the divergent views of the two high constitutional functionaries and leaving him to prefer the views of one to the other. [928 H, 929 A-HJ\n\n6:1. It is true that Art. 224(1) confers power on the President to appoint duly qualified persons to be additional judge of a High Court, if the pre-conditions mentioned therein exist \"for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify\". The phrase cannot be construed literally to mean that the term can be for any short period or that the period is not justiciable or that the period must of pee\\)ssity get corelated to the contiP.\\l\\:<l c; l\\isteµce of the precon<Jitions relating to . . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO'Q.TS\n\n[19S2J 2 S.C.R.\n\nte. volume of wor~ fr which the appointments are to be made, because no prov1s10n of the constitution can be interpreted in a manner which will be in conflict t-- with any of the basic features of the constitution and the cardinal principle of independence of Judiciary is one such basic feature; therefore, the construction to be .put on the phrase in the Article must be consistent with the said principle. Admittedly security of tenure .ensures judicial independence and tenures for shortterms like three months, six months or nine months hring insecurity directly impinging on judicial independence and also tend to shake the faith of the community in the administration of justice and, therefore, would be unconstitutional.\n\n[930 E-H; 931 A-BJ j-\n\n'~1 , 6:2. Granting short-term extensions for periods like three months, six months, or nine months' pending inquiry into the complaints said to have been received against some of the sitting Additional Judges, would be clearly outside the contemplation of the Constitution for no machinery having legal sanction behind it has been provided for either in the Constitution or any other law authorising such inquiry or invest iga lion into the complaints against sitting Additional Judges and must be voided as unconstitutional. [931 B-C]\n\n\"6:3 Assuming that suitability test while deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges, is required to be gone through, the process must be completed well in advance of the date of expiry of their initial term or if for any reason it cannot be so completed the concerned Additional Judge must be given extension for at least one year, as evidenced by constitutional convention or practice that has grown over the years notwith-standing that phrase in Article 224(1).\n\nJn any case no extension for less than a year should ever be granted irrespective of whether volume of work justifies it or not simply with a view to give the Judge concerned fixity of tenure for that period. Further, it is extremely desirable and necessary that order granting extensions to sitting Additiona I Judges or making them permanent are issued and intimated to the concerned Judges and not merely to the Constitutional authorities well in advance of the date of expiry of their term and not at the eleventh hour keeping them on tender-hooks till the last moment. After all the sitting Additional Judges are high Constitutional functionaries possessing the same position, powers and privileges as the permanent Judges, and deserve due consideration and respectful treatment at the bands of thQ\n\nappointing authority. [931 D-H; 932 A-BJ\n\n7:1. On a consideration of the two Articles, namely 216 and 224(1), it is clear, that Art. 216 unquestionably casts a mandatory obligation on the President (appointing authority) to provide adequate strength of permanent Judges in every High Court to cope with and dispose of its normal business and further to review periodically such permanent strength. The word 'shall' and the further words \"such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint\" occurring in the Article are a clear pointer in that direction. Art. 224(1) confers power on the President to apoint additional Judges only to meet the situation arising f; om (a) temporary increase in the business of the High Court, or (b) a, rrears of work tl\\erein. In otber words, if the increase in the work of business of\n\nv '\n\ns.t>. GUPTA v. UNiON 437\n\nthe High Court is not of a temporary character but a permanent increase every year resort will have to be made to Art. 216 and not to Art. 224(1). Further, ordinarily, it will not be proper to appoint an Additional Judge in a High Court while keeping a permanent post vacant or unfilled. [933 F-H, 934 A-Bl\n\n7:2. But, it will not be proper for the Supreme Court to give the directions or reliefs by way of declaring the sitting Additional Judges to be deemed to have become permanent nr by way issuing a mandamus to the President to make them permanent by arpropriately increasing the permanent strength in the concerned High Courts. It cannot be disputed that appointing Judges to a High Court either as permanent Judges or Additional Judges is purely an executive function entrusted by the constitution to the appointing authority and it will not be proper for the Supreme Court to usurp that function to itself or issue any directions in that behalf unless forced by glaringly compelling circumstances, (ii) no directions or relief as sought is possible unless a full, complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths for every High Court as on a particular date is made available to the court ; (iii) such assessment about the requisite strengths for every High Court must depend on statistical data to be collected throwing light on 'normal business', 'temporary increase' and 'arrears of work' in each High Court after fixing the rate of disposal per judge per year and defining what should be regarded as 'main cases, miscellaneous cases' or 'interlocutory cases' etc. the norm in regard to such matters being a variable criterion requiring refixation depending on facts, circumstances and situation as and when they develop. [934 B-F]\n\nWhell the President lias appointed a duly qualified person as an Additional Judge fonwo years the President cannot be deemed to have appointed him as the permanent Judge under Art. 216. Though no particular Article is referred to in the warrant of appointment, reference in the warrant to the fact that the person has been appointed \"an Additional Judge\" and the mentioning of the short-periods therein will clearly negative any intention on 'the part of the President to appoint him a permanent Judge, notwithstanding the duty having arisen in the circum stance of the cases to make a permanent appointment. [934 F-H; 935 Al\n\nShewpujanrai lndrasen Rai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs & Ors. [1959] SCR 821 at 840 and 841 ; Y. Mahaboob Sheriff and Ors. v. Mysore State Tr pt. ) Authority & Ors. [1960) 2 SCR !46 referred to.\n\n8:1. The safeguard of public interest read into Art. 222( l) is not intended for protecting any black-sheep in the judiciary but for protecting the numerous honest, conscientious hard-working Judges and niether corrupt or dishonest Judge, nor a Judge, who contrary to his oath of office indulges in any kind or favouritism while discharging his duties-who could be likened to a rotten egg, should be tolerated in the Judicial basket and he deserves to be dealt with under Art. 218 read with Art. 124(4) and (5) but not by transferring him to another High Court, fof such a transfer would be contrary to public interest. Therefore, a transfer by way of punishment for misbehaviour is clearly outside the purview of Art. 222(1) and\n\n438 SUPRflME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.lt\n\nA similarly, any transfer with an oblique motive or for an oblique purpose, such as for not toeing the line of the Executive or for rendering decision unpalatable to the Executive or for having for some reason or the other fallen from the grace of the Executive, would also be outside its purview and liable to be struck down, if oblique motive or purpose is established. [942 D-GJ\n\n8:2. Transfers under Art. 222(1) have to be made only in public interest, the ground being convenience of the general administration like a transfer from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High Court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not be locally available (b) transfer to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court with a view to have a man unaffected by local politics or local jealousies and (c) transfer effected for remedying unsatisfactory working conditions obtaining in a High Court for reasons beyond the control <'f the Judge concerned and for which he is not responsible in any manner and ( d) Transfer resorted, if a particular Judge by reason of his nature and temperament is unable to get along with the Chief Justice or any of colleagues in a High Court.\n\nIn the context of tile power to transfer under Article 222, in such cases the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another without his consent would be appropriate and justified and will not be by way of punishment. [9430-E; 944B-E)\n\n8:3. When it is said that the power to transfer under Art. 222(1) cannot be and should not be exercised by way of punishment, what is intended to be conveyed is that Judge concerned should not be transferred for misbehaviour falling under Art. 124(4) or with oblique motive or for oblique purpose, which alone would be by way of punishment in the correct sense of that expression in the Article and not that be should not be subjected to the kind of punishment which is inherent in the transfer. There is a clear distinction between the punishment involved in making the transfer for misbehaviour or out of oblique motive and the punishment which is inherent in the order of transfer in the sense of infliction of personal injury, loss or damage arising out of his moorings being severed, he being required to have two establishments or his suffering a dislocation in his family affairs, etc. Further it is not as if this latter aspect of punishment which is inherent in an order of transfer is being totally ignored before passing the order of transfer, for precisely these very aspects concerning the Judge proposed to be transferred are required to be taken into consideration and given due weight by the Chief Justice of India during the consultative process which he is required to undertake for observing the second safeguard of full and effective consultation.\n\nTherefore, the two safeguards of public interest and effective consultation subject to which the power of transfer is to be exercised are neither illusory nor unreal and if they afford real protection to the Judge concerned against the abuse of power, there would be no need to read consent into Art. 222( 1). Non-consensual transfers are within the purview of Art. 222(1). [944 F-H; 945 A-C & 947 E]\n\nSankalchand Sheth v. Union of India [1978) l SCR 423 explained and followed.\n\n8:4. Even if a transfer is effected pursuant to a general policy adopted by\n\nte Government, the same must satisfy requirements of Art. 222(1) that is to sa)'.,\n\n..,...\n\nS.t>. OuPTA v. ONION 439\n\nit must be in public interest and made after full and effective consultation.\n\nOrdinarily, no general policy will be adopted unless it clearly serves some public interest and hence when a transfer is stated to be pursuant to such general policy, it will be a difficult task for the Judge concerned to establish that it has been made for extraneous considerations but all the same a transfer based on a general policy will have to satisfy the requirement of Art.222(1) and if extraneous considerations are established the same will have to be struck down.\n\n[948 DE]\n\n8:5. It is true that Art. 222(1) merely refers to consultation of the Chief Justice of India o,; specific individual proposals for transfer as and when these are\n\nmade and nothing is mentioned therein as regards consultation with him on points C such as whether, and if so what policy or policies should be adopted for effecting transfer of Judge from one High Court to another. It is also true that ordinarily policy matters would be decided upon by the Government. But, propriety requires and perhaps smooth working thereof may necessitate consultation with the Chiei Justice who is the highest administrative head of the country's Judiciary especially as the policy or policies to be adopted are in relation to transfor of High Court Judges. But, even after a general policy in the matter of transfers of High Court Judges is framed and adopted whenever a transfer is to be made in pursu ance of such policy the proposal, before it culminates into an order, will have to satisfy the requirements of Art. 222(1).\n\n(948 F-H; 949 A-CJ\n\n8:6. A policy transfer, that is to say, a transfer based on or made in pursuance of a general policy would not necessarily be non-punitive in character nor would every selective transfer be necessarely punitive. A policy transfer with out fixing the requisite mechanism or modality or procedure ensuring complete insulation against the Executive interference could be a punitive transfer in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive. Even with proper mechanism or modality of procedure a transfer can be made for extraneous considerations, and will be liable to be struck down if it so established.\n\nBut admittedly no mechanism or modality of procedure of any kind has been fixed or decided upon so far and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that every policy transfer made in pursuance of either of these two policies would necessarily be above board. In other words, merely adopting a general policy, which is or may be broadly supportable for reasons of public interest would not be sufficient to insulate transfers of High Court Judges against fa.ecutive interference unless adequate mechanism or modality of procedure in that behalf is also fixed and followed in practice. Conversely, a selective transfer in an appropriate case for strictly objective reasons and in public interest of general administration could be non-punitive. In other words, each case of transfer, whether based on a policy or a selective transfer, will have to be judged on the facts and circumstances of its own for deciding whether it is punitive in character in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive or not. (949 E, 950 A-El\n\n44() stJi>ilBMil COtJll'r RBPOR'rS {1982) 2 s.c.a..\n\n9:1. Reading it as a whole, the Circular letter clearly exudes an odour of executive dominance and arrogance intended to have coercive effect on the minds of the sitting Additional Judges by implying a threat to them that if they do not furnish their consent to be shifted else where they will not be continued nor made permanent but would be dropped. The Circular letter, therefore, which seeks to obtain the consent of the sitting Additional Judges to their transfers from their own High Court to another High Court induced by threat, coercion or duress clearly amounts to Executive interference with the Judiciary and impinges on its independence and as such is illegal, unconstitutional violative of Article 222(1) and void and the consent if any either already obtained there under or that may be obtained, would be equally void. [960 G-H; 961 A-B]\n\n9:2. In substance and reality in extending the term of an Additional Judge or making him permanent in that High Court no \"Fresh appointment\" is involved, except for the formality of issuing a fresh warrant of appointment and taking a fresh oath. If in the case of such sitting Additional Judge his consent is sought for being \"appointed to\" another High Court it is virtually and in substance seeking his consent for his transfer from his own High Court to another High Court falling within the concept of transfer contemplated in Art. 222(1). It is true that para 2 of the Circular letter uses the expression \"to be appointed\" but it is not the nomenclature or label used that would be decisive of the matter but one has to look to the substance and looking at the Circular from this angle, it is clear, that in so far as sitting Additional Judges are concerned their consent is sought for transferring them from their own High Court to other High Courts and the attempt in substance is to transfer them under the guise of making fresh appointment on the expiry of their initial or extended term. Further, considered in the light of the historical background, Circular letter is another attempt on the part of the Union Government this time to effect mass transfers of sitting Additional Judges, the previous attempt to effect mass transfers of permanent Judge!!' during the last Emergency having failed. [954 B-G]\n\n9:3. The transfers of sitting Additional Judges contemplated by the Circu· lar are based on the policy to have one-third of the Judges of a High Court from outside without each invidual being considered on its own facts and merits and therefore such transfers based on policy accepted or adopted by the Law Minister and/or the Union Government would be outside the purview of Art. 222(1). In any case, by procuring the consent of the sitting Additional Judges for their transfers from their own High Court to another before undertaking any consultation with the Chief Justice of India clearly reduces the full and effective consultation contemplated under that Article to a mere formality, if not to a mockery, for it is, obvious that such consultation and the advice which Chief Justice will be tender ing following upon such consultation will not be of any use or avail as the consent to such transfer shall have already been procured from the concerned Additional Judges. The consultation and the resultant advice of the Chief Justice will be robbed of its real efficacy in face of such pre-obtained consent. The Circular which has such effect is clearly violative of Art. 222(1); in fact it will have to be regarded as having been issued n ala fide for a collateral purpose namely to bypass Art. 222(1) and confront the Chief Just ice oflndia with fait accompli when the proposal to transfer such additional judge would be forwarded to him and as\n\n... '\n\nS.P. GUPTA V, UNION 441\n\nsuch the same is illegal and unconstitutional and deserves to be struck down.\n\n(961 G-H; 962 A-CJ\n\n9:4. That the Circular letter was not a Dreliminary step in tbe direction of collecting data and information from sitting Additional Judges which could be placed before the Chief Justice of India when the consultation process under Art. 217(1) would be gone into but was and is intended to be acted upon forthwith by conferring.an advantage on those who would be furnishing their consent is clearly borne out by the stand taken by the Government in Shri Iqbal Cbagla's petition.\n\nThe Circular letter, thus, makes invidious discrimination against those sitting Additional Judges who would not be furnishing their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent will be at an advantage and thus it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\n[963 G-H; 964 C-E]\n\n9:5. The Circular Jetter seems to confer unfettered and unguided power on the .Government to indulge ill picking and choosing even within the class of those Additional Judges who shall have furnished their consent in the sense it will be up to 1he Government to select some from that class Jor being shifted to High Courts other than <heir own and to retain and appoint others in their own High Courts. [964 :E-F]\n\n9:6. As regards the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or services) recommended for their initial appointments, there will be no question of discrimination in the case of those who have not been appointed at all but in the case of consenting appointees discrimination is bound to arise because of unfettered and unguided power or discretion vesting in the Government to pick and choose from amongst the consenting appointees, for in their case also it will be up to the Government to decide and select some for being appointed to High Courts other than their home-State High Courts. Having regard to the aforesaid position it is abundantly clear that invidious discnmination is writ large on the face of the Circular Jetter and the same is clearly violative of Art. 14 and as such unconstitutional. (965 AD]\n\n10: I. The disclosure has been ordered by Supreme Court only for the limited purpose of finding out whether any part of the correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Union Law Minister was kept away from the Chief Justice of India, and not for deciding upon the merits or demerits of the grounds on which each of the Chief Justices made his own recommendation nor is the Court concerned with the truth or otherwise of the facts or materials on the basis of which each one acted. [967 A-El\n\n10:2. From the decisions of this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad's case and Sankalchand Sheth' s case it is clear that consultation implies a confe rence of two or more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or at least a satisfactory solution and that in order that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact it is essential that ea<; li must liave for its c; onsiqeration_ full an!f\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982j 2 S.C.R.\n\nA identical facts, which can at once constitute both the sources and foundation of the final decision. Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of views known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. [968 C-E]\n\n10:3. Having regard to the well-settled principles concerning consultation, it is clear that both the Union Law Minister as well as Delhi Chief Justice have failed to discharge their comtitutional obligation in the matter 'of consultatio~ contemplated under Art. 217(1). In the first place, contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in Sankalchand Sheth's case that the President must make the relevant data available to the Chief Justice of India for obtaining his considered opinion, the Union Law Minister did not forward the complaints which be bad received against Shri S.N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India (Which he forwarded to the Delhi Chief Justice); secondly, the Delhi Chief Justice did not forward \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" touching Shri S.N. Kumar's integrity to the Chief Justice of India inspite of the latter having specifically called for the same, and thirdly between them the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice saw to it that the communication of May 7, 1981 (from the Delhi Chief Justice to the Union Law Minister) which contained \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or material\" in regard to the allegations of lack of integrity against Shri S.N. Kumar was kept confidential from the Chief Justice of India and was not shown to him. It is thus amply clear from the record that the facts which were taken into consideration ly the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice and which provided the basis to the appointing authority to arrive at the inpugned decision were not placed before the Chief Justice of India, and therefore, there was neither full nor effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India as required by Art. 217(1) of the constitution.\n\n[974 B-G]\n\nThere is another aspect relating the procedure that has to be followed while undertaking such full ancl effective consultation, namely, that the procedure must ensure fair play qua the concerned Judge. That the scope and ambit of consultation includes fair-play qua the concerned Judge is clearly laid down in Sankalchand Sheth's case in the context of question of the Judge's transfer and the same position must obtain in regard to consultation under Art. 217(1) in the context of the question of the continuance of an Additional Judge on the expiry of his initial or extended term, especially Y..hen it has been held that the such Additional Judge has a legitmate expectancy and a right to be considered for continuance either for another term or as a Permanent Judge and the consideration of his case would suffer grave infirmity and illegality unless the consultation is again full and effective, that is to say, all facts concerning him are before all the functionaries undertaking the consultation including his version on facts allegedly adverse to him. In other words the procedure to be followed in such consultation under Art. 217(1) qua an Additional Judge must ensure fair-play in relation to him. If a person has a right to be considered such right cannot be effective unless he has an opportunity to meet or explain the alleged adverse material against him. Sans such opportunity his right to be considered will be\n\niJ!usorl and unreal. [974 G-H; 975 A-CJ\n\n...\n\nS.1'. OtJt>TA v. UNION 443\n\n10:4. It is clear from the record that \"further details\" and \"concrete facts and material\" in regard to the allegations of lack of integrity against Shri S.N. Kumar were not put to him nor was his explanation thereon sought; The question of Chief Justice of India disclosing or putting to him the said material obviously does not arise, for he himself was not apprised of such \"further details\" and \"Concrete facts or materials\" but the same constituted the basis on which the Delhi Chief Justice and the Union Law Minister acted leading to the impugned decision and therefore it was up to the Delhi Chief Justice to have apprised Shri S.N. Kumar of such material by telling him that the same is likely tn be held against him and by seeking his explanation or version thereon and it was up to the Union Law Minister to see to it that such procedure was followed through the Delhi Chief Justice before advising the appointing authority to act on the same The record does not show that anything of the kind was done and in that sense also there was no full and effective consultation which vitiates the impugned decision. [975 D-H]\n\n10:5. In short, in Shri S.N. Kumar's case it is quite clear that both these high constitutional functionaries namely, the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice abdicated their constitutional responsibility or to use Justice Krishna lyer's language they utterly failed to discharge their \"accountability to the Justice constituency.\" The decision against Shri S. N. Kumar is vitiated by legal ma/a /ides and as such is void and non-est. [975 G-H; 976A]\n\n11:1. A policy transfer, therefore, without fixing the requisite mechanism or modality or procedure that ensured complete insulation against executive interference, could be a punitive transfer in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive whereas a selective transfer in an appropriate case for strictly objective reasons and in public interest could be non-punitive, with the result that each case of transfer, whether based on a policy or a selective transfer, will have to he Judged on the facts and circumstances of its own for deciding whether it is punitive in character in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive or not. In the case of the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh the transfer must be regarded as a selective transfer and not based on the policy in the contemplation of the Union Government, notwithstanding the reference to \"Government Policy\" made by the Chief Justice of India during his telephonic talk with Shri K.B.N. Singh on January 5, 1981. [986 A-D]\n\n11:2. The two considerations, namely, (I) remedying dissatisfactory G working conditions in a High Court (certain persons exploiting their proximity to a Judge) and (ii) posting an experienced senior Chief Justice in a High Court, can not be considered to be \"Not in public interest\". (988 D-F]\n\nBut it will not be correct to draw an inference of the concerned Judge's H connivance or complicity in every case where persons close to him exploit their proximity to him while handling their matters in the High Court and in the\n\n444 StJP!lEMll COUkT REPOktS [1982] 2 s.c.a..\n\nabsence of any connivance or complicity on his part, such exploitation of close proximity would not imply any reflection on the Judge concerned. It is conceivable that undesirable activities are indulged in without his knowledge or consent-may even against his wishes and sometimes despite counter measures adopted by him, and yet such exploitation of close proximity and the undesirable activities would spoil the atmosphere and lead to dissatisfactory working conditions io the High Court. lo such a case if the atmosphere has to be improved and dissatisfactory working conditions have to be remedied it may become inevitable to transfer the concerned Judge without any blame attaching to him whatsoever ; it is obvious that such a transfer will not carry any reflection on him. Further if the data or information, which leads to the discovery of dissatisfactory working conditions in th~ High Court, were also to indicate the concerned Judge's connivance or complicity in the exploitation then only the question of putting the same to him will arise but not otherwise. In the absence of any connivance or complicity oo his part in the matter of the exploitation, no reflection on Shri K.B.N. Singh is implied simply by reason of his transfer, which must be regarded as having been made, with a view to remedying the dissatisfactory working conditions in that High Court and no unfair play was involved in the procedure followed by the Chief Justice of India. lo the circumstances, it is clear that the impugned transfer has been in public interest and not by way of punishment. [988 G-H; 989 A-G]\n\n11:3. It is true that a mere recital in the impugned Notification dated 19th January, 1981 about such consultation will not be of much avail especially when the factum of such full and effective consultation has been put in issue but sufficient materials have been produced on record to show that there was full and effective consultation as contemplated by Article 222(1) before the transfer order E was made. [989 H; 990 A-B]\n\n11 :4.· Io writ proceedings the affidavits, counter-affidavits and rejoinderaffidavits filed by the parties constitute not merely their pleadings but also partake of the character of evidence in the case and it is from this angle that the counteraffidavits filed on behalf of the contesting respondents, particularly that of the Chief Justice of India, a party to the consultative process, will have to be examined. [990 C-D]\n\n11 :5. From the material produced on record, therefore, it is abundantly clear that there was full and effective consultation between the transferring authority on the one hand and the Chief Justice of India oo the other in regard to the impugned transfer as contemplated by Art.222(1) before the effective decision there on was taken, and if the consultation has been full and effective as contemplated by Art. 222(1), as is shown by the material produced on record, the contention that the normal procedure ought not to have been reversed and the proposal should have emanated from the President and not from the Chief Justice of India as is the case here loses its significance. Moreover, there is !10 hard and fast rule as to from whom a proposal for transfer should emanate. [992 F.-G]\n\n....... - ,..• \" ' ... \\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 445\n\n11:6. The material on record clearly shows that the Chief Justice of India had discussed all the relevant aspects concerning the impugned transfer with Shri K.B.N. Singh including his personal difficulty pertaining to his mother's advanced age and serious illness. That the Chief Justice of India took a different view about it does not mean that any unfair-play was involved. After all in his view public interest outweighed the considerations of personal difficulty as well as the language difficulty which were put before him. There being no charge nor any imputation against Shri K.B.N. Singh, there was no question of giving him an opportunity to meet any. It is thus clear, that the procedure that was followed ensured complete fair-play qua Shri K.B.N. Singh. [992 G-H; 993 AB]\n\n11:7. Art. 222(2) does not provide that the order fixing compensatory allowance to the transferee Judge has to be isued simultaneously alongwith the transfer order ; all that it provides is that when a Judge has been or is transferred after complying with the requirement of Sub-Art.(!) he shall, during the period he serves as a Judge of other High Court, be entitled to receive, in addition to his salary, such compensatory allowance as may be determined, by Parliament by law and, until so determined, such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.\n\nIt is obvious that such an order fixing the compensatory allowance could follow and would have followed, in the insiant case, within reasonable time but here the occasion to make such order got postponed because of the stay of transfer that was ordered by this Court.\n\n[993 G-H; 994 A-B]\n\n12. A section of the Press, while reporting the proceedings of this Court in this case seems to have, without fully realising the scope and purpose of the disclosure ordered by the Court, exceeded its limits of fair reporting and fair comme.nt by discussing the merits and demerits of the grounds on which recommendations were made concerning the Judges or the truth or falsity of the disclosed material; assuming that this Court was intending to adjudicate on the merits or demerits of the grounds of the recommendations made or on truth or falsity of the materials even then the Press could not have, before this Court has finally adjudicated upon the issues involved, pronounce its verdict-which it almost didon the high constitutional functionaries involved by holding a trial by Press. The disclosure, which became necessary in the highest public interest of administration of Justice-for seeing that injustice was not perpetrated and justice was meted out to high judicial functionaries under the Constitution, was not intended for being used for such purpose. Such behaviour of a section of the Press has been most distressing and has unnecessarily affected the image of Judiciary and the hih coustitutional functionaries involved. [995 A-El\n\nPer Desai J.\n\n1 :1. Independence of Judiciary under the constitution has to be ascertained within the frame work and the parameters of the constitution. There are\n\nvarious provisions in the constitution which indicate that the constitution has not H provided something like a \"hands off attitude\" to the judiciary. The power of appointment of High Court Judges and the Judges of the Supreme Court vests in the Presi\\:lent and the President. \\>in~ a Constitutional Head, he is constitutioµ-\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.11.\n\nally bound to act according to the advice of the Council of Ministers. Articles 32(3), 133(3), 138, 139, 140, 130, 230, 234, 237, 225, 126, 127(i), 128 confer such power on other constitutional institutions such as the executive which when it acts within the limits of power will have a direct impact on the functioning of the judiciary. This conspectus of Articles, not meant to be exhaustive do indicate that Parliament has power to regulate court's jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, judiciary the third branch of the Government cannot act in isolation. They are ensured total freedom of course, after entering the Office, from any overt or cowrt pressure or interference in the process of adjudicating causes brought before them and to this end they are ensured tenure, pay, pension, privileges and certain basic conditions of service. The judiciary like any other constitutional instrumentality has, however, to act towards attainment of constitutional goals. The independence of judiciary is not to be determined in all its ramifications, as some a priori concept but it has to be determined within the frame work of the constitution. True, the thrust is to ensure that adjudications are untrammelled by external pressures or controls and independence of judiciary under the constitution is confined to the adjudicatory functions of the courts and tribunals and they are insulated from executive control in that behalf. It is not unlikely that the total insulation may breed ivory tower attitude. It is not as if judicial independence is an absolute thing like a brooding omnipresence. One need not too much idolise the independence of judiciary so as to become counter-productive.\n\n[1008 G-H; 1009 A-H; 1010 A, 1010 D-G]\n\n1:2. While undoubtedly political packing must be abhrred, in putting the independence of the judiciary on pedestal, one cannot lose sight o:f the fact, that the judiciary must keep pace with the changing mores of the day, its decisions must be informed by values enshrined in the constitution, the goals set forth in the fundamental Law of the land, peoples' yearnings desire for a chanc:e for the better and the promised millenium. An actvist role in furtherence of the same is sine qua non for the judiciary. If value packing connotes appointment of the persons otherwise well qualified as required by the constitu1ion, having a.dditional qualifications, of awareness of a high priority task of eradication of poverty, removal of economic disparity, destroying the curse of ii literary, ignorance, exploitation, feudal overlordship, coupled with conscious commitment, to administerring socio-economic justice, establishment of a just social order, and egalitarian society, then not only the value packing is not to be frowned upon nor thwarted by entrenched establishments, prone people but it must be advocati'd with a crusador's zeal, as judiciary can not stand aloof and apart from the mainstream of the society., This will ensure its broad accour:tablity to injustice ridden masses and therefore, it is not unnatural that the status quoists can enter their caveat to value packing but which does not commend.\n\nWhile appointing each individual the constitutional philosophy of each individual ought to be a vital consideration and if this is labelled as value packing it is neither unethical nor unconstitutional nor a weapon to strike at independence of judiciary. [1011 E-H; 1012 A-BJ .,\n\n2:1. Undoubtedly Sec. 123 of evidence act, a century old provision enacted to some extent, keeping in view the needs of empire builders must change in\n\n1'1~ context of the Republican Goven1meqt 11nd the open society which in India\n\nI I\n\n_I )-\n\n\\ ' {\n\n) 1 I '~ j\n\nI I - I\n\n~.!>, OUttA-•. UNION. 447\n\nwe have set up. Undoubtedly there must be such affair of state involving security of the nation and foreign affairs where public interest necessitates security but fair administration or justice is itself a matter or vital public interest Therefore, if two public interests conflict the Court will have to decide.whether the public inter•\n\nest which formed he foundation for claiming the privilege would be jeopardised. if the disclosure is ordered and on the other hand whether fair administration of . 'justice would suffer by nondisclosure and decide which way the balance. tilts; In the ultimate analysis the approach. of the. court, while deciding thC question of privilege would be that it has to balance public interest in . just justice and just administration of justice and state affairs at high level in respect of appointment to high constitutional offices and then decide which way the balance tilts. Having formulated this test, the answer is that the disclosure in the interest of justice far outweighs the possible embarrassment felt by disclosing certain aspets.\n\nl:t. In the democracies the world over till today there are two known methods or recruitments, nomination and election~. Under the Indian Constitu .. tion the power to appoint judges vests in the executive. The methodology adOJ>- ted by various democratic countries in the matter of appointment Of judges reveals that the power to aPpoint judges where election method is eschewed always vested in the executive and it has not been found tO be subversive of independence of\n\njudiciarY. / The contention cannot be accepted in view of the frank admissiOn, D in the SOth report of Law Commission that. by and large the existing system of appointment of judges is sound. [1014 C.E]\n\n3:2. Further the constituent assembly in terms. rejectedany veto to be vested in the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of a High Court Judge. What is specifically moved and rejected while drafting the constitution cannot be introduced by the backdoor through the process of interpretation. It is too late in the day to Contend that debates in the constituent assembly do not\n\nprovide an aid to construction of articles of constitution or it is impermissible to refer to them. [1015 A-B; 1016 AC] ·\n\nState of Mysore v. R.V. Bldap [1974] 1 SCR 589; Union of India v. G.S.\n\nDhillon (1972] 2 SC' R 33 relied on; Sagnata lnvestmentJ Ltd. v, Norwich Corpo ration [1971) 3WLR 133 quoted with approval.\n\n3:3. The President is a constitutional or formal bead and he must exercise his powers and functions conferred on him by 6r under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his council of Ministers. The power to appoint Judges confer red oD the President by Articles 217(1) and 124 is an executive power, and. in the absence of a provisiOn in the constitution which permits the President to act in his discretion, bereft of the advice of the council of Ministers, it is not possible to hold that in the matter of appointment of Judges of High Court and Supreme Court, the advice offered under Article 74 is not binding on the President. Where the President is not expected to act on the advice of the council of Ministers a clear indication is given in the constitution. It cannot be said that while exerci .sing _the power Of appQi.Q.tm.ent .or Judes or SupremC? Cort a; n'=1 Hib Court! thq\n\n448 SUPREMI! CoURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R\n\nPresident is either perfoTrning a ju'dicial or quasi judicial function. It is admit tedly an executive function, and howsoeVer, one i:nay like to wish away the interference of the council ·or Ministers in the matter of 8ppointinent of Judges or High Court and Supreme Court, the frarriers of cOnstitution, after having' examined various aspeCts of the matter conferred\" power on the President rejecting :-- simultaneOusly the vetO of Chief Justice of India~- Once this :iunCtion of appoint- . ment of Judges is held to be an executiVe function, Article 74 would come -into operation with all its rigours and the President will have tO' act on the advice of council of Ministers. [1016 G, 1019 C-E, 1020 C-E)\n\n, . Slzamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) I SCR 814 followed; Ramjawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR 236-237, A. Sanjee.i Naidu v. State of Madr., (1970) 2 SCR SOS at 511 UNR Rao v. Indira Gandhi [1971) Supp, SCR 46, Sardari/a/ v. Union of India & Ors. (1971) 3 SCR 461, Jayantlla/ Amrit la/ Shed an v. F.N. Rana & Ors. [1964) S SCR 294; Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter [1971) 3 SCR .483 referred to.\n\n_ 3:4. Looking at the language of Article 217, there is no distinctJon In the use of the two expressions. namely, after consultation with ,\"and'\" in considera .. tion with, which may have an impact on the construction or the Article. The power is 1the power to appoint and the limitations on the power is to consult the three functionaries. Ultimate power of appointment unquestionably vests in tho President. [1025 A-B, DJ\n\n3:5. Participation of the execulive in the decision making process of appointment of a judge would not be su!rversive of, the iridependence of the E _judiciary~ Even a body like the Law Commission was of the considered opinion,\n\nthat it would not be conducive to appointment of suitable persons, to totally exclude the state executive in the decision making process for. appointment of a 'Judge of a High Court. The power to appoint a judge of a High Court is in the President. When appointed by the President the judge would be working as a\n\n- , _judge of the High Court to which be is appointed His salary, pension, allowan .. ces. etc: would be chargeable on the consotidated fund of the state. Influenced F by these Considerations the constitution itself provides for giving a share to the\n\n.... \"\"',--............ state executive in the decision making process and it would be contrary to the intendment of the constitution to exclude it by process of interpretation.\n\n' '-,,.\n\n[1026 E-H; 1027AJ\n\n--,..-_\n\n3:6-, Once some one is appointed as a judge of the High Court under Art. 217, he is to be suffered even though h(s continuance may not be conducive to the fair administration of justice. Extreme care was, therefore, focussed on the question of the initial appointment probably in order to see -that error of judgement of one or the other, constitutional functionary may not go unnoticed.\n\n-....___;__ Three high constitutional functionaries were involved in the process of appoint\n\n. ment of a judge of the High court, and each one, namely, the Chief Justice of thC\n\nHigh Court, the Governor of the State, are the highest judicial and excutive func tionaries in the State and the Chief Justice of India holder of the highest office in the country, were to be consulted bCfore the President took the step of making an H\n\nppointment under Article 217. When three such high constitutional function ..\n\n...\n\nS.1>, GUPTA V. UNION 449\n\naries participate in the process of consultation there would be a remote or minimal chance of some infirmity being over-looked or any vital consideration relevant to the process of ap; iointmen t being ignored and the best man will be selected. In the u l!imate analysis consumers of justice are interested in securing undiluted justice free not only from bias or subservience but free from predilections, aberrations, preconceived notions and personal philosophies of incumbent of the office of a judge. In a country by rule of law, respect for the law is a sine qua non and the respect for law would increase and enhance directly in the proportion to the work of judges in law courts which would inspire confidence.\n\nActuated with a burning desire that the best one is selected for appointment, while vesting the power in the highest executive of the country three high constitutional functionaries were involved in the decision making process. The State executive, theiefore, must participate as intended by the Constitution in this process and its role cannot be minimised by the specious plea that it might erode independence of judiciary. [1027 C-G, 1028 B-C]\n\n3:7. There is nothing in the language of Article 217 that the proposal cannot be initiated by any of the four constitutional functionaries set out in the article. If elaborate provision was made for appointment of a High Court judge with a view to securing the appointment of the best available man for the time being it would not be conducive to effectuating the purpose underlying the article if the proposal can be initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court alone. The Chief Justice of India can also initiate a proposal and there could not be a blanket embargo on the state executive initiating the proposal. But the state executive should not make its own recommendation and forward it directly to the Centre. The State Executive initiating the proposal must first forward it to the Chief Justice of the High Court who would be better informed about the practising advocates as well as the District Judges subordinate to the High Court, and seek the views of the Chief Justice. The process of consultation must go on whatever new facts relevant to the consideration are elicited or obtained by any of the constitutional functionaries and this may ultimately lead to a possible consensus amongst all the constitutional functionaries and translate the purpose underlying Article 217 into reality by appointing the best man to this High Office.\n\nThe submission that any proposal from the State Executive or even from the Central Executive for consideration of the other two constitutional functionaries would make a serious inroad on the independence of judiciary is to ignore the role assigned to these two constitutional functionaries in the process of appointment.\n\nHowever, the consultation must be not merely formal but of substance.\n\n[1032 H, 1033 A-G]\n\n4: I. It cannot be said that the Chief Justice of India when consulted under Article 217 would have primacy over the view of the Chief Justice of the G H.igh Court. (1029 G-H]\n\n4:2. The President is under constitutional obligation to consult the three constitutional functionaries. Each is on par. They are co-ordinate authorities.\n\nThere is no relative hierarchy. At any rate, the appellate jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of India functioning as a judge of the Supreme Court over a decision of the Chief Justice of the High Court would not provide an indicia that the view of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe Chief Justice of India in administrative matters has predominance or overri- . ding effect over the view of the Chief Justice of the High Court. In the process of drafting the Constitution there was some suggestion that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over the High Court and this suggestion was rejected. Initiation of proposal for appointment of High Court judge is not a judicial function of the Chief Justice of the High Court. While performing this function Chief Justice of the High Court is not under the administrative subordination of the Chief Justice of India. Further as the system functions, proposal, for appointment of a High Court Judge is initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court, The person recommended may be a member of the Bar or from the subordinate judiciary, say a District judge. As the High Court has both administrative and judicial control over the subordinate judiciary, the Chief Justice of the High Court is more knowledgeable about the capacity, ability and eligibility of a District Judge for being considered for the post of High Court Judge. Chief Justice of India will have very little information about the capacity, eligibility and quality of a District Judge. Similarly, while recommending a person from the Bar in the State, Chief Justice of the High Court is more advantageously placed compared to Chief Justice of India. And, Chief Justice of India will have to depend upon his sources of information which may not either exclude grapevine or hearsay. He has little or no opportunity of seeing the member of the Bar functioning as a lawyer in the Court Cumulatively, therefore, Chief Justice of the High Court is more advantageously placed compared to the Chief Justice of India in this behalf. About the various other factors which enter into the verdict, the State executive will be more favourably placed than the Chief Justice of India becauseJt bas its own instrumentalities for inquiry and information. Therefore, the view of the Chief Justice of India cannot have any primacy in this behalf.\n\n[1029 A-G]\n\nShamsher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR P. 814 Union of India v.\n\nJyoti Prakash Mitter [1971] 3 SCR 493 distinguished.\n\n4:3. To say that high constitutional functionaries like the Chief Justice of a High Court would not be free from several such shorccomings and that the Chief Justice of India would be free from such shortcomings is not basically sound to over reach the plain intendment of Article 217. There was no question of primacy to be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of India with regard to the advi~ preferred by him when consulted under Article 222 because he is the only constitutional functionary required to be consulted. The very expression \"Primacy\" envisages two or more coordinate authorities, one having a preferential position over the other. Such a situation does not arise under Article 222 and, therefore, torn out of context the use of the expression pater familias would not help. Therefore, the view of the Chief Justice of India when consulted under Article 217 would not have primacy over the view of the Chief Justice of the High Court. P1imacy has the flavour of veto and if conceded the authority to be consulted would become the final decision making authority. No canon of construction permits such a thing to be done. The Court cannot assign to one authority powers explicitly granted to another. [1030 E-H, 1031 C-E, 1032 B-C]\n\n~··.\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 451\n\n5:1. The framers' of the constitution envisaged appointment of an addi- .tional Judge in the High Court in contradistinction to a permanent judge or acting judge. A retired judge of a High Court who is requested to sit and act as a judge of the High Court is not deemed to be a judge of the High Court, and can be given no lab)e or nomenclature and is certainly not an additional judge as contemplated by Article 224. An additional judge can only be appointed either by reason of temporary increase in the business of the High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein. If one or both of the' requisites are satisfied the President may proc.:ed to appoint an additional judge but in the absence of both there is no power in the President to appoint an additional judge in the High Court.\n\nAppointment cannot be made for a period exceeding two years and before or while making the appointment the number of Judges in the High Court may be increased for the time being, f.e. not permanently.\n\nThe expression judge in Article 217 includes an additional judge. [1034 E-G, 1035 A-D, E]\n\nKrishan Gopal v. Shri Parkash Chandra and Others [1974] 2 SCR 206., explained.\n\n5:2. An additional judge before entering upon his office has to make and subscribe an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the Third schedule. Article 224 obliges the President to specify the tenure of the additional judge for such period not exceeding two years. Now, therefore, if the additional judge with the knowledge of the specified period of tenure enters upon his office, makes and subscribes to the oath and starts functioning as a judge of the High Court, undoubtedly when the period expires, if nothing else takes place he ceases to be a judge of the High Court. Assuming that he has to be appointed again, the whole gamut of consultation as constitutionally ordained in Article 217 bas to be gone through over again. Harsh though this may appear, it is an inescapable situation flowing from the provisions of the Constitution. Now if the process of consultation starts over again undoubtedly the various constitutional functionaries are bound to express their. opinion on the relevant merits and demerits of the judge and the expression of opinion would be more or less on the same lines as when a person is being appointed for the first time as a judge of the High Court.\n\nWhatever canon of construction one may resort to, it is not possible to hold that the consultation in respect of an additional judge who has been once appointed and whose tenure has expired and being eligible, isbeing considered for appointment afresh for a fresh tenure, the relevant consideration which would govern the decision for appointment would be different, save and except saying that the cons_ titutional functionaries will have the additional benefit of the experience of the person concerned as a judge of .the High Court for the period he was appointed am! he worked. (1039 C'H, 1040 A]\n\n6:1. In a parliamentary democracy with a written Constitution in which three organs of the Government are clearly marked out, it becomes a primary duty of the Ste.te to provide for fair and efficient administration of justice .. Justice must be within the easy reach of the \\QWst of the Jowlies\\, Raqcour of injustic~\n\n452 SUPREME COURT RBpORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R\n\nhurts an individual leading to bitterness resentment and frustration and rapid evaporation of the faith in the institution of judiciary. Two vital limbs of the justice system are that justice must be within the easy reach of the weaker sections of the society and that it must be attaintable within a reasonably short-time, in other words, speedily. Leaving aside other factors contributing to the arrears in courts, it cannot be gainsaid that in each High Court adequate number of judges must be appointed and the situation in each High Court must be regularly reviewed by the President so as to efficiently discharge the duty cast on him by Article 216. [1042 G-H, 1043 A]\n\n6:2. All short-comings and infirmities in the system cannot be remedied by judicial process. Courts cannot cope with all infirmities in the system. Failure to perform duty of appointing adequate number of judges in High Courts cast on the President by Article 216 would make him answerable to the Parliament and not to the Court. [1044 A-D]\n\n6:3. Denial of extension of tenure to Additional Judge without completing process of consultation in letter and spirit can be challenged i~ Court.\n\n6:4. Article 224 was not meant to provide an entry door for becoming a judge of a High Court under Article 217. Article 224 was for a specific purpose.\n\nArticle 224 was meant to confer power on the President to increase for the time being the number of Judges in a High Court and to appoint additional judges to fill in the increased strength. This power can be exercised if one or the other of two pre-requisites set out in Article 224 is satisfied. The article was worked as if an entry in the High Court for a permanent judgeship is via Article 224, namely, by first being appointed as an additional judge and then when a vacancy occurs in the permanent strength of the High Court, to be appointed as a permanent judge, This has been invariably the practice save in rare cases ascertainable by microscope. Every one was ordinarily first _appointed as an additional judge and in course of time even after once, twice or thrice being appointed as an additional judge till the vacancy occurred in the permanent strength that one became a permanent judge. This is clearly contrary to the intendment of Article 224, and the present malaise arises out of this impermissible, yet without exception or with rare exception, use of Article 224 both by the executive and judiciary. This has also led to inaction on the part of the President in not reviewing regularly and at regular intervals the permanent strength of the High Courts. Even Chief Justices were unconcerned ab_out the undesirable situation in that they have asked for increase in the strength of additional judges. If permanent strength was reviewed from time to time the renewal of tenure of an additional judge twice orthrice could have been avoided. If an additional judge was appointed to deal with temporary increase in work and his term is renewed twice or thrice and the temporary increase ha~ become a permanent feature of the High Court, what was needed was increase in the permanent strength of the High Court. It is unbecoming for a\n\nJiih Court judlle to b~ on two years tenure repeatedly. That is clearly contrary\n\n------- -· .\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 453\n\nto what was intended by Article 224. Ordinarily an additional judge save in rare cases was always offered a permanent judgeship unless he himself wanted to opt out. From this invariable practice, a firm belief, therefore,' developed that an additional judge enters upon office with almost an unwritten albeit incontrovertible assurance to b~ appointed a permanent judge. Howsoever strong the belief may be, it is not borne out by the constitutional provision. After all, the appointment was as an additional judge within the constraints and limitation of Art. 224 and no canon of construction would permit the .court to treat the appointment as one under Article 217.\n\nIf, therefore, the tenure was of two years, on the expiry of it the appointment will have to be a fresh appointment and for making such a fresh appointment, consultation as ordained by Article 217 is inescapable. Once the consultation starts, all possible hazards in the process of consultation cannot be wished away and the appointment has to be afresh. [1045E-H, 1046A-H,1047A-E]\n\n6:5. A practice has grown up for over last quarter of a century (1956-81)· that whenever an additional judgeship is offered to a person, he accepts it in the reasonable belief that in course of time he would get a berth as a permanent judge. It may generate hope in him and his expectations could be said to be wellfounded and reasonable more so it is, save in rarest of rare cases, invariably done so far. At the minimal most he is entitled to be first considered for a fresh tenure of two years or when the permanent vacancy arises for appointment to the permanent vacancy before any rank outsider is considered, given the situation that the pre-requisites which necessitated his initial appointment continue to exist. There is no gainsaying the fact that a practice was followed for over 25 years tht an additional judge was always first considered and he was entitled to be considered for a fresh tenure if there was no permanent vacancy and if there was a vacancy in the permanent strength for being appointed as a permanent judge. .\n\n[1054 F-H, 1055 B-C]\n\n6:6. Constitutional conventions grow around and upon the principles of the written constitution and where the power of the government are vested in . different persons or bodies or where there is a written constitution. But conventions do presuppose the law and any convention contrary to the written context is of no validity. The conventions are built, in the first instance, on the foundation of law but once they are established they tend to form the basis for the law. These rules of law which are conventions are a mere matter of practice and their effect must change with the changing circumstances of national life. That apart, what is sought, is not enforcement of the convention in the court but 'its being invoked as an aid to construction of Article 224. Implications arising from the provisions of the constitution, constitutional conventions and constitutional practice all stand on a different footing. A constitutional convention when spread over a long period, of immemorial antiquity, followed.invariably becomes entrenched as a rule of law but any convention contrary to the written provision is of no vali dity. Implications may arise from the context in which a provision is placed or the use of the language in the provision r from the nature of the power claimed vis-a-vis the whole constitutional scheme. Constitutional practice may be spelt out as a course of conduct over a reasonably long period which may indicate how the authorities charged with a duty to implement the constitution have worked cut or implemented. a certain proviiQP. '?f te ~~J?; S\\itution,. c A, oi; i.tit1,1tim;1a\\\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nconventio~ must be founded on some provision of law. Any convention contrary to the provision of, the constitution and its basic intendment cannot be given effect to as a convention. Its genesis must be in the provision itself,.\n\n[ 1053 A-B, E-F, H, 1054 A-CJ\n\nCommonwealth v. Colonial Combing etc. etc. Co. Ltd. [1922] 31 CLR p. 438-439 Quoted with approval.\n\nH.H. Keshavananda Bharati v. Union of India [1973] Supp. SCR p. I refered to.\n\n6:7. If Art. 224 conferred power on the President to appoint additional judge only in the specified situation set out in the article and for a fixed limited duration beyond which even the President had no power to appoint, it cannot be said that because the way in which the article has been worked, a constitutional\n\nconventio~ has grown up that every additional judge right from the day of bis entry irrespective of his two years' tenure would be deemed to be appointed as a permanent judge or would be entitled as a matter of right to a renewal of his tenure till a permanent vacancy arose. Such a construction of Article 224 would run counter to the plain intendment of the constitution and no such convention can be spelt out as would pro tanto amend Article 224. Nor any such implication can be raised that an additional udge is deem::d to be appointed as a permanent judge or be is entitled as of right to a' renewal of his tenure till a permanent berth is found for him. [1054 C-F]\n\n6:8. The constitutional scheme is that ordinarily there would be permanent judges of the High Court. Article 224 is an enabHng provision conferring power on the President to appoint additiQnal judge to meet a specific situation, namely, a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or the arrears in the High Court. Ordinarily, therefore, the constitution envisages appointment of permanent judges. Permanent judges are appointed to deal with the regular work of the High Court and the strength is fixed keeping in view the institutions and disposals and the minimum work-load which each judge is supposed to handle.\n\nWhen permanent strength of the High Court is fixed and there is a vacancy, it would mean that for the routine work of the High Court the number of judges is inadequate and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the President to fill in the vacancy unless it can be made out that the work-load in the High Court does not justify the appointment. But if the permanent vacancy is not filled in and the President proceeds to appoint an additional judge, which can only be done if there is a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or if there are arrears, it would mean that the regular work is not sufficient for the sanctioned. strength of permanent judges and vacancy may remain unfilled, an additional judge is necessary as if temporary increase in the work of High Court or arrears cannot be dealt with by permanent judges. Two situations cannot co-exist. Additional judges can be. appointed when the permanent judges wqile dealing with the regular work of the High Court are unable to deal with such temporary increase in the work of the High Court or clear the arrears. If the permanent strength is reduced by not filling in a vacancy and it is considered not necessary to fill in such vacancy it would only imply that not only regular work of the High Court is being adequately handled but an~ other work in the High Court can also be handled by the\n\nS.i>. OtJi>tA v. UNION\n\nnumber of judges then working in the High Court. In such a situation appointment of additional judge cannot be justified and in the absence of pre-condition set out in Article 224 the appointment of an additional judge would be plainly outside the purview of Article 224 and contrary to the intendment of Article 224.\n\nTherefore, when a permanent post is vacant an additional judge cannot be appoin- - ted. An additional judge even if appointed, could not be deemed to be a permanent judge. If the President appoints an additional judge and specifies his tenure as tw~ yearn in the warrant of appointment, it is not open to the appointee to ignore the tenure and to _accept' the appoiritment,-as being of a permanent judge.\n\nUndoubtedly consultation for the purposes of Article 224 and for appointing a permanent judge under Article 217 is of the same width' and dimension and the constitutional functionaries involved in the process of appointment are all the same, nonetheless power of the President to appoint for a fixed duration in a given situation even if the situation is shown not to exist, cannot be understood to mean that the President had some other power under some other Article and is deemed to have acted under that Article. Here the President has specifically set out in the warrant of appqintment tbat the Judge is appointed as \"additional judge\" for \"a period of two years\". Even if the pre-requisite for exercise of power was absent and therefore, it was an impermissible exercise of power under Art. 224 there was.no intention to appoint a permanent judge which this Court by a deeming fiction can enforce. Doctrine of severability is no_t attracted.\n\n[1055 F-H, 1056 A-F, 1057 C-E, 1058 D-E]\n\nWaterside Workers Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander Ltd. 25 C.L.R. 434 ; Shewpujan Rai v. Collector of Customs [1959) 2 S.C.R. 821 ; Y.\n\n\n6:9. Article 224 provides for a tenure not exceeding two years. It may be that the problem may not be wholly solved within the period of two years but the reasonable expectation was that a period of two years would provide adequate length of time to the additional judge to deal with the problem for tackling which he is appointed. It was assumed that a period of reasonable duration such as two F years would give adequate opportunity to an additional judge appoir.ted for a specific task an.d the approach in appointment would be a result oriented approach. If this was the underlying assumption in enacting Article 224, the appointment of short-term duration of six months or in the two cases here, of three months, is inconsistent with the intendment of Art 224 and unbecoming of the dignity of a High Court Judge. The appointment for such a ridiculously short duration of three months or six months is not only an exercise in futility but is G inconsistent with the intendment of Article 224. Further such appointment cannot be made for the purpose of making inquiries into the suitability, eligibility or fitness of the incumbent additional judge at the time of consideration of bis appointment for a fresh term. [1058 G-H, 1059 A, C-G]\n\n6:10. Whenever the tenure of an additional judge is about to expire, sufficiently in advance ihe process of consultation for considering his case for\n\n456 SUPREM)i COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C.lt.\n\nappointment as envisaged by Article 217 must start and it must proceed along the hitherto chalked out lines. It has to be completed sufficiently in advance before the tenure is to expire and a decision has to be taken. If the incumbent of the\n\noffice is considered suitable for a fresh tenure, keeping in view the only two relevant considerations, namely, the existence of the temporary increase in the work of the Court or the continued existence of the arrears for resolving or tackling which the judge was appointed, his fresh tenure should be fixed. If on objective consideration it appears that the situation is not likely to improve even within a period of two years, normally the fresh tenure should be of two years unless a contrary legitimate decision verifiable on objective facts is reached that the problem can be resolved within a short period which should in no case be less than one year. It violently hurts the dignity of a Judge of a High Court to be appointed for a period of six months or three months and that during this period he is not supposed to clear the arrears to deal with l!Vhich he was appointed but during the period of three months either the executive or the Chief Justice of India will be holding their inquisition to consider his future suitability, a decision which these two high constitutional functionaries could not reach within a period of two years for which initially the additional judge was appointed. There can be a short-term appointment when in a near future a vacancy in the permanent cadre of the High Court is likely to occur. That approach is hardly relevant because even if the additional judge is appointed, say for a period of one year, and vacancy occurs within three months of his appointment, there is no bar in law in offering him the permanent appointment and if the workload still justifies, to appoint someone else as an additional judge. [1060 D-H, 1061 A, C-D]\n\n7:1. The word 'Consultation' has been used in different contexts and different authorities are required to be consufted for different purposes before exercise of certain power. The scope and content of consultation may vary from situation to situation. The word 'consult' would take its colour and its content and scope will depend upon the context in which it is used. If the consultation is for appointment all those relevant considerations which enter the verdict before an appointment is mad.e would be the subject-matter of consultation. If the consultation is for transfer of a High Court Judge under Article 222(1) the word 'consultation' would mean examination of all those relevant aspects to be presently mentioned including the consequences of transfer. [1062 D-G]\n\n\n7:2. Under Article 217(1) the consultation is for the purpose of appoint ment of a judge of a High Court. The constitutional functionaries to be consul ted are the Chief Justice of the High Court, Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India. The consultation has to be meaningful, purposeful, result oriented and of sul:stance. Wherever the President can exercise the power in consultation with the Chief Justice of India or other constitutional functionaries, the consultation has to be o~ all relevant aspects which would enter the final.\n\n8.1'. GtJ1''l'A V. UNION 457\n\nverdict. All the parties involved in the process of consultation must put all the A material at its command relevant io the subject under discussion before all other authorities to be consulted. Nothing can be kept back. Nothing can be withheld.\n\nNothing can be left for the eye of any particular constitutional functionary. Th• President has, however, a right upon consideration of all relevant facts to differ from the other constitutional functionaries for cogent reasns and take a contrary view. [1063 H, 1064A, 1065 A-B]\n\n7:3. The non-appointment is the end product of a process of appointment. There is nothing like an independent process of non-appointment. When the four constitutional functionaries are involved in the decision making process of appointment, differences of opinion are inevitable. The President may ultimately adopt the proposal or drop the proposal resulting in non-appointment.\n\n[1066 E-F, C-D]\n\n7:4. The Chief Justice of the High Court does not have veto sub-siltntio over other constitutional functionaries. It must be the obligatory duty of the Chief Justice to initiate the proposal. May be, his initiation of the proposal may start with a recommendation that. he is not in favour of a fresh term for the con cerned additional judge. He is entitled to express his opinion. .Proposal has, however, to be proceeded further and must be sent to the Governor of the State who with his own opinion endorsed in. the proceeding .should forward the same to the Minister of Justice and who in turn must send it to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nNo constitutional functionary merely entitled to be. consulted has a right to kill the proposal on his own. When there are differences of opinion· qua a person amongst the three constitutional functionaries entitled to be consulted, it is inevitable in the very scheme of things that the PresideLt will have to choose keeping in view the fundamental assumption underlying this complex scheme that the best must be appointed and the doubtful must be eliminated. Therefore, there is nothing like a process of non-appointment in respect of which consultation can be eschewed. [1066 B-H] ·\n\n7:5. Whenever a proposal for appointment is initiated by any of the constitutional functionaries before it can be killedat any stage the process of consultation must go through in its entirety~ [1071 C-D]\n\n8:1. The Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 is constitutionally valid. It is impossible to read any overt or covert attempt at transferring judges from one High Court to another. There is not even a whisper of transfer in the circular. '\n\n[1074 A-BJ\n\n8:2. Fresh appointment cannot be bracketed with transfer. Consent is sought from an additional judge whose tenure is about to expire and to whom a fresh tenureif, to be offered. Ipso facto it will be a fresh appointment. Initial tenure having come to a close, he is offered a fresh appointment, it is being dono H with his consent. In case of such a fresh appointment one cannot say that tho additional judge is transferred on the expiry of bis first temlfe, to another High\n\nSUJ.>REMll COURT REPORtS p982] i s.c.lt\n\nCourt where he is appointed afresh with a fresh tenure. The concep, t of transfer is foreign to the situation. (1075 B-D]\n\n8:3. If every little thing is looked upon with s_uspicion and as an attack on te independence of judiciary, it becomes absolutely misleading. The expres sion obtained would only mean request to the judge to give consent, if he so desires. If he gives the consent, we11 and gbod, and if he does not give, no evil consequences are likely to ensue. (1075 F, H, 1076 A]\n\n 8:4. No positive advantage was tO accrue to one who gives his consent.\n\nIf any positive advantage was to be given to one who gives consent and if it had been spelt out, there W-Ould have been some force in this submission bui mere omission to mention any evil consequences flowing from not giving consent would not necessarily imply that such would be the case. Similarly, the statement in the circular that giving an opportunity to indicate preferences would not imply that the Government would be bound to give the additional judge an appointment or he would be at least given a station of. his choice out of the three preferences indicated by him would mean that while unilaierally obtaining consent on one hand, there was no quid pro quo that the appointment would be. given. This is clearly reading the circular with coloured glasses and the submission is unwarranted by the language used in it. If an option to indicate preferences is given and option is exercised, undoubtedly that by itself cannot obligate the Government to appoint an additional judge for a fresh term or a new entrant either as additional or a permanent judge, because varfous factors will have to be taken into conside- . ration over and above his consent and preferences in making the appointment.\n\nConsent is asked for at a stage prior to the decision to appoint is taken. Therefore, this caution was absolutely necessary and has been rightly stated that it implies no promise to do a certain thing. (1076 D-H]\n\n 8:5. In every appointmeni of an additional judge as permanent judge in any High Court, the Chief Justice of India is to be consulted and his view would always receive the weight they enjoy. Therefore, once Chief Justice of India gives his considered opinion with respect to every proposal, the element of picking and choosing is effectively curbed ?t c;; ontrolled. -\n\n9. The non-extension of the tenure of Mr. S.N. Kumar as an additional judge is in order. There was full and effective consultation on all relevant points including those set out in the letter dated May 7, 1981. Non showing of the I:tter of May 7, 1981 to the Chief Justice oflndia would not detract from the fullness of consultation as required under Article 217. (1085 D-F]\n\n10:1. The expression 'transfer' is used in Article 222 to mean nsfer from ope High Court to anot!ier High -Court. The person so transferred l:'l; htinuing to be a High Court Judge with continuity of service and there is no break. Undoub- !edly the oath to which a judge of the High Court must subscribe provided that\n\n....\n\nS.I>. GUPTA v. UNION 459\n\nhe takes oath as judge on being appointed to a designated High Court and, therefore, on transfer when he goes to another High Court he has to subscribe to a fresh oath as being appointed to tha! High Court. But in service jurisprudence appointment by transfer is a well recognised concept involving continuity of office without break. Thus fresh oath does not imply that his appointment as High Court judge comes to an end. What comes to an end is his appointment as a judge of a particular High Court and not the holder of the constitutional office of High Court judge and Article 217(1) provides for appointment of a High Court judge and not judge of a particular High Court.\n\nHe continues to hold office even when transferred. But when he reaches the other High Court he subscribes to an oath to be a judge of that High Court, not that he subscribes to an oath to be a judge. The jurisdiction to function as a High Court judge is not ambivalent but the judge functions as a judge of a particular High Court and enjoys the jurisdiction of a High Court judge in relation to the High Court to which he is thereby attached. [1105 B-F]\n\n10:2. Interpretation of a constitutional provision is both an art and a science but while resorting to well-known canons of construction uttwittingly the pet theory that the independence of judiciary is prized so high that in order to achieve it if it becomes a compelling necessity the provision of a constitution may\n\nbe rewritten, no canon of construction permits this to be done. The constitution D makers clearly euvisaged a power to transfer a High Court judge and conferred it on the President. By reading the words \"With consent\" in Article 222, not only the power of the President is totally taken away but the power is reallotted to the judge who is to be transferred, namely he cannot be ordered to be transferred but he can be requested, a request which can be finally turned down.\n\nSuch a construction would be contrary to Jurisprudential concept of power.\n\n[1107 A-D, G-H, 1108 A] E\n\nEdward Mills v. Ajmere (1956] A.I.R.1979 S.C. 1084 referred to .\n\nS.C.R. 735; Manohar v. Maruti Rao\n\n10:3. It is true that the power to transfer a High Court judge is an extraordinary power. But, the three safeguards, namely, full and effective consulta• tion, with the Chief Justice of India, that the power to transfer can be exercised in public interest, and judicial review would certainly insulate independence of judiciary against an attempt by the executive to control it. While transfer in the public interest is conducive to independence of judiciary, such power when exercised with a view to punishing a judge becomes counter-productive. To punish a High, Court judge by an impermissible method _is not in public interest. And if a judge is uprootedfrom one place because he has made himself obnoxious, the transfer itself may inflict punishment [1109 A, 1110 CD, G-H, 1111 A-BJ\n\n10;4. Selective transfer of individual judge for something improper. in his behaviour or cllnduct would certainly cast a slur or attach a stigma and would leave such indelible mark on the character of the judge that even in the High Court to which he is transferred he would be shunned and the consumers of justice would have Utile or no faith in his judicial integrity. This is an inevitable\n\n460 StJPIU!Ml! COtJkT kEPOkTS ( 19821 2 s.c.a.\n\noutcome of selective transfer on the ground of some improper streak in the con duct or behaviour of the judge. It is true that the procedure for impeachment is rather very cumbersome and it ought to be so because the ultimate power to impeach rests with the Parliament. And in a Parliamentary democracy the executive which controls a majority in Parliament would he able to carry out the threat of impeachment. It may be that the judge may behave in an impechable manner but there are others functioning in the court who would render judge's task of judicial justice impossible. Tile power conferred by Art. 222(1) cannot be exercised with a view to punishing the judge for anything improper in bis behaviour or conduct. Whenever the transfer answers to some objective norms eveil if it causes personal inconvenience and hardship, it can be said to be in public interest: The transfer of a judge not answering to any objective norms but selectively made and founded upon complaints and grievances relatable to the conduct or behaviour of the judge would certainly cast stigma or slur and would be by way of punishment and that cannot be inflicted by exercise of power under Art. 222(1).\n\nIf transfer can be effected because there are complaints and grievances against a judge of a High Court .on account of his behaviour or conduct it would permit the executive after going through the process of consultation to rotate inconvenient judges and this rotation causes such character assassination on one hand and hardship and inconvenience on the other that it will be sufficient to drive out even a strong willed judge. Therefore, a transfer on account of any complaint or grievance against a judge referable to his conduct or behaviour is impermissible . in exercise of power under Art. 222(1). (1114 E-H, 1115 A-F]\n\n10:5. Undoubtedly the power is in the President to transfer and as a pre condition the Chief Justice is required to be consulted. But on that account alone it cannot be said that the Chief Justice of Iildia cannot initiate the proposal.\n\nWhere power to do a thing is vested in a certain constitutional functionary it is immaterial who draws the attention of the constitutional functionary, the repository of power, for exercise of the same: If the power is exercised after fulfilling ail pre-conditions, the mere fact that somebody invited the repository of power to exercise power which may tantamount to saying that someone initiated the prooo\n\nsal for exercise of the power, such initiation of proposal would not be unconstitu\n\ntional or contrary to the constitutional mandate. The only caution that must be required to be administered is and it has assume.d importance in this case, that if Chief Justice or India who is the authority to be consulted in respect of a proposal for transfer himself becomes the initiator of the proposal, the whole process of consultation must move in such a manner as to ensure that the President who is invited to exercise the power at the instance of the Chief Justice of India has to apprise himself of all relevant considerations and has to fully inform himself of all the aspects of the matter and then the power is to be exercised. [1116 A-Fl\n\nG 10:6. While testing the validity or otherwise of an order of transfer of a\n\nHigh Court judge made by the President in exercise of the power conferred by Art. 221(1), below mentioned tests will have to be applied : ·\n\n(i) Po.;., er to transfer a Judge of High Court is conferred on the Presi\n\n'dnt which as part of the executive function of the President he\n\nwould, in view of Art. 74, discharge according to the. aid and 11dvice received by him from the Council of Ministers ;\n\n....\n\nS.1'. GuPTA V. UNION 461\n\n(ii) The power to transfer a High Court Judge thus is' n the executive which is the litigant in a very large number of cases coming before a judge of a High Court ;\n\n(iii) The power to transfer a High Court Judge is extraordinary power ;\n\n(iv) The limitation on the exercise of power is a full, effective and meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of India :\n\n(v) The power to transfer can be exercised only in public interest and not according to the whim, caprice or fancy of the executive or to remove an inconvenient judge not toeing its line :\n\n(vi) The consultation to be effective must be focussed upon such very personal factors as the family problems of the judge, which include the position of his wife and children and parents, the reasons for transfer whether the transfer is actuated on account of anything in. the conduct or behaviour of the judge, whether the injury, incon- . venience and difficulties experienced by the judge consequent upon his transfer are such as to be inconsequential in view of the larger public interest for which the transfer is being ordered ;\n\n(vii) Would the transfer cast a slur or stigma on the judge proposed to\n\nbe transferred ;\n\n(viii) The policy universally followed till 1976 of not transferring a judge of High Court without his consentis being shelved for achieving some larger public interest or the so-called public interest .is a - cloak or device to strike at an inconvenient judge ;\n\n(ix) ls the transfer intended to inflict punishment for misbehaviour not of adequate magnitude to invoke proceedings analogous to impeachment as contemplated by Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. ·\n\nIn the instant case, the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh to Madras as Chief Justice 't is invalid and based on extraneous considerations. [1117 G-H,1118A-H, 1119A-B]\n\n11. Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act must be construed on its own terms. Undoubtedly, a century old provision enacted to some extent keeping in view the needs of Empire builders must change in the context of the Republican Government and the open society which we have set up. There must be such affairs of the State involving security of the nation and foreign affairs where public interest requires that disclosure should not be ordered. It is, however, equally well recognised that fair administration of justice is itself a matter of vital public interest. Therefore, if the two public interest conflict, the Court will have to decide whether the public interest which formed the foundation for claiming privilege would be jeopardised if disclosure is ordered and on the other hand\n\nI 462 SUPREME COUR.1' R.El>Olt1'S [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nwhether fair administration of justice would suffer by non-disclosure and decide' which may the balance tilts. (1150 B-D]\n\nState of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 SCR 371; Duncan v.\n\nGammell Laird & Co. Ltd. '[1942] A.C. 624; Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910; Science Research Council -v. Nasse [1980] A.C. 1028; Burma Oil Co. Ltd. v.\n\nGovernor & Co. of the Bank of England & Anr. (1980] A.C..1090, referred to.\n\n12. It is a well receognised pithet of cons ti tut ional wisdom that in constitutional matters the Courts do not decide what is not brought before it nor would it proffer advice except in a reference under Art. 143, on the wisdom or validity of a future action. . If there is no policy till today it would be unwise to pronounce upon a future policy without knowing what form and shape it would take. No carte blanche can be given in this behalf. If the policy were to be laid down by the executive that a judge of the High Court who decides the matter against the Government will be transferred it would be an objective norm because it can be easily ascertained whether ajudge has decided a matter against the Government.\n\nSuch a policy if at all laid down, would be complele anti-thesis of the indepen- . dence of judiciary. (1144 B-D]\n\nPer Pathak J:\n\n1. Public confidence in the administration of justice is imperative to its effectiveness, because ultimately the ready acceptance of a judicial verdict alone gives relevance to the judicial system. While the administration of justice draws its legal sanction from the Constitution, its credibility rests in the faith of the people. An independent and impartial judiciary supplies the reason for the judicial institution, it also gives character and content to the constitutional miliue.\n\nThe framers of the Constitution took great pains to ensure that a better and more effective judicial structure was incorporated in the Constitution, one which would meet the highest expectations of judicial independence to ensure the Rule of law and with the intention that the widest aml'litude of remedial action should be available to every person throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts. [1155 G-H, 1156 A, €, D-HJ\n\n2:1. The rules now developed by the Supreme Court relatinjJ to the disclosure of documents need to be carefully applied. The balance between the conflicting claims of public interest represented by officialdom and the public interest flowing from the administration of justice often calls for a delicate assessment, into which perforce must enter consideration vital to the operations of Government on the one hand and the demands of adjudication on the other. Yet no court can shirk its duty if it finds that its power has been rightly invoked.\n\n(1210 G-H, 1211 A-C]\n\n2:2. It is the advice and its reasons tendered by the Council of Ministers to the l>resident which are proteCted from enquiry by a court and no such protec- H tion extends to the material from which the advice proceeds. fl 211 C-D)\n\n!l.P. GUPTA V. UNION 463\n\n3:1. The circi1lar letter cannot be acted on and any consent given pursuant A .to the Circular letter is not binding in law on those who have given it. [1210C-D]\n\n3:2.\n\nAn appointment of a person as a Judge of a High Court must be an appointment to a particular High Court. For the purpose of making such appoint-· ment, the Constitutional process must be initiated with respect to a particular High Court. The Constitution does not contemplate a single process in relation to several High Courts, collecting as many persons as there are vacancies all over India, and then in the discretion of the Government appointing each of them where the Government pleases. To adopt this procedure will be to equate the appointment of Judges with the appointment of members of an All India Service, a position which cannot constitutionally be countenanced. There must be a separate and distinct process in regard to appointment to each High Court. The Governor of the particular State and the Chief Justice of the particular High Court have to be involved in that process, bes ides the Chief Justice of India. It is in the course of such a process that a proposal for appointment is made to the person intended for appointment. In other words, a valid proposal, as part of the constitutional process, is one which offers an appointment .to a particular High Court. It is only when consent is given to such a proposal, that is to say, consent to appointment in a particular High Court, that it can be said in law to be binding and effective. Tlie Circular letter .has invited the consent of the additional judges in the most general terms, to appointment to any High Court other than the High Court in which they are serving as additional Judges. If it is intended to bind the additional Judges, it has 'failed in its purpose. A concrete proposal can contemplate appointment only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause(!) .of Article 217. [1209 D-H, 1210 A & C]\n\n4:1. The transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras High E Court is in order and there is no violation of clause I of Article 222. The considerations on which the transfer was made must be regarded as falling within the expression \"public interest\". The provisions of the Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Government of India have been complied with.\n\nF.ven the language problem which might cause some difficulties has been considered. A fair. procedure was adopted and all that could reasonably be done in the circumstances of the case was done, including full and effective consultation.\n\n[ 1203 A-B, 1207 F-G]\n\n'f Union of India v. Sakal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr. (1978] I SCR 423 . referred to.\n\n4:2. When a Judge permits his judgment in a case to be influenced by G the irrelevant consideration of caste and creed, of relationship or friendship, of hostility or enmity, he commits a breach of his oath. It is a case where Justice is not done and is denied. It is a case of misbehaviour, to which the provisions of Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 are attracted. There is another kind of case where a Judge acts in accordance with his conscience on the basis of the facts and the law as he bona fide understands them, and yet H because of surrounding circumstance it may appe(lr that justice has not been done even though in f!!t it ma~ have been done, Where there is a dan!ler that Justi9~\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R\n\nwill not appear to be done, and the prevailing environment is linked with the Person of the Judge notwithstanding that he may have done nothing to promote ' ' it, the injury to the administration of justice can be as serious as a case where the Judge has consciously deviated from the standards of impartial judgment.· Where there is a genuine apprehension that justice may not appear to be done, the ordinary rule is that the case pending before the Judge should be transferred to another Judge. But where the apprehension is rooted in local association on links with members of the Bar or influences present in close proximity to the Judge and the circumstances are such that, notwithstanding that the conduct of the Judge has done nothing to promoe it, there is grave and bona fide fear in the minds of honest citizens that the fount of justice may be polluted its effect is not confined to a single case but spreads widely endangering the purity of the entire administration of Justice. Inasmuch as the administration of justice relies fodts vitality on the strength of public confidence, it must range supreme, and, there fore, if the Judge is transferred in these circumstances it must be regarded as a transfer in the public interest. [120S B-H, 1206 A-CJ\n\n4:3. The considerations which prevailed with the Chief Justice of India and the Government in the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh were substantially identical, that for the purposes of this transfer the Government had agreed that having regard to the reasons for the transfer it was prepared to consider. the case on its individual merits and not to insist on the making of transfers generally for the time being. (1207 E-F]\n\n4:4. The power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another under clause (I) of Article 222 is a:n extraordinary power. Inasmuch as it can be exercised without the consent of the Judge, it can constitute a threat to the sense of independence and impartiality of the Judge. It must be most sparingly used and only for good reason. The onus of justifying the transfer lies heavily on the State. [1197 F-G]\n\n4:5. Any policy governing the application of clause (I) of Article 222 must conform in all respects to the scope and content of clause (l) of Article 222.\n\nThe power to transfer is to be found in that clause, and every act of the Government, be it the framing and adoption of a policy or the actual order of transfer, must fall completely within the scope of that provision. The entire content of power vested in the President respecting the transfer of Judges of the High Courts must be traced to the confines of the clause. Accordingly, any policy framed and adopted in this behalf must be tested on the criterion of public interest, and it must be clearly understood that \"public interest\" means, here, the interest of the administration of justice. That is the sole purpose of the grant of the power under clause (1) of Article 222.\n\nNo~, if the framing and adoption of a policy is an act of the President under the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222, it must be subjected to consultation with the Chief, Justice of India. That is an imperative co_ndition grafted on the exercise of all power relating to the transfer of Judges of the High Courts. That the framing and adoption of a policy should be governed>by that condition is asily explicable if it is appreciated that the policy constitutes the basic consideration entering the order . of tr1111sfer. All\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 465\n\nconsiderations controlling the transfer of a Judge of a High Court must fall with in the scope of the cOnsultative process. The Constitution intends that the Chief Justice of India should be consulted before a tra\"nsfer is ordered by the President.\n\nThe consultation must travel over thC entire area of consideration , whichpro.mpts the tranSfer •. The scope of consultation is not limited to any particular. , It must be remembered that the Constitution bas insistCd on consultation with the Chief Justice of India in order J:o protect the administration of. justice and its central prlociplc, the independence of thC judiciary, froni arbitrary encroachment b)r executive power. [1198 AFJ . ! __ , ·· '\n\n4:6. Having regard to the plain terms or clause (i) or .Article 222; policy making, cannot be accepted as the exclusive and absolute preserve of governmental Power. , The fraining or a policy is an administre.iive exercise. and calls for making a choice of one or more considerations for execu, tive action'. within the field or several considerations. When the Chief Jllstice or India is coDsulted 9n the formation-of a Policy by the President, the consultation involves an adminis. trative choice operating on an administrative plane. When the President consults the Chief Justice or India uD.der clause (1), of Article 222. it is consultation in relation to an executive act. (1198 F-H, U99 AB] . , ,\n\n4:7. There is DO All India Service or High Court Judges. Article 215 Speaks r a High Court for each State. and Article 216 plainly 'declares that.-- the High Court shall consist of a Chier Justice. and other Judges. The Chief Justice is a Chief Justice\\ or that High Court 1 only and so are the other Judges. The Judges of a High Court -owe their responsibilities and discharge their functions in relation to that High Court only. -They have no .constitutional connection and\n\nDO legal relationship with th, e body or Judges or any other High Court. [H9QC.E]\n\n4:8. \\A Judge appointed to .a High cOurt is entitled to continue aS a Judge of ihat High Cocirt until be attains the age of 62 yearS. unless or course he resigns Lis 'office or is removed from it. His transfer to another fligh Court involves the vacation of his office in that High Court. that is to say. his appoint .. mellt as a Judge of_ that High Court stands terminated. This is confirmed by clause (c) of the proviso to _Clause (1) of Article 217. Alt order of transfer of a Judge of a High Court under Clause (1) of Article 222, therefore. is a transaction in two parts9 the termination of bis ppointment as Judge of the original High Court and hill simultaneous appointment as a judge of the othef .. High Court. -\n\nUIW&~\n\n4:9. Clause (1) or Art. 222 Wal enacted Specifically in the Indiai::t ConstitutiOn. tor the purpose of empowering the President to transfer a Judge without necessarily securing his consent. . The power Was intended to be in the widest terms and subject only to the obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India. If transfer _was conditioned further by the imperative of secufing the Consent of the Judge concerned. theD. having regard to past practice there was in fact no need to enact Art. 222. A Judge can always be moved from one High Court to another with his conSent9 But the framers of the Constitution intendCd a departure from that positiori.. By clause (1) of Article 222 in the terms enacted. they did not include lhe conditioq !ht !IJe Jud~ cn'°~~<;~ m.u!t osnt to his transfr. {1193 1)-EJ\n\n• H\n\n---\"--~----------------\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il.\n\n4:t0. Unless cJauSe (J) of.Article 222 had been enacted. it was not. possi : bie for the President to transfer a JudgC from one High Court to another without_ bis consent: If a transfer only with the consent was contemplated, it would have\n\nben sufficient to rely on the power .of the Preside.D.t Under clause. (1) of Article 217 to' appoint the Judge to anoth.er High Court, and clause (c) of the p.ioviso to\n\nI clauSe (1) or Ariicle 217 would remove any doubt that by· suC:h-_appointment the . Judge vacated his office in the original High Court. There is no need to confer -power in express: terms to-do a specific act wbiCh cci.n be done with the ccinsent or\n\nthe parties under the umbrella of a general power. [1193 F-H,'1194 AJ · '\n\n,.r, . 4:tl •. If_~ trnsfe~Cd Judge refuses lo make: and. ubSCribe an oath or affirmation in Order tO assunle\" Office as a Judge of the High Court to. which he is transferred he Coutd be rCgarded, it seems as guilty of misbeb3:viour warfanting\n\n- bis removal. [11. 94 G-H. J ' . . .. ' -.. - . . , . ' .. , - . -,. /_ - .. .•\n\n; ,·.. 4:12. aause (1) or Article 222 does not mention th~ g; ound~· on biCh the'Judge inay be transferred. Plainly, inasmuch as it is in the nature or a publiC power .Vested in a functionary of the StatC, it can be exercised only in the public\n\ninterest~ _:r:blic interest is the touch-stonit on which every transfefmust be tested. . That is thd necessary limitation implicitly. circumscribing the eXercise of power under clause (I) of Article 222. All grounds which can be said to fall within that rubric may be entertained._ But no ground which falls within the scope of Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 can be brought within that scope.\n\nThe groun.ds envisaged by those provisions are ••proved misbehaviour or incapa:.. .city,._ -In relation to \"them expres provision has been made by the -Constitution,\n\n- the grourids being sO grave that if established they can result in one penalty only, that of removal pf the Judge. [1193 B-D]\n\n'. ;_\n\n, _4:13. The grollnds of, misbehaviou~ or incapa'city are clearly ruled out from the scope of clause (1) of Article 222. The transfer of a Judge under that f '-. . .._ provision canriot be made for thC purpose of punishing him.\" Ir was never inten· . ..._ '-----ded that the power should_ be exercised to impose a penalty by way of punish\n\nmeD.t. _ To permit that would be to permit a violation of the principle of. judicial indeperldence, for the only grounds envisaged by the Constitution for ·punisbmerit are grounds Constituting misbehaviour and the penalty for which is removal from office.-[1194 0-H, 1195 AB] '\n\nG 4:14. Iri the transfer of a Judge frorD one: High Coui-t to.'aO:other'ihe principle of ju\"diCial inde_penencC aD~ the rightS of the Judge are protected by\n\n- .__,_two safeguards.' -The first is that incorporatCd in clause (1) or Art. 222, 'that is to say. the obligation of the President to consult the Chief Justice of India. - The Constitution expects the Chief Justice of India to ensure in the' process of consul\n\nH tation that the power to transfer is not usCd arbitrarily aga.inst a Judge of a High Court, that it is not employed as a di~ise foi punishirlg him,· and that, even if the round f9r the proposed transfer is made out, it wi11 be in the public interest\n\n.,.\n\n_s, p, GUPTA v .. UNION 467\n\nto effect the transfer. In this regard, the consultation, with the Chief Justice of India must, extend to the entire gam11t of the grounds on which the transfer is proposed, even where the grounds are incorporated in a policy. The protection afforded to the Judge by the obligation of consultation with the Chief Justice of India is intended to be a coplete protection. The Judge concerned is entitled to continue in the High Court to which he has been appointed for the full period 0 f his tenure. To properly discharge his responsibility in the matter, the Chief Justice of India must consider himself obliged to entertain not only the material furnished by the President to him but he must also make as full an enquiry as he conveniently can for the purpose of determining whether a transfer should be . advised. In that process, he must determine not only whether the grounds of\n\nwhich the transfer proposed are made out but he must also consider as relevant C the personal circumstances of the Judge concerned. It is ultimately in the public interest that the personal circumstances of the Judge should be taken into consideration, for there may be a case where they may hinder the proper discharge of his duties inthe High Court to which he is transferred. In that connection it is only right that the Chief Justice of India should satisfy himself by enquiring from the J\\)dge himself about what he has to say in the matter of his transfer, both in D regard to the ground for the transfer as well as in regurd to any hardship or inconvenience which may be suffered l'>y him by such transfer. (1195B-H, l196A]\n\n4:15. As a sitting Judge he is entitled to be informed of the proposed transfer and of the grounds therefor because his right to continue as a Judge of E the High' Court is placed in jeopardy. It is a very different case from the transfer of an officer who is a member of a service and is ordinarily transferable. The Judge does not have a right of hearing in the sense in which that right is generally understood in law.. The scope and degree of inquiry by the Chief Justice of India must rest ill his discretion. All that is necessary is that the 'Judge should know why bis transfer is proposed and. be should be able to. acquaint the Chief Justice of India of any reason why be should not be transferred. The process of consultation envisaged under clause (I) of Article 222 requires that all the material in . ' the possession of the President must be placed before the Chief Justice of India, as well as such other information which he may need and may call for in order to render his advice. [1196 A-DJ\n\nUnion of India v. Sakalchand Himmatlal 'iheth [1978] I SCR 423; ' , Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR 814 referred to.\n\n5. The decision of the Union Government not to appoint Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar as an additional Judge fo~ !I fyfther erm w~~ viltive of tpe co11stitq-\n\n468 SUPRBMll COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.ll.\n\ntional requirement mandated by clause (I) of Article 217. The process of consultation with the Chief Justice of India was not full and effective and the withholding of important and relevant material from the Chief Justice of India has vitiated the process. The Government was deciding aginst a further term to Shri Kumar solely on the ground of doubtful integrity and clearly the allegations, contained in the letter of May 7, 1981, were strongly influencing that decision.\n\n[1184 BD]\n\n6:1. While the President is vested with the power to appoint Judges, he is also under a constitutional obligation to ensure that the High Court is fully constituted. It is fully constituted when it consists of Judges sufficient in number to regularly cope with and dispose of the work falling within its jurisdiction.· From the terms of Art. 216 it. is also plain that the constitutional obligation impo sed on the President extends to ensuring from time to time that the High Court consists of a sufficient number of Judges. The responsibility imposed by Article 216 requires the making of a periodic review of the annual institution of cases and the pending strengt!t of arrears resulting in a reasonable assessment of the number of Judges needed in each High Court. Serious injury is possible to a constitutional democracy where this is not done, ad the judiciary remains insufficiently manned and pending cases continue to accumulate for long periods. A continuing imbalance in the proper operation of the constitutional system ranging over a long period of time by reason of one of its primary organs remaining ill-equipped to discharge its essential responsibilities is a matter for grave concern.\n\n[1158P-H,1159 A]\n\n6:2. A fixed tenure unaffected by the discretion of the executive safeguards the principle of judicial independence. In special circumstances, however, and in special circumstances only, the appointment of additional Judges or acting Judges is contemplated under Article 224. The number of Judges is increased only for the time being, and the appointment of an additional Judge is, therefore, envisaged for a limited period which, by clause (1) of Article 224 lllllst got xei;<) \\WQ years. [1159 C-D, El\n\n6:3. The appointment of a Judge is an executive act. The power to appoint is vested in the President, who by virtue of clause (I) of Article 74 is required to act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. The President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, but he must act in accordance with the advice tendered H after such reconsideration. While there can be no doubt that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court lies in the executive power of the President; it is not an absolute and unfettered power, it is conditioned by the obligation imposed on the\n\nS.P. GbPtA v. tJNioN\n\nPresident to consult the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of an appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court. The consultation is a constitutional imperative and the process of consultation \"must precede the appointment. Three constitutional functiOnaries are required to be consulted, the Chief Justice of India and the\n\nChief Justice of the High Court, who are judicial functionaries and the Governor of the State who is the executive head of the State in respect of which the High\n\n--~ Court has jurisdiction. The Constitution itself. bas imposed the obligation to consult . .[1161 A-C, D-F, 1162 A]\n\n6:4. Clause (I) of Art. 217 prescribes that besides the Governor of the State, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court must be consulted in the appointment of a Judge of a High Court. Three distinct constitutional functionaries are involved in the consultative process, and each plays a distinct role and the nature and scope of the role arc indicated by the character and status of their respective offices. [1162 G-H]\n\n6:5. The President is obliged to consider the advice tendered by the three constitutional functionaries under Clause (1) of Article 217, and in the evaluation of the advice from each be must bear in mind that the appointment under consideration is the appointment of a Judge of a High• Court, that is to say, a judicial appointment. Io order that the person recommended is of desirable personal character and reputation, the greatest value should be attached .to the advice tendered by the.Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe advice tendered by the two judicial functionaries possesses a quality peculiarly pertinent to the appointment of .an able and efficient Judge. It is, in a sense, \"expert\" advice, and where the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India agree on the recommendation it is within reason to bold that the President will ordinarily accept the recommendation, unless there .jg streng and cogent reason for not doing so, which must , be a reason directly relevant to the purpose of the appointment. [1164 DGJ\n\n6:6. Nothing expressly is laid down on the matter whether the advice given by the Chief Justice of India willhave primacy over that rendered by the Chief Justice of the High Court in express terms in clause (I) of Article 217. If by \"primacy is.meant that the opinion.of the Chief Justice of India supersedes that of the Chief Justice of the High Court and .can alone be considered, it is clearly against the provisionsof clause (1) of Article 217, for the.clause intends that the President should consult both judicial functionaries, besides the Governor. The\n\n476 stJPlU!ME couat tl.Ei>oa'rs [i982i 2 s.c.tt.\n\nA advice of each, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court, has to be considered by the President. The Chief Justice of India does not sit in appellate judgment over the advice of the. Chief Justice of the High Court, and the fact that the former has given his advice cannot imply to that the advice of the latter must be ignored. But, the advice by the Chief Justice of India tak'es into\n\naccount not only the primary material before him but also the assessment made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, and therefore when he renders advice the assessment by the Chief Justice of the High Court has also been considered by -jhim. In other words, in formi; g his opinion and giving his a(lvice, the Chief Justice of India will take all the facts and circumstances into consideration, inclu- '* dihg the material circumstance that the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court is the advice of an authority possessing the advantage of direct and intimate knowledge of the requirements of the Court and generally also of the person recommended, and there after he will advise 'whether he .endorses the recommendation. In that sense, it can be said that the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court is screened through the assessment made by the Chief Justice of India. The screening is allogical result of the Chief Justice of India D being brought in to express his opinion on the recommendation. If any material comes into the possession of the Chief Justice of India which was not before the Chief Justice of the High Court, it should be communicated to the Chief Justice of the High Court for his comments. W.hen the advice of the Chief Justice of the\n\nHigh Court and of the Chief Justice of India is placed before the President., the ·~- President will consider both and assess them in the light of the positions held, and Ill the advantages possessed, by the respective functionaries in relation to the recommendation, and also bear in mind that while the Chief Justice of the High Court bas the advantage of proximity in relation to the High court and generally in assessing the ability and efficiency of the person recommended the Chief Justice of India enjoys the advantageous position of being able to apply a more objective judgment and also of taking into account a national perspective and present F standards and trends in other High Courts. In the ultimate analysis, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the advice rendered by the Chief Justice of India enjoys mere parity with that of the Chief Justice of the High Court. If the Chief Justice of India was intended to eojoy equal status merely with the Chief Justice \"f of the High Court in this regard, the Chief Justice of India would riot have been brought in at all, especially when the advice expected of a judicial functionary for G appointing a Judge of a High Court could be obtained from the Chief Justice of the High Court alone. The constitutional schem~ indicates that in matters concerning the High Courts there is a close consultative relationship .between the President and the Chief Justice of India. In matters so serious as transfer of Judges\n\nH and the determination of the age of Judges, the Constitution has appointed the Chief Justice of India as the sole functionary to be consulted by the President.\n\nS.P. GtJPtAv. ttNtON \"· 411\n\nIn that.Capacity,. the Chief Justice of India functions under the Constitution as a constitutional check on the exercise of arbitrary power and protects the independence of the Judiciary. [1165 F-H, 1166 A-H, 1167A-C]\n\n6:7. Under clause (1) of Article 224, an additional Judge may be appointted where by reason of the temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of the arrears of work therein it appears to the President that the number of Judges should for the time being be increased. [il67 E-F]\n\n6:8. The two conditions control the exercise of the power, and if neither\n\nis satisfied there can be no case for appointing an additional Judge, The increase C in the business of the High Court must be tempora'ry and should be capable of being disposed of wiihin a short priod. Likewise, the arrears of work should be such that they cannot be expecte<fto endure long. Inasmuch as the period of appointment of 'additional Judges is prescribed as a maximuin of two years, it is\n\n' . oniy where the disposal of' the temporary increase. in the business of the High . . . .\n\nCourt or the pending aears of worlc is expected to take about two years at the D most that a case for 'appointing additional Judges' arises. if the increase in the\n\nbusiness of the High Court or the volume of arrears of work is of a magnitude which cannot. ordinarily be disposed of within two years, it is a case where the business of work must be regarded as an accretion to the regular business or work of the High Court, calling for an increase in the strength of.\n\nprmanent Judges. [1167 F~H, 1168 A-Bl\n\n6:9. -· An additional Judge discharges functions of the same character as a permanent Judge. There is no difference whatever -between the two in status and the other incidets of office, except that an additional Judge can hold office only for the period specified in the warrant of his .appointment. There is nothing in clause (1) of Article 224 to suggest that the temporary increase ii) the business of the High Court or the pending arrears of work can alone .. be entrusted to addi- tional Judges. All that the clause provides is that either or both conditions can constitute a reason for temporarily increasing the nunlb('.r of Judges of the High\n\nCourt. Which work should be assigned to permanent Judges and which to addi- G tional Judges is a matter normally falling within the discretion of the Chief Justice of the High Court .. (1168. C-E]\n\nKrishan Gop•I v.'Shri Prakash Chandra, [1974) 2 SCR 206, referred to. ff\n\n. -~. . . .\n\n412 (1982} ~· s.c.tt\n\nA 6:10. The period prescribed by clause (I) of Article 224 for the appointment of an additional Judge is put a maximum of tw•> years, but th'at docs not mean that in every case the appointment must be for two years. The appoint ment of an additional Judge may be for a period less than two years, and the period will be determined with reference to the time estimated for disposing of the te!11porary increase in the business or the pending arrears of work '!hich occasioned the appointment. The period of appointment cannot be fixed on the\n\nbasis of any other factor . . Where, the work or business is not completed within\n\ntwo years and calls for a further appointment of additional Judges, the duration of the further appointment will be conditioned again by the time assessed for disposing of the remaining business or work. Bnt additional Judges can be appointed only where the temporary increase in the business of the high Court or the arrears of work can be expected to be disposed or wi.thin a .period of two years and not very much more. If additional Judges are appointed for successive periods of two years or more it is clearly a case where the increase in the business of the High Court or the volume of the arrears of ork does not call for the appointment of additional Judes but for a review df. the number of permanent Judges. _Appointments of additioQal Judges for successive periods of two years or more constitute a violation of the safeguard afforded by the appointment of\n\npermanetlt Judges for the protection of the principal of judicial independence.\n\n(1169 AB]\n\n6:11. The warrant of appointment issued .by the P.resident recites that the\n\nappointment is of an additional Judge for the limited period specified therein. ' The intention was to appoint an additional Judge and for the period specified. It is not open to the court to alter the terms of the warrant. Although it may be generally possible to say that the circumstances require an increase in the number of permanent Judges and not the appointment of additional Judges, it is for the President under Article 216 to determine what should be the number of pcrma nent Judges. The Court cannot by judicial ver<lict decide how many permanent Judges are required for the 'High Court. And if the court .is not competent to do so, it can neither regard .the appointment of additional Judges nor can it issue a direction to the Government that the additional Judgesshould be appointed now as permanent Judges. [1171 .F-H; 1172 A-Bl\n\n6:12. While an additional Judge may not bve a right to be deemed to be a permanent Judge or be entitled to a direction that he be so appointed, nontheless he has, a right to be considered• for such appointment. His case must be distinguisded from the case of a person considered for direct appointment as a permanent Judge. The latter bas no right to be considered for appointment.\n\n...\n\n$.P. GUPTA' v. UNION 473\n\nThe additional Judge, however, bas accepted office within the framework of a definite and consisent practice practically always followed and leading him to believe that he would be considered for appointment in accordance with that practice. [1172 B-C]\n\nThe practice of additional Judges being appointed permanent Judges, the B senior most additional Judge being invariably appointed first, bas been followed in India almost without exception. Where no present vacancy of permanent Judge was available, the additional Judge was, on the expiry of his term, always appointed for a further term as additional Judge. This practice bas been uniformly and consistently followed and has crystallised into a positive rule of conduct. It is a rule of conduct followed by the Government regularly and without interruption, almost entirely without exception, and bas. operated consistently for twenty-five years ob the basis of precisely defined norms in respect of a general 'class. And it flows from the power of the State. It prescribes a channel of appointing Judges and is not inconsistent with clause (I) of Article 217. So long as it is not varied or superseded, it will operate as a rule of conduct, binding on\n\nthe resident. [1171 A-DJ\n\nAll the additional Judges accepted judicial office on the assumption that the practice clothed with all the status of constitutional reality would operate in\n\ntheir cases and that they would in their turn be considered for appointment as E permanent Judges. AU of them certainly lleved that. Inspired by that trust, they abandoned their positions at the Bar and law practices assiduously built up over many years. Therefore, the additional Judges must be held entitled to consideration for appointment as permanent Judges or to consideration for further appoitment as additional Judges. [1172 F-H; 1173 A-BJ\n\n6:13. The provisions of clause (I) of Article 217 come into play when an additional Judge is to be considered for appointment as permanent Judge or even.\n\nfor further appointment as additional Judge. The process involves the consideration of all the concomitant elements and factors which entered into the process of G consultation at tLe time of appointment earlier as an additinal Judge, but no account can be tak;:n of the merits of judgments, decree; and orders rendered by him or administrative orders or directions made in tbe bonafide exercise of bis functions as an additional Judge. In the consideration of matters under clause\n\n(1) of Article 217 there will be a somewhat varied approach. The difference, and inevitably there will be a difference because the process bas already been applied earlier in the case of that person, will UQ i111!1e reduced emphasis with which the;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nconsider.ation will be exercised. Ordinarily, the presumption will be that a person found suitable for appointment as an additional Judge continues to be suitable for appointment as a permanent Judge. But circumstances may arise ar.d events may take place meanwhile which bear adversely on the mental and physical capacity, character and integrity or other matters rendering it unwise to appoint\n\nh_im as a permanent Judge. There mus!, however, be relevant and pertinent material before it can be said that such a person has forfeited the badge of suitability for appointment .as a permanent Judge. There must be material which sufficiently convinces the reasonable mind that the person is no longer suitable to fill the li'igh office of a Judge. (1173 F-H, 1174 AC]\n\n6:14. It is difficult to define precisely the nature and quality of such material. If I he reputation of the person is in doubt, the doubt must be rooted in reasonable foundation. It must not be forgotten that ii is a case of a person\n\nwho has a right to be considered for appointment. It is a right to be considered fairly. The exercise of arbitrary judgment is clearly ruled out While such a D person is not entitled as of right to be heard in regard 10 material discovered against him, for the purpose of discharging responsibilities involved in the. process of consultation the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India will find it desirable in their (!iscretion to ascertain from him whether there\n\nis any substance in what has been conveyed to them. In doing so, the two judicial functionaries will not be conceding a right of bearing to such a person. For a F. right to be heard involves an enquiry of certain dimensions well known to the law. In doing so, the two judicial functionaries will be acting within the scope of their legitimate duty of giving advice to the President if for that purpose they\n\n• acquaint themselves fully and truly, so far as they reasonably conceive it necessary, to collect all available relevant information. Surely if it is open to them to gather information from other sources there is no valid reason why they shquld exclude the one person who would be in personal possession of material concerning information operating to his qetriment. But must will depend on the circumstances of each case. What needs to be considered is that the constitutional duty to tender advice necessarily involved the obligation of ensuring that the advice, in the judgment of the functionary tendering it, is accurate and proceeds on the\n\nG basis of reliable material. Whatever verification is possible, there is no doubt that recourse should be had to it. There can be no half measures, and in the discharge of that constimtional duty the tepose must be equal to the respotlsibi lity. A continuous process of consultation between all three autho1ities is manda ted, resulting ultimately in advice tendered to the President by the Chief Justice\n\nof the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, (1174 C-H; 1175 A]\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 475\n\n6:15. An additional Judge, however, is entitled to serve for the full period specified in his appointment, and can be removed only under Article 218 read with clause (4) and clause (5) of Article 124. (1175 CD]\n\nPer Venkataramiah; J.\n\nl. A constitution of a country is a living document and cannot, therefore, be interpreted in a narrow pedantic sense. A broad and liberal spirit should inspire those who are called upon to interpret the Constitution; They are not free to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution. The broad purposes and\n\nthe general scheme of every provision in the Constitution, its history, its objects C and the result which it seeks to achieve should always be kept in view. Current usage and a priori reasoning should also be used as the tools of interpretation of the constitutional provisions. [1222 G-H, 1223 A]\n\n2:1. The petitioners, in the instant c'.lse, have a standing to file the petitions .. It is no doubt true that the power to fix the number of permanent Judges to\n\n0 be appointed in each High Court is within the discretion of the President. But that power is coupled with a duty which the President owes to the public \"in gene-\n\n/l ral and to the lawyers and litigants in particular. If at any given point of time it is found that the nuber of Judges in a High Court is absolutely inadequate to\n\n-'f\n\nmeet its requirements, the members of the Bar who are vitally interested in the E administration of justice can file a petition before the High Court to compel the Government to review the strength of the permanent Judges of that Court and to appoint adequate number of Judges. The members of the Bar are not called officers of courts only to impose obligations on them: they have certain rights too. Article 124 (3) (b), Article 217 (2) (b) and Article 233 (2) of the Constitution F specifieally state that the legal profession is a source of recruiiment of Judges of the Supreme ourt, High Courts and District Courts. Entries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution specifically refer to person entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Court. Section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961, provides that only one class of persons can practise the profession of law. namely, advocates. Members of the Bar have a vital stake in the functioning of the judiciary. Members of the Bar and even litigants whose cases have remained undisposed for a long number of ye'lirs on account of the Government not appointing sufficient number of Judges can therefore file a petition demanding appointment of sufficiet J:\\U!llber of permanent Judges in High Courts, (1238 C-H]\n\nff,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\n2:2. The power under Article 216 of the Constitution is an administrative power which can be regulated in an appropriate way by the courts like any >- other administrative power. It is not a matter of policy simpliciter. The question of appointment of sufficient number of additional Judges unber Article 224\n\n(1) of the Constitution for the required period having regard to the arrears or the\n\nquantum of business in a High Court can also be agitatd by lawyers and litigants.\n\nIt is true that the Court should not ordinarily issue a mandamus in such cases unless it is satisfied that there has been a gross deriliction of duty on the part of the Government. That however is a point to be considered before granting or refusing to grant the relief.\n\nBut it cannot in any event be said that a petition filed\n\nby lawyers for the above-said reliefs is liable to be dismissed at the thres!iold\n\nmerely on the ground of locus standi. (1239 A-CJ\n\nGouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, (1978) A.C. 435; Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers & Ors., [1977] l All E.R. 696; Attorney-Ge11eral and\n\nAttorney General ex rel. Mc. Whirler v. lndependent Broadcasting Authority [1971] D 1 W.L.R. 1037 & (1973] Q.B. 629; R.V. Gotham (1898] 1 Q.B. 802 at 804; Ex\n\nparte Stott [1916] 1 K.B. 7 at 9; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National r\n\nFederation of Self-Emp/Oyed and Small Businesses Ltd., (1981] 2 All E.R. 93;\n\n\nPherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Serrvai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay, E (1971] 1 S.C.R. 863; Attorney General of the Gambia v. Pierre, Sarr N' lie [1961].\n\nA.C. 617; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. N.V. Dabholkar etc. etc., [1976) 1 S.C.R. 306; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar v. Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., [1976] \"\n\n\nreferred to.\n\nState of Gujarat & Anr. v. Sim' Amblca Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad etc., [1974) G 3 S.C.R. 760; held inapplicable.\n\n2:3. Lawyers only because they have right to practise in. a court cannot\n\nbe said to have locus standi to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning Judges, courts and administration of justice. The.re are many such matters in which they have no locus stan:li to a'; k for relief. For example, lawyers cannot\n\nquestion the establishment of a new court on th~ rouQd thiit their professoinal\n\nI /\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 477\n\nprospects would be affected thereby. Even in these cases on the question of nonappointment of Mr. S.N. Kumar and on the question of transfer of Mr. K.B.N.\n\nSingh, the lawyer-petitioners may have no voice. But for the active participation of these two persons, the writ petitions regarding reliefs concerning them individually would have probably become liable to be dismissed on the ground that lawyers have no locus standi to make these prayers. The question of locus standi in the field of administrative law is still in a fluid state and it is not possible to lay\n\ndown in any one case the principles which can govern all situations.\n\n[1244 C-F; G-H, 1245 A]\n\nI A\n\nV.R. Mudvedkar & Ors. v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1971 Mysore 2020; C approved.\n\n3:1. Supreme Court cannot decline to go into the questions agitated in the petitions on the ground that they are political questions or questions within the exclusive domain f executive discretion. [1245 B-C]\n\n3:2. In India which is also governed by a written Constitution many questions which appear to haye a purely political colour are bound to assume the character of judicial questions. . Therefore, the questions involved in these petitions cannot be rejected as non-justiciable merely on the ground that they are political in character. [1248 F-G]\n\n3:3. But it is made clear that the courts are not entitled to enquire into every sort of question without any limitation. There is still a certain class of ques~ lions such as international relations, national security, which cannot be entertained by the Court. It is for the Court to determine in each case whether a particular question should be debated before it or not. [1246 F-GJ\n\n1 Baker v. Carr., 369 U.S. 186 : .7 Led 2d. 663; Powell v. Mc Cormack, 395 U.S. 486 : 23 L ed 2d. 49; quoted with approval.\n\n.State of Rajasthan & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India etc. etc., [1978] I S.C.R. 1; followed.\n\n4. All the High Courts organically form integral parts of a sin.gle system H although their territorial jurisdiction are defined. No High Court can claim any superiority over the other either on the basis of its situation or on th~ l;>asis th!!I\n\n\n(1982) 2 S, C.R.\n\nit is a successor to a High Court which was functioning in any Province immediately before the commencement. of the Constitution or on the basis of the extent of its territorial jurisdiction. All the High Courts have the same status under the\n\nConstitution. (1255 D-E]\n\n5:1. The words prescribing the consultation machinery in Article 2i7 (1) of the Constitution have to be construed in the context of the broad purposes and the general scheme of that provision; its history, its object, and the result which it seeks to achieve. It is equally necessary that the Court while construing a constitutional provision should bear in mind that it is a part of the organic law of the country and not just an ordinary piece of legislation. A High Court is the C highest judicial authority in a State and is the Court of the last resort for the\n\nmajority of cases. Along with the Supreme Court at the apex, the High Courts\n\nhave to play the role of protectors of the rights and liberties of the people and, ....\n\nshould, therefore, be manned by independent and efficient Judges. Realising the\n\nimportance of the High Court in a democratic country with a federal form of\n\nGovernment the constitution states that the Judges should be appointed after\n\nfollowing the consultative machinery provided in Article 217 (1).\n\n[1259 F-H 1260 Al\n\nBiswa11ath Khemka v. The King Emperor, [1945] F.C.R. 99; State of Uttar\n\nPradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533 referred to.\n\n. ' 5:2. An advocate who is left out of consideration cannot make a grievance of it before a court of Jaw and claim that his case should be considered for such appointment. The paramount public importance attached to the post prevents\n\ninstitution of such action by a member of the Bar. From the nature of the provisions contained in Article 217 (1) of the Constitution, it is also clear that any\n\nappointment made without following the procedure of consultation with the\n\nauthorities mentioned therein, which appears to be mandatory, would not be valid one. [1260 D-E]\n\n5:3. From the scheme of the constitutional provisions, it appears that\n\neach of the three functionaries mentioned in Article 217 (I) of the Constitution who have to be consulted before a Judge of a High Court is appointed has a\n\n\\ J<..c\n\ndistinct and separate role to play. The Chief Justice of the f!igh Court is the --.: H most competent person to evaluate the merit and efficiency of a person recommended for the judgeship. The Governor is the proper authority who through\n\nthe executive agency available to him may be able to report iibout the local posis.P'. oui>TA v. uNroN 479\n\ntion of the person proposed, bis character and integrity, bis affiliations, and the like, which have a considerable bearing on the working of the person proposed for appointment as a Judge. The Chief Justice of India is brought into the picture to prevent any vagaries on the part of the Chief Justice of the High Court who may be moved on occasions by petty considerations such as comrnunalism and favouritism or who may even be capricious in proposing names 'bf persons for judgeship. The Chief Justice of India will naturally be able to assess the qualities of persons proposed having in view the standard of efficiency of Judges in all the High Courts in India and also to prev_ent unsatisfactory appointments being made on the basis of faulty recommendations made by the Chief Justice of High Courts. The position of the Chief Justice of India under Article 217 (1),\n\nhowever, is not that of an appellate authority or that of the highest administra- C tive authority having the power to over rule the opinion of any other authority. - From the specific roles attributed to each of them, which may to some extent be\n\noverlapping also, it cannot be said that the Chief Justice of India bas been given any position of primacy amongst tlie three persons who have to be consulted under Article 217 (I) of the Constitution.\n\nTher~ are no express-words conveying that meaning. The President has to take into consideration the opinions of all of them and he should not accept the opinion of any of them only on the sole principle of primacy. He has to take a decision on the question of appointment of\n\nJudges of the Higli Courts oil the basis of all relevant materials before him.\n\n[1261 F-H, 1262 A-C]\n\n5:4. The power of appointment of a Judge of a High Court is an executive power. In principle an appointment under Article 217 (1) cannot be different from an appointment under Article 234. [1265 C, 1268 C]\n\n5:5. From clause (2) of Article 124, it is obvious that when the appointment is to the post of the Chief.Justice of India, it is not obligatory on the part\n\nof the President to consult any specified functionary. But he has to -consult such of the Judges of the Supreme Court each one of whom may himself be an aspirant to the post and such other Judges of the High Courts he may consider necessary. Io this situation, it is quite evident that the opinion of any one of the Judges who may be consulted cannot be treated as binding on the President. The power of appointment rests with the President who bas no doubt to take the decision on the advice given by the Council of Ministers after making the necessary eonsulta-\n\n1 tion. When the 'primacy of judicial opinion' doctrine thus fails in the case of the\n\nappointment of the Chief Justice of India, it would not be appropriate to hold H that it prevails in the case of appointment of other Judges of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the High Courts. [1269 E-H]\n\nSUPRBME OOURT REPORTS. [I 982.l 2 s.c.l\\.\n\nState of Wst Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, [1966] 1 S.C:.R. 771 at pp. 789-790; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors., [1970] 2 ··\n\nS.C.R. 666; Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1975] 1 S.C.R. 814; referred to .\n\n• 5:6. Under Article 217 (1) of the Constitution the President should, therefore, while making an appointment of a High Court Judge act on the advice of his Council of Ministers having d_ue regard to the opinions expressed by the\n\nfunctionaries mentioned therein after a full and effective consultation. There is no scope for holdin~ that either the Council of Ministers cannot advice the President on this matter or that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is binding on the C President although such opinion should be given due respect and regard.\n\n[1270 A-BJ\n\n5:7. Merely because the power of appointment is with the executive, the\n\nindependence of the judiciary would not become impaired. The true principle\n\nis that after such appointment the executive should have no scope to interference with the work of a Judge. The process of consultation prescribed by Article 217 (!) acts as a sufficient safeguard against the appointment of undesirable persons as Judges of the High Courts. The independence of the judiciary bas not in any way been impaired by reason of the President appointing Judges on the advice of bis Council of Ministers after following the process of consultation prescribed in E Article 217 (1). This method has been adopted so that the appointments of Judges may have ultimately the sanction of the people whom the Council of Ministers represent in a Parliamentary form of Government. In that way only the Judges may be called people's Judges. If the appointments of Judges are to be made on the basis f the recommendations of Judges only then they will be Judges' Judges and such appointments may not fit into the scheme of popular democracy.\n\n[1270 C-D; 1273 D-H]\n\nS:S. Article 217 of the Constitution does not say in terms that the pro- Y posal for appointment of a person as Judge should be initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Under the scheme of Article 217 the power to appoint G a Judge of a High Court is vested in the President. While he is bound to consult the authorities mentioned therein and take into consideration their opinion, he is not bound by their opinions. Ordinarily one does not expect the President to make an appointment by ignoring all the adverse opinions expressed by the\n\nfunctionaries mentioned in Article 217. If there are, conflicting opinions the\n\n. H President has to weigh them after giving due consideration to each of them and\n\n...\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION 48i\n\ntake a decision on the question. In any event an advocae or a member of the Subordinate Judiciary whose name is approved by the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India does not get a vested right to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. In fact he has no justiciable right at all. If for any reason he is not appointed he cannot move the Court to appoint him as Judge of the High Court .. The position of an additional Judge who is currently holding\n\noffice and who is not reappointed stands on a slightly different footing.\n\n[1274 BF] •. 6:1. The two occasions when an additional Judge can be appointed mentioned in Article 224 (1) of the Constitution are: (i) a temporary increase in its business or (ii) accumulation of arrears of work in the High Court concerned.\n\nC Article 224 (1) is not, therefore, intended for meeting a situation where the work - of the High Court is gradually on the increase requiring the appointment of more\n\nnumber of permanent Judges. [1282 A-C]\n\n6:2. Article 216 imposes a duty on the President to review the strength of Judges in each High Court from ti'me to time and to increase the number of Judges as and when it is necessary. [1288 C-D]\n\n6:3. Article 224 (1) was never intended for appointing almost every Judge first as an additional Judge and then as a permanent Judge. A Judge who is not assured of the office after the specified period and whose continuance in office is subject to the will of any other authority generally does not inspire confidence in\n\nthe litigant public also. [1289 E-F, G-H, 1290 A]\n\n\n6:4. The present practice of appointing almost all the High Court Judges initially under Article 224 (1) and later on as permanent Judges is not conducive to the independen<; e of judiciary. The independence of the judiciary is one of the central values on which our Constitution is based. No other constitutional\n\nagency is shielded as are the superior courts in.our country with so many built-in safeguards. Thf Judges can, if they choose to, be guided by the doctrine of conscience only while discharging their duties. They are not expected to be under H any kind of external pressure. They are circumscribed by 'expectations of neutrality and impartiality' and by the traditions of the' legal profession which.is always\n\n\n' ,, [19821 2 s.c.k\n\n' I keeping a watchful eye on every action of a Judge. In all countries where the\n\nrule of law prevails and the power to adjudicate upon disputes between a man\n\nand a man, a man and the State, a State and a State, and a State and the Centre,\n\nis entrusted to a judicial boy, it is natural that such body should be assigned a status free from capricious or whimsical interfenence from outside and the judges\n\nwho cpnstitute it should be granted a security of tenure that lifts them above the fear of acting against. theirconscience. (1292 E-F, G-H, 1293 A-Bl\n\n6:5. Ordinarily wherever there is a right there should ·e a remedy, other- +\n\nwise the right would be without meaning. On a fair construction of Article 224 C\n\n(1) of the Constitution which enables the President to appoint an additional Judge for a period not exceeding two years and of Article 217 (1) of the Constitution which limits the tenure of a additional Judge appointed to the period specified under Article 224 (1), it is not possible to make a declaration that an additional Judge should be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent Judge on\n\nthe ground that when his appointment was made under Article 224 (1) it was\n\nnecessary for the President to appoint a permanent Judge in view of the quantum of work pendlng in the High Court concerned and not an additional Judge. The\n\nwarrant of appointment has to be construed in accordance with the unequivocal language in which it is couched and nothing more can be read into it.. The constitution does not confer any right upon an additional Judge to claim, as of right, that he should be appointed again either as a permanent Judge or as an additional Judge. There is no such enforceable right. A Court of law has no power to give effect to any right not recognised by law. It is 'also not the function of a\n\ncourt of justice to enforce or give effect to moral obligations which do not carry with them legal or equitable rights. No court has a right to enforce what may seem to be just, apart from the Constitution and the laws. [1296 H, 1297 AE]\n\nTerrell v. Secretary of State for the Colonies & Anr., [1953] 2 Q.B. 482;\n\nquoted with approval.\n\n6:6. Constitutional conentions, understandings or practice therefore,\n\nconstitute a source of constitutional law or binding rule of conduct though not enforced by courts. Articles 74, 75, 77, 85 and 117 contain some of the British constitutional conventions in a modified form. But apart from those conventions which are incorporated in the Constitution, there may be some conventions which\n\nf .-\n\nare followed by those in office out of political necessity. The latter, iiowever are ,.._,.\n\nH not capable of enforcement in court. The courts are not concerned with the\n\n...\n\n. \"!\n\nI\\ r ... • I 1(\n\nI •\n\n' --\n\nt l '\n\n_,.\n\n-~-\n\ns.1>. out>T~ v. uNmN 483\n\nconstitutional practices' which are outside the Constitution.. It is, therefore, difficult to mak'e a declaration on the basis of any constitutional convention not found in the Constitution that an additional Judge who was appointed after following the. same procedure prescribed for appointment of a permanent Judge should be deemed to have b.;;; n appointed as a permanent Judge because the circumstances warranted the appointment of a permanent Judge at the time of his app<;>intment, contrary to the express and unequivocal language of the warrant of his appointment. [1301 D-F]\n\n6:7. , Since invariably an additional Judge has been appointed as a perma nent Judge, every member who is appointed as an additional Judge expects that he will be made permanent as and when a vacancy arises in the permanent strength. In addition to such settled e.xpectatioil on the part of the additional\n\nJudge, even on the part of the Governmet there has always been reluctance to send back an additional Judge to the Bar after the completion of his term specified under Article 224 (1) and to lose the services of a Judge with experience.\n\nThese. twin factors namely the expectation on the part of the additional Judge and the reluctance on the part or the Government distinguish the case of an additional Judge from the case of a new member who may be a competitor for the same post at the termination of the tenure of the additional Judge. Ordinarily the additional Judge is continued in service as a Judge or as an additional Judge unless there are any relevant circumstances which would outweigh! the above\n\nmentioned factors. In the absence of any cogent reasons for not appointing hi!D E again the appointment of some body else in his place would be an unreasonabl~ or perverse act which entitles an additional Judge to move the Court for appropriate relief in the peculiar circumstances in which Article 224 (!) is being operated till now. [1304 G-H, 1305 B-D]\n\n6:8. The wide discretionary power of appointment exercisable by the President in the public interest under Article 217 (1) is indicative of the absence of an obligation to act judicially. It is seen from the language of that Article . that the Constitution has evinced an intention to exclude the operation of the rule of audi alteram partem. by conferring on the President lmfettered discretionary power subject only to the prescribed procedure of consultation mentioned therein.\n\nHaving regard to the high office to which appointment has to be made under Article 217 (1) of the Constitution and lo the association of the high dignitaries\n\nr who. have to be consulted before any such appointment is made the application of principles of natural justice as of right is ruled out and non-compliance with such H principles woµId not vitiate the decision. But it may still be shown on the available material thilt there was no cogent reason for the decision. [1305 E-H, 1306 A]\n\n\n{1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA 6:9. The Supreme Court, howev.er, is under a duty to do complete justice when a matter comes before it. If the problem is a new one, a new solution has to be evolved. A Judge who has cultivated assiduously a sense of right and wrong sometimes may even depend upon his hunch while moulding the relief to be granted in a given case. It is a part of the judging process. (1306 C-D]\n\nCandler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., (1951] 2 K.B. 164; quoted with approval.\n\n7:1. rticle 222 does not state in express terms that the. consent of the Judge concerned is a pre-requisite for his transfer. It cannot be said that any transfer or shifting of a Judge without his consent would amount to a punishment and would interfere with the independence of the Judge concerned or of the judiciary. If the requirement of the consent of the Judge in question is read into Article 222 then the power conferred on the President ceases to be a p, ower in the jurisprudential sense. Powers are either iiublic or private. The former are those which are vested in a person as an agent or instrument of the functions of the State. If Article 222 is construed as requiring the consent of a Judge to be trans ferred then the power of the President can be neutralised by the Judge witholding consent. Such a construction would virtually confer on an unwilling Judge an immunity against the exercise of the power by the President under Article 222 even though public interest demands the transfer of the Judge. Article 222 would in that case become almost in effective. That being so, such a construction has to be avoided. [1312 D, 1313 C-F]\n\nUnion of India v. Sakal Chand Sheth [1978] 1 SCR 423; V.B. Raju v.\n\nState of Gujarat & Anr., [1981] 1 SCR 613; referred to.\n\n7:2. The Court while construing a statute has to read both the marginal notes and the body of its provisions. Whether the marinal notes would be useful to interpret the provisions and if so to what extent depends upon the circumstances of eacli case. No settled principles applicable to all cases can be laid down in this fluctuating state of the law as to the degree of importance to be attached to a marginal note in a statute. If the relevant provisions in the body of the statute firmly point towards a construction which would conflict with the marginal note, the marginal note has to yield. If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute the marginal note may be\n\nlooke~ into as an aid to construction. [1323 D-F]\n\nH Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh, [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 798 at 809; Indian Aluminium Co'mpany etc. v. Kera/a Sate Electricity Board, [1976] I SCR 70 at 86-87 applied.\n\n...\n\ns.il. ouPTA v. tJNioN 485\n\n7:3. The constitution has used the word 'appointment' and 'transfer' to A convey two different senses, tlie first meaning the initial induction of a person into a post and the latter meaning the shifting of a person from one post to another equivalent post. If the Constituent Asse.mbly had thought that 'appointed' and 'transferred' were interchangeable, there would have been no need for the amendment of Article 222 in the Revised Draft Constitution by substituting 'transferred' iii the place of 'appointed'. If in spite of this amendment, the Constituent Assembly has allowed paragrah 11 (b) (iii) in the Second Schedule. to the Constitution to remain as it is, it only means that it thought that the word 'transfer; had been used there; n in a broad sense meaning a physical 'transfer' of the Judges concerned which included both appointment to the Supreme Court and\n\ntransfer to another High Court and that is clear by the use of a common expres- C sion 'transfer' in respect of both the events which following it in that clause. Any other construction will run counter to Article 222 of the Constitution which is a complete code on the topic of transfer of a High Court Judge. If transfer is a fresh appointment, Article 217 (1) of the Constitution would immediately be\n\nattracted and that provision contains an entirely different procedure of consultation from what is contained in Article 222. [1326 D-B, 1327 B-H, 1328 A]\n\nState of Bombay v. He'man Sant/al Alreja, AIR 1952 Bombay 16; held in applicable.\n\n7:4. An oath is taken by a Judge in order to show bis allegience to the '' Constitution and to affirm that he will faithfully discharge his duties as a Judge without fear or favour, affection cir ill-will and that he will l!Phold the Constitution. The essential part of it is what he swears or affirms to do. The words \"having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of the High Court at (or of)\" in the form of oath are only descriptive of the person who takes the oath. The oath i~ not confined to the High Court where he enters his office. It will operate as long as he discharges judicial duties either.in that HlSh Court or in any other High Court to which he may be transferred under Article 222 of the Constitution or even when he discharges any other duty which he may be requested to do by the President as provided in paragraph 11 (b) (i) of the Second Schedule to the\n\nConstitution. The oath binds him even after his. retirement where be is asked to G function as a Judge under Art. 224A. [1329 C-F]\n\n7:5. No fresh oath need be taken by a Judge who is transferred before entering upon duties as a Judge in the High Court to which he is transferred sice\n\nthe oath already taken continues to bfod him and the transfer ls only traceable to H\n\n486 SUP.RilMil COURT REPORTS i I 982) 2 s.c.i.\n\nthe status which he had acquired after taking the oath earlier in the Court to which he was initially appointed: It is not correct to state that the effect of that oath comes to an end because he vacates his post on his transfer. Since there is no necessity for a fresh oath after his transfer, even though as a matter of abundant caution the practice of taking fresh oath is prevailing now a days, it cannot B be said that he is appointed afresh as a Judge in the Court to which he is transferred. [1331 F-H, 1332 A]\n\nHari Singh & Ors. v. Jai Singh & Ors. AIR 1937 A!l.588: (FB) referred to.\n\n7:6. The transfer does not :esult in a fresh appointment. If it is a fresh appointment in a new High Court with bis consent, payment of an additional compensation under Article 222 (2) of the Constitution to the Judge who becotnes a Judge of that High Court under an order of transfer under Article 222 (1) would become anam.olous as the other Judges of that Court who are initially appointed to that Court would be getting the usual salary, allowances and other perquisites allowable in the case of a High Court Judge. It is only when a Judge is transferred in the public interest without bis volition it can be said that the payment\n\nunder Art. 222 (2) would not be discriminatory as then he would be belonging to a different class. The payment under Article 222 (2) can be justified only by holding that the transfer under Article 222 (1) does not result in a fresh appointment\n\nin another High Court to which a Judge is transferred. [1332 B-D]\n\n7:7. If a Judge who is transferred under Article 222 of the Constitution is to be treated as having been appointed afresh in the High Court to which he is\n\ntransferred then he will have to' be assigned a rank below all the other judges who were working in that Court before he was transferred. It is only if it is held that he goes there as a person already appointed as a Judge though in another High Court then he can reasonabiy be assigned seniority over others who were appointed after he was appointed initially as a High Court Judge. [1332 D-F] ·\n\n7:8. A transfer under cla!!se (1) of Article 222 of the Constimtion could not ever have been considered to be a punishment in disguise, the transfer being in the public interest. The transfer may not be on account of any conduct of a Judge which is not relished by the transferring authority. It may be on account of th~ public interest such as providing another High. Court with a competent H Judge who is able to discharge his duties effectively in that court. Payment of such compensatory allowance does not imply that a transfer involves an ele!I)ent of punishment. Article 222 was not enacted by the Constituent Assembly as a\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 487\n\nmeasure of punishment to an erring Judge. It may be that when a Judge is trans A\n\nferred in the public interest, he suffers. some i.nconvenience but such inconvenience\n\ncannot be termed as a punishment. [1333 B~D)\n\n7:9. An order of transfer made under Article 222 is liable to be struck down by the Court if it is shown that it has been made for an extraneous reason, that is, on a ground falling outside the scope of that Article.\n\nUnder that Article\n\na Judge can be. transferred when such transfer subserves public interest and the\n\nPresident \"has no power to transfer a High Court Judge for reasons not bearing\n\non public interest but arising out of whim, caprice, or fancy of the executive or\n\nits desire to bend a Judge to its own way of thinking.\" [1334 G-H, 1335 A)\n\nUnion of India v. Sakal Chand Sheth, [1978] 1 SCR 423; applied.\n\n7:10. People accept the decision of a Judge not because his decision is\n\nalways coHect but because it is rendered by a person known for his wisdom, integrity, character and impartiality. It is only on account of these qualities of a Judge, people have faith in the judiciary. The litigants naturally expect the presiding officer of a Court to be a virtuous person. If there is a slight rumour which\n\nwould adversely affect his reputation, he ceases to command the respect of the\n\npeople. Even a correct judgment given by a Judge who is transferred would be\n\nviewed with suspicion, if it is known that a Judge, whose character and E conduct are not above reproach is liable to 'be transferred from. one High Court to another High Court, even when his transfer is effected in the Pl!blic interest and not on the ground of his character or conduct. Then, a Judge who\n\nls transferred cannot _command the respect of theBar and the people in the\n\nState to which he is transferred when his moral personality stands destroyed by\n\nthe very act of transfer unless the order of transfer carries a postscript that he is F\n\nnot being trimsferred on any ground of misbehaviour or incapacity.\n\n[1337H, 1338 A-D]\n\n7:11 . A construction by reading down Article 222 as not conferring 'on the President the power to transfer a Judge on the basis of untested allegations or\n\n rumours about acts of misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge, would not merely be in conformity with Article 218 and 124 (4) and but also would be consistent with the independence of the judiciary. As the law now stands it is not open to\n\nany single individual, whether it is the President or the Chief Justice of India or anybody else to take cognizance of any allegations of misbehaviour or of incapa- H city of a Judge and to take any legal action on their basis under the Judges (Inquiry} Act, 1968. One hundre~ mmers of the Lo~ Sabha or fifty Member~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C. ll.\n\nA of the Rajya Sabha alone. can initiate any action on such allegations. Naturally, all others are excluded from taking cognizance of them and acting on them. In 0\n\nthe absence of any categorisation of acts of misbehaviour or incapacity into different classes-like those on the basis of which Parliamentary proceedings for the removal of a Judge may be initiated and those on the basis of which an order of\n\ntransfer under Article 222 of the Constitution can be passed, it would be incorrect to hold that a transfer of a Judge can be made under Article 222 on mere allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge. Article 218 and Article 124 (4) and (5) of the Constitution make it clear that Article 222 cannot be resorted to in\n\nany such case, and if it is utilised by the President in that way, the transfer would have to be set aside on the ground of excess of jurisdiction.\n\n[1338 G-H, 1339 AD] ..\n\n7:12. When a transfer of a Judge cannot be made at all on the. ground of allegations of misbehaviour or of incapacity and can only be made in the public interest, the reputation of a transferred Judge would remain unsullied and no evil D consequences would follow. A transfer made in the public interest in accordance with Article 222 but without the consent of the Judge who is transferred is unassailable. (1339 D, E, F]\n\n7:13. The expression 'Judge' cannot be construed as not including a E 'Chief Justice.' Otherwise anamolous results follow. (1339 G]\n\n To avoid-several anamolies, the reasonable way to construe the relevant Articles of the Constitution is to interpret the word 'Judge' wherever it appears in the .constitutjon as including the 'Chief Justice' also except where a particular F provision expressly or by necessary implication distinguishes a Chief Justice from a Judge. In all other places, the word 'Judge' should be considered as having been used in a generic sense. (1341 E-FJ\n\nArticle 222 _'!f the Constitution, therefore, applies to all Judges of High Courts including a Chief Justice. Of course, a Chief Justice can only be transferred as a Chief Justice of another High Court and not as a Judge. (1341 FJ\n\n 7:14.\n\nEv_en where a transfer is made pursuant to a valid transfer policy, each transfer should receive adequate consideration at the hands of the authori- H ties concerned. All other relevant matters in relation to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred pursuant to the policy should be considered before ordering !iis transfer. If on such consideration it is found that he should not be transferred,\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 489\n\nthe proposal should he given up and the question of transferring another Judge in furtherance of the policy may be taken up for consideration. By doing so the policy remains unaffected and the public interest to be served by the policy also would not suffer. [1352 AC]\n\n7:15. Therefore, and also in view of the opm1ons expressed by several expert bodies an~ transfer of a Judge of a High Court under Arttt:le 222 .of the Constitution in order to implement the policy of appointing the Chief Justice of\n\nevery High Court from outside the State concerned and of having at least Ol)e third of the Judges of every High Court from outside the State, of course, after consultation witb the Chief Justice of India would not be unconstitutional.\n\n[1352 BF]\n\n8:1. The tendency in all the democratic countries in recent times is to liberalise the restrictions placed on the right of the citizens to know what is happening in the various public offices. The.emphasis now is more on the right\n\nof a citizen to know, than on his 'need to know' the contents of official D documents. [1376 E-F]\n\nDuncan & Anr. v. Cammell, Laird & Company Ltd., [1942] AC 624; Robinson v. State of South Australia, JO 2 [1931] AC 704; Merricks v. Nott-Bower, [1964] 1 All ER 717; Re Grosvener Hotel, London (No. 2) [1964] 3 All ER 354; Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry of Housing & Local Government, [1965] l E All ER 186; Conway v. Rimmer, [1967] 2 All ER 1260; Conway v. Rimmer [1968] I All ER 874; (HL); Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973] AC 388; Burmah Oil Co.\n\nLtd. v. Bank of England, [1979] 3 All ER 700; Science Research Council v. Nasse,\n\n[1980) AC 1028; Sankey v. Whit/am & Ors., 21 ALR 505; Regina v. Snider [1954] 4 DLR 483 at p. 489; Marbry v. Madison 5 US 137; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187; (No. 14694) Cir. Ct. Va. 1807; State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev F Singh, [1961) 2 SCR 371; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors., [1975] 3 SCR 333;\n\ndiscussed:\n\n8:2. The documents which included the correspondence between the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi, ihe Chief J.ustice of India and the Minister of Law and Justice and some official notings pertaining to the question of appointment of Shri S.N. Kumar as a Judge of the Delhi High Court, had no concern with either the security of the State or with the diplomatic relations between' our country and any foreign country. They no doubt related to a 'high level' appoir:.tment, but that fact by itself was not sfficient in the circumstances of the case to prevent the Court from directi.ng the Government to produce the\n\ndocµments for its inspection before deciding the question of discovery. -. - . , . . . .\n\n[1387-G-H, 1388 A-BJ . . . - ~\n\n\n(1982} 2S.C.R.\n\n8:3. The documents in question were 'high level' documents relating to the appointment of a Judge of a High Court and any order to be made on the question of disclosure had to be made after considering the pros and cons of all relevant matters, like, whether their disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or {; aptious, public or political criticism or whether the business of the Government would be exposed to.the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the backgrOU!Jd or perhaps those who have some axe to grind; and whether the disclosure would lead to any other further consequence of any body taking any further action on the basis of these documents. The Court must strike a balance between the public interest in the proper functioning of the public service and the public interest in the adminisiration of justice.\n\n[1388 C-D, F-G]\n\nRiddick v. Thames Board Mills Ltd., [1977] 3 WLR 63; referred to.\n\n8:4. Ours is an open society which has a government of the people, which has to be run according to the Constitution and the laws. The expression 'affairs of State' should, therefore, receive a very narrow meaning. Any claim for interpreting it with a wider connotation may expose section 123 of the Evidence Act to l:e challenged as being unconstitutional. An additional .iudge who was not reappointed could move the Court for .a direction to the Government to consider the question of his reappointment in a fair way. Here, the issue involved the performance of a duty which was judicially .identified and its breach was capable of judicial determination. and that it was possible to grant relief, though in a limited way,\"if circumstances warranted it. Considering the contP.ntions of the parties against the background of the facts .and the important questions of constitutional law and their application involved in this case, a decision not to direct disclosure of the documentswould result in graver public prejudice than the decision to direct such disclosure and that the public interest involved in the administration of justice should prevail over the public interest of the public service in the peculiar circumstances of case •. [1389 F-G, 1390 C-E]\n\n.. 9:1. Article 217 (1) of the Constitution which empo'wers the President to appoint Judges of High Courts does not make any distinction between the tests that should be applied in the case of appointment of a permanent Judge and the tests to be applied in the case of the appointment of an additional 'Judge, as to the fitness of the person to be appointed. The same tests have to be applied even when a person who has already been appointed as an additional Judge is to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge or for appointment as an additional Judge for another period although an additional Judge has two factors in his favour which have to be taken into consideration by the appolnting authority in the context of the manner in which Article 224 of the Constitution has been operated all these days. Since the appointment in question is to the post of a Judge, questions of integrity and of character of th~ person proposed for the post do assume large importance in taking a decision. The appointing aµthority cannot merely act on mere absence of evidence of lack of integrity or character of the person concerned. The appointing authority should on the other hand feel positively assured about the integrity and good character of such person. Having regard to the importance of the office of a Judge of a\n\nJiih Court, the constitµtional and Iei:al immunities that a Judge enjoys and the ·\n\ny -\n\nS.P. GUPTA V, UNION 491\n\nneed for infusing confidence .in the mind of the people who approach courts seeking impartical justice, the appointing authority has to take sometimes hard decisions and it is likely that in that process some person who is really honest may not be appointed on account of some doubt expressed by one or. the other amongst the functionaries who have to be consulted under Article 217 (l) of the Constitution or on account of some other relevant material that may be available to the appointing authority. Hence if a person i$ not appointed as a Judge after the usual process of consultation is over it dos not necessarily mean that in fact he lacks integrity or character. [1390 H, 1391 A-Fl ·\n\n9:2. Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a voluntary combination of two or more persons to achieve some unlawful object or to bring about some result injurious to some other person or persons. If there were only two in a given case and one of them had exerted pressure .on the Other to secure some information it would not be a case of conspiracy but a case of extortion of some\n\n C information by one from the other. [1393 B-D]\n\n9:3. There is no allegation in the case that either the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court or the Law Minister had any personal ill-will against Sbri S N.\n\nKumar. There is no allegation also to the effect' that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had anything to gain by colluding with the Law Minister. 'He had been appointed as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court before February 19, 1981 on which date he wrote the first letter expre.ssing his opinion against the reappointment of Shri S.N .. Kumar. Further the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court is not impleaded as a respondent in the case. It is wholly improper and opposed to all canons of judicial process to make any comment against him without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. Under the Constitution, he is under a duty to express his opinion en the question of appointment ofa Judge in the High Court of Delhi. Such opinion should be about all relevant aspects includin1; the reputation and integrity of the person concerned.\n\nJn discharge of his constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Law Minister on February 19, 1981. [1393 E~H] ·\n\n 9:4. A reading of the aforesaid letter shows that it was being written in anguish and with a feeling of sincerity. It is not shown that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had made any statement which was false to his knowledge-, or which he did not believe to be true or which he believed to be untrue. A Chief Justice of a High Court has no machinery to investigate into complaints but be has got to state about the fitness of the person to be appointed as a Judge.\n\nIt. is seen that he has relied on the statement of some of his colleagues and some of the members of the Bar. He has no doubt not given their names, having regard to the constraints of law which applies to persons who make such statements. It is significant that even the Chief Justice of India has not given the names of Judges and of lawyers who were consulted by him as stated in his letter dated May 22, 1981. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the' Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court that he had heard some statements whichr suggesteo that the integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar was in doubt. The said statement may be in fact not true. The Supreme Court cannot go into the correctness or otherwise of those statements in proceeding of this character. It is not shown that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High <;:ourt bad not heard such statements at all.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nIn this situation if the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had conveyed whatever he had heard and had not recommended continuance of Shri S.N. Kumar he cannot be considered as having committed any act of impropriety even though Shri Kumar had not in fact done anything which was improper as a Judge. If Shri Kumar is a victim of false rumour he deserves sympathy but it is not open to condemn the action of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court which he had to discharge in the public interest' and true to his oath of office.\n\n-[1395 D-H, 1396 A]\n\n9:5. In the case of the High Court of Delhi which is situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, consultation with the Governor does not arise (vide section 4 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966). The only two authorities who have to be consulted by the President are the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The process of consultation referred to in Article 217 (1) requires that the authorities concerned should be given sufficient information and also sufficient opportunity to furnish their opinion. In the instant case letter dated February 19, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court was made available to the Chief Justice of India. [1396 BD]\n\n9:6. That there was full and frank discussion between the Chief Justice of India and the Delhi Chief Justice with reference to the very particulars referred to in the letter of May 7, 1981 is clear by the following facts : (i) Tho statement \"with regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general con- duct, the matter has already been discussed between us\" which is found in the letter of March 28, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India, (ii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the same date addressed by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Law Minister enclosing a copy of the above said letter dated March 28, 1981, (iii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India dated May 21, 1981 and (iv) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated May 22, 1981 written from Simla. This is further supported by the affidavit dated July 17, 1981 of Shri S.N. Kumar himself which had been filed long before the date on which documents in question were directed to be disclosed by the Court i.e. in October\n\n1981. That means that the Chief Justice of India had been furnished all the particulars by the Delhi Chief Justice earlier at the meeting which took place on March 26, 1981 and the Chief Justice of India had also the explanation of Shri S.N. Kumar. Sufficient information was available with the Chief Ju.stice ofJndia to record his opinion on the question of appointment of Shri S.N. Kumar and no material of ny substantial importance had been kept back from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India. It cannot, therefore, be said that the process of consultation had become defective or that Shri S.N. Kumar had been prejudiced by reason of the Government keeping back the letter dated May 7, 1981 from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India out of respect to the wishes of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. [1418 C-F, 1420 C-H] ..\n\n9:7. There does not appear to be any undue haste or impropriety on the part of the Law Minister in making his recommendation not to appoint Shri Kumar on May 27, 1981 for two reasons : (1) that the Government had to take a decision on that'.question on or before May 27, 1981 as directed by the interim orderLof the1Suprem~; eourt and (2) tht1t th~ Law Ministr IJad_ expressly kept out\n\nI . ,,, \\ ., ! 1 S.P. GUPTA v._UNION 493\n\nof consideration the I.B. reports while taking his decision, as can be:seen from the note of May 27, 1981 on which alone the Chief Justice of India had reserved his opinion in his letter dated May 22, 1981 which showed that on the other questions he had finally_ expressed his opinion. The granting of extension to a Judge pending enquiry into a materil!l aspect of the case may not strictly be in consonance with the Constitution. It may be irregular to issue a warrant of appointment pending inquiry into tbe fitness of.the person to be appointed as a Judge.\n\nHence it cannot be said that there was any transgression of ordinary rules of official conduct on the part of the Government in finally processing the file by May 27, 1981. [1421 F-H, 1422A]\n\n9:8. The 'President has taken bis decision on a consideration of the material before him and in doing so he is not shown to have relied on any irrelevant ground. He is not, however, bound by the opinion of any of them although he is expected to give due regard to the opinions expressed by them. The President in the instant case has, out of prudence decided not to reappoint Shri S.N.\n\nKumar as the opinions of the two constitutional dignitaries were conflicting on the question of integrity, a question vital to the appointment of a Judge. There is no constitutional impropriety in the !lecision of the President. The reason for reappointing Sbri Kumar is not an irrelevant one. Moreover there is a distinction between the appointment of a Judge without proper and effective consultation as required by Article 217 (1) and non-appointment of a person as a Judge preceded by defective oonsultation. la the former case, the validity of the appointment may be open to question but in the latter case ordinarily no petition will lie except under an extraordinary case like the one here where the scope of Article 224 of the Constitution was not correctly understood by the authorities. Every one of the authorities viz. the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court has discharged his duties in this case with a sense of responsibility. [1422 B-F]\n\n9:9. But unfortunately the Court cannot undertake the function of granting an opportunity to the Judge to prove his ianocenc: in view of the restricted scope of the jurisdiction of this Court in ihis. case. The Court, cannot proceed further in this case and try to find out the truth or otherwise of the complaints said to have been made against Shri S.N. Kumar. It is true that if the complaints are really untrue, then Sbri Kumar bas paid the penalty for no fault committed by him. The deeision of the President not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the High Court of Delhi cannot, however be interfered with.\n\n[1422 H, 1423 CE]\n\n10:1. If as a matter of policy the Government proposes to appoint some\n\nJudges in every High Court from outside the State, it is a matter within the realm G of the Government, It is not constitutionally impermissible to do so.\n\n[1429 C]\n\n10:2. The Reports of the Committees of the Law Commission are entitled to great respect as they are prepared by experienced person after taking into consideration all relevant aspects and sometimes the evidence collected by them from several sources. If they are. to be excluded many opinions expressed in many of the books relied on by the petitioners themselves have to be excluded. Reports of the Law Commission can be looked into to nderstand the history of the legis-\n\n494 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS [1982] :i s.c.R..\n\nA lation, the object with which certain legal provisions are enacted and what advantages m'ay be derived by adopting a particular policy. Reports of the Law Commission have been made use of by this Court earlier to understand the history of the legislation which was under consideration and the object with which it was\n\npasse~. [1429 F-H]\n\nB Balahand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR 52; followed,\n\n10;3. In the context of Article 217, the functionaries who have to express opinion under that Article can ascertain all relevant information about a person proposed for the appointment by any reasonable means and thel'. need not know them personally. Any other view would result in the exclusion of a large body of lawyers who are not practising before the High Courts from consideration for appointment as High Court Judges, which certainly could not have been the intention of the Constitution makers. (!430 C-D]\n\ni0:4. The letter dated March 18, 1981 cannot be an indirect attempt to. transfer some additional Judges from one High Court to another, for the reason that the transfer bf an additional Judge (appointed under Article 224 (1) unless the arrears have been cleared off) and the transfer of an acting Judge (appointed\n\nunde~ Article 224 (2) (in any event would not be possible at all. An additional Judge is appointed for a term not. exceeding two years only with a view to clearing off the arrears in a High Court. If tl)at is the sole object of appointing him, he cannot be transferred as an additional Judge in the public interest from that Court to another Court unless the purpose for which be is appointed is achieved namely, clearing off the arrears. Moreover when bis stay as an additional Judge is very short it would not subserve the interest of efficiency of public service if be is made to work in more than one High Court during that short period unless there isnot sufficient work to be assigned to him in the High Court in 'which he is initially appointed as an additional Judge. The case of an acting Judge appointed under Article 224 (2) of the Constitution is a self-evident one. An acting Judge is appointed to act as a Judge until the permanent Judge in whose place he is appointed bas resumed his office. He cannot, therefore, be transferred under Article 222 contrary to the .express terms of Article 224 (2)., In view of this declaration the petitioners cannot entertain any suspicion that the circular lett.er has been issued to achieve the object of transferring additional Judges, during their tenure fixed under .Article 224 (1).\n\nThis, however, does not come in the way of an additional Judge or an.acting Judge being appointed as a permanent Judge either in bis own High Court or in any other High Court before the tenure specified under Article 224 (I) or Article 224 (2), as the case may be, comes to an end. [1430.E-H, 1431 A-CJ\n\n10:5. The circular letter of the Law Minister does not suggest that the additional Judges who have not given their consent would be under a disadvantage in the matter of their continuance as additional Judges or of their appointment as permanent Judges in their own Court The portion in paragraph 3 of the letfer, namely, 'it may be made clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of\n\nS.l'. GUPTA v. UNION 495\n\nGovernment either in regard to their appointment or in regard to .accoll)moda- A tion in accordance with the preference given' does not carry with it any sinister design. [1431 C-F]\n\n10:6. The circular letter is not violative of Artide 217 (I) and Article 222 of the .Constitution on the ground that it bad been addressed without the previous consultation of the Chief Justice of India. The letter as can be seen from its tenor is intended to find out whether any additional Judge is willing to be appointed as a Judge in any other Higli Court. Such appointment has to be made only in accordance with Article 21T(1) of the Constitution. Before making such appointment, the President has to consult all the functionaries mentioned in Article 217\n\n(1) including the Chief Justice of India. Article 222 of the Constitution does not come into picture at all as no transfer is contemplated under the letter. Th.e letter relates to initial appointments only. In the circumstances there is no error commited by the Law Minister in writing the impugned letter to the Chief Ministers. [1431 G-H, 1432 A-BJ\n\n11:1. The order transferring Shri K.B.N. Singh to Madras High Court is an administrative order which is passed by the President in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India, who is the sole authority to be consulted under Article 222. [1432 E] D\n\n11 :2. Article 222 does not Jay down the procedure to be followed for effecting a transfer. Even granting that the proceedings for transfer of a Judge are initiated.by the Chief Justice of India the order of transfer would not be bad as under Article 217 (1) of the Constitution which is couched in almost the same languages, an appointment of a Judge would not be bad only because the (jhief E Justice of a High Court who is one of the authorities to be consulted initiate~ the proposal. In fact the practice has been that the Chief Justice of the High Cc; iurt invariably initiates it. [1432 G-HJ\n\nll:3. A fair reading of the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated -December 7, 1980 shows that there was prior discussion about the question of . transfers of Chief Justices of High Courts and that there was a suggestion by the Government that there should be a transfer of all Chief Justices of High .Courts so that in every High Court there. was a Chief Justice .. who hailed from outide the State. This.suggestion sterns from the proposed policy of the Government\n\nwhiCh is clear from the statement of the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1980. [1433 B-D] ,\n\n11 :4. There is no doubt that a policy decision should ultimately be applicable to all High Courts. But it can be applied by stages. A policy or for that matter a law may have to be.applied by stages in different areas 11nd in the case of different institutions or bodies by reason of administrative cornpulsions and such application cannot be considered as either arbitray or capricious or unconstitutional. Some times the application of a policy of a law in all areas'or in respect of all institutions to which it is ultimately intended to apply simultaneously may defeat the very policy or Jaw, even though it may be otherwise benefi-\n\n496 sui>RilME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.it.\n\ncial. Moreover a policy is not something which should take the form of a formal statute or a written code. It can be gathered from a course of action or conduct and it can take its birth when the fint step is taken in its direction.\n\n[1436 F-H, 1437A] ' 11:5. The question of policy is a matter entirely for the es.ident to decide. Even though the Chief Justice of India is consulted in that behalf by the President since the policy relates to the High Courts, his -opinion is not binding on the President. It is open to the President to adopt any policy which is subject only to the judicial review by the Court. Under Article 222 of the Constitution the Chief Justice of India has to be consulted on the question whether a particular Judge should be transferred and where he should be transferred while implcmen- 0 ting the said policy. If the Government requests the Chief Justice of India to give his opinion on a transfer to implement the said policy which is really in the public interest he cannot decline to do so. Even though the Chief Justice was opposed to the 'wholesale transfers' of Judges there is no bar for the Government treating the recommendation for transfers made by the Chief Justice of l!ldia as a part of the\n\nD implementation of its policy. [1437 !I-BJ\n\n11:6. The policy of having the Chief Justice in every High Court from outside the State is not unconstitutional and it could be achieved by resorting to \"--\n\nArticle 222 of the Constitution. The transfer ordered pursuant to that policy cannot, therefore, be considered as either discriminatory or not being in the E public interest. In fact such transfers are in the public interest. Here, the Chief Justice of India had never formed an opinion that there was any error committed by Shri K.B.N. Singh. Hence there can be no basis for the apprehension in the\n\nmind of Shri K.B.N. Singh that the transfer was being used as a measure of punishment in his case. If it had been a selective transfer ordered without regard to\n\nthe public interest it would have been unconstitutional.\n\nBut this is not such a\n\ntransfer. The order docs not attach an stigma to Shri K.B.N. Singh. It is a bona-. fide one made in implementation of a perfectly valid policy which may be implemented in instalments. [1437 H, 1438 G-HJ\n\n11:7. The expression 'President\" should be understood here in the consti\\utional sense. The discussion must have taken place with the Minister concerned. A discussion in fact did take place after Shri K.B.N. Singh met the Chief Justiee -of India on the evening of-January 8, 1981. From the records produced, it is seen that discussion gone on between the authorities concerned sometimes over telephone and sometimes at a meeting. No minutes are kept of H many such discussions. It cannot, therefore, be said that either there was no time to discuss or no such discussion had taken place at all. It has to be borne in mind that the Chief Justice of India asked Shri K.B.N. Singh to meet hini at New Delhi\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION\n\n496-A\n\nto discuss the matter further and accordingly Shri K.B.N. Singh met him oti January 8, 1981. If the Chief Justice of India had-felt that any repressentation to be' made by Shri K.B.N. Singh was irrelevant he would not have called him for discussion at New Delhi. After discussing the matter with him he must have discussed the ll;!atter before the decision was taken on January 9, 1981 with the other authority concerned. In the course of the discussion referred to above all matters which had come te the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India must have been placed before the person with whom the discussion .had taken place. All official acts must deemed to have been done in 11ccordance with law. [1443 B-FJ\n\n11:8. The question of policy is within the realm of the Government.\n\nTherefore, even if the Chief Justice of India considerd that the recommendation made by him was one of six or seven transfers suggested by him which would mean •\n\nfor the time being a partial implementation of the. policy, it cannot be said that the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh is bad for all aspects relating to Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh were considered by the appropriate authority before ordering the transfer.\n\n(1443 H, 1444 A-B]\n\n11 :9. Article 222 of the Constitution is not confi!1ed only to policy transfer involving all Judges. Even individual Judges may be transferred for administra- ·\"' tive reasons in the public interest. In the circumstances_ of the case, it is difficult to hold that the transfer was an act of victimisation. [1444 C-D]\n\n11:10. The decision to transfer a Judge under Article 222 of the Constitution, is an administrative one. In this case it is not alleged that there was mala tides on the part of any authority. On the other hand the material available i~ the case clearly es_tablishes that due proceC!ure had been followed and all facts that justify the transfer have been affirmatively proved.\n\nIt is shown that the authorities concerned felt satisfied about the need for the transfer. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case the order of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras is legal. [1444 E, 144~5 A-C]\n\n\n108 held not relevant.\n\n12:1. If it is the constitutional or statutory duty of a Governor or the President to exercise his discretion with respect to a certain matter he may be required by mandamus to do so but the manner in which he has to discharge that dut.Y canl)oi 9e directed by the <; O\\Jf!~. A statutory discretion is not nece~·\n\n496B\n\n\nA sarily or indeed usualy absolute and it may be qualified by express and implied legal duties to comply with substantive and procedural requirements before a decision is taken, whether to act and how to act. [1451 B-D]\n\nR. Tithe Com71issioners case, [1849] 14 Q.B. 459 at 474; Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, [1880]5 A. C. 214 at pp 222-223; Paidfield & Ors. v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food & Ors., [1968] I AU E.R. 694; Breen v. Amalgamated\n\nE~[fineerin[! Union [1971] 2 Q.B. 175 at 190, referred to,\n\n' 12:2. The power conferred on the President by Article 216.ofthe Constitution to appoint sufficient number' of Ju<lges is a power coupled with a duty and is not merely a political function. In the instant case ordinari.ly the court would have been reluctant to issue any mandamus to the Government to con:iply with the duty of determination of the strength of Judges of High Courts. B'ut having regard to the undisputed total inadequacy of the strength of Judges in many High Courts, ii appears to be inevitable that the Union Government should be directed to determine within a reasonable time the strength of permanent Judges recorded for the .disposal of cases instituted in them and to take steps to fi!l up the vacancies after making such determination. [1451 D-F)\n\nIt is true that the Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court hold their tenure not at the pleasure of the President but till they atlain\n\nthe prescribed age of retirement; that their removal is posible only after following an elaborate procedure; that their salaries and allowances and pension are charged on the consolidated funds of the States qr of the Union; that no discussion can take place in the legislatures with respect to their conduct in .the discharge of their duties except on the motion for their removal that they have the power to punish a person for contempt of court and they are proteckd by a host of other provisions of Jaw which are intended to make them feel and to remain independent of any external agency such as the executive. These, as far as they go, are necessary for ensuring the lnd'ependcnce of the judiciary. But if the judiciary should be really independent something more is necessary and that we have to seek in the Judge himself and not outside.\n\nA Judge should be inaependent of himself, A Judge is a human being who isa bundle of passions and prejudices, likes and dislikes, affection and ill-will, hatred and contempt and fear and recklessness. In order to be successful Judge these elements should be curbed and kept under restraint and that is possible only by education, training, continued practice and cultivation of a sense of humility r..nd dedication to duty.\n\nThese curbs can neither be bought in the market nor injected into human system by the written or unwritten laws. In these things are there even if any of the protective measures provided by the Constitution and the laws go the independence of the judiciary will .not suffer. B, ut with all these measures being there still a Judge may not be independent. It ; s the inner strength of Judges alone that can save the judiciary. .The life of a Judge does not really call for great acts of self-sacrifice: but it does insist upon sm:ill acts of self-denial almost every\n\nar. (1453 G-H, 1454 AE]\n\n\" .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION 497\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case Nos. 19, 20, 21, A 22, 2, 6~ and 24 of 1981.\n\n{l\\Jnder_Article, l39A (l) of1 the Constitution of India)\n\nAND\n\nWRfT PETITION NO. 2'74 OF 198•1 /\n\n(, Under Article 32 o( the Constitution o( Indiai)\n\nAND\n\nSPECIAL LEA VB PETITION (CIVtL) NO. 1509' OF 19'81\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 2nd February 1981 of the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 312/81.\n\n1 . In Transferred Cases Nos. 19, 20, 21 & 22/81-\n\nS.P: Gupta-Petitioner in person - and H.K. Puri in T.C.\n\nD No. 19/81.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, P. H. Parekh and Miss M'anik Tarkunde for-\n\n'JI, the Petitioner in T.C. No. 20/81.\n\nP.P. Rao, G.C. Kumar, R. Venkatar, amani, Mahesh R'. Choudhary and G.D. Gpta for the Petitioner in T.C. No. 21/81.\n\n, H.M. Seer, vai, K.C. Cooper, A.J. Rana, J:.R. Gagrat, B.R'. Agurwal, P.G. Gokha/e for the petitioner in T.C. 22/81.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-. Sarthy, G.S. Narayana, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini for th((· Respondents in t.c.\n\n19~22/81.· '\n\nR.K. Garg, B. V. l)esai and S.[(.. .Jain (or Respondent No. 3 in T.C. No. 20/8J.\n\nln. W.P. N.o. 274/81-\n\nMiss. Lily Thomµs~Peti, tioner in person a, nd: Mr. H.M.\n\nSeervai.\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K; Parasaran, Solicitor General H K.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss A. Subhashini and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.\n\n498 SUPREME douR'f REPORTS\n\nA s. Markadeyafor Respondent No. 2.\n\n':.\n\nL.M. inghyi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha . and A.M. S!nghvi for Responderif'No. 3. ' ' · ' . . \\:; .\n\nDr. L; M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma , and N. 'Sudhakaran for the ,) •• s . . • i B intervenor- Kerala High Co'urt Advocates Association.\n\nE.C. Aggar'wala fot\"the intervenor.\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,. > '. ' • c .. f:;.L. Sphu f9r the intervenor.\n\nK.R. Nagaraja for the. intervenor.\n\nN.S. Das Bhal for the' iri.terverior.\n\nD A.K. Srivastava, for the intervenor.\n\nIn Transferred Case No; 2/81.\n\n'c.s. Vaidyanathan for the Petitioer\n\n' . ·., ' E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,'\n\nK.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss.A. Subhashini and R.N .. Poddarfor Respondent No. I. ·' ·- \" ·\n\nS. Markedeya for Respondent No. 2.\n\nDr. L.M.Singhvi and S.K. Verma for Respondent No. 6.\n\nBasudeva Pd. and Ashok Grover for the intervenor-'-(Patna High Court Bar Association)\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Susanta Kumar Dass, D.P; Mukherjee and G.S.\n\nChatterjee for the intervenor.\n\nIn Transferred Case No. 6/81--:-\n\nFor the Petitioner :\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,, K.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss A. Subhashini and R.N. Poddar.\n\n--\n\n...\n\n- _.,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 499\n\nIn Transferred Case No. 24/81-\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha, L.K. Pandey and A.M. Singhvi, for the Petitioners.\n\nL.N. Sinha, Attorrey General, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, K.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss A. Subhashini and R.N. Poddar for the\n\nRespondents.\n\nIn Special Leave Petition No. 1509/81-\n\nA.K. Srivastava for the Petitioner.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nBHAGWATI J.\n\nThese writ petitions filed in different High C Courts and transferred to this Court under Article l 39A of the Constitution raise issues of great constitutional importance affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length before us.\n\nThe arguments have occupied as many as thirty five days and they have ranged over a large number of issues comprising every imaginable aspect of the judicial institution.- Voluminous written submissions have been filed before us which reflect the enormous industry and vast erudition of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and a large number of authorities, Indian as well as foreign, have been brought to our attention.\n\nWe must acknowledge with gratitude our indebtedness to the learned counsel for the great assistance they have rendered to us in the delicate and difficult task of adjudicating upon highly sensitive issues arising in '- these writ petitions.\n\nWe find, and this is not unusual in cases of this kind, that a considerable amount of passion has been injected into the arguments on both sides and some times passion may appear to lend strength to an argument, but, sitting as Judges, we have to be careful to see that passion does not blind us to logic and prediletions pervert proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions.\n\nWe have to examine the arguments objectively and dispassionately without being swayed by populist approach or sentimental appeal.\n\nIt is very easy for the human mind to find justification for a conclusion which accords with the dictates of emotion.\n\nReason is a rea iy enough advocate for the decision one, consciously or unconsciously, desires to reach.\n\nI will recall the brilliant fling of Shri Arobindo in his poem \"Savitri\".\n\n\"An inconclusive play is Reason's toil.\n\nEach strong idea can use her as its tool; Accepting every brief she pleads her case, Open to every thought she c&nuot know,\"\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nWe have therefore to rid our mind of any pre-conceived notions or ideas and interpret the Constitution as it is and not as we think it ought to be.\n\nWe can always find some reason for bending the language of the Constitution to our will, if we want, but that would be rewriting the Constitution in the guise of interpretation.\n\nWe must also remember that the Constitution is an organic instrument intended to endure and its provisions must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional objectives and goals and not in the light of how a particular Government may b~ acting at a given point of time.\n\nJudicial response to the problem of constitutional interpretation must not suffer from the fault of emotionalism or sentimentalism which is likely to cloud the vision when Judges are confronted with issues of momentous importance.\n\nWe must consstantly bear in mind the famous words of Holmes J. in Northern Security Company v. United States(1) where that great illustrious Judge said :\n\n\"Great cases like hard cases make bad law.\n\nFor great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accicent of immediate over-whelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.\"\n\nWith these prefatory words we may now proceed to state the facts of these writ petitions.\n\nWe propose to take up these writ petitions in a slightly different order than that given in the cause title.\n\nThe first writ petition is that filed by Iqbal Chagla and others in the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThe petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the the High Court of Bombay and they have challenged a circular letter dated 18th March, 1981, addressed by Shri Shiv Shankar, the Law Minister of the Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of the other States.\n\nSince the circular letter has formed the subject matter of heated controversy between the parties and its constitutional validity has been assailed on behalf of the petitioners, it would be\n\n(I) 193 us 197,\n\n....\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 501\n\ndesirable to reproduce it in extenso in the words of the author\n\n~ himself:\n\n\"D.O. No. 66/10/81-Jus.\n\nt My dear\n\nMinistry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, 'India, New Delhi-110001.\n\nMarch 18, 1981\n\nIt has repeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Reotganisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochil tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. Somehow, no start could be made in the past in this direction.\n\nThe feeling is strong, growing and justified that some effective steps should be taken very early in this direction.\n\n-~ 2.\n\nIn this context, I would request you to :-\n\n--~-\n\n(a) obtain from all the Additional Judges working in the High Court of your State their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country. They could, in addition, be requested to name three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as permanent Judges; and\n\n(b) obtain from persons who have already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in the country along with a similar preference for three High Courts.\n\nWhile obtaining the consent and the preference of the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it may be made clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of the GoverQment either iq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nregard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the preferences given.\n\nI would be grateful if action is initiated very early by you and the written consent and preferences of all Additional Judges as well as of persons recommended by you for initial appointment are sent to me within a fortnight of the receipt of this letter.\n\nI am also sending a copy of this letter to the Chief Justice of your High Court.\n\nWith regards,\n\nGovernor of Punjab\n\nYours sincerely, Sd/ ·(P. Shivshankar)\n\nChief Ministers (by name) (Except North-Eastern States.)\"\n\nIt appears that a copy of the Circular letter was sent by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of each High Court and the Chief Minister of each State also forwarded a copy of the circular letter to each Chief Justice of the High Court of his State. We do not know what the Chief Justices of the various High Courts did on receipt of a copy of the circular Jetter from the Law Minister and from the Chief Ministers of their respective States, but presumably each Chief Justice sent a copy of the circular letter to the Additional Judges in his court with a request to do the needful in view of what was stated in the circular letter. The Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in any event addressed such a communication to each of the additional Judges in his Court. We do not know what was the response of the additional Judges in Bombay to the circular letter but the record shows that out of a total number of Additional Judges in the Country quite a few Additional Judges gave their consent to be appointed outside their High Court. The petitioners and other advocates practising on the original as well as appellate side of the High Court of Bombay however took the view that the circular letter was a diret attack on \\he independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. tJNION (Bhagwati, 1.) 5o3\n\nConstitution and hence the Advocates Association of Western India which represents advocates practising on the appellate side, the Bombay Bar Association which represents advocJtes practising on the original side and the Managing Commitee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society which represents So!icifors practising in the High Court of Bombay, passed resolutions condemning the circular letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Government of India to withdraw the circular letter.\n\nSince the circular letter was not withdrawn by the Law Minister, the petitioners filed the present writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the circular letter aod seeking a declaration that if consent has been given by any Additional Judge or by any person whose name has been or is to be submitted for appointment as a Judge consequent on or arising from the circular letter, it should be held to be null and void. There were several grounds on which the constitutional validity of the circular letter was challenged but it is not necessary to set them out at the present stage because we shall have occasion to refer to them in detail when we deal with the rival argu 11ents of the parties. The petitioners impleaded the Law Minister as respondent No. 1, the Union of India as respondent No. 2 and ten Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court as respondents Nos. 3 to 12.\n\nThe writ petition was filed on 20th April 1981 and immediately after filing it, the petitioners applied to the learned single Judge sitting on the original side of the Bombay High Court for admission of the writ petition and interim relief. The admission of the writ petition as also the grant of interim relief were opposed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 but the learned single Judge admitted the writ petition and issued a rule and granted interim relief in terms of prayer (e) of the writ petition. The effect of granting the interim relief was that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were restrained from further implementing the circular letter and acting in any manner upon the consent, if any obtained from any person following on or arising from the circular\n\n- letter. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 thereupon preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court under clause ( 15) of the Letters Patent but the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench on 24th April, 1981.\n\nThe Division Bench fixed the hearing of the writ petition before the learned single Judge hearing writ petitions on 25th June 1981 and also gave directions for filing of affidavits by the parties.\n\nRespondent Nos. 1 and 2 being aggrieved by the order made by the Division Bench dismissing their appeal made an application to this Court on 8th May 1981 for taking up their\n\n504 SlJPllilME COlJRt REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nspecial leave petition directed against the order of the Division Bench on the same day, but this Court refused to take up the special leave petition for hearing on that day and directed that it may come up for hearing in due course. Respondents Nos. l and 2 in the meanwhile filed Transfer Petition No. 24 of 1981 for transfer of the writ petition from the Bombay High Court to this Court under Article\n\nI 39A of the Constitution and ultimately by an order dated 9th June 1981, the vacation Judge directed that the writ petition be withdrawn from the Bombay High Court to this Court and he also gave directions for filing of affidavits and written briefs.\n\nThat is how the present writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others has come up for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe second writ petition is that filed by V.M Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi.\n\nThe petitioner in this writ petition is a senior advocate practising in the Supreme Court and he has not only challenged the constitutional validity of the circular letter issued by the Law Minister but also assailed the practice followed by the Central Government in appointing Additional Judges in various High Courts. The grounds on which the constitutional validity of the circular Jetter is challenged are the same as those taken in the first petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others, but, so far as the complaint in respect of appointment of additional Judges is concerned, this writ petition covers new ground not treaded by the first writ petition. What made it necessary to include this complaint in the writ petition was the fact that three Additional Judges of Delhi High Court, namely, O.N. Vohra. S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from 7th March, 1979, and whose term was expiring on the mid-night of 6th March 1981 were further appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from 7th March 1981 and these short-term appointments were, according to the petitioner, unjustified by the terms of Article 224 and were in any event subversive of the independence of the judicary. The petitioner therefore claimed in the writ petition, in addition to the declaration that the circular letter was unconstitutional and void, a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to convert the posts of Additional Judges into permanent Judges in the various High Courts commensurate with the regular business and the arrears in those High Courts and in particular to convert 12 posts of Additional Judges in the Delhi High Court into permanent posts having\n\n....\n\n---:>- _,..\n\nS.1'. GUPtA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 505\n\nregard to the regular business and the large arrears in that High Court. The petitioner also questioned the 'validity of short-term appointments of O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad and claimed that since there was an existing vacancy in a permanent post,\n\nO.N. Vohra should be appointed as a permanent Jdge to fill that vacancy and so far as S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad were concerned, they should be appointed for the full term of two years. It appears that the Union of India was the only respondent impleaded in the writ petition as originally filed, but subsequently the Law Minister as also the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs were added as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the writ petition. The High Court of Delhi by its order dated 23rd April 1981 admitted the writ petition and issued rule upon it.\n\nHowever, since the questions arising in the writ petition were questions of great constitutional importance and the first writ petition had already been filed in the Bombay High Court and other writ petition to which we shall presently refer had also been presented in the High Court of Allahabad raising substantially the same questions, an application was made to this Court on 24th April 1981 for transfer of the writ petition to this Court and by an order dated 1st May 1981 this Court transferred the writ petition to itself from the Delhi High Court. Meanwhile, the further term of O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad was about to expire on 6th June 1981 and no decision appeared to have been taken till then for continuing these three Additional Judges for a further term and the petitioner apprehended that if these three Additional Judges were not continued as Additional Judges on the expiration of their term on 6th June 1981, the writ petition might become infructuous. The petitioner therefore, presented an application to this Court on 4th May 1981 for an order directing that the writ petition be heard and disposed of before 6th June 1981 and that in any event, the respondents should maintain status quo by extending the period of appointment of Additional Judges in the various High Courts till the the disposal of the writ petition. Immediately on filing this application the petititioner requested the Court to fix an early date of hearing of the writ petition so that it could be disposed of before 6th June, 1981, but since the Court was closing for the summer vacation frcm 9th May 1981, it was not possible to fix the hearing of the writ petition until the reopening of the court after the summer vacation.\n\nThe petitioner thereupon prayed for an interim order that on the expiration of their term on 6th June, 1981, the Additional Judges should be continued and their term extended until the final disposal of the writ petition.\n\nBut, obvi0usly this was not a prayer which could be granted by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] i S.C.R.\n\nCourt because it is for the President and not for the Court to appoint Additional Judges and once tire term of an Additional Judge has come to an end by efflux of time, it is not competent for the court to reappoint him for a further term. Since, however, an allegation was made in the application that the appointments of Additional Judges for a further term were being made at the last minute and three Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur were not informed about the extension of their term until the evening of the last day on which their original term was due to expire, this Court made an order dated 8th May 1981 directing that, since the hearing of the writ petition would not be taking place until the reopening of the court after the summer vacation, the Union of India should \"decide not less than ten days before 6th June, 1981 whether any of the three Additional Judges should be reappointed for a further term as Additional Judges or they should be appointed as permanent Judges or otherwise.\" So far as the circular letter was concerned though no prayer for interim relief was made in the written application, this Court, on an oral application made on behalf of the petitioner, directed that any Additional Judge who does not wish to respond to the circular letter may do so until the disposal of the writ petition and he shall not be refused extension nor shall he be refused permanent appointment, as the case may be, on the ground that he has not sent any reply to the circular letter or has not indicated his preference as asked for in the circular Jetter. Now, according to this order, the Central Government was bound to take its decision in regard to the continuance or otherwise of O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad on orbef'ore 27th May,1981 but since no such decision was communicated to the three Additional Judges, the petitioner, presuming that such decision must not have been reached by the Central Goverment, preferred an application to this Court on 1st June, 1981 for directing the Central Govern rnent, to communicate its decision regarding the continuance or otherwise of the three Additional Judges. Before this application came up for hearing, the petitioner came to know that a decision had been taken by the Central Government in regard to O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad and \\\\bile S. B. Wad continued as and Additional Judge for a period of one year from 7th June, 1981, O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar were not continued for a further term. The petitioner thereupon preferred another application to this Court on 4th. June, .1981 and in this application the petitioner pointed out that there were still large arrears of work in the Delhi High Court and therefore there was no lawful and bona fide reason for the non-\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 501\n\ncontinuance of O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar and not grauting fresh appointments to them was mala fide and unconstitutional and prayed that in the circumstances, an interim order should be made by the Court directing that O.N. V.:ihra and S.N. Kumar shall continue to function as Judges of the Delhi High Court.\n\nBoth these applications came up for hearing before the learned vacation Judge and by an order dated 6th June, 1981, the learned vacation Judge declined to grant interim relief that O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar shall continue as additional Judges but directed that notice be issued to show cause why status quo in respect of these two Judges should not be maintained and continued till the pendency of the writ petition.\n\nIt appears that no order was thereafter made on the notice, since the writ petition itself was directed to be heard at an early date and in the meanwhile, O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar, were impleaded as respondent Nos. 4 and 5, to the writ petitition.\n\nO.N. Vohra did not appear at the hearing of the writ petition but S.N. Kumar appeared through counsel, filed a counter-affidavit and claimed that the . decision of the Central Government not to appoint him for a further term was vitiated since it was reached without full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India and in any event it was based on irrelevant considerations and that on a proper construction of Article 224 read with Article 217, he must be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent Judge and in any event, be was entitled to be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term. The Union of India also filed an affidavit in answer to the writ petition and a furiher affidavit in reply to the counter-affidavit of S.N. Kumar.\n\nThe writ petition was thereafter placed for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges along with the writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others.\n\nThe third writ petition is that filed by J.L. Katra and others in the High Court of Delhi.\n\nThe petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the Delhi High Court and they have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Cenral Government to make an assessment of the number of permanent and additional Judges required by the Delhi High Court having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears to create such number of posts of permanent and additional Judge; as may be necessary and to make appointments to these posts.\n\nThe other reliefs asked for in this writ petition are substantially the same as the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition filed by V.M. Tarkunde. This writ petition was also like the other writ\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA petitions withdrawn and transferred to )tself by this Court. Since\n\nthe issues arising in this writ petition are identical with the issues arising in the other two writ petitions, it was heard by this Bench of seven Judges along with those writ petitions.\n\nThe fourth writ petition is that filed by S.P. Gupta in the High Court of Allahabad. The petitioner in that writ petition is an advocate practising in the Allahabad High Court and he has filed this writ petition for substantially the same reliefs as the writ petitions of Iqbal Cbagla and V.M. Tarkunde, with only this difference that the reliefs claimed by him relate to the appointments of additional Judges in the High Court of Allahabad. The petitioner has inter alia prayed for a declaration that the three additional Judges of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma and Mr. Justice N.N. Mittal must be deemed to have been appointed permanent Judges under the warrants already issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister must be held to be void. This writ petition was also heard along D with the other writ petitions by this Bench of seven Judges.\n\nSince these four writ petitions to which we have just referred raise the same issues in regard to the circular letter issued by the Law Minister and the scope and ambit of the power of the Central Government in regard to appointment or non-appointment of additional Judges, it would be convenient to deal with them in a group and we shall hereafter for the sake of convenience refer to them as the first group of writ petitions.\n\nThe fifth writ petition is that filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an advocate practising in the Supreme Court. This writ petition has challenged the transfer of Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, Cflief Jutice of the High of Madras as the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court.\n\nWhat occasioned the filing of this writ petition was an Order dated 19th January 1981 made by the President trasferring Mr. Justice M, M, Ismail, Chife Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office. This order recited that it was made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (i} of Article 222 and after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nSimultaneously with the making of this Order, another order of the same date was issued by the President whereby the President in exercise of the powers conferred by clame (i} of Article 222 after consultation with the Chief Justice transferred Mr. Justice K .B.N.\n\nSingh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna as Chief Justice of\n\nS.1'. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 509\n\nthe High Court of Madras with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office.\n\nIt was the first Order of transfer of Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court frnt was challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. There were several grounds on which the transfer was challenged and they were inter alia that the power of transfer conferred under clause ( 1) of Article 222 was confined only to transfer of a High Court Judge and did not cover transfer of the Chief Justice of a High Court; even if the Chief Justice of a High Court could be transferred in exercise of the power conferred under clause ( 1) of Article 222, such transfer could be effected only with consent of the Judge sought to be transferred and in any event, even if consent was not necessary, such transfer could be effected only in public interest and after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India and in the case of transfer of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail, none of these conditions was satisfied, since the transfer was not effected with his consent and it was neither in public interest nor after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis writ petition was filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution and therefore when it came up for admission before a berich of this Court, the Bench asked the petitioner as to how it was maintainable under Article 32. The Bench was inclined to throw out the petition summarily on the ground that it did not lie under Article 32, but the Attorney General of India appearing on behalf of the Union of India submitted that since the writ petition raised important questions of law, it may be entertained by the Coart, because in any event, even if this writ petition was rejected on the ground that it was not maintainable under Article 32, a new writ petition for the same reliefs could always be filed under Article 226 and then it could be brought to this Court either by way of transfer under Article 139A or by way of an appeal under Article 136.\n\nThe Bench therefore decided to admit this petition and issued rule nisi.\n\nAfter this writ petition was admitted, there were several interlocutory proceedings taken out by the petitioner, but it is not necessary to refer to them since most of them were rejected. The Union of India filed a counter-affidavit in reply to this writ petition contesting the various grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner.\n\nChief Justice M.M. Ismail who was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in this writ petition, also filed an affidavit but the stand he took was that he had decided not to challenge the legality or validity of the Order of the President transferring him as Chief J utice of the Kerala High Court and he did not want anyone to litigate for or agai11st\n\n.510 SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS f 1982} 2 s.c.il.\n\nhim .. snce Chief Justice M.M. Ismail, who was the person to whom\n\nlegl m1ury was caused by the Order of transfer, did not claim any\n\nr:hef ad made it clear that he did not want anyone to litigate for him, this writ petition could not be maintained by the petitioner and it was liable to be dismissed, but since tl1e petitioner who was appearing in person, wanted to make a few submissions in regard to the scope and ambit of the power of transfer, we heard her for some time.\n\nWe may point out that whilst this writ petition was pending, Chief Justice M.M. Ismail resigned his office as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and therefore, all the more, nothing survives in this writ petition.\n\nThe sixth writ petition is that filed by A. Rajappa, an advocate practising in the High Court of Madras.\n\nThis writ petition was originally filed in the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution and in this writ petition the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Orders of transfer passed by the President on 19th January 1981 transferring Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court as the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Mr. Justice K.B. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as the Chief Jstice of Madras High Court.\n\nThe principal grounds on which these two Orders of transfer were assailed as unconstitutional and void were substantially the same as those urged in the fifth writ petition filed by Miss Lily Thomas, with only two additional grounds, namely, that the transfers having been effected without prior consultation with the Governors of the States to which the two Chief Justices were transfened, were violative of clause (!) of Article 217 and so far as the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras High Court was concerned, it was not in public interest, since Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh did not know the Tamil language. This writ petition was withdrawn and transferred to itself by this Court since it raised substantially the same issues as the fifth writ petition filed by Miss Lily Thomas which was pending in this Court. The Union of India opposed this writ petition by filing a counter-affidavit where it contended that the transfers of both the Chief Justices were effected in public interest and after consultation with the Chief Justice of India who is the only authority required to be consulted whilst exercising the power of transfer under Article 222, clause (1) and the procedure prescribed by Article 217 clause (I) had no application in the case of transfer of a Judge or Chief Justice from one High Court to another.\n\nThis writ petition was also referred to a Bench\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 511\n\nof seven Judes along with the fifth writ petition and that is how both these writ petitions have come up for hearing before us.\n\nThe seventh writ petition is tha_t filed by P. Subramanian, an advocate practising in the Madras High Court. This writ petition was originally filed in the Madras High Court under Article 226 and along with the other writ petitions it was transferred to this Court for hearing and final disposal.\n\nThe averments and prayers made in this writ petition are substantially the same as those in the sixth writ petition filed by A. Rajappa and so also are the statements made in the couner-affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India. This writ petition does not therefore need any separate or independent consideration .\n\nThe eighth writ petition is that filed by D.N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, two advocates practising in the High Court of Patna. This writ petition was originally filed in the High Court of Patna under Article 226 and it challenged the constitutional validity of the Orders transferring Chief Justice M.M. Ismail to the Kerala High Court and Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court. The averments and prayers made in this writ petition are substantially the same as those made in the fifth, sixth and seventh writ petitions filed respectively by Miss Lily Thomas, A. Rajappa and P. Subramanian and it is therefore not necessary to repeat them. Suffice it to state that this writ petition was also transferred to this Court along with the other writ petitions under Article 139A.\n\nWhilst this writ petition was pending, Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, who was originally impleaded as respondent No. 3 in the writ petition, applied for being transposed, as petitioner No. 3 and since the original petitioners had no objection to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh joining them as co-petitioner, this Court made an Order on 17th September, 1981 transposing Chief Justice K.B.N. \"Singh as petitioner No. 3.\n\nChief Justice K.B.N. Singh thereafter filed an affidavit setting out in extenso what transpired between him and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the proposal for his transfer and detailing the various grounds on which he contended that the order transferring him as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was unconstitutional and void.\n\nChief Justice K.B.N. Singh contended inter alia that the order transferring him as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was passed by the President by way of punishment and it was based on irrelevant and insufficient grounds a11d was not in public interest and in any event, it wa, s not precedeq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll\n\nby full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe avcrments made by Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh in his affidavit were disputed by the Union of India in an affidavit sworn by K.C.\n\nKankan, Deputy Secretary, Depatment of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and the Chief Justice of India also filed a counter-affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh.\n\nThe counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India prompted two affidavits in rejoinder, one by Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and the other by petitioners Nos. I and 2.\n\nWe shall have occasion to refer to these various affidavits when we deal with the rival argu ments advanced on behalf of the parties.\n\nThese last four writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Orders of transfer of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh raised identical issues and we would therefore dispose them of together in one group.\n\nThey may for the sake of convenience be referred as the second group of writ petitions.\n\nWemayalsoatthisstagerefer to S.L.P. No.1509 of 1981, filed by Ripudaman Prasad Sinha in this Court.\n\nThis petition for special leave is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Patna rejecting the writ petition of the petitioner challenging the constitutional validity of the Order of transfer of Chief Justice K.B. N. Singh, on the ground that the petitioner had not been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance.\n\nThis is hardly a ground on which the writ petition should have been rejected by the High Court in limine and we would have therefore, ordinarily granted special leave to appeal against the decision of the High court, but in view of the fact that the issues sought to be raised by the petitioner have already been agitated in the other writ petitions, it is not necessary to grant special leave and hence we do not propose to make any order on the special leave petition.\n\nLocus Standi\n\nWhen these writ petitions reached hearing before us, a preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mridul, appearing on. behalf of the Law Minister, challenging the locus standi of the petitioners in Iqbal Chagla's writ petition. He urged that the petitioners in that H writ petition had not suffered any legal injury as a result of the issuance of the Circular by the Law Minister or the making of short term appointments by the Central Government and they had there-\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 513\n\nfore no locus standi to maintain the writ petition assailing the constitutional validity of the Circular or short term appointments. The legal injury, if at all, was caused to the Additional Judges whose consent was sought to be obtained under the Circular or who were appointed for short terms and they alone were therefore entitled to impugn the constitutionality of the Circular and the short term appointments and not the petitioners. The basic postulate of the argument was that it is only a person who has suffered legal injury who can maintain a writ petition for redress and no third party can be permitted to have access to the Court for the purpose or seeking redress for the person injured. The same preliminary objection was urged by Mr. Mridul against the writ petition of S. P. Gupta and the contention was that the petitioner in that writ petition not having suffered any legal injury had no locus standi to maintion the writ petition.\n\nSo far as the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde is concerned Mr. Mridul said that he would have had the same preliminary objection against the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain that writ petition because the petitioner had suffered no legal injury, but since S.N. Kumar had appeared, albeit as a respondent, and claimed relief against the decision of the Central Goverment not to appoint him for a further term and sought redress of the legal injury said to have been caused to him as a result of such decision, the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioner was made good and the writ petition was maintainable. Mr. Mridul asserted that if S.N. Kumar had not appeared and sought relief against the decision of the Central Government discontinuing him as an Additional Judge, the writ petition would have been liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground that the petitioner had no locus stand! to maintain the writ petition. This preliminary objection urged by Mr. Mridul raised a very interesting question of law relating to locus standi, or as the Americans call it 'Standing', in the area of public law. This, question is of immense importance in a country like India, where access to justice being restricted by social and economic constrain ts; it is necessary to democratise judicial remedies, remove technical barriers against easy accessibility to justice and promote public interest litigation so that the large masses of people belonging to the deprived and exploited sections of humanity may be able to realise and enjoy the socio-economic rights granted to them and these rights may become meaningful for them instead of remaining mere empty hopes.\n\nTb.I' tra<litiona,1 rule in reard to loc; qs sta, ndi js that judicia, I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS f 1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nredress is available only to a person who has sufferred a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legaly protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public autbority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind oc reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. The leading case in which this rule was enunciated and which marks the starting point of almost every discussion on locus standi is Ex-parte Sidebotham(1).\n\nThere the Court was concerned with the question whether the appellant could be said to be a 'person aggrieved' so as to be entitled to maintain the appeal. The Court in a unanimous view held that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the appeal because he was not a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the lower court. James LJ. gave a definition of 'person aggrieved' which, though given in the context of the right to appeal against a decision of a lower court, has been applied widely in determing the standing of a person to seek judicial redress, with the result that it has stultified the growth of the law in regard to judicial remedies.\n\nThe learned Lord Justice said that a 'person aggrieved' must be a man \"who bas suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to some\n\nthing.\" This definition was approved by Lord Esher M. R. in In Re Reed Baveri and Comp.111y(2) and the learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that when James L. J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which bas wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been refused something which he had a right to demand. There have been numerous subsequent decisions of the English Courts where this definition has been applied for the purpose of determining whether the person seeking judicial redress had locus standi to maintain the action. It will be seen that, according to this rule, it is only a person who bas suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can\n\n(!) 14 Chancery Division 458. (2)\n\n19 Q.B.D. 174,\n\n...\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 515\n\nbring an action for judicial redress. Now obviously where an appli- .- cant has a legal right or a leglly protected interest, the violation of which would result in legal injury to him, there must be a corresponding duty owed by the other party to the applicant. This rule in regard to locus standi thus postulates a right-duty pattern which is commonly to be found in private law litigation.\n\nBut, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the courts over the years. i\n\nIn the first place a rate payer of a local authority is accorded standing to challenge an illegal action of the local authority. Thus,\n\n L e payer can question the action of the municipality in granting a cinema licence to a person, vide : K.R. Shenoy v.\n\nUdipi Municipality(1).\n\nSimilarly, the right of a rate payer to challenge misuse of funds by a municipality has also been recognised by the courts vide : Vaidarajan v. Salem Municipality(2). The reason for this liberalisation of the rule in the case of a tax payer of a municipality is that his interest in the application of the money of the municipality is direct and immediate and he has a close relationship with the municipality.\n\nThe courts in India have, in taking this view, followed the decisions of the English courts. Secondly, if a ; i person is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the decison making process culminating in the impugned decision, he would have locus standi to maintain an action challenging the impugned decision. vide : Queen v. Bowman(3) where it was held that any memher of the public had a right to be heard in opposition to an application for a licence and having such right, the applicant was entitled to ask for mandamus directing the licensing Justices to hear and determine the applkation for licence according to law.\n\nThirdly, the statute itself may expressly recognise the locus standi of an applicant, even though no legal right or legally protected interest of the applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to him. For example, in J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar( 4) this Court noticed that the Bombay Cinematograph Act, 19 I 8 and the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1945 made under that Act, recognised a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple, mosque etc. located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which the cinema house is proposed to be constructed and held\n\n(I) AIR 1974 SC 2177.\n\n(2) AIR 1973 Mad. 55.\n\n(3) [1898) Q.B.D. 633.\n\n(4) [1976) 3 SCR 58,\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthat as the petitioner, a rival cinema owner, did not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality, he had no locus standi to maintain the petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the No Objection Certificate granted by the District Magistrate to respondents Nos. I and 2. It is obvious from the observations made at page 72 of the Report that if the petitioner bad been a person falling within this category of persons having a special interest in the locality, he would have been held entitled to maintain the petition. There is also another decision of this Court illustrating the situation where a statute expressly gives locus standi to persons to complain against a public wrong and that is the decision in Rat/am Municipality v. Vardhi Chand(1). The statutory provision which came up for consideration in this case was section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers a magistrate on receiving the report of a police officer or other information to make an order for remedying a public nuisance. What happend in this case was that the Ratlam Municipality failed to carry out its statutory duty of constructing a drain pipe to carry the filth etc. on a particular road.\n\nThe local residents decided to invoke section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the Municipality. The magistrate made an order requiring the Municipality to construct drain pipes and this order was confirmed in appeal by this Court.\n\nThe Municipality pleaded lack of funds but this was not accepted as a valid defence.\n\nHowever, to have a viable scheme keeping in view the financial position of the Municipality, this Court examined the three schemes submited to it and directed the Municipality to implement one Of them.\n\nThe standing of the local residents to move the magistrate was recognised since section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly conferred such right on t!lem.\n\nThere is also another exception which has been carved out of this strict rule of standing which requires that the applicant for judicial redress must have suffered a legal wrong or injury in order to entitle him to maintain an action for such redress. It is clear that, having regard to this rule, no one can ordinarily seek judicial redress for legal injury suffered by another person; it is only such other person who must bring action for judicial redress. It is on this principle that the Supreme Court of the United States held in United States v. Raines(2) that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities and save in exceptional cases, no person\n\n(l) AIR 1980 SC 1622. (2_) 362 U.S, 17; 4 L. Ed. 2d 524.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 517\n\ncan claim standing to v_indicate the constitutional rights of a third party.\n\nBut it must now be regarded as well settled law where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to approar; h the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantaged position, some other person can invoke assistance of the Court for the purpose of provid: ing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice is done to him. Take for example, the case of a minor to whom a legal wrong has been done or a legal injury caused. He obviously cannot on his own approach the court because of his disability arising from minority. The law therefore provides that any other person actin,1? as his next fri:nd may bring an action in his name for judicial redress. Vide : Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. So also where a person is detained and is therefore not in a position to move the Court for securing his release, any other person may file an application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention. Of course, this court has ruled in a number of cases that a prisoner is entitled to address a communication directly to the court complaining against his detention and seeking release and if he addresses any such communication to the court, the Superintendent of the prison is bound to forward it to the court and, in fact, there have been numerous instances where this Court has acted on such communication received from a prisoner and treating it as an application for a writ of habeas corpus, called upon the detaining authority to justify the legality of such detention and on the failure of the detaining authority to do so, released the prisoner. But since a person detained would ordinar!ly be unable to communicate with the outside world, the Jaw presumes that he will not be able to approach the court and hence permits any other person to move the court for judicial redress by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus. Similarly, where a transaction is entered into by the Board of Directors of a company which is illegal or ultra vires the company, but the majority of the share-holders are in favour of it and hence it is not possible for the company t_o sue for setting aside the transaction, any share-holder may file an action impugning the transaction.\n\nHere it is the company which suffers a legal wrong or a legal injury by reason of the illegal or ultra vires transaction impugned in the action, but an individual shareholder is permitted to sue for redressing such legal wrong or injury to the company, because\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\notherwise the company being under the control of the majority shareholders would be without judicial redress. Vide : Atwood v. Merry Wether(1). The •Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also affirmed this exception to the strict rule of standing in Duryappah v.\n\nFernando(2).\n\nThere what happened was that the Jaffna Municipal Council was dissolved by the Minister of Local Government without giving it an opportunity to be heard.\n\nThe order of dissolution was therefore voidable at the instance of the Council, but the Council did not complain. The appellant was a mayor at the time of the dissolution and he petitioned for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of dissolution. Lord Upjohn speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee denied standing to the appellant in the following words :\n\n\"The appellant was no doubt mayor at the time of its dissolution but that does not give him any right to complain independently of the council. He must show that he is representing the council or suing on its behalf or that by reason of certain circumstances, such, for example, as that the council could not use its seal because it is in the possession of the Municipal Commissioner, or for other reasons it has been impracticable for the members of the council to meet to pass the necessary resolutions, the council cannot be be the plaintiff.\"\n\nThe Judicial Committee thus clearly laid down that for a legal wrong or legal injury caused to the council, it is only the council which can sue but if a member of the council can show that for some sufficient reasons it is not possible for the council to take action for challenging the order of dissolution, he can file an application for a writ to assert the right of the council and to redress the fogal wrong or injury done, to the council. We find that in the United States of America also this exception has been recognised and the strict rule of standing has been liberalised in the interest of justice. In B2rrows v . .Tackso11(3), the defendant was sued for breach of a restrictive covenant binding the defendant not to sell his property to non-cancacians and claiming damages. The defendant raised the plea that the judgment of the court allowing damages for breach of the covenant would constitute denial of the equal protection clause to non-canca-\n\n(l) [1867] 5 Equity 464, ( 2) [ 1967] 2 Appeal Cases 337.\n\n(3) 346 US 249 : Law pd. 1586,\n\n-~-\n\nS.Jl. GUPtA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 519\n\ncians, because a prospective seller of restricted land would either refuse to sell to non-cancacians or else would require non-cancacians to pay a higher price to meet the damages which the seller may have to pay. The argument put forward in answer to this plea was that the defendant was not entitled to plead in defence the constitutional rights of non-cancacians. But the Supreme Court of the United States negatived this argument observing: \"We are faced with a unique situation in which it is an action of the state court which might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court\". Even in our own country we have recognised. this departure from the strict rule of locus standi in cases where there has been a violation of the constitutional or legal rights of person who by reason of their socially or eeonomically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court for judicial redress.\n\nWe have in such cases permitted a member of the public to move the court for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of such persons and judicial redress for the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them. Take for example, the decision of this Court in Sunil IJatra v. Delhi Administration,(1) where this Court accepted the habeas corpus petition of a prisoner complainit1g of brutal by a head warden on another prisoner.\n\nJt may be incidentally rnentioried-and this is a point of some importance in the area of judicial remediesthat in this case the Court broadened the scope of habeas corpus by making it available to a prisoner, not only for seeking his liberty, but also for the enforcement of a constitutional right to which he was lawfully entitled even in confinement.\n\nSimilarly, in Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P.(2) when it was found that the inmates of the Protective Home at Agra were living in inhuman and degrading conditions in blatant violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and by reason of their socially and economically disadvantaged position, they were not in a position to move the court for judicial redress, two law professors of the Delhi University addressed a letter to this Court seeking enforcement of the constitutional right of the inmates under Article 21 by improvement of the living conditions in the Protective Horne, so that the inmates can live with human dignity in the Protective Home. This Court treated the letter as a writ petition and permitted the two law professors to maintain an action for an appropriate writ for the purpose of enforcing the consll) AIR 1980 SC 1579.\n\n(1) (1981] 3Scale1137,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.il\n\ntitutional right of the inmates of the Protective Home providing judicial redress to them.\n\nThis Court has also entertained a letter addressed by a journalist claiming relief against demolition of hutments of pavement dwellers by the Municipal Corporation of Bombay and this letter has been treated as a writ petition by a Bench presided over by thr Chief Justice of India and interim relief has been granted to the pavement dwellers.\n\nIt may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of Jaw or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief, any member of public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.\n\nWhere the weaker sections of the community are concerned, such as under-trial prisoners languishing in jails without a trial, inmates of the Protective Home in Agra or Harijan workers engaged in road construction in the Ajmer district, who are !iv i ng in poverty and destitution, who are barely king out a miserable existence with their sweet and toil, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society and who do not have easy access to justice, this Court will not insist on a regular writ petition to be filed by the public spirited individual espousing their cause and seeking relief for them. This Court wilJ readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bona publico. It is true that there are rules made by this Court prescribing the procedure for moving this Court for relief under Article 32 and they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach this Court. But it must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The Court would therefore unhesitatingly\n\nand with out the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public minded individual as a writ peti-\n\nS.i>, GUPTA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, 1.) 521\n\n' tion and act upon it. Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only way in which this can be done is by entertaining writ petitions and even letters from ;>ublic spirited individuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose constitutional or legal right has been violated but who by reason of their poverty or socially or economically disavantaged position are unable to approach the court for relief. It is in this spirit that the court has been entertaining letters for judicial redress and treating them as writ petitions and we hope and trust that the High Courts of the country will also adopt this pro-active, goal-oriented approach.\n\nBut we must hasten to make it clear that the individual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshhold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in court.\n\nWe may also point out that as a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of a third party, where there is an effective legal aid organisation .which can take care of such cases.\n\nThe types of cases which we have dealt with so far for the purpose of considering the question of locus standi are those where there is a specific legal injury either to the applicant or to some other person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought, arising from violation of some constitutional or legal right or legally protected interest. What is complained of in these cases is a specific legal injury suffered by a person or a determinate class or group of persons. But there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury\n\nStJPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il.\n\nto public inte1 est or what may conveniently be termed as public \"' injury as distinguished from private injury. Who would have standing to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority ? Can any member of the public sue for judicial redress? Or is the standing limited only to a certain class of persons ? Or there is no one who can complain and the public injury must go unredres>ed.\n\nTo answer these questions it is first of all necessary to understand what is the true purpose of the judicial )r function.\n\nThis is what Prof. Thio states in his book on \"Locus Standi and Judicial Review\";\n\n'Is the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining tbe legislative and executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the public (Jurisdiction de droit objectif) or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by preventing iliegal encroachments on their individual rights (jurisdiction de droit subjectif) ? The first contention rests on the theory that courts are the final arbiters of what is legal and illegal ......... Requirements of locus standi are therefore unnecessary in this case since they merely impede the purpose of the function as conceived here.\n\nOn the other hand, where the prime aim of the judicial process is to protect individuals rights, its concern with the regularity of law and administration is limited to the extent that individual rights are infringed.\"\n\nWe would regard the first proposition as correctly setting out the nature and purpose of the judicial function, as it is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the State must act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution or the law. If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a *\n\nspecific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group t~_... of persons, it would be a case of private injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate clase or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress.\n\nBut if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the\n\n-.,-\n\n\"\"·\n\n$.P. GUPtA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 523\n\nState or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of Jaw and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty. If no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disasterous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it.\n\nThe courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the Jaw is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. The view has therefore been taken by the courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy-body or a middlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice.\n\nLord Diplock rightly said in Rex v. Inland Revenue Commissioners.(1)\n\n\"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by out-dated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of Jaw and get the unlawful conduct stopped It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their unctions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the\n\n(1) [1981] 2 WLR 722 at 740:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nonly judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge.''\n\nThis broadening of the rule of locus standi has been largely responsible for the development of public law, because it is only the availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which invests Jaw meaning and purpose or else the law would remain merely a paper parchment, a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. It is only by liberalising the rule of locus standi that it is possible to effectively police the corridors of power and prevent violations of law.\n\nIt was pointed out by Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade in their book on \"legal Control of Government\" at page 354 :\n\n\"Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system of administrative law. If a plaintiff with a good case is turned away, merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some government agency is left free to violate the law, and that is contrary to the public interest. Litigants are unlikely to expend their time and money unless they have some real interest at stake. In the rare cases where they wish to sue merely out of public spirit, why should they be discouraged?\"\n\nIt is also necessary to point out that if no one can have standing to maintain an action for judicial redress in respect of a public wrong or public injury, not only will the cause of legality suffer but the people not having any judicial remedy to redress such public wrong or public injury may turn to the street and in that process, the rule of law will be seriously impaired. It is absolutely essential that the rule of law must wean the peolple away from the lawless street and win therr for the court of law.\n\nThere is also another reason why the rule of locus standi needs to be liberalised. Today we find that law is being increasingly used as a device of organised social action for the purpose of bringing about socio-economic change. The task of national reconstruction upon which we are engaged has brought about enormous increase in developmental activities and law is being utilised for the purpose of development, social and economic. It is creating more and more a new category of rights in favour of large sections of people and imposing a new category of duties on the State and the public offi-\n\n...\n\n_..\n\n->-,\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, i.) sis\n\ncials with a view to reaching social justice to the common man. Individual rights and duties are giving place to meta-individual, collective, social rights and duties of classes or groups of persons. This is not to say that individual rights have ceased to have a vital place in our society but it is recognised that these rights are practically meaningless in today's setting unless acompanied by the social rights necessary to make them effective and really accessible to all.\n\nThe new social and economic rights which are sought to be created in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy essentially require active intervention of the State and other public authorities. Amongst these social and economic rights are freedom from indigency, ignorance and discrimination as well as the right to a healthy environment, to sccial security and to protection from financial, commercial, corporate or even governmental oppression. More and more frequently th~ conferment of these socio-economic rights and imposition of publie duties on the State and other authorities for taking positive action generates situations in which, single human action can be beneficial or prejudicial to a large number of people, thus making entirely inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a two-party affair.\n\nFor example, the discharge of effluent in a lake or river may harm all who want to enjoy its clean water; emission of noxious gas may cause injury to large numbers of people who inhale it alongwitb the air; defective or unhealthy packaging may cause damage to all consumers of goods and so also illegal raising of railway or bus fares may affect the entire public which wants to use the railway or bus as a means of transport. In cases of this kind it would not be possible to say that any specific legal injury is caused to an individual or to a determinate class or group of individuals. What results in such cases is public injury and it is one of the characteristics of public injury that the act or acts complained of cannot necessarily be shown to affect the rights of determinate or identifiable class or group of persons : public injury is an injury to an indeterminate class of persons. In these cases the duty which is breached giving rise to the injury is owed by the State or a public authority not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons, but to the general public. In other words, the duty is one which is not correlative to any individual rights. Now if breach of such public duty were allowed to go unredressed because there is no one who bas received a specific legal injury or who was entitled to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision relating to such public duty, the failure to perform such public duty would go unchecked and it would promote disrespect for the rule of law. It would also open the door for corruption and inefficiency because there would be\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.c.11..\n\nA no check on exercise of public power except what may be provided by the political machinery, which at best would be able to exercise only a limited control and at worst, might become a participant in misuse or abuse of power. It would also make the new social collective rights and interests created for the benefit of the deprived sections of the community meaningless and ineffectual.\n\nNow, as pointed out by Cappelletti in Vol III of his classic work on \"Access to Justice\" at page 520, \"The traditional doctrine of standing (legitimatio ad causam) attributes the right to sue either to the private individual who 'holds' the right which is in need of judicial protection or in case of public rights, to the State itself, which sues in courts through its organs.\" The principle underlying the traditional rule of standing is that only the holder of the right can sue and it is therefore, held in many jurisdictions that since the State representing the public is the holder of the public rights, it alone can sue for redress of public injury or vindication of public interest. It is on this principle that in the United Kingdom, the Attorney General is entrusted with the function of enforc-ing due observance of the law. The Attorney-General represents the public interest in its entirety and as pointed out by S.A. de Smith in \"Judicial Review of Administrative Action\" (Third edition) at page 403: \"the general public has an interest in seeing that the law is obeyed and for this purpose, the Attorney-General represents the public.\" There is, therefore, a machinary in the United Kingdom for judicial redress for public injury and protection of social, collective, what Cappelletti calls 'diffuse' rights and interests. We have no such machinary here. We have undoubtedly an Attorney-General as also Advocates General in the States, but they do not represent the public interest generally.\n\nThey do so in a very limited field; see sections 91 and 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. But, even if we had a provision empowering the Attorney General or the Advocate General to take action for vindicating public interest, I doubt very much whether it would be effective.\n\nThe Attorney General or the Advocate General would be too dependent upon the political branches of Government to act as an advocate against abuses whieh are frequently generated or at least tolerated by political and administrative bodies. Be that as it may, the fact remains that we have no such institution in our country and we have therefore to liberalise the rule of standing in order to provide judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public dnty or from other violation of the Constitution or the law. If public duties are to be enforced and social collective 'diffused' rights and interests are to be\n\n...\n\n......\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 527\n\nprotected, we have to utilise the initiative and zeal of public minded persons and organisations by allowing them to move the court and act for a general or group interest. even though, they may not be directly injured in their own rights.\n\nIt is for this reason that in public interest litigation-litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused' rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who bas sufficie11:t interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be determined by the court in each individual case. It is not possible for the Court to Jay down any hard and fast rule or any straight jacket formula for the purpose of defining or delimiting 'sufficient interest'. It has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the Court. The reason is that in a modern complex society which is seeking to bring about transformation of its social and economic structure and trying to reach social justice to the vulnerable sections of the people by creating new social, collective 'diffuse' rights and interests and imposing new public duties on the State and other public authorities, infinite number of situations are bound to arise which cannot be imprisoned in a rigid mould or a procrustean formula.\n\nThe Judge who has the correct social prespective and who is on the same wave-length as the Constitution will be able to decide, without any difficulty and in consonance with the constitutional objectives, whether a member of the public moving the court in a particular case has sufficient interest to initiate the action.\n\nIt is interesting to note that the concept of public interest litigation had its origin in the United States and over the years, it has passed through various vicissitudes in the country of its origin.\n\nWe do not propose to enumerate or examine various decisions given by the Supreme Court of the United States from time to time in regard to standing in public interest litigation, for no useful purpose would be served by such exercise. Suffice it to state that in that country, the strict requirement of legal interest has been watered down.\n\nJustice Douglas said i11 D:lla Processing Service v. Camp(') that. \"the legal interest test goes to the merits.\n\nThe question of' standing is different.\" Similarly Justice Brannan, citing Flast observed that \"the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular\n\n(!) 397 U, S. 150; (2d) 25 Law Ed. 184,\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nissue and not ... whether the plaint if)' had a legally protected interest which the defendant's action invaded'' (Italics supplied). This view also found expression in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC(1) where the standing of television viewers was upheld with the following observations: Since the concept of standing is \"one designed to assure that only one with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and acute concern as the listening audience.\" Vi de article on \"Evolving Trends in Locus Standi. Models For Decision-Making\" by D.Y. Chandrachud.\n\nBut of late, there has been a slight regression in this dynamic approach.\n\nSee United States v. Richardson.(2) Warth v. Seldin,(3) where the Supreme Court of United States seems to have recoiled a little against expansion of its judicial power.\n\nSo far as the United Kingdom is concerned, there have been remarkable developments in this area in recent times largely due to the dynamic activism of Lord Denning. The McWhirter case and the three well known Blarkburn cases clearly establish that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for enforcing a public duty against a statutory or public authority.\n\nWe need not make a detailed reference to all these cases but it will be sufficient if we refer to the Mc Whirler case and one of the three Blackburn cases.\n\nThe Mc Whirler case is reported in Attorney Genernl v. Independent Broadrasting Authority.(4) This was an action by Mc W'hirter for injuction against the Broadcasting Authority which wasthreatening to show a film which did not comply with the statutory requirements and the showing of which would therefore be illegal.\n\nLord Denning considered the qu :st ion whether McWhirter had locus standi to bring the action when leave to bring a relator action was refused by the Attorney General, and answering this question in the affirmative, he said :\n\n\"We live in an age when Parliament has placed statutory duties on government departments and public authorities for the benefit of the public-but has provided no remedy for the breach of them. If a government department or a public authority transgresses the law laid down\n\n(I) U.S. App. D.C. 328.\n\n(2) 418 U.S. 166.\n\n0) 422 U.S. 490.\n\n(4) [1973) 1 All Enland Reports 689.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nby Parliament, or threatens to transgress it, can a member of the public come to the court and draw the matter to its attention, .... .I am of the opinion that, in the last resort, if the Attorney General refuses leave in a proper case or improperly or unreasonably delays in giving leave, or his machinery works too slowly, then a member of the public who has sufficient interest, can himself apply to the court itself.\"\n\nLord Denning held that McWhirter had sufficient interest to bring the action since he had a television set for which he had paid licence fee and his susceptibility would be offended like that of many others watching television if the film was shown in breach of the statutory requirements. It may be noticed that in this case the duty which was sought to be enforced again the Broadcasting Authority was one which the Broadcasting Authority owed to the general public and not to any specific individual or clas~ or group of individuals.\n\nThe same principle was applied by Lord Denning in Rex v. Greater London Council,(1) to accord standing to Blackburn to maintain an action for an order of prohibition preventing the Greater London Council from allowing, contrary to law, the exhibition of pornographic films.\n\nHere again the duty owed by the Greater London Council was to the general public and not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons and there was no one who could claim that a specific legal injury was caused to him by the exhibition of pornographic films But even so Lord Denning held that Blackburn was entitled to maintain an action because he had sufficient interest; he was a citizen of London, his wife was a rate payer and he had children who might be harmed by the exhibition of pornographic films.\n\nThe learned Master of the Rolls emphasized that if Blackburn had no sufficient interest, no other citizen had, and in that event nc one would be able to bring an action for enforc!ng the law and the transgression of the law would continue unabated.\n\nThe principle on which the learned Master of the Rolls proceeded was formulated by l.im in these words:\n\n\"I regard it as a matter of high consitutional principle, that if there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of his Majesty's subjects, then any-\n\n\\1) J:lxP; irte Blackburn p976] 3 All England Reports 184,\n\nSUPREME COUR'1 REPORTS\n\n\none of those offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate''\n\nThe House of Lords, of course, in Gouriet v. U.P. W (1) took the view that the Attorney General alone can sue for enforcing the observance of the law and if he refuses to give his consent to a relator action, such refusal was not reviewable by the courts and without such consent, a member of the public could not maintain his action.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to examine this decision because it has no binding effect upon us.\n\nBut we may point out this decision has been severely criticised by jurists in England and elsewhere.\n\nIt is clearly erroneous ar.d shows the high water mark of abdication of judicial power which is likely to stultify the development of public law in the United Kindgom.\n\nThere is however one distinguishing feature which we must point out, namely, that the action in that case was a relator action and not an application for a writ\n\nWe would therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objectives. \"Law\", as pointed out by Justice Krishana Iyer in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.\n\nUnion of Jndia(2) \"is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction. A fear is sometime expressed that if we 1<eep the door wide open for any memb :r of the public to enter the portals of the Court to enforce public duty or to vindicate public interest, the Court will be flooded with litigation But this fear is totally unfounded and the argument based upon it is answered completely by the Australian Law Reforms Commission in the following words:\n\n(ll [ t 978] Appeal Cases 482.\n\n(I) AIR 1981 SC 344.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 531\n\n\"The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a spectre which haunts the legal litera- 1ure, not the court room. (Prof: K.E. Scott ; \"Standing in the Supreme Court : A Functional Analysis\" (I 973) 86)\n\nA major expressed reason for limiting standing rights is fear of a spate of actions brought by busy bodies which will unduly extend the resources of the courts. No argument is easier put, none more difficult to rebut. Even if the fear be justified it does not follow that present restridons should remain. If proper claims exist it may be necessary to provide resources for their determination. However, the issue must be considered .\n\n. . . . . Over recent years successive decisions of the United States Supreme Cour. have liberalised standing so as to afford a hearing to any person with a real interest in\n\nthe relevant controversy. Surveying the result in 197 3 D Professor Scott commented : (Op Cit. 673)\n\nWhen the floodgates of litigation are opened to some new class of controversy by a decision it is notable how rarely one can discern the flood that the dissenters fuared.\n\nProfessor Scott went on to point 0ut that the liberalised standing rules had caused no significant increase in the number of actions brought, arguing that parties will not litigate at considerable personal cost unless they have a real interest in a matter.\" F\n\nWe wholly endorse these remarks of the Australian Law Reforms Commission.\n\nWe may add, with Justice Krishan Iyer; \"In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy, and activisim is essen\n\ntial for participative public justice, some risks hav: to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locus standi.\" It is also interesting to note that in India, as in other Commonwealth countries, the strict rule of standing does not apply to a writ of quo warranto or a rate payer's action against a municipality, but there is no evidence that this has\n\n\n[ J 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Jet loose the flood gates of litigation in these areas.\n\nThe time, money and other inconveniences involved in litigating a case act as sufficient deterrrnts for most of us to take recourse to legal action, vide article of Dr. S.N. Jain on \"Standing and Public Interest Litigation.\"\n\nBut we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind is acting bonafide and not for personal gain or private prout or political motivation or other oblique consideration.\n\nThe Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective.\n\nAndre Rabie has warned that \"political pressure groups who could not ltchieve their aims through the administrative process\" and we might add, through the political process, \"may try to use the courts to further their aims.\" These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the court has to be careful to avoid.\n\nIt is also necessary for the court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justi ciable. The court must take care to see that it does not over-step the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which arc reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the Court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability.\n\nThe frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the Jaw and which were so far as embedded in the worn b of the future, are beginning to be born.\n\nBefore we part with this general discussion in regard to locus\n\ntandi, there is one point we would like to emphasise and it is, that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the act\n\nm on:ission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member\n\ns.P. GUPTA I'. UNION (Bhagwati. J.) 533\n\nof the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot A maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such member of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want.\n\nIf we apply these principles to determine the question of locus standi in the writ petition of Iqbal Chagla & Ors. in which alone this question has been sharply raised, it will be obvious that the petitioners had clearly and indisputably locus standi to maintain their writ petition. The petitioners are lawyers practising in the High Court of Bombay. The first petitioner is a member of the Bombay Bar Association, petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are members of the Advocates Association of Western India and petitioner No. 4 is the President of the Incorporated Law Society. There can be no doubt that the petitioners have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if any unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary, the petitioners would certaintly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such action. The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They assist the court in dispensing justice and it can hardly be disputed that without their help, it would be well nigh impossible for the Court to administer justice. They are really and truly officers of the Court in which they daily sit and practise. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of judicial system and if the integrity or independence of thr judiciary is threatened by any act of the State or any public authority, they would naturally be concerned about it, because they are equal partners with the Juc'ges in the administration of justice. lqbal Chagla and others cannot be regarded as mere bystanders or meddlesome interlopers in filing the writ petition. The complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition was that the circular letter issued by the Law Minister constituted a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary and it was unconstitutional and void and if this complaint be true, and for the purpase of determining the standing of the petitioners to file the writ petition, we must assume this complaint to be correct, the petitioners already had locus standi ot maintain the writ petition. The circular letter, on the averments made in the writ petition, did not cause any specific iegal injury to an individual or to a deteilninate class or group of individuals, but it caused p1.1btiq injury by prejudicially affecting the\n\n\nindependence of the judiciary. The petitioners being lawyers had sufficient interest to challenge the constitutionality of the circular letter and they were, therefore entitled to file the writ petition as a public interest litigation. They had clearly a concern deeper than\n\n-that of a busybody and they cannot be told off at the gates. We may point out that this was precisely the principle applied by this Conrt to uphold the standing of the Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union to challege the sale <fa part of the undertaking by the Fertilser Corporation of India in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.\n\nUni01i-of India (supra). Justice Krishna Iyer pointed out f at if a citizen \"belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the . subjeci matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered.\" We must therefore, hold that Iqbal Chagla and Others had locus standi to maintain their writ petition. What we have said in relation to the writ petition of Iqbal Chagla and others must apply equally in relation to the writ petitions of S.P. Gupta arid J.C. Kalra. and others/ Safar as the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde is concerned, Mr. Mridul, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Law Minister, did not contest the maintainability of that writ petition since S.N. Kumar to whom, according to the averments made in the writ petition; a specific legal injury was caused, appeared in the writ petition, and claimed relief against the decision of the Central Government to discontinue him as an additional Judge.\n\nWe must therefore, 'reject the preliminary. objection raised by Mr. Mridul challenging the locus standi of the petitioners _in the first group of writ petitions.\n\nConcept of Independence of the Judiciary ' -~~.\n\nHaving disposed of the preliminary objection in regard to\n\nlous standi of the petitioners, we may now proceed to consider the\n\n\"_ questions which arise for determination in these writ petitions. The\n\n-questions are of great constitutional significance affecting th ' prioci- 'C pie of independence of the judiciary \\vhich is a basic feature of the .Constitution and we would therefor: prefer to begin the discussion by making a few prefatory remarks highlighting what the true func- . tion of the judiciary should be in a country like India which is march- •....__ ing along the road to social justice with the banner of democracy H and the rule of law, for the principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract conceptio.1 but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitutional charter and its nourish- . . . : . .\n\n-·~\n\n' s 1.P. GUPTA v. iJNiON (Bi1agwati, J.) 535\n\nment and sustenance from the constitutional values. It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that our Constitution is not a nonaligned national charter. It is a document of social revoluion which casts an obligation on every instrumentality\n\nincluding the judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch or the State, to transform the sta111s quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all institu: lions of national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socioeconomic destination and a creative function. It bas, to use the words of Glanville Austin; to become an arm of the socio-economic revolution and perform an active role calculated to bring social justice within the reach of the common man. It cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic justice. The British concept cf justicing, which to quote Justice Krishna Iyer, is still '\n\n0bugged by the heirs of our colonial legal culture and shared by many . on the Bench\" is that \"the business or a Judge is to hold his tongue until the last\n\npssibtd moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to look\" and in the same strain are the words quoted by professor Gordon Reid from a memorandum to the Victorian Government by Irvin, C.J. in 1923 . where the judicial function was idealised in the following words: I\n\n-\"The duty of His Majesty's Judges is to hear and determine issues of fact and of law arising between the king --and the subject or between a subject and a subject present\n\ned in a form enabling judgment to be passed upon them,\n\n\\llld when passed, to be enforced by a process of Jaw. 1here begins and ends the function of the judiciary.\"\n\nNow this.: approach to the judicial function .may bealright for a stable and static society but not for a society pulsating with urges of gendCr justice, worker justice,· minorities justice, dalit jllstice and . ( equal justice between chronic unequals. Where the contest is between those who are socially or economically unequal, the judicial process\n\nmay prove disasteros from the point of view of social justice, if the Judge adopts a merely passive or negative role and does not adopt a positive and creative approach. The judiciary cannot remain a mere bystander or spectator but it must become an active participant in the judicial process ready to use law in the service of social justice through a pro-active goal oriented-approach. But this cannot be\n\n536 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982J 2 s.C.R.\n\nachieved unless we have judicial cadres who share the fighting faith of the Constitution and who are imbued with the constitutional values. The necessity of a judiciary which is in tune with social philosophy of the Constitution has nowhere been better emphasized than in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer which we quote :\n\n\"Appointment of Judges is a serious process where judicial expertise, legal learning, life's experience and high integrity are components, but above all are two indispensables-social philosophy in active unison with the socialistic Articles of the Constitution, and second, but equally important, built-in resistance to pushes and pressures by class interests, private prejudices government threats and blandishments, party loyalties and colltrary economic and political ideologies projecting into pronouncements.\"\n\nJustice Krishna Iyer goes on to say in his inimitable style :\n\n\"Justice Cardozo approvingly quoted President Theodore Roosevelt's stress on the social philosophy of the Judges which shapes the course of a nation and, therefore, the choice of Judges for the higher Courts which makes and declares the law of the land, must be in tune with the social philosophy of the Constitution. Not mastery of the law alone, but social vision and creative craftsmanship arc important inputs in successful justicing.\"\n\nWhat is necessary is to have Judges who are prepared to fashion new tools, forge new methods, innovate new strategies and evolve a new jurisprudence, who are judicial statesmen with a social vision and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of commitment to the Constitution with an activist approach and obligation for accountability, not to any party in power nor to the opposition nor to the classes which are vociferous but to the half hungry , millions of India who are continually denied their basic human rights.\n\nWe need Judges who are alive to the socio-economic realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear from every eye, \"ho have faith in the constitutional values and who are ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional objectives.\n\nThis has to be the broad blue-print of the appointment project for the higher echelons of judicial service. It is only if appointments of Judges are made with these considerations weighing predominently\n\ns.i>. GUPTA V. UNlON (Bizagwati, J.) 531\n\nwith the appointing authority that we can have a truly independent judiciary committed only to the Constitution and to the people of India. The concept of independence of the judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional sche; ne and constitutes the foundation on which rests the eJifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the principle of the rule of law and under the Constitution, it is the judiciary whicl1 is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. It is to aid the judiciary in this task that the power of judicial review has been conferred upon the judiciary and it is by exericising this power which constitutes one of the most potent weapons in armory of the law. that the judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bu! wark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive and therefore it is absolutely essential that the Judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution-makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution to which detailed reference has been made in the judgments in Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra).\n\nBut it is necessary to remi11d ourselves that the concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence from executive pressure or influence but it is a much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of the power centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong.\n\nIf we may again quote the eloquent Words of Justice Krishna Iyer:\n\n\"Independence of the Judiciary is not genufiexion; nor is it opposition to every proposition of Government. It is neither Judiciary made to opposition measure nor Government's pleasure.\n\nThe tycoon, the communalist, the parochialist, the faddist, the extremist and radical reactionary lying coiled up and sub-consciously shaping judicial mentatio11s are menaces to judicial independence when they are at variance with\n\nParts HI and IV of the Paranwunt Parchment.\" H\n\nJudges should be of stern stuff and tough fibre, unbending before\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.d.R..\n\npower, economic or political, and they must uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says \"Be you ever so high, the law is above you.\" This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of real participatory democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable sections of the community. It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which we must keep in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution.\n\nCan mandamus issue for fixation of strength of Judges in a High Court: Article 216.\n\nWe may first examine the true meaning and import of Article 216 which provides for the constitution of High Courts. This Article when originaIIy enacted in the Constitution consisted of the main provision and a proviso but the proviso was deleted by Section 11 of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 with the result that since !st November, 1956 when the Amending Act came into force, this Article consists of only one clause which reads as under :\n\n\"Every High Court shaII consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.\"\n\nThis Article confers power on the President to appoint such number of Judges in a High Court as he may deem nec11ssary. The Union of India has placed before us figures showing that as on 18th March, l 981, the aggregate sanctioned strength of permanent and additional Judges was 308 and 97 respectively while the aggregate actual strength was only 277 and 43 respectively.\n\nThe figures given by the Union of India also show the large arrears pending in the different High Courts and it is clear from these figures that the total number of pending main cases has been steadly rising from 6,13,799 on 31st December 1978 to 6,78,951 on 31st December, 1980.\n\nThe average rate of disposals per Judge per year fixed at one of the Chief Justices' Conference was 650 but the figures produced by the Union of India show that the average rate of disposals of main cases per Judge per year during the years 1978-79 and 1980 was higher namely, 860. It is obvious that even on the basis of the average rate of disposals per Judge per year being taken at the higher figure of 860 , if no judicial reform is brought about and the present system continues as it is without any change, many more Judges would be required than the total sanctioned strength of permanent and addi-\n\n...\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 539\n\n,> tional Judges in order to dispose of the pending cases which include\n\nnot only main cases but also interlocutory and miscellaneous cases which do take the time of the Court. It was therefore contended on behalf of the petitioners that the President has failed to discharge his constitutional duty under Article 216 by not appointing the requisite number of Judges necessary for the purpose of disposing of the pending cases.\n\nThe argument was that the President was under a constitutional obligation to apply his mind to the question as to how many Judges were necessary to be appointed in each High Court for the purpose of disposing of the cases pending in that High Court, but the President had failed to apply his mind to this question and not taken the necessary steps for the purpose of appointing the requisite number of Judges in each High Court.\n\nThe petitioners therefore sought a writ of mandamus against the Union of India requiring the Union of India to re-fix the strength of Judges in each High Court having regard to the number of pending cases in that High Court and on the basis of the average rate of disposals per judge per year. We do not think we can issue such a writ of mandamus against the Union of India for fixing a particular strength of judges in each High Court. The fixation of the strength of judges in each High Court is a purely executive function which is entrusted by Article 216 to the President, that is, the Government of India and it is entirely for the Government of India to decide in the exercise of its judgment as to what shall be the strength of judges in each High Court. How many judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court is left to the discretion of the Government of\n\nIndia and there are no judicially manageable standards for the purpose of controlling or guiding the discretion of the Union of India in that respect. It is not possible for this court to lay down any standards or norms on the basis of which it can require the Union of India to appoint a certain number of Judges in a particular High Court. The fixation of the number of judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court does not depend upon the application of a mathematical formula dividing the number of pending cases by the average rate of disposal per judge per year. It is a singularly complex problem and merely increasing the number of judges in a High Court would not necessarily solve the problem of disposal of pending cases.\n\nSometimes when the number of judges in a High Court is increased, the law of diminishing returns begins to operate and the disposals of cases do not increase commensurately with the addition to the number of judes. Some times it is difficult to recruit competent judges and no useful purpose is served\n\n540 SUPREME COURT REPORtS ( 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nby appointing mediocre judges who ultimately would not be able to make any impact so far as the arrears of pending cases are concerned and who would dilute the quality of justice administered in the High Court. Then there are also problems of finding court rooms for the new judges who might be appointed because at most places the High Court buildings are heavily congested and there is hardly any space which can be spared. There may also be many other constraints operating with the Government of India which may dissuade it from taking a decision to increase the number of judges in a High Court. The Government of India may legitimately feel that increasing the number of judges in a particular High Court may not solve the problem of arrears of pending cases but that some other strategies may have to be adopted for that purpose, such as the setting up of administrative tribunals or reducing the number of appeals etc. There would therefore be many policy considerations which would influence the Government of India in taking a decision as to what number of judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court. It would not be possible to lay down any judicially manageable standards with reference to which the Government of India could be directed to appoint a particular number of judges in a High Court. What should be the number of Judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court must essentially remain a matter within the discretion of the Government of India and if the Government of India does not appoint sufficient number of judges, the appeal must be to the legislature and not to the Court.\n\nAll that the Court can do is to express the hope that the Government of India will periodically review the strength of judges in each High Court and appoint as many judges as are found necessary for the purpose of disposing of arrears of pending cases.\n\nF The Power of Appointment of Judges: Article 217.\n\nThe next question that arises for consideration is as to where is the power to appoint Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme\n\nCourt located ? Who has the final voice in the appointment of Judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court? The power of appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court is to be found in clause (2) of Article 124 and this clause provides that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the States as I he President may deem necessary for the purpose, provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted. It is obvious on a plain reading of clause (2) of\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UN10N (Bhagwati, J.) 541\n\nArticle 124 that it is the President, which in effect and substance means the Central Government, which is empowered by the Constitution to appoint Judges of the Supreme Court. So also Article 217, clause(!) vests the power of appointment of Judges of High Courts in the Central Government, but such power is exercisable only \"after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court.\" It is clear on a plain reading of these two Articles that the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court and such other Judges of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court as the Central Government may deem it necessary to consult, are merely constitutional functionaries having a consultative role and the power of appointment resides solely and exclusively in the Central Government. Jt is not an unfettered power in the sense that the Central Government cannot act arbitrarily without consulting the constitutional functionaries specified in the two Articles but it can act only after consulting them and the consultation must be full and effective consultation.\n\nThe question immediately arises what constituts 'consultation' within the meaning of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217. Fortunately, this question is no longer res integra and it stands concluded by the decision of this Court in Sankalchand Seth's case (supra).\n\nIt is true that the question in Sanka/chand Seth's rase (supra) related to the scope and meaning of 'consultation' in clause (I) of Article 222, but it was common ground between the parties that 'consultation' for the purpose of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217 has the same meaning and content as 'consultation' in clause (I) of Article 222.\n\nChandracbud, J., as he then was in his judgment in Sanka/chand Seth's case (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment given by Justice Subba Rao, when he was a Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Pushpam v. State of Modras( 1) \"the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more person or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution\" and added. \"In\n\norder that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact, it is essential that each must have for its consideration full and identical facts which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision.\" Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of himself and Fazal Ali, J, also pointed out that\n\n(1) AI.R. 1953 Mad. 392.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R\n\n\"all the materials in the possession of one who consults must be unreservedly placed before the consultee\" and further \"a reasonable opportunity for getting information, taking other steps and getting prepared for tendering effective and meaningful advice must be given to him'' and \"the cosultant in turn must take the matter seriously since , he subject is of grave importance.\" The learned Judge proceeded to add : \"Therefore, it follows that the President must communicate to the Chief Justice all the material he has and the course he proposes. The Chief Justice, in turn, must collect necessary information through responsible channels or directly, acquaint himself with the requisite data, deliberate on the information he possesses and proceed in the interests of the administration of justice to give the President such counsel of action as he thinks will further the public interest. especially the cause of the justice system.\" These observations apply with equal force to determine the scope and meaning of 'consultation' within the meaning of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause(!) of Article 217. Each of the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under these two articles must have for his consideration full and identical facts bearing upon appointment or non-appointment of the person concerned as a Judge aad the opinion of each of them taken on identical material must be considered by the Central Government before it takes a decision whether or not to appoint the person concerned as a Judge.\n\nBut, while giving the fullest meaning and effect to 'consultation', it must be borne in mind that it is only consultation which is provided by way of fetter upon the power of appointment vested in the Central Government and consultation cannot be equated with concurrence.\n\nWe agree with what Krishna Iyer, J. said in Sankalchand Sheth' s case\n\n(supra) that \"consultation is different from consentaneity. They may discuss but may disagree; they may confer but may not concur.\" It would therefore be open to the Central Government to over-ride the opinion given by the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted and to arrive at its own decision in regard to the appointment of a Judge in the High Court or the Supreme Court, so Jong as such decision is based on relevant considerations and is not otherwise mala fide. Even if the opinion given by all the constitutional functionaries consulted by it is identical, the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with such opinion, though being a unanimous opinion of all the three constitutional functionaries, it would have great weight and if an appointment is made by the Central Government in defiance of such unanimous opinion, it may prima facie be vulnerable to attack on the ground that it is mala fide or based on irrelevant grounds.\n\nThe same position would obtain if\n\n\".·\n\ns.~. GUPTA V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 543\n\nan appointment is made by the Central Government contrary tc the unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nBut we do not think that ordinarily the Central Government would make an appointment of a Judge in a High Court if all the three constitutional functionaries have expressed an opinion against it.\n\nWe may, 1 however, make it clear that on a proper interpretation of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217, it is open to the Central Government to take its own decision in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a Judge in a High Court or the Supreme Court after taking into account and giving due weight to the opinions expressed by the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under these two Articles and the only ground on which such decision can be assailed is that it is mala fide or passed on irrelevant considerations.\n\nWhere there is a difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries who are consulted, it is for the Central Government to decide whose opinion should be accepted and whether appointment should be made or not. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that where there is difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India should have primacy, since he is the head of the Indian Judiciary and pater familieas of the judicial fraternity.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept this contention. It is difficult to see on what principle can primacy be given to the opinion of one constitutional functionary, when clause (I) of Article 217 places all the three constitutional functionaries on the same pedestal so far as the process of consultation is concerned and does not make any distinction between one copstitutional functionary and another. Each of the three constitutional functionaries occupies a high constitutional office and clause ( l) cf Article 217 ; xovides that the appointment of a High Court Judge shall be made after consulation with all the three constitutional functionaries without assigning superiority to the opinion of one over that of another. It is true that the Chief Justice of India is the head of the Indian Judiciary and may be figuratively described as pater famil.leas of the brotherhood of Judges but the Chief Justice of a High Court is also an equally important cons:itutional functionary and it is not possible to say tlrnt so far as the consultative process is concerned, he is in any way less important tban the Chief Justice of India. In fact, urider the constitutional scheme, the Chief Justice of a High Court is not subject to the administrative superintendence of the Cl1ief Justice of India nor is he under the control or supervision of the Chief Justice of India. It is only the power of hearing appeals a ; ainst the decision :or the Chief Justice of a Hih Court that is possessed by the Cqief Jqstii,:i;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nof India and there, his superiority over the Cnief Justice of High Court ends. If we look at the raison d'etre of the provision for consultation enacted in clause (I} of Article 217, it will be obvious that the opinion given by the Chief Justice of the High Court must have atleast equal weight as the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, because ordinarily the Chief Justice of the High Court would be in a better position to know about the competence, character and integrity of the person recommended for appointment as a Judge in the High Court. The opinion of the Governor of the State, which means the State Government would also be entitled to equal weight, not in regard to the technical competence of the person recommended and his knowledge and perception of law on which the Chief Justice of the High Court would be the proper person to express an opinion, but in regard to the character and integrity of such person, his antecedents and his social philosophy and value-system. So also the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would be valuable because he would not be affected by caste, communal or other parochial considerations and standing outside the turmoil of local passions and prejudices, he would be able to look objectively at the problem of appointment. There is therefore, a valid and intelligible purpose for which the opinion of each of the three constitutional functionaries is invited before the Central Government can take a decision whether or not to appoint a particular person as a J u<lge in a High Court.\n\nThe opinion of each of the three constitutional functionaries is entitled to equal weight and it is not possible to say that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India must have primacy over the opinions of the other two constitutional functionarjes. If primacy were to be given to the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, it would, in effect and substance, amount to concurrence, because giving primacy would mean that his opinion must prevail over that of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the State, which means that the Central Government must accept his opinion. But as we pointed out earlier, it is only consultation and not cocurrence of the Chief Justice of India that is provided in clause (1) of Article 217. When, in the course of debates in the Constituent Assembly, an amendment was moved that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court should be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar made the following comment which is very significant :\n\n\"With regard to the question of the concurrence of the chief Justi9e, it eem$ to me th11t those advocate that pro-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, .i.) 545\n\nposition seem to rely implicitly both on the impartiality of the Chief Justice and soundness of his judgment. I personally feel no doubt that the Chief Justice is very eminent person. But after all, the Chief Justice is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and all the prejudices which we as common people have; and I think, to allow the Chief Justice practically a veto upon the appointment of judges is really to transfer the authority to the Chief Justice which we are not prepared to vest in the President or the Government of the day.\n\nI therefore, think that that is also a dangerous proposition.\"\n\nIt is therefore, clear that where there is difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries in regard to appointment of a Judge in a High Court, the opinion of none of the c, mstitutional functionaries is entitled to primacy but after considering the opinion of each of\n\nthe constitutional functionaries and giving it due weight, the Central D Government is entitled to come to its own decision as to which opinion it should accept in deciding whether or not to appoint the\n\n• I particular person as a Judge. So also where a Judge of the Supreme Court is to be appointed, the Chief Justice of India is required to be consulted, but again it is not concurrence but only consultation and the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India though it is entitled to great weight as the opinion of the head of the Indian Judiciary. The ultimate power of appointment rests with the Central Government and that is in accord with the constitutional practice prevailing in all democratic countries.\n\nEven in the United Kingdom, a country from which we have inherited our system of administration of the Justice and to which many of our anglophiles turn with reverence for inspiration and guidance, the appointment of High Court Judges is made by or on the advice of the Lord Chancellor, who is a member of the Cabinet while appointments to the Court of appeal and the House of Lords and to the office' of Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls and President of the Family Division are made on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with t!1e Lord Chancellor. Thus the appointment of a Judge belonging to the higher echelons of judicial service is wholly in the hands of the Executive.\n\nSo also in the common-wealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the appointment of High Court and Supreme Court Judges is made by the Executive. This is, of course,\n\npot an ideal system of appointmnt of J udes, but the re!!SOQ why\n\nD •\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe power of appointment of Judges is left to the Executive appears to be that the Executive is responsible to the Legislature and through the Legislature, it is accountable to the people who are consumers of justice. The power of appointment f Judges is not entrusted to the Chief Justice of India or to the Chief Justice of a High Court because they do not have any accountRbility to the people and even .if any wrong or improper appointment is made, they are not liable to account to anyone for such appointment.\n\nThe appointment of a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court does not depend merely upon the professional or functional suitability of the person concerned in terms of experience or knowledge of law though this requirement is certainly important and vital and ignoring it might result in impairment of the efficiency of administration of justice, but also on several other considerations such as honesty, integrity and general pattern of behaviour which would ensure dispassionate and objective adjudication with an open mind, free and fearless approach to matters in issue, social acceptability of the person concerned to the high judicial office in terms of current norms and ethos of the society, commitment to democracy and the rule of law, faith in the constitutional objectives indicating his approach towards the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy, sympathy or absence thereof with the constitutional goals and the needs of an activist judicial system. These various considerations, apart from professional and functional suitability, have to be taken into account while appointing a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and it is presumably on this account that the power of appointment is entrusted to the Executive.\n\nBut, as pointed out above, there is a fetter placed upon the power of appointment by the requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a High Court Judge and with the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge.\n\nHowever, at this stage, it is necessary to point out that so far as appointment of a Supreme Court Judge is concerned, it is not cousultation with the Chief Justice of India alone that is provided in clause (2) of Article 124. Undoubtedly, consultation with the Chief Justice of India is a mandatory requirement but in addition \"such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts\" as the Central Government may deem necessary are also required to be consulted. One argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that w!ien clause (2) of Article 124 µs(!s (he expression \"after consql-\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 547\n\ntation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose\", it does not impose a mandatory obligation on the Central Government to consult one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts but it leaves it to the discretion of the Central Government whether or not to consult one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts before making appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court. The petitioners contended that the Central GovernP.Jent may, if it thinks fit, consult one or more of the Judges of the Supreme and of the High Courts or it may not consult any and where it does not, the Chief Justice of India will be the only constitutional functionary required to be consulted and in such a case the Central Government must accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of India as binding upon it. We do not think this argument is well founded. In the first place it is not justified by the plain language of clause (2) of Article 124. This clause clearly provides for consultation as a mandatory exercise and the only matter which is left to the discretion of the Central Government is the choice of the Judge of the Supreme Court and the High Courts who may be consulted. The words \"as the President may deem necessary\" qualify only the preceding words ''such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States.\" Which of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted is left to the discretion of the Central Government but consultation there must be with one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts. The Central Government must consult at least one Judge out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts before exercising the power of appointment conferred by clause (2) of Article 124.\n\nThis requirement is prescribed obviously because the Constitution makers did not think it desirable that one person alone, however high and eminent he may be, should have a predominent voice in the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court. But it seems that this requirement is not complied with in making appointments on the Supreme Court Bench presumably under a misconception that it is not a mandatory but only an optional provision. The result is that the Chief Justice of India alone is consulted in the matter of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge and largely as a result of a healthy practice followed through the years, the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is ordinarily accepted by the Central Government, the consequence being that in a highly important matter like the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge, it i$ t4e decision of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nChief Justice of India which is ordinarily, for all practical purposes final. But, as it happens, there are no criteria laid down or evolved to guide the Chief Justice in this respect nor is there any consultation with wider interests. This is, to our mind, not a very satisfactory mode of appointment, because wisdom and experience demand that no power should be vested in a single individual however high and great he may be and howsoever honest and well meaning. We are all human beings with our own likes and dislikes, our own predelictions and prejudices and our mind is not so comprehensive as to be able to take in all aspects of a question at one time and more over sometimes, the information on which we base our judgments may be incorrect or inadequate and our judgment may also sometimes be imperceptibly influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations.\n\nIt may also be noticed that it is not difficult to find reasons to justify what our bias or predeliction or inclination impels us to do. It is for this reason that we think it is unwise to entrust power in any significant or sensitive area to a single individual, howsoever high or important may be the office which he is occupying.\n\nThere must be checks and controls in the exercise of every power, particularly when it is a power to make important and crucial appointments and it must be exercisable by plurality of hands rather than be vested in a single individual. That is perhaps the reason why the Constitution makers introduced the requirement in clause (2) of Article 124 that one or more Judges out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted in making appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. But even with this provision, we do not think that the safeguard is adequate because it is left to the Central Government to select any one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts for the purpose of consultation. we would rather suggest that there must be a collegium to make recommendation to the President in regard to appointment of a Supreme Court or High Court Judge.\n\nThe recommending authority should be more broad-based and there should be consultation with wider interests. If the collegium is composed of persons who are expected to have knowledge of the persons who may be fit for appointment on the Bench and of qualities required for appointment and this last requirement is absolutely essential-it would go a long way towards securing the right kind of Judges, who would be truly independent in the sense we have indicated above and who would invest the judicial process with significance and meaning for the deprived and exploited sections of humanity. We may point out that even countries like Australia and New Zealand have veered\n\nro!ln~ to the view that tere soµld be a Judicial Commission for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 549\n\nappointment of the higher judiciary. As recently as July 1977 the Chief Justice of Australia publicly stated that the time had come for such a commission to be appointed in Australia. So also in New Zealand, the Royal Commission on the Courts chaired by Mr. Justice Beattle, who has dow become the Governor General of New Zealand, recommended that a Judicial Commission should consider all judicial appointments including appointments of High Court Judges. This is a matter which may well receive serious attention of the Government of India.\n\nThe position of an Additional Judge : Article 224.\n\nWe then turn to consider what is the position of an additional Judge under the Constitution. This question is of the greatest importance because as against a total sanctioned strength of 308\n\npermanent Judges, there is a total sactioned strength of as many as 97 additional Judges, which means that the total sanctioned strength\n\nof additional Judges is almost one third the total sanctioned D strength of permanent Judges. There are a large number of additional Judges in various High Courts whose tenure is short and precarious and their fate should therefore naturally be a matter of serious concern for this Court. The power to appoint an additional Judge in a High Court is to be found in clause (I) of Article 224 which reads as follows : E\n\n\"If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the Judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified perso::s to be additional Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\"\n\nClause (2) of Article 224 provides for appointment of an acting Judge during the period when any Judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is, by reason of absence or for any other reason, unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed temporarily as Chief Justice. It is obvious that the tenure of an acting Judge is by its very nature limited because he is appointed to act as a Judge only during the period when the permanent Judge in whose place he is acting is unable to perform the duties of his office and be would therefore cease to be a Judge as soon as the permanent Judge resumes his duties. We are not concerned in these writ\n\nF .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\npetitions with the case of an acting Judge and we need not therefore dwell any further on this clause Clause (3) of Article 224 provides inter alia that no person appointed as an additional Judge shall hold office after attaining the age of 62 years. Therefore even if an additional Judge has been appointed for a period of two years he would cease to be a Judge if he attains the age of 62 years prior to the expiration of his term of two years.\n\nIt is clear from the provisions of clause (I) of Article 224 that the maximum period for which an additional Judge can be appointed by the President is two years. This provision for appointment of a Judge for a period not exceeding two years seems to be peculiar to this country. There is no such practice of appointing a Judge for a short term either in the United Kingdom or in the United States of America. Even in India, there are no Judges either in the Supreme Court or in the subordinate judiciary whose tenure is so short. It is rather an unusual provision and in order to understand its true scope and effect, it is necessary to trace briefly its historical evolution.\n\nThere was no provison in the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861 for appointment of an additional Judge with a restricted tenure in a High Court. It was for the first time in the Government of India Act, 19 I 5 that a provision was enacted for appointment of additional Judges Sub-section (2) of section I 0 I provided that each High Court shall consist of the Chief Justice and as many other Judges as His Majesty may think fit to appoint and clause (i) of the provision to that sub-section authorised the Governer General in Council to appoint persons to act as additional Judges of any High Court for such period not exeeding two years as may be required.\n\nThe additional Judges were to have all the powers of a Judge of the High Ciurt appointed by His Majesty. The Government of India Act 1915 was replaced by the Government of India Act, 1935 and section 220 of that Act provided that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as His Majesty may from time to time deem it nece>sary to appoint and there was a proviso to this section which said that the Judges so appointed together with any additional Judges appointed by the Governor General shall at no time exceed in number such maximum number as the Governor- General may by order fix in relatio11 to that Court. Section 222 sub-section (3) provided for appointment of additional Judges in\n\nt~\\lS\\l terms ;\n\nS.P. GUP\"i'A v. iJNiON (Biiagwati, J.) 551\n\n\"Section 222 (3)-If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of any High Court or by reason of arrears of work in any such Court it appears to the Governor-General that the number of the Judges of the Court should be for the the time being increased, the Governor-General (in his discretion) may, subject to the foregoing provisions of this chapter with respect to the maximum number of Judges, appoint persons duly qualified for appointment as Judges to the additional Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\"\n\nThe system of appointment of additional Judges was therefore in vogue when the Constituent Assembly met to frame the Constitution.\n\nArticle 199 of the Draft Constitution was al most in the same terms as sub-section 3 of Section 22: of the Government oflndia Act, 1935.\n\nThere was also Article 198 in the Draft Constitution which in clause (!) provided for appointment of an acting Chief Justice and in clause (2) for appointment of an acting Judge. The provision for appointment of an acting Judge made in clause (2) of Article 198 was that when the office of any Judge of a High Court is vacant or when any such Judge is appointed to act temporarily as a Chief Justice or is unable to perform the duties of his office by reason of absence or otherwise, the President may appoint a person duly qualified for appointment as a Judge to act as a Judge of that Court.\n\nThe acting Judge contemplated by this clause of Article 198 was therefore clearly a temporary Judge. Now when Artitcles 198 and 199 in the Draft Constitution came to be considered in the Constituent Assembly, a number of representations were received suggesting that both these articles should be deleted from the Constitution.\n\nIt was felt by many that the practice of appointing acting or additional Judges was pernicious and it should be done away with Tej Bahadu r Sapru expressed his firm opposition to this practice of appointing acting or additional Judges in the course of his speech in the Constituent Assembly. He said, decrying this practice in no uncertain terms :\n\n\"Additional Judges, under the old Constitution were appointed by the Governor-General for a period not exceeding two years. I do not know whether that condition has been reproduced in the proposed Constitution. This prohibition, however, does not apply to acting judges or\n\n552 sui>trnME COURT REPORTS [19si] i s.c.R.\n\ntemporary judges. I think the rule in future should be that any barrister or advocate, who accepts a seat on the Bench shall be prohibited from resuming practice anywhere on retirement. I would not, however, apply this to temporary judges taken from the services who hold a seat on the Bench for a few months, but I would add that the practice of appointing additional and temporary judges should be definitely given up. When I said at the Round Table Conference that there were acting additional and temporary judges in India, some of the English lawyers not accustomed to Indian Law felt rather surprised. I am also of the opinion that temporary or acting judges do greater harm than permanent judges when after their seat on the Bench for a short period they revert to the Bar. A seat on the Bench gives them a pre-eminence over their colleagues and embarrasses subordinate judges who were at one time under their control and thus instead of their helping justice they act as a hindrance to free justice. I have a very strong feeling in this matter and have during my long experience seen the evil effects of unchecked resumption of practice by barristers and advocates.\"\n\nThere were also many others who expressed the same view. The Drafting Committee agreed with this view and expressed the opinion that \"it would be better to delete Articles I 98 and I 99 relating to the appointment of temporary and additional Judges, than to retain those articles without the ban on practice by persons who hold office as additional or temporary judges.\" The Drafting Committee took the view that \"it was possible to discontinue the system of appointment of temporary and additional judges in the High Courts altogether by increasing, if necessary, the total number of permanent judges of such Courts. The Constituent Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Drafting Committee to delete Articles 198(2) and 199 of the Draft Constitution providing for appointment of acting and additional Judges in High Courts, with the result that when the Constitution came to be enacted, there was no provison in the Constitution for appointment of acting or additional Judges.\n\nIt is clear from the discussions which took place in the Constituent Assembly that the Constitution makers realised that an acting or additional Judge would have to go back to the Bar on the expiration of his term of office and his tenure was of a strictly limited\n\ns.:P. GUPTA v. UNION (Biwgwati, J.) 5s3\n\nduration. The Constitution makers did not oppose the practice of appointing acting or additional Judge an on the ground that on the expiration of his term of office, an acting or additional Judge would have to go back to the Bar, but their anxiety was that after going back to the Bar he would resume his practice and this might lead to abuses and it was this undesirable consequence which they wanted to prevent and that is why they deleted Articles 198(2) and 199 with a view to abolishing the practice of appointing acting or additional Judges. The underlying postulate of Articles 198 (2) and 199 was that an acting or additional Judge would come back to the Bar on the expiration of his term and start practice and this was intended to be stopped, but since it was not possible to debar an acting or additional Judge from practising after he came back on the expiration of term, it was decided that the institution of acting and additional Judges should be done away with. There was no assumption by the Constitution makers that an acting or addititional Judge would necessarily be made permanent and he would not have to go back to the Bar. On the contrary, going back to the Bar was clearly contemplated and hence Articles 198 (2) and 199 were deleted. The Constitution makers also thought that it would be possible to discontinue the system of appointing acting and additional Judges altogether without any detriment to early disposal of cases, if the total number of permanent Judges was sufficiently increased.\n\nBut within six years of the coming into force of the Constitution it was found that the arrears in the High Courts were increasing and it was becoming difficult to bring them under control. There was Article 224 in the Constitution which provided that the Chief Justice of a High Court may at any time with the previous consent of the President request any retired Judge to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court. But this provision fur recalling retired Judges to function on the Bench of a High Court for short periods was found to be neither adequate nor satisfactory and it was of no assistance in reducing the arrears of cases which were mounting-up from year to year. Parliament in its constituent capacity, therefore, decided to introduce two provisions: one for appointment of additional Judges to clear off the arrears and the other for the apponitment of acting Judges in temporary vacancies and with that end in view, enacted the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. This amending Act substituted the existing Article 224 by a new Article 224 which reads as follows :\n\n554 SUPREME cotJR.'r REPORTS [i98~) 2 s.c.tt\n\n\"Appointment of additional and acting Judges :\n\n(I) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears tu the President that the number of the judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\n\n(2) When any judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is by reason of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, the President may appoint a duly qualified person to act as a Judge of that Court until the permament judge has resumed his office.\n\n(3) No person appointed as an additional or acting judge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty-two years.\"\n\nThe existing Article 224 was added as new Article 224A after the new Article 224.\n\nClause (1) of Article 217 was also simultaneou.sly amended with a view to making provision in regard to an acting or additional Judge. We have already set out the amended clause(!) of Article 217 in an earlier part of the Judgment and we need not, therefore, reproduce it here once again.\n\nThe first question which arises for determination under Article 224 clause (!) is as to when can an additional Judge be appointed by the President. This article confers power on the President to appoint an additional Judge. If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the judges of that Court should be for the time being increased and in that event, he can appoint an additional Judge for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify. It must appear to the President that either by reason of temporary increase in the business of the High Court or by reason of accumulation arrears of work in the High Court, it is necessary to increase the number of the Judges of that Court for the time being. The power to appoint an additional Judge cannot\n\nS.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Bl1agwati, i.) 555\n\ntherefore be exercised by the President unless there is either temporary increase in the business of the High Court or there is accumulation of arrears of work in the High Court and even when one of these two conditiom exists, it is necessary that the President must be further satisfied that it i > necessary to make a temporary increase in the number of Judges of that High Court. The words \"for the time being'' clearly indicate that the increase in the number of judges which the President may make by appointing additional Judges whould be temporary with a view to dealing with the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the arrears of work in the High Court.\n\nArticle 224 clause (I) did not contemplate that the increase in the number of Judges should be for an indefinite duration. The object clearly was that an additional Judge should be appointed for a short period in order to dispose of the temporary increase in the business of the High Court and/or to clear off the arrears of pending cases. There is sufficient indication in clause (I) of Article 224 that the appoinments of additional Judges were intended to be of short duration and Parliament expected that sufficient number of additional Judges would be appointed so as to dispose of the temporary increase in the work or the arrears of pending cases within a period of two years or thereabouts.\n\nThat is why clause (1) of Article 224 provided that additional Judges may be appointed for a period not exceeding two years. The underlying idea was that there should be an adequate strength of permanent Judges in each High Court to deal with its normal institutions and so far as the temporary increase in the work or the arrears of pending cases were concerned, additional Judges appointed for a period not exceeding two years should assist in disposing of such work. This was the reason why the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report stated in paragraphs 54 and 57 of Chapter 6 in Vol. I :\n\n''54. The large increase in the volume of annual institutions which has been referred to earlier must now, we think, be taken as a permanent feature. This position accor dingly necessitates a thorough revision of existing ideas regarding the number of judges required for each High Court. The strength of the High Courts has been increased from time to time. In doing this, however, the post-Constitutional developments which have thrown a much heavier burden on the High Courts have, in our view, not been adequately taken into account.\n\nTo expect the existing number of judges in the various High Courts to deal\n\nsui>itEt.te couat REPoitrs\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.t.\n\nefficiently with the vastly increased volume of work is, in our opinion, to ask them to attempt the impossible. As pointed out to us by a senior counsel, if there is a congestion on the roads due to an increase in traffic, the remedy is not to blame the traffic but to widen the roads.\n\nThe first essential therefore, is to see that the strength of every High Court is maintained at a level so as to be adequate to dispose of what may be called its normal institutions. The normal strength of a High Court must be fixed on the basis of the average annual institutions of all types of proceedings in a particular High Court during the last three years. This is essential in order to prevent what may be termed the current file of the Court falling into arrears and adding to the pile of old cases.\n\nThe problem of clearing tlie arrears can be satisfactorily dealt with only after the normal strength of each court has been brought upto the level required to cope with its normal institutions. We suggest that the required strength of the High Court of each State should be fixed in consultation with the Chief Justice of that State and the Chief Justice of India and the strength so fixed should be reviewed at an interval of two or three years. Such a review will be necessary not only by reason of changing conditions E but because the implementation of our recommendations made elsewhere will lead to a quicker disposal of work in the subordinate courts which, in its turn, will result in an increase in the work of the High Courts.\n\n57.\n\nWe are of the view that the provisions of article F 224 of the Constitution should be availed of and additional judges be appointed for the specific purpose of dealing with these arrears. The number of such additional judges required for each High Court for the purpose of dealing with the arrears will have to be fixed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the State G High Court after taking into consideration the arrears in the particular court, their nature and the average disposal of that Court.\n\nThe number of additional judges to be fixed for this purpose should be such as to enable the arrears to be cleared within a period of two years. The additional judges H so appointed should, in our view be utilised as far as possible exclusively for the purpose of disposing of arrears and not be diverted to the disposal of current work. Pari passu\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Biragwati, J.) 551\n\nwith the disposal of the arrears, the permanent strength of the High Court will have to be brought up to and maintained at the required level, care being taken to see that their normal disposal keeks pace with the new institutions and that they are not allowed to develop into arrears. The appointment of additional Judges for the exclusive purpose of dealing with the arrears is, in our view, called for in a large number of High Courts.\"\n\nThe sentence underlined by us in paragraphs 57 clearly shows that according to the Law Commission also the intendment of clause (I) of Article 224 was that sufficient number of additional Judges would be appointed \"so as to enable the arrears to be cleared off within a period of two years.\" The same note was struck by P.N. Sapru when he said in the course of the Debates in Rajya Sabha during the discussion of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Bill: It is necessary to have additional Judges for the disposal of arrears.\n\nThese arrears, I hope, represent a temporary situation ................. .\n\nOnce these arrears have been cleared off, it will be possible for us to fix or to determine the permanent strength of our Courts with some degree of assurance.\" It would thus seem that on a true interpretation of clause (I) of Article 224 it was never intended that additional Judges should go on being appointed and reappointed term after term. Now it is obvious that if additional Judges were appointed according to the true intendment of clause (I) of Article 224, they would be temporary Judges appointed for a short duration to clear off the arrears and once the arrears are cleared off, which was expected by Parliament to be achieved within not more than two years they would, on the expiration of their term, go back to the Bar or to the District Judicial service. Their tenure being for a short period limited by the time expected to be taken in clearing off the arrearssuch time, in any event, being hopefully not more than two years-they would know that, on the expiration of their term, they would have to go back. They would have no right to be appointed or even to be considered for appointment as permanent Judges, because when they accepted appointment as additional Judges under clause (I} of Article 224, they would have known that they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears.\n\nBut what happened in practice was that the true intendment and purpose of clause (I) of article 224 was never carried into effect.\n\n558 SUPREME cotJR.r REPORTS [I 982.J 2 s.c.i.\n\nThe Government did not increase the strength of permanent Judges , in different High Courts adequately so as to be able to cope with the normal institutions. Though the Law Commission had recom mended in its Fourteenth Report that the normal strength of a High Court must be fixed on the basis of average annual institution of all types of proceed in gs in the High Court during the last three years, this recommendation was not heeded with the result that even the current institutions in many of the High Courts could not be dis po sed of by the inadequate number of permanent Judges and they started adding to the existing arrears. Of course, it was not only the Government which was responsible for not increasing adequately the strength of permanent Judges but the Chief Justices of many High Courts were also remiss in looking after the interests of their High Courts, in as much they too did not ask the Government for increase in the strength of permanant Judges. Wherever the fault may lie and it is not necessary for the purpose of these writ petitions to fix the blame, the consequence was that the arrears in the High Courts started growing menacingly from year to year. The requisite number of additional Judges was also not appointed by the Government though clause (l) of Article 224 clearly contemplated that sufficient number of additional Judges would be appointed in order to clear off the arrears within a period of about two years. The old arrears therefore continued to exist and new arrears were added out of the current file of cases which remained undisposed of by the existing strength of Judges. The strength of additional Judges was not fixed realistically and a much lesser number of additional Judges than required for the purpose of clearing off the arrears within a period of about two years were appointed in the different High Courts from time to time with the result that the arrears continued to increase and the need for additional Judges continued to subsist. The unfortunate consequence was that the additional Judgeship became a gateway for entering the cadre of permanent Judges.\n\nWhenever a person was appointed as a Judge in a High Court, he would be first appointed an additional Judge and only when a vacancy occurred in the post of a permanent Judge, he would be confirmed as a Permanent Judge in that vacancy in accordance with the seniority amongst the additional Judges. The practice therefore grew up of a person being first appointed as an additional Judge and then being confirmed as a permanent Judge in the same High Court.\n\nThe Union of India at the instance of the petitioners filed before us a statement showing that in almost all cases barring a negligible few, every person was appointed first as an\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 559\n\nadditional Judge in the High Co.urt and then confirmed as a permanent Judge in the same High Court as soon as a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge became available to him. The entire object and purpose of the introduction of clause (I) of Article 224 was perverted and additional Judges were appointed under this Article not as temporary Judges for a short period who would go back on the expiration of their term as soon as the arrears are cleared off, but as Judges whose tenure, though limited to a period not exceeding two years at the time of each appointment as an additional Judge, would be renewed from time to time until a berth was found for them in the cadre of permanent Judges.\n\nBy and large, every person entered the High Court judiciary as an additional Judge in the clear expectation that as soon as a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge became available to him in the High Court he would be confirmed as a permanent Judge and if no such vacancy became available to him until the expiration of his term of office, he would be reappointed as an additional Judge for a further term in the same High Court.\n\nTherefore, far from being aware that on the expiration of their term, they would have to go back because they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears-which would have been the position if clause (I) of Article 224 had been implemented according to its true intendment and purpose-the additional Judges entered the High Court judiciary with a legitimate expectation that they would not have to go back on the expiration of their term but they would be either reappointed as additional Judges for a further term or if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge became available, they would be confirmed as permanent Judges.\n\nThis expectation which was generated in the minds of additional Judges by reason of the peculiar manner in which clause (I) of Article 224 was operated, cannot now be ignored by the Government and the Government cannot be permitted to say that when the term of an additional Judge expires, the Government can drop him at its sweet will.\n\nBy reason of the expectation raised in his mind through a practice followed for almost over a quarter of a century, an additional Judge is entitled to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term and if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge becomes available to him on the basisof seniority amongst additional Judges, he has a right to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge in his High Court.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S.C.1t.\n\nIt is clear on a plain reading of Article 217 clause (1) that when an additional Judge is to be appointed, the procedure set out in that article is to be followed.\n\nClause (I) of Article 217 provides that \"Every Judge\" of a High Court shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court The expression \"Every Judge\" must on a plain natural construction include not only a permanent Judge but also an additional Judge. It is significant to note that whenever the Constitution makers intended to make a reference to a permanent Judge, they did so in clear and explicit terms as in clause (2) of Article 224.\n\nMoreover, there is inherent evidence in Article 217 clause (I) itself which shows that the expression \"Every Judge\" is intended to take in an additional Judge as well.\n\nClause (I} of Article 217 says that \"Every Judge ... shall hold office in case of an additional Judge ..... as provided in Article 224 which clearly suggests that the case of an additional Judge is covered by the opening words \"Every Judge\".\n\nWe may also consider what would be the consequence of construing the word \"Every Judge\" as meaning only a permanent Judge.\n\nOn that construction, clause (I) of Article 217 will not apply in relation to appointment of an additional Judge and it would be open to the Central Government under Article 224 clause (I) to appoint an additional Judge without consulting any of the constitutional functionaries specirled in clause (I) of Article 217. This could never have been intended by the Constitution makers, who made such elaborate provisions in the Constitution for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary.\n\nWe must therefore, hold that no additional Judge can be appointed without complying with the requirement of clause\n\n(I) of Arricle 217.\n\nNow, when the term of an additional Judge expires he ceases to be a Judge and therefore, if he is to continue as a Judge, he must be either reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge.\n\nIn either case, clause (I) of Article 2 i 7 would operate and no reappointment as an additional Judge or appointment as a permanent Judge can be made without going through the procedure set out in Article 217 clause (1).\n\nOf course, an additional Judge has a right to be considered for such reappointment or appointment, as the case may be, and the Central Government cannot be heard to say that the additional Judge need not be considered. The additional Judge cannot just be dropped without consideration.\n\nThe name of the additional Judge would have to go through the procedure of clause (I) of Article 217 and after consultation with\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 561\n\nthe Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Central Government would have to decide whether or not to reappoint him as an additional Judge or to appoint him as a permanent Judge. If the procedure for appointment of a Judge followed as a result of a practice memorandum issued by the Central Government is that the proposal for appointment of a Judge may ordinarily originate from the Chief Justice of the High Court and may then be sent to the Governor of the State and thereafter to the Chief Justice of India through the Justice Ministry for their respective opinions before a decision can be taken by the Central Government whether or not to appoint the person proposed the name of the additional Judge must be sent-up by the Chief Justice of the High Court with his recommendation whether he should be reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge or not and it must go upto the Central Govern\n\nment with the opinions of the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, so that the Central Government may, after considering such opinions, make-up its mind on the question of reappointment or appointment as the case may be.\n\nBut this is the only right possessed by the additional Judge.\n\nThe additional Judge is not entitled to contend that he must automatically and without any further consideration be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge.\n\nHe has to go through the process of clause (I) of Article 217 and to concede to him the right to be appointed either as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge would be to fly in the face of Article 217 clause (1). If the additional Judge is entitled to be appointed without anything more, why should the process of consultation be gone through in regard to his appointment? Would consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court not be reduced to a farce ? It would be a mockery of consultation with such high constitutional dignitaries. There can, therefore, be no doubt that an additional Judge is not entitled as a matter of right to be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term or as a permanent Judge. The only right he has is to be considered for such appointment and this right also belongs to him not because clause (I) of Article 224 confers such right upon him, but because of the peculiar manner in which clause (!) of Article 2H has been operated all these years,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nBut the question then arises what are the factors which can legitimately be taken into account by the Central Government in deciding whether or not to reappoint an additional Judge for a further term or to appoint him as a permanent Judge. The argument of the petitioners was that an additional Judge is not on probation.\n\nHe is as much a Judge as a permanent Judge with the same jurisdiction and the same powers and to treat him as if he were 0.1 probation would not onlY, detract from his status and dignity but also affect his independence by making his continuance as a Judge dependent on the good opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India. We find it difficult to accept this argument in the face of the clear and unambi guous language of clause (1) of Article 217. There are no limitations in the language of clause( 1) of Article 217 as to what factors shall be considered and what factors shall not be, but having regard to the object and purpose of that provision namely, appointment of a High Court Judge, it i~ obvious that fitness and suitability, physical, intellectual and moral, would be the governing considerations to be taken into account in deciding the question of appointment.\n\nNow, when, on the expiration of the term of an additionai Judge, the Central Government is again called upon to consider whether or not he should be reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a\n\npernanent Judge, 1he Central Government would have to apply its mind to the question whether such additional Judge possesses the requisite fitness and suitability for being reappointed or appointed as the case may be. Public interest requires that only such person should be appointed as a Judge who is physically, intellectually and morally fit and suitable to be appointed as a Judge and it would be contrary to public weal to appoint a person, who does not possess the requisite fitness and sui1ability.\n\nThe Central Government would therefore be under a constitutional obligation to consider whether the additional Judge, whose term has expired, is fit and suitable to be reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge.\n\nNow can clause (1) of Article 217 or Article 224 be so interpreted as to require the Central Government to reappoint an additional Judge fur a further term or to appoint him as permanent Judge, even if at the time of web re appointment or appointment as the case may be, he is physically, intellectually or morally unfit or unsuitable to be appointed as a Judge.\n\nOf course, at the time when the question of re-appointment of an additional Judge for a further term or his appointment\n\n11s a permanent Jude comes up before the <;:entral Government\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 563\n\nfor consideration, the additional Judge would have two weighty circumstances in his favour: one, that he has experience as a Judge for one term and the other, that it would not be desirable to send an\n\ndditional Judge back to the Bar.\n\nBut even with these weighty circumstances in his favour, he would have to satisfy the test of fitness and suitability, physical, intellectual and moral, before the Central Government can, consistently with its constitutional obligation and in public interest, decide to reappoint him as an additional Judge or appoint him as a permanent Judge.\n\nIt is true that the fitness and suitability of the additional Judge must have been considered by the Central Government at the time of his original appointment, but when the question again comes-up for consideration on the expiration of his term, the Central Government has to consider afresh, in the light of the material then available, save and except material which was already with the Central Government at the time of original appointment as to whether he possesses the requisite fitness and suitability for being appointed as a Judge.\n\nIt would not be right to say that merely because the fitness and suitability of the additional Judge is required to be considered again for the purpose of deciding whether he should be reappointed for a further term or appointed as a permanent Judge, it would amount to treating him as if he were on probation. An additional Judge is certainly not on probation in the sense that his service cannot be terminated before the expiration of his term unlike a \"probationer who can be sent out at any time during the period of probation. It would also not be open to the Chief Justice of the High or the Governor of the State or the Chief Justice of India to sit in judgment over the quality of the work turned out by the additional Judge during his term, because that would be essentially an appellate function which can be discharged only by the court entitled to hear appeals from the decisions of the additional Judge. But every other consideration which bears on the physical, intellectual and moral fitness and suitability of the additional judge based on material other than that which was with the Central Government at the time of orginal appointment can and must be considered an l if the Central Government finds, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India that the additional Judge is not fit and suitabk: for being appointed as a judge, the Central Government may decide not to appoint him as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge. So long as the case of the additional Judge is considered by the Central Government for reappointment or appointment as the case may be,\n\n564 SUPREME COURT REPORlS\n\n[1982] 2 S.C R.\n\nthe decision of the Central Government cannot be questioned except on the ground that it was reached without full and elfective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India or that it was based on irrelevant comiderations.\n\nWhere such a challenge is made, the burden is on the Central Government to show that there was full and effective consultation and the decision was based on relevant considerations. In fact where an additional judge is not appointed as an additional judge for a further term or as a permanent judge despite the unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. the decision of the Central Government would piima facie be liable to attack and the burden would be heavy on the Central Government to show that it had cogent reasons to disagree with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThere was also one other argument advanced by the learned Attorney General and it was that where an additional Judge is not appointed for a further term or as a permanent Judge, he cannot challenge the decision of the Central Government not to appoint him, because clause (I) of Article 217 prescribes the procedure to be followed only where an appointment is made and it has no application where an appointment is not made.\n\nThis argument is, in our opinion, without force and must be rejected.\n\nAn additional Judge, as we have pointed out, has a right to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or in case there is a vacancy in a permanent post, then for appointment as a permanent Judge, and he must therefore, be considered by the Government for such reappointment or appointment as the case may be, and a r'ecision must be taken in regard to him after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India, and if it is found that there was no consultation with any of these three constitutional functionaries before the decision was taken by the Central Government not to appoint him or the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, it would not be consideration by the Central Government as required by clause (I) of Article 217 and he would, therefore, be entilled t challenge the decision of the Central Government which is based on what may be called 'non-consideration in law' and to require the Central Government to reconsider his case in accordance with clause (I) of Article 217.\n\nThis consequence would follow only because an additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge.\n\nNo person, who is proposed for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 565\n\ninitial appointment as a Judge would be entitled to complain against the decision of the Central Government not to appoint him, beacuse he would have no right to be considered for appointment as a Judge.\n\nWe must also deal with the argument of the petitioners that so long as there is a post of a permanent Judge vacant, no appointment of an additional Judge can be made under clause (I) of Article\n\n224. It is clear from the language of clause (I) of Article 224 that it is only where permanent Judges of a High Court are unable to cope with the current institutions and the increased business or the arrears of pending cases and it is found necessary for the purpose of disposing of the increased business or the arrears of pending cases to increase the strength of the Judges of the High Court for the time being that additional Judges can be appointed.\n\nClause (1) of Article 224 contemplates appointment of additional Judges to augment the trength of the existing Judges. It must therefore follow logically that there must be full strength of existing Judges before additional Judges can be appointed and so long as any post of existing Judges is not filled-up, there can be no question of appointing additional Judges to augment their strength.\n\nWhen there is a vacancy in the post of permanent Judge, it must first be filled up before any additional Judge can be appointed under clause (l) of Article 224.\n\nIt is therefore, necessary that the Central Government must periodically review the strength of permanent Judges in each High Court, so that there is a proper and adequate strength for the purpose of dealing with the normal institutions.\n\nSince there are large arrears pending almost in every High Court and it is not humanly possible to dispose of these arrears within a measurable distance 9f time even by appointment of additional Judges, we think it necessary that instead of appointing additional Judges for the purpose of disposing of the arrears, it would be desirable to increase the strength of permanent Judges because the arrears have come to stay and we do not think it is possible to wipe them out for a long period of time.\n\nWe are glad that towards the close of the arguments Mr. Mridul submitted to us a statement on behalf of Central Government assuring us that :\n\n\"The Union Government has decided to increase the number of posts of permanent Judges in the various High Courts keeping in view the load of work, the guidelines prescribed and other relevant considerations.\n\nIn fact in\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n1980 itself, on the basis of intitution, disposal and arrears of cases and the guidelines prescribed, the Governments of seven States where the problem was more acute, had been addressed to consider augmentation of the Judge strengths of their High Courts.\n\nIt has been decided that where necessary the guidelines prescribed will be suitably relaxed by taking into account local circumstances, the trend of litigation and any other special or relevant factors that may need consideration. The Union Government will\n\ntake up the matter with the various State Governments so that after consulting the Chief Justices of the High Courts, they expeditiously send proposals for the conversion of a substantial number of posts of Additional Judges into those of Permanent Judges.\"\n\nWe hope and trust that the Central Government will soon take the necessary steps to increase realistically the strength of permanent Judges in each High Court.\n\nOne last argument now remains: when an additional Judge is appointed, what should be the term for which his appointment is made.\n\nClause(!) of Article 224 provides that an additional Judge may be appointed for a period not exceeding two years. That is the outside limit prescribed by Article 224 clause (I) and it was therefore, contended by th learned Attorney General that appointment of an additional Judge can be made for any term, howsoever short it be, so long as it does not exceed two years.\n\nThe appointments ofO.N. Vohra, S.\\/. Kumar and S.B. Wad for three months and the appointments of some other additional Judges for six months were thus defended by the learned Attorney General as being within the scope and ambit of clause (!) of Article 224 We cannot accept this argument. It is no doubt true that clause(!) of Article 224 fixes the outer limit for the term for which an additional Judge may be appointed, but that has been done because there may be cases where the temporary increase in the business or the arrears of pending cases are so small that it may be possible to dispose them of by appointing additional Judges for a term less than two years.\n\nIf the temporary increase in the business or the arrears of pending cases can be disposed of within a shorter time, why should additional Judges be appointed for the full period of two years. That\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 567\n\nis why Parliament provided that an additional Judge may be appointed for a term not exceeding two years.\n\nRut when arrears of pending cases are so large that it would not be possible to dispose them of even within a period of ten years-and when we say ten years, we are making a very conservative estimate-what justification there can be for appointing additional Judges for a period of less than two years.\n\nThat would be plainly outside the scope of the power conferred under clause (I) of Article 224.\n\nWhen the arrears of pending cases are such that they cannot possibly be disposed of within a period of less than two years, addition1l Judges must be appointed for a term of two years and no less.\n\nMr. Mridul informed us towards the close of the arguments that the Union Government had decided that ordinarily further appointment of an additional Judge will not be made for a period of less than one year, but we cannot regard this statement as being fully in compliance with the constitutional requirement. The term for which an additional Judge is appointed must not be less than two years, unless the temporary increase in business or the arrears of pending cases are so small that they can rea>onably be disposed of within a shorter period, which, of course, today is only an idle dream in most of the High Courts.\n\nWe may also point out that an additional Judge cannot be appointed for a period of three months or six months in order to enable the Chief Justice of India or the Central Govenment to consider whether the additional Judge should be appointed for a further term or ns a permanent Judge. That is a matter on which the Chief Justice of India must come to his opinion well in time and th~ Government of India must a!so reach its decision sufficiently in advance so that the additional Judge would know quite sometime before his term is due to expire whether he is going to be appointed for a further term or is going to be discontinued.\n\nThere is no power in the Central Government to appoint an additional Judge for a short term in order to enable either the Chief Justice of India or the Central Government to make enquiries with a view to satisfying itself whether the additional Judge is fit and suitable for being appointed as an additional Judge or as a permanent Judge.\n\nWe are, therefore,. of the view that the Chief Justice of India acted under a mi.sconception of the true constitutional position when he recommended the appointment of O.N.\n\nVohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad for a period of six months and the Central Government was also in error in appointing them only for a period of three months.\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Circulcr Lei/er of the Law Minister:\n\nWe must then turn to consider the question whether the circular Jetter issued by the Law Minister was unconstitutional and void.\n\nNow obviously the circular letter could be assailed as unconstitutional and void only if it could be shown to be in violation of some constitutional or legal provision. There was admittedly no provision of law, at least none could be pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, which could be said to have infringed by the issuance of the circular letter, but the argument was that the circular letter offended against the provisions of clause (I) of Article 217 and clause (I) of Article 222.\n\nWe shall presently\n\neamine this argument but before we do so, it would be worthwhile first to analyse the terms of the circular letter in order to determine what is it that the circular letter seeks to achieve which is constitutionally objectionable or impermissible. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the circular letter must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in that letter and no extrinsic aid, such as a statement subsequently made by the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha, should be invoked for the purpose of arriving at its true interpretation. The decision of this Court in CommissionPr of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji.(1) was referred to in this connection and strong reliance was placed on the following observations made by this Court, namely, \"Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actions and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.\" This principle of interpretation is indisputably a valid principle and no exception can be taken against it, but we do not think it can have any application in the present case. because the circular letter addressed by the Law Minister is not in the natur~ of a public order made by a public authority.\n\nThe Law Minister is undoubtedly a member of the Cabinet and it is reasonable to assume that in issuing the circular Jetter he was acting on behalf of the Central Government but the circular letter does not appear to have been issued by the Law Minister in the exercise of any constitutional or legal power.\n\nThe circular letter has no constitutional or legal sanction behind it and non-compliance with the request contained in it would not proprio vigore entail any adverse consequence to the additional Judge or to the person recommended for initial appointment, for not complying\n\n(I) Ll952] SCR 135.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (B/wgwati, .'.) 569\n\nwith s'.lch request. It may be that because an additional Judge does not gi1e his consent to be appointed as l permanent Judge in another High Court, he may not be appointed as a permanent Judge 111 his own High Court and may be discontinued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term, though this is not within the intendment of the circular letter and is clearly impermissible, but in that event it would be his non-appointment as a permanent Judge or disconti nuance as an additional judge which would, if at all, give him a cause of action and not the circular letter asking for such consent.\n\nThe circular letter is a document without any legal force and does not by itself of its own force, create or alter any legal relationship or arrangement or prodiice any legal consequence or effect. It is no more than a letter addressed to the Chief Minister of e; ich State asking him to obtain the consent of the additional Judges as also of those recommended or to be recommended for initial appointment, for being appointed as Judges in a High Court outside the State.\n\nIt would therefore seem that the principle of interpretation enunciated by this Court in Gordhandas Bhanji's case (supra) cannot apply in the construction of the circular letter.\n\nWe must construe the circular letter from a common-sense point of view having regard to the clarification, if any, given by the author of the circular letter, namely, the Law Minister.\n\nThe circular letter has been reproduced by us in extenso in an earlier part of the judgment while stating the facts giving rise to the writ petitions. The first paragraph of the circular letter begins by saying that it has repeatedly been suggested to the Government over the years \"by several bodies and forums including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one-third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated.\" The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners criticised this statement by observing that since the names of the \"several bodies and forums\" referred to in this statement were not specifically mentioned, it was not possible to deal with their credentials or to examine the validity of the reasons on which their conclusion was based.\n\nBut Mr. Mridul appearing on behalf of the Law Minister convincingly dealt with this criticism and referred in detail to various bodies and torums which had from time to time expressed the view that one third of the Judges of every High Court\n\nSUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nshould as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. The earliest point of time when this view was expressed by a high powered body was in the year 195.5, when the States Reorganisation Commission in its report recommended that \"at least one-third of the number of Judges in the High Court of a State should consist of persons who are recruited from outside that State\" and this recommendation was guided by the consideration that \"the principal organs of State should be so constituted as to inspire confidence and to help in arresting parochial trends\". Then the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report presented in 1958 expressed the same view : \"The recent creation of various zones in the country and the efforts to treat the States forming part of these zones as one unit for various purposes would. we hope, lead to the States forming part of each zone to be the recruiting ground for appointments to the High Court from the members of the Bar in these States. It is hoped that in th rs manner the expectation of the States Reorganisation Commission that atleast one-third of the High Court Judges would be persons drawn from outside the State will be fulfilled.\" There was also a discussion on this proposal, namely, wl. ether one-third of the number of Judges in each High Court should be from outside the State, at the Chief Justices Conference held in March, I S65 and out of 15 Chief Justices of High Courts who attended tbe Conference, 8 were against the proposal, 6 were in favour and the remaining Chief Justice also supported the proposal, but with this qualification that the one-third number of Judges should be worked out by initial appointment.\n\nChief Justice Subba Rao also in his letter dated 6th October, 1966, expressed the view that it would be better to bring Judges from outside at the time of initial appointment. Then came the Report of the Study Team of the Admini&trative Reforms Commission submitted in 1967 and this Report also examined the question of appointment of Judges in High Courts and came to the view that the recommendation of the States Reorganisation Commission should be implemented so that as far as possible one-third of the number of Judges in a High Court are from outside. The Study Team observed that a serious effort to implement this recommendation \"will make its own contribution to efficiency, independence and national integration.\" The same question once again came up for consideration before the Law Commission in the year 1978 and the Law Commission sent out a questionnaire to various individuals and associations for the purpose of eliciting their views inter alia in regard to the suggestion that\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 571\n\nthere should be a convention according to which one-third of the Judges in each High Court should be from another State.\n\nMr. S.V. Gupte, who was then Attorney General of India and who is known for bold and courageous expression of his views, stated in answer to the questionnaire that he was wholly in favour of having one-third the number of Judges in each High Court from outside the State \"as that alone may perh1ps secure some kind of freedom from bias on grounds of caste and class consideration or any close association with local people.\" The Bar Council of India also in its reply to the questionnaire supported the proposal of one-third Judges in a High Court being from outside the State. It is interesting to note-and this completely establishes the bona fides of the Law Minister in issuing the circular letter-that even as far back as 26th February, 1979, when the political party to which the Law Minister belongs was not in power, the Law Minister stated clearly and unequivocally that he agreed with the view expressed by the Law Commission that one third of the Judges in each High Court must be from outside the State because this would achieve better national integration in the field of judidary. Whilst expressing this view, it is significant to note that the Law Minister made it clear that he would not support transfer of a High Court Judge \"if it is based on extraneous considerations.\" Then followed the Eightieth Report of the Law Commission presided over by Mr. Justice H.R. Khanna. This Report was submitted to the Government of India in August 1973 and in this Report, the Law Commission expressed its agreement with the recommendation made by the earlier Law Commission in its Fourteenth Re;:iort, namely, that \"there should be a convention according to which one third of the Judges in each High Court should be from another State\" and added that this should normally be done through the process of initial appointments and not by transfers. The Law Commission gave the folio wing reasons for taking this view :\n\n\"Evolving such a convention would, ir. our opmton, not only help in the process of national integration but would also improve the functioning of various High Courts.\n\nIt would secure on the Bench of each High Court the presence of a number of Judges who would not be swayed by local considerations or affected by issues which may rouse local passions and emotions. As observed by us in one of our earlier Reports, one of the essential things for the due administration of justice is not only the capacity of the Judges to bring a dis passionate approach to cases\n\n\nhandled by them, but also to inspire a fee'ing in all concerned that dispassionate approach would underlie their decision. quite often, cases which arouse strong emotional sentiments and regional feelings come up before courts of law. To handle such cases, we need judges who not only remain unaffected by local sentiments and regional feelings, but also appear to be so.\n\nNone would be better suited for this purpose than judges hailing from other States.\n\nIt is a common feeling amongst old lawyers that apart from cases with political overtones, the English judges showed a sense of great fairness and brought a dispassionate approach in the disposal <'f judicial cases handled by them. We in India are in the fortunate position of having a vast country.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no difficulty in having a certain percentage of judges who hail from other States. The advantages gained by having persons from other States as judges would be much greater compared with any disadvantage which might result therefrom.\"\n\nThis question was also discussed at the Meelings of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Law Ministry held on 7th June, 1980, 24th July 1980 and 17th December, 1980 and the unanimous view taken by the members of the Consultative Committee belonging to different political parties was that at least one third of the Judges in a High Court should be from outside the State. The Chief Justice of India also in a communication addressed to the Law Minister in March, 1978, expressed his view favouring outside appointments to High Courts and in a letter addressed by him to the Law Minister on 18th March, 1981, he opined that \"it\n\nis high time that at least a few of the new appointments to every High Court were made from outside the State.\" He also observed in a communication addressed in April 1981 that \"he had publicly proclaimed his opinion more than once that at least one third of the new appointments should be from amongst persons from outside the particular States.\" The National Seminar on Judicial Appointments and Transfers convened by the Bar Council of India in Ahmedabad from 17th to 19th October 1980 also yielded the same consensus view, namely :\n\n\"The ideal of having one third of High Court Judges from outside the State helps promotion of national integration and the preservation of a unified judicial system.\n\ns.P. GUPTA I'. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nHowever, it is desirable that this composition of the High Court should be accomplished by way of initial appointments rather than by transfers. Furthermore, in implementation of this formula care must be taken to preserve the\n\nlegitiate representation of States and t.o maintain the sanctioned strength to each State.\"'\n\nIt will thus be seen that, barring perhaps the Associations of Bombay Lawyers, all high powered bodies, forums and associations, which have anything to do with judicial system, have consistently over the years taken the view that one third of the number\n\nof Judges in each High Court should be from outside the State.\n\nC The unanimity of view has been so complete and overwhelming that it is impossible to contend that the policy of having one third of the Judges in every High Court from outside the State, which the Law Minister is trying to implement by issuing the circular letter, is ill-conceived or malafide or subversive of the independence of the judiciary. So long as the policy is evolved by the Government D after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and it is not otherwise unconstitutional, the Court cannot pronounce upon the wisdom of the policy or strike it down because it does not appeal to the court. Here the policy of having one third of the number of Judges in each High Court from outside the State has been adopted after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and, in fact, it has E his complete approval and the Law Minister did not therefore act unconstitutionally or illegally in relying upon this policy in the first paragraph of the circular letter.\n\nThe circular letter after referring to th~ suggestion made by F several bodies and forums that one third 'of che Jud!!eS of the High Court should, as far as possible, be from outside the State, pro ceeded to add: \"Somehow no start could be made in the past in this direction\". The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners assailed the correctness of this statement and contended that an attempt was made during the emergency to transfer perma G nent Judges of one High Court to another and the transfers were sought to be defended by the Government of India on the same plea of national integ:ation and removal of narrow parochial tendencies and therefore it was not correct on the part of the Law Minister to state that no start could be made in the past for imple- H menting the policy of having one third Judges of the High Court from outside the State.\n\nNow it is difficult to appreciate how this state-\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA ment in the circular letter could be branded as incorrect for the reason that the transfers effected during the emergency were sought to be defended on the plea of national integration and removal of narrow parochial tendencies.\n\nIn the first place, what the circular Jetter seeks to do is to obtain the consent of the additional Judges, not for transfer to rnme other High Court, but for appointment as permanent Judges in another High Court, whereas what took place during the emergency were transfers of High Court Judges from one High Court to another.\n\nSecondly, it is true that the transfers of High Court Judges made during the emergency were sought to be defended by the Government of India on the plea of national integration and c\n\nremoval of narrow parochial tendencies, but this defence was found by the Court in Union of India v. Sankalchand Sheth(1) to be false.\n\nChandrachud, J., as he then was, observed in his judgment in that case : \"I would only like to add that the record of this case does not bear out the claim that any one of the 16 High Court Judges was transferred in order to further the cause of national integration Far from it.\" What was held by the Court was that the transfers, of High Court Judges during the emergency were made not for the purpose of furthering the cause of national integration but by way of punishment. The Law Minister was therefore right in stating in the first paragraph of the circular letter that no start has been made in the past in the the direction of having one third Judges in a High Court from outside the State and that is why he was taking the initiative in the matter.\n\nComing to the merits of the challenge against the validity of the circular letter, the principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that the circular letter required the additional Judges as also those whose names were recommended or might in future be recommended for initial appointment, to give their consent for being appointed as Judges outside the State and obtaining of such consent in advance would reduce the consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court in which the additional Judge or the propective Judge is to be appointed and the Governor of the State illusory and an empty formality and this would be violative of Article 217 clause (t) which provides that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court can be made only after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis contention is\n\n(I) [1978] I SCR 423.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 575\n\nalso, in our opinion, without force and must be rejected. It is clear A from the language of clause ( 1) of Article 217 that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court can be made by the President only after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India and, according to the interpretation placed by us, consultation within the meaning of this Article means full and effective consultations with each of the three B constitutional functionaries after placing all relevant material before them.\n\nNow, if a person who is an additional Judge in the High Court in one State or who is practising as a lawyer in that State is to be appointed as a Judge in another State, then obviously his willingness to be so appointed would be a highly relevant factor and that would have to be ascertained and placed before the three constitutional functionaries who are required to be consulted before an appointment can be made.\n\nIt is obvious that the President cannot appoint a person to be a Judge of a High Court without first ascer taining his willingness to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court and some one has to make an inquiry in that behalf in order to ascertain his willingness. It is only if the person concerned is willing to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court that the question\n\nwould arise of processing his name and consulting the three consti tututional functionaries in regard to the appointment of such person.\n\nThis inquiry has to be made before the process of consultation can start and the Law Minister therefore by addressing the circular letter requested the Chief Minister of each State to make this inquiry.\n\nIt is true that the Law Minister did not state in so many terms in the circular letter that the Chief Minister may make this inquiry through the Chief Justice of the High Court but that was clearly implicit in the circular letter, because a copy of the circular letter wa.s also sent.to the Chief Justice of each High Court with the endorsement' \"for necessary action\" and moreover it must be presumed that the necessary inquiry would be made by the Chief Minister only through the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\nThe Chief Minister would not be expected to contact directly the addi. tional Judges or the persons recommended for initial appointment, for the purpose of ascertining whether they are willing to be appointed as Judges in any other High Court. Since the Chief Justice of the High Court is the head of the judiciary in the State, the Chief Minister would invariably route his i11quiry through the Chief Justice of the High Court and request the Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain whether any of the additional Judges or persons recommended for initial appointment are willing to be appointed to a\n\nE ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1982) 2 S.C.ll.\n\nHigh Court outside the State. This inquiry could have been made by the Law Minister by writing directly to the Chief Justice of each High Court but, instead of doing so, the Law Minister chose to address his inquiry to the Chief Minister of each State, presumably because he thought that it would be more appropriate for him to make this inquiry through the Chief Minister of the State rather than by direct communication with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Law Minister had to make this inquiry because without information as to whether an additional Judge or a person recommended for initial appointment was willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court, his name could not be processed for appointment as a Judge in that High Court.\n\nThis was the first step required to be taken and it was only after the willingness of the additional Judge or p.!rson recommended for initial appointment, to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court was ascertained that the Law Minister could place the proposal for appointment of such person as a Judge for the consideration of the Chief Justice of that High Court, the Governor of the State in which that High Court is situated and the Chief Justice oflndia. It would then be for the Chief Justice of that High Court to consider whether the person proposed for appointment is fit to be appointed in his High Court and whether he would recommend him for such appointment. On this point, however, a serious objection was raised on behalf of the petitioners and a question was posed as to how the Chief Justice of a High Court can make any recommendation in regard to a person proposed to be appointed as a Judge in his High Court unless he knows such person and has seen his work either at the Bar or in the High Court or district court and is therefore in a position to assess his suitability for being apponinted as a Judge.\n\nThe argument was that tbe Chief Justice of the High Court in which the appointment is proposed to be made has a constitutional duty to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of the person proposed to be appointed and suitability would naturally include competence, character and integrity and how can the Chief Justice give an honest opinion in regard to the suitability of such person \\\\hen he does not know him at all and has not even had an opportunity of seeing his work. We do not think this argument is well founded; the difficulty pointed out on behalf of the petitioners is more imaginary than real. The Chief Justice of the High Court where the appointment is proposed to be made need not blindly and unquestioningly accept the proposal made by the Law Minister. The Chief Justice of the High Court can make his own inquiries in regard to the suitability of the person proposed for appointment\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 571\n\neither through the Chief Justice of the High Court where such person is working as an additional Judge or district Judge or practising as a lawyer or through other sources such as the Advocate General of that State. The Chief Justice of the High Court can also enquire from the Governor of the State where the person proposed to be appointed is working as an additional Judge or district Judge or practising as a lawyer and find out what are his antecedents and whether he possesses chara.Jter and integrity. The social philosophy of the person proposed to be appointed as also his attitudes and habits of mind can also be ascertained by the Chief Justice of the High Court by making inquiries from the Chief Justice of the High Court where such person is working as an additional Judge or district Judge or practising as a lawyer as also from the Governor of that\n\nState and diverse other sources. It is not at all difficult for the Cnief Justice of the High Court where an appointment is proposed to be made to gather the requisite information about the person proposed to be appointed so as to enable him to make up his mind in regard to the suitability of such person for appointment jas a Judge. May we ask what happens when a person is recommended for appointment as a Judge in a High Court by the Chief of India? There have been quite a number of instances where this has happened. There have been cases where the Chief Justice of India has recommended members of the Supreme Court Bar for appointment as Judges in different High Cou• ts and equally there have been cases where members of the Income-tax Tribunal as also persons working in the legal department of the Government of India have been recommended by the Chief Justice of India for appointment as High Court Judges. Jn such cases, the Cnief\n\nJustice of the High Court where the appointment is proposed to be made, would naturally gather the requisite information about the person proposed to be appointed from the Chief Justice of India and other sources available to him and decide whether such person is suitable for being appointed as a Judge in his High Court. He may agree with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India or he may disagree with it. In fact, there have been cases, though very few, where the Chief Justice of the High Court has declined to accept the person proposed by the Chief Justice of India for appointment as a Judge in his High Court. Merely because a recommendation emanates from the Chief Jutice of India, it does not mean that consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court where the person concerned is proposed to be appointed, would be reduced to a mockery. The proposal for appointment of a person as a Judge may be initiated by the Central Government or by any of the three\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nconstitutional functionaries required to be consulted and from whomsoever the proposal emanates, the other constitutional functionaries are required to be consulted in regard to it on the basis of full and identical material.\n\nWhen the Chief Justice of the High Court is informed that a particular person is willing to be appointed as a Judge in bis High Court and the proposal to appoint him as a Judge may therefore be considered, the Chief Justice of the High Court can ask the Central Government or the Chief Justice of India, whosoever has made the proposal, to place before him all the relevant material in regard to the person proposed to be appointed and also gather the necessary material from the Chief Justice of the other High Court as also from other sources available to him and then clecide whether to recommend such person or not.\n\nSo also the Governor of the State where the appointment is proposed to be made, can make the necessary inquiries and after considering all relevant material decide what attitude it should adopt in regard to the proposed appointment. The Chief , Justice of India also would have a very important role to play in the process of consultation. Before giving his opinion in regard to the proposed appointment, the Chief Justice of India may enquire directly from the person proposed to be appointed whether he is 1 really willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court and whether the consent given by him is genuine and free.\n\nThe person proposed to be appointed may also point out to the Chief Justice of India his problems and difficulties in accepting appointment in the other High Court and the Chief Justice of India will consider all this material before he gives his opinion to the President. The Chief Justice of India will also have to consider whether the proposed appointment is bonafide and in public interest or it is being made only with a view to favouring the person concerned so that by appointment in another High Court, he may get some benefit which he would not get in the High Court of his own State. The Chief Justice of India may in such a case refuse to agree to the proposed appointment, even though the person proposed to be appointed has consented to it.\n\nThese and many other relevant considerations will have to be taken into account by the Chief Justice of India before be gives bis opinion to the President in regard to the proposed appointment. We therefore fail to see how the obtaining of the consent of the person proposed for appointment, in advance for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court can possibly have the effect of reducing consultation with the Chief Justice of India to a mockery or making it ineffective so as to be violative of clause (~) of Article 2 J 7.\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 579\n\nThe next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the circular letter held out a veiled threat to the additional Judges that if they do not consent to their appointment as Judges in a High Court other than their own, they may not be appointed as permanent Judges at all and may be dropped on the expiration of their term of office. The petitioners relied on the use of the word \"obtain\" in the circular letter and submitted that the use of this word conveyed a sense of compelled obedience with an implied threat that failure to give consent may entail adverse consequences. whether such adverse consequences actually flowed or not was not material, contended the petitioners, but what was disturbing was that there was an implied threat of such adverse consequences and that was subversive of the independence of the judiciary. Moreover, consent obtained under such threat of advers~ consequences could not be be regarded as valid consent in Jaw because coment to be valid must be free and must not be induced by threat, coercion or duress.\n\nNow we fail to see how from the mere use of the word, \"obtain' in the circular letter, this entire edifice of an argument that there was an implied threat to the additional Judges that if they do not give their consent for being aopointed as Judges in another High Court, they would be visited with adverse consequences, can be built up. The word \"obtain\" is a transitive verb and it is obvious that when the Chief Minister of each State was asked by the Law Minister by issuing the circular letter to obtain the consent of the additional Judges for being appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court, what was meant was that the Chief Minister should obtain the consent of each additional Judge if he was willing to give such consent. It is clear as a matter of plain grammar that one person can obtain something from another provided that other is willing to give it. The use of the word 'obtain' cannot possibly be construed to mean that the person from whom the consent is to be obtained must be coerced into giving it.\n\nTo read the word 'obtain' in the circular Jetter as meaning that the Chief Minister was expected to coerce the additional Judges into giving their consent or as conveying an implied threat to the additional Judges that if they do not give their consent they might be dropped as additional Judges on the expiration of their term, would, in our opinion, be nothing short of torturing out of the language used in the circular letter, a meaning which the language does not bear and which could not possibly have been intended by the Law Minister.\n\nThe petitioners also sought to bolster up their case that circular letter held out a veiled threat to the additional Judges by relying on\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS f[l 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe statement contained in the circular letter that the giving of consent by additional Judges would not necessarily involve any commitment on the part of the Central Government to appoint them as permanent Judges.\n\nBut we do not see how this statement can be regarded as a veiled threat that if an additional Judge dots not give his consent for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court, he may not be appointed as a permanent Judge at all and may be discontined on the expiration of his term of office. We do not think it is possible to read any such sinister implication in this statement contained in the circular letter. This statement merely reiterated the legal position, too well-settled to admit of any doubt or debate, that merely because a person has given bis consent to be appointed as a Judge in a High Court, it does not mean that he would necessarily be appointed as a Judge. He may not be appointed at all, if after consultation with the three constitutional functionaries as provided in Article 217 clause(!), it is decided not to appoint him.\n\nEven if it is decided to appoint him, he may not be appointed as a Judge in the High Court of his choice because the Chief Justice of that High Court or the Governor of that State or the Chief Justice of India may object to his appointment in that High Court.\n\nHe must not therefore remain under the impression that merely because he bas given his consent for being appointed as a Judge outside his State and expressed his preference as regards the High Courts where he would like to be appointed, he would necessarily be appointed as a Judge and in the High Court of his choice.\n\nFar from this being a threat to the additional Judges, it was a clear intimation to them that they should not be under any wrong impression that giving of consent would ensure them appointment as a permanent Judge and in the High Court of their choice. Whether to appoint an additional Judge as a permanent Judge or to continue him as an additional Judge for a further term or to discontinue him on the expiration of bis term would be decided in accordance with the procedure laid down in clause (l) of Article 217 and giving of consent would not be a factor tilting the balance in favour of the additional Judge giving such consent. We are also not impressed by the argument urged on behalf of the petitioners that the omission to state in the circular letter that if an additional Judge does not give his consent to be appointed in any other High Court, it would be held against him in considering his appointment as a permanent Judge, conveyed an implied threat that failure to give such consent would be held against the additional Judge and he might be discontinued as an additional Judge on that account. It is difficult to spell out any such implied\n\nthreat on a plain reading of the circular letter.\n\nOn the contrary it\n\n....\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 581\n\nis significant to note that the circular letter did not state, as it well might have, if such was the intention of the Law Minister, that if consent is not given by an additional Judge for being appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court, he would run the risk of being discontinued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term. It would be quite open to an additional Judge under the circular letter to say that he is not willing to be appointed in any other High Court except his own and even so, when his term as an additional Judge expires, he could still be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, there being nothing in the circular letter against it and the procedure set out in clause (I)\n\no:· Article 217 would then be followed. An additional Judge, as w! have already pointed out above, is entitled to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge in his own High Court and such appointment cannot be refused to him on the ground he has not given his consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court.\n\nSuch a ground for discontinuing an additional Judge on the expiration of his term would be a wholly irrelevant ground and we do not think it could ever have been intended by the Law Minister consistently with the constitutional requirement that an additional Judge who does not give his consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge outside his High Court should on that account be discontinued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term. It would not be right to read the circular letter with a suspicious eye as if it was designed to cow down the additional Judges into submission by holding out an implied threat to them. There are, in fact, quite a few Judges who have not given their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court and no adverse c:insequence has ensued to them.\n\nWe do not think that our additional Judges are made of such weak stuff that they would submit to any supposed threats by the Executive and give their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court out of fear that they might be discontinued as additional Judges if they do not give such consent.\n\nThere was also one other contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that to require a person whose name is to be recommended for initial appointment as a Judge to give his consent for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court would be to introduce an irrelevant qualification for the appointment of a Judge.\n\nThe argument was that to obtain such\n\n\nconsent from a person whose name is to be recommended for appointment would be to introduce a requirement for appointing a Judge which is not prescribed by the Constitution and the obtaining of such consent would therefore be unconstitutional. It is, with the greatest respect to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, extremely difficult for us to appreciate this argument.\n\nWhen the name of a person is being considered for appointment as a Judge because he is regarded as suitable for such appointment, we fail to see why he cannot be asked whether he is willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court. It is for him to decide whether or not to give his consent for such appointment. He may very well say that he is not agreeable to be appointed as a Judge in any High Court other than his own, but if, in the exercise of his own volition, he gives his consent for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court, it is difficult to see how it can ever be contended that by oMaining such consent, an irrelevant qualification for appointment of a Judge has been introduced. It is not as if a person who does not give his consent for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court would necessarily be refused appointment in his own High Court. It is significant to note that, in fact, even after the date of the circular letter, quite a few new appointments have been made in different High Courts of persons either practising as lawyers in those High Courts or working as District Judges under those High Courts.\n\nThe last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the circular letter was really an attempt on the part of the Government to transfer Judges from one High Court to another by circumventing the decision of this Court in Sa11kalchand Sheth's case (supra). This contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is wholly unfounded and no amount of legal causistry or ingenuity can sustain it. It is difficult to appreciate how the circular letter can at all be interpreted as an attempt to bring about transfer of Judges from one High Court to another. 1 he circular letter deals with two categories of persons: one is the category of persons who are recommended or may in future be recommended for initial appointment as Judges and the other is the category of additional Judges who are appointed for a period of two years or less.\n\nSo far as the first category of persons is concerned, it is impossible to contend and with all his ingenuity even Mr. Seervai appearing on behalf of the petitioners could not argue, that when a person who is recommends.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 583\n\ned or proposed to be recommended for initial appointment as a Judge is asked whether he is willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court, any transfer is involved in such process.\n\nWhen such person is not a sitting Judge in any High Court and is appointed for the first time in another High Court, it is difficult to see how he can be said to be transferred.\n\nThe transfer contem plated in Article 222 clause (I) is not a mere act of physical locomotion or transfer of residence from one place to another, but it is an act by which a Judge in one High Court is transferred as a Judge of another High Court. Equally there is no transfer involved where an additional Judge is, on the expiration ot his term, appointed as an additional Judge in another High Court or is appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. It is no doubt true that by reason of his appointment as an additional Judge or permanent Judge in another High Court he has physically to go to that High Court, but it is not while being a Judge of one High Court that he goes over as a Judge of the other High Court. His appointment as an additional Judge of one High Court comes to an end and he is appointed afresh as an additional or permanent Judge in another High Court. It is by virtue of a fresh appointment that he becomes a Judge, whether additional or permanent, of another High Court and he is nut transferred from one High Court to another within the meaning of clause (1) of Article 222. If the contention of the petitioners were correct, it would not be necessary, while appointing an additional or permanent Judge in another High Court, to follow the procedure set out in clause ( l) of Article 217 and to consult the Chief Justice of the latter High Court and the Governor of that State as required by that article and it would be possible to appoint such person as an additional or permanent Judge in another High Court after consulting only the Chief Justice of India under clause (1) of Article\n\n222. This proposition has only to be stated in order to be rejected; it would clearly amount to circumventing the provisions of clause (J) of Article 217.\n\nTake for example a case where a pmon who is an additional Judge in a High Courr for a period of two years is, on the expiration of his term of two years, appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court. Can such appointment of a permanent Judge be made in the other High Court without consulting the Chief Justice of that High Court and the Governor of that State under clause (I) of Article 217? There is in such a case no transfer at all; it is a case of fresh appointment made in the other High Court and that can be done only after going through the procedure set out in clause (I) of Article 217.\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nMr. Seervai, appearing on behalf of the petitioners however relied strongly on a Speech made by the Law Minister in the Lok\n\nSabha on 16th April, 1981 where at columns 271 and 274 of the Lok Sabha Debates, the Law Minister himself had used the expression 'transfer' while speaking about the circular letter. The learned counsel contended that the use of the expression'transfer' by the Law Minister himself supported his argument that what the circular letter sought to do was to transfer Judges from one High Court to another. This contention is in our opinion, wholly unsustainable and it is no better than relying on a broken reed. It is undoubtedly true that in columns 271 and 274, the Law Minister used the expression 'transfer' or 'transferred' while referring to the circular letter, but one cannot fasten upon a stray use of a loose expression for the purpose of determining what is the true effect of the circular letter.\n\nThe Speech of the Law Minister has to be read as a whole and if it i's so read, it is clear that at more than one place, the Law Minister made it clear that what was contemplated by the circular letter was \"not a case of transfer but a case of an appointment under Article 217\" vide Col. 273.\n\nThe Law Minister also reiterated in col. 223 that \"in so far as additional Judges are concerned, the circular letter seeks to obtain their consent to their appointment as permanent Judges to High Courts outside and these would be appointments under Article 217\". Then again in col. 270, the Law Minister clarified that the appointment of an additional Judge as a permanent Judge could also be termed as an initial appointment.\" The expression 'transfer' or 'transferred' in columns 271 and 274 was obviously used in a loose sense meaning physical locomotion. It must be remembered that this expression happened to be used by the Law Minister in an extempore speech made on the floor of the House and not in a document or letter prepared after much care and deliberation. No undue reliance can therefore be placed on behalf of the petitioners on the use of the expression 'transfer' or 'transferred' in the speech of the Law Minister.\n\nMr. Seervai also relied strongly on the circumstance that three associations of lawyers in Bombay had all taken the view that the circular letter contemplated transfer of additional Judges and sought their consent to\n\nsuch transfer.\n\nBut this circumstance has very little relevance in the interpretation of the circular letter for it is not for the lawyers practising in a particular High Court to construe the circular letter but is for this Court to determine what is the true meaning of that document. We are clearly of the view-in fact we find it impossible to take a different view-that what was contemplated by the circular letter was not transfer of additional Judge from one High Court to\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bizagwati, J.) 585\n\nanother and it did not therefore, have to satisfy the requirements of clause (I} of Article 222.\n\nBut quite apart from this consideration, even if the view be taken that what the circular letter sought to achieve was transfer of additional Judges from one High Court to another. it is difficult to see how by obtaining consent of the additional Judges in advance, the Law Minister would be circumventing the majority decision in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra). The majority view in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) was that a Judge can be transferred from one High Court to another without his consent, but the transfer must be after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India and it must not be by way of punishment but must be in public interest.\n\nTherefore, obviously it would be of no help to the Law Minister to obtain the consent of an add.itional Judge in advance to be appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court, because despite such consent, the additional Judge cannot be appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court without full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India and according to the majority decision in Sankalchand Sheth' s case {supra), the opinion given by the Chief Justice of India would be entitled to the greatest weight and any departure from it would have to be justified by the Central Government on strong and cogent grounds.\n\nIn such a case, even where the consent of the additional Judge has been obtained in advance, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider whether it is in public interest to appoint the additional Judge as a permanent Judge in another High Court and the consent obtained in advance would not pre-empt the consultative exercise with the Chief Justice of India. The advance consent obtained from the additional Judge would have no meaning so far as the Chief Justice of India is concerned, because irrespectiveof whether the additional Judge has given his consent or not, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider whether it would be in public interest to allow the additional Judge to be appointed as a permanent Judge in the other High Court. Therefore, even on the assumption that the appointment of an additional Judge as a permanent Judge in another High Court amounts to transfer, which of course we emphatically repudiate, it is difficult to see how the circular letter can be construed as an attempt to circumvent the majority decision in Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra).\n\nWe do not therefore find any coastitutional or legai i:1J.rmity\n\n\nI 1982] 2 S.C.R..\n\nor any abuse or misuse of authority on the part of the Law Minister in issuing the circular letter. The circular letter does not violate the provisions of clause (I) of Article 217 or clause (I) of Article 222 nor does it offend against any other constitutional or legal provision and the challenge against the validity of the circular letter must, therefore, fail.\n\nWe may, however, while affirming the validity of the circular letter, make it clear that since an additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term, and in case of a vacancy in a permanent post, for appointment as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, he cannot be discontinued as an addditional Judge on the ground that he has not given his consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. Such a ground for discontinuing an additional Judge would be a wholly irrelevant ground and if, on the expiration of his original term, an additional Judge is discontinued on any such ground, the decision of the President discontinuing him would be unconstitutional and void and the Union of India would be liable to be directed to recon sider his case on the basis of relevant considerations after excluding the irrelevant ground.\n\nDisclosure of documents : Privilege.\n\nWe now come to a very important question which was agitated before us at great length and which exercised our minds considerably before we could reach a decision. The question related to the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-appointment of O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar as additional Judges.\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioners and S.N. Kumar argued before us with great passion and vehemence that these documents were relevant to the inquiry before the Court and they should be directed to be disclosed by the Union of India. This claim of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar for disclosure was resisted by the Solicitor General of India on behalf of the Union of India and Mr. Mridul on behalf of the Law Minister. They contended that so far as 0. N. Vohra was concerned his case stood on an entirely different footing from that of S.N. Kumar since, unlike\n\nS. N.\n\nKumar who allied himself with the petitioners and actively participated in the arguments almost as if he was petitioner, O.N. Vohra though made a party respondent to the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde did not appear and participate\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 587\n\nin the proceedings or seek any relief from the Court in regard to his continuance as an additional Judge.\n\nMr. Mridul on behalf of the Law Minister informed us that in fact O.N. Vohra had started practice in the Delhi High Court and his case could not be con, idered by us when he himself did not want any relief So far as the case of S.N. Kumar was concerned the learned Solicitor General on, behalf of the Union of India conceded that the documents of which disclosure was sought on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar were undoubtedly relevant to the issues arising bdore the Court, but contended-and in this contention he was supported by Mr. Mridul on behalf of the Law Minister-that they were privileged against disclosure for a two-fold reason.\n\nOne was that they formed part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Presi- . dent and hence by reason of Article 74 clause (2) of the Constitution the Court was precluded from ordering their disclosure and looking into them and the other was that they were protected against disclosure under section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act since their disclosure would injure public interest. We propose to consider these rival arguments in the Order in which we have set them out, first in regard to O.N. Vohra and then in regard to S.N. Kumar.\n\nSo far as O.N. Vohra is concerned, it is apparent that though he was joined as a party respondent to the writ petition filed by V.M. Tarkunde, he did not choose to appear and take part in the proceedings. He did not even file an appearance, presumbly because he was not interested in wresting back the office of an additional Judge through a judicial writ. He adopted a commendable attitude consistent with the dignity of the high office which he had the , privilege to hold for over two years and scorned to be a party to any litigative adventure for getting back the office of a High Court Judge.\n\nHe took the view that the office of a High Court Judge is no mean office for which one may canvas, lobby or fight but it is a high position which can only be offered and which one should regard as an honour to be invited to fill and if for any reason, justifiable or not, the Government chooses not to offer it to the deserving person, it may result in detriment to public interest for which the Government may have to account to the people through their elected representatives, but the person concerned should not litigate his claim to this high office.\n\nThat would lower the dignity of the office by making it the subject matter of litigativecontroversy. It was presumably for this reason that O.N. Vohra did not appear in the writ petition or seek any relief from\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe Court in regard to his continuance as an additional Judge.\n\nIn fact, we are told, 0.N. Vohra has already started practice in the Delhi High Court. Now if O.N. Vohra has not come forward to seek any relief from the Court and is not claiming that he should be deemed to have been appointed a permanent Judge or that he should be reappointed as an additional Judge for a further term, it is difficult to see how the Court can be called upon to examine bis case for the purpose of determining whether he was wrongly discontinued as an additional Judge. We have taken a broad and liberal view in regard to locus standi and held that any public spirited advocate acting bonafide and not for private gain or personal profit or political motivation or any other oblique consideration, may file a writ petition in the High Court challenging an unconstitutional or illegal action of the Government or any other constitutional authority prejudicially affecting the administration of justice and in such writ petition he may claim relief not for himself personally but for tho'e who are the direct victims of such unconstitutional or illegal action, because granting such relief to them would repair the injury caused to administration of justice. But the persons for whom the relief is sought must be ready to accept it; they must appear and make it known that they are claiming such relief; it cannot be thrust upon them unless they wish it. If, in the present case, O.N. Vohra does not seek to go back as an additional Judge through judicial intervention, the petitioners cannot contend that he must still be continued as an additional Judge irrespective of his inclination. The relief sought by the petitioners being primarily for the benefit of O.N. Vohra, it is for O.N. Vohra to decide whether he would have it and if he does not want it, it would be a fruitless exercise for the Court to determine whether the decision not to appoint him as an additional Judge was unconstitutional and he should have been appointed as an additional Judge for a further term. The Court does not decide issues in the abstract. It undertakes determination of a controversy provided it is necessary in order to give relief to a party and if no relief can be given because none is sought, the Court cannot take upon itself a theoretical exercise merely for the purpose of deciding academic issues, Lowsoever important they may be. The Court cannot embark upon an inquiry whether there was any misuse or abuse of power in a particular case, unless relief is sought by the person who is said to have been wronged by such misuse or abuse of power. The Court cannot take upon itself the role of a commission of inquiry-a knight errent roaming at will with a view to destroying evil wherever it is found. It was for this reason that we held that the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 589\n\ncorrespondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to nonappointment of O.N. Vohra was not relevant to the issues arising for determination in the writ petition and the Union of India could not be required to disclose it.\n\nThat takes us to the case of S.N. Kumar which stands on a totally different footing, because S.N. Kumar has appeared in the writ petition, filed an affidavit supporting the writ petition and contested, bitterly and vehemently, the decision of the Central Government not to continue him as an additional Judge for a further term. Since S.N. Kumar has claimed relief from the Court !ll regard to his continuance as an additional Judge, an issue is squarely joined between the petitioners and S.N. Kumar on the one hand and the Union of India on the other which requires to be determined for the purpose of deciding whether relief as claimed in the writ petition can be granted to S.N. Kumar. Now, as we have already pointed out while discussing the scope and ambit of A :ticle 217, there are only two grounds on which the decision of the Central Government not to continue an additional Judge for a further term can be assailed and they are, firstly, that there has been no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the constitutional authorities required to be consulted under that Article and, secondly, that the decision of the Central Goverment is based on irrelevant grounds. It was on both these grounds that the petitioners and\n\nS.N. Kumar impugned the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term and there can be no doubt that the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India would be relevant qua both these grounds.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India and Mr. Mridul on behalf of the Law Minister, with the usual candour and franknss always shown by them, did not dispute the relevance of these documents to the issues arising in the writ petition in regard to S.N. Kumar, but contended that they were protected against disclosure under Article 74 clause (2) of the Constitution as also section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. This contention raised an extremely important question in the area of public Jaw particularly in the context of the open society which we are trying to evolve as part of the democratic structure and it caused great concern to us, for it involved a clash between two competing aspects of public interest, but ultimately after inspecting these documents for ourselves and\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA giving our most anxious thought to this highly debatable question, we decided to reject the claim for protection against disclosure and directed that these d\"cumen ts be disclosed by the Union of India.\n\nWe now proceed to give our reas ons for this decision taken by us by a majority of six against one .\n\n. B\n\nThe first ground on which protection against disclosure was claimed on behalf of the Union of India and the Law Minister wa's based on Article 74 clause (2) of the Constitution. It is clear from the constitutional scheme that under our Constitution the President is a constitutional Head and is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This was the position even before the amendment of clause (I) of A :ticle 74 by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act 1976, but the position has been made absolutely explicit by the amendment and Article 74 clause (I) as amended now reads as under :\n\n\"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions act in accordance with such advice.\"\n\nWhat was judicially interpreted even under the unamended Article 74 clause (1) has now been given Parliamentary recognition by the constitutional amendment. There can therefore be no doubt that the decision of the President under Article 224 read with Article 217 not to appoint an additional Judge for a further term is really a decision of the Council of Ministers and the reasons which have weighed with the Council of Ministers in taking such decision would necessarily be part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President.\n\nNow clause (2) of Article 74 provides :\n\n\"The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into any Court.\"\n\nThe Court, cannot, having regard to this constitutional prov1s10n, embark upon an inquiry as to whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to tne President and since the reasons which have prevailed with the Council of Ministers in taking a particular decision not to continue an additional Judge for a further term would form part of the advice tendered to the President,\n\n--I\n\nS.P. GUPTA •• UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 591\n\nthey would be beyond the ken of judicial inquiry. But the Government may in a given case choose to disclose these reasons or it may be possible to gather them from other circumstances, in which event the Court would be entitled to examine whether they bear any . reasonable nexus with the que; tion of appointment of a High Court\n\nJudge or they are constitutionally or illegally prohibited or extraneous or irrelevant.\n\nBut if these reasons are not disclosed by the Government and it i; otlletwise not possible to discover them, it would be impossible for the Court to decide whether the decision of the Central Government not to app, int an additional Judge for a further term is based on irrelevant grounds. There would however not be much difficulty by and large in cases of this kind to gather what are reasons which have prevailed with the Central Government in taking the decision not to continue an additional Judge. Article 217 requires that there must be full and effective consultation between the President, that is, the Central Government on the one hand and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor, that is the State Government and the Chief Justice of India on the other and the . \"full and identical facts\" on which the decision of the Central\n\nGovernment is based must be placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe reasons which the Central Government is inclined to take into account for reaching a particular decision have therefore necessarily\n\nto be communicated to the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State E Government and the Chief Justice of India and in the circumstances, it should orclinari!y be possible ;.for the Court to gather from su:h communication; the reasons which have persuaded the Central Government to take its decision. Of corse there may be cases where there are several reasons discussed between the Central Government and the three constitutional authorities and some of ' these reasons may be relevant, while some others may be irrelevant and without inquiring into the advice given. by the. Council of\n\nMinisters to President, it may not be possible to determine as to what are !he reasons, relevant or ir.relevant, which have weighed with the Central Government in taking its decision and in such a case, the Court may not be able to pronounce whether the decision of the\n\nCentral Government is based on irrelevant grounds.\n\nBt ordinarily the correspondence exchanged between the Central G Jvern moot, the\n\nChief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the C.1ief Justice cf India would throw light on the question as to what are the reasons which have impelled the Central Government to take any particular decision regarding the continu1C1ce of an additi()odl Judge.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThis correspondence would also show whether the \"full and identical facts\" on which the decision of the Central Government is based were placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India before they gave their opinion in the course of the consultative process. Of course if the communication between the Central Government, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India has not taken place by correspondence but has been the subject matter of only oral talk or discussion, it would become impossible for the Court to discover the reasons which have weighed with the Central Government in taking the decision not to continue the additional Judge for a further term, unless of course the Central Government chooses to disclose such reasons and it would also become extremely difficult for the Court to decide whether the \"full and identical facts\" on which the decision of the Central Government is based were placed before the other three constitutional authorities and there was full and effective consultation as required by Article\n\n217. The Court would then have to depend only on such affidavits as may be filed before it and the task of the Court to ascertain the truth would be rendered extremely delicate and difficult, as it has been in the writ petitioas challenging the transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court. It is not at all desirable that when the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India has to communicate officially with the State Govern. ment or the Central Government in regard to a matter where he is discharging a constitutional function, such communication should be only by way of oral talk or discussion unrecorded in writing.\n\nWe think it absolutely essential that such communication must, as far as possible, be in writing, whether by way of a note or by way of correspondence. The process of consultation, whether under Article 217 or under Article 222, must be evidenced in writing so that if at any point of time a dispute arises as to whether consultation had in fact taken place or what was the nature and content of such consultation, there must be documentary evidence to resolve such dispute and 'an ugly situation should not arise where the word of one constitutional authority should be pitted against the word of another and the Court should be called upon to decide which of them is telling the truth. Oral talk or discussion may certainly take place between the Central Government and any other constitutional authority required to be consulted but it must be recorded immediately either in a note or in conespondence.\n\nBesides eliminating future dispute or controversy, the practice of having written comm uni-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 593\n\ncation or record of oral discussion ensures greater care and deliberation in expression of views and considerably reduces the possi -\n\nbility of improper or unjustified recommendations or unholy confabulations or conspiracies which might be hidden under the veil of secrecy if there were no written record.\n\nMoreover, such a practice would tend to promote openness in society which is the hall-mark of a democratic polity. It would indeed be highly regrettable if, instead of following this healthy practice of having a written record of consultation, the Central Government or State Government or the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India were to carry on the consultation process either on the telephone or by personal discussion without recording it. But we find that fortunately in the present case, unlike KB N. Singh's case which falls for determination in the second batch of writ petitions, there was correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the continuance of S.N. Kumar and the question is whether this correspondence forms part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President so as to be protected against disclosure by reason of clause (2) of Article 74.\n\nThe argument of the learned Solicitor General was that this correspondence formed part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and he sought to s Lip port this argument by adopting the following proce; s of r.:asooing. H: s1id that the Council of Ministers cannot advise the President to appoint or not to ap , mint an additional Judge for a further term without consulting the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of Iadia, it is only after consulting them that appropriate advice cao be tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President.\n\nWhen advice is tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President, it is open to the President unccr the Provi.; o to clause (1) of Article 74 not to immediately accept such advice but to require the Council of Ministers to reconsider the advice generally or otherwise. If in a given case the President finds that advice has been given by the Council of Ministers without consulting either the Chief Ju; tic~ of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India or both or that there has been no full and effective co.isultation with them as required by the Constitution, he may, and indeed he must, send the case back\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C R.\n\nto the Council of Ministers and require them to reconsider the advice .\n\nafter carrying out full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. Now how can the President satisfy himself in regard to the fulfilment of the the constitutional requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, unless the views expressed by the two Chief Jmtices are placed before him alongwith the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The exercise of the power of the President to appoint or not to appoint an additional Judge is so integrally connected with the con8titutional requirement of full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India that at no stage can it be de!inked from the views expressed by them on consultation and it would not be possible for the President to exercise this executive power in accordance with the constitution unless the views of the two Chief Justices are placed before him.\n\nOn the basis of this reasoning and as a logical consequence of it, argued the learned Solicitor General, the views of the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India obtained on consultation must be regarded as forming part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President. The learned Solicitor General sought to draw support for his argument from the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the Stare of Punjab v. SodhiSukhdev Singh(1) We shall presently refer to this decision but before we do so, let us examine the argument of the learned Solicitor General on principle.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President is protected against judicial scrutiny by reason of clause (2) of Article 74.\n\nBut can it be said th at the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India on consultation form part of the advice.\n\nThe advice is given by the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The two Chief Justices are consulted on \"full \"and identical facts\" and their views are obtained and it is after co11si dering those views that the Council of Ministers arrives at is decision and tenders its advice to the President. fhe views expressed b' the two Chief Justices precede the formation of the advice and merely because they are referred to in the advice which is ultimately tendered by the Council of Ministers. they do\n\n(I) [1961] 2 SCR 371.\n\n......\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 595\n\nnot necessarily become part of the advice. What is protected against disclosure under clause(2) or Article 74 is only the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The reasons which have weighed with the Council of Ministers in giving the advice would certainly form part of the advice, as held by this Court in S.ate of Rajasthan v.\n\nUnion of Jndia( 1).\n\nVide the observations of Beg, C.J. at page 46, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) at page 91, Fazal Ali J. at pages\n\n120 and 121, where all the three learned Judges took the view that by reason clause (2) of Article 74 the Court would be barred from inquiring into the grounds which might weigh with the Council of Ministers in advising the President to issue a proclamation under Article 356, because the grounds would form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers.\n\nBut the material on which the reasoning of the Council of Ministers is based and the advice is given cannot be said to form part of advice.\n\nThe po.int we are making may be illustrated by taking the analogy of a judgment given by a Court of Law.\n\nThe judgment would undoubtedly be based on the evidence led before the Court and it would refer to such evidence and discuss it but on that account can it be said that the evidence forms part of the Judgment ? The judgment would consist only of the decision and the reasons in support of it and the evidence on which the reasoning and the decision are based would not be part of the judgment. Similarly the material on which the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers is based cannot be said to be part of the advice and the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India which constituted tbe material forming the basis of the decision of the Central Government must accordingly be held to be outside the exclusionary rule enacted in clause (2) of Article 74.\n\nWe may now refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh\n\n(supra) on which the greatest reliance was placed by the learned Solicitor General in support of his plea based on clause (2) of Article 74.\n\nThe respondent who was the District and Sessions Judge in the erstwhile State of PEPSU was removed from service by an order dated 7th April, 1953 passed by tbe President who was then incharge of the Administration of the State. The respondent made\n\n(I) (1978] 1 SCR 1.\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\na respresentation against the Order of removal which was considered by the Council of Ministers of the State as in the meantime the\n\nPresident's rule had come to an end and the Council of Ministers expressed its views in a Resolution passed on 28th September, 1955.\n\nBut before taking any action it invited the Report of the Public Service Commission. On receipt of the Report of the Public Service Commission, the Council of Ministers considered the matter again and ultimately on 11th August, 1956 it reached the final conclusion . against the respondent and in accordance with the conclusion the order was passed to the effect that the respondent must be reemployed on some suitable post. The respondent thereµpon instituted a suit against the successor St11-te of Punjab for a declaration that his removal from service was i!Jegal and in that suit he filed an application for the production of certain documents which included inter alia the proceedings of the Council of Ministers deted 28th September 1955 and 1 lth August 1956 and the Report of the Public Service Commission.\n\nThe State objected to the production of these documents and ultimately the matter came before this Court.\n\nGajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the majority of the Court upheld the claim of privilege put forward on behalf of the State and so far as the Report of the Public Service Commission was concerned, the learned Judge held that it was protected against disclosure both under clause (3) of Article 163 and Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nWe are at present concerned only with the claim for protection under ciause (3) of Article 163 because that is an Article which corresponds to clause (2) of Article 74 in so far as advice by the Council ot Ministers to the Governor is concerned. The learned Judge speaking on behalf of the majority, accorded protection to the report of the Public Service Commission under clause (3) of Article 163 on the ground that it formed part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Rajpramukh. This view taken by the majority does appear prima facie to support the contention of the learned Solicitor General, but we do not think we can uphold the claim for protection put forward by the learned Solicitor General by adopting a process of analogical reasoning from the majority view in this decision. In the first place, we do not know what were the circumstances in which the majority Judges came to regard the report of the public Service\n\nC<'mmission as forming part of the advice tendered to the Rajpramukh. There is no reasoning in the judgment of t11e learned Judge showing as to why the majority held that the report of the\n\nPublic Service Commission fell within the terms of clause (3) of\n\nS.P GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 597\n\nArticle 163. The learned Judge has merely set out his ipse dixit, without any reasons at all, saying in just one sentence. \"The same observation falls to be made in regard to the advice tendered by the\n\nPublic Service Commission to the Council of Ministers.\" It is elementary that what is binding on the Court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision but the ratio of that decision, for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion. Secondly, we may point out that we find' it difficult to accept the view taken by the majority in this case.\n\nWe are unable to appreciate how the report of the Public Service Commission which merely formed the material on the basis of which the Council of Ministers came to its decision as recorded in the pro\n\nceedings dated I Ith August, 1956 could be said to form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Rajpramukh.\n\nWe do not think the learned Solicitor General can invoke the aid of this decision in support of his claim for protection under clause (2) of Article 74.\n\nThat takes us to the next qhestion whether the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India is protected from disclosure under any other provision of law.\n\nWe do not have in India any common law protection under the label of \"Crown Privilege\" as it was known a decade ago and now called \"Public interest immunity\" as there is in England and the only provision of law under wh!ch such immunity can be claimed is section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore, it is this provision which we must now turn to consider.\n\nBut, before we do so, we would like to indicate the socio-political background in the context of which this section has to be interpreted. It is true that this section was enacted in the second half of the last century but its meaning and content cannot remain static. The interpretation of every statutory provision mu st keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the requirements of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. The language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in a country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values and agressive developmental strategies, so must the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is elel!l\n\nSUPREME COORT REPORTS\n\n\nmentary that law does not operate in a vaccum. It is not an antique to be taken down, dusted, admired and put back on the shelf, but rather it is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reason of clash between conflicting interests. It is therefore intended to serve\n\n~ social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the socio-economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function.\n\nHe has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skelton provided by the legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivery of justice.\n\nWe need not therefore be obsessed with the fact that section 123 is a statutory provision of old vintage-Or that it bas been interpreted in a particular manner some two decades ago. It is not as if it has once spoken and then turned into muted silence.\n\nIt is an instrument which can speak again and in a different voice in the content of a different milieu.\n\nLet us therefore try to understand what voice this statutory provision speaks today in a democratic society wedded to the basic values enshrined in the Constitution.\n\nNow it is obvious from the Constitution that we have adopted a democratic form of Government. Llvhere a society has chosen to accept democracy as its credal faith, it is elementary that the citizens ought to know what their government is doing. The citizens have a right to decide by whom and by what rules they shall be governed and they are entitled to call on those who govern on their behalf to acccunt for their conduct.\n\nNo democratic government can survive without accountability and the basic postulate of accountability is that the people should have information about the functioning of the government.\n\nIt is only if people know how government is functioning that they can fulfil the role which democracy assigns to them and make democracy a really effective participatory democracy. \"Knowledge\" said James Madison, \"will for ever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information on the means of obtaining it, is but a prologue to a force or tragedy or perhaps both.\" The citizens' right to know the facts, the true facts, about the administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of a democratic State.\n\nAnd that is why the demand for openness in the government is increasingly growing in different parts of the world.\n\nS, P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 599\n\nThe demand for openness in the government is based principally on two reasons. It is now widely accepted that democracy does not consist merely in people exercising their franchise once in five years to choose their rulers and, once the vote is cast, then retiring in passivity and not taking any interest in the government.\n\nToday it is common ground that democracy has a more positive content and its orchestration has to be continuous and pervasive.\n\nThis means inter alia that people should not only cast intelligent t and rational votes but should also exercise sound judgment on the\n\nconduct of the government and the merits of public policies, so that democracy does not remain merely a sporadic exercise in voting but bec0mes a continuous process of government-an attitude and habit of mind.\n\nBut this important role people can fullfil in a democracy C only if it is an open government where there is full access to information in regard to the functioning of the government.\n\nTl:ere is also in every democracy a certain amount of public suspicion and distrust of government, varying of course from time to time according to its performance, which prompts people to insist upon maximum exposure of its functioning. It is axiomatic that every action of the government must be actuated by public interest but even so we find cases, though, not many, where governmental action is taken not for public good but for personal gain or other extraneous considerations. Sometimes governmental action is influenced by political and other motivations and pressures and at ti mes, there are also instances of misuse or abuse of authority on the part of the executive.\n\nNow, if secrecy were to b-e observed in the functioning of government and the processes •of government were to be kept hidden from public scrutiny, it would tend to promote and encourage oppression, corruption and misuse or abuse of authority, for it would all be shrouded in the veil of secrecy without any public accountability.\n\nBut if there is an open government with means of information available to the public, there would be greater exposure of the functioning of government and it would help to assure the people a better and more efficient administratio!'. There can be iittle doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of the surest means of achieving a clean and healthy administration.\n\nIt has been truly said that an open government is clean government and a powerful safeguard against political :ri; d administrative aberration and inefficiency.\n\nThe Franks Committee of the United Kingdom also observed\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982) 2 s.c.1..\n\nto the same effect while pleading for an open government. It said in its report at page 12 :\n\n\"A totalitarian government finds it easy to maintain secrecy. It does not come into the open until it chooses to declare its settled intentions and demand support for them.\n\nA democratic government, however, though it must compete with these other types of organisations, has a task which is complicated by its obligations to the people. It needs the trust of the governed. It cannot use the plea of secrecy to hide from the people its basic aims.\n\nOn the contrary it must explain these aims : it must provide the justification for them and give the facts both for and against a selected course of action.\n\nNow must such information be provided only at one level and through one means of communication. A government which pursues secret aims, or which operates in greater secrecy than the effective conduct of its proper functions requires, or which turns information services in to propaganda agencies, will Jose the trust of the people.\n\nIt will be countered by illinformed and destructive criticism. Its critics will try to break down all barriers erected to preserve secrecy, and they will disclose all that they can, by whatever means, discover. As a result matters will be revealed when they ought to remain secret in the interests of the nation.\"\n\nSo also ~(f fuitobservations in the same strain by Mathew, J. in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain :(1)\n\n\"In a government of responsibility like ours, where , all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct. there can but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries.\n\nThey are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its hearing.\n\nThe right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transacti.ons which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil secrecy to common routine business, is not in the\n\n(I) [ 1975] 3 SCR 333 at page 360.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\ninterest of the public. . Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. it is generally desired for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratiQ routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and corruption.\"\n\nThe need for an open government where there is access to information in regard to the functioning of government has been emphasized and the arguments in support of it have been ably and succinctly summarised in the following passage from the book of Dr. S. R.\n\nMaheshwari on \"Open Government in India\" at pages 95 and 96 :\n\n\"Administrative India puts the greatest weight on keeping happening within its corridors secret, thereby denying the citizens access to information about them.\n\nSuch orientations produce deep contradictions in the larger socio-political system of the land which itself is in a state requiring nourishment and care.\n\nAs the latter is still relatively new and in its infancy, its growth processes inevitably get retarded for want of information about the Government, which means from the Government. Overconcealment of governmental information creates a communication gap between the governors and the governed, and its persistence beyond a point is apt to create an alienated citizenry. This makes democracy itself weak and insecure.\n\nBesides, secrecy renders administrative accountability unenforceable in an effective way and thus induces administrative behaviour which is apt to degenerate into arbitrariness and absolutism. This is not all.\n\nThe Government, today, is called upon to make policies on an ever increasing range of subjcts, and many of these policies must necessarily impinge on the lives of the citizens. It may sometimes happen that the data made\n\navailable to the policy makers is of a selective nature, and even the policy-makers and their advisers may deliberately suppress certain viewpoints and favour others. Such bureaucratic habits get encouragement in an environment of secrecy; and openness in governmental work is possibly the only effective corrective to it, also raising, in the process, the quality of decision-making.\n\nBesides, openness has\n\n{(\\2\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\n~ an educational role inasmuch as citizens are enabled to\n\nacquire a fuller view of the pros and cons of matters\n\n1 of major importance, which naturally helps in building\n\ninformed public opinion, no less than goodwill for the\n\nGovernment.\"\n\nThis is the new democratic culture of an open society towards which every liberal democracy is moving and our country should be no exception. The concept of an open government is the direct --r emanation from the right to know which seems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Artie!!' 19 (I) (a). Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands.\n\nThe approach of the court must be to attentuate the area of secrecy as much as possible consistently with the requirement of public interest, bearing in mind all the time that disclosure also serves an important aspect of public interest. It is in the context of this background that we must proceed to interpret section 123 of the Indian. Evidence Act.\n\nWe might begin by reproducing section 123 which reads as follows : .:(\n\n\"Sec. 123 : Evidence as to affairs of State-No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.\"\n\n~ It is also necessary for arriving at a proper interpretation of section 123 to refer to section 162 which says: .~\n\n\"Sec. 162. Production'l@f documents-A witness sum- \" moned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power. bring it to court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility.\n\nThe validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the court.\n\nThe court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 603\n\nTranslation of documents-If for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret, unless the document is to be given in evidence and if the interpreter disobeys such directions, he shall be held to have committed an offence under sec. 166 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).\" B\n\nThese two sections came up for consideration for the first time before the Court in State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh (supra).\n\nGajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of himself, Sinha, C.J. and Wanchoo, J. pointed out that the principle behind the exclusionary rule enacted in section 123 is that a document should not be allowed to be produced in court if such production would cause injury to public interest and where a conflict arises between public interest in non-disclosure and private interest in disclosure, the latter must yield to the former. The learned Judge emphasized that though section 123 does not expressly refer to injury to public interest, that principle is obviously implicit in it and indeed it is the sole foundation and proceeded to add that even though administration of justice is a matter of very high public importance, if there is a real \"conflict between public interest and the interest of an individual in a pending case, it may reluctantly have to be conceded that the interest of the individual cannot prevail over the public interest.\" Now we agree with the learned Judge that public interest Hes at the foundation of the claim for protection against disclosure enacted in section 123 and it seeks to prevent production of a document where such production would cause public injury but we do not think the learned Judge was right in observing that the interest which comes into conflict with the claim for non-disclosure is the private interest of the litigant in disclosure. It is rather the public interest in fair administration of justice that comes into clash with the public interest sought to be protected by non-disclosure and the court is called upon to balance these two aspects of public interest and decide which aspect predominates.\n\nWe shall have to discuss this problem of balancing different aspects of public interest a little later, but in the meanwhile let us continue with the examination of the decision in Sukhdev Singh' s case (supra).\n\nGajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) after pointing out that public interest was the sole foundation for the claim for protection under section 123 proceeded to consider when a document can be said to be relating to' 'affairs of State\" within the meaning of that section.\n\nThe learned Judge observed that three different views are possible' on\n\n604 SUPREME CCUl\\T REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthis question. The first view is that documents relating to affairs of State are broadly divisible into two classes, one the disclosure of which will cause no injury to public interest and which may therefore be described as innocuous documents and the other the disclosure of which may cause injury to public interest and may therefore be described as noxious documents; it is the head of the department who decides to which class the document in respect of which the claim for protection against disc! osure is made, belongs, if he comes to the conclusion that the document is innocuous, he will give permission for its production: if, however, he comes to the conclusion that the document is noxious, be will withhold such permission; in any case the court does not materially come into the picture. The second view is that documents relating to affairs of State should be confined only to the clause of noxious documents and when a question arises, it is for the court to determine the character of the document and if necessary, to enquire whether its disclosure would lead to injury to public interest. The third view which does not accept either of the two extreme positions would be that the court can determine the character of the document and if it comes to the conclusion that the document belongs to the noxious class, it may leave it to the head of the department to decide whether its production should be permitted or not, for it is not the policy of section 123 that in the case of every noxious document, the head of the department must always withhold permission. The learned Judge then proceeded to consider which of the three views represents the correct legal position and for that purpose, turned to examine section\n\nI 62 and after discussing the true import of that section and holding that where an objection to the disclosure of a documet is raised under section 123 on the ground that it relates to affairs of State, the court cannot inspect the document for the purpose of deciding the objection, the learned Judge accepted the third view as correct and summarised his conclusion in the following word~ :\n\n\"Thus our conclusion is that reading ss. 123 and 162 together the court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question.\n\nThat is a matter for the authority concerned to decide; but the Court is competent, and indeed is bound, to hold a preliminary enquiry and determine the validity of the objections to its production, and that necessarily involves an enquiry into the question as to whether the evidence relates to an affair of State µ11di:r ~~<;(ion 123 or not, •\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 605\n\nIn this enquiry the court has to determine the A character or class of the document.\n\nIf it comes to the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State then it should reject the claim for privilege and direct its production.\n\nIf it comes to the conclusion that the document relates to the affairs of State, it should leave it to the head of the department to decide whether he should permit its production or not.\"\n\nThe learned Judge thus took the view in no uncertain terms that documents relating to affairs of State are documents belonging to the noxious class, that is, documents which by reason of their contents or the class to which they belong, are such that disclosure may cause injury to public interest.\n\nThe learned Judge agreed that it is for the court to determine whether a particular document in respect of which the claim for non-disclosure is made is a document relating to affairs of the State or in other words, it is a document falling within the noxious class, but introduced a serious impedi\n\nment in the way of the court making such determination by holding that the court cannot for this purpose inspect the document or hold \"an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document.\" Now, if the court has no power to inspect the document, it is difficult to understand how the court can find, without conducting an enquiry as regards the possible effect of the disclosure of the document upon public interest, that the document is one relating to affairs of State, as exhypothesi a document can be said to relate to affairs of State only if its disclosure will cause injury to public interest. It might be that there are certain classes of documents which are of such a character that even without inspecting them or conducting an enquiry, it might be possible to say that by virtue of their character, their disclosure would be injurious to public interest and therefore they are documents relating to affairs of State.\n\nBut, there might be other documents which do not fall within this description and yet whose disclosure might be injurious to public interest and in case of such documents, it would not be possible for the court without inspecting them or at any rate without holding an enquiry, t\" determine whether their disclosure would be injurious to public interest and they should therefore be classified as documents relating to affairs of State. Even so, according to Gajendragadkar, J. and the other learned Judges, the court can and must determine whether such documents relate to affairs of State without inspecting them and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nwithout even holding an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which might result from their disclosure.\n\nThe view taken by Gajendragadkar, J. and the other learned Judges in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh' s case (supra) thus runs into an inconsistency and creates an illogical situation.\n\nThere is also another infirmity from which the view taken in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) suffers.\n\nGajendragadkar, J. speaking on behalf of himself and the other learned Judges observed that when an objection against the disclosure of a document is raised under section 123, the court must first determine the character of the document and if it comes to the conclusion that the document relates to affairs of State, it should leave it to the Head of the department to decide whether he should permit its production or not.\n\nNow even according to Gajendragakar, J. and the other learned Judges, a document can be said to relate to affairs of State only if it is a document of such a character that its disclosure will injure public interest and therefore the court would have to reach the conclusion that the disclosure of the document will be injurious to public interest before it can find that the document relates to affairs of State. If that be so, it is difficult to understand, after the court has enquired into the objection and come to the conclusion that disclosure of the document would be injurious to public interest, what purpose. would be served by reserving to the head of the department the power to permit its disclosure, because the question to be decided by him would practically be the same, namely, whether disclosure of the document would be injurious to public interest-a question already decided by the court. In other words, if injury to public interest is the foundation of this immunity from disclosure, when once the court has inquired into the question and found that the disclosure of the document will injure public interest and therefore it is a document relating to affairs of State, it would in most cases be a futile exercise for the head of the department to consider and decide whether its disclosure should be permitted as he would be making an enquiry into the identical question.\n\nThere may be a few rare cases where in regard to a document which by reason of the class to which it belongs may be regarded as relating to affairs of State, the head of the department may be able to take the view that though it belongs to the noxious class, its disclosure would not be . injurious to public interest and therefore allow it to be disclosed.\n\nBut, by and large, once the court has found that the document is of such a character that its disclosure will cause injury to public interest, it w9uld b~ futil\\! to leav~ it to the head of the department\n\n·~\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNiON (E/zagwati, J.) 601\n\nto decide whether he should permit its production or not.\n\nWe are therefore unable to accept the decision ip Sodhi Singh' s case (supra) as laying down the correct law on this point.\n\nThe court would allow the objection if it finds that the document relates to affairs of\n\nState and its disclosure would be injurious to public interest, but on the other hand, if it reaches the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure or that the public interest in the administration of justice in the particular case before it over-rides al! other aspects of public interest, it will over-rule the objection and order disclosure of the document. The basic question to which the court would therefore have to address itself for the purpose of deciding the validity of the objection would be whether the document relates to affairs of State or in other words, it is of such a character that its disclosure would be against the interest of the State or the public service and if so, whether the public interest in its non-disclosure is so strong that it must prevail over the public interest in the administration of justice and on that account, it should not be allowed to be disclosed.\n\nThe final decision in regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under section 123 would always be with the court by reason of section 162.\n\nNow an objection against the disclosure of a document on the ground that it relates to affairs of State may be made before the court either because it would be against the interest of the State or the public service to disc1ose its contents or because it belongs to a class of document which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, whether or not it would be harmful to disclose the contents of the particular document.\n\nWhere immunity from disclosure is claimed on the ground that discloS1Jre of the contents of the document would be injurious to the interest of the State or the public service it would not be difficult to decide the claim because it would almost invariably be supported by an affidavit made either by the Minister or by the head of the department and if the Minister or the head of the department asserts that to disclose the contents of the document \"would or might do to the nation or the public service a grave injury, the court will be slow to question his opinion or to allow any interest, even that of justice, to prevail over it\" unless there can be shown to exist some factor suggesting either lack of good faith or an error of judgment or an error of law on the part of the minister or the head of the department. But, even in such cases it is now well-settled that the court is not bound by the statement made by the minister or the head of the department in\n\ni ,:.,\n\n608 SlJl>RilMll COlJRT REl>OllTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe affidavit and it retains the power to balance injury to the State or the public service against the risk of injustice, before reaching its decision. Vide observations of Lord Scarrnan in Burma 0:1 v. Bank of England(1). But the claim in the present case to withhold disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to continuance of S. N. Kumar is not based on the ground that the contents of these particular documents are such that their disclosure would harm the nationa[ interest or the interest of public service. The claim put forward by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India is that these documents are entitled to immunity from disclosure because they belong to a class of documents which it would be against national interest or the interest of the judiciary to disclose. It is settled law, and it was so clearly recognised in Raj Narain' s case (supra) that there may be classes of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed, no matter what the individual documents in those classes may contain or in other words, the law recognises that there may be classes of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure. There is one such class of documents which for years has been recognised by the law as entitled in the public interest to be protected against disclosure and that class consists of documents which it is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold from disclosure. The documents falling within this class are granted immunity from disclosure not because of their contents but because of the class to which they belong.\n\nThis class includes cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions between heads of departments, high level inter-departmental communications and despatches from ambassadors abroad (vide : Conway v. Rimmer;(2) and Reg v. Lewes J. K. Ex parte Home Secretary), e) Papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet (vide Lanyon Property Limited v. Commonwealth(4) and indeed any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level (vide : Re Grosvenor Hotel, London)(6). It would seem that according to the decision in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), this class may also extend to \"notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files, information expressed or reports\n\n(1) (1979] 3 All England Reports 700 at 732.\n\n(2) [1968] Appeal Cases 910 at pp. 952, 973, 979, 987 & 993.\n\n(3) (1973] Appeal Cases 388 at 412.\n\n(4) 129 Commonwealth Law Reports 650.\n\n(5) [1964) 3 All E, R. 354. (CA)\n\ns.J>. GtJl>TA v. UNlO!S ( 11hagwati, J.) 609\n\nmade and gist of official decisions reached\" in the course of determination of questions of policy.\n\nLord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer\n\n(supra) at page 952; proceeded also to include in this class \"all documents concerned with policy-making within departments including, it may be minutes and the like by quite junior officials and correspondence with outside bodies.\" It is not necessary for us for the purpose of this case to consider what documents legitimately belong to this class so as to be entitled to immunity from disclosure, irrespective of what they contain. But, it does appear that cabinet papers, minutes of discussions of heads of departments and high level documents relating to the inner working of the government machine or concerned with the framing of government policies belong to this class which in the public interest must be regarded as protected against disclosure.\n\nNow, one reason that is traditionally given for the protection of documents of this class is that proper decisions can be made at high levels of government only if there is complete freedom and candour in stating facts, tendering advice and exchanging views and opinions and the possibility that documents might ultimately be published might affect the frankness and candour of those preparing them. This reason based on the need for frankness and candour, though suggested by some Judges, has not found universal acceptance. In Conway v. Rimmer (supra) Lord Reid dismissed the \"candour argument\" summarily at page 952 and Lord Upjohn pointed out at page 993 that immunity of this class of documents against discloure \"has nothing whatever to do with candour or uninhibited freedom of expression\", for it is not possible to believe \"that any minister or any high level military or civil servant would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views in the course of his duty on some subject, such as even the personal qualifications and delinquencies, of some colleague, by the thought that his observation might one day see the light of day.\" Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest also said in the same case at page 957:\n\n\"in many decided cases there have been references to a suggestion that, if there were knowledge that certain documents (for example reports) might in some circumstances be seen by eyes for which they were never intended, the result would be that in the making of similar documents in the future candour would be lacking. Here is a suggestion of doubtful validity. Would the knowledge that there was a remote chance of possible enforced 1production really\n\n610 SUPREME couttt Rlll>ORts [19S2] 2 s.C.it.\n\naffect candour ? If there was knowledge that it was conceivably possible that some person might himself see a report which was written about him, it might well be that candour on the part of the writer of the report would be encouraged rather than frustrated.\"\n\nLord Radcliffe also remarked in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board(1) that he would have supposed Crown servants to be \"made of sterner stuff\", a view shared by Harmen L. J. in the Grosvenor Hotel case at page 1255. Lord Salmon too rejected the \"candour theory\" in Reg v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Secretary of State for Home Deptt. (supra) at page 413 by referring to it as \"the old fallacy\" that \"any official in the government service would be inhibited from writing frankly and possible at all unless he could be sure that nothing which he wrote could ever be exposed to the light of day\". The candour argument has also not prevailed with Judges and jurists in the United States and it is interesting to note what Raoul Berger while speaking about the immunity claimed by President Nixon against the demand for disclosure of the Watergate Tapes, says in his . book \"Executive Privilege\" : A Constitutional Myth at page 264 :\n\n'Candid interchange\" is yet another pretext for doubt ful secrecy. It will not explain Mr. Nixon's claim of blanket immunity for members of his White House staff on the basis of mere membership without more; it will not justify Kleindienst's assertion of immunity from congressional inquiry for two and one-half million federal employees. It is merely another testimonial to the greedy expensiveness of power, the costs of which patently outweigh its benefits. As the latest branch in a line of illegitimate succession, it illustrates the excess bred by the claim of executive. privilege.\"\n\nWe agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs A.C, J. in Sankey Whit/am (supra), it would not be altogether unreal to suppose \"that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and can did of these concerned believe that they are protected from dis-\n\n(1) f!956] SC (HL) al page 20.\n\nS.1'. GUPtA v. UNlON (Bhagwati, J.) 611\n\nclosure\" because not all Crown servants can be expected to b .- made of \"sterner stuff\". The need for candour and frankness must therefore certainly be regarded as a factor to be taken into account in determining whether, on balance, the public interest lies in favour of disclosure or against it. (vide : the observations of Lord Denning in Neilson v. Lougharre(1).\n\nThere was also one other reason suggested by Lord Reid in -Y Conway v. Rimmer (supra) for according protection against disclosure to documents belonging to this case : \"To my mind\", said the learned Law Lord : \"the most important reason is that . such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind.\" But this reason does not commend itself to us.\n\nThe object of granting immunity to documents of this kind is to ensure the proper working of the government and not to protect the ministers and other government servants from criticism however intemperate and unfairly based. ).\n\nMoreover, this reason can have little validity in a democratic society which believes in an open government. It is only through exposure of its functioning that a democratic government can hope to win the trust of the people. If full information is made available to the people and every action of the government is bona fide 11:nd actuated only by public interest, there need be no fear of \"illinformed or captious public or political criticism\". But at the same time it must be conceded that even in a democracy, government at a high level cannot function without some degree of secrecy.\n\nNo minister or senior public servant can effectively discharge the responsibility of his office if every document prepared to enable policies\n\nto be formulated was liable to be made public. It is therefore in the interest of the State and necessary for the proper functioning of the public service that some protection be afforded by law to documents belonging to this class.\n\nWhat is the measure of this protection is a matter which we shall immediately proceed to discuss.\n\nWe have already pointed out that whenever an objection to the disclosure of a document under section 123 is raised, two ques-\n\n(1) [1981] 1 All England Reports at page 835.\n\n612 SIJi>REME COURt REi>ORtS [ 1982) 2 s.c.tt.\n\ntions fall for the determination of the court, namely, whether the document relates to affairs of State and whether its disclosure would, in the particular case before the court, be injurious to public interest. The court in reaching its decision on these two questions has tq balance two competing aspects of public interest, because the document being one relating to affairs of State, its B disclosure would cause some injury to the interest of the State or the proper functioning of the public service and on the other hand if it is not disclosed, the non-disclosure wou Id thwart the admi- nistration of justice by keeping back from the court a material document. There are two aspects of public interest clashing with each other out of which the court has to decide which predominates.\n\nC The approach to this problem is admirably set out in a passage from the judgment of Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer (supra) :\n\n\"It is universally recognised that there are two kinds of public interest which may clash. There is the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents, and there is the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be produced if justice is to be done.\n\nThere are many cases where the nature of the injury which would or might be done to the nation or the public service is of so grave a character that no other interest, public or private, can be allowed to prevail over it. With regard to such cases it would be proper to say, as Lord Simon did, that to order production of the document in question, would put the interest of the State in jeopardy. But there are many other cases where the possible injury to the public service is much less and there one would think that it would be proper to balance the public interests involved.\n\nThe court has to balance the detriment to the public interest on the administrative or executive side which would result from the disclosure of the document against the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side which would result from non-disclosure of the document though relevant to the proceeding. Vide the observations of Lord Pearson in Reg. v. Lewes JJ. Ex parte Home Secretary\n\n(supra) at page 406 of the report. The court has to decide which aspect of the public interest predominates or in other words, whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced, outweighs the public interest that a court of justice\n\nS.l'. GUPTo\\ v. UNIONj(Hhagwati, J.) 613\n\nin performing its function should not be denied access to relevant evidence. The court has thus to perform a balancing exercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public inkrest against the other, decide where the balance lies. If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure. of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure, the court would uphold the objection and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the other hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interests lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interest has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class. Even in Conway v. Rimmer at page 952, Lord Reid recognised an exception that cabinet minutes and the like can be disclosed when they have become only of historical interest, and in Lanyon Private Limited v. Commonwealth (supra), Menzeies J. agreed that there might be \"very special circumstances\" in which such documents might be examined. Lord Scarman also pointed out in the course of his speech in Burma Oil v. Bank of England (supra) that he did not accept \"that there are any classes of documents which, however harmless their content and however strong the requirement of justice, may never be disclosed until they are only of historical interest\". The learned Law Lord said and we are quoting here his exact words since they admirably express our own approach to the subject :\n\n\"But, is the secrecy of the inner workings of the government machine so vital a public interest that it must prevail over even the most imperative demands of justice ?\n\nIf the contents of a document concern the national safety, affect diplomatic relations or relate to some state secret of high importance, I can understand an affirmative answer.\n\nBut if they do not (and it is not claimed in this case that they do), what is so important about secret government that it must be protected even at the price of injustice in our courts.\"\n\nThe reasons given for protection, the secrecy of H government at the level of policy making are two.. The first is the need for candour in the advice offered to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.tt\n\nMinisters; the second is that disclosure 'would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism.' Lord Reid in Conway v.\n\nRimmer though the second 'the most important reason'. Indeed, he was inclined to discount the candour argument.\n\nI think both reasons are factors legitimately to be put into the balance which has to be struck between the public interest in the proper functioning of the public service (i.e. the executive arm of the government) and the public interest in the administration of justice. Sometimes the public service reasons will be decisive of the issue; but they should never prevent the court from weighing them against the injury which would be suffered in the administration of justice if the document was not to be disclosed \"\n\nThe same view was expressed by Gibbs ACJ, in Sankey v. Whit/am D\n\n(supra) where the learned acting Chief Justice said :\n\n\"I consider that although there is a class of documents whose members are entitled to protection from disclosure irrespective of their contents, the protection is not absolute, and it does not endure for ever. The fundamental and governing principle is that documents in the class may be withheld from production only when this is necessary in the public interest. In a particular case the court must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should not be disclosed against the need to produce them in the interests of justice. The court will of course examine the question with special care, giving full weight to the reasons for preserving the secrecy of documents of this class, but it will not treat all such documents as entitled to the same measure of protection-the extent of protection required will depend to some extent on tbe general subject matter with which the documents are concerned.\"\n\nThere is nothing sacrosanct about the immunity which is granted to documents because they belong to a certain class.\n\nClass immunity is not absolute or inviolable in all circumstances.\n\nIt is not a rule to be applied mechanically in all cases. The principle upon which class immunity is founded is that it would be ...contrary to public interest to disclose documents belonging to that class, because such disclosure would impair the proper functioning of the public service\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 615\n\nand this aspect of public interest which requires that justice shall not be denied to any one by withholding relevant evidence. This is a balancing task which has to be performed by the Court in all cases.\n\nWhat should .be the technology and methodology of this balancing task is a matter which we shall presently examine. But, before we do so, it is necessary to point out that class immunity is not confined merely to that class of documents in respect of which nondisclosure is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service, though mostly it is in respect of documents falling within this class that the claim for class immunity is usually made.\n\nThere is also another class of documents which has always been recognised by the Court as entitled to the same immunity and that class consists of documents evidencing the sources from which the police obtain information. Now we agree with the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners th at this immunity should not be lightly extended to any other class of documents, but, at the same time, boundaries cannot be regarded as immutably fixed.\n\nThe principle is that whenever it is clearly contrary to the public interest for a document to be disclosed, then it is in law immune from disclosure.\n\nIf a new class comes into existence to which this principle applies, then that class would enjoy the same immunity. This is the basis on which in Reg. v. Lewes, JJ. Ex parte Home Secretary (supra) the House of Lords extended this immunity to a new class of documents, namely, all such documents as were supplied to the Gaming Board and related to the \"character, reputation and financial standing of the applicant\". Lord Reid pointed out in that case that the claim for protection made on behalf of Gaming Board was not based on the contents of the particular letter of which disclosure was sought by the appellant, but it was \"based on the fact that the Board cannot adequately perform their statutory duty unless they can p; eserve the confidentiality of all communications to them regarding the character, reputation or antecedents of applicants for their consent.\" The learned Law Lord posited the question for consideration in the following words : \"Here the question is whether the withholding of this class of documents is really necessary to enable the Board adequately to perform its statutory duties\" and proceeded to hold that \"if there is not to be very serious danger of the Board being deprived of information essential for the proper performance of their task, there must be a general rule that they are not bound to produce any document which gives information to them about any applicant\". Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest also observed to the same effect at page 405 of the Report :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c, R.\n\n\"However honourable and public spirited a person might be, he would undoubtedly feel somewhat inhibited in the future if he found that as a result oi his last response to a request for information he had himself become a defendant or an accused. The test, however, is not in personal terms. It rests upon a consideration of the necessities of the public service arising out of the rather special duties and functions imposed and recognised by Parliament.\"\n\nThe House of Lords accordingly held that \"on balance the public interest clearly requires that documents of this kind should not be\n\ndisclosed\" and thus upheld the claim of immunity in respect of the Jetter which gave information to the Gaming Board about the character, reputation and antecedents of the appellant.\n\nThe question is whether immunity of this kind-what we have described as class immunity-should be extended to the class of documents consisting of correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister or other high level functionary or the Central Government, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a High Court or Supreme Court Judge.\n\nNow we may cunveniently at this stage consider the question as to how a claim for immunity against disclosure should be raised under section 123. It is necessary to repeat and re emphasize that this claim of immunity can be justifiably made only, if it is felt that the disclosure of the document would be injurious to public interest.\n\nWhere the State is a party to an action in which disclosure of a docurnent is sought b\" the opposite party, it is possible that the decision to with-hold the document may be influenced by the apprehension that such disclosure may adversely affect the head of the department or the department itself or the minister or even the Government or that it may provoke public criticism or censure in the legislature or in the press, but it is essential that such considerations should be totally kept out in reaching the decision whether or not to disclose the document.\n\nSo also the effect of the document on the ultimate course of the litigation-whether its disclosure would hurt the State in its defence-should have no relevance in making a claim for immunity against disclosure. The sole and only consideration must be whether the disdosure of the document would be detrimental to public interest in the particular case before the Court.\n\nIt has therefore been held since long before Conway v. Rimmer\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 617\n\n(supra) was decided in England and since the decision in Sodhi Sukhdeo Singh's case (supra) in India that a claim for immunity against disclosure should be made by the minister who is the political head of the department concerned or failing him, by the secretary of the department and the claim should always be made in the form of an affidavit. Where the affidavit is made by the secretary. the Court may in an appropriate case require an affidavit of the minister concerned.\n\nThe affidavit should show that the document in question has been carefully read and considered and the person making the affidavit has formed the view that the document should not be disclosed either because of its actual contents or because of the class of documents to which it belongs. If in a given case no affidavit is filed or the affidavit filed is defective, the Court may give an opportunity to the State to file a proper affidavit. The reason is that the immunity against disclosure claimed under section 123 is not a privilege which can be waived by the State. It is an immunity which is granted in order to protect public interest and therefore even if the State has not filed an affidavit or the affidavit filed is not satisfactory, the court cannot abdicate its duty of deciding whether the disclosure of the document in question would be injurious to public interest and the document should not therefore be allowed to be disclosed.\n\nThat is why in England this immunity is no longer described as \"Crown Privilege\" but is called \"public interest immunity\". This aspect of the immunity was emphasized by Lord Reid in Reg v. Lewes Ex parte Home Secretary (supra) where the learned Law Lord observed that the expression 'Crown Privilege' is wrong and may be misleading and there is no question of any privilege in the ordinary sense of the word, as the real question is whether the public interest requires that the document shall not be produced. Lord Simon of Glaisdale also pointed out in the same case; \"Crown privilege is a misnomer and apt to be misleading. It refers to the rule that certain evidence is inadmissible on the ground that its adduction would be contrary to the public interest ....... it is not a privilege which may be waived by the Crown or by anyone else\". It is therefore clear that if a document is entitled to immunity against disclosure, it cannot be adduced in evidence by either party and even if neither of the parties claims, such immunity, the Judge himself must take the objection, for the rule that the public interest must not be put in jeopardy by the disclosure of a document which would injure it, is one upoo which the court should, if necessary, insist, even though no objection has been take11 by any party or by any government department. In Conway v.\n\nRimmer (supra) Lord Reid said that it is the duty of the Court to prevent the disclosure\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nof a document without the intervention of any minister, \"if possible serious injury to the national interest is readily apparent\".\n\nIn Reg\n\nv. Lewes Ex. parte Home Secretary (supra) Lord Simon of Glaisdale pointed out that even a litigant or a witness may draw the attention of the Court to the nature of the document with a view to its being excluded.\n\nSince the immunity is founded '.on public interest, it is necessary that the court should have the power and the?duty to prevent the disclosure of a document when it would be injurious to public interest to disclose it, even if the proper procedure for objection by or on behalf of the minister or the secretary has not been followed.\n\nThe Court must intervene proprio motu if it appears that the public interest requires the document to be protected from disclosure.\n\nThis being the correct legal position, it is immaterial whether in the present case appropriate affidavit claiming immunity was filed on behalf of the Union of India. The learned Attorney General sought to tender on an affidavit sworn by Burney, the then Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming immunity against disclosure in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-appointment of S. N. Kumar but since the affidavit was sworn on 7-9-1981 and yet not tendered until 16-9-1981 even though the arguments had begun long back, we expressed our displeasure at the delay in filing the affidavit whereupon the learned Attorney General stated that he would not rely upon the affidavit.\n\nThereafter when the learned counsel for S. N.\n\nKumar sought answers to certain queries in regard to this correspondence, the learned Attorney General filed an affidavit sworn by T.N. Chaturvedy, Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming protection against disclosure of this correspondence, strong objection was taken to the filing of this affidavit by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar on the ground that the learned Attorney General having made a statement that he would not rely upon previous affidavit, it was not competent and in any event not proper for the Union of India to file the affidavit of T.N. Chaturvedi which was almost in the same terms as the previous affidavit.\n\nBut we over-ruled this objection, because, as would be clear from what we have discussed above, even if no affidavit were filed earlier on behalf of the Union of India claiming immunity against disclosure, the Union of India could always file an affidavit claiming such immunity at any stage before the claim for immunity\n\n, . . ,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 619\n\nwas considered and decided by the court and once the claim for immunity was raised, the court could also on its own direct the Union of India to file a proper affidavit, if no such affidavit were already filed.\n\nWe therefore took the affidavit of T.N. Chaturvedi on file and allowed the Union of India to rely upon it.\n\nWe may point out that even if this affidavit had not been filed, the Court would still have had to consider on the basis of the other material before it including the nature of the correspondence whether its disclosure would be injurious to pub! ic interest and hence it should not be allowed to be disc! osed.\n\nWe may also point out that we were invited to inspect for ourselves the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India for the purpose of deciding whether that correspondence was entitled to immunity against disclosure.\n\nNow the view taken in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case was that where an objection is raised against the disclosure of a document under section 123, the Court has no power to inspect the document under section 162 for the purpose of deciding the objection.\n\nBut with the greatest respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we do not think this view is correct and in fact subsequent decisions of this Court seem to be against it.\n\nSo far as English law is concerned it is now well-settled as a result of the decision of the House of Lords in Conway v. Rimmer {supra) that there is a residual power in the Court to inspect the document if the Court finds it necessary to do so for the purpose of deciding whether on balance the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure. Vide Conway v. Rimmer\n\n(supra) at pages 953, 979, 98 l and 993. This residual power of the court to inspect the document has also been recognised in Australian Law by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Sankey v.\n\nWhitlam(1).\n\nWe do not see any reason why under Indian Law the Court should be denied this residual power to inspect the document.\n\nIt is true that under section 162 the Court cannot inspect the document if it relates to affairs of State, but this bar comes into operation only if the document is established to be one relating to affairs of State. If, however, there is any doubt whether the document does relate to affairs of State, the residual power which vests in the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of determining whether the disclosure of the document would be injurious to public interest and the document is therefore one relating to atf airs of State, is not\n\n(1) 21 Australian Law Reports 505.\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA excluded by section 162.\n\nThis Court in fact held in no uncertain terms in Raj Narain' s case (supra) where an objection against the disclosure of the Blue Book was take~ on behalf of the State under section 123, that if the Court was not satisfied with the affidavit objecting to the disclosure of the document, the Court may inspect\n\nthe document.\n\nRay, C.J. observed at two places while dealing with the objection against the diselosure of ti1e Blue Book under section 123 that \"If the Court would yet like to satisfy itself, the Court may see the document. This will be the inspection of the document by the Court.\" and \"If the Court in spite of the affidavit wishes to inspect the document, the Court may do so.\" Mathew, J. also pointed out that in Amarchand Butail v. Union of India & Others(1), this Court inspected the document in order to see whether it related to affairs of State.\n\nThere can therefore, be no doubt that even where a claim for immunity against disclosure of a doculllent is made under section 123, the Court may in an appropriate case inspect the document in order to satisfy itself whether its disclosure would, in the particular case before it, be injurious to public interest and the claim for immunity must therefore be up-held.\n\nOf course this power of inspection is a power to be sparingly exercised, only if the Court is in doub.t, after considering the affidavit, if any, filed by the minister or the secretary, the issues in the case and the relevance of the document whose disclosure is sought.\n\nSince, in the present case, the affidavit of T. N. Chaturvedy claiming immunity against disclosure was made at a late stage of the proceedings and the claim for immunity was in respect of a new class of documents which has so far not come up for judicial consideration and we were in doubt, even after considering the affid1vit, whether the correspondence whose disclosure was sought on behalf of the petitioners and S. N.\n\nKumar was of such a character that its disclosure would, on an overall view after weighing the two a'pects of public interest referred to above, be injurious to public interest, we inspected the correspondence for ourselves for the purpose of deciding whether or not it should be ordered to be disclosed.\n\nNow as we have already pointed out above, it is for the court to decide the claim for immunity against disclosure made under section 123 by weighing the competing aspects of public interest and deciding which, in the particular case before the court, predominates.\n\nThe court is not bound by the affidavit made by the minister or the secretary because the minister or the secretary would be concerned\n\n(1)\n\nAIR 1964 SC 1658.\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 621\n\nprimarily and almost exclusively with the assertion of the public interest which would be injured by the disclosure of the document and he would have very little concern, if at all, with the public interest in fair administration of justice and in fact he would not be in a position to appreciate and assess the relative importance of the two competing public interest so as to be able to judge as to which in the particular case before the Court should be allowed to prevent.\n\nWhat should be the relative weight to be attached to each aspect of public interest is a question which the court would be best qualified to decide and not the minister or the secretary. That is why in Convey v. Rimmer (supra) Lord Reid, while rejecting the notion that a minister's claim of immunity was conclusive, pointed out at page 943 that the minister who withholds production of a document has no duty to consider the degree of public interest involved in a particular case in frustrating the due administration of justice, if not mattering to the minister at all whether the result of withholding the document would merely be to deprive a litigant of some evidence on a minor issue in a case of little importance or on the other hand, to make it impossible to do justice in a case of the greatest importance.\n\nThe court would of course consider the affidavit made by the minister or the secretary and give it due weight and importance, but ultimately it is the court which will have to determine which aspect of public interest must prevail and whether the claim for immunity against disclosure should be upheld or not.\n\nThis was most felicitously expressed by Lord Radcliffe in the Scottish appeal of Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board\n\n(supra) where the learned Law Lord said :\n\n\"The power reserved to the court is therefore a power to order production even though the public interest is to some extent affected prejudicially. This amounts to a recognition that more than one aspect of the public interest may have to be surveyed in reviewing the question whether a document which would be available to a party in a civil suit between private parties is _not to be available to the party engaged in a suit with the Crown. The interests of government, for which the Minister should speak with full authority, do not exhaust the public interest.\n\nAnother aspect of that interest is seen in the need that impartial justice should be done in the courts of law, not least between citizen and Crown, and that a litigant who has a case to maintain should not be deprived of the means of its proper presentation by anythin~ less th!l, n a wei$hty public reason.\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nIt does not seem to me unreasonable to expect that the court would be better qualified than minister to measure the importance of such principles in application to the parti cular case that is before it.\n\n\"Mathew, J. also observed to the same effect in his concurring B opinion in Raj Naraian's case (supra):\n\n\"The claim of the executive to exclude evidence is more likely to operate to subserve a partial interest, viewed exclusively from a narrow depa1tmental angle. It is impossible for it to see or give equal weight to another matter, namely, that justice should be done and seen to be done.\n\nWhen there are more aspects of public interest to be considered, the court will, with reference to the pending litigation, be in a better position to decide where the weight of public interest predominates.\"\n\nThe court will therefore have to put in the scales against the injury to public interest which may be caused by the disclosure of the document, the likely injury to the cause of injustice by non-disclosure and both will have to be assessed and weighed and it will have to be determined on which side the balance tilts.\n\nNow obviously the weight of the Jike!y injury to the cause of justice will vary according to the nature of the proceeding in which the disclosure is sought, the relevance of the document and )he degree of likelyhood that the document will be of importance in the litigation. The particular nature of the proceeding and the importance of the document in the determination of the issues arising in it are vital considerations to be taken into account in determining what are the relevant aspects of public interest which are to be weighed and what is the outcome cf that weighing process. Perhaps the most striking example of the way in which the nature of the case will bear upon the judicial process of weighing aspects of public interest is afforded by the well recognised rule that where a document is necessary to support the defence of an accused person whose liberty is at stake in a criminal trial, it must be disclosed whatever be the nature of the document, because, as observed by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in D. V. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1977) 2 Weekly Law Reports 207, \"the public interest that no innocent man should be convicted of crime is so powerful that it outweighs the genc;:r11l .Public interest\" which\n\nI ...\n\n...\n\n.... ,-\n\nS, P, GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwatl, J.) 623\n\nmight be injured by the disclosure of the document.\n\nLord Keith also emphasized the necessity of taking the particular nature of the proceeding into account in the balancing process, when he said in Glasgow Co-poration v. Central L'lnd Board (supra) that \"everything must depend on the particular circumstances of the case. It is impossible to lay down broad and general rules.\" So also a Sankey\n\nv. Whit/am (supra) the High Court of Australia pointed out that the character of the proceeding in which the claim for immunity against disclosure is raised and the importance of the document in the determination of the issues arising in the proceeding are of extreme relevance in deciding which way the balance of public interest lies There, the question was whether in a proceeding alleging offences against Mr. Whitlam, a former Prime Minister and others, certain papers and documents which were relevant to the issues arising in the proceeding were entitled to public interest immunity so as to be protected against disclosure.\n\nThe High Court of Australia nega tived the claim for immunity and in the course of his judgment, Stephen, J. laid the greatest stress on the character of the proceeding and pointed out its triple significance in the determination of the claim:\n\n\"First, it makes it very likely that, for the prosecution to be successful, its evidence must include documents of a class hitherto regarded as undoubtedly the subject of Crown privilege. But then to accord privilege to such documents as a matter of course is to come close to conferring immunity from conviction upon those who may occupy or may have occupied high offices of State if proceeded against in relation to their conduct in those offices. Those in whom resides the power ultimately to decide whether or not to claim privilege wHI in fact be exercising a far more potent power : by a decision to claim privilege dismissal of the charge will be well-nigh ensured.\n\nSecondly, and assuming for the moment that there should prove to be any substance in the present charges, their character must raise doubts about the reasons customarily given as justifying a claim to Crown pl'ivilege for classes of documents, being the reasons in fact relied upon in this case. Those reasons, the need to safeguard the proper functioning of the executive arm of government and of the public service, seem curiously inappropriate\n\n624 SUPREME CoURT ilEPORTs [i982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nwhen to uphold the claim is to prevent successful prosecution of the charges : inappropriate because what is charged is itself the grosaly improper functioning of that very arm of government and of the public service which assists it. Thirdly, the high offices which were occupied by those charged and the nature of the conspiracies sought to be attributed to them in those offices must make it a matter of more than usual public interest that in the disposition of the charges the course of justice be in no way unnecessarily impeded. For such charges to have remained pending and unresolved for as Jong as they have is bad enough; if they are now to be met with a claim to Crown privilege, invoked for the protection of the proper functioning of the executive government, some high degree of public interest for non-disclosure should be shown before the privilege should be accorded.\"\n\nThe nature of the proceeding in which the claim for immunity arose was regarded as an important factor influencing the decision of the court in rejecting the claim and ordering production of the documents. It would thus seem clear that in the weighing process which the court has to perform in order to decide which of the two aspects of public interest should be given predominance, the character of the proceeding, the issues arising in it and the likely effect of the documents on the determination of the issues must form vital considerations, for they would affect the relative weight to be given to each of the respective aspects of public interest when placed in the scales.\n\nBearing these observations in mind, we must now proceed to examine the claim for immunity against disclosure in respect of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar. It was a class immunity which was claimed in respect of this correspondence and the protected class was said to consist of correspondence between the Law Minister or other high level functionary of the Central Government, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief Minister or the Law , Minister of the State Government and the Chief Justice of India in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a High Court Judge or a Supreme Court Judge or transfer of a High Court Judge and the notings made by these constitutional functionaries in that behalf.\n\nThe argument was\n\n' 1\n\ns.P. GtlPrA v.\n\nUNION (Bhagvati, i.) 625\n\nthat the documents belonging to this class are immune from dis- A closure, irrespective of their contents, because it is in national interest and also necessary for maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and preserving the confidence of the people in the integrity of the judicial process that documents belonging to this class should be withheld from disclosure.\n\nNow there are a few prefatory remarks we would like to make before embarking upon an examination of this argument. In the first place, it is necessary to bear in mind that the burden of establishing a claim for class immunity is very heavy on the person making the claim. Lord Reid pointed out in Reg. v. Lewes Justices, Ex parte Home Secretray (supra) that the speeches in Convey v. Rimmer (supra) made it clear that there is a heavy burden of proof on any authority which makes a claim for class immunity.\n\nThe claim for class immunity is an extraordinary claim because it is , based not upon the contents of the document in question but upon its membership of a class whatever be its contents and therefore the court should be very slow in upholding such a broad claim which is contradictory, if not destructive, of the concept of open government.\n\nSecondly, it is true, as pointed out earlier, that classes of documents to which the immunity may be accorded are not closed and in the life of a fast cha ngi ng society rapidly growing and developing under the impact of vast scientific and technological advances new class or classes of documents may come into existence to which the immunity may have to be granted in public interest, but that should only be as a highly exceptional measure. It is only under the severest compulsion of the requirement of public interest that the court may extend the immunity to any other class or classes of documents and in the context of our commitment to an open government with the concommitent right of the citizen to know what is happening in the government, the court should be reluctant to expand the classes of documents to which immunity may be granted. The court must on the contrary move in the direction of attenuating the protected class or classes of documents, because by and large secrecy is the badge of an authoritarian government.\n\nWe may point out once again though it be at the cost of repetition, that even in regard to documents belonging to the class which has been judicially recognised as entitled to immunity, the law must now be taken to be wellsettled that the immunity is not absolute.\n\nThe public interest in non-disclosure of a document belonging to this class may in an appropriate case yield to the public interest that in the administration of justice, the court should have the fullest possible access to every relevant document and in that event, the document would be liable to be disclosed even though it belongs to the protected class.\n\n626 SUPREME COURT REPORts i 19 82) 2 s.c.1l\n\nThe executive cannot by merely invoking the scriptural formula of class immunity defeat the cause of justice by withholding a document which is essential to do justice bet ween the parties, for otherwise the doctrine of class immunity would become a frightful weapon in the hands of the executive for burying its mistakes, covering up its inefficiencies and sometimes even hiding its corruption. Every claim for immunity in respect of a document, whatever be the ground on which the immunity is claimed and whatever be the nature of the document, must stand scrutiny of the court with reference to one and only one test, namely, what does public interest require-disclosure or nondisclosure. The doctrine of class immunity is therefore no longer impregnable; it does not any more deny judicial scrutiny; it is no more a mantra to which the court pays obeisance.\n\nWhenever class immunity is claimed in respect of a document, the court has to weigh in the scales the one aspect of public interest which requires that the document should not be disclosed against the other that the court in performing its functions should not be denied access to relevant document and decide which way the balance lies.\n\nAnd this exercise has to be performed in the context of the democratic ideal of an open government.\n\nIf we approach the problem before us in the light of these observations, it will be clear that the class of documents consisting of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister or other high level functionary of the Central Government, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice.of India in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a High Court Judge or Supreme Court Judge or the transfer of a High Court Judge and the notes made by these constitutional functionaries in that behalf cannot be regarded as a protected class entitled to immunity against disclosure. It is undoubtedly true that appointment or non-appointment of a High Court Judge or a Supreme Court Judge and transfer of a High Court Judge are extremely important matters affecting the quality and efficiency of the judicial institution and it is therefore absolutely essential that the various constitutional functionaries concerned with these matters should be able to freely and frankly express their views in regard to these matters. But we do not think that the candour and frankness of these constitutional functionaries in expressing their views would be affected if they felt that the correspondence exchanged between them would be liable to be disclosed in a subsequent judicial proceeding. The constitutional functionaries concerned in this exercise are holders of high constitutional offices such as the Chief Justice of a High Court and\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati. i.) 621\n\nthe Chief Justice of India and it would not be fair to them to say that they are made of such weak stuff that they would hesitate to express their views with complete candour and frankness if they apprehend subsequent disclosure.\n\nWe have no doubt that high level constitutional functionaries like the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India would not be deterred from performing their constitutional duty of expressing their views boldly and fearlessly even if they were told that the correspondence containing their views might subsequently be disclosed. If, to quote the words of Lord Pearce in Convey v. Rimmer {supra) \"there are countless teachers at schools and universities, countless employers of labour, who write candid reports, unworried by the outside chance of disclosure,\" there is no reason to suspect that high level constitutional functionaries like the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India would flinch and falter in expressing their frank and sincere views when performing their constitutional duty. We have alredy dealt with the argument based on the need for candour and frankness and we must reject it in its application to the case of holders of high constitutional offices like the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India. Be it noted-and of this we have no doubt-that our Chief Justices and Judges are made of sterner stuff; they have inherited a long and ancient tradition of independence and impartiality; they are by training and experience as also by their oath of office dedicated to the cause of justice administered without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and in fact there is no power on earth which can deflect them from the path of rectitude. They are, to quote the words from the famous verse from Manasollasa <::~~1!1' fcr<:rf;; rn: I and f~TllT lf'ff'Gr<'f: and we find it difficult to believe that they would not act as Judges but as weak kneed and effete individuals afraid to express their views Jest they might come to be known to others and provoke criticism.\n\nThe Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India would undoubtedly expect confidentiality while expressing their views but that is no ground for upholding a claim for class immunity in respect of the correspondence exchanged between them and the Central Government or the State Government.\n\nConfidentiality is not a bead of privilege and the need for confidentiality of high level communications without more cannot sustain a claim for immunity against disclosure. Vide : Science Research Council v.\n\nNasse(1) and particularly the observations of Lord Scarman at page 697 and 698.\n\nEven if a document be confidential, it must be pro-\n\n(I) [1979] 3 AH England Reports 673.\n\nsurllEME cduilr REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.ft.\n\nduced, notwithstanding its confidentiality, if it is necessary for fairly disposing of the case, unless it can be shown that its disclosure would otherwise be injurious to public interest.\n\nNow we fail to see how in cases of this kind where nonappointment of an additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge is challenged, the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them, could at all said to be injurious to public interest.\n\nWe have already pointed out above that so far as non-appointment of an additional Judge for a further term is concerned, the only two grounds on which the decision not to appoint can be assailed are : firstly, that there was no full and effective consultation by the Central Government with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India before reaching the decision and secondly, that the decision is mala fide or based on irrelevant considerations.\n\nNow obviously these twc grounds cannot be made good by a petitioner unless the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them are dis closed, for they alone would furnish the relevant evidence showing whether these two grounds are satisfied or not. These documents would show or atleast shed light on the question whether there was full and effective consultation between the Central Government on the one .hand and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India on the other, because, as already, pointed out by us, such consul cation would ordinarily be in writing-as . it ought to be-and they would also, in cases where such consultation has taken place, indicate the reasons which have weighed with the Central Government in reaching its decision.\n\nApart from these documents, there would be no other documentary evidence available to the petitioner to establish that there was no full and effective consultation or that the decision of the Central Government was based on irrelevant considerations and if an affidavit is made by an appropriate authority of the Cel'ltral Government or by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the Chief Justice of India stating that every releva11t aspect of the question was .discussed and there was full and effective consultation, it would be well-nigh impossible for the petitioner to successfully challenge the decision of the Central Government. It is only through these documents that the petitioner can, if at all, hope to show that there was no full and effective consultation by the\n\ns.1'. G\\JPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 629\n\nCentral Government with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India or that the decision of the Central Government was mala fide or based on irrelevant grounds and therefore, to accord immunity against disclosure to these documents would be tantamount to summarily throwing out the challenge against the discontinuance of the additional Judge.\n\nIt would have the effect of placing the Unioo of India, whose decision is challenged, in an unassailable-almost invincible-position \"t where it can, by claiming class immunity in respect of these documents, ensure the rejection of the writ petition. The harm that would be caused to the public interest in justice by the non-disclosure of these documents would in the circumstances far outweigh the injury which may possibly be caused by their disclosure, because the non-disclosure would almost inevitably result in the dismissal of the writ petition and consequent denial of justice even though the claim of the petitioner may be true and just. Moreover, it may be noted that the discontinuance of an additional Judge by the Central Government is a serious matter and if such discontinuance is mala fide or bassed on irrelevant grounds, it would tend to affect the independence of the judiciary and it is therefore necessary in order to maintain public confidence in the independent functioning of the judiciary that the people should know whether the constitutional requirements were complied with before the decision was taken not to continue the additional Judge and whether any oblique motivations or irrelevant considerations influenced the Central Government in reaching that decision.\n\nThe charge against the Central Government in the first group of present writ petitions was that there was no full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India before the decision was reached by the Central Government in regard to S. N. Kumar and in any event, the decision of the Central Government was actuated by oblique or improper motives. This was a serious charge against the Central Government and there can be no doubt that it would be very much in public interest that the necessary documents throwing light on the truth or otherwise of this charge should be disclosed, so that the full facts may be known to the public and the doubts raised and entertained about the influence of extraneous factors in the case of S. N. Kumar should be resolved and removed. It is significant to note that had there not been disclosure of these documents, a certain doubt or misgiving would have continued to prevail in the public mind that the decision to discontinue S. N. Kumar as an additional Judge was taken by the Central Government without full and effective consul-\n\n630 SUPREME COlJRt Ril!>OR.tS (19S2) 2 s.c.R..\n\ntation of the Chief Justice of India and that this decision was motivated by oblique or irrelevant considerations. But, as we shall presently point out these documents when disclosed helped to clear this doubt an :I remove this misgiving by explaining to the people what were the true facts behind the decision to discontinue S. N.\n\nKumar as an additional Judge.\n\nFurthermore, it may be noted that when the charge against the Central Government is that it bas discontinued S. N. Kumar as an additional Judge for oblique or improper reasons and thereby sought to interfere with the independence f of the judiciary, it would be singularly inappropriate to exclude these documents which constitute the only evidence, if at all, for establishing this charge, by saying that the disclosure of these documents would impair the efficient functioning of the judicial institution. The interest of the wider community in getting to the bottom of this charge is so great that it cannot be allowed to be impeded by a mere rule of evidence. Nor can the decision to admit or exclude be safely left to the Central Government which is itself charged with wrongful or improper conduct.\n\nThese self-same reasons must apply equally in negativing the claim for immunity in respect of the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to the transfer of a High Court Judge including the Chief Justice of a High Court. These documents are extremely material for deciding whether there was full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India before effeting the transfer and the transfer was made in public interest, both of which are, according to the view taken by us, justiciable issues and the non-disclosure of these documents would seriously handicap the petitioner in showing that there was no full and effective consultation with the Chid Justice of India or that the transfer was by way of punishment and not in public interest. It would become almost impossible for the petitioner, without the aid of these documents, to establish his case, even if it be true.\n\nMoreover, the transfer of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court is a very serious matter and if made arbitrarily or capriciously or by way of punishment or without public interest motivation, it would erode the independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution and therefore when such a charge is made, it is in public interest that it should be fully investigated and all relevant documents should be produced before the Court so that the full facts may come before the people, who in a democracy are the ultimate arbiters. It would be plainly contrary to public interest to allow the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 631\n\ninquiry into such a charge to be baulked or frustrated by a claim -'+ for immunity in respect of documents essential to the Inquiry. It is also important to note th at when the transfer of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court is challenged, the burden of showing that there was full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the transfer was effected in public interest is on the Union of India and it cannot withhold the relevant documents in its possession on a plea of immunity and expect to discharge this burden by a mere statement in an affidavit.\n\nBesides, if the reason .. • for excluding these documents is to safeguard the proper functioning\n\n~ of the higher organs of the State including the judiciary, then that reason is wholly inappropriate where what is charged is the grossly improper functioning of those very organs. It is therefore obvious that, in a proceeding where the transfer of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court is challenged, no immunity can be claimed in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law\n\nMini8ter and the Chief Justice of India and the notings made by them, since, on the balance, the non-disclosure of these documents '7 would cause greater injury to public interest than what may be caused by their disclosure.\n\nBut, quite apart from these considerations, we do not understand how the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice Of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes made by them in regard to non-appointment of an additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge can be detrimental to public interest. It was argued by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India that if the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India differ in their views in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment, the disclosure 0f their views would cause considerable embarrassment because the rival views might be publicly debated and there might be ca.)tious and un-informed criticism which might have the effect of undermining the prestige and dignity of one or the other Chi., f Justice and shaking the confidence of the people in the administration of justice. If the difference in the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India becomes publicly known, contended the learned Solicitor General it might create a difficult situation for the Chief Justice of the High Court vis-a vis the Chief Justice of India and if despite the adverse opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the additional Judge\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nis continued for a further term, and the additional Judge knows that he has been so continued over-ruling the view of the Chief Justice of the High Court, it might lead to a certain amount of friction which would be detrimental to the proper functioning of the High Court.\n\nSo also if an additional Judge is continued for a further term accepting the view expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and rejecting the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, it would again create a piquant situation because it would affect the image of the Chief Justice of India in the public eyes.\n\nMoreover, a feeling might be created in the mind of the public that a person who was regarded as unsuitable for judicial app, Jintment by one or the other of the two Chief Justices, has been appointed as a Judge and\n\nthe litigants would be likely to have reservations about him and the confidence of the people in th~ administration of justice would be affected. The learned Solicitor General contended that for these reasons it would be injurious to public interest to disclose the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nWe have given our most anxious thought to this argument urged by the learned Solicitor Genera I, but we do not think we can accept it.\n\nWe do not see any reason why, if the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes -made by them, in regard to discontinuance of an additional Judge are relevant to the issues arising in a judicial proceeding, they should not be disclosed.\n\nThere might be diffe, rence of views between the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India but so long as the views are held bona fide by the two Chief Justices, we do not see why they should he worried about the disclosure of their views ? Why should they feel embarrassed by public discussion or debate of the views expressed by them when they have acted bona fide with the greatest care and circumspection and after mature deliberation.\n\nDo Judges sitting on a Division Bench not differ from each other in assessment. of evidence and reach directly contrary conclusions on questions of fact ? Do they not express their judicial opinions boldly and fearlessly leaving it to the jurists to decide which of the two differring opinions is correct? If two Judges do not feel any embarrassment in coming to different findings of fact which may be contrary to each other, why should two Chief Justices feel embarrassed if the opinions given by them in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment differ and such differing\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 633\n\nopmtons are made kn0 wn to the public. Not only tolerance but acceptance of bona fide difference of opinion is a part of judicial discipline and we find it difficult to believe that the disclosure of their differing opinions might create a strain in the relationship between the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. We have no doubt that the Chief Justice of the High Court would come to his own independent opinion on the material before him and he would not surrender his judgment to the Chief Jug. tice of India, merely because the Chief Justice of India happens to be head of the judiciary having a large voice in the appointment of Judges on the Supreme Court Bench.\n\nEqually we are confident that merely because the Chief Justice of the High Court has come to a different opinion and is not prepared to change that opinion despite the persuation of the Chief Justice of India, no offence would be taken by the Chief Justice of India and he would not harbour any feeling of resentment against the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\nBoth the Chief Justices have trained judicial minds and both of them would have the humility to recognise that they can be mistaken in their opinions.\n\nWe do not therefore see any real possibility of estrangement or even embarrassment for the twci Chief Justices, if their differing views in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appoinment are disclosed. We also find it difficult to agree that if the differing views of the two Chief Justices become known to the outside world, the public discussion and debate that might ensue might have the effect of lowering the dignity and prestige of one or the other of the two Chief Justices.\n\nWhen the differing Yiews of the two Chief Justices are made public as a result of disclosure, there would certainly be public discussion and debate in regard to those views with some criticizing one view and some criticizing the other, but that cannot be helped in a democracy where the right of free speech and expression is a guaranteed right and if the views have been expressed by the two Chief Justices with proper care and deliberation and a. full sense of responsibility in discharge of a constitutional duty, there is no reason why the two Chief Justices should worry about public criticism. We fail to see how such public criticism could have the effect of undermining the prestige and dignity of one or the other Chief Justice.\n\nSo long as the two Chief Justices have acted honestly and bona fide wi1h full consciousness of the heavy responsibility that rests upon them in .matters of this kind, we do not think that any amount of public criticism can affect their prestige and dignity.\n\nBut if either of the two Chief Justices has acted carelessly or improperly or irresponsibly\n\n\n[ 1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\nor out of oblique motive, his view would certainly be subjected to public criticism and censure and that might show him in poor light and bring him down in the esteem of the people, but that will be the price which he will have to pay for his remissness in discharge of constitutional duty.\n\nNo Chief Justice or Judge should be allowed to hide his improper and irresponsible action under the cloak of secrecy. If any Chief Justice or Judge has behaved improperly or irresponsibly or in a manner not befitting the high office he holds, there is no reason why his action should not be exposed to public gaze.\n\nWe believe in an open government and openness in government does not mean openness merely in the functioning of the executive arm of the State. The same openness must characterise the functioning of the judicial apparatus including judicial appointments and transfers. Today the process of judicial appointments and transfers is shrouded in mystery.\n\nThe public does not know how Judges are selected and appointed or transferred and whether any and if so what, principles and norms govern this process. The exercise of the power of appointment and transfer remains a sacred ritual whose mystery is confined only to a handful of high priests, namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief Minister of the State, the Law Minister of the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment or non appointment of a High Court Judge and the Law Minister of the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge or transfer of a High Court Judge. The mystique of this process is kept secret and confidential between just a few individuals, not more than two or four as the case may be, and the possibility cannot therefore be ruled out that howsoever highly placed may be these individuals, the process may on occasions result is making of wrong appointments and transfers and may also at times, though fortunately very rare, lend itself to nepotism, political as well as personal and even trade off.\n\nWe do not see any reason why this process of appointment and transfer of Judges should be regarded as so sacrosanct that no one should be able to pry into it and it should be protected against disclosure at all events and in all circumstanees.\n\nWhere it becomes relevant in a judicial proceeding, why should the Court and the opposite party and through them, the people not know what are the reasons for which a particular appointment is made or a particular additional\n\nJud.!!e is discontinued or a particular transfer is effected.\n\nWe fail to se what harm can be caused by the disclosure of true facts when they become relevant in a judicial proceeding. In fact, the possi-\n\n• .+I\n\n-..\n\n-,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 635\n\nbility of subsequent disclosure would act as an effective check against carelessness, impetuosity, arbitrariness or mala fides on the part of the Central Government, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and ens•ue bona fide and correct approach, objective and dispassionate consideration, mature thought and deliberation and proper application of mind on their part in discharging their constitutional duty in regard to appointments and transfers of Judges. It is true that if the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment become known to the public, they might reflect adversely on the competence, character or integrity of the additional Judge but the additional Judge cannot legitimately complain about it, because it would be at his instance that the disclosure would be ordered and the views of the two Chief Justices made public. If the additional Judge is appointed for a further term either accepting the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of the. High Court in preference to that of the Chie.f Justice of India or vice versa, the question of disclosure of differing opinions of the two Chief Justices would not arise, because no one would know that the two Chief Justices were not agreed on continuing the additional Judge for a further term, and therefore, ordinarily, there would be no challenge to the appointment of the additional Judge. It is only if the additional Judge is not continued for a further term that he or some one on his behalf may challenge the decision of the Central Government not to continue him and in that event, if he asks for disclosure of the relevant correspondence embody- . ing the views of the two Chief Justices, and if such disclosure is ordered, he has cnly himself to thank for it and in any event, in such a case, there would be no harm done to public i aterest if the views expressed by the two Chief justices become known to the public.\n\nWe are therefore of the view that, in the two groups of writ petitions which are before us, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public jqt<; rst 1?¥ heir disclosure anc\\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nhence these documents were liable to be disclosed in response to the demand of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and S. N. Kumar. These were the reasons for which we directed by our order dated 16th October, 81 that these documents be disclosed to the petitioners and S. N. Kumar.\n\nB Pacts of S.N. Kumar's Case: Whetherfull & effective consultation.\n\nThat takes us to the next question as to whether there was full and effective consultation between the President which means the Central Government on the one hand and the Chief Justice of India on the other.\n\nArticle 217 provides that every Judge of the High Court shall be appointed by fre President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief\n\nJutice of the High Court.\n\nWe have already rejected the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that the requirement of consultation is necessary only where a person is being appointed a Judge of the High Court and not where a decision is taken not to appoint him. We have, of course, made it clear that where the name 0f a person is proposed for appointment as a Judge of the High Court for the first time, he, having no right to be considered for such a appointment, is not entitled to insist that the proposal for his appointment, whether initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the State Government or the Chief Justice of India, should be subj(cted to the process of consultation set out in Article 217 and his name can be dropped without any such consultation. But, as pointed O'Jt by us in an earlier portion of the judgment, the position is different in case of an additional Judge, for though an additional Judge has no right, on the expiration of his term, to be appointed\n\nan additional Judge for a further term or to be appointed a permanent Judge, has still a right to be considered f\"r such appointment and the Central Government has to decide whether or not to appoint him after consultation with the three constitutional functionaries mentioned in Article 217.\n\nHere, in the present case, Shri S.N.\n\nKumar was an additional Judge whose term expired on 6th June, 1981 and he was entitled to be considered for appointment as an additionnl Judge for a further term and the Central Government certainly could, after considering his name, decide in the bona fide exercise of its power, not to appoin him, but that could be done only after consultation with the three constitutional functionaries specified in Article 217 which included the Chief Justice of India. It therefore becomes necessary to consider whether the Central Government arrived at its decision not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an addi-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 637\n\ntkmal Judge for a further term after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nWe have already discussed the true nature and scope of consultation required under Article 217 and pointed out that the consultation contemplated by that Article is full and effective consultation where the relevant facts bearing upon appointment or non-appointment are brought to the notice of the Central Government and the three constitutional functionaries required to be consulted and the opinion of each of the three constitutional functionaries is taken on identical material and then a decision is reached by the Central Government whether or not to appaint the person concerned as a Judge, whether additional or permanent.\n\nNow Article 217 does not require that any particular procedure should be followed for full and effective consultation nor does it insist that the rf:!evant facts on which the final decision of the Central Government is based shauld be conveyed to the other three constitutional functionaries in any particular manner or by the Central Government itself.\n\nWhat is necessary to ensure full and effective consultation within the meaning of Article 217 is that the Central Government as well as each of the three consititutional functionaries required to be consulted \"must have for its consideration full and identical facts which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision\" and it is immaterial as to how such \"full and identical facts\" are conveyed by one authority to the other. It is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of Article 217 if the self-same facts on which the final decision is taken by the Central Government are placed before each of the three consitutional functionaries required to be consulted and their opinion is taken on the basis of such facts whatever be the manner in which those facts are brought to their notice.\n\nLet us examine whether in the present case this constitutional requirement was satisfied before the decision was taken by the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term or to paraphrase it in the context of the controversy raised on behalf of the petitioners, whether the full and identical facts on which the decision was taken by the Central Government were placed before the Chief\n\nfostice of India.\n\nThe unfortunate drama leading to the non-appointment of SN.\n\nKumar as an additional Judge for a further term begins with the ktter dated I 9th February, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of\n\nDelhi to the Law Minister. This letter was written by the Chief H Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister, becaU§e the term for which\n\n638 SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nS.N. Kumar was originally appointed as an additional Judge was due to expire on 6th March, 1n1.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out in this letter that the arrears pending in the Delhi High Court undoubtedly justified the appointment of additional Judges but he was not in a position to recommend the \"extension for iustice Kumar'' for an additional term for three reasons, namely, (I) There were serious complaints against S.N. Kumar both oral and in writing.\n\nThese complaints had been received hy him direct as well as through the Law Minister.\n\nHe had examined these complaints and found that some of the complaints were not without basis; (2) S.N. Kumar had not been very helpful in disposing of cases; and (3) some responsible members of the Bar and some of the colleagues of the Chief Justice whom he did not think it proper to name had also expressed doubts about S.N. Kumar's integrity. The Chief Justice frankly stated that he had no investigating ageney to conclusively find out whether the complaints against S.N. Kumar were genuine or not, but added that \"all the same the complaints have been persistent.\" He pointed out that in the circumstances it was his painful duty not to recommend an extension for S.N. Kumar but added that the Law Minister might examine the matter at his end and take such steps as he thought proper. Now a suggestion was made by Mr. R.K. Garg, learned advocate appearing on behalf of S.N. Kumar that this letter was addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi .to the Law Minister pursuant to a conspiracy between the two to discontinue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge.\n\nThe suggestion was that the Chief Justice of Delhi had played into the bands of the Law Minister and written this letter recommending n0n-appoin1ment of S.N. Kumar in order to oblige the Law Minister. We are afraid we cannot term this suggestion as anything but unfounded. There is absolutely not a little of evidence in support of such a suggestion.\n\nThe charge of conspiracy is at all times a very serious charge and it must not be lightly made more particularly when it is directed against persons holding high offices and such persons are not impleaded as respondents in the Writ Petition. Here it is difficult 1o see any justification at all for levelling a charge of conspiracy agaimt 1Je Chief Justice of Delhi and the Law Minister. The Chief Justice of Delhi was appointed acting Chief Justice on 27th June, 1980 and he was confirmed as permanent Chief Justice with effect from 8th January, 1981 and therefore on the date of the letter, his position as Chief Justice was not at all in jeopardy and be was not dependent on the H Central Government or the Law Minister for his office.\n\nThere were also no disputes or differences between the Chief Justice of Delhi and S.N. l(umar prior to the <Jat(j) pf the letter and no suggestion\n\n'f -\n\ns.i>. otJ:i>TA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 639\n\nhas been made on behalf of S.N. Kumar that the Chief Justice of Delhi had any animus or prejudice against him.\n\nNothing had transpired between the Chief Justice of Delhi and S.N. Kumar which might have induced the Chief Justice of Delhi to make a false all.egation or imputation against him.\n\nNor was any reason suggested as to why the Law Minister should have gone out of his way to see that S.N. Kumar was not continued as an additional Judge. It would indeed be going too far to suggest without a shred of evidence that the Chief Justice of Delhi was so deprived as to yield to the pNssure of the Law Minister and make a deliberately false imputation of lack of integrity against his colleague merely in order to oblige the Law Minister.\n\nIt is impossible to conceive of any earthly reason why the Chief Justice of Delhi should have gone to the length of condemning his colleague unless he had received complaints against him and he bona fide believed that some of these complaints were not without basis. The letter dated 19th February, 1981 in fact, contains inherent evidence to show that the Chief Justice of Delhi was acting bona fide in addressing that letter to the Law Minister.\n\nHe pointed out in the letter that he had received complaints against S.N. Kumar both oral and in writing and on examining these complaints he had found that some of them were not without basis but he frankly stated that he had no investigative machinery at his disposal and it was therefore not possible for him to l'ind conclusively whether these complaints were genuine or not.\n\nThis was a correct and proper approach to be adopted by a careful and responsible Chief Justice who had beard complaints against his coli:eague some of which appeared to him not without basis but in respect of which be was not in a position to state definitely whether they were true or not. Since some of the complaints appeared to him not without basis and responsible members of the Bar and some of his colleagues bad also complained to him against S.N.\n\nKumar, he naturally thought that it would not be right for him to recommend continuance of S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge.\n\nBut, at the same time, he made it clear that the Law Minister might examine the matter at his end and take such action as he thought fit.\n\nIt is impossible to conclude from this Jetter that the Chief Justice of Delhi acted improperly or irresponsibly in not recommending the continuance of S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge.\n\nIf what was stated by the Chief Justice of Delhi in this letter were true-and for the purpose of inquiry as to whether there was full and effective consultation, we must accept the facts as given in the letter as true for we are not concerned to inquire whether the facts on which the Chief Justice of Delhi based his opinion were true or not-the Chief\n\n640 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982i 2 s.c.R..\n\nJustice of Delhi could not be said to be unjustified in taking the view that S.N.Kumar should not be recommended for continuance as an additional Judge.\n\nWhile making his recommendation whether S.N. Kumar should be continued as an additional Judge or not, the Chief Justice of Delhi bad to consider the fitness and suitability of\n\nS.N. Kumar at the time and if there were complaints against S.N.\n\nKumar, some of which he did not find to be without basis and doubts about the integrity of S.N. Kumar were expressed by responsible members of the Bar and some of his own colleagues, the Chief Justice of Delhi could not be said to have acted unreasonably in declining to recommend S.N. Kumar for an extension. It ay be that on full and detailed investigation through an independent and efficient investigative machinery , the complaints and doubts against S.N.\n\nKumar might have been found to be unjustified but such a course would have been neither practicable nor desirable. In the first place, as pointed by the Chief Justice of Delhi himself, he had no investigative machinery at his disposal and if he wanted the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar to be investigated, he would have had to ask the Central Government to carry out such investigation through the Central Bureau of Investigation or the Intelligence Bureau or some such investigating ageney and that would have been clearly subversive of the independence of the judiciary.\n\nIt would have been most improper for the Chief Justice of Delhi to ask the Central Government to investigate into complaints or doubts against a sitting Judge of his Court. This Court has in unhesitating terms condemned the adoption of such a course by the High Court in the case of subordinate judiciary and much more so would it be reprehensible in the case ot sitting Judge of a High Court.\n\nMoreover, leaving the investigation of complaints and doubts against a sitting Judge in the hands of an investigative agency under the Control of a political Government would not be desirable because, apart from exposing the sitting Judge to unhealthy political pressures, it may not yield satisfactory result in all cases, because, such an investigation would not have the benefit of the guidance of a mature and experienced person like the Chief Justice who has lived a whole life time in the courts and who is closely and intimately connected with lawyers and Judges in the Court over which he presides. It would indeed be impossible for any one unfamiliar with the legal profession and the functioning of the courts to judge the genuineness or veracity of the sources from which information might be obtained in regard to a sitting Judge. It must, therefore, necessarily be left to the Chief Justice of the High Court to give his opinion in regard to\n\n~·\n\n\"-+ .\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v, iJNioN (Ehugwati, J.) 64i\n\nthe suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment on the basis of such information as he may gather by making his own inquiries. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have sufficient opportunities for judging the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment, because the additional Judge would be working with him in the same court and he would be in close contact with the members of the Bar and his own colleagues and if there is any thing wrong with the functioning of the Court or the Judges, he would be best in a position to know about it.\n\nIf an additional Judge does not enjoy good reputation for integrity, the Cb.ief Justice of the High Court would ordinarily come to know about it. Of course, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the information received by the Chief Justice of the High Court may at times be motivated or prejudiced, because the additional Judge has offended some member of the Bar or decided some case against a litigant.\n\nThese occupational hazards which beset the life of an additional Judge--in fact, even of a permanent Judge whether in the High Court or in the Supreme Court have unfortunately increased in recent times, because there has been a steady erosion of values and not only some interested politicians but also a few and fortunately their tribe is still small-lawyers and members of the public are prone to make wild and reckless allegations against Judges and impute motives for the decisions given by them. It is not realised by many that very often the judgments given by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are value judgments, because there are conflicting values competing for recognition by the Judge and the choice made by the Judge is largely dictated by his social philosophy and it is not possible to emphati cally assert that a particular view taken by one Judge is wrong and a different view taken by another Judge is right. The nature of the judicial process being what it is, it is inevitable that the view taken by a Judge, perfectly bonafide though it may be, may not accord with the expectations of a section or group of persons believing in a particular social or political philosophy, but that cannot be a ground affording justification for making imputation against the Judge or accusing him of lack of bonafides or charging him with surrender or subservence to the executive or to any other interest.\n\nThose who indulge in such personal attacks against Judges for the decisons given by them do not realise what incalculable damage they are doing to the judicial institution by destroying the confidence of the public in the integrity and inviolability of administration of justice. Unfortunately, it is the easiest thing to make false, reckless and irresponsible allegations against Judges in regard to their honesty and integrity\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.il.\n\nand in recent times the tendencey has grown to make such allegations against Judges because they have decided the case in a particular manner either against a dissatisfied litigant or contrary to the view held by a group or section of politicians or lawyers or members of the public.\n\nThe Judge against whom such allegations are made is defenceless because, having regard to the peculiar nature of the office held by him, he cannot enter the arena of conflict and raise or join a public controversy. This pernicious tendency of attributing motives to Judges has to be curbed, if the judicial institution is to survive as an effective instrument for maintenance of the rule of law in the country and this can happen only if politicians, lawyers and members of the public accept the judgments rendered by the Judges as bonafide expressions of their views and do not impute motives to Judges for the judgments given by them, even though they be adverse to the views held by them.\n\nBut unfortunately, the situation being what it is, we must emphasise with all the strength and earnest ness at our command that the Chief Justice of the High Court should exercise the greatest care and circumspection in judging the veracity of the information which he may receive from time to time in regard to the conduct or behaviour or integrity of an additional Judge of his Court. The Constitution has entrusted to him the task of giving his opinion in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment and on the basis of the information received by him or gathered as a result of inquiries made by him, he has to decide wisely and with responsibility whether or not he should recommend the appointment of an additional Judge for a further term.\n\nNow where the Chief Justice of the High Court is reasonably satisfied after the greatest care ond circumspection exercised by him as the holder of a high constitutional office to whom the Constitution has assigned an important function and in whom it has reposed a sacred trust, that the additional Judge in regard to whose suitability he has to give opinion, does not enjoy good reputation for integrity, he obviously cannot recommend such additional Judge for further appointment.\n\nIt is possible that the Chief Justice of the High Court may go wrong in a given case and arrive at an errone ous opinion in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for appointment for a further term and that may result in injustice to the additional Judge who may suffer by reason of such erroneous opinion but that cannot be helped because ultimately some constitutional functionary has got to be entrusted with the task of assess-\n\n...... ·\n\nS.1>. GUPTA v. UN10N (iJhagwati. J.) 643\n\ning the suitability of the person to be appointed an additional Judge or a permanent Judge and no better person can be found for this purpose than the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court may err in his assessment as anyone else may, fallibility being the attribute of every human being. But that is a risk which has necessarily to be taken and it cannot be avoided howsoever perfect may be the mechanism which human ingenuity can evolve. It may happen that the Chief Justice of the High Court, not being aware that the additional Judge whose term is about to expire does not enjoy good reputation for integrity may recommend his name for appointment for a further term though he is clearly ur.su1table for such appointment and equally it may happen that on the basis of the information available with him which information may be incorrect, the Chief Justice of the High Court may come to the opinion that the additional Judge whose suitability he is called upon to consider does not possess good reputation for integrity though in fact he is a person of sterling character and possesses a high degree of honesty and integrity.\n\nThese errors are inevitable in every process of assessment and the Constitution has sought to minimise them by entrusting the task of assessment to a high dignitary like the Chief Justice of the High Court who would be expected to act with a high sense of responsibility and, who by reason of training and experience, would be able to sift the grain from the chaff and arrive at a correct opinion on the material before him.\n\nWe might also at, this stage refer to one contention seriously pressed on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that what would be material to consider for the purpose of assessing the suitability of an a:dditional Judge for further appointment would be not whether the additional Judge enjoys good reputation for honesty and integrity but whether in fact he possesses honesty and integrity.\n\nThe argument of the petitioners was that if the additional Judge has the hall-mark of honesty and integrity \"he cannot be removed or dropped because unconfirmed reports say that he is Jacking in honesty and integrity\", for otherwise \"the reputation of every Judge would be at the mercy of rumours, gossips and uncon firmed reports\". We do not think this argument is well founded.\n\nIn the first place, it must be remembered that when the Chief Justice of the High Court is called upon to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment, he is not' required to adjudicate upon various matters bearing upon his suitability and to come to a definitive finding or conclusion in regard to such matters: Where the complaint against an additional Judge\n\n644 SUPREME COtJRt REPORi'S ( t 982] 2 s.c.it.\n\nis in regard to his integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court is not expected to hold a judicial or quasi judicial inquiry for the purpose of adjudicating whether the. additional Judge is, in fact, lacking in honesty and integrity. Such an inquiry against a Judge whether additional or permanent would not be permissible except in a proceeding for bis removal What the Chief Justice of the High Court has to do is merely to assess the suitability of the additional Judge for further appointment and where lack of integrity is alleged against him, the assessment can only be on the basis of his reputation for integrity. The point we are making will become abundantly clear if we take the case of a member of the Bar or the senior most District Judge who is for the first time considered for appointment as an additional or permanent Judge. The integrity of the person under consideration would undoubtedly be a relevant factor to be taken into account, but in assessing such factor the Chief Justice of the High Court would not be expected to hold a judicial or quasijudicial inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the person cocerned does. in fact, possess honesty and integity or is lacking in these qualities. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have to proeeed on the basis of the reputation for honesty and integrity enjoyed by the person under consideration and if, on the basis of the information gathered by him, the Chief Justice of the High Court comes to the view that such person does not enjoy good reputatio11 for integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court would be justified in not reommending such person for appointment.\n\nWhere a question of honesty and integrity of a Judge is concerned, it is almost impossible to come to a conclusive determination whether he is lacking in integrity or not, because experience shows that most. persons are not willing to speak if they know that they may be quoted and that in any event they are not prepared to testify in any judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry. It is therefore not enough in order to be able to recommended a person for appointment as a Judge to say that there is no proof of lack of integrity against him, because, if such were the test to be applied, there would be grave danger of persons lacking in integrity being appointed as Judges. The test which must be applied for the purpose of assessing the suitability of a person for appintment as a Judge must be whether the Chief Justice of the High Court or for the matter of that, any other constitutional authority concerned in the appointment, is satisfied about the integrity of the person under consideration. If the person under consideration does not enjoy reputation for honesty and integrity, it would not be possible for the Chief Justice of the High Court to say that he is satisfied about the integrity of such person and in such an event, the Chief Justice of the High Court would be justified in not\n\n; )...\n\ns.I>. GUPtA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 645\n\nrecommending such person for appointment; in fact, it would be his duty not to recommend such person. The publice injury which may be caused by appointment of a Judge lacking in integrity would be infinitely more than the public injury which may result from nonappointment of a competent Judge possessing integrity. If therefore the Chief Justice of Delhi found on inquiries made by him that some of the complaints made against S.N. Kumar were not without basis and doubts about the integrity or S.N. Kumar were expressed by responsible members of the Bar as also by some of his own colleagues, the Chief Justice of Delhi COl!ld not be said to be unjustified in writing the letter dated 19th February 1981 declining to recommend S.N.\n\nKumar for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term.\n\nWe may once again repeat that this assessment of S.N. Kumar by the Chief Justice of Delhi may have been erroneous and, as we shall point out a little later, the Chief Justice of India took the view that it was erroneous, but on no account can lack of bona fides be attributed to the Chief Justice of Delhi. On the bona fide view taken by him, the Chief Justice of Delhi did what it was his plainest duty in the circumstances to do.\n\nThere was also one other argument urged on behalf of the petitioners which we might conveniently dispose of at this stage, since it is an argument closely allied to the one which we have just discussed and rejected. The petitioners contended that fair play and justice required that before an additional Judge is dropped on the ground that he is lacking in integrity or that he does not enjoy good reputation for integrity, he must have an opportunity of showing cause against such a serious imputation made against his honour and integrity. This contention is also in our opinion without merit and the answer to it is provided by what we have already discussed above.\n\nWhat the Chief Justice of the High Court is required to do is to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge for further appointment and he has therefore to consider various matters relevant to the question of appointment and give his opinion to the President. He does not hold a judicial or quasi judicial inquiry into the honour and integrity of the additional Judge nor does he arrive at any conclusive finding or determination.\n\nHe merely gives his personal opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge in discharge of the constitutional duty laid upon him and there is therefore no question of any opportunity being afforded to the additional Judge before the Chief Justice of the High Court arrives at his opinion. When the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his opinion, it is a confidential comstJPkllMll COURT REPORTS [i 9811 2 s.c.tt\n\nmunication which would not ordinarily be known to the public and in the case of S.N. Kumar too, but for the disclosure of documents vehemently pressed and passionately sought not only by the counsel for the petitioners but also by the counsel for S.N. Kumar, the world would never have known that the Chief Justice of Delhi has given an adverse opinion against the continuance of S.N. Kumar on the ground that his integrity was doubtful. It is obvious that in cases of this kind where the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his personal opinion or assessment on consultation by the President, there is neither adjudication nor condemnation and hence there is no basis or justification for importing the requirement of fair play or natural justice.\n\nWhen a copy of this letter dated 19th February 1981 was received by the Chief Justice ofJndia, he took the view that what was stated in the letter was \"too vague to accept that Shri Kumar Jacks integrity\" and he therefore stated in a note dated 3rd March, 1981 submitted by him to the Central Government that he \"would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar\" and recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar by six months.\n\nThe reason which prevailed with the Chief Justice of India in recom mending extension of the term of S.N. Kumar for six months was two fold. In the first place, he felt that since he had recommended eitension of the term of O.N. Vohra by six months and O.N. Vohra was senior to S.N. Kumar, the interests of propriety required that the term of S.N. Kumar should also be extended by six month and secondly, he desired to look carefully into the charges against S.N. Kumar before deciding whether to recommend his further appointment or not. Now having regard to the scope and purpose of Article 224 which we have discussed in some detail in an earlier portion of this judgment, it is clear that the Chief Justice of India misconceived the true legal position when he recommended extension of S.N. Kumar for a period of six months in order to enable him to look carefully into the charges against S.N. Kumar.\n\nWe have already pointed out that on a true interpretation of Article 224 no short term appointment of an additional Judge can be made for the purpose of enabling the constitutional authorities to examine and decide whether the complaints or charges against the additional Judge are justified or not, so that if the complaints or charges are found to be not without basis, the constitntional authorities may advise the Central Government not to appoint the additional Juclge for-a further term. We have held that such short term appointment\n\n' \" ·>--\n\n\"-+ .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Blzagwati, J.) 647\n\nbeing for a purpose other than that warranted by Article 224, would be outside the scope and ambit of that Article. But even so the Chief Justice of India recommended, though constitutionally it was impermissible to do so, that the appointment of S.N. Kumar be extended for a further term of six months in order that he should ia the meantime be able to examine carefully the charges against S.N. Kumar. The Law Minister thereupon submitted a note to the Prime Minister on 3rd March, 1981 pointing out that the letter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated 19th February, 1981 made a serious complaint against the integrity of S.N. Kumar but he did not proporpose to go into the merits of the case at that stage since he was suggesting a short extension of three months for S.N. Kumar. But while so stating, he added that he strongly felt that in matters of this nature, \"the views of the Chief Justice\" of the High Court\" are paramount as it is in his association that the Judge concerned dis~ charges his duties\" yet \"out of sheer reverence to the views of the Chief Justice of India\" he proposed that the term of S.N. Kumar as additional Judge be extended for three months. Thus, while the Chief Justice of India recommended extension of the term of S. N. Kumar for six months, the Law Minister proposed an extension for only three months, presumably because he took the view that whatever inquiries are to be made in regard to the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar should be carried out as quickly as possible and the decision on such a sensitive issue as to whether an additional Judge should be continued or not should not be unduly delayed. fhe result was that S.N. Kumar was appointed as an additional Judge for a period of three months from 7th March, 1981.\n\nThe Law Mininster thereafter addressed a letter dated 19th F March 1981 to the Chief Justice of Delhi drawing his attention to observations made by the Chief Justice of India in regard to his earlier letter dated 19th February, 1981 and requesting him that in the light of those observations he should offer his \"furlher comments on the question of continuance or otherwise\" of S.N. Kumar.\n\nThe Law Minister stated that since the term of S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge was expiring on 6th June, 1981, he would be grateful if the Chief Justice of Delhi could send his comments so as to reach him latest by 15th April, 1981. This communication addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi shows clearly beyond any doubt that the Law Minister was not party to any conspiracy for discontinuing S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge Since the Chief Justice of India had observed that the Jetter dated 19th Feb-\n\n648 .SUl'RIJME COURT REl'ORTS [1982J 2 s.c.n.\n\nruary 1981 addressed by the Chi1:f Justice of Delhi was too vague to form the basis of an opinion that S.N. Kumar was lacking in integrity, the Law Minister naturally asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to offer his further comments in answer to this remark of the Chief Justice of India. It appears that the Chief Justice India also addressed a letter dated 14th March, 1981 to the Chief Justice of Delhi asking him, with reference to the observations made hy him in his letter dated 19th February, 1981, to furnish \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\" The Chief Justice of Delhi thereupon met the Chief Justice of India and had discussion with him on 26th March, 1981. There was considerable controversy between the parties as to what were precisely the facts which were discussed between the Chif Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India at this meeting, but the subsequent correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India throws considerable light on this controversy and we must therefore proceed to examine it. It appears that subsequent to this meeting held on 26th March, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi addressed a letter dated 28th March 1981 to the Chief Justice of India recording that since receipt of the letter of the Chief Justice; of India dated 14th March, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi had had an opportunity \"to discuss this delicate matter\" with the Chief Justice of India and observing, to quote the exact words used by Chief Justice of Delhi :\n\n'There were three points mentioned in my D.O.\n\nNo. 257-/HCJ/PPS, dated 19th February, 1981, addressed to the Law Minister, a copy of which was forwarded to you. l had also menioned in that letter that I have no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not.\n\nUnderstandably there will be some who would support the allegations and there will be some who would refute them. Therefore, it is natural that there may be variance between the views that may be expres.>ed by different people.\n\nIndeed, my experience is that people are hesitant in speaking out frankly.\n\nWith regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the matter has already been discussed between us.\n\nAbout Justice Kumar not being very helpful in disposing of <:ases, I enclose a statement of\n\n. '\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 649\n\ndisposal by Justice Kumar in 1980. Just by way of compa rison I have also included the figurs of disposal in the same period of my other two colleagues whose cases for re-appointment are under consideration.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi also addressed a letter dated 28th March 1981 to the Law Minister pointing out that since receipt of the letter of the Chief Justice of India, he had had an opportunity \"to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\"\n\nand that after this discussion he had addressed a letter dated 28th March, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India a copy of which was being enclosed by him. The Chief Justice of Delhi then proceeded to add in this letter addressed to the law Minister :\n\n\"Perhaps you will consider this to be sufficient \"comments\" on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Jusice of India which you have quoted in your letter.\"\n\nNow it is clear from this letter addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister that the Chief Justice of India asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to furnish him \"Details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar\" and in response to this request, the Chief Justice of Delhi met the Chief Justice of India on 26th March 1981 and discussed \"the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\". Obviously all \"the details and concrete facts\" in regard to the allegations against S.N. Kumar which were required by the Chief Justice of India must have been discussed in detail between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India at t:.is meeting held on 26th March, 1981. There is no reason to believe that any facts which were in the possession of the Chief Justice of Delhi in regard to the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar were not disclosed and discussed by him with the Chief Justice of India. There is also inherent evidence in the letter dated 28th March, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India that the entire matter relating to the integrity of S.N. Kumar was discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of Delhi stated at the commencement of this letter that he had had an opportunity to discuss \"this delicate matter\" with the Chief Justice of India. The\n\nreference to \"this deliate matter\" could not be to any matter other H than that relating to the integrity of S.N. Kumar. Then the Chief Justice of Delhi proceeded to state that there were three points\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nmentioned in bis letter dated 19th February, 1981 and obviously there was no reason for him to refer to these three points in his Jetter dated 28th March 1981 unless be had discussed these three points with the Chief Justice of India. It was with reference to the meeting which the Chief Justice of Delhi bad with the Chief. Justice of India that the Chief Justice of Delhi adverted to the three points in bis letter to the Chief Justice of India. One of the three points was that serious complaints against S.N. Kumar had been received by him direct as well as through the Law Minister . and some of these complaints were found to be not without basis and the second point was that some responsible members of the Bar as also some of his own colleagues had expressed doubts about the integrity of S.N. Kumar. These two points must have been discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India, for otherwise there is no reason why the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of Delhi should have referred to them in his Jetter to the Chief Justice of India and if these two points were discussed, it is difficult to believe that the Chief Justice of Delhi should not have disclosed all the facts bearing upon these two points to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of Delhi emphatically reiterated in the last paragraph of his letter to the Chief Justice of India that the niatter in regard to the complaints against the integrity of\n\nS.N. Kumar had already been discussed between the.m.\n\nNow, as stated in the Jetter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated 19th February, 1981, complaints against the integrity of S.N. Kumar were received by the Chief Justice of Delhi direct as also through the Law Minister and doubts against the integrity of S.N. Kumar had been expressed by responsible members of the Bar as also by some of the Judges of Delhi High Court and therefore the inference is irresistible that when the matter in regard to the complaints against the integrity of S.N. Kumar was discussed, these facts must have been disclosed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India had with him a copy of the letter dated 19th February, 1981 where reference was made to complaints against S.N. Kumar, said to have been received by the Chief Justice of Delhi and to doubts against the integrity of S.N. Kumar said to have been expressed by responsible members of the Bar and some of his own colleagues and it is impossible to believe that when the matter relating to the integrity of S.N. Kumar was discussed, the Chief Justice of India should not have asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to apprise him as to what were the complaints received against S.N. Kumar and who were the responsible members of the Bar and\n\n.....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 651\n\nJudges who had expressed doubts against the integrity of S.N. Kumar.\n\nIf the Chief Justice of Del hi refused to disclose these facts to the Chief Justice of India. we have no doubt that the Chief Justice of India would have remonstrated with the Chief Justice of Delhi for such refusal and expressed his displeasure about it to the Law Minister.\n\nThere is no doubt in our mind that the Chief Justice of Delhi must have disclosed all the facts relating to the complaints and doubts expressed against the integrity of S.N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India but, as is evident from a subsequent letter dated 22nd May, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India had already, prior to the date of the meeting, made his own inquiries in the matter and as a result of such inquiries he was not inclined to agree with the opinion given by the Chief Justice of Delhi and t is obvious therefore that he must have told the Chief Justice of Delhi that in the course of the inquiries made by him he had been told by persons that there was nothing against integrity of S.N. Kumar and he was consequently unable to agree with the view expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi. The Chief Justice of Delhi apparently remained unconvinced and that is why he stated in his letter to the Chief Justice of India that there was bound to be variance between the views expressed by different persons in regard to the integrity of a Judge, since there would be some who would support the allegations of lack of integrity while there would be some others who would refute them.\n\nThis was a courteous and respectful way of expressing disagreement with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nBut, at the same time. the Chief Justice of Delhi politely, yet firmly, pointed out to the Chief Justice of India, by way of answer to his view, that experience showed that \"persons are hesitant in speaking out frankly\" when the question relates to the integrity of a Judge, suggesting clearly that merely because persons questioned by the Chief Justice of India in the course of the inquiries made by him did not choose to say anything against the integrity of S. N. Kumar, it did not necessary follow that the integrity of S.N. Kumar was above board. This letter addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India clearly shows that there was full discussion between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to complaints and doubts against the mtegrity of S. N. Kumar but at the end of the discussion the Chief Justice of Delhi stuck to his opinion and that is why in the letter addressed by him to the Law Minister, he did not go back upon his refusal to recommend S.N. Kumar for further appointment and maintained his oriinal recomm1mdation not to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982) 2 S.C.R\n\ncontinue S.N. Kumar for a further term. The Chief Justice of Delhi expressed the hope that what he had stated in his letter to the Chief Justice of India would be considered sufficiet comments on his part in regard to the observations of the Chief Justice of India quoted in the letter of the Law Minister dated J 9th March, 1981.\n\nThe criticism of the Chief Justice of India voiced in that letter was that what was stated by the Ceief Justice of Delhi in his Jetter dated 19th February, 1981 was vague and the Chief Justice of Delhi therefore pointed out to the Law Minister that he had discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and met his objection and hence there was no question of any vagueness and he e therefore hoped that his reply would be sufficient answer to the observations of the Chief Justice of India. The effect and substance of what the Chief Justice of Delhi stated in his letter to the Law Minister was that he had cleared the charge of vagu:ness by discussing all the facts in regards to the allegations against S.N. Kumar with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis was followed by a letter dated 15th April, 1981 addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi. We have already pointed out that since what was stated in 1he letter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated 19th February 1981 was vague, the Law Minister had, by his letter dated 19th March, 1981 requested the Chief Justic~ of Delhi to offer further comments in support of his recommendation against the discontinuance of S.N. Kumar. The only reply which the Law Minister got from the Chief Justice of Delhi was that the Chief Justice of Delhi had met and discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and removed the objection based on vagueness by giving him ''details and concrete facts\" in regard to the allegations against S.N. Kumar. But the Law Minister was not informed as to what was discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and what were the \"details and concrete facts\" disclosed by him to the Chief Justice of India. It was obvious from the reply given by the Chief Justice of Delhi that despite the discussion with the Chief Justice of India he stuck to his original recommendation not to continue S.N. Kumar for a further term and the Law Minister therefore naturally enquired from him by his Jetter dated 15th April, 1981 as to what was the material which provided the basis on which he concluded that S.N. Kumar's reputation for integrity was not above board and recommended that he may not be continued.\n\nUltimately, it was the\n\n---·\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 653\n\nLaw Minister who had to take a decision on behalf of the Government of India as to whether S.N. Kumar should be continued or not and in order to be able to discharge this constitutional function fairly and honestly, it was necessary for the Law Minister to know what was the material on the basis of which the Chief Justice of Delhi had reached the opinion that S.N. Kumar did not enjoy good reputation for integrity and that he could not therefore be recommended for reappointment.\n\nThe Law Minister obviously could not accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi blindly and unquestioningly because that would have amounted to abdication of his constitutional obligation and he therefore asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to furnish him the material on whieh the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi was based. This letter addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi provides the clearest evidence that the Law Minister was not a party to any conspiracy to throw out S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge. The Law Minister if he was a party to any such conspiracy, would not have required the Chief Justice of Delhi to provide the material which formed the basis of his opinion and instead, he would have accepted the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi and after formally inviting the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, decided to discontinue S.N. Kumar. But, obviously, the Law Minister wanted to satisfy himself that there was material on the basis of which it could be said that the integrity of S.N. Kumar was doubtful, and that is why he did not regard it as sufficient that the Chief Justice of Delhi had discussed the matter with the Chief Justice of India but asked for the material which formed the basis of the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi so that the Central Government could come to its own decision whether or not to continue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge. This action on the part of the Law Minister clearly establishes his bona fides in the matter of discontinuance of S.N. Kumar.\n\nNow we come to a very important letter which formed the subject matter of bitter controversy between the parties. This was a letter dated 7th May, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister in response to the request contained in the letter of the Law Minister dated 15th April, 1981. The Chief Justice of Delhi by his letter supplied to the Law Minister the material on which his opinion against the continuance of S.N. Kumar was based.\n\nThis letter contained at the top the words \"Secret (For personal attention only)\". It contained in the second paragraph a prefatory statement by way of preamble to !the facts set out in the subsequent\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nparagraphs. This prefatory statement is extremely important and it may be set out in extenso in the following words :\n\n\"Hon'ble the Chief Justice oflndia had made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and the same were communicated to me by you for my comments in your D.O. No. 50/2/81- Jus., dated 19th March, 1981. The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated 14th March, 1981 asking for \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar\". As I wrote to you in my D.0. No. 293-HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March, i 981, I discussed the matter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his Jetter, wrote my D.O. No. 292-HCJ/PPS dated March 28, 1981, a copy of which was forwarded to you.\n\nAccordingly, it is not only embarrassing but painful for me to write this letter. As you, however, desire to know what material provided the basis for me to conclude that Justice Kumar's integrity was not above board, I give below some facts.\"\n\n(Underlining is ours)\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi reiterated in this prefatory statement that pursuant to the letter dated 14th March, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of India asking for \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar\". he had met the Chief Justice of India and discussed the matter with him and the letter dated 28th March 1981 was written by him as desired by the Chief Justice of India and Accordingly-for that reason-it was not only embarrassing but painful for him to write this letter, but since the Law Minister desired to know what material provided the basis for him to conclude that the integrity of S.N. Kumar was not above board, he was proceeding to give some facts.\n\nIt is clear from this prefatory statement that it was as per the desire of the Chief Justice ofindia that the letter dated 28th March, 1981 was addressed by Chief Justice of Delhi in the terms in which he did. There is an under-current of suggestion here that the Chief Justice of India did not approve of the idea of the Chief Justice of Delhi setting out in a letter the facts discussed by him with the Chief Justice of India and perhaps that is why the Chief Justice of Delhi stated that it was both embarrassing and painful for him to write that letter setting out the facts on which his apinion was based.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi then proceeded to state the facts on the\n\n. .,__\n\ns.i>. GUPrA v. UNiON (1Jhagwat1, i.) 655\n\nbasis of which he had formed the view that S.N. Kumar did not enjoy good reputation for integrity. It is not necessary for us to refer to these facts in any detail but suffice it to state that several facts were set out by the Chief Justice of Delhi which made him conclude \"that the reputation for integrity of Justice Kuma7 was not as should be for a Judge of the High Court.\" The Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out that some time early in May, 1980 one of his colleagues had told him that he had information to the effect that \"if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an Insurance Company would be decided in favour of that party.\" The reference here was obviously to suits Nos. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 which were filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Limited and Jain Export Private Limited against the New Indian Insurance Company Limited. The Chief Justice of Delhi stated that even though original side of work was taken away from S.N. Kumar and he was put on the appellate side in the second half of the year, 1980, that is, after the summer vacation, S.N. Kumar did not release these three suits as also some other suits which were part-heard before him and continued to deal with them. In August,\n\n1980, observed the Chief Justice of Delhi, the same colleague of his who had talked to him earlier as also another colleague mentioned to him that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of S.N. Kumar vis-a-vis these three cases and some others whereupon he \"made discreet inquiries from some of the leading counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations\". The Chief Justice of Delhi also found that besides the above mentioned three cases there were a 'number of other cases which had been retained by S.N. Kumar on his board despite his transfer to the appellate side and in some of these cases \"the parties involvd were rich and influential including some former Princes.\" The Chief Justice of Delhi was at that time acting Chief Justice and after his appointment as permanent Chief Justice early in Junary, 1981, he looked into this matter a little more closely and made further inquiries and found that some of the lawyers were non-committal but there were others who \"asserted with some force that Justice Kumar's reputation was not above board.\" The Chief Justice of Delhi also talked to some other colleagues besides the two who had spoken to him and they also said that \"unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were not very complimentary to Justice Kumar.\" The Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out that th; se were the facts on the basis of which he had come to the opinion that S .N. Kumar did not enjoy good reputation for integrity. Now it was sought to be\n\n656 stli>REME toukt REPOilts i 1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nargued by learned counsel appearing on behalf of S.N. Kumar that these facts were not true and the Chief Justice of Delhi was not justified in reaching an adverse opinion against S.N. Kumar on the basis of these facts. The learned counsel for S.N. Kumar submitted that it was a well established practice of the Delhi High Court that a part-heard matter always went with the Judge and was heard by him whether he was transferred from the original side to the appellate side or vice-versa and S.N. Kumar did not therefore act improperly in taking up part-heard matters even after he was transferred to the appellate side and no inference of Jack of integrity could therefore be drawn against him merely because he continued to take up the part-heard matters. We are afraid this argument which seeks to assail the crediblity of the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi cannot be entertained by us. It is not open to the Court to hold an inquiry and determine for itself the correctness of the opinion of any of the constitutional authorities required to be consulted by the President. The opinion given by any such constitutional authority may be mistaken or erroneous but the. corrective for such mistake or error is to be found in the constitutional provision itself and it cannot be provided by judicial intervention. The Court cannot take evidence for the purpose of determining whether the facts on which the opinion of a constitutional authority required to be consulted is based are true or not or whether the opinion expressed by such constitutional authority is well-founded or not. That is a function entrusted by the Constitution to the President, that is, the Central Government and it is for the Central Government to Judge whether tbe opinion expressed by the constitutional authority such as the Chief Justice of the High Court is well-founded or not and whether it should be accepted or rejected. The court cannot be invited to go i_nto the question whether the facts on which thhe opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi was based were correct or not and whether the opinion expressed by his was or was not justified.\n\nThe effect of going into this question would be to expose the opinions of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India to judicial scrutiny, inviting possible examination and crossexamination of these two high functionaries which would be clearly disastrous to the institution of the judiciary. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the correctness of the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi and of the facts on which it was based could be tested in his absence when he was not joined as a respondent in the writ petition. But all the same we may point out that, even on the record as it stands, the statemeat of S.N. Kumar in his affidavit in regard to the practice of the Delhi High Court, does not seem to\n\n.. ~\n\n-+-\n\nS.i>. dtJi>TA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 657\n\naccord with what the Chief Justice of India, according to his Jetter dated 22nd May, 1981 appears to have learnt as a result of the inquiry made by him, namely, that even after the allocation of a Judge is charged from the original side to the appellate side and vice-versa, he continues to take up part-heard cases provided that a substantial amount of time has been already spent on them. It is not every part-heard case which travels with the Judge from the original to the appellate side and vice-versa but only those partheard cases on which a substantial amount of time has alre.idy been spent. It may be pointed out that there is nothing to show that the part-heard suits which continued to remain with S.N. Kumar were suits on which a considerable amouat of time had already been spent.\n\nIn fact, suits Nos. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 were not at all partheard suits and much less could it be said that a considerable time had already been spent by S.N. Kumar on them and yet, according to the Chief Justice of Delhi, they continued to be dealt by S.N. Kumar.\n\nBut, as we observed a little while ago, this is not a matter which can be investigated by the court and it must be left to the President, that is the Central Government to decide what credibility or weight to attach to the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi. The court is concer ned merely to enquire whether there was, in fact, to the full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and not whether the opinion given by the Chief Justice of Delhi or the Chief Justice of India was correct or not. It is possible that the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi in the present case was mistaken or erroneous, but that is not an issue which can be examined by the court. The Chief Justice of Delhi bona fide came to the view that S.N. Kumar did not enjoy good reputation for integrity and he franly expressed this view to the Law Minister as he was bound to do, but from this it does not necessarily follow that S.N. Kumar was lacking in integrity. The possibility of a bona fide error on the part of the Chief Justice of Delhi can never be excluded.\n\nThere is also inherent evidence in the letter dated 7th May, 198 I, to show that the Chief Justice of Delhi acted bona fide in giving his opinion to the Law Minister in regard to the integrity of S.N. Kumar. The Law Minister had by his letter dated 15th April, 1981 requested the Chief Justice of Delhi to send his comments on the complaint made by one Sabir Hussain, an advocate. The Chief Justice of Delhi after examining the relevant files in regard to the complaint intimated to the Law Minister by his letter dated 7th\n\n6s8 SUPREME colJR.t REPORTS i 19s2j 2 s.c.il.\n\nMay, 1981 that the complaint related to a suit which was disposed of by S.N. Kumar and it was therefore a matter which could be Jmmented upon only judicially. The Chief Justice of Delhi adopted a correct approach in regard to this complaint and did not betray any undue enthusiasm to condemn S.N. Kumar If the Chief Justice of Delhi were actuated by any mala fide against S.N. Kumar, he would have immediately seized upon this complaint and tried to utilise it for the purpose of supporting his opinion against the integrity of S.N. Kumar.\n\nWe may point out that the Chief Justice of Delhi was perfectly right in not sitting in judgment over the decision given by S.N. Kuml!.r in Sabir Hussains suit, for it is not open to the Chief Justice of a High Court to examine the judgments given by an additional Judge and pass upon the quality of those judgments for the purpose of deciding whether the additional Judge should be reappointed or not. This exercise is not open to the Chief Justice of the High Court or to the Chief Justice of India because the additional Judge is not on probation and that is why we are constrained to observe though the case of O.N. Vohra not being before us, it is not necessary for us to do so, that the Chief Justice of Delhi was not justified in wading through the papers of Kissa Kursi Ka Case for the purpose of deciding whether O.N. Vohra should be reappointed as an additional Judge, If O.N. Vohra was in error in not disposing of any application in the case or in making a wrong order on such application, it was for this Court in appeal, in the exercise of its judicial power, to comment on the judicial performance of O.N. Vohra and it was not for the Chief Justice of Delhi to sit in judgment over it for the purpose of condemning O.N. Vohra.\n\n We may point out that the Chief Justice of Delhi also referred in his letter dated 7th May, 1981 to the low disposals of S.N. Kumar as also to his unsatisfactory behaviour with the members of the Bar.\n\nBut these allegations need not detain us because the discontinuance of S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge by the President was not based on these allegations but it was founded only on the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi in regard to the integrity of S.N. Kumar.\n\nNow we come to a most important part of the controvesy between the parties. The letter dated 7th May, 1981 addrssed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister carried at the top the remark, \"Secret (for personal attention only).\" Now before this letter was sent by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister, he had informed the Law Minister to treat it as secret but at that time the Law Minister did not try to probe into the implications cf this\n\nS.P. GUPtA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nrequest. Later, however, when the Chier Justice of Delhi, with reference to the letter proposed to be written by him in regard to the continuance of O.N. Vohra, requested that that letter also should be kept secret for personal attention only, the Law Minister asked him as to what exactly he meant by the remark \"Secret (for personal attention only)\" in the letter dated 7th May, 1981. The Chief Justice of Delhi in reply intimated to the Law Minister that what he meant was that that Jetter should not be brought to the notiee of the Chief Justice of India and for three very good reasons, namely :\n\n\" -·\n\nFor reasons stated in the opening portion of his letter dated 7th May, 1981.\n\nHe felt highly embarrassed and perplexed after he addressed the original Jetter dated 19.2.1981 about Shri S.N. Kumar as the contents of that Jetter came clearly to be known to Sbri S.N. Kumar and certain of his colleagues on the bench as a result of which it embarrassed him in discharge of his duties and functions.\n\nHe felt that the contents of his letter dated 7th May, 1981 would also get into the hands of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar and certain of his other colleagues and be would thereby be put to greater embarrassment which might create probJ, ems for him in future in the discharge of his duties as Chief Justice.\n\nHe felt that the Chief Justice of India had already started wrongfully denigrating him for his letter of February '81 as some of his friends conveyed to him\n\nthe feelings of the CJI.\" F\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi also informed the Law Minister that \"he could not afford to spoil his relations with the Chief Justice of India on one hand and on the other could not desist from expressing\n\nv.ithout fear or favour what he felt of certain matters\" and if he was \"going to be suspect for discharging bis functions fairly and conscientiously, then his functioning as the Chief Justice• would never be smooth vis-a-vis Chief Justice of India.\" The Law .Minister placed this conversation on record in a note made by him on 19th May, 1981 as also in a letter dated 29th May, 1981 addressed by him to the Chief Justice of Delhi. Pursuant to this\n\n660 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [198212 s.c.il.\n\nrequest made by the Chief Justice of Delhi, the Law Minister did not place the letter dated 7th May 1981 before the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThough the Chief Justice of India had stated in his note dated 3rd March 1981 that he would like to go carefully into the charges against S.N. Kumar and he had a meeting with the Chief Justice of Delhi on 26th March 1981 in that connection, he did not write to the Law Minister until the 3rd week of May 1981 giving his opinion in regard to the question whether S.N. Kumar should be continued or not.\n\nMeanwhile, the time fixed by this Court for the Union of India to decide whether S.N. Kumar should be reappointed for a further term as an additional Judge or should be appointed as a permanent Judge or otherwise, was expiring on 27th May 1981 and the Law Minister was therefore constrained to address a letter dated 21st May 1981 reminding the Chief Justice of India that he had stated in his note dated 3rd March 1981 thathe desired to look carefully into the charges against SN. Kumar and requesting him that if be had made any inquiries, the Law Minister \"would be grateful to have the details\" and also pressiv : n::'\"l to give his \"urgent advice in regarc to the continuance or otherwise\" of the term of S.N. Kumar. It appears that this letter W\" received by the Chief Justice of India when he was camping at Sb.. , during the summer vacation and on receipt of this letter, the Chief Justice of India addressed a communication dated 22nd May 1981 to the Law Minister stating that he had made the most care ful and extensive inquiries in regard to the allegations against the integrity of S.N. Kumar as also his rate of disposals and he was satisfied that there was no substance in any of these allegations.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India pointed out that it was a common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a Judge was changed from the original side to the appellate side 1nd vice-versa, he continued to take up the part .. heard cases on which sufficient amount of time had already been spent and S.N. Kumar therefore did nothing out of the way or unusual in taking up part-beard cases after the allocation of his work was changed.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India observed that, on inquiries made by him, he disagreed with the view taken by the Chief Justice of Delhi that S.N. Kumar was either slow in his disposals or his integrity was doubtful and stated that it was not. possible for him to agree that the term of S.N. Kumar should not be extended for the reasons mentioned by the Chief Justice of Delhi. Not one member of the Bar or Bench, said the\n\n\\.- /\n\nr ' r -·\n\ns.1>. GUPTA v. UNION (/Jhagwati. J.) 661\n\nChief Justice of India, doubted the integrity of S.N. Kumar and on the contrary, in some of them stated that he was a man of unquestioned integrity. It seems that some Intelligence Bureau report regarding S.N. Kumar was also sent by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion along with his letter dated 22nd May, 1981, but the Chief Justice of India could not give his opinion with reference to the report since he bad no time to examine it and he therefore stated that he would give his opinion after his return to New Delhi on 26th May 1981 and in the circumstances he recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar for another short term of three months.\n\nBut, since one short term extension had already been granted, the Law Minister presumably thought that it would not be right to go on giving short term extensions but that a decision should now be taken whether S.N. Kumar should be continued or not and he therefore proceeded to make his recommendation ignoring the Intelligence Bureau Report agaiqst S.N. Kumar, the rate of his disposals and even his alleged behaviour in court and confining himself only to the question of his reputation for integrity.\n\nThe Law Minister put up a note before the Prime Minister on 27th May 1981 summarising the effect of the correspondence which had taken place between him. The Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and pointing out that notwithstanding his specific request as to details of the inquiries made by him, the Chief Justice of India had not furnished the same to him and on the contrary the letter dat ; d 22nd May 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of India revealed \"that he became a victim of his own charge of vagueness made by him against the Chief Justice of Delhi.\" The Law Minister stated in the note that he presumed that when the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India met, \"the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned ...... in his Jetter dated 7th May 1981\" and this inference was obvious from the letters addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India. The Law Minister observed that even according to the Chief Justice of India, the prevailing practice in the Delhi High Court was that not every part-heard case but only those part-hea1 d cases on which substaitial amount of time had already been spent would go with the Judge when there was change of allocating of work but the Chief Justice of India had \"surprisingly left the matter there\" without probing further \"as to whether the part-heard matters which Justice Kumar chose to handle as single Judge notwithstanding his having been allocated to the Division Bench were such on which substantial\n\nSUPREME coli.llt REf>oilts [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\namount of time had already been spent by him.\" It was pointed out by the Law Minister in his note that it was not merely a case of drawing inference against the integrity of S. N. Kumar from his taking up part-heard cases after being transferred to th<: appellate side but the details given by the Chief Justice of Delhi in his letter dated 7th May 1981 went further and in contrast, the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated 22nd May 1981 was not only lacking in details but was too vague. The Law Minister after making this analysis concluded that in the matter of assessment of integrity he preferred to accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi since \"it is in his association that the Judge concerned discharges his duties and he has a better occasion and opportunity to watch his work and conduct\" and on this view he recommended that S.N.\n\nKumar may not be continued any further as an additi0nal Judge.\n\nThe result was that S.N. Kumar was not continued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term on 6th June, 1981.\n\nNow the rgument urged on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar was that the facts set out in the letter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated 7th may, 1981 on which the decision of the Central Government not to continue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge was based, were not disclosed to the Chief Justice of India and he had therefore no opportunity to consider those facts and give his opinion upon them and hence there was no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India and the decision of the Central Government not to continue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge was vitiated by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of consultation laid down in Article 217. This argument was pressed with great vehemence by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the S.N. Kumar and he injected considerable amount of passion in it, but we do not think it can be sustained. It is undoubtedly true that it was constitutionally impossible to the Central Government to arrive at the decision not to continue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge \"ithout consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India as mandatorily required by Article 217, but as pointed out by us in an earlier portion of the judgment, it is was not necessary that the full and identical facts which at once constituted \"both the source and foundation of the final decision\" of the Central Government should be placed before the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India by the Central Government itself or that they should be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in any particular order or by following\n\n/- __.\n\nr >\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 663\n\nany particular procedure. What was necessary to constitute full and effective consultation within the meaning of Article 217 was that the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India should have for their consideration \"full and identical facts\" which ultimately formed the basis of the decision of the Central Government. Now there can be no doubt that the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar for a futurther term was based on the '( facts provided by the Chief Justice of Delhi in his letter dated 7th May, 1981 and if these facts were not placed before the Chief Justice of India before he gave his opinion in regard to the continuance of S.N. Kumar in his letter dated 22nd may, 1981, the decision of the Central Government would be clearly vitiated for want of full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India. It therefore becomes material to enquire whether the facts set out in the letter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated 7th May, 1981 were placed before the Chief Justice of India before he gave his opinion in the letter dated 22nd May, 1981.\n\nWe have already discussed this question at some length while dealing with the meeting held by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India on 26th March, 1981, and the letters dated 28th March, 1981 addressed by the Chief lustice of Delhi to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India subsequent to that meeting. We have pointed out various circumstances which establish beyond any doubt that all the facts relating to the complaints and doubts expressed against the integrity of S.N. Kumar which were in the possession of the Chief Justice of Delhi must have been disclosed by him to the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March, 1981. We need not repeat what we have already discussed in great detail but we may add that, judging as practical men conversant with the ordinary course of human affairs, we do not see any reason why the Chief Justice of Delhi should not have disclosed these facts to the Chief Justice of India, particularly when the Chief Justice of India had asked him to furnish \"details and concrete facts in regard to the ... allegations against Justice Kumar\". But, the question may then be asked as to why, if the Chief Justice of Delhi had disclosed all the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981, to tt'e Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi should have requested the Law Minister not to bring the letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India. The Law Minister was also intrigued by this request and he therefore asked the Chief Justice of Delhi as to why he did not want the letter dated 7th May 1981 to be placed before\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of Delhi gave three reasons which we have reproduced verbatim a little earlier.\n\nThe first reason given by the Chief Justice of Delhi is extremely significant because it shows clearly and indisputably that the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May 1981 were discussed by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981. The Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out tbat he did not want the letter dated 7th May 1981 to be brought to the attention \"f of the Chief Justice of India because, as observed by him in the opening portion of the letter, he Ji.ad difcussed the \"details and concrete facts in regard to the alle11ations against Justice Kumar\" with the Chief Justice of India but the letter dated 28th March 1981 was written by him in the terms in which it was couched as per the desire of the Chief Justice of India and therefore it was embarrassing and painful for him to write the letter dated 7th May 1981. This . reason given by the Chief Justice of Delhi carries a veiled suggestion though not expressly articulated but implicit in what he has stated, that the Chief Justice of India did not want him to place on record the \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations\" against S.N. Kumar and that is why he wrote the letter dated 28th March, 1981 in the terms he did according to the desire of the Chief Justice of India. This was perhaps the reason why the Chief Justice of Delhi found it embarrassing as well as painful to write the letter the dated 7th May 1981 setting out the \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations\" against S.N. Kumar, such a course being presumably contrary to the suggestion of the Chief Justice oflndia.\n\nWe have, of course, no definite material before us on the ba>is of which we can conclude that the Chief Justice of India must have a ked the Chief Justice of Delhi not to place the detailed facts relating to the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar in writing, but it does appear that some discussion must have taken place between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India as a result of which the Chief Justice of Delhi bona fide carried a feeling that the Chief Justice of India might feel offended if the Chief Justice of Delhi were to put the detailed facts in regard to the allegations against S.N. Kumar on record, contrary to the view held by the Chief Justice of India. That is why the Chief Justice of Delhi was anxious that his letter dated 7th May 1981 should not be brought to the attention of the Chief Justice of India. It was not because the Chief Justice of Delhi did not want the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 to be disclosed to the Chief Justice of India that he requested the Law Minister not to place that letter\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagvati, J.) 665\n\nbefore the Chief Justie of India, but because in view of the impression given or perhaps a suggestion made at the meeting by the Chief Justice of India, he apprehended that if he placed those facts on record contrary to the wish of the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of India might feel offended and his relations with the Chief Justice of India might be spoilt. The second reason given by the Chief Justice of Delhi was that he had found that the contents of his previous letter dated 19th February 1981 had come to be known to S.N. Kumar and some of his colleagues on the Bench and he therefore felt that if the letter dated 7th May 1981 was not kept by the Law Minister with himself along, but was sent by him to the Chief Justice of India, leakage might occur in the process and the contents of that letter also might get known to S.N. Kumar and others, causing him further embarrassment. The Chief Justice of Delhi might have been right or might have been wrong in entertaining the apprehension that if his letter dated 7th May t98 l was sent to the Chief Justice of India, its contents might in the process leak out and S.N. Kumar and others might come to know about them, but there is no reason to doubt that he bona fide felt this apprehension and that weighed with him by asking the Law Minister not to bring his letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India particularly since he had already discusssed the \"details and concrete facts\" set out in that letter with the Chief Justice of India. The third reason given by the Chief Justice of Delhi was that the Chief Justice of India had already started wrongfully denigrating him for his letter dated 19th February, 1981 as intimated to him by his friends and that if the Chief Justice of India came to know that he had placed the detailed facts in regard to the allegations against S. N. Kumar on record contrary to his wish, the Chief Justice of India might feel offended and in that event his functioning as Chief Justice of Delhi would become difficult vis-a-vis the Chief Justice of India. This feeling voiced by the Chief Justice of Delhi might or might not be justified and the information received by him from his friends in regard to the feelings of the Chief Justice of India might or might not be correct, but we have no reason to hold that the Chief Justice of Delhi acted otherwise than bona fide in carrying this feeling. It may be that the Chief Justice of Delhi was wrong in entertaining this feeling, but his bona fide and veracity cannot be doubted for a moment. Moreover, that is not a matter which falls within the scope of our inquiry. What we have to determine is only a very limited issue, namely, whether the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 were disclosed by the Chief Justice of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C.k\n\nDelhi to the Chief Justice of India and so far as that is concerned there is no doubt in our minds that these facts were discussed by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981 and no contrary inference can be drawn merely because, for the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice B of Delhi asked the Law Minister not to bring his letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThere is, in fact, another piece of evidence which clearly establishes that the detailed facts in regard to the allegations against S.N. Kumar were discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe petitioners and S.N. Kumar of course did not dispute that the meeting of 26th March 1981 did take place between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India but their contention was that the only circumstance pointed out by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India for drawing an adverse inference against the integrity of S.N. Kumar was that he had taken up part-heard cases of the original side even after he was transferred to the appellate side and no other facts in regard to the integrity of S.N. Kumar were discussed by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India. This contention of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar is wholly without force and it stands completely answered by what we have already discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. But, additionally, we may point out that this contention is also belied by the counter-affidavit dated 7th July 198 l filed by S.N. Kumar himself. If the only complaint in regard to integrity of S.N. Kumar mentioned by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India related to the taking up of part-heard cases by S.N. Kumar after transfer to the appellate side and that was a fortiorari the only matter mentioned by the Chief Justice of India to S.N. Kumar when he called S.N. Kumar for discussion after his meeting with the Chief Justice of Delhi, it is difficult to understand how S.N. Kumar happened to refer to Suits Nos. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 in his counter-affidavit filed before the disclosure of the letter dated 7th May, 1981. These three suits were not part-hP.ard suits becaus~ the summonses for judgment in these three suits had been disposed of by S.N. Kumar on 7th March 1980 by granting unconditional leave to defend and yet they were specifically referred to by S.N. Kumar in his counter-affidavit and explanation was sought to be given in regard to them. These three suits were \"particularly\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 667\n\nmentioned in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 and according to that letter, it was in relation to these suits th; it allegation of lack of integrity was made against S.N. Kumar. Now if the complaint against the integrity of S.N. Kumar in relation to these three suits was not mentioned by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March, 1981, how could S.N. Kumar think of dealing with them in his counter-affidavit. The reference to these three suits in the counteraffidavit of S.N. Kumar clearly shows that apart from the part heard suits, these three suits and the allegations relating to them were also disclosed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India and if that be so, there can be no doubt that all the facts in regard to the allegations against S.N.\n\nKumar must have been discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nIt was suggested by the learned counsel on behalf of S.N. Kumar in the course of arguments that the Chief Justice of Delhi was anxious to keep the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 secret from the Chief Justice of India, lest he should make his comments on them and reject the recommendation not to continue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge based on these facti;. But this suggestion is meaningless, because the Chief Justice of Delhi in any event knew as a result of the meetini: held on 26th March 1981 that the Chief Justice of India was not agreein~ with the view expressed by him and was against his recommendation to discontinue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge, while he, on his part, was not prepared to change his view and retract the recommendation made by him, because even after the discussion with the Chief Justice of India, he felt that he could not honestly recommend continuance of\n\nS.N. Kumar as an additional Judge and if that be so, there is no reason why he should have wanted to keep back his letter dated 7th May, 1981 from the Chief Justice of India except for the three reasons given by him. We must, of course, observe that in our opinion, howsoever strong and cogent might be the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice of Delhi should never have asked the Law Minister not to place his letter dated 7th May, 1981 before the Chief Justice of India. So long as the Chief Justice of Delhi was acting bona fide in the discharge of his constitutional duty-and we have no doubt that in the matter of continuance of S.N. Kumar he was acting bona fide, he should not have bothered whether by his action in puting the facts on record in the letter dated 7th May,\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA 1981 the Chief Justice of India would be offended and his relations with the Chief Justice of India would be spoilt. There are occassions when persons holding high constitutional offices are called upon to perform an unpleasant duty and this duty they have to perform, whatever be the consequences. If necessary, let the the heavens fall but\n\nwhat is right and just shall be done without fear or favour, affection or goodwill.\n\nLong years ago that great common Law Judge, Lord Mansfield spoke of the judicial office in majestic tones and said :\n\n\"I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon his occassion; to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press; I will not avoid doing what I think is right; though it should draw on me the whole artillery of Habels; all that falsehood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a deluded popular can swallow ...... Once for all, let it be understood, 'that no endeavours of this kind will influence any man who atpresent sits here.\"\n\nWhat the learned Chief Justice said in regard to judicial .'u 1ction must apply with equal validity where a Judge is called upon to discharge any other function entrusted to him by the Constitution and he must boldly and fearlessly do that which Constitution commands.\n\nBut merely because the Chief Justice of Delhi flinched and faltered out of a sense of apprehension that the Chief Justice of India might feel offended by his writing the letter dated 7th May, 1981, it does not follow that the facts set out in that letter were not personally discussed by him with the Chief fostice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981.\n\nWe are clearly of the view that the ' full and identical facts\" on which the decision of the Central Government was based were placed before the Chief Justice of India and there was full and effective consultation with him before Central Government reached the decision that S.N. Kumar should not be continued as an additional Judge. We may also point out that this decision of the Central Government was not based on any irrelevant considerations, since, as we have already pointed out earlier, lack of reputation for integrity is certainly a most relevant consideration in ·\n\ndeciding whether a person should be appointed a Judge.\n\nWe may make it clear that in taking this view we do not for a moment wish to suggest that S.N. Kumar was lacking in integrity.\n\n. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwali, J.) 669\n\nThat is not a matter into which we are called upon to enquire and nothing that is stated by us should be regarded as expression of any opinion on this question.\n\nWe may observe in fairness to S.N. Kumar that the Chief Justice of India clearly stated it to b~ his opinion that the integrity of S.N. Kumar was unquestionable What happened here was that there were two conflicting opinions given by the two constitutional authorities required to be consulted, namely, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nBoth were perfectly bona fide opinions and the Central Government had to choose between them and come to its own decision.\n\nThe Central Government preferred the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi for the reasons mentioned in the note of the Law Minister dated 27th May, 1981 and decided not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an acditional Judge for a further t;:rm. We do not think this decision suffers from any constitutional infirmity.\n\nBut before we part with this point, we must refer to one last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar and that contention was that the non-appointment of S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge was tantamount to bis removal and the Central Government was therefore bound to follow the principles of natural justice before taking the decision not to continue him as an additional Judge. This contention is without merit and the premise on which it is based is not sustainable. It is wholly incorrect to say that when an additional Judge whose term has expired and who would therefore have to return to the Bar or to the subordinate judicial service, is not appointed a permanent Judge or an additional Judge for a further term, he is removed by the Central Gov :rnment.\n\nWe have already discussed this aspect of the matter and pointed out that on the expiration of his term, an additional Judge has no right to be appointed a permunent Judge or an additional Judge for a further term and his only right is to be considered for such appointment and if as a result of such consideration after going through the consuliation process envisaged in Article 217, he is not considered suitable for further appointment and it is decided not to reappoint him, he cannot complain against the decision, unless he can show that there was no full and effective consultation as contemplated in Article 217 or that the decision not to appoint him was based on irrelevant considerations. If he is not appointed a permanent Judge or an additional Judge for a further term, he goes out, but that happens because the term for which he was originally appointed has come to an end and not because he is\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nremoved. There is therefore no question of giving him an opportunity to be heard before the decision is taken not to appoint him as a permanent Judge or an additional Judge.\n\nWe must in the circumstances reject the challenge levelled on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar against the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term.\n\nWe would therefore dismiss the first group of writ petitions in so far as they seek relief in respect of O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar.\n\nNo reliief can be granted in respect of 0.N. Vohra because, though added as a party respondent, he has not appeared and claimed any relief against the decision of the Central Goverment to discontinue him as an additional Judge and has accepted such decision without protest or complaint. That is the reason why we have not examined the complaint of the petitioners in regard to discontinuance of O.N. Vohra as an additional Judge.\n\nSo far as S.N. Kumar is concerned, we have rejected his claim for relief, because, in our opinion, and we have already given our reasons taking this view, the decision to discontinue him as an additional Judge was taken by the Central Government after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and it was not based on any irrelevant considerations. We have taken the view that the circular letter issued by the Law Minister was not unconstitutional and void and hence the first group of writ petitions must also fail in so far as they challenge the constitutional validity of the circular letter.\n\nThe other reliefs claimed in tl1e first group of writ petitions hav also been rejected by us and hence this group of writ petitions must wholly fail.\n\nBut, while dismissing this group of writ petitions, we may observe that though, in our opinion, there was full and effective con-\n\n\"' .\n\nsultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of -( India before the decision was taken by the Central Government to discontinue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge and neither the petitioners nor S.N. Kumar could therefore have any legitimate cause for grievance against such decision, it would be a good thing if, having regard to the high status and dignity of a High Court Judge, the Union of India could see its way to place the letter dated 7th May, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister before the Chief Justice of India and elicit his opinion with refereace to that letter and then consider whether S.N. Kumar\n\n, ,\n\nl-- )---\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 671\n\nshould be reappointed as an additional Judge in the Delhi High Court. This is only a suggestbn which we are making ex-tathedra\n\nfor the acceptance of the Government; if thought fit.\n\nK.B.N. Singh's case.\n\nThe second group of writ petition> raises the question of con>- titutional validity of the orders transferring Chief Justice M. M.\n\nIsmail to the Kerala High Court and Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court.\n\nHowever, so far as Chief Justice M.M. Ismail is concerned, the question bas become academic because he has stated in the counter-affidavit filed by him in reply to the writ petition of Miss Lily Thomas that he does not want any-one to litigate for or against him nor does he want anything about him to be argued or debated and he has subsequently resigned his office as Chief Justice of the Madras High C0urt. The only quetion which therefore survives for consideration is whether the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court could be said to be constitutionally invalid. The determination of this question obviously depends upon the true scope and ambit of the pJwer of transfer conferred under clause (I) of Article 222. That Article reads as follows :\n\n\"Article 222 (!). The President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court.\"\n\nThis article came up for consideration before a B~;1ch of five Judcres 0 of this Court in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra).\n\nMr. Seervai arguing on behalf of Sankalchand Sheth in that case contended that a Judge cannot be transferred from one High Court to another without his consent. and there were two grounds on which he rested this contention. One was that on a proper construction of Article 222 clause (1) in the context of the basic principle of independence of the judiciary, consent must be read a~ a necessary requirement in that article and the other was that since transfer of a Judae involves a fresh appointment in the High Court to which he is\n\n0 transferred such transfer cannot be made without the consent of the Judge'.\n\nThe majority Judges comprising Cbandrachud, J., (as he then was) Krishna Iyer, J. and Fazal Ali J. rejected this contention of Mr. Seervai and held that there was no need or justification, in order to uphold and protect the independence of the judiciary, to construe Article 222 clause (I) as meaning that a Jud:e can be trans-\n\n\n[ 19~2] 2 S.C.R.\n\nferred from.one High Court to another only with his consent. Justice Untwalia and myself, however, took a different view.\n\nWe upheld the contention of Mr. Seervai and held that a Judge cannot be trans ' ferred from one High Court to another without his consent.\n\nMr. Justice Untwalia based his conclusion on the second ground urged by Mr. Seervai, namely, that the transfer of a Judge involves fresh appointment in the High Court to which he is transferred and the Judge is also required to take a fresh oath in accordance with Article 219 and in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule and he cannot therefore be transferred without his consent. I accepted' both the grounds urged by Mr. Seervai in support of his contention and held that it is no doubt true that the words \"without his consent\" are not to be found in clause (I) of Article 222, but the word 'transfer' which is used there is a neutral word which can mean consensual as well as compulsory transfer and if the l1igh and noble purpose of the Constitution to secure the independence of superior judiciary by insulating it from all forms of executive control or interference is to be achieved, the word 'transfer' must be read in the limited sense of consensual transfer. I pointed that when a Judge is transferred to another High Court, he has to make and subscribe a fresh oath or affirmation before the Governor of the State to which he is transferred before he can enter upon the office of a Judge of that High Court and such transfer would not become effective unless the Judge makes and subscribe an oath or affirma tion before the Governor and that would plainly be a matter within the volition of the Judge and l therefore, concluded that since the volition of the Judge who is transferred is essential for making the transfer effective, there can be no transfer of a Judge of a High Court without bis consent. The view taken by Justice Untwalia and myself was thus a minority view, but since the present writ petitions were being heard by a larger Bench than that which decided Sankalchand 8heth's case, Mr. Seervai canvassed the minority view for acceptance by the Bench of seven Judges.\n\nThe learned Attorney General, on the other hand, contended that the majority view taken in Sanka!chand Sheth's case represented the correct law on the point and the Bench of seven Judges should affirm that view.\n\nI have carefully examined the arguments which have been advanced with great ability and learning on both sides, but I am afraid I find it impossible to change the view I took in Sankalchand Sheth's case.\n\nNothing that has been said in the course of the arguments has persuaded me to take a different view.\n\nI remain unconvinced of the incorrectness of the view taken by me\n\n~··\n\n~-.\n\n.. ,..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 673\n\nand I hold to that view despite the fact that I still happen to be in a minority.\n\nI have already given elaborate reasons in my judgme:it in Sankalchand Sheth' s case for taking the view that a Judge cannot be transferred from one High Court to another withJut his consent and I think it would be a futile exercis~ on my part to reiterate those reasons once again in this judgment.\n\nI hold for the reasons given by me in my judgment in Sankalchand Sheth's case that the power of transfer under Article 222 clause (1) cannot be exercised against a Judge without his consent. It is, I may repeat, a highly dangerous power involving great hardship and injury to the Judge transferred including a stigma on his reputation in cases where the transfer is not effected pursuant to any policy but the Judge is picked out for transfer on a selective basis and to my mind, it makes no difference whether the transfer is made by the Government on its own initiative or it is made at the instance of the Chief Justice of India as in the case of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh.\n\nEven if I am wrong in taking the view that no Judge can be transferred from one High Court to another without his consent, the tranfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh must still fail. It has been held in Sankalchand Sheth' s case, and on this point there was no disagreement between the majority and the minority, that the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another can be exercised only in public interest and there must be full and effective consultation between the President, that is, the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India before the decision to transfer 1 a Judge is taken.\n\nI wholly accept this construction of clause (I) of Article 222 and since full and detailed reasons have been given in the various judgments in Sankalchand Sheth's case, I need not indulge in the same exercise again.\n\nNow it is obvious that when a Judge is transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment, it can never be in public interest for no public interest would countenance punish-, meat of a Judge except by way of impeachment under proviso (b) to clause (1) of Article 217 read with clause ( 4) of Article 124.\n\nThere is a clear antithesis between a transfer by way of punishment and a transfer in public interest and therefore, a transfer by way of punishment must he held to be outside the scope and ambit of Article 222 clause (I). In fact, it was so held into &mkalchand Sheth' s case by all the Judges.\n\nBut the question then arises when can it be said that a Judge is transferred from one High Court to\n\nF ...\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nanother by way of punishment.\n\nUndoubtec'ly, when a Judge is tran&ferred by the Government because he does not toe the line of the Executive or gives decisions against the Executive or has Cor some reason or the other fallen from its grace, it would be a transfer by way of punishment. That would be the plainest case of penal transfer. But these are not the only circumstances in which a Judge may be transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment. The element of punishment is not confined merely to the wrath of the Government on account of a Judge being inconveniently independent. There may be cases where a Judge may be transferred because he is not behaving properly or is conducting himself in a manner not befitting the position of a High Court Jud&e and such a transfer grounded on the conduct or behaviour of the Judge would clearly be punishment, even if it be en the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India. It is also po&Sible that the Chief Justice of India may find in a given case that a Judge of a High Court is promoting the interest of his son or brother in practice or by passive inaction allowing his son or brother to uploit his relationship with the Judge for the purpose of advancing bis professional interest and in such a case, the Chief Justice of India may recommend that the Judge should be tramferred to another High Court and the Government may accept such recommendation. Would the transfer in such a case not clearly be by way of punishment ? There may also be cases where the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India for transfer of a Judge may proceed from his disagreement with the social philo sopby of the Judge or his unhappiness with the manner in which be is deciding cases and the Government may unquestioningly accept ch recommendation. This would also, in my opinion, be nothing short of punishment. I take the view that whenever transfer of a Judge is effected for a reason bearing upon the conduct or behaviour of the Judge, it would be by way of punishment and therefore, not permissible under clause (1) of Article 222.\n\nWhen I say this, I may make it clear that I do not regard transfer per se as a punishment.\n\nIt is the reason for which the transfer is made, which makes it penal and if that reason is related to the conduct of behaviour of the Judge, the transfer would clearly be a penal transfer not in public interest and hence outside the scopo and ambit of Article 222 clause (I).\n\nThat takes me to a consideration of the question whether in the present case there was full and effective consultation\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwat1, J.) 675\n\nbetween the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India before the decision was taken to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court and whether such transfer was effected in public interest and not by way of punishment. While considering this question, I would like to emphasise at the outset, and the point I am making here is one of great importance, that when a transfer of a Judge of a High Court is challenged in a Court of Law, the burden must lie upon the Government to sustain the validity of the transfer. The power of transfer, even according to the majority decision in Sankalchand Seth's case, is a drastic power to be exercised only in rare cases as it has the effect of destroying the right of the Judge who is transferred, to continue as a Judge in the High Court to which he was appointed until he reaches the age of 62 years and removing him to another High Court where possibly he would not have agreed to go if he had been asked at the time of his original appointment.\n\nWhen an Order of transfer is made, the Judge has a difficult choice, either to go to the High Court where he is transferred or to resign and having burnt his boats and given up his profession long back, he would be in great difficulty if he chose to resign and therefore, from a practical point of view, he would have no option but to go to the other High Court, howsoever inc.:invenii:nt it may be to him. Moreover, it would be almost in.possible for the Judge to successfully challenge the order of transfer if the burden C'f showing its invalidity were cast upon him.\n\nEven as it is, the Judge would have to wage a lone and unequal battle against the Government whe:;. he challenges the order of transfer and if the onus of establishing facts invalidating the order of transfer were thrown-upon him, the battle would be rendered still more unequal and the scales would be weighted heavily against him.\n\nThe result would be that even an invalid order of transfer would pass muster on account of the in ability of the Judge to discharge the burden of showing the of the order of transfer and the virtual immunity thus granted to the order of transfer would seriously impair the independence of tbe judiciary. Furthermore, having regard to the high status and dignity of a Judge of a High Court, it is but fair that when the Government is displacing the right of the Judge to continue in his High Court upto the age of 62 years, he should be told what are the reasons wnich have weighed with the Government in transferring him. He must be assured that all the constitutional requirements have been complied with.\n\nBesides, the facts showing that there was full and effective consultation between the Government and the Chief Justice of India and the reasons for\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ>ORTS\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nmaking the transfer would be within ::the special knowledge of the Government and the onus must therefore be upon the Government. to prove them. Thus the burden of sustaining the validity of the Order of transfer must rest on the Government and this burden, it may be pointed out, is a heavy burden, which must be satisfactorily discharged by the Government.\n\nThis is the same principle which has been applied by this Court when the legality of detention of a person is . challenged by filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. This Court has consistently taken the view in such cases, unlike the House of Lords in Zamihr's case, that the burden of sustainining the validity of the detention must lie on the detaining authority.\n\nI may observe that this is a remarkably unusual cas~ in which there is substantially a contest between the Chief Justice of a High Court on one hand and the Chief Justice of India on the other. The Government is, of course, a party of this contest since it is ultimately the order of transfer made by the Government which is called in question by Chief Ju .tice K.B.N. Singh, but since the Order of transfer was made by the Government on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, it is the Chief Justice of India who has accepted the gauntlet and joined the contest against Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh. The Chief Justice of India has tiled a counter-affidavit in reply to the writ petition of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and others, but having filed suclt counter-affidavit, he has chosen not to appear before us through counsel. The result is that we have been deprived of the opportunity of asking for clarification of some of the averments made in the counter-affidavit, which appeared at least to some of us to be vague and indefinite. When we asked the learned Solicitor General in the course of the hearing to give us particulars of one statement made in the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India, namely, \"Every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer,\" the learned Solicitor General rightly rejoined by saying that he was not appearin, g for the Chief Justice of India and he could not therefore give the particulars asked for by the Court. We have therefore to proceed on the basis of the counteraffidavit of th~ Chief Justice of India as it stands without any further clarification or elucidation. We must also remined ourselves when we are deciding this contest between Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh on the one hand and the Chief Justice of India and the Government on the other, that we are sitting as Judges, who have taken an oath to\n\n...,.\n\n• -·\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 677\n\nperform the duties of our office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and it is our solemn and sacred duty to do justice, irrespective of who is the litigant before us. We have the highest regard for the Chief Justice of India as we have for Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, but they are both litigants before us and while deciding the contest between them, we must be blind to their status or position and we must adjudicate the controversy between them as we might do in the ease of any other litigants before us.\n\nWe must apply the same standards in assessment of the affidavits and counter-affidavits filed by Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh .and Chief Justice of India as we would do in any other case.\n\nThe scales of justice cannot tilt one way or another merely because a litigant before us happens to be the Chief Justice of a High Court or the highest amongst the Indian Judiciary.\n\nThey are all equal before us when we sit on the seat of Justice and we shall do justice, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and decide the issues arising in the case objectively and dispassionately, forgetful of the high status and dignity enjoyed by the two litigants before us.\n\nWith these preliminary observations I may now proceed to consider the facts.\n\nBut on facts, I do not wish to say much, because I agree with the judgment prepared by my learned brother D.A. Desai on this point. He has carefully analysed the correspondence as well as the affidavits and reached the conclusion that there was no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India before the decision was taken to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court and the transfer was made by way of punishment and not in public interest I wholly endorse_ this view taken, by him as also the reasons given by him in support of that view, but having regard to the importance of the matter affecting as it does the fate of the Chief Justice of a High Court, I would add a few words in support of what\n\nmy learned brother D.A. Desai, has stated in his judgment.\n\nSo far as the first question is concerned whether there was full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India, I have already pointed out, while discussing the scope and effect of clause (I) of Article 217 as to what is the meaning and content of 'consultation'. It requires that the Central Government must make available to the Chief Justice of India relevant data in regard to the Judge proposed to be transferred and the Chief Justice of India must l also elicit and ascertain all relevant\n\n678 SUPREME COURT REPO~!lTS\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nmaterial relating to the Judge either directly from him or from other reliable resources and place such material before the Central Government. Each of the two c0nstitutional authorities, the Central Government and the Chief Justice of Indi'i, must have for its consideration full and identical facts which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision.\n\nThere must be careful and intelligent deliberation on the part of each of them on full and identical facts. Each must make known to the other its point of view and they must discuss and examine the relevant merits of the views. It is only after this process is gone through that a decision can be taken by the Central Government to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another. Now here, in the present case, the ini1iative for transferring Cb.ief Justice K.H.N. Singh was taken by the Chief Justice of India. He proposed by his letter dated 7th December, 1980 that Cb.ief Justice K.B.N. Singh may be transferred to the High Court of Rajasthan. This means that on his part he had made up his mind prior to 7th December, 1980 that Chief Justice K .B.N. Singh should be moved out of Patna. Now admittedly, the Chief Justice of India had not mentioned anything about the proposed transfer to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh prior to making his proposal of 7th December, 1980. This was rather str.ange-1 might say almost inexplicable-because the judgments of the Chief Justice of India and Krishna Iyer, J. in S; inkalchdnd Seth' scase have clearly laid down tlrnt it is the duty of the Chief Justice of India to elicit and ascertain, if necessary by asking directly the Judge concerned all relevant material relating to the Judge and such material would include, for example, the health of the Judge, the availabl ity of medical facilities in and the climate of the place to which he is to be transferred, the business or occupation of his wife or daughter, the position of his parents and the education of his children etc. as a part of the process of consultation. The Chief Justice of India should have therefore, before making bis proposal for transfer by his letter dated 7th Dec.:mber, 1980, informed Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh about his proposed transfer to Rajasthan High Court and enquired from him whether he would have any particular problems or difficultiea, if he was transferred to the Rajasthan High Court.\n\nBut unfortunately, no such enquiry was made by the Chief Justice of India before he made his proposal for transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Rajasthan High Court, which proposal might well have been accepted by the Central Government immediately, but for the fact that there was some difficulty in regard to another proposal simultaneously put forward by the Chief Justice of\n\n-.-\n\n\n....\n\ns.P. GUPTA 11, UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 679\n\nIndia for transfer of Chief Justice K.D. Sharma from the Rajasthan High Court to the Kerala High Court.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India however, changed his proposal in regard to the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and asked the Central Government by his letter dated 20th December, 1980 addressed to the Law Minister co traQsfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court. There was thus a change in the proposal for transfer of Chief Jutice K.B.N. Singh within a period of less than 14 days. But even then, the Chief Justice of India did not inform Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh that he was being transfer; ed to the Madras High Court nor did he enquire to gather from him any relevant material bearing upon the proposal for transfer. Now it is significant to note that neither of the two letters dated 7th December, 1980 and 20th December, 1980 sets out any facts showing why the Chief Justice of India desired that Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh should be transferred from the Patna High Coun. Neither of these two letters throws any light as to what were the facts on the basis of which the Chief Justice of India recommended transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh from the Patna High Court and there is also nothing in these two letters to show that these facts were communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister or to any other high level functionary of the Central Government. The letter dated 7th December, 1980 merely states that he was recommending the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh 011 the basis of the data which he had collected as a result of personal inquiries made from several lawyers and many other Judges of the High Court and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity.\n\nWhat were the. data collected by him on the basis of which he was recommending the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was not disclosed by the Chief Justice of India in his letter dated 7th December, 1980 and from the tenor of this letter it appears though it cannot be said with certainty that no such data must have been communicated to the Law Minister prior of 7th December, I 980 for otherwise the Chief Justice of India would have stated in this lettr that he was recommending the transfer on the basis of the data which he: had already pointed out to the Law Minister. lt is a little surprising that if any facts bearing upon the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh were to be communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister, it should not have been done in writing particularly when the letter dated 7th December, 1980 recommending the transfer was addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister, and this was followed by another letter dated 20th December, 1980 addressed to the Law Minister. It was quite sometime after the revised proposal for\n\n\ntransfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was made in the letter dated 20th December, 1980 that on 5th January, 1981, the Chief Justice of India telephoned [to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and informed him that Chief Justice M.M. Ismail was proposed to be transferred to the Kerala High Court and that he may therefore have to go to the Madras High Court and enquired him ''if he had anything to say on the (question of his proposed transfer\".\n\nChief Justice K.B.N. Singh thereupon enquired from the Chief Justice of India as to why \"he may be transferred to Madras\" on which, according to the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India, he gave two reasons, one that it was Government policy and the other that it was proposed to transfer Chief Justice M .M. Ismail from Madras and \"it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place.\" Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, however, informed the Chief Justice of India that his mother was bedridden and was not in a position to go with him to Madras and that if his transfer was insisted upon, he would prefer to resign.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India requested him not to act in haste and to give the matter a c'.ose\n\nthought. Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh thereafter met the Chief Justice oflndia in New Delhi in the evening of 8th January, 1981 and discussed the question of his proposed transfer with him for some time.\n\nWhen Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh mentioned his difficulty in regard to his mother's advanced age and illness, the Chief Justice of India told him that he was unable to agree with him \"since there were available persons in his family who could look after his mother and in any case, his brother SBN Singh who was practising in the High Court was quite capable of looking after the mother. \"Chief Justice KBN Singh, however, informed the Chief Justice of India that his mother has a special attachment to him and be could not leave her to the care of his brother or other members of his family.\n\nChief Justice KBN Singh then told the Chief Justice of India that certain persons connected with the High Court who were influenced by communal considerations, had made some baseless complaints against him and that he on bis part did not permit communal or any other extraneous considerations to influence him administratively or judicially. The Chief Justice of India, however, assured Chief Justice KBN Singh that he did not hold that Chief Justice KBN Singh himself was to hlame, but certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which bad created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction.\n\nChief Justice KBN Singh thereafter left and on the next day that is, 9th January, 1981, the Prime Minister endorsed her decision\n\n.,._\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 681\n\non the file in regard to transfer of Chief Justice KBN Singh to the 4 Madras High Court and the formal order effecting such transfer was made on 19th January, 1981.\n\nIt is extremely difficult on these facts to hold that there was full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India. The burden of showing that there was full and effective consultation rests heavily on the Government and it is not possible to say that this burden. has been discharged by the Government. I have a\\r., ady referred to the correspondence exchanged between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister and there is nothing in it which shows that any facts bearing upon the transfer of Chief Justice KBN Singh were communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister.\n\nWe were informed by the learned Solicitor General on an enquiry made by us that there is also nothing in the nJtin3~ w:1ich might indicate even remotely that any such facts were cj:nnunic1ted by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister or to th~ Prim~ Minister or to any other high level constitutional functionary of the Central Government. The only statement which we have on this point is the one made by the Chief Justice of India in his counteraffidavit, namely, that \"every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I propJsed the transfer.\" This statement, even if it be accepted as wholly correct, is in my opinion, not sufficient to dicharge the burden which lieil upon the Governmnt to show that there was full and effective consultation. In the first place, it does not say who was the constitutional functionary on behalf of the President with whom \"every relevant aspect of that question was discussed.'' Did the Chief Justice of India discuss the matter with the President personally, though, of course, a statement was made to us on behalf of the President that he had no discussion with the Chief Justice of India in this respect or did he discuss with the Prime Minister or did he discuss with the Law Minister ? We are not informed as to who was the person with whom the discussion took place and unless the name of the permn is mentioned, I do not see how the correctness of the statement can b! verified or challenged by the other side. It is not enough merely to repeat the constitutional formula that every aspect of the question was discussed with the President.\n\nIt is an affidavit which is made by the Chief Justice and the affidavit must contain not merely the constitutional incantation but facts giving particulars stating with whom the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nChief Justice of India had discussion. The affidavit also does not give the date or dates when the discussion took place between the Chief Justice of India and the President. The statement made in the affidavit is delightfully vague. According to this statement, the discussion took place \"both before and after I proposed the transfer\". This would mean that the discussion could have taken place at any time before 7th December, 1980 or at any time after 7th December, 1980 upto 9th January, 1981. How can Chief Justice KBN Singh possibly meet such a vague allegation ? I personally fail to see why if the Chief Justice of India had discussion with the Law Minister or the Prime Minister in regard to the proposed transfer of Chief Justice KBN Singh, the Chief Justice of India could not give us the date or dates when such discussion took place, because surely he must be having some record in regard to his meetings with the Law Minister or the Prime Minister.\n\nThen again, the statement in the affidavit merely says that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed, but does not indicate what aspects were discussed. It is for the Court to decide whether all relevant facts were discussed between the Chief Justice of India and the Central Government so as to constitute full and effective consultation and this enquiry cannot be pre-empted by the Chief Justice of India by asserting in his affidavit that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed by him with the Central Government.\n\nIt is not for the Chief Justice of India to decide, but it is for the Court to be satisfied, that all relevant aspects of the question were discussed by him with the Central Government.\n\nIt is possible that the Chief Justice of India might have considered some facts as irrelevant and not discussed them with the Central Government, but the Court may find that such facts were relevant and should have formed the subject matter of discussion and it is equally possible that some facts might have been discussed which the Chief Justice of India considered relevant but the Court might find them to be irrelevant. We are not told by the Chief Justice of India as to what were the facts discussed by him with the Central Government and in the absence of this information, it is not possible for us to conclude that there was full and effective consultation between the Chief Justice of India and the Central Goverment.\n\nThere is also another infirmity from which the process of consultation suffers.\n\nIt was on 8th January, 1981 that Chief Justice KBN Singh discussed with the Chief Justice of India the difficulty arising from his mother's advanced age and illness and when the\n\nS, P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 683\n\nChief Justice of India pointed out to him that his brother and other family members were there to look after his mother, he explained to the Chief Justice of India that his mother, had a sentimental attachment to him and he could not leave her to the care of his brother or other members of the family.\n\nThere is nothing to show that this particular difficulty of Chief Justice KBN Singh was brought to the notice of the Central Government by the Chief Justice of India before the decision was taken by the Prime Minister on 9th January, I 981 to transfer Chief Justice KBN Singh. The meeting between Chief Justice KBN Singh and the Chief Justice of India took place at 7.00 p.m. on 8th January, I 981 and on the next day, the Prime Minister made her endorsement on the file and there is absolutely nothing to show, nothing even in the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India, that after his talk with Chief Justice KBN Singh, he telephoned either to the Law Minister or to the Prime Minister pointing out this particular difficulty of Chief Justice KBN Singh to the Central Government. There is nothing even in any notings on the file showing that any such information was conveyed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister or to the Prime Minister in the evening of 8th January 1981 or on 9th January I 9S I.\n\nI his omission to communicate the difficulty which would be experienced by Chief Justice KBN Singh as a result of transfer is sufficient to vitiate the process of consultation and it must be held that there was no full and effective consultatton as required under Article 222 clause (I).\n\nWe may now exmine the reasons for which Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was transferred to the Madras High Court. Two reasons were given by the Chief Justice of India to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh in the course of the telephonic talk which took place on 5th January, 1981. One was that the transfer was being made on account of Government policy and the other was that since Chief Ju-tice M.M. Ismail was being transferred from Madras, it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place. So far as the first reson is concerned, I find it rather difficult to appreciate it. The government policy which the Law Minister put forward was that there should be Chief Justice from outside in every High Court, but the Chief Justice of India in his letter dated 7th\n\nDecmber, 1980 expressed his firm opposition to this Government policy and stated that transfers of Chief Justices \"may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reas0ns\" and it was in pursuance of this view taken by him that he recommended the transfer\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n\nof Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh. The Chief Justice of India did not recommend the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh pursuant to the Government policy because he was firmly opposed to that policy, but he recommended the transfer because he thought that for strictly objective reasons, it was necessary to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh. Then, how could the Chief Justice of India tell Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh that he was heing transferred on account of Government policy. The second reason given by the Chief Justice of India is also a little intriguing. If Chief Justice K.B. N. Singh was proposed to be transferred to Madras because it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in place of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail, why, may I ask, was he proposed for transfer to the Rajasthan High Court ? This reason could not possibly apply to the proposed transfer to the Rajasthan High Court. There is no doubt that Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was proposed to be transferred not because he was a senior and experienced Chief Justice who was required to man the High CJurt of Madras in place of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail but because the Chief Justice of India was of the view that he shou'.d be m Jved out of the Patna High Court.\n\nThen, in the course of the discussion at the meeting which took place on 8th January 1981, the Chief Justice of India stated to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which bad ceated needless misunderstading and dissatisfaction.\n\nI do not know whether this statement was made by the Chief Justice of India by way of furnishing to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh the reason why he was being transfrrred because I do not tind it so stated in the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India. But even if it be assumed that this was the real reason why Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was sought to be transferred from the Patna High Court, I cannot say whether this reason was communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Central Government because there is nothing in the correspondence or in the notings showing that any such communication was made by the Chief Justice of India to the Central GJvernment, nor does the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India throw any light on this point beyond making a vague and indefinite statement which I have already discussed. This circumstance would also show that there was no full and effective consultation. But assuming that this reason was communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Central Government and it weighed with the Central Government in making the order of transfer; it would, I am afraid, have the effect of converting\n\nS.P. GIJPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati. J.)\n\n68S\n\nthe transfer into a penal transfer. It is undoubtedly true that the Chief Justice oflndia told Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh that he was not personally to blame, but if he was by his passive inaction allowing certain persons-and certain persons in this context must mean his close relatives-to take advantage of their proximity 10 him and he was being transferred on that account, it would certainly be a transfer for a reason related to his conduct or behaviour. But quite apart from that, I find that this is not the reason which weighed with the Central Government in making the order of transfer against Chief Justice K.E .N. Singh.\n\nThe Central Government stated in a note handed over by the learned Solicitor General to the Court that the reason why the Central Government made the order of transter was; \"(!) it was felt that not agreeing to these transfers may be construed as though the Government is departing from the view of having Chief Justices from outside : (2) the policy aspect could still be\n\npresed mto service later,\" This reason which prevailed with the Central Goverment was totally different from the reason which induced the Chief Justice of India to make his proposal for transfer and there is nothing to show that this reason which weighed with the Government of India was co11111unicated to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion.\n\nThere was therefore clearly no full and effective consultation even in regard to this aspect. Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Governmeflt did not apply its mind to the question whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedieflt to transfer Chief Justice K B.N. Singh. but accepted the recommendation of the Chief of India, because it tluught that if the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India was accepted and the transfers of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chef Justice K.B.N. Singh were made, it would be easier for the Central Government thereafter to press for acceptance of the government policy by the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThere was in my opinion, clearly abdication of its constitutional function by the Central Government.\n\nThe order of traflsfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court must therefore be held to be unconstitutional and void.\n\nI would, therefore, allow the second group of writ petitions G in SJ far as they challenge the constitutional validity of the order transferring Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and issue 'l writ declaring the order of transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh as unconstitutional and void.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in both the groups of writ petitions.\n\nThere will also be no order on the special leave petition.\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nGUPTA, J.\n\nThis batch of writ petitions raises broadly two is mes :\n\n(i) whether on the expiry of the term of office of an additional Judge of a High Court it is permissible to drop him by not giving him another term though the volume of work pending in the High Cotirt requires the services of another Judge; and\n\n(ii) in what circumstances a Judge of a High Court can be transferred to another High Court.\n\nA number of other matters connected with these questions, directly or remotely, were discussed at length at the hearing of the petitions.\n\nAs I happen to agree with the conclusions reached by one or another of my learned brethren on the different questions that arise for decision, I shall deal with only some aspects of the controversy. It is necessary at the outset to state two propositions on which there is no controversy: one is that the independence of the judiciary is a cardinal principle of ollr Constitlltion, and the other is that an additional Judge of a High Court is not appointed on probation.\n\nThe first proposition needs a little elaboration.\n\nIndependence of the judiciary does not mean freedom of the Judges to act arbitrarily, it means that the Judges must have freedom in discharging their judicial functions.\n\nIn order to maintain the independence of the judiciary it has to be protected against interference, direct or indirect; it also follows that the constitutional provisions should not be construed in a manner that wotild tend to undermine this independence.\n\nThe first of the two questions set out above arises on the decision of the Union of India not to extend the tenure of Shri S.N. Kumar, an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, on the expiry of his initial term of office.\n\nShri Kumar was appointed an Additional Judge of the )Delhi High Court for a period of two years. He assumed the charge of his office on March 7, 1979. On February 19, l 931, a few days before Shri Kumar's term of office was to expire, the~Chief fo>tice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 687\n\nUnion Law \\.1inister saving th1t it was his \"very painful duty not A to recommend an extension for Justice Kumar\" as he had been receiving \"persistent\" and \"serious complaints\" against Shri Kumar.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India to whom a copy of this letter was sent wanted to look carefully into the charges against Shri Kumar and accordingly advised extension of his term by a period of six months.\n\nUltimately on the recommendation of the Law Minister Shri Kumar's tenure as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was extended by three months commencing from March 7, 1981; at the end of this period the Chief Justice of India took a different view from the Chief Justice of the High Court and in a letter to the Law Minister written on May 22, 1981 he said that he had \"made in den dent enquiries in regard to Justice Kumar's integrity\" and that \"Not\n\none member of the Bar or of the Bench doubted the integrity o Justice Kumar\" and that \"On the other hand, several of them stated that he is a man of unquestioned integrity\".\n\nHowever, in a note recorded on the relevant file on May 27, 1981 the Law Minister said 'In the matter of assessment of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J. Delhi be given -credence\" and recommended that \"Shri Justice S.N. Kumar may not be continued any further as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure on 7-6-1981 \". Shri Kumar's tenure of office as an Additional Judge thus ended. In the aforesaid letter dated February 19, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to the Law Minister, the Chief Justice had also said: \"Normally, extension of the tenure of an Additional Judge is recommended keeping in view the pendency in Court. The pendency in this Court still justifies the appointment of Additional Judges\".\n\nIn my opinion the decision not to extend Shri Kumar's term of office as an Additional Judge was invalid and unconstitutional on several grounds. The first ground is that when the question before the concerned authorities was whether the term of an Additional Judge should be extended and the volume of work pending in the High Court admittedly required the services of another Judge, it was not permissible to refuse extension on the basis of unconfirmed reports.\n\nThe scheme of the constitutional provisions does not warrant such a course of -action.\n\nUnder article 217 (1) of the Constitution the President, before he appoints a person as a Judge of a High Court, whether permanent or additional, has to consult these functionaries: the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ J 982] 2 s.C.R..\n\nHigh Court. A permanent Judge holds office until! he attains the age of 62 years.\n\nThe tenure of an Additional Judge, article 217( l) says, is as provided in article 224.\n\nArticle 224(1) provides that the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be Additional Judges if it appears to him that \"by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work threin''\n\nthe number of the Judges of the court \"should be for the time being increased\" and that the appointment of Additional Judges shall be for a period not exceeding two years. It is thus clear that the appointment of an Additional Judge depends on the volume of work pending in thourt.ec The maximum period of two ye 1rs was fixed presumably to introducE a mesure of uniformity and to serve as a check on the number of such appointments because the appointment of Additional Judges was apparently considered as an exceptional measure to meet a particular situation when article 224 in its present form was introduced in the Constitution in 1956.\n\nAs things stand at present, however, this seems to have become a regular feature as would appear from the chart supplied dur ing the hearing of these petitions showing the number of permanent and Additional Judge in the different High Courts. There can be no dispute however that the continuance of an Additional Judge in office is conditional upon the continued existence of arrears in a High Court.\n\nExcept that the tenure of an Additional Judge is limited depending on the arrears of work or the temporary increase in the business of a High Court, the position and powers of an Additional Judge and a permanent Judge are the same.\n\nQualifications required of a person for appointment as a Judge of a High Court as stated in article 217 (2) are the same for both. Article 221 (1) read with the Second Schedule which provides for the salaries payable to the Judges of the High Court makes no distinction between an Addition~! and a permanent Judge.\n\nClauses (4) and (5) of article 124 provide the procedure for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court from his office and article 218 makes these provisions applicable in relation to the Judges of a High Court.\n\nHere also there is no special provision for Additional Judges; it cannot be suggested that an Additional Judge of a High Court cannot be removed from office. The oath of office which a Judge has to take before assuming office is also the same for both.\n\nI have already referred to the provisions of article 217 (I} which provides that the President must consult the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned before appointing a person as a Judge of a High\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 689\n\nCourt, whether permanent or additional.\n\nNaturally, the fitness of a person to be appointed a Judge has to be considered by the three functionaries and this fitness test is applicable to both permanent and additional Judges.\n\nFitness must include both capacity and integrity.\n\nIt is admitted in the affidavit sworn on July 22, 1981 by Shri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary in the Department of Justice, Ministy of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, and filed on behalf of the Union of India that an Additional Judge is not a Judge on probation. To say that an Additional Judge is not on probation means that his appointment is not a tentative appointment, it is not for trying out if he is fit to be a permanent Judge. An Additional Judge is appointed for a certain period to cope with the temporary increase and the pending arrears of work in a High Court. Therefore, if the volume of work still pending in the High Court justifies the appointment of an Addittonal Judge, when the term of an Additional Judge is about to expire, there seems to be no reason why the Judge should not be appointed for another term.\n\nShri Kankan's affidavit however adds: It is denied that the appointments of Additional Judges should always be for a period of 2 years unless the amount of business or arrears of work do not warrant the appointment for that period. It is submitted that the 2-year period is the ceiling mentioned in Article 224 and that the President is competent to appoint all or any Additional Judges for any shorter period as he may consider justified.\" This claim of absolute power for the government is not acceptable. The argument is that article 224 only fixes an outer limit of time, and the President is therefore free to appoint Additional Judges for varying periods of time not exceeding 2 years-for three months or six months-as he pleases with out reference to the volume of work pending in the High Court. Such a claim is untenable on the language of article 224 and militates against the conception of independence of the judiciary.\n\nThe independence of the judiciary depends to a great extent on the security of tenure of the Judges. If the Judge's tenure is uncertain or precarious, it will be difficult for him to perform the duties of his office without fear or favour.\n\nOn a proper reading of article 224 (I) it must be held that the tenure of an Additional Judge is not uncertahi. or precarious but it is conditional on the existence of arrears in the High Court which is an objective condition of fact.\n\nIt was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the practice has always been to appoint an Additional Judge for a further period on the expiry of his previous term if the pending work in the High Court required the services of an Additional Judge and to appoint tke\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nseniormost among the Additional Judges as a permanent Judge when a vacancy was available. The existence of such practice could not be denied.\n\nHowever, as an Additional Judge has to be appointed again on the expiry of his intial term, article 217 ( 1) is attracted.\n\nThe fitness of the Judge had been considered at the time of his initial appointment; what then should be the scope of consultation when the appointment of an Additional Judge for another term is contemplated ? In my opinion it reasonably follows that in such a case the scope is limited to an enquiry as to the volume of work pending in the High Court and the time likely to be required to dispose of the arrears. If his initial appointment was not on probation, the Judge's capacity and integrity cannot come within the scope of the conrnltation necessary under article 217 (I) for giving him another term on the expiry of his previous term of office.\n\nA question then arises, whether the Judge should be appointed for another term if these are complaints against him regarding his integrity. If the complaints are serious and are from a responsible source, they cannot certainly be ignored.\n\nBut, as pointed out by Mr. Seervai appearing for the petitioners in Transfer Case No. 22 of 1981 which is writ petition No. 527 of 1981 filed in the Bombay High Court that the allegations cannot be presumed or assumed to be true and have to be proved. In his letter written to the Law Minister on Feburary 19, 1981 the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court while stating that it was his \"very painful duty not to recommend an extension for Justice Kumar\", added that he had \"no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not.\" That being so. the only reasonable course open, which does not undermine the independence of the judiciary, was to appoint the Judge for another term having a rational nexus with the volume of arrears pending in the High Court and then proceed with an enquiry into the allegations and remove the Judge if the. allegations were found true, in accordance with the procedure laid down in clauses (4) and (5) of article 124 read with article 218.\n\nJ do not think the language of article 224 (l) permits short term extensions of the tenure of an Additional Judge to enable the authorities to complete i!lvestigation into the allegations against him.\n\nThat being so there seems to be no possible alternative to what has been suggested above as the proper course to follow.\n\nIn the case of Shri Kumar, admittedly there has been no real investigation into the complaints against him Possibly conscious of this position\n\n....\n\n.~· -~,.··\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 691\n\nthe Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court in a letter to the Law Minister written on May 7, 1981 said \"To my mind, the reputativn of integrity is iust as important as a person actually being above\n\nboard '. This statement should then apply to both additional and permanent Judges, but a permanent Judge cannot be removed from office on the ground that his reputation is bad. From loag prac tice mentioned earlier, an additional Judge has a legitimate eoectancy, if not a not a right, to be appointed for another term if the pending business in the High Court requires the service~ of an Additional Judge, or as a permananent Judge, when a vacancy is available, if he is the seniormost of the Additional Judges.\n\nRefusing to appoint him again when the conditions required an appointment to be made means in substance his removal.\n\nTo remove a perma nent Judge the prescribed procedure must be followed and the allegations against him proved; dropping an Additional Judge at the end of his initial term of office on the ground that there are allegations against him without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations may be expedient but it is destructive of the independence of the judiciary. This would be an easy way for the executive to get rid of an inconvenient Judge. Taking into consideration all these aspects I am of the view that the scope of consultation contemplated in article 217 {I), when the question is whether an Additional Judge should be given another term, is limited to the enquiry whether the volume of work pending in the High Court requires his reappointment.\n\nAssuming that the scope of consultation under article 217 (I) is the same for the initial appointment of an Additional Judge and also for his appointment for another term, it seems to me that there has been no proper consultation in the case of Shri Kumar. In Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr.(1) Chandrachud J, explained what consultation means within the meaning of article 222 (!)which provides that the President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to another High Court. What is said in that case should apply also to 'consultation' for the purpose of article 217 (I). It is observed in Sheth' s case : \" .. there can be no purposeful consideration of a matter, in the absence of facts and circumstances on the basis of which alone the nature of the problem involved can be appreciated and the right decision taken. It must, therefore, follow that while\n\n(I) [J 978] 1 SCR 423.\n\n\n[J982J 2 S.C.R.\n\nconsulting the Chief Justice the President must make the relevant data available to him on the basis of which he can offer to the President the benefit of his considered opinion. If the facts necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are not made available to the Chief Justice, he must ask for them because, in casting on the President the obligation to consult the Chief Justice, the Constitution at the same time must b; taken to have imposed a duty on the Chief Justice to express his opinion on nothing less than a full consideration of the matter on which he is entitled to be consulted. The fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation to place full facts before the Chief Justice and the performance by the latter of the duty to elicit facts which are necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are parts of the same process and are complementary to each other.\n\nThe faithful observance of these may well earn a handsome dividend useful to the administration of justice. Consultation within the meaning of article 222 (1), therefore, means full and effective, not formal or unproductive, consultation.\"\n\nFrom the facts appearing from the correspondence that passed between the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Law Minister, and between the Chief Justic~ of [ndia and the Law Minister, it would appear clearly that there has been no complete and effective consultation on the question whether Shri Kumar's term as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court should be extended.\n\nIt will b~ convenient for a proper appreciation of the matter to set out chronologically the gist on the letters that passed between the constitutional functionaries in Shri Kumar's case and certain other facts :\n\n19.2.1981 The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court w:rote to the Union Law Minister that it was his \"very painful duty not Ito reommend an extension for Justice\n\nKumar\" because there had been \"serious complaints against Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, both oral and in writing. These complaints have been received by me direct as well as through you. I have examined these complaints and find that some of the complaints are not without basis.\n\nResponsible members of the Bar and some of . my colleagues, whom I would rather not name, have also complained about Mr. Justice Kumar. I have no investigating agency to 1; onclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNI01' (Gupta, J.) 693\n\nor not.\n\nAll the same the complaints have been persistent.\" It was added that\" Mr. Justice Kumar has also not been very helpful in disposing of cases.\n\nSome responsible members of the Bar and some of my colleagues have also expressed doubts about Justice Kumar's integrity.\" The Chief Justice prefaced his statement about the complaints against Justice Kumar by saying: \"Normally, extension of tenure of an Additional Judge is recommended keeping in view the pendency in Court. The pendency in this Court still justifies the appointment of Additional Judges.\" The point to note in this letter is that it does not mention the facts constituting the basis of the complaints against Shri Kumar\n\n3.3.1981 A copy of this ktter was sent to the Chief Justice of India and on March 3, 198 J the Chief Justice of\n\nIndia recorded this note on the relevant file: \"I would D like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar.\n\nThe letter of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seems to me too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity.\" The Chief Justice of India recommended extension of Shri\n\nKumar's term of office by six months. The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case.\n\n28.3.J 98 I The Chief Justice of the High 'Court wrote to the Law Minister saying that he had had \"an opportunity to discuss entire matter in detail with the Chief\n\n\nIJ982) 2 S.C.R\n\nJustice of India\" and that after the discussion he had also addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice ended the letter by saying: \"Perhaps you will consider this to be sufficient 'comments• on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply [letter dated 19.3.1981] about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you -have quoted in your letter.\"\n\nThe letter that the Chief Justice wrote to the Chief Justice of India on the same day refers to the three points mentioned in his letter dated 19.2.1981 addressed to the Law Minister repeating that he had \"no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not.\" The letter ends as follows: \"With regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, tbe matter has already been discussed between us.\n\nAbout Justice Kumar not being very helpful in disposing of cases, I enclose a statement of disposal by Justice Kumar in 1980.\"\n\n15.4.1981 The Law Minister wrote to the Chie Justice of the High Court in reply to the letter dated March 28,\n\n1981. Among other things, the Law Minister in this letter said: \"It is true that you have no investigating agency to conclusively establish the truth of complaints. Nevertheless, you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you concluded that Justice Kumar's repu1ation for integrity was not above board .. In view of tbe observations of Chief Justice of India asking for concrete material, it would be necessary for us to have it with your comments.\"\n\n7.5.1981 In answer to the Law Minister's letter of 15.4.1981 the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote back saying that in regard tJ the allegations against Shri\n\nKumar, he had discussed the matter with the Chief Justice of India and had also written to him. \"Accordingly,\" the Chief Justice wrote, \"it is not only embarrassing but painful for me to write this\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J) 695\n\nJetter. As you, however, desire to know what material provided the basis for me to conclude that Justice Kumar's integrity was not above board, I give below some facts \" The facts which the Chief Justice mentioned in the letter are :\n\n(i) In the first half of 1980 when he was not the Chief Justice \"chance remarks\" came to his knowledge about Shri Kumar's \"conduct in Court as well as about his integrity\" when Justice Kumar was doing mostly original side works sitting singly and that in early May of the same year one of his colleagues had told me that he had \"information with him to the effect that if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance company would be decided in favour of that party.\"\n\n(ii) As Acting Chief Justice he constituted the Benches for the second half of 1980 putting Justice Kumar in a Division Bench on the Appellate Side which he thought \"was a safe way to finish the rumours if the same were incorrect and thus safeguard the reputation of a Judge.\" However \"Justice Kumar did not release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his board\". The particulars of the suits and the names of the parties were mentioned in the letter.\n\n(iii) In August 1980 the same colleague of his who had talked to him earlier regarding Shti Kumar's integrity and another colleague mentione'1 that \"doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis-a-vis the aforesaid cases and some others.\" He made discreet inquiries from some of the leading counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations. Looking into the matter more carefully he found that \"it\n\nwas not only the three suits mentioned above but\n\nSUPREME:COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthat there were other Single Bench matters also which had been retained by Justice Kumar on his board despite being put in the Division Bench .. .ln some of these the parties involved were rich and influential including some former princes.\"\n\nThe Chief Justice added that these \"unconfirmed reports\" made him \"conclude that the reputation for integrity of Justice Kumar was not what should be for a Judge of the High Court. To my mind, reputation of integrity is just as important as a person actually being above board \" The Chief Justice also mentioned certain figures to show the rate of dis ?osal of cases by the Division Bench of which Justice Kumar was a member.\n\nIt seems from what the Chief Justice of the High Court said in his letter of May 7, 1981 that he had not recommended extension D of Justice Kumar's term not really because he found the reports against Shri Kumar were true-he has admittedly no \"investigating machinery\" - but because he thought that reputation of integrity is as importnant as a man being actually above board. I have already said that this is a view which will undermine the independence of the judiciary.\n\nThe letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Chief Jusctice of the Delhi High Court to the Law Minister was marked \"SECRET (For Personal Attention Only):' It appears from a subsequent letter addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of the High Court on May 29, 1981 that a few days after the letter of May 7, was written, the Chief Justice of the High Court had requested the Law Minister to keep that letter a secret from the Chief Justice of India. The letter of May 29 discloses that the Chief Justice of the High Court mentioned three reasons for not disclosing the letter to the Chief Justice of India. The reasons as appearing from the Law Minister's letter are as follows :\n\n\"1. .. the reasons stated in the opening portion of your letter dated 7th May, 1981.\"\n\nProbably the reference is to the following lines of the 7th May Jetter written by the Chief Justice the High Court :\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 697\n\nI. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India had made certain A observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and the same were communicated to me by you for my comments .in your D.0. No. 50/2/81-Jus .. dated 19th March, 1981. The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated 14th March, 1981 asking for \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\" As I wrote to yon in my D.O. No. 293-HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March, 1981, I discussed the matter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my D.O.\n\nNo. 292-HCJ/PPS, dated March 28, 1981, a copy of which was forwarded to you. Accordingly, it is not only embarrassing but painful for me to write this letter.\n\nAs you, however. desire to know what material provided the basis for me to conclude that Justice Kumar's integrity was not above board, I give below some facts.\"'\n\n2. You felt highly embarrassed as the contents of your letter dated 19th February, 1981 about Shri Kumar came clearly to be known to Shri S.N. Kumar and some of his colleagues on the Bench. You felt that the contents of your letter dated 7th May, 1981 might\n\nalso get known to them and cause you further embar- E rassment.\n\n3. You felt that the Chief Justice of India had alredy started wrongfully denigrating you for your letter of February 19, 1981.\"\n\nThe letter of May 29 concludes by saying that in view of the fact that the Chief Justice of the High Court was keen on keeping the letter \"confidential from t)le Chief Justice of India\", the letter was not shown to him. Whether the reasons for not disclosing the letter of May 7 to the Chief Justice of India were valid or not, it is clear that the Chief Justice of India was not apprised of the particulars contained in the letter of May 7 concerning Justice Kumar's intt· . grity. It was argued on behalf of the Union of India and the Law Minister that it must be presumed that all the details were placed before the • Chief Justice of India because the Chief Justice of the High Court in his letter dated March 28, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister had stated that he \"had an opportunity to discuss tbr\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nentire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\" and that in another letter written on the same day to the Chief Justice of India he had said:\n\n\"With regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the matter has already been discussed between us.\"\n\nThat this presumption is wrong would appear from the following .,, facts. On May 21, 1981 the Law Minister had written a letter to the Chief Justice of India when he was in Simla. Paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of this letter read as f Jllows :-\n\n\"3. In regard to complaints regarding Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the Chief Justice of the High Court discussed the matter with you as mentioned in his D.O. letter No. 292-HCJ, dated 28th March, 1981, to you, a copy of which he had sent to me. In that letter he had also mentioned the disposals of Justice Kumar.\n\n4. x x x\n\n5. You will please see that in your advice dated 3rd March,\n\n1981 you desired to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar. In terms thereof if you were pleased to make any inquiries, I shall be grateful to have the details.\n\n6. I would be grateful for your urgent advice in regard to the continuance or otherwise of the terms of Justice S.N. Kumar. .. \"\n\nThere is no reference here to the letter of May 7 from the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Chief Justice of India replied to this letter next day, May, 22, 1981 from Simla. The relevant portions of the; letter are as follows :-\n\n\"Shri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, had written a letter dated February 19, 1981 to you,\n\nacopy of which was sent to me. The Chief Justice had recommended in that letter that Justice Kumar's appointment should not be extended further for three reasons :\n\n.,.\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 699\n\n(1) that serious complaints were received against Justice Kumar orally as well as in writing ; (2) that Justice Kumar was not very helpful in disposing of cases ; and (3) that some responsible members of the Bar and Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumar's integrity. By my letter dated March I 4, 1981 to the Delhi Chief Justice I requsted him to furnish further details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar since the result of the enquiries made by me was quice at variance with what the Chief Justice had stated in his Jetter of March 19.\n\nThe Chief Justice met me on March 26, 1981 when he told me that Justice Kumar v; as very slow in his disposals and that he doubted his integrity because even after Justice Kumar's allocation was changed from the original side to the appellate side, he still continued to hear the part-heard cases on the original side The Chief Justice did not mention any thing adverse in regard to Justice Kumar's political leanings or affiliations. By my request the Chief Justice promised to send a statement showing the disposals of Justice Kumar.\n\nI have made the most careful and extensive enquiries E in regard to both of these matters and I am satisfied that there is no substance in any one of them. I have with me a detailed statement of the disposals of Justice Kumar from which it would appear that no charge can be made against him that he is slow in his disposals.\n\nAs regards the complaint of the Chief Justice that Justice Kumar's integrtiy was doubtful since he continued to take old part-heard matters even after the allocation of his work was changed, I have made enquiries not only from members of the Bar but from the sitting Judges of the Delhi High Court which show that is it a common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a Judge is changed from the original side to the appellate side and vice-versa, be continues to take up part-heard cases on which a subtantial amount of time has been already spent.\n\nJustice Kumar therefore did nothing out of the way or un-\n\nA'.\n\n?CO\n\nSUPRFME COURT REPORTS I I 982) 2 s.c:.&\n\nusual in taking up part-beard cases after the allocation of his work was changed.\n\nI find it therefore difficult to agree that Justice Kumar's term should not be extended for the reasons by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. I disagree with the learned Chief Justice, on enquiries made by me, that Justice Kumar is either slow in his disposals or that his integrity is doubtful.\n\nI must mention that I also made independent enqumes in regard to Justice Kumar's integrity generally and apart from the reason for which the learned Chief Justice thought that Justice Kumar lacked integrity.\n\nNot one member of the Bar or of the Bench doubted the integrity of Justice Kumar. On the other hand, several of them stated that be is a man of unquestioned integrity.\"\n\nHowever. on May 27, 1981 the Law Minister recorded a note in the relevant file recommending that \"Shri Justice S.N. Kumar may not be continued any further as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure on 7-6-1981.\" It appears from this note that in making this recommendation, the Law Minister confined himself only to Shri Kumar's reputation. The portion of the note relevant for the present purpose reads :\n\n\"C.J.I does mention that C.J. Delhi met him on 26.3.J 981. He also refers about the common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a Judge is changed from the original side to the appellate side and vice-versa, he continues to take up part-heard cases on which a substantial amount of time has been already spent.\n\nI presume that when C.J. Delhi and the C.J. of the Supreme Court met, the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned to me in his letter dated 7-5-198 I. This presumption is raised on the basis of the letters from the Chief Justice, Delhi... The C.J. I. in his advice proceeds from the premises that taking up part-heard cases after the allocation of work is changed does not amount to lacking in integrity. If it were that simple I\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 701\n\nwould not have joined issue, but the details furni; hed by the C.J. Delhi in his letter dated 7.5.1981 go farther.\n\nx x x\n\nJn the matter 0f assessrnen t of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J. Dell1i be given credence as it is in his association that the Judge concerned discharges his duties and that he has a better occasion and opportunity to watch his working and conduct. The correspondence from the C.J. of Delhi addressed to me furnishes clear details which cannot easily be brushed aside.\"\n\nTaking the last paragraph of the note first, I find it difficult to see how, because the Chief Justice of the High Court had a \"better occasion and opprtunity\" to watch \"his [Justice Kumar's] working and conduct\", he was in a better position to come to a correct conclusion as to the Judge\"s integrity, if all the facts concerning the matter were also placed bef0re the Chief Justice of India; it is not like watching the demeanour of a witness to test his credibility. As regards the statement that the letter from the Chief Justice of the High Court furnished \"clear details which cannot easily be brushed aside\", the details are only particulars of certain suits that Justice Kumar had dealt with, but it is difficult to follow what is sought to be conveyed by saying that these cannot \"easily be brushed aside\".\n\nMere details of the suits can indicate nothing regarding Justice Kumar's integrity. If however by 'details' the unconfirmed reports against Justice Kumar were also sought to be included, no reasonable person could accept them as true without proof. As regards the earlier portion of the note quoted above, the presumption the Chief Justice of the High Court must have informed the Chief Justice of Jndia about the details that the former had mentioned in his letter dated May, 7, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister does not appear to have any basis. It is true the Chief Justice of the High Court in his two letters dated March 28, 1981 written respectively to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India had said that the \"entire matter\" concerning Justice Kumar's integrity had been discussed between him and the Chief Justice of India but it would be wrong to assume, though the Chief Justice of the High Court spoke of the \"entire matter\", that the particulars of the suits and the allegations\n\naainst Justice Kumar concerning them were placed before the Chief Justice of India. What was discussed between the two would appear\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nvery clearly from the letter addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister on May 22, 1981. I have quoted above relevant extracts from this letter. It is plain from this Jetter that when the Chief Justice of the High Court met the Chief Justice of India on March 26, 1981 the only thing that he disclosed was the alleged impropriety of Justice Kumar's conduct that \"even after Justice Kumar's allocation was changed from the original side to the appellate side, be still continued to bear the part-heard cases on the original side\" and that \"be continued to take old part-heard matters even after the allocation of bis work was changed\".\n\nThere is no mention of the other allegations against Justice Kumar concerning these part-heard matters.\n\nIt is impossible to think that if the details that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court mentioned in his letter of May 7, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister for his \"personal attention only\" were disclosed to the Chief Justice of India he would not have referred to them in his letter on May 22.\n\nIt further appears from the affidavit of Shri Kumar, sworn on July 17, 1981, that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had not asked him any question or called for any explanation or clarification from him regarding the allegations against him, but the Chief Justice of India had a discussion with him only with regard to the allegations that he was slow in his disposal and that it was improper for him to continue to deal with the original side matters heard in part by him while sitting on the appellate side. It is also impossible to think that the Chief Justice of India though apprised of the allegation of corruption against Shri Kumar would not ask for his explanation on this serious charge and discussed only the minor allegations against him.\n\nAs part of the relevant material was withheld from the Chief Justice of India it must be held that there was no full and effective consultation as contemplated in article 217 ( 1) and this vitiates the decision not to extend Shri Kumar's term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court though the volume of pending work that High Court required the services of another Judge.\n\nIn any event, even assuming that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had informed the Chief Justice 0f India of the .allegation of corruption against Shri Kumar, it is clear that it was not disclosed to Shri Kumar and he was not given an opportunity to explain the charge against him. Assuming again that Shri Kumar had no legal right to have his term extended, he had at least\n\n--.I\n\n'\"'\n\n--,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 703\n\na legitimate expectation that his tenure as an Additional Judge would continue following the usual practice, and it appears from the Jetter of the Chief Justice of the Delhi Court written to the Law Minister on Feburary 19, 1981 that but for the allegations against him, Shri Kumar would have got an extension of his tenure as an Additional Judge in view of the arrears of work in the Delhi High Court. Consistent with the principles of natural Justice Shri Kumar who had undoubtedly suffered an injury by his term of office not being extended should have been given an opportunity to explain the charge of corruption against him.\n\nThe principles of natural justice apply even to a person who has no legal right. (See In re H.K. (An Infant); [1967] 2 O.B. 617).\n\nThe decision against Shri Kumar cannot be sustained on this ground as well.\n\nAs stated above, in reachillg the decision not be extend Shri Kumar's tenure of office, the Law Minister preferred the opinion of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to that of the Chief Justice of India on the view that the Chief Justice of thfl High Court had \"better occasion and opportunity\" to watch his working and conduct. As I have already said, this is a view which has no valid basis. Under article 217 (1) tlie President, before appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court has to consult three functionaries, the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the , Chief Justice of the High Court; for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the President has to consult the Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State. The controversy is over the question whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India should have primacy or the three functionaries must be regarded as coordinate authorities for the purpose of article 217 (I) and , fthe President was free to accept the opinion of any of them. Assuming however they are coordinate authorities in the sense that each of them must be consulted, the scope of consultation is not the same so far as the Governor is concerned. He is certainly not in a position to give any opinion on the legal acumen of the persons proposed to be appointed.\n\nHis opinion is relevant on matters on which the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India are not expected to have any information. The question however remains, whose opinion should the President accept if the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India differ ? Normally, the Chief Justice of the High Court is likely to know more about a lawyer practising in that court whose name is proposed for appointment but where the question is whether\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nor not the tenure of an Additional Judge should be extended, if all the relevant materials are before both, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, it is difficult to see how the Chief Justice of the High Court is in a better position than the Chief Jmtice of India to give a correct opinion. However, as Krishna Iyer J., has 8aid in Shamsher Singh' s(1) case the Chief Justice of India the ''highest dignitary of Indian Justice\". The President has to consult him for the appointment of the Chief Justice of a High Court. He is, what Mr. R.K. Garg appearing for Shri S.N.\n\nKumar in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981 (which is writ petition No. 882 of 198 I filed in the Delhi High Court) described as the Pater families of the Indian Judiciary. In my view the President should accept the opinion given by the Chief Justice of India in such a case unless the opinion suffers from any obvious infirmity; he cannot act as an umpire and choose between the two opi1.1ions.\n\nFor the reasons indicated above, the decision in Shri S N.\n\nKumar's case must be held invalid and the case should go back to the President for a fresh decision after a full and effective consulta-..\n\nti on as contemplated in article 217 ( 1) of the constitution.\n\nThe other main issue arising on these writ petitions relates to the transfer of Judges from one High Court to another High Court.\n\nThe question of transfer arises upon a letter addressed by the Law Minister on March 18, 1931 to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of different States, except the North-eastern States, stating that the Law Commission, States Re-organisation Commis~ sion and various Bar Associations had expressed the view that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one; third of the Judges of a High Court should be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. The Law Minister in this letter requested those to whom the letter was addressed to (a) obtain from all the Additional Judges of the High Court in a State their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country and (b) also to obtain similar consent from those persons who have been or in the future were likely to be proposed for appointment as Judges.\n\nThe letter also carried a\n\n(I) [1975] I SCR 81<4.\n\n\"' '\n\nI -i\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 705\n\nrequest to obtain from the Additional Judges and the proposed appointees names of three High Courts in order of preference to which they would like to be appointed as Judges or permanent Judges as the case may be.\n\nIt was however added that it should be made clear to them that the furnishing of the conse11t or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of the Government either in regard to their ap; nintmnt or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the prefere:1ces given. The letter says that the written consent and preferences of the Additional Judges and the persons recommended for initial appointment should be sent to the Law Minister within a fortnight of the receipt of the letter.\n\nThe question of transfer also arises in Transferred Case No. 2/81 which is writ petition No. 390 of 1981 filed in the Madras High Court and in Transferred case No. 24 of 1981 which is Writ Petition No. 2224 of 1981 in the Patna High Court. These petitions relates to the transfer of the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court, Shri K.B.N. Singh, to the Madras High Court. Article 222(1) says that the President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court. It was argued that the letter seeking to obtain general consent of the Additional Judges to their transfer to other High Courts was only a device to circumvent article 222( I) reducing the requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of India to a formality.\n\nClearly, the Constitution does not contemplate taking of such general consent to transfer which might take place at some future dates in respect of only some of the Judges.\n\nThe letter has thus no authority of law.\n\nThis aspect has been dealt with in detail in the Judgments of Tulzapurkar J , and Pathak J., which I have bad the advantage of reading. I agree with them that the said letter dated March 18, 1981 is of no c:insequcnce legally and cannot bind or affect in any way those for whom it was intended.\n\nThis letter of March 18, 1981 suge>ts in defenc~ of the proposed transfer of Judges that for furthering national integration and combating narrow parochiul tendencies one-third of the Judges of a High Court should be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. It has been held by a majority in Swkil C!1q•1d's case that transfer of a Judge of a High Court to another High Court is permissible only in public intere>t and not by way of punishment.\n\nOne reason stated in support of the policy of transfer in the letter -0fMarch 18, 1981 is that it would Ci>mb1t narro.v p1ro:'1ia.l te1d-\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ndencies. However, the transfer of an individual Judge on the ground that he is guilty of parochial tendencies would be a transfer by way of punishment and as such not permissible. If the proposed transfer is with a view not to allow parochial tendencies to grow, then again the question will remain who among the Judges should be transferred and to which High Courts. Also, whether the transfer of Judges from one High Court to another would really further national integration may be open to debate. However, the validity of the policy does not arise for decision on these writ petitions.\n\nApart from its validity, to what extent the policy is relevant in the context of article 222(1) is a question. As held in Sankal Chand's case mass transfers are not contemplated under article 222(1). The President may transfer a Judge from one High Court to another only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The policy may provide the President with a ground to suggest the transfer of a Judge, but the. Chief Justice of India must consider in each case whether [the proposed transfer is in public interest because, even granting the validity of the policy, the question would remain who among the Judges should be transferred and to which High Courts.\n\nIn Transferred Case No. 24 of 1981 which was writ petition No. 2224 of 1981 in the Patna High Court in which Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court has been transposed as a petitioner, and Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981 which was writ petition No. 390 of 1981 in the Madras High Court, the validity of the Notification transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court is challenged.\n\nThe notification is challenged mainly on the ground that the order of transfer was bad as Shri K. B. N. Singh had not consented to it, that there was no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India before the order was made, and that the transfer was not in public irJ:erest but was really by way of punishment. Tulzapurkar J. has dealt with this aspect of the case in detail in his Judgment and I do G not propose to go over the same ground as 1 agree with him for the reasons given by him that the impugned order of transfer is valid under article 222(1) of the Constitution.\n\nI would however like to add that an order of transfer even if H made for administrative reasons and in public interest is likely to <>ause some injury to the Judge transferred, though that could not be\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J) 707\n\nvalid ground for holding that the transfer is by way of punishment, it is the reason behind the order of transfer that should determine its nature.\n\nIt would be only fair not to let the Judge who is being transferred face mJre difficultie~ than are absolutely necessary. If the Judge is wholly unfamiliar with th~ language of the State to which he is transferred, it is possible in some cases that it will affect his efficiency.\n\nI would ask the Government to consider if it is possible to transfer Shri K.B. N. Singh to some High Court, consistent with his position as a senior Chief Justice, where the language difficulty will not be so actute.\n\nCounsel for the Law \\1inister questioned the locur standi of the petitioners in these cases who are members of the legal profession.\n\nThe question however seems to be academic because Shri S.N. Kumar and Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh are parties respectively in Trai1sferred Case No. 20 of 1981 and Transferred Case No. 24 of 1981; Shri SN. Kumar, impleaded as respondent NJ. 5 in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981 has supported the ptitioners in challenging the validity of the decision not to extend his term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court and Shri K.B.N. Singh transposed as petitioner in Transferred case No. 24 of 1981 has challenged the notification transferring him to the Madras High Court.\n\nApart from the fact that they are both parties, for the reasons given by Bhagwati J. and Tulzapurkar J. in their respective Judgments I agree with them that the petitioners who are practising advocates of different High Courts are competent to maintain the petitions.\n\nIn the course of the hearing of these petitions we had made two orders for the disclosure of certain documents. The reasons in support of these orders will appear from the Judgment of Bb.agwati, J. with which I agree.\n\nThe petitions shall be disposed of in accordance with the conclusions reached on the various points arising for decision in these petitions.\n\n\n[ J 982] 2 S.C.R\n\nFnAL Au, J.\n\nTransfi rred Case No. 22 of 1981 :\n\n1 he petitioners, Advocates practising in the High Court of Bcrr, bay, filed a writ petition No. 527/81 before the Bombay High Court challenging the constitutionaity of Exhibit 'A', a Circular said to have been issued by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981 and addressed to the Governer of Punjab and Chief Ministers of States (except the North Eastern States).\n\nThe petitioners prayed for several reliefs to which we shall refer hereafter.\n\nThe wnt petition was transferred to this Court with the consent of parties by an order dated June 9, 1981.\n\nThe petitioners alleged that the Union Law Minister who was respondent No. 1 in the original writ petition had issued a Circular letter dated 18.3.1981 (hereafter referred to as the 'Circular') to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of States requesting them to obtain the consent of Additional Judges of the High Courts concerned to their transfer as permanent Judges of High Courts other than those in which they were appointed as Addititional Judges. We shall give details of this Circular when we deal with it.\n\nThe Circular was received by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court on 29 3. 81 and on 30.3.81 he addressed a letter to the Addittonal Judges (respondents 3 to 12) and asked them to do the needful. The said Circular seems to have created a serious upheaval in the rank and file of the lawyers of Bombay Bar resulting in a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of Western India on 3.4.81. It is alleged in the petition that the meeting was largely attended and a unanimous resolution was passed, inter alia, condemning the Circular as being subversive of judicial independence and demanding that the Government be directed to withdraw the Circular. The furore on the Circular seems to have infiltrated into the Bombay Bar Association which also held several meetings and similar resolutions were passed. On 14.4. 81 a meeting of the G Managing Committee of the Bombay incorporated Society passed similar resolutions and also resolved that the President of the\n\nSociety should join as a petitioner, as a result of which the fourth petitioner was added as one of the petitioners. As a mark of serious protest against the Circular and the discourteous language in which H the said document (circular) is alleged to have been expressed, the legal practitioners practising in the High Court, city civil courts,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 709\n\nSmall Causes Courts and the police courts resolved not to attend those collrn on 15.4.81. The petitioners further alleged that they represented a large body of legal opinion of Bombay as also representing public interest in a free and independent judiciary whic'.1 wa> the very bulwark of the democratic form of GJvern:mnt c nte n plated by the Constituthn. In the writ petition, which has now been transferred to this Court, the petitioners sought the followin~\n\n~ reliefs:\n\n\"(a) that it may be declared that the said letter, Exhibit\n\n\"A\" to the petition, is ultra vires and void ;\n\n(b) that it may be declared that the consent if any conse\n\nquent on or arising from the said letter given by an additional Judge or any person whose name has been or is to be submitted for his appointment as a Judge is null and void;\n\n(c) that this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to issue an order or direction under Article 226 qt1a>hin5 the said letter Exhibit 'A', and the consent, if any, obtained from any person following on or as a result of the said letter ;\n\n(d) that in the alternative to prayer (c) above this Hon'ble Court will be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus (or any other writ, order or direction) directing Respondents 1 and 2 to withdraw the said letter and to abstain from using or in any manner acting on the consent, if any, obtained from any person following on or arising from the said letter.\"\n\nThe petitioners also prayed for an ad interim injunction pnjin5 hearing of the petition.\n\nThis seems to have been the reation of the Bombay lawyers to the aforementioned Circular.\n\nTransferred Case No. 20 of 1981.\n\nAnother writ petition was filed by Shri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court in the High Court of Dlhi making Union of India, Justice O.N. Vohra, Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad as respondents and alleging that the indepndence of judiciary which was essential for the preservation of civil librty was\n\n710 SUPREME COURT REPORlS\n\n[!982] 2 S, C.R.\n\nbeing eroded by the actions of the Government, viz, short-term appointment of Additional Judges for 3-4 m.mths arid short extensio is\n\ngranted af1er the term was over. Anothr grievane mide regardirig the Circular issued by the Union Law Minister compelling more than\n\n100 Additional Judges all over the country to give their conserit f.n being appointed as permanent Judges outside their State on the pain of being dropped was that this was a 1 inqirect method of by passing the consultative process contemplated by Art. 222.\n\nApart from these apprehensions the petitioner m1de seriau s allegations the purport of which was that a cJn>iste1t ca n~.1ig n had been launched by some of the Ministers of Central G; wern ment and Chief Ministers of States against the higher judiciary.\n\nIn this connection, statements of a Cabinet Minister and some Chief Ministers were mentioned. Referring to SJme concrete cases it was alleged that although permanent vacancies in the High Court of Delhi were available yet Justice Goswami and Justice Sultan Singh in stead of being made permanent Judges were appointed as Additional Judge for a period of two years in July and August, 1980 respectively whereas Justice Vohra as an Addi. Judge only for there months. It was further alleged that two more Additional Judges, viz., Justice Kumar and Justice Wad were appointed for three months.\n\nAccording to the allegations made by the petitioner, the terms of the aforesaid three Judges, Justice Vohra, Kumar and Wad was to expire on 6.6.81.\n\nIt appears that after the term of Justice Vohra and Justice Kumar expired on the 6th of June 1981, the Central Government did not reappoint them as a result of which they were sent back to the Bar. Justice Vohra did not i'Ile any petition and instead F started his practice.\n\nThe writ petition filed by Mr. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi was also transferred to this Court and was numbered as Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981.\n\nWhile this case was pending in this Court the term of Justice Kumar expired and at his request be was impleaded and transposed as third respondent in the case so that he may be in a position to defend his cause. The petition of Mr. Tarkunde apart from challenging the Circular has also assailed the refusal of the Government to grant further extension to Justice Kumar and Justice Vohra.\n\nAs Justice Vohra's case was not pressed it is not necessary for us to go into the circumstances under which the term of Justice Vohra was not extended.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 711\n\nTransferred Case No. 19 of 1981.\n\nThis petition has been filed by Mr. S.P. Gupta against the President, Union of India, Chief Justice of the Allahabad Court and the Governor of U.P. In view of similar petiticms having been tra:1sferred to this Court, this petition was also transferred to this Court from the Allahabad High Court by an Order dated 1.5.1981. In this petition, the following reliefs were prayed :\n\n\"(a) issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of a declaratory writ that Justice Murlidhar, Justice A.N.\n\nVerma, Jmtice N.N. Mitthal have already been appointed as permanent Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by virtue of the warrants of appointment dated 12.12.1980, 12.3.1981 and 12.3.1981 respectively.\n\n(b) in the alternative, issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of Mandamus directing the President to appoint judges of the High Court according to the\n\nsubmisions made in this petition;\n\n(c) issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of Mandamus directing the President of India to appoint permanent judges of the High Court on the vacancies in the office of the permanent Judges, whenever such vacancies occur, in accordance with the Constitutional scheme and provisions, as submitted in this Petition and found by this Court:\n\n(d) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the President of India to fill the vacancy of the additional Judges of the High Court without delay.\"\n\nTransferred Case No. 21 of 1981.\n\nA petition exactly similar to the one filed by Mr. S.P. Gupta was also filed bv Mr. J.L. Kalra, Advocate and others in the Delhi\n\nHigh Court which was also transferred to this Court by an Order H dated 1.5.1981 alongwith the case of Mr. S.P. Gupta. In this case, the following reliefs were sought :\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(a) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent to assess the number of permanent and additional judges required for this Hon'ble Court having regard to its current business and the accu'llulated arrears of work and create such number of permanent and additional posts of judges as may he required, within such reasonablr time as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in accordance with law;\n\n(b) direct the respondent to appoint Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.N. Goswamy, Hon'hle Mr Justice Sultan Singh and Hon'ble Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra as permanent judges of this Hon'ble Court against the three vacant permanent posts forthwith;\n\n(c) direct the respondent to extend the term of the additional judges namely Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Wad by a period of two years within two weeks from the date of the order.\n\n(d) direct the respondent likewise to confirm/extend the terms of the additional judges of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan, whose names are mentioned in paragraph No. 5 of this petition;\n\n (e) direct that no such piecemeal extension, but a reasonably long term shall be given to the other additional judges of this Hon'ble Court as well as of other High Courts in future.\"'\n\nApart from these petitions which have been transferred to this Court other petitions were also filed against the Order of the President transferring Justice Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to be the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to be the Chief Justice of Madras High Court.\n\nWrit Petition No. 274 of 1981\n\nThis writ petition was filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate of the Supreme Court challenging the order of transfer of Justice\n\n,_ ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 713\n\nIsmail from Madras High Court to Kerala High Court. While the petition was pending, Justice Ismail chose to retire from service and hence the petition became infructuous so far as the main relief was concerned. Miss Thomas, however, pressed the petition only on one ground, viz., that even if the grievance against the transfer of Justice Ismail no longer survived yet she was entitled to contest the Order of the President of India transferring Justice K.B. ~. Sing 1 from\n\n-Patna High Court to Madras High Court.\n\nShe was permitted to argue the case on this limited point.\n\nTransferred Case No. 2 of 1981.\n\nAnother petition was filed by Mr. Rajappa, Advocate in the Madras High Court being writ petition No. 3 of 1981 praying that the orders of the President of India transferring Ch:ef Justice of the Madras High Court to the Kerala High Court and the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court be quashed on the ground that they were null and void and unconstitutional. This case was also transferred to this Court and numbered as T.C. No. 2\n\nof 1981. This case, therefore, raises subtaintially the same questions as are involved in writ petition. No. 274 of 1901.\n\nTransferred Case No. 24of1981.\n\nSo far as the case of Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is concerned, Mr. D.N. Pandey, Secretary of the Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Ass'.lciation alongwith Thakur Rampati Sinha filed a writ petition No. CMJC 2224/1981 in the Patna High Court against the Union of India, the Chief Justice of India Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Cour; and the Registrar, Patna High Court. Justice K.B.'N. Singh, respondent No. 3, later after filing an affidavit in this Court prayed that he may be transposed to the category of petitioner.\n\nHe was directed to file a detailed affidavit which wa~ filed on 16.9.81 and he w1s transposed as petitioner No. 3.\n\nThis petition was also transferred to this Court as similar points were involved.\n\nIn this petition, the petitioners prayed that the Order of the President transferring Justice K.B.N. Singh be quashed and the respondents be directed not to give effect to the notification issued by the President transferring petitioner No. 3 to Madras.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[ J 982) 2 S.C.R\n\nA Transferred Case No. 6 of 1981.\n\nA Simili.r writ petition No. 553/81 was filed by Mr. P. Subramanian before the Madras High Court praying that the Order of the President transferring Justice Ismail from the Madras High Court to Kerala High Court be quashed. This petition also does n •t B survive in view of the retirement of Justice Ismail.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1509 of 1981.\n\nThis petition has been filed by Ripudarnan Prasad Sinha praying for a writ of quo warranto against Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice Patna High Court for not proceeding to join his new posting at Madras and in continuing as Chief Justice of Patna High Court without any sanction of law in view of the Order of the President transferring him to Madras. Special leave has not yet been granted in this petition but it has been tagged on with the cases relating to Justice K BN. Singh but was ultin:ately withdrawn before the conclusion of hearing of their cases.\n\nSince the various writ petitions and intervenor applications transferred to this Court raised almost common questions they were heard together but so far as the Petitions relating to Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court are concerned they were delinked. After having heard Dr. Singhv i, counsel for the petitioners, on the point of law regarding the interpretation of Art. 222 of the Constitution, we proceeded to deal with the questions of law and the constitutional points raised in the petitions of Mr. Chagla, Mr. Tarkunde, Mr. S.P. Gupta and others as also the constitutional points involved in Justice K.B.N. Singh's case.\n\nSo far as Justice K.B.N. Singh's case is concerned we delinked it from other cases because his was thi;: only case which had to be heard on facts turning upon mainly on the question-whether or not there was an effective consultation between the Chief Justice of India, and the Chief\n\nJustice concerned, viz., Justice K.B.N. Singh.\n\nG As these petitions more or less involve common and overlapping points, we shall dispose them off by one common judgment but deal with individual cases separately where-ever necessary.\n\nTransferred Casa Nos. 19 and 22/1981.\n\nWe would first deal with the question relating to the variou1 facets, ihadeg and apecti of Art. 222 of the Constitution as contend-\n\n. ...\n\n.,. .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v . . UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 715\n\ned before us by Messrs Seervai, Sorabjee, Dr. Singhvi, and others during their respective turns.\n\nSo far as Mr. Seervai i concerned his contention on the interpretation of Art. 222, apart from its legislative history and setting, may be indicated as follows :-\n\n(I) The language of Art. 222(1) is clear enough to enable the Court to hold that the transfer must be with the consent of the Judge concerned. Even if it is not so, then the main object of Art. 222 is not very clear and plain and therefore, it is necessary to go into the legislative history of the doctrine of Transfer in order to ascertain the real intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution and, if so read, it would be amply clear that even if Art. 222 (I) does not expressly mention 'consent' the same must be implied in the Article by necessary intendm.ent.\n\n(2) As transfer of a High Court Judge from one High Court to another is an extraordinary phenomenon and has to be made in public interest, we must read consent of the Judge concerned before he can be transferred under Art. 222, otherwise the very purpose and object of the Article would be defeated.\n\n(3) As a transfer without consent of a Judge amounts to punishment, such a transfer involves a serious stain and stigma. Hence, in order to avoid such an anomalous position it should be held that no Judge can be F transferred under Art. 222 from one High Court to another without his consent.\n\nIn the same token it was argued by Dr. Singhvi that before transferring a Judge various aspectsof public interest have to be examined qua the circumstances under G which the Judge is transferred-the compelling reasons why the transfer is being made and the personal difficulties or hardships that the Judge may suffer as a result of his transfer. In other words, by and large, it was contended that non-consensual transfers should be H considered to be prima facie punitive and, therefore, violative of Art. 124(4~ l;>e<; a.~_s_~ jf the¥ !\\!ll01:1ll~ tg\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\npunishment then the punishment can only be for his misbehaviour or incapacity as contemplated by Art. 124 (4) and the procedure established by the Constitution for impeachment. We shall, however, develop the detailed aspect of the arguments of Dr. Singhvi when we deal with the same at a later stage.\n\n(4) It would appear from the historical background of Art. 222 that a transfer of a Judge from one high Court to another really amounts to a fresh appointment as a Judge to the transferee court, because before taking oath in the transferee Court, the Judge has to vacate his office of the original court and thereby he vacate his office of the ceases to be a Judge in the , legal sense of the term of the transferor court although for purposes of pension, allowances and salary, etc. he continues to be a Judge by virtue of a legal fiction.\n\nAs no person can be appointed as a Judge of the High Court in the first instance against his consent the same principle will apply mutatis mutandis to a Judge who is transferred from one High Court to another because his transfer to the transferee court would amount to his first appointment. In other words, the argument comes to this that once an order of transfer is passed by the President of India under Art. 222, the Judge so transferred dies a civil death in the original High Court where he was appointed and takes a new birth in ti e new High Court where he is transferred.\n\n(5) That if a transfer is made by the President without the consent of a Judge, it will seriously undermine and impair the independence of the judiciary which is doubtless the basic structure of our Constitution.\n\n(6) That the majority decision of the Court in Union of\n\nIndia v. Sankal Chand Himatla! Sheth & Anr (1) (Herein after referred to 'Sheth's case') merits a second look\n\n(I) [1978] 1 S C.R. 42~,\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.)\n\nand since the present is a larger Bench consisting of seven Judges, the previous decision should be reconsidered and the view taken therein that consent is not necessary for the application of Art. 222, must be overruled.\n\nThus, the sum and substance of the contentions raised by Mr. Seervai is that the words 'with his consent' should be read into Art. 222(1) after the words 'transfer a Judge.'\n\n, Messrs Sorabjee, Garg and S.P. Gupta who followed Mr.\n\nSeervai adopted his arguments in toto so far as the interpretation of Art. 222 it concerned. They, however, laid greater emphasis on the question of primacy of the Chief Justice of India (hereinafter referred to as 'Cn') and cotended that the opinion of the en was final and binding on the President or on the Council of Ministers who should tender advice to the President in accordnace with the opinion expressed by the en if independence of judiciary was to be ensured.\n\nDr. Singhvi while adopting the arguments of Mr. Seervai submitted that a transfer without consent affects a Judge adversely and results in evil consequences and virtually amounts to a punishment which is worse than removal but he laid greater stress on the efficacy of the consultative process by the constitutional authorities concerned and a proper meeting and application of minds before a transfer is ordered.\n\nOther aspects and conditions of Art. 222 relating to the nature and content of consultation will be examined when we deal with the case of D.N. Pandey (T.C. No. 24/81) in which the Chief Justice of Patna High Court has been transposed as a petitioner.\n\nThese are the broad contentions advanced before us by the counsel for the parties in these petitions.\n\nThe Attorney General, the Solicitor-General and Mr. Mridul appearing for the Law Minister have countered all the arguments advanced by the petitioners and have fully defended the impugned orders, the Circular and the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court to Madras High CourL We shall indicate the arguments in opposition wlwq we cje11J i\\'1 the arguments of the counsel for the petitioners., ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThus, from the facts disclosed in the various petitions and in the light of the arguments advanced before us by the counsel for the parties, the following points arise for determination :-\n\nLocus standi\n\nArticle 217\n\n(a) where is the power to appoint located, is it with the Executive ?\n\n(b) Is the opinion of en entitled to primacy; where the two Constitutional functionaries namely, CJ of a High Court and CJI differ, does the adverse opinion of either of them operate as a VETO against appointment; where both the CJ of a High Court and en agree upon accepting or rejecting a candidate for appointment, can the executive take a differrent view and appoint or decide not to appoint?\n\n(c) who can initiate the proposal for appointment under this Article ?\n\n( d) whether consultation is necessary in case the Executive decides not to appoint a person ?\n\n(e) Does this Article apply when an Additional Judge is to be appointed for a further term or as a permanent Judge.\n\n(f) Scope of judicial review in case of appointment or non-appointment.\n\n3. Policy of General Transfers.\n\n(a) In the general policy of transfers of all CJs so that every State has a CJ from outside, good, valid and constitutional and in public interest ?\n\n(b) Can this policy be formulated and laid down by a declaration made by the President or an executive order of the Council of Ministers without any\n\nleislation 7\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 719\n\n(c) Is the policy of !recruiting one-third Judges from outside the State good, valid and constitutional and, if so, what should be the mechanism for implementing the said policy and the manner of its formulation?\n\n(d) Has it been shown that the aforesaid policy has B already been evolved, formulated and finalised by the Central Government ?\n\nArticle 216.\n\n(a) what is the scope of the power of the President under this Article ?\n\n(b) Is the exercise of the power by the President under this Article amenable to the Judicial review and, if so, to what extent ?\n\nArticle 224.\n\n(a) What are the conditions and circumstances under which Additional Judges can be appointed ?\n\n(b) On the expiration of his term, is an Additional Judge entith:d to be continued automatically, ifthe conditions for appointment of an Additional Judge continue to exist or is he again liable to be subjected to the process of Article 217.\n\n(c) Does the Additional Judge have right to be considered for appointment for a further term or as permanent Judge on expiration of his term or he can be just dropped without any consideration at all.\n\n(i) Is there any convention that an Additional Judge must on the expiration of his term be continued for a further term or be appointed permanent Judge and if so, what is its legal effect on the interpretation of Art. 217 and 224.\n\n(ii) If there is no convention, is there a practice to the above effect and, if so, what is its effect.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\n(d) Can an' Additional Judge be appointed when a permanent post is vacant : if such an appointment is made, can the Additional Judge be deemed to be a permanent Judge ?\n\n(e) Can a short-term appointment of Additional Judge be made under this Article ?\n\nArticle 222.\n\n(a) Who can initiate the proposal for transfer of High Court Judge ?\n\n(b) Is consent of a Judge to be transferred necessary before he can be transferred ?\n\n(c) What is the nature and effect of the consultation with CJI.\n\n(d) Does the requirement of public interest limit the exercise of the power of transfer under this Article?\n\n(e) What is the nature of public interest for which transfer of a High Court judge can be effected ?\n\n(f) Can a Judge be transferred on account of complaints or grievances against him or on account of anything in his conduct or behaviour ?\n\nCircular letter dated March 18, 1981.\n\nClaim of privilege against disclosure.\n\nT.C. No. 20 of 1981-whether there was full and effective consultation; if not, what relief can be granted.\n\n10.\n\nT.C. No. 24 of 1981.-whether there was full and G effective consultation between the Government and CJI, whether the transfer of K.B.N. Singh was effected in public interest.\n\nWe first propose to deal with the various aspects of Art. 222 the question ol privilege, the nature and extent of consultative process under Art. 222, the legal effect of the Circular and its constitutionality.\n\n....\n\n...\n\ns.i>. GiJPtA v. i.JNION (Fazai Ali, J.) 721\n\nComing to the interpretation of Art. 222, the first question A that falls for determination is a~ to whether or not consnt earl be read into Art. 222 as argued by the counsel for the petitioners. To begin with, this matter was fully considered in Sheth's case where the minority judgment considered almost all the aspects of the matter and held that consent cannot be read into Art. 222 and a transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court can be made even without his consent subject to effective consultation which has been explained by all the Judges. In that case Bbagwati J. and Untwa!ia J. dissented from the majority decision and took the view that no transfer of one High Court Judge to another High Court can be made without his consent. In other words the. minorites was of the view that the word 'consent' has to read into Art. 222 having regard to the extraordinary circumstances in which such a power is exercised and the constitutional position of a Judge. Normally, the decision in Sheth's case would have concluded the matter because in the instant case also the points raised are more or less similar but the arguments advanced before us in these cases have revealed many more aspects which may not have been before this court in Sheth' s case and have opened new vistas which undoubtedly require a further consideration. Moreover, in that case the stand taken by the Union of India was that the matter may be decided as a sort of an academic question as the transfers made by the previous Government would be nullified by retransferring them.\n\nIn view of this concession made by the Union of India in that case it was not necessary for this Court to go deep into the matter bcause ultimately the decision would turn out to be purely academic.\n\nThirdly, as the question of general policy of transfer has cleariy arisen in these cases and lot of material has been produced before us to justify both the constitutionality and the legality of this\n\n~ F policy, Art. 222 as also the consultative process now assume a new complexion.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are of the oprn1on that the judgment in Shr?th's case (supra) may be reconsidered in the light of the fresh facts which have emerged since then though ultimately we may reach the same conclusions as held by the majority judgment.\n\nWe shall now examine the first limb of the contention of Mr. Seervai that the word 'consent' should be read into Art. 222.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that a transfer under Article 222 must be made in public interest and it was so held in Sheth's case by all the Judges\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nwho were completely unanimous on this aspect of the matter.\n\nIn this connection, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) observed thus :-\n\n\"The power to transfer a High Court Judge is conferred by the Constitution in public interest and not for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon to punish a Judge who does not toe its line or who, for some reason or the other, has fallen from its grace.\"\n\n(p. 444)\n\nAnd Bhagwati, J. 'made the following observations :\n\n\"One thing is, however, certain that the power to trans• fer a Judge from one High Court to another under Article 222, clause (I) can be exercised only in publie interest.\"\n\nKrishna Iyer, J., speaking for himself and one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) D expressed his views thus :\n\n\"Indeed the independence of the judiciary is itself a necessitous desideratum of public interest, and so interference with it is impermissible except where other considerations of public interest are so strong, and so exer- E cised as not to militate seriously against the free flow of public justice.\"\n\nAnd Untwalia, J. in his judgment struck an identical note and observed as follows :-\n\n\"It was, however, accepted by all concerned that the transfer can be made only in public interest or on the ground of public policy which sometimes has been characterised by eminent jurists as an unruly horse.\"\n\nThis position is also conceded by the Attorney General, the G Solicitor General and Mr. Mridul. The main reason why this Court had held the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another should be in public interest was that the President should not exercise power by way of victimisation or to impede the free flow of public justice or as Chandrachud, J., put it \"for an extrane- H ous or collateral purpose\". Where, however, the compelling circumstances and the exigencies of administration or situation are\n\nobjectively considered and it becomes necessary for the exercise of\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 123\n\nthis power, these factors would constitute public interest to justify A the exercise of the power by the President under Art. 222.\n\nIn the instant case, a general and unanimous policy of transfer of judges and Chief Justices of High Courts to pro mote national integration and suppress fissiparous tandencies, would doubtless be in public interest. Although Art. 222 does not contain the words 'Public interest' in so many words but the very exercise of the power, which B is not a normal power but an exceptional one, it follows as a logical consequence that public interest is a necessary concomitant of the exercise of this power. •\n\nThe question that now arises is if it can be said on a parity of reasoning that 'consent' also should be read as a part and parcel of the exercise of the power under Art. 222. It is difficult to accede to this contention because if a Judge cannot be transferred without his consent then the power loses its significance and becomes an immunity to a judge from transfer by withholding his consent. Thus, a power which is to be exercised by the President can be defeated or stalled by a simple act of the Judge in refusing to give his consent to the transfer. This could never have been the intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 222 may be extracted thus:\n\n\"222. Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.\n\n(I) The President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court.\n\n(2) When a Judge has been or is so transferred, he shall, during the period he serves, after the commencement of the Constitution (Fifiteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, as a Judge of the other High Court, be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined; such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.\"\n\nA perusal of Art. 222 unmistakably shows that it is expressed m absoluely clear: explicit, intelligible, plain and unambiguous language which admits of no vagueness or ambiguity. Mr. Seervai,\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nhowever, by an involved ; irocess of reasoning wants us to import the concept of 'consent' by reading the same into the Article by way of necessary intendment of the Parliament. It is not the function of the court to supply words to suit a particular course of action so as to be acceptable to a particular set of persons as a doctrine of implied consent. It is just like first raising a ghost and then trying to kill it. Before we enter into a detailed discussion of the Rules of Interpretation of Statutes we might indicate that there is intrinsic evidence in the various constitutional provisions which clearly show that the word 'consent' has been dropped by the legislature deliberately or it is a case of deliberate omission rather than casus omisus. In order to drive home our point we would give a brief survey of the scheme of the Constitution regarding the expressions 'consent', 'concurrence' or 'Consultation' used in various Articles to determine the context, the purport and the intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution.\n\nTake, for instance, Art. 127 which expressly deals with pre vious consent of the President, and may be extracted thus :\n\n\"127.\n\nAppointment of Ad hoc Judges.\n\n( l) If at any time there should not be a quorum of the Judges of the Supreme Court available to hold or continue any session of the Court, the Chief Justice of India may, with the previous consent of the President and after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, request in writing the attendance at the sittings of the Court, as an ad hoc Judge, for such period as may be necessary, of a Judge of a High Court duly qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice of India.\n\n(2) It shall be the duty of the Judge who has been so designated, in priority to other duties of his office to attend the sittings of the Supreme Court at the time and for the period for which his attendance is required, and while so attending he sail have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges, and shall discharge the duties, of a Judge of the Supreme Court.''\n\nThis Article may be divided into four parts :-\n\n....\n\n.,.\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 725\n\n(1) that there should be a lack of quorum of the Judges of the Supreme Cours.\n\n(2) that the Chief Justice of India may with the previous consent of the President and\n\n(3) after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High B Court.\n\n(4) request in writing the attendence, as an ad hoc Judge, for such period as may be necessary of a Judge of a High Court duly qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court\n\nClause (2) of the Article provides that it shall be the duty of the Judge to attend the sittings.\n\nIt would thus appear that when the Constituent Assembly intended that there should be consent, it has said so in very clear terms.\n\nThe first part clearly shows that the power under Art. 127 ( 1) can be exercised only with the previous consent of the President and not otherwise.\n\nSimilarly, in the second part, the word 'consultation' is used and in clause (2) the word 'duty' is used which completely rules out 'consent'.\n\nAn analysis of this Article clearly shows that whenever the Constitution intended a partieular expression to have a particular meaning it has made its intention clear and unambiguous by using the word 'duty', 'consent' or consultation'.\n\nArticle 128 requires consent of the President before an offer is made to a retired Judge to act as an ad hoc Judge of the Supreme\n\nCourt.\n\nProviso to Art. 128 may be extracted thus: F\n\n\"Provided that nothing in this article shall be deemed to require any such person as aforesaid to sit and act as a Judge of that Court unless he consents so to do.\"\n\nThis proviso clearly enjoins that the ad hoc Judge cannot be requested to sit in the court unless he consents to do so.\n\nIndeed, if the intention of the Constituent Assembly was that a transfer could not be made without the consent of the Judge, then a similar expression as contained in the proviso or something like that would have been used in Art. 222 ( 1). The absence of any such exepression shows that the Constituent Assembly deliberately omitted 'consent' by necessary intendment.\n\n\n[ 1892) 2 S.CR.\n\nA Article 224A deals with the appointment of retired Judges\n\nat sittings of High Courts which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"224A. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Chief Justice of a High Cort for any State may at any time, with the previous consent of the President, request any person who has held the office of a Judge of that Court or of any other High Court to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court for that State, and every such person so requested shall, while so sitting and acting, be entitled to such allowances as the President may by order determine and have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges of, but shall not otherwise be deemed to be, a Judge of that High .\n\nCourt:\n\nProvided that nothing in this article shall be deemed to require any such person as aforesaid to sit and act as a Judge of that High Court unless he consents so to do.\"\n\nThe provisions of this Article make the exercise of powers conditional on the consent of the Judge concerned. In Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. & Ors.(1) this Court has clearly indicated that where the Constitutution intended particular expressions to be used it has expressed its intention clearly and observed thus :\n\n\"Wherever the Constitution intended to provide more than one consultant, it has said so : see Arts. 124 (2) and 217 (1).\n\nWherever the Constitution provided for consulta tion of a single body or individual it said so : see Art. 222.\n\nArt. 124 (2) goes further and makes a distinction between persons who shall be consulted and persons who may be consulted.\"\n\nArticle 258 runs thus :\n\n258. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution the President may, with the consent of the Govern- G ment of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.\n\n(1) [1967] I SCR 77.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazai Ali, J.) 727\n\n(2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any\n\nState may, notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect to which the Legislature of the State has no power to make laws, confer powers, and impose duties, or authorise the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the State or officers and authorities thereof.\n\n(3) Where by virtue of this article powers and duties have been conferred or imposed upon a State or officers or authorities thereof, there shall be paid by the Government of India to the State such sum as may be agreed, or,.in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India, in respect of any extra costs of administration incurred by the State in connection with the exercise of those powers and duties.\"\n\nHere also, the President has to exercise his powers with the consent of the Government of a State either conditionally or unconditionally. In other words, where the power conferred on the President is to be exercised with consent, the Founding Fathers of the Constitution have expressly said so in the concerned Articles. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, if the intention of the Founding Fathers was to make 'consent' an essential ingredient of Art. 222, they would have used the exepression 'the President may, with the consent of the Judge concerned, transfer a Judge from one High Court to another.' The fact that Art. 258 requires the President to act with the consent of the Government of a State, which is also a constitutional authority; the same principle will apply to a High Court Judge who is also a constitutional authority.\n\nTherefore, this leads to the irresistible conclusion that the word 'consent' was never intended to be included in the powers to be exercised under Art. 222.\n\nArticle 258 A runs thus :-\n\n'258 A. Nothwithstanding anything in this Constitution,\n\nthe Governor of a State may, with the consent of the H Government of India, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ l 982f 2 S.C.R.\n\nin relation to any matter to which the executive power of the State extends.\"\n\nHere also, the Governor of a State has to exercise a particular power only with the consent of the Govunment of India and not otherwise.\n\nThis also shows that the Founding Fathers were fully aware of the situations where consent is necessary and where it is not.\n\nArticle 254 deals with the legislative powers of the Centre and the States. Clause (2) of Art. 254 provides thus :\n\n\"254 (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State :\n\nProvided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, E varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.\"\n\nIt is obvious that here as a legislation is concerned. the expression used is 'assent' and not 'consent' though both the terms are synonymous. The use of the word 'assent' is generally made when F we are dealing with statutory enactments.\n\nSubciause (ii) of clause (I) of Art. 370 may be extracted thus : ~\n\n\"(ii) such other matters in the said lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.\"\n\nThe laws mentioned in Art. 370 can be applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir only with the concurrence of the Govermenr of the State.\n\nHere the word 'concurrence', which is stronger than\n\nonst;:nt' ! hs been usc; d o indi<; te 1\\1:\\d maiqtl\\in the spe<; ial SWl!S\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 729\n\ngiven to that State.\n\nCertain aspects of this matter have been clearly pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sheths case thus :\n\n\"It would thus appear that the Constitution itself spe cities 'consent' where it is intended and omits it when unnecessary. If, therefore, the Constitution-makers intended that under Article 222 a Judge cannot be transferred from one High Court to another without his consent then it should have been expressly so mentioned in the Con\n\nstitution.''\n\nWe have given these clear instances to drive home the point that whenever the Founding Fathers intended that a particular expression should be used in an Article as a condition precedent to the exercise of a particular power, the same has been mentioned and where no such intention was there the expressions have not been used.\n\nAs against this, Mr. Seervai submitted that in Art. 217, which provides for the ppointment of High Court Judges, it has no where been indicated that the Judge proposed to be appointed should give his consent to the appointment.\n\nIn Sheth' s case, Krishna Iyer J. while dealing with an identical argument observed as follows:-\n\n\"It would be seen that in this constitutional provision E the words \"appointed\" and \"transferred\" have been used separately conveying different connotations; and if the Constitution makers had used these two terms in the said subject in different contexts it cannot be argued that these two terms are interchangeable. On the other hand, an analysis of Article 217 (I) (c) shows that the constitutional P provision makes a clear-cut distinction between appointment and transfer.\"\n\nWe stick to the view expressd by Krishna Iyer J. in the majority judgment. The argument of Mr. Seervai appears to be G fallacious because this analogy cannot be applied to a Judge who after being appointed is transferred under Art. 222. It is obvious that there is no provision in the Constitution empowering the President to appoint for the first time a person as a Judge of a High Court against his consent and even if he is appointed, the person so H appointed can refuse to act as a Judge and if he does so the matter ends there and he cannot be compelled to act as a Judge. Once,\n\n730 SUPRllMll COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nhowever, the person decides to accept the appointment of a Judge of a High Court he becomes a constitutional functionary and therefor would be subject to the provision of the Constitution because before deciding to accept the appointment he must be presumed to be aware of the constitutional provisions contained in the various Articles regarding High Court Judges, viz., the conditions of service, the salary and other allowa'nces the date of retirement and also the provison regarding transfer as provided for in Art. 222 which does not contain the word 'consent'.\n\nIt would thus not be open to any Judge to complain that he had been transferred against his consent or to plead that had he known this he may not have accepted the office of a High Court Judge.\n\nAs the words 'consent' is conspicuously absent from Art. 222, such a plea cannot in the very nature of things be permitted to be taken by the concerned Judge. If he does not want to be transferred, it is always open to him to resign for which also there is a clear provision under proviso (a) to clause (I) of Art. 217.\n\nTherefore, the argument of Mr. Seervai must be overruled.\n\nThese are the intrinsic circumstances to show that the Founding Fathers did not intend to use the word 'consent' in Art. 222 deliberately. We have already held that Art. 222 is expressed in the clearest possible terms. But, assuming for the sake of argum<nt as urged by Mr. Seervai, that there is some element of ambiguity either in the setting and pattern of Art. 222 or in the real object which it seeks to subserve, which according to Mr. Seervai finds ample support from the fact that two Judges in Sheth's case have taken the view which is being propounded by the learned counsel, we would attempt to ccustrue Art. 222 in the light of the well settled rules of interpretation of statutes.\n\nBefore, however, we discuss the various books, reference and authorities we must take into consideration a very weighty circumstance \\\\ hich is peculiar to our Constitution as also to the American Constitution. It must be remembered that in England if any error is commited by a court of Appeal, it may be corrected by the House of Lords or eventually by Parliament by a simple majority.\n\nSimilarly, in Australia also if the High Court gives a wrong interpretation of a particular constitutional provision it can be set right by Privy Council by an appeal against the said order of High Court and the Parliament may amend the statute to bring it in conformity with the intentign an<l that too by a simple majority.\n\nThe position\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 731\n\nso far as our country is concerned is similar to that of America and if any error of interpretation of a Constitution provision is committed by the Supreme Court or any interpretation which is considered to be wrong by the Government can be rectified only by a constitutional amendment which is a very complicated, complex, delicate and difficult procedure requiring not merely a simple majority but two-third majority of the Members present and voting. Apart from the aforesaid majority, in most cases the amendment has to be ratified by a majority of the States. In these circumstances, therefore, this Court which lays down the Jaw of the land under Art. 141 must be extremely careful and circumspect in interpreting statutes, more so constitutional provisions, so as to obviate the necessity of a constitutional amendment every time which, as we have already mentioned, is an extremely onerous task. S.R. Das, Chief Justice in the case of The Bengal lmmuuity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar &\n\nOrs.(1) expressly referred to this aspect of the matter and observed as follows:-\n\n\"An erroneous interpretation of the Constitution may quite conceivably be perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified for a considerable time to the great detriment to public weJI being.\"\n\nHaving carefuJly interpreted a particular prov1s10n of the Constitution, the Court should as far as possible stick to the doctrine of stare decisis. It must be remembered that as Lord Wright pointed out in James v. Commonwealth(') that a Constitution is a federal component and the constituents must hold a balance between all its parts.\n\nThus, so far as the general principles regarding interpretation of statute are concerned they are now well settled beyond any controversy for the last two centuries in almost all the countries of the world having a democratic constitution or pattern of Government. As far as this Court is concerned, on some po in ts decisions during the first decade of its existence were some what inconsistent but generally the view which found favour with most of the Judges during the first decade was that the methodology of interpretation of statutes should be the same for constitutional provision as it is for statutory provisions. It has further been held that external aids like\n\n(I) [1955] 2 SCR 603. <2)\n\n[1936] AC 578,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 S.C. ll\n\nParliamentary debates, report of the Drafting or select committees the Objects and Reasons of the Act are wholly inadmissible for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of a statute which would depend entirely on the language of the provisions concerned. Here also, some of the cases have held that where the language of the provisions is shrouded in obscurity or is not fully intelligible so as to ascertain or find out the objects of the Act, external aids may be permissible. So far as speeches made by a Minister is concerned, it has been consistently held to be wholly inadmissible because it represents the individual view of a single person with which the majority of the Members of Parliament may or may not have agreed.\n\nDuring the second and third decade this Court made a prominent shift from the original stand and a long course of recent decisions have permitted parliamentary debates or Reports of Drafting or Select Committees to be taken into consideration for the purpose of ascertaining the object or the real meaning of the language employed in a statutory or constitutional provision\n\nBut there is one principle on which there is complete unanimity of all the courts in the world and this is that where the words or the language used in a statute are clear and cloudless, plain, simple and explicit unclouded and unobscured, intelligible and pointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation, there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids.\n\nIn such cases, the statute should be interpreted on the face of the language itself without adding, subtracting or omitting words therefrom\n\nIt is equally well settled that it is not the duty of the court to import words which have been omitted deliberately or intentionally in order to fill up a gap or supply omissions to fit in with the ideology or concept of the Judge concerned. The words and the language used must be given their natural meaning and interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense.\n\nThere may be a third type of cases which may be on the border line-where the language may admit of two interpretations in which case the court may consider the desirability of resorting to external aids in order to catch and delve into the spirit and object of the statute.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Aii, J.) 733\n\nThese principles have been enunciated over the years by several A authorities of various courts to which I shall refer hereafter. Before, however, going to the authorities, it may be necessary to refer to extracts from the various books of legal scholars on the interpretation of statutes.\n\nCrawford in his book captioned 'Statutory Construction' B (1940 Edition) in para 158 'Purpose of Interpretation and Construction' (p.p. 244-245) has observed thus :\n\n\"The basic principle has been announced time after time that if the statute in plain, certain and free from am biguity, a b11re reading suffices and interpretation is C unnecessary.'\n\nAt page 344, it has also been pointed out by the author that alteration, interpolation or elimination of words are not permissible.\n\nIn this connection, the author makes the following observations while dealing with an American case : ' D\n\n\"As we have already stated, the intention of the legislature must be primarily ascertained from the language used.\n\nThis obviously means, as a general rule, that the courts have no power to add to, or to change, alter, or eliminate the words which the legislature has incorporated in a statute, E not even in order to provide for certain contingencies which the legislature failed to meet, or to avoid hardship flowing from the language used, or to advance the remedy of the statute.\n\nAt pages 388-389, the author further observes thus :\n\n\"Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, the court may resort to contemporar.eous construction-that is, the construction placed upon the statute by its contemporaris at the time of its enactment and soon thereafter-for\n\nassistance in removing any doubt. Similarly, resort may G also be had to the usage or course of conduct based upon a certain construction of the statute soon after its enactment and acquiesced in by the courts and the legislature for a long period of timt As is obvious, the meaning given to the language of a statute by its contemporaries is more H likely to reveal its true meaning than a construction given by men of another day or generation. Even words change\n\n734 SUPREME COURt REPOlitS ( 1982] 2 s.c.li.\n\nin meaning with the march of time. And the meaning given by contemporaries can be revealed with no more certainty than by resort to the common usage and practice under the statute itself over a considerable period of time.\"\n\nThe author has rightly observed that sometimes it so happens that words change in meaning with the march of times If this is so, it is manifest that the court while interpreting a statute dealing with socialism cannot ignore the temper of the times and the modern trends of legal thought.\n\nSimilarly, while dealing with the circumstances and the history of the Statute, the author says thus :\n\n\"According to the weight of authority, and surely the better view, the court may consider the general history of a statute, including its derivation that is, the various steps leading up to and attending its enactment, as shown by the legislative journals, in its effort to ascertain the intention of the legislature where it is in doubt. Conversely, the legislative history cannot be considered where the statute's meaning is plain.\" (p. 383)\n\nHere also, we find that history, etc., is permissible only where the language of a statute is ambiguous and not where the meaning of the statute is plain and clear.\n\nV.P. Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes' (1975 Edn.) observes thus:\n\n\"In order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, the state of law and judicial decisions antecedent to and at the time the statute was passed are material matters to be considered ..... .\n\nCourts sometimes make a distinction between legislative debates and reports of committees and treat the letter as a more reliable or satisfactory source of assistance.\n\ni) It is submitted that the subtle distinction that parliamentary history may be referred for ascertaing the intention, but not for construction, is pedantic. In fact all such\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.)\n\nmaterial must be freely referred; and it is only by resort to A such material that the object of the legislation and how the legislature intended to achieve that object by the particular statute can be correctly ascertained by the Court.\"\n\n(p. 339)\n\nAt p ge 367, the author observes thus :\n\n{al Reference to English and American decisions may be made, because the) have the same system of jurisprudence as ours, but do not prevail when the language of the Indian Statute or enactment is clear.\n\n{b) They are of assistance in elucidating general principles and construing Act in pari materia.\n\n(c) But Indian statutes should be interpreted with reference to the facts of Indian life,\"\n\nThe observations in clanse (c) are rather important because that seems to us to be the correct approach. Seervai in \"Constitutional Law of India\" {2nd Edn.) Vol. II, p. 1543-44 observes thus :\n\n\"Secondly, where words are clear and unambiguous effect rr; ust be given to them regardless of consiquences ......\n\nAfter all the object of interpretation of documents and statutes is to ascertain '!the intention of them that made it.\"\n\nThe literal interpretation has a prima facie preference, but to get at the real meaning it is necessary to apply the rule in Heydon's case.\n\nHowever, where the words of a statutory or constitutional provision are ambiguous, resort may be had to well recognised extrinsic aids to construction and regard may be had to the consequences of adopting one construction rather than another. The meaning of \"ambiguity\" has been considered at length in paras 2.31 and 2.:12 of the text.\"\n\nCraies on 'Statute Law' (6th Edn.) while quoting Jervis CJ., at p. 86 observes thus :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\n\"It is clear that \"if\", as Jervis C.J. said in Abley v.\n\nDale (8 I 50(20) LJCP 33,35) the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice.\n\nWords may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.\"\n\nSimilarly, the author has categorically observed that in the interpretative process casus omissus is not to be added or supplied.\n\nIn this connection, the following observations have made at p. 70 :\n\n\"A second consequence of this rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made ..... Although in construing an Act of Parliament the Court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there,\"\n\nand quoting Lord Parker, the author says thus :\n\n\"Where the literal reading of a statute... produces an intelligible result ...... there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of Parliament.\"\n\nAt page 66, the auther observes thus :\n\n\"The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts or Parliament is that they should. be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves ...... If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pazal Ali, J.) 737\n\nWhere the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we A must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequeuces, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.'\n\nLord Bacon says that \"the function of a Judge is jus decere and not jus dare, i.e., to interpret the law and not to make it.\n\nSimilarly, Marshal, CJ observed that we must remember that \"it is the constitution that we are expounding.\" These observations aptly apply to the instant case where we are construing a constitutional provision viz., Art. 222, particularly when a provision like this is not to be found in any Constitution of any other country of the world.\n\nAccording to Maxwell, the golden rule of interpretation is to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used unless it is in direct conflict with the intention of the Act. In this connection, the author in his book 'Interpretation of Statutes' (12th Edition) observes thus :\n\n\"It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express.\" (p. 33)\n\nI have laid particular stress on the cams omissus aspect of the interpretative process because the main thrust of the argument of Mr. Seervai on interpretation of Art. 222 was that the word , consent' should be read into Art. 222 which is not there at all, and\n\nif the contention of the counsel is accepted, it will amount to the F court supplying an omission which has been made deliberately by the Founding Fathers of the Constitution and would be in direct contravention of the scheme of the Constitution as discussed • above\n\nThe leading case on the subject is Heydon's case[5) where the G broad principle of interpretation of Statutes was spelt out and explained.\n\nIn this connection, the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal H\n\n(1) 76 Bngli>h Reports 637.\n\nSUPRI-ME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nor beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common, Jaw,) four things are to be discerned and considered :-\n\n1st.\n\nWhat was the common law before the making of the Act.\n\n2nd.\n\nWhat was the mischief and defect for which the common Jaw did not provide.\n\n3rd.\n\nWhat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.\n\nAnd, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions aad evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.\"\n\nThis case has been followed both by this Court as also by the courts in England for a pretty length of time. This may be the starting point of the manner and the method which the court should adopt in interpretation of statutes.\n\nThe authorities on the question of interpretation of the constitutional provisions may roughly be divided into four categories which may not exactly be absolutely separate or independaut so as to be confined in a watertight compartment but in some cases may overlap, yet they generally Jay down the law on the subject categorised by us:\n\nCategories :\n\n(A) Where the language of a statute is plain, explicit and unambiguous, no external aid is permissible.\n\n(B) Where the language is vague and ambiguous or does not clearly spell out the object and the spirit of the Act, external aids in the nature of parliamentary debates, reports of Drafting or Select Committees may be permissible to determine and locate the real intention of the legislature.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 739\n\n(C) Where certain words are omitted from the statute, the A court cannot supply the omission or add words to the statute on a supposed view regarding the intention of the legislature.\n\n(D) Any speech made by a Minister or a Member in the Parliament is not admissible or permissible to construe B a statutory or a constitutional provision.\n\nWe shall now deal with the authorties which fall more or less within the four categories indicated above.\n\nCategory (A)\n\nThe earliest case on the subject is A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1) where Kania CJ pointed out that external aid wa~ not permissible unless a statute was ambiguous and observed thus :\n\n\"Our attention was drawn to the debates and report of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the working of this clause. The report may be read not to control the meaning of the article, but may be seen in case of ambiguity ...\n\nResort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be resolved.\"\n\nFaz! Ali, J. (as he then was) speaking in the same strain made the following observations :\n\n\"In my opinion, though the proceedings or discussions . in the Assembly are not relevant for the purpo'e of construing meaning of the expressions used in Article 21, especially when they are plain and unambiguous, they are relevant to show that the Assembly intended to avoid the use of the expression without due process of law.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nAnd Mukherjea, J. observed thus :\n\n\"It is well settled that the Constitution must be interc\n\nIi'\n\npreted in a broad and liberal manner giving effect to all its H\n\n(I) [1950] SCR, 88,\n\n\n[1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nparts, and the presumption should be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by its framers. In interpreting the words of a constitution, the same principle' undoubtedly apply which are applicable in construing a statute.\n\nAs an aid to discover the meaning of the words in a Consti tution, these debates ar.~ of doubtful value. \"Resort can be iiad to them\" , says Willoughby, \"With great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be solved .. \"\n\nThe same view was expressed by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhuknan(1) where the learned Judge observed as follows :\n\n\"If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise.''\n\nIn M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors.(2) Sarkar, J. observed thus :\n\n\"Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.\n\nNevertheless, the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a Statute, or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a rpug nancy to good sense.\"\n\nIn M. V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi and Anr.(3) Subba Rao, J. expressed the opinion of the Court thus :\n\n( 1) [1958] SCR 360.\n\n(2) [1961] 2 SCR 294.\n\n(3) [1961) 3 SCR:986.\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNIO~ (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\n\"But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principles of interpretation, namely, that the primary test is the language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the Legislature.\"\n\nIn Hansraj Gordhandas v.\n\nH. H. Dave, Asstt. Co!ledtor of B Central Excise and Customs, Surat and two Ors .,(1) Ramaswami, J, speaking for the court observed thus :\n\n\"It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed C wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax-payer is within the plain t-:rms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority.\n\nIt is an application of this principle that a statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus\n\nomissus.\"\n\nAlthough these observations were made in respect of a taxing statute, the principle of interpretation of provisions of a statute or E of the Constitution is the same, the only difference being that, in a taxing statute where two interpretations are possible, benefit of the doubt is normally given to the tax-payer.\n\nIn Commissiouer of Income-Tax, Assam and Naga!and, etc. v. shri G. Hyatt,(2) Hegde, J. speaking for the Court made the follow- F ing observations :\n\n\"In our opinion the meaning of Section 17(3)(ii) is plain and unambiguous.\n\nHence there is no need to call into aid any of the rules of construction as was sought to be done by the High Court.\"\n\nIn Senior Superintendent, R.M.S. Cochin and Anr. v K. V. Gopi Nath, Sorter,(3) Mitter, J. reiterated this well settled principle thus:\n\n(lJ [1969] 2 SCR 253.\n\n(2) [1971J t sec 466.\n\n(3) [1972] 3 SCR 53Q,\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C R.\n\n•As has often been said that if \"the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense\", \"and not to I imit plain words in an Act of Parliament by considerations of policy, if it be policy, as to which minds may differ and as to which decisions may vary.\"\n\nIn Shri Urned v. Raj Singh and Ors.,(1) Bhagwati, J. (one of us.) made the following observations :\n\n\"But that does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregards the context and the collocation in which they occur. It is a familiar rule of interpretation that the words used by the Legislature must be construed according to their plain natural meaning.\"\n\nIn Anandi Haridas and Co~. Pvt. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor 0 Sangh and Anr.(2) this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such E as Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the Committees of the Legistature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words.'\n\nIn Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of F Income Tax, West Benga/(3), this Court observed thus :\n\n\"The justification for this submission is stated to be that the word 'transfer', occurs in tile collocation of three other words 'sale' 'exchange' and 'relinquishment' which are essentially volitional or voluntary acts, leading to the conclusion that the word 'transfer' must take its colour from the three other words in association with which it is used. 'Transfer', therefore, according to the learned\n\n< o [19751 1 sec 76.\n\n(2) [1975] 3 SCR 542. (3J [19781 3 sec 248.\n\n§.:P. GUPTA v. UNioN (Faza/ Ali, J.)\n\ncounsel, means a voluntary transfer and cannot include all compulsory acquisition of.property.\n\nWe find it impossible to accept the submission. In the first place if it was intended that voluntary transfers alone should fall within the meaning of the section, it was unnecessary for the legislature to use the expression 'transfer', an expression acknowledged in law as having a wide connotation and amplitude ... Without more. therefore, there is no reason for I imiting the operation of the word 'transfer' to voluntary acts of transfer so as to exclude compulsory acquisitions of property.\"\n\nThis decision seems to us to be apposite to the facts of the present case, viz , interpretation of the word 'transfer' as the argument of Mr. Seervai is that the word 'transfer' used in Art. 222 must be confined only to a transfer with the consent of the Judge concerned, thereby Jimitfog the scope and ambit of Art 222.\n\nA similar argument was advanced in the case supra and rejected and the Court held that there was no reason to limit the word 'transfer' only to a voluntary transfer so as to include compulsory acquisition of propery. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, we are of the opinion that to read 'consent' into Art. 222 would be to\n\nlimit and whittle down the scope, ambit and purpose of Art. 222, E\n\nIt is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on the subject covered by category 'A' because the textbooks and the authorities of this Court as also of some foreign courts referred to above, clearly lay down that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous it is not permissible to rely on external aids.\n\nCategory B\n\nThis category consists of those cases which have laid down that where the language is vague or ambiguous to what extent external aid can be used to locate the actual intention of the Legislature. In\n\nPowell v. The Kempton Paik Racecourse Co. Ltd.(1) Lord Halsbury indicated the extent to which external aid could be used by courts in construing a statutory provision and observed thus :\n\n\"It has, indeed been argued that the history of the legislation and of the facts which gave rise to the enactment\n\n(!) [1899] AC 143.\n\n\n[1982] 2 S.C. R.\n\nmay in view of the preamble affect the construction of the Act itself, but though I do not deny that such topics may usefully be employed to interpret the meaning of a statute, they do not, in my view, afford conclusive argument here.\"\n\nIn A. K. Gopalan' s case (supra), Sastri, J. (as he then , was) observed as follows :\n\n\"It is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that the Drafting Committee appointed by Constituent Assembly of India recommended the substitution of the expression \"except according to procedure established by law\" taken from the Japanese Constitution, 1946, for the words \"without due process of law\" which occurred in the original draft, \"as the former is more specific.\"\n\nThe learned Judge has clearly indicated that the reason why our Founding Fathers substituted the words 'except according to the procedure established by law' in Art. 21 instead of the words\n\n~'without due process of law\" as used In the American Constitution because they implemented the Report of the Drafting Committee which had taken the words 'procedure established by law' from the Japanese Constitution of 1946.\n\nHis Lordship then indicated the nature, extent and the circumstances in which external aid could be used to construe a constitutional provision. Sastri J., also commented on the extent of the relevancy of a speech made in the course of a debate on a Bill and in this connection observed thus :\n\n\"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill.\n\nNor it is reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.\"\n\nThus, the view of Sastri, J. was that a court could locate the objective and intent of the legislature primarily in the words used by the constitution supported by such historical material as may be available. ·\n\nIn Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v, Vadilal Lallubhai etc.(1) Hegde, J. observed as follows :-\n\n(!) [1973] I SCR 1058.\n\ns.1>. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 745\n\n\"In order to find out the legislative intent, we have to A find out what was the mischief that the legislature wanted to remedy.\n\nThe Act was extensively amended in the year\n\n1939. Section 44-F was not in the draft bill.\n\nThat section was recommended by the Select Committee consisting of very eminent lawyers. It will not be inappropriate to find out the reasons which persuaded the Select Committee to B recommennd the inclusion of S. 44-F, if the section is considered as ambiguous.\"\n\nIn this case, the Court relied on the recommendation of the Select Committee in order to find out the reasons for inclusion of a particular section.\n\nIn State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidap(1) this Court !leems to have made a positive shift from the view taken in earlier cases of this court and held that in order to ascertain the meaning of a statute or its object the court should not confine itself within a particular sphere but should take into consideration whatever is logically relevant or admissible. This is a decision of a Contitution Bench and shows the modern trend of interpretation of statute. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court tersely observed as follows(1)\n\n\"The Rule of Exclusion has been .criticised by jurists as artificial. The trend of academic opinion and the practice in the European system suggest that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible.\n\nRecently, an eminent Indian jurit has reviewed the legal position and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone and Justice Frankfurter. Of course, nobody suggests that such extrinsic materials should be decisive but they. must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation must mutually illumine and interact. There is authority for the proposition that resort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when incongruities and ambiguities are to be resolved. There is a strong case for whittling down the Rule of Exclusion followed in the British courts and for less apologatic reference to legislative proceedings and like\n\no> [1974] 3 sec 337.\n\n746 SliPlrnMll CbURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.k.\n\nmaterials to read the meaning of the words of a statute.\n\nWhere it is plain, the language prevails, but where there is obscurity or lack of harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances it may be legitimate to take external assistance such as the object of the provisions, the mischief sought to be remedied, the social context, the words of the authors and other allied matters.\"\n\nAn identical view w.as taken in a later case of this Court in fagu Shaw and Ors. v. The State of West Benga/(1) where Bhagwati, J. relied on the decision extracted above and observed thus:\n\n\"Since the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the real meaning of a constitutional provision, it is evident that nothing that is logically relevant to this process should be excluded from consideration. It was at one time thought that speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the Draft Constitution were wholly inadmissible as extraneous aids to the interpretation of a constitutional provision, but of late there has been a shift in this position and following the recent trends in juristic thought in some of the Western countries and the United States, the rule of exclusion rigidly followed in Anglo-American jurisprudence has been considerably diluted.\"\n\nIt is true that these observations are to be found in the dissenting judgment Bhagwati, J. (one of us) but on this issue there was no dissent. We are inclined to endorse the observatiolls made F by Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. as referred to in the cases mentioned above.\n\nIn Anandji Haridas & Co. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh and Anr.(2), Sarkaria, J. speaking for the: Court observed as follows ;-\n\n\"It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, unc:ertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led\n\nO> [1974) 4 sec 152.\n\n121 [t975J 3 sec 862.\n\ns.i'. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 141\n\nto the passing of the statute may be looked into for.the 'A purpose of ascertaining the object which the legislature had in view in using the word in question.\"\n\nIn The Sole Trustees, Lok Shikshana Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore,(~) this Court made the following observations :\n\n\"But, in the case before us, the real meaning and purpose of the words used cannot be understood at all satisfactorily without referring to the past history of legislation on the subject and the speech of the mover of the amendment who was, undoubtedly, in the best position to explain what defect in the law the amendment had sought to remove.\"\n\nIn State of Timil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra and Ors.(2) Beg, J. (as he then was) observed thus :\n\n\"The reason given, in the Statement of objects and Reasons of the 1972 Act, for an elucidation of the \"definition\" of iron and steel, was that the \"definition\" had led to varying interpretation by assessing authorities and the courts so that a comprehensive list of specified declared iron and steel goods would remove ambiguity. The select Committee, which recommended the amendment called each specified category \"a sub-item\" falling under \"iron and steel.\"\n\nIn this case, the court relied on the Report of the Select\n\nCommittee as also on the statement of Objects and Reasons of the F Act in order to elucidate the definition of certain words used in the statute.\n\nTo the same effect is a later decision of this Court in Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi and Ors. v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and Ors.(8). where the court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Amending Act 22 of 1972 was, therefore, enacted for the express purpose of saving decree which had already\n\nct> [19761 1 sec 254.\n\n(2) [1976) 1 sec 834.\n\n(3) [1980J 3 sec 162.\n\n748 SUPRilMil cotJRt REPOR.ts iI98Z] i s.t.ll\n\nA been passed. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act stated :\n\nSame view was taken in a batch of appeals by this Court in M/s. Polestar Electronics (Pvt.) Ltd etc. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales-Tax & Anr.etc. (1) where Bhagwati, J. (one of us) took into B consideration the subsequent history of the Act as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons in order to construe certain provisions of the statute concerned and observed thus:\n\n\"The subsequent history of the Act also supports the construction which we are inclined to place on Section 5(2)(a)(ii) and the second proviso.\n\nSection 5(2)(a)(ii) was amended with effect from May 28, 1972 by Finance Act, 1972 and the words 'in the Union Territory of Delhi' were added after the word manufacturer' so as to provirle that manufacture should be inside the territory ..... .It is clear from the statement of objects and reasons that this amendment was not introduced by Parliament ex-abundanti cautela, but in order to restrict the applicability of the exemption clause in Section 5 (2)(a)(ii). The statement of objects and reasons admitted in clear and explicit terms that: -\n\nJn Mangalore Electric Supply Co. (supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) relied on the legislative history of the provision of the statute concerned in order to construe the intention of the legislature and pointed out thus ::\n\n\"The legislative history of the Section 12B(I) furnishes an important clue to the question raised by the appellant's counsel.\"\n\nIn Dadaji alias Dina v. Sukhdeobabu & Ors.(') this Court made the following observations :\n\n\"Even though the proce(:dings of the Joint Committee cannot be relied upon for the purpose of construing the\n\nOrder, they may be looked into to ascertain the circumstances in which the several communities were grouped under one entry or the other.\"\n\nco [197811 sec 638.\n\n(2) L!980l 1 sec 621.\n\nSJ>. GUPTA v, UNtON (Fazal Ali, i.)\n\nCategory 'C'\n\nThis Category consists of those cases which take the view that words cannot be omitted from the statute or supplied to it if they are not there. In other words, in interpretation of statute, the doctrine of casus omissus is a fundamental test. In A.K. Gopalan's case (supra) S.R. Das J. very poignantly pointed out thus :\n\n\"The Constitution has by article 21 required a procedure and has precribed certain minimum requirements of procedure in article 22, To add to them is not to interpret the Constitution but to recast it according to our intellectual yardstick and our unconscious predilections as to what an ideal Constitution should be.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nA similar view was taken by Das J. in Nalinakhya Bysack v.\n\nSham Sunder Haldar & Ors.(1) where he very pithily observed thus :\n\n'It must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Hulsbury in Commissioner for Special Purpose of lnrome Tax v. Pemsel (L.R. (1891) A.C. 531 at p. 549) that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. The Court must proceed on the footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the Court cannot, as pointed out in Crawford v. Spooner (6 Moo P.C. 1) aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of au Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act.\n\nEven where there is a casus omissus, it is as said by Lord Russel of Killowen in Hansraj Gupta v.\n\nOfficial Liquidator of Dehra Dun Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [(1933) L. R. 60 I.A. 13)] for others than the courts to remedy the defect.\"\n\nThus, this Court has clearly held that in construing a statutory or a Constitutional provision, the court should not presume that the legislature has either committed a mistake or has omitted something which was very necessary.\n\nDas J. very rightly remarked that it was not for the court but for others to remedy the defect, if\n\n(1) f1953] SCR 533.\n\n750 stJi>ilEME cou.Rt ilili'okts iI 9s2j i s.c.ll.\n\nany, found in a statutory provision. If we acceept the argument of Mr. Seervai and read the word 'consent' in Art. 222 by supplying the omission, we will be violating the cardinal principle of interpretation as adumbrated by Das, J. in the case supra.\n\nIn Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. Srate of Bombay(1) the law on the subject was very succinctly and clearly laid down by this Court and N.H. Bhagwati J. observed thus :\n\n\"Acceptance of the interpretation which is sought to be put upon these words by the petitioners would involve the addition of words \"in the process of the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein'' or \"in the process of such acquisition\" which according to the well known canons of construction cannot be done. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom some sense which may be said to carry out the supposed intentions of the legislature.\"\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with these observations which aptly apply to the present case so far as Art 222 is concerned and are sufficient to demolish the argument of Mr. Seervai E that the word 'consent' should be added to or read into Art. 222 even if it is not there.\n\nIn Commis•ioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders(1) Tulzapurkar, J. speaking for the court highlighted the importance of the doctrine of casus omissus in a very poignant F exposition of the law on the subject and opined thus ;\n\n\"In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus sb ould not be readily referred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on\n\n(I) (1959] Supp, I SCR 489.\n\n(2) [1980J t sec 310.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Alf, J.)\n\na particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.'\n\nThus, Tulzapurkar J. laid down three conditions under which omissions could be supplied to a statute-\n\n(I) that there was a clear necessity for the same,\n\n(2) that the reason for supplying the omission was to be found in the provisions of the statute itself expressed or by necessary intendment, and\n\n(3) that the omission was to be supplied only to make the C provision consistent with the object of the statute.\n\nIt is manifest that none of these conditions apply to Art. 222 and therefore to supply the omission by reading the word 'consent' would really be going against the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case.\n\nIn Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab(1) Chandrachud C.J. while dealing with this particular aspect of canon of construction of a statute, very pithily observed thus :\n\n'By any known canon of construction, words of width and amplitude ought not generally to be cut down so as to read into the Language of the statute restraints and. conditions which the legislature itself did not think it proper or necessary to impose.\"\n\nIt follows from the observations made by this Court that if the word 'consent' is read into Art. 222 then it will amount to imposing unnecessary restraint5 and conditions in the Article which are not there at all and which cannot be done under the well-known rule5\n\nof interpretation of statutes.\n\nCategory 'D'\n\nIn this category we shall include those cases which hold that a speech made by a Minister or by a Member of Parliament is neither admissible nor permissible to construe a statutory or a constitutional provision. It may, however, be noted that a speech made in a debate is different from the Report of a Select Committee or views\n\n(t) [ t9SOJ 2 sec 565.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nexpressed in close proximity to the making of a statute or introduction or insertion of a statutory provision where the statement would undoubtedly be relevant because it forms part of the formative process of the statutory provision iteself.\n\nWe have highlighted this particular aspect of the matter because in the instant case, we shall show that there are statements made by some of the Fouding Fathers when the Constitution was being framed and the reasons given by the speakers formed 1he basis and foundation of the constitutional provisions inserted in the Constitution.\n\nIn A.K. Gopalan's case (supra) Sastri J. while dwelling on the C admissibitity of the speech made by a Minister on the floor of the House observed thus :\n\n\"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process laying behind the majority voted which carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.\"\n\nSimilar view was taken in United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Association(1) where the following observations were made:\n\n\"Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did, and tho<; e who spoke might differ from each other.\"\n\nTo the same effect is a decision of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr.(2) where Sastri CJ speaking for himself, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ. observed as follows:\n\n\"As regards the speeches made by the members of the House in the course of the debate, this Court has recently held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions.\"\n\nMuukherjea J. also spoke in a similar strain and observed as follows:\n\n(I) 169 us 290.\n\n(2) [1953] SCR 1.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 753\n\n\" ... the language of a \"Minister of the Crown\" in pro posing a measure in Parliament which eventually becomes law is inadmissible.\"\n\nA reference to the legislative debates or the speeches that were actually delivered in the floor of the House is. in my opinion inadmissible to aseertain the meaning of the words used in the enactment.\"\n\nand Das J. observed thus:\n\n\"that the debates and speeches in the Legislature which reflect the individual opinion of the speaker cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act as it finally emerged from the Legislature and so the debates must be left out of consideration.\"\n\nIt appears that while all the Judges were unanimously of the opinion that speech by a Minister or a speaker in the course of a debate was not admissible to construe the intention of the legislature, the majority judgment held that external aid in the nature of the legislative debates which resulted in the corning into existence of the constitutional provisions and were in close proximity to the same, could be pressed into service.\n\nOn this point we would like to follow the majority decision on the subject, subject of course to the condition that the language of a statute does not clearly spell out the dominant object which was sought to be achieved by the legislature.\n\nIn State of West Bengal v. Union of lndia(1) Sinha, CJ. speaking for himself, Jafer Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar\n\n-...\\ JJ. observed as follows:\n\n\"A statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intenrion and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\n(I) [1964] I SCR 371,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA In another Constitution Bench decision in Shyamlal Mohan/al\n\nv. State of Gujarat(1) Shah J. speaking for the Court endorsed as the stand taken in the case referred to above and observed as follows: --\n\n\"In construing the words used by the Legislature, speeches on the floor of Legislature are inadmissible. I do B not refer to the speech for the purpose of interpreting the words used by the Legislature, but to ascertain the historical setting in which the statute which is parent to s. 94 (I) came to be enacted.\"\n\nThe learned Judge clearly held that while a speech on the floor of a legislature was inadmissible in ascertaining the real meaning of the word used by the legislature, the historical setting in which the statute was passed could doubtless be admissible. This decision, therefore, make a clear departure, on the point of admissiblity of historical setting, from the minority dissenting judgment of Das J. as indicated above,\n\nIn Anandji Haridas's case (supra), this Court observed thus:\n\n''We are afraid what the Finance Minister said in his speech cannot be imported into this case and 'Used for the construction of clause (c) of section 7.\n\nThe language of that provision is manifestly clear and unequivocal. It has to be construed as it stands, according to its plain grammatical sense without addition or deletion of any words.\"\n\nIn Lok Shikshana Trust's case (supra), this Court made the following observations:\n\n\"It is true that it is dangerous and may be misleading to gather the meaning of the words used in an enactment merely from what was said by any speaker in the course of a debate in Parliament on the subject. Such a speech cannot be used to defeat or detract from a meaning which clearly emerges from a consideration of the enacting words actually used.\"\n\nThus, on a full and complete consideration of the decisions classified under the various categories, the propositions that emerge from the decided cases of this Court and other foreign courts are as H follows:\n\n(!) [1965) 2 SCR 457.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pazal Ali, J.)\n\n(1) Where the language of a statute is clear and unambi ·\n\nguous, there is no room for the application either of the doctrine of casus omissus or of pressing into service external aids, for in such a case the words used by the Constitution or the statute speak for themselves and it is not the function of the court to add words or expressions merely to suit what the courts think is the supposed intention of the legislature.\n\n(2) Where, however, the words or expressions used in the constitutional or statutory provisions are shrouded in mystery clouded with ambiguity and are unclear and unintelligible so that the dominant object and spirit of the legislature cannot be spelt out from the language, external aids in the nature of parliamentary debates, immediately preeding the passing of the statute, the report of the Select Committees or its Chairman, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the statute, if any, or any statement made by the sponsor of the statute which is in close proximity to the actual introduction or insertion of the statutury provision so as to become, as it were, a result of the statement made, can be pressed into service in order to ascertain the real purport, intent and will of the legislature to make the constitutional provision workable.\n\nWe might make it clear that such aid may neither be decisive nor conclusive but they would certainly assist the courts in interpreting the statute in order to determine the\n\navowed object of the Act or the Constitution as the case f' may be.\n\n(3) Except in the aforesaid cases, a mere speech of any Member made on the floor of the House during the course of a parliamentary or legitlative debate would not be admissible at all because the views expressed by the speaker may be his individual views which may or may not be by the majority of the Members accepted present in the House.\n\n(4) Legislative history of a constitutional provision though H not directly germane for the purpose of construing a statute may, however, be used in exceptional cases tQ\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R\n\ndenote the beginning of the legislative process which results in the logical end and the finale of the statutory provision but in no case can the legislative history take the place of or be a substitute for an interpretation which is in direct contravention of the statutory provision concerned.\n\n(5) Where the scheme of a statute clearly shows that certain words or phrases were deliberately omitted by the legislature for a particular purpose or motive, it is not open to the court to add those words either by con forming to the supposed intention of the legislature or because the insertion or the omission suits the ideolgy\n\nof the Judges deciding the case. Such a course of action would amount not to interpretation but to interpolation of the statutory or constitutional provisions, as the case may be, and is against all the well established canons of interpretation of statutes.\n\nThe main reason behind the principles enunciated above is that the legislature must be presumed to be aware of the expanding needs of the nation, the requirements of the people and above all, the dominant object which the legislation seeks to sub; erve\n\nThus, where the language is plain and unambiguous the court is not entitled to go behind the language so as to add or supply ommissions and thus play the role of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature.\n\nOn the other hand, the counsel for the respondents have strongly urged that the entire argument of Mr. Seervai to the effect that the word 'consent' should be read into Art. 222 is in vague and there is not the slightest vagueness or ambiguity in the words used in Art. 222 to necessitate the reading of the word 'consent' therein.\n\nThe counsel further urged that the attempt of Mr. Seervai is merely to create a so-called cloud of suspicion and mystery and then to resolve it by asking the court to read consent into it.\n\nIn other words, the counsel for the respondents have fully supported the propositions which we have adumbrated above.\n\nAssuming for the sake of argument, particularly in view of the far-reaching consequences of our decision and the large magnitude of the arguments that have been addressed to us, that the dominant\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 757\n\nobject of Art. 222 is not very clear or unambiguous, we may discuss the legislative history of introduction of Art. 222 in the Constitution as also the parliamentary debates or Reports of the Drafting or Select Committees as a direct result of which the said Article came into existence.\n\nSo far as the legislative history of the provisions prior to the constitution regarding the functioning and the constitution of the High Court is concerned, we might start from the Government of India Act, I 915 (hereinafter referred to as the '1915 Act') because the prior Acts are neither helpful nor germane for construing the questions at issue in these petitions. Sections 101 to 114 of the 1915 Act are the provisions which relate to the High Courts. It may be noted that i11 this Act, there was no provision at all for transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.\n\nSection 101 provided that each High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and as many other Judges as His Majesty may think fit to appoint.\n\nThis is the precursor of Art. 217 of our Constitution. It may be noticed that in the 1915 Act while the appointment of Judges vested in His Majesty the King but the power of appointment of Addi. Judges was vested in the Governor-General-in-Council although the Addi, Judges so appointed had the same powers as the Judges appointed by His Majesty. This complexion has been completely changed so far as the provisions of our Constitution are concerned. Further, under s. 102 a Judge of a High Court was to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure unless he resigned on his own. This provision has not been incorporated in our Constitution which has provided complete security of tenure to a Judge of a High Court who is to continue until he reaches the age of superannuation which is 62 years in the case of a High Court Judge and 65 years in the case of a Supreme Court Judge. The only manner in which a Judge can be removed before hii term is by impeachment as provided under Art. 124(4) read with the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act of\n\n1968. The other provisions are not relevant for the purpose of deciding this issue.\n\nSection 113 conferred powers on His Majesty to establish an Additional High Court in any territory in British India.\n\nThus, the only common feature which has been retained in our Constitution is regarding the appointment of Additional Judges of any High Court for a period not exceeding two years and while\n\n.. 758\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthis provision was introduced by the 7th Anendmcnt of the Consti tion, it was slightly different from the one cantained in proviso (i) to sub-section (2) of s. IOI of the 1915 Act \\\\ hich may be extracted thus:\n\n\"the Governor-General in Council may appoint persons to act as additional judges of any High Court for such period, not exceeding two years. as may be requ'red, and the judges so appointed shall, whilst so acting, have all the powers of a judge of the High Court appointed by His Majesty under this Act.\"\n\nIn Art. 224, the purpose, viz., arrears, is mentioned which was conspicuously absent from the 1915 Act perhaps becam.e at that time there were no heavy arrears.\n\nThe next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the '1935 Act') which is merely a precursor of our Constitution as most of its provisions are based on the pattern and structure of this Act. The relevant sections dealing with High Courts are ss. 219-231 and 253-256. Section 220 makes two marked improvements on the previous provisions of the 1915 Act-(l) that every Judge appointed by His Majesty held office until he attained the age of 60 years and not at the pleasure of His Majesty as provided by s. I 02 of the 1915 Act, and (2) Section 220(2) (b) expressly states that a Judge can he removed on the ground of misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mind if the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on a reference made to it by His Majesty, reported that the Judge ought on any such ground be removed.\n\nThis provision has been retained by our Constitution but the procedure of removal has been substituted by the procedure of impeachment as contained in Art. 124(4) read with Art. 218.\n\nAlthough there is no specific provision for transfer of a High G Court Judge from one High Court to another, an implied power seems to have been conferred in s .. 220 (2) (c) the 1935 Act, which may be extracted thus:\n\n\"The office of a judge shall be vacated by his being H appointed by His Majesty to be a judge of \\he federal Court or of another High Court,\"\n\n.,_\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. tJNlON (Pazal Ali,' J.) 759\n\nIt may be pertinent to note that s. 220 (2) (c) provides that a Judge shall vacate his office either on his being appointed as a Judge of the Federal Court or of another High Court. This provision does not contain any element or concept of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.\n\nWhat it contemplated is that if a Judge of a High Court was to be transferred he would have to be appointed to that High Court.\n\nOur Constitution, however, makes a clear distinction so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned inasmuch as Art. 222 expressly uses the word 'transfer' rather than the word 'appointment' when a Judge is trans;\"erred from one High Court to another.\n\nSo far as our Constitution is concerned while Art. 222 confers on the President the power of transferring one Judge of a High Court to another in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, Art. 217 (c) provides that the office shall be vacated on his being appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court or if he is transferred to any other High Court. It may thus be noticed that Art. 217 (c) is placed in Chapter V which deals with High Courts and may be extracted thus:\n\n\"The office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by bis being transferred by the President to any other High Court within the territory of India.\"\n\nWhile in the case of a Judge who goes to the Supreme Court, the word \"appointed\" is used to indicate that this is a fresh appoint ment in a higher court, or rather the highest court in the country, whereas when a Judge is transferred from one High Court to another, te word 'transfer' in contradistinction to the word 'appointed' as mentioned in s. 220 (2) (c) of the 1935 Act, has been deliberately used which cleHly shows that the two modes of vacation of office by a sitting Judge are quite different.\n\nWe have mentioned this fact because Mr. Seervai has argued before us that the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another results in vacation of his office and therefore must be construed to be a fresh appointment implying thereby that he co.J Id be tranferred only if he gives his consent as when he is first appointed to the High Court.\n\nThe fact that he gives his consent has to be implied, for he cannot be appointed as a High Court Judge against his consent.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] i s.c.ii\n\nA We have mentioned these circumstances in order to highlight the second argument of Mr. Seervai regarding interpretation of Art. 217 (c) on the basis of which he contended that this would\n\nshow that the transfer of a Judge under Art. 222 amounted to a first or a fresh appointment in the transferee court, as the moment a Judge is transferred to another High Court, he vacates his office in B the original High Court and assumes the charge of a new office only after taking the oath. It was suggested by Mr. See:rvai that under proviso (c) to Art. 217 just as a Judge vacates his office on being appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court, identical consequences follow when he is transferred to any other High Court. c\n\nThe Attorney General has rightly pointed out that the proviso itself makes a difference between vacating the office by a Judge who is appointed to the Supreme Court and a Judge who is transferred.\n\nA Judge who is transferred merely vacates the office in a limited sense, namely, that he cannot act as a High Court Judge in the High Court where he was appointed but the fact remains that until he takes oath in the transferee High Court, he continues to be a Judge of the Original High Court. For these reasons, this argument does not appeal to us.\n\nFinally, there is one more circumstance which clearly shows that a transfer cannot be treated as a first or fresh appointment. It\n\nwoild be seen that the heading of each Article which deals with the appointment of Judges clearly mentions this fact.\n\nTake for instance, Art. 21. 7-the heading is appointment and conditions of a Judge of a High Court. Article 223 realtes to appointment of acting Chief Justice and Art. 224 deals with appointment of additional and acting Judges. It may be pertinent to note here that Art. 223 comes immediately after Art. 222 where the heading is transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another. The Constitution has thus itself brought out a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. Similarly, Art. 224A deals with appointment of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts. There are number of other instances where the word 'appointment' is used in contradistinction to transfer in respect of authorities other than High Court Judges.\n\nThis is, therefore, also an important circumstance to negative the argument of Mr. Seervai that a transfer amounts to a fresh or a first appointment in the transferee High Court and, therefore, consent becomes a necessary concomitant of such a transfer.\n\nIt may also be pointed out that whenever a legislature or constituent assembly uses a particular phrase in contradistinction\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. iJNiON (Fazai Aii, J.) 76i\n\nto another phrase it is not possible to read the two phrases so as to indicate the same purpose. In the instant case, the Constitution has used the word 'appointed' in the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court and 'transfer' in the case of.a Judge of a High Court. A persual of the language of Art. 2 I 7(c) leads to the irresistible conclusion and logical inference that the Founding Father's have made a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. It is true that in both cases the office held by a Judge is vacated in a fictional sense because there is a complete change in the life of the Judge but that does not mean that the incidents of both these appoint men ts are the same.\n\nA Judge of the High Court when appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be equated in any respect with a Judge of the High Court who is transferred to another High Court and continues to possess the same status, position and emoluments which is essentially different from a Judge of the Supreme Court.\n\nMr. Seervai, however, submitted that both Art. 124 which relate to the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge and Art. 217 which provide for the appointment of a High Court Judge do not mention anything about obtaining the consent of a Judge which has to be implied in both the cases. On a parity of reasoning it was submitted that where a Judge is appointed in a High Court or transferred to another Court, every time it is a new appointment as a result of which the Judge of the High Court on being transferred to another court has to take a fresh oath. because he ceases to be a Judge in the court of its origin.\n\nIt is true that on being transferred to another High C0urt a fodge ceases to be a Judge but then he ceases to be a Judge of the transferor court only and does not cease to be a Judge for all times to come so as to make his transfer in the transferee court a fresh appointment. This is clear from paragraph I !(iii) to the Second Sch, dulc to the Constitution which runs thus :\n\n\"joining time on transfer from a High Court to the Supreme Court or from one High Court to another.\"\n\nIt is true that in this schedule joining time is mentioned on transfer from a High Court to Supreme Court or from one High Court to another and the word 'appointment' has not been used as such. That 'however makes no difference because this schedule only refers to a small matter of joining time which both the judges, viz., a judge appointed to the Supreme Court and the judge transferred, are entitled to avail.\n\nNothing, therefore, turns upon the language of para 11 (iii) of the Second Schedule.\n\n762 SlJPll.EMll COlJRT RllPOlttS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nLastly, it was contended that the. fact that a Judge who is transferred from the original High Court to another High Court has to take oath suggests that his transfer amounts to an appointment and that is why the taking of a fresh oath become necessary.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this contention. It is obvious that when a Judge was appointed in the original High Court be had taken the oath of bis office which bound him to act as a Judge of that particular High Court. Since by virtue of the transfer, the court is changed, a fresh oath becomes necessary as a clerical formality to indicate that although his appointment as a Judge of High Court does not cease to exist he discharges his duties as a Judge in another court in respect of which he had not taken the oath of office. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that merely because a transferee Judge has to take a fresh oath the transfer becomes a new or a fresh appointment. Moreover, it is doubtful if the taking of a fresh oath is necessary at all because the warrant signed by the President appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court holds good in the transferee court and the place is indicated by the notification issued under the authority of the President which really means that after the notification the warrant would have to be read to indicate that the Judge was transferred to transferee court where he is to act as a Judge. At any rate, we do not consider it necessary to go into this question in this particular case.\n\nThe last plank of the argument of Mr. Seervai was that no stress can be laid on the distinction between 'appointment' and 'transfer' because these are synonymous and interchangeab!e terms and in this connection he relied on a decision of this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. S1a1e of Kerala(1) where Chandrachud J. (as he then was) observed as follows :\n\n\"These are not words occurring in a school text-book so that one can find their meaning with a dictionary on one's right and a book of grammar on one's left. These are words occurring in a Constitution and one must look at them not in a school-masterly fashion, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer. but with the realization that they occur in \"a single complex instrument, in '\\\\bich one part may throw light on another\", so that \"the construction must hold a balance between all its parts ...... A word is not a crystal,\n\n(I) (1973] Supp. S.C.R. L\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 763\n\ntransparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought A and may vary greatly in colour and content according to circumstances and the time in which it is used\".\n\nThis Court merely held that in certain circumstances different words may not necessarily produce a change in the meaning and those observations have to be read with reference to the context. In B the instant case, however, the plain and unambiguous language of Art. 217(c) and Art. 222 cannot be stretched to indicate that 'appointment' and transfer' are synonymous terms when the constitutional provisions make it very clear that the power of transfer and the power of appointment are two different kinds of powers to be exercised in different ways.\n\nWe, therefore, reject this part of the C argument of Mr. Seervai as being without substance.\n\nHaving dealt with the legislative history and the setting, Art. 222 which, as pointed out by us earlier. took its birth for the~First , time in our country in the form of s. 220(2)(c) of the 1935 Act and was later inserted in then constitution after a full parliarpentary D debate.\n\nAs we have already held that detailed speeches made on the floor of the House or the statement of Ministers are not admissible, we would confine ourselves only to these debates ot statements which have been made by the sponsors or the architects of the Constitution itself and which immediately resulted in the introduction of Art. 222 in our Constitution.\n\nOn September 16, 1949 one of the architects of our constitution, Dr. Ambedkar while proposing the insertion of Art. 128 (which became the present Art. 222) highlighted the various aspects of the philosophy and the doctrine of transfer of Judges and speaking with persuasion and poignancy observed thus(1) • F\n\n\"The only question that we are called upon to consider is when a person is appointed as a judge of a High Court of a particular State, should it be permissible for the Government to transfer him from that Court to a High Court in any other State. If so, should this transfer be accom- G' panied by some kind of pecuniary allowance which would compensate him for the monetary loss that he might have to smtain by reason of the transfer? The Drafting Committee felt that since all the High Courts so far as the appointment of judges is concerned form now a central ff\n\n(I) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 11 (1949) p, 580.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nsubject, it was desirable to treat all the judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single carde like the I.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred from one High Court to another. If such power was not reserved to the Centre the administration of justice might become a very difficult matter. It might be necessary that one judge may be transferred from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High Court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not be locally avaifoble Secondly, it might be desirable to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court because it might be desirable to have a man who is unaffected by local politics and local jealousies. We thought therefore that the power to transfer should be placed in the hands of the Central Government.\n\nWe also took into account the fact that this power of transfer of Judges from one High Court to another may be abused. A Provincial Government might like to transfer a particular judge from its High Court because that judge had become very inconvenient to the Provincial Government by the particular attitude that . he had taken with regard to certain judicial matters, or that he had made a nuisance of himself by giving decisions which the Provincia I Government did not like.\n\nWe have tak n care that in effecting these transfers no such considerations ought to prevail. Transfers ought to take place only on the ground of convenience of the general administration. Consequently , we have introduced a provision that snch transfers shall take place in consultation with the Chief Justice of India who can be trusted to advise the Government in a manner which is not affected by local or personal prejudices.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThus, the speech coming as it did immediately before Art. 222 was inserted completely demolishes the argument of :vtr. Seervai because the apprehensions and fears expressed by him are found in the statement of Dr. Ambedkar and he had made it a point to emphasise that the power of transfer should serve three purposes :-\n\n(i) that it might be necessary to transfer a judge from one High Court to another to strengthen the transferee court by importing better talent in which the said Court may be lacking.\n\n--'!'\n\ns P. oiJPtA v. UNiON (Fazal Ali, i.)\n\n(ii) that it might be desirable to have a Chief Justice from outside who is unaffected by local politics\n\nand local jealousies, and\n\n(iii) that transfer should be made only on the ground of convenience and general administration and since the transfers could be made by tbe President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, who is the highest authority in the country, it can be safely presumed that exercise of such a power would not be affected by local or personal prejudices.\n\nThese observations, therefore, furnish a complete answer to the two arguments of Mr. Seervai that 'consent' should be read into Art. 222 or that the transfer amounted to a fresh appointment.\n\nIt may be mentioned that even in the Revised Draft, Art. 222 ran thus :-(1)\n\n\"222.\n\nTransfer of a Judge from one Hight Court to another.\n\n(I) The President may transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court within the territory of India.\n\n(2) When a Judge is so transferred, he shall, during the period he serves as a Judge of the other Court, be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such comepensatory allowance as may be determined by\n\nParliament by law and until so determilled, such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.\"\n\nIt would be noticed that in this draft Article there was no mention of consultation of CJI by the President but this seems to have been later introduced as a result of the speech of Dr. Ambedkar as indicated above. Furthermore, it would appear from the Note appended by Mr. Santhanam in his book 'Constitution of India' as to now and under what circumstances the present Art. 222 came to\n\n(I) The Framing of India's Constitution, by B. Shiva Rao, Vol. IV p. 826.\n\n766 SUPREME COURT REPORtS ( i 982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA be incorporated in the Constitution, where at page 169 the author says thus :\n\n\"This is a new article inserted in the final stage.\n\nIt was objected that this power might be used to punish a judge who might not be in the good books of the Central Government. It was also suggested that such tiansfer should be made only the consent of the judge concerned. This suggestion was rejected because it might become necessary in the national interests to send a competent judge to some part of India in spite of his own inclinations.\n\nThe President may be trusted not to use this power to the detriment of judicial independence,\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThis note clearly shows that even at the time when Art. 222 was taking its birth there was some talk of making the transfer with the consent of the Judge concerned but this idea was given up when it was pointed out that in the national interest it may be necessary to send a competent judge to another High Court and this policy may be stalled by the judge by withholding his consent. In other words, the idea of 'consent' having been conceived, discussed and rejected clearly shows that the Founding Fathers deliberately omitted the word consent' from Art. 222 and that knocks the bottom out of the argument of Mr. Seervai that if the Founding Fathers rejected the concept of 'consent', the court should still read it into the Article which is patently against all canons of interpretation of statutes.\n\nIt was suggested that the note of 1>\"1r.\n\nSa nthanam cannot be treated to be the last word in the matter.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention.\n\nSanthanam is riot merely the author of the Constitution but he was also a Member of the Drafting Committee and the Note fully shows that the speech made by Dr. Ambedkar regarding Art. 222 (which in its draft form was Art. 128) was incorporated according to the guidelines indicated by Dr. Ainbedkar.\n\nThe Note, therefore, finds ample support from what Dr.· Ambedkar had said.\n\nNo material has been placed before us to show that tbe Note of Mr. Santhanam was wrong either on point of fact or on a point of law. In our opinion, therefore, read with the speech of Dr. Ambedkar, the Note of Mr. Santhanam in regard to Ari. 222 clinches the issue and no further argument on this question can be entertained.\n\nS.P. GUPTA I'. UNION (Fazal Ali, 1.) 767\n\nFinally, there is yet another aspect to which we may advert in order to understand the spirit, philosophy and pattern of our Constitution. Shiva Rao in 'The Framing of India's Constitution' (Vol. IV) refers to various speeches made after the adoption of the Constitution. To begin with, Dr. Ambedkar while explaining the various sources of the Constitution reminded the Members that before finally drafting the Constitution. the Members of the Drafting Committee had before them almost all the important Constitutions of the big countries of the world. The American Constitution was considered, the Australian Constitution was also taken into account and comparisons were made with American, Canadian, South African and Australian Constitutions.\n\nDr. Ambedkar further pointed out a distinctive feature in our Constitution which he. highlighed thus : (1}\n\n\"In making comparisons on the basis of time consumed, two things must be remembered.\n\nOne is that the Constitutions of America, Canada, South Africa and Australia are much smaller than ours.\n\nOur Constitution as I said contains 395 articles while the American has just seven articles, the first four of which are divided into sections which total up to 21, the Canadian has 147, the Australian 128 and the South African, 153 sections. The second thing to be remembered is that the makers of the Constitutions of America, Canada, Aus•ralia and South Africa did not have to face the problem of amendments.\n\nThey were passed as moved.\n\nOn the other hand, this Constituent Assembly had to deal with as many as 2,473 amendments. Having regard to these facts the charge of dilatoriness seems to me quite unfounded and this Assembly may well congratulate itself for having accomplished so formidable a task in so short a time.\"\n\nSimilarly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was President of the\n\n__.\n\nDrafting Committee, observed thus : (2)\n\n\"We considered whether we should adopt the American model or the British model where we have a hereditary king who is the fountain of all honour and power, but who does not actually enjoy any power.\n\nAll the power rest in the Legislature to which the Ministers are responsible. We have had to reconcile the position of an elected President\n\n(I) 'The Framing of India's Constitution' by B. Shiva Rao, Vol. IV, p. 936.\n\n(2) Ibid. pp. 951-352.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 982) 2 S.C.R\n\nwith an elected Legislature and, in doing so, we have adopted more or less the position of the British monarch for the President .\n\nThen we come to the Ministers. They are of course responsible to the Legislature and tender advice to the President who is bound to act according to that advice.\n\nAlthough there are no specific provisions; so far as I know, in the Constitution itself making it binding on the President to accept the advice of his Ministers, it is hoped th at the convention under which in England the King acts always on the advice of his Ministers will be established in this country also and the President, not so much on account of the written word in the Constitution, but as the result of this very healthy convention, will become a constitutional President in all matters.\"\n\nDr. Prasad expressed a wish that by working the Constitution, the people of the country will evolve a convention by which the advice of Council of Ministers would be binding on the President and his historical words have proved to be true and have now taken a constitutional shape becau ; e by virtue of the Constitutional 42od Amendment, the advice of the Council of Ministers has been made binding on the President and he has to act on such advice.\n\nThus, a convention which was ingrained in the Constitution has now taken a constitutional shape.\n\nLastly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad expressed his view that the Constitution undoubtedly made clear provisions for an independent judiciary and observed thus : (1)\n\n\"We have provided in the Constitution for a judiciary which will be independent.\n\nIt is difficult to suggest anything more to make the Supreme Court and the High Courts independent of the influence of the executive. There is an attempt made in the Constitution to make even the lower judiciary independent of any outside or extraneous influence.\n\nOne of our articles makes it easy for tne State Governments to introduce separation of executive from judicial functions and placing the magistracy which deals\n\n(I) 'Tb~ Framing of India's Constitution' by Shiva R110 (Vol. l\\i) p. 954.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 769\n\nwith criminal cases on similar footing as civil courts. I can only express the hope that this long overdue reform will soon be introduced in the States.\"\n\nWe have mentioned these facts at this stage for two reasons.\n\nIn the first place, we wanted to illustrate and emphasise the actual philosophy of the Constitution so that the various articles may be read in the light of the views and the desire expressed by the Founding Fathers. Secondly, the fact that our Constitution is based not on the American but on the British pattern is established from the observati ons extracted above and the internal evidence furnished by the various provisions of the Constitution itself.\n\nIt is true that we have borrowed some provisions from the American Constitution and others from the Japanese Constitution but by and large our Constitution is fashioned on the British pattern. Therefore, while considering the doctrine of privilege or the doctrine of candour it would be safer to reply on English cases rather than the American doctrine.\n\nHowever, this aspect of the matter will be dealt with at the appropriate stage.\n\nIt was next c0ntended both by Mr Seervai and Dr. Singhvi that nonconsensual transfers of High Court judges are punitive in nature and amount to punishment.\n\nDetailed contentions in this regard have already been narrated by us when we dealt with their contentions on this point.\n\nOne of the cardinal points made out by the learned counsel for the petitioners against non-consensual transfers was that if a transfer is made without the consent of the judge it will arm the Central Government witt a strong weapon to punish a High Court judge, who either does not share the ideology of the Government or is not prepared to oblige it, by compelling him to toe the line of the Government at the risk of being transferred.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this argument on a large number of transfers that were made during the emergency resulting in writ petitions filed in the Gujarat High Court in Seth's case where this very point was argued on behalf one of the Judges who had moved the petition before the Gujarat High Court. It was also pointed out that in the Supreme Court both Bhagwati and Untwalia JJ. dissented from the majority view and particularly Untwalio J. mentioned the fact that the large number of transfers had created a panic. It is true that there were quite a few transfers during the emergency which were not in consonance with the spirit of Art. 222 and that is why the Government had conceded this fact and took\n\n770 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982) S.C.R\n\nsteps to revoke the transfers by retransferring almost all the judges to the High Courts from where they had been transferred.\n\nEven so, the Government insisted that the point of law iiwolved should be decided by this Court as a result of which the majority judgment held that Art. 222 does not contemplate that a transfor should be made only with the consent of the Judge concerned.\n\nTaking the argument at its face value, we cannot jump immediately to the conclusion that in all cases non-consensual transfers would amount to a punishment so as to arm the Government with a weapon to punish a Judge for not toeing the lir.e of the Government.\n\nIt is a well-known saying that one swallow does not make a summer. It seems that it is neither logical nor congruent to draw an irresistible inference merely from the massive transfers made during the emergency inspired by particular motive to the conclusion that the power of the President enshrined in Art. 222 would be exercised for collateral reasons always in future also; more particularly so when this Court in the majority judgment in Seth's case had laio down the guidelines for transferring a judge from one court to another and D also laid very great stress on the process of effective consultation, the possibility of abuse of power is completely ruled out.\n\nThis Court in that case had laid down sufficient safeguards againt a wrong or colourable exercise of power by the President under Art. 222.\n\nTherefore, there is no reason to presume that any order which is passed by the President under Art. 222 henceforward is bound to E be mala fide or colourable and even if it is in a particular case or cases, it is doubtless subject to judicial review.\n\nIt was than contended that a transfer of a judge from one High Court to another entails evil consequences inasmuch as it uproots the judge from his hearth and home and transplants him in a new and alien place where he has to start his life or career anew and face several personal difficulties and inconveniences.\n\nOnce it is conceded that the power of transfer under Art. 222 is to be exercised in public interest, then any inconvenience that is felt by the judge would have to yield to the larger interest of the community so as to make the said article workable.\n\nAlthough Art. 222 is an extraordinary power, whenever a person accepts judgeship of a High Court he is fully aware that during his career as a judge the power under Art. 222 could be exercised by the Presidnt without his consent and if knowing this he accepts the position of a High Court judge, he cannot be heard to say that he ought not to be transferred because be woµJd sutfr lot of inconvpienc~.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 771\n\nIt is true that the transfer of a High Court Judge is an A extraordinary phenomenon and is resorted to very sparingly. Though not the usual incident of the career of a High Court Judge as in the case of other services, particularly the subordinate judiciary the provision for transfer is undoubtedly there and has to be worked out in suitable cases.\n\nWe shall deal with this apect of the matter in greater detail when we come to the limb of the argument regarding B the policy of general transfers. ·\n\nFurthermore, the very concept of transfer under Art. 222 being a punishment is highly derogatory to the high constitutional position that a High Court judge holds.\n\nSuch a constitutional appointment, which makes a Judge a constitutional functionary and not a government servant, more so when he obtains certain special privileges having regard to the high position be holds, is against the very concept of penalty or punishment. It is manifost that when a person is punished for an offence or a mistake or an error, then be is to undergo some penal process. In the case of a Judge who is transferred, no such penal consequences are at all visited because on the plain term of Art. 2:2 the Judge has to get special facilities before being transferred to the transferee High Court.\n\nClause (2) of Art. 222 clearly provides that a transferred judge is also to receive in addition to bis salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined such compensatory allowance as the President may fix.\n\nThus, the granting of compensatory allowance to a judge in lieu of transfer completely destroys the concept that the transfer involves a stigma or a punishment. You don't have to award a person additional facilities if you punish him and if you do, then the act cannot amount to a punishment. Apart from the allowances, the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act and the Rules made therein clearly provide that a judge who is transferred from one High Court to another can always avail of the special leave concession rules by visiting his home State, alongwith his family, at Government cost once a year.\n\nThe Judges Rules, as amended, further enjoin that the Judge must be supplied with a free furnished house which under the Amendment Act of 198 l is not even to be treated as a perquisite under the Income Tax Act. It is true that some of these facilities are available to a Judge in his original High Court also but the totality of the facilities taken into consideration undoubtedly seek to make him as comfortable as possible in the transferee court also.\n\nIn the speeches and statements of the Members of the Drafting Committee' p!!rticularly thot? of I:lr AmbC?dkar Art. 222 (which W!!s\n\n\n(1982] 2 S, C.R\n\n128 in Draft Constitution) was introduced not by way of punishing a judge but to import better talents in other High Courts and enable the judge to work in a free and fair atmosphere where he can work without any local influence.\n\nIndeed, if our Founding Fathers were alive today and were to be told to their utter dismay that transfer amounts to a punishment, they would have got the greatestshock of their life.\n\nFar from being a punishment the transfer of a judge does not involve any stain or stigma nor even the slightest reflection on bis legal functioning or his judicial character or integrity.\n\nThe transfer of a judge contemplated by Art. 222 is in the nature of a response to a calJ of duty in the larger national interest of the country in order to maintain and ensure absolute purity of judicial administration.\n\nOn being transferred the Judge would find himself free to work in an independent atmosphere untramelled by any provincial or parochial consideration, undaunted by any external or internal influences or local pulls or pressures and uninfluenced by the considerations of class, caste or creed.\n\nHe would also generate much greater confidence in the people to whom be imparts justice which is bound to enhance his judicial prestige and as a logical result would subserve the concept of independence of judiciary.\n\nFor a true and conscientious judge there can be no higher honour than to create a feeling that justice is not actually done but also appears to have been done, the later being more important and fundamental quality of judicial approach. The apprebensi:>n that a judge on being transferred to another State is likely to face a hostile Bar is merely an anathema and an illusion which bas neither a factual nor a legal existence. lf the Judge's behaviour towards the Bar is polite and courteous and he gives a lit tie accomodation to the Bar he is bound to win laurels of the Bar. In fact, the Bar always welcomes an outside judge who is likely to build up a new judical structure and establish a flawless and unblemished reputation.\n\nThis is not merely a pious wish or an ideal deam but a stark and speaking reality which is evident from the performance and reputation of Judges who had been transferred outside their States and had proved to be not only successful but memorable judges.\n\nJudges transferred as CJ/Judges outsides their State.\n\nJustice Sinha of the Patna High Court was transferred and appointed as CJ in Nagpur High Court.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nJustice Sarjoo Prasad of the Patna High Court was appointed as CJ of Assam and later of Rajasthan High Courts.\n\nJustice C.P. Sinha of Patna High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court\n\nJustice Malhotra of Allahabad High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court.\n\nJustice Narasimham from Orissa to Patna as CJ.\n\nJustice Khalil Ahmed from Patna to Orissa as CJ.\n\nJustice A.T. Harries from Punjab to Calcutta as CJ.\n\nJustice S.R. Dasgupta from Calcutta to Karnataka High Court\n\nJustice Ansari from Andhra Pradesh to Kerala High Court.\n\nJO.\n\nJustice A.D. Koshal from Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court to Madras High Court.\n\nApart fr0m these there were other transfers, a list of which was submitted by the counsel for the respondents.\n\nThese Judges have left an indelible imprint in the judiciary of the State where on transfer or appointment they worked.\n\nWe might also mention that the Solicitor General in his statement at the Bar drew our attention to the excellent manner in which our colleague Justice A.D. Koshal shaped himself when he was transferred to Madras during the emergency.\n\nThe Soiicitor-Grneral said that he had left behind an unparalled reputation of being a very sharp and independent judge. These circumstances, therefore, fully justify transfer of judges from one High Court to another.\n\nThe Attorney General with his usual ingenuity submitted a very plausible argument in order to show that transfer of a judge from one high Court to another under certain circumstances even though inconvenient cannot by any process of reasoning amount to a reflection or stigma It was submitted by the Attorney-General that there may be two contingencies where a Judge may or may not\n\nive his consent.\n\nOne type of Judges may consent to the tr!\\11sfc; r\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nagainst the background of public interest and the Judge responds to the sensitive call of duty ignoring his private losses and inconveniences and gives his consent to the said transfer. There may be other type of Judges who care more for their personal conveniences or losses and refuse to give their consent.\n\nThe hardship involved in both the cases is the same.\n\nThe only question to consider is as io whether or not Art. 222 operates to the disadvantage of a more conscientious judge or of a judge who is not willing to meet the demands of public interest or, if we may say so, national interest, for either public or national interest may some time make it not only desirable but imperative that a Judge should be transferred.\n\nFurthermore, the Attorney General pointed out that there may be several factors which may affect the administration of justice or the confidence of the community which may involve the judge himself on a purely environmental basis.\n\nFor instance, the atmosphere may be vitiated by his close relations or friends even without the knowledge of the judge who may remain innocent and become an unfortunate victim of environments.\n\nIn such cases, his continued presence in the High Court is bound to vitiate the very atmosphere in which justice is to be dispensed with so that a conscientio1Js judge would himself opt for a transfer outside his State.\n\nWe have to take into account the advice given by the CJI in one of the Seminars that where close relations of a judge or the Chief Justice practise in the same court and are likely to gain undue advantage, the concerned judge should himself, in obedience to the keen sense of justice which every judge possesses opt to be transferred to some other High Court. This is undoubtedly a very valuable advice which seems to have been given by our CJI to the judges in the country.\n\nMr. Seervai in his anxiety to drive home his opposition to nonconsensual transfers sumbitted that if the father-judges or the unclejudges are transferred from one High Court to another and the relations who exploited him also foll ow suit and start practice in the transferee court, could such a transfer be a sufficient cure for G this malady? The answer to this argument is very short and simple.\n\nWhere a judge is tra.isferred because environment or the atmosphere is not congenial or conducive to administration of impartial justice he does so as a conscientious judge responding to a call of duty but where his sons or relations follow him in the transferee court then H it becomes the most cogent and reliable evidence to show that the judge openly allows himself to be exploit\\ld by hi~ sons or relations\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 775\n\nand this per se would be conclusive proof of misbehaviour for which he can be impeached under Art. 124(4) read with Art. 218. If these facts are proved, then he will haveto be removed, for no court can ever accept a plea of the judge that even after he was trao.sferred to some other court his close relations followed him there without his knowledge.\n\nAnother difficulty which was pointed out before us was regarding the language problem. This, however, appears to be of a very minor significance as compared to various plus points indicated above.\n\nAfter all, the British Judges could administer justice for two centuries in our country without knowing our language. Furthermore, at the High Court level there are ample facilities for translating the record into the language with which the judge is conversant, and if necessary these facilities could be increased. The Law Commission suggested that even if transfers are made from one High Court to another they could be made on zonal basis which will eliminate the lao.guage difficulty to great extent.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are una hie to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that non-consensual transfer amounts to punishment or a reflection on, the integrity of the judge concerned or can in any way be described as penal.\n\nThe next pillar of the argument of Mr. Seervai regarding nonconsensual transfer was that such a transfer would seriously affect and impair the independence of judiciary. Dr. Singhvi who followed him not only adopted this argument but elaborated it by giving illustrations from various constitutional provisions which we shall deal with presently.\n\nDr. Singhvi submitted that non-consensual transfer was against the very spirit of the doctrine of separation of powers contained in our Constitution. We have already shown from the concluding speeches of the Members of the Drafting Committee that our Constitution is based mainly on the British pattern although some provisions of the American Constitution have been borrowed. Secondly, a detailed survey of the various provisions of the Constitution dealing with judiciary would clearly reveal that our Constitution does not envisage a complete separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive as such.\n\nWhat our Constitution has done is to effect no separation of powers as such but separation of judicial and executive functions. In achieving this object, our Consti-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] i S.C.R.\n\ntution has particularly relied on the American Constitution while rejecting the British pattern of conventions. For instance, the judiciary is absolutely independent and supreme in the decision-making process, that is to say, in deciding cases between man and man and State and man without being influenced by any governmental or official consideration.\n\nIn England, in spite of the independence of judiciary even the highest judiciary does not have the power to strike down a law made by the Parliament. In contradistinction to this, our Constitution confers absolute powers on the High Courts and the Supreme Court to strike down not only legislations brought about by the legislature but also Acts passed by the Parliament and the peak of the judicial power reached when in Kesavanada Bharti' s case (supra) this Court held that the amending power enshrined in Art. 368 of the Constitution could not be amended so as to affect the basic structure of the Constitution.\n\nWe might mention that it has, however, not been doubted by counsel for any of the parties that independence of judiciary is doubtless a basic structure of the Constitution but the said_ concept of independence has to be contined within the four corners of the Constitution and cannot go beyond the Constitution.\n\nWhile this absolute judicial power has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary, a certain amount of executive control has already been vested in the higher judiciary in respect of the subordinate judiciary. At the same time, the power of appointment of High Court Judges including the CJ or Supreme Court Judges, including the CJI, vests entirely in the executive i.e., the President of India, who acts on the advice of Council of Ministers. Here again, this executive power is not absolute and has to be exercised in consultation with the CJI in the case of appointment of Supreme Court Judges, as also in consultation with the CJI and the Governor of the States concerned in case of the appointment of Chief Justice of the High Courts-in the case of appointment of High Court Judges, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court is also to be consulted.\n\nThis Court has in several cases, which need not be repeated here, clearly held that consultation contemplated by the Constitution must be full and effective 'and by convention the view of the concerned CJ and CJI should always prevail unless there are exceptional circumstances which may impel the President to disagree with the advice given by these Constitutional authorities.\n\nH Thus, in fine, the doctrine of separation of power, so far as our Constitution is concerned, reveals an artistic blending and an\n\ns.i>. otJi>TA v. UNION (Fazai Ali, i.) 777\n\nadroit admixture of judicial and executive functions.\n\nThe Constitution has taken the best of both the British and the American Constitution. In order to illustrate our point and to show that the separation sought to be itchieved by our Constitution is not absolutely or completely separate, let us compare our Constitutional provisions with those of the American Constitution.\n\nUnder the American Constitution Supreme Court Judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and no qualifications are necessary for the appointment to the court nor are any stipulations mentioned therein.\n\nThe Judges, however, serve for life during good behaviour and may be removed by impeachment almost in the same manner as provided for in our own Constitution. Section 1 of Article I of the American Constitution runs thus : (1)\n\n\"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.\"\n\n( Page 613)\n\nAnd section 1 of Article II reads thus :\n\n\"The executive power shall be vested in a President of E the United. States of America.\n\nHe. shall hold his office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-\n\nPresident, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows :\n\n(Page 618 )\n\nI<'\n\nThus, under s. 1 of Article I while legislative powers completely vest in the Congress, the executive power vests in the President.\n\nHere, our Constitution makes a distinct departure by making the President, in whom the executive power vests, to be bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nTherefore, under our Constitution for all practical intents and purposes the executive power vests in the Council of Ministers only and the President is bound to accept the advice of the Council of Ministers. Proviso to clause (1) of Art. 74 may be extracted thus :\n\n(I) American Constitutional Law by Rocco J. Tresolini (1959 Edition).\n\n' E\n\n( ,, ,,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\n\"Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.\"\n\nUnder this proviso, the President has no doubt the power to require the Council of Ministers to reconsider the advice if he (President) entertains any dobut in respect of the advice tendered to him, but if the same advice is given to him after reconsideration, the same is binding on him.\n\nClause (2) of Art. 74 bars any inquiry by a court into the nature of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President.\n\nThus, under our Constitution the executive power does not vest absolutely in the President as in the case of America where the President has got vast powers and is assisted by his Advisers who are called Secretaries.\n\nThen we come to Art III of the U.S. Constitution, which is most relevant for our purpose. Section 1 of the said Article runs thus:\n\n\"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\n\nThe Judges, both of Supreme and inferior Courts shall hold their office during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during t.heir Continuance in Office.\"\n\n( pp. 620-21 )\n\nThus, the judicial power vests completely in the Supreme Court or such inferier courts as the Congress may from time to time establish or ordain.\n\nSection 2 of Article III provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, including laws of the United States. Treaties made and cases affecting Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls, etc.\n\nThus, in the American Constitution by virtue of the fact that the entire judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court or other\n\n.• -'I\n\nS.f>. GtJP'i\"A v. UNION (Faza/ Ai;, J.) 779\n\ncourts, the appointments have to be made by the Supreme Court, unlike the provisions of our Constitution where appointments are tu be made by the President in consultation both with judicial and executives authorities as indicated above.\n\nTherefore, in expounding the concept of separation, the essential distinctive features which differentiate our Constitution from the American Constitution must be kept in mind.\n\nAn attempt was made by Mr. S. P. Gupta, one of the petitioners, to establish that even under our Constitution the judicial power exclusively vests in the CJI who takes the place of Council of Ministers. This argument is wholly unacceptable and cannot be countenanced because it is against the clear and express provisions of Art. 224, 222 and 217 of our Constitution. However, this matter has been elaborately dealt with by Brother Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. and I entirely agree with their opinions and have nothing useful to add so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned.\n\nLastly, on the question of separation of powers, apart from what we have said it may be noticed that so far as framers of our Constitution are concerned they had deliberately rejected the theory of complete insulation of the judicial system from the executive control. During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambcdkar wanted to give larger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President.\n\nThe facts will be borne out from the observations made on pages 338-339 of Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution (Vol. IV), and on pages 128-132 of The Indian Constitution-Cornerstone of a Nation by G. Austin.\n\nEven an attempt of Dr. Austin and others to introduce instrument of instructions to provide guidelines for the action to be taken by the President was rejected.\n\nIn fact, the method of appointment adopted by our country seems to have been followed in every democratic country except the United States where, as already shown, the Judges are not appointed by the executive excepting the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but by the judiciary. Even in America, the Federal Court judges of the States are not appointed by the judiciary. Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nA and Government pp. 726-727; Harold Laski : Grammer of Politics, pp. 545-548; 80th Report of tht> Law Commission, pp. 7-11; and Basu; Commentary on the Constitution of India (4th Ed. Vol. 3, pp. 77-79).\n\nIt would appear that our Constitution has devised a wholesome and effective mechanism for the appointment of judges which strikes a just balance between the judicial and executive powers so that while the final appointment vests in the highest authority of the executive, the power is subject to a mandatory consultative process which by convention is entitled to great weight by the President.\n\nApart from these safety valves, checks and balances at every stage, where the power of the President is abused or misused or violates any of the constitutional safeguards it is always subject to judicial review.\n\nThe power of the judicial review, which has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary, is in our opinion the safest possible safeguard not only to ensure independence of judiciary but also to prevent it from the vagaries of the executive. Another advantage of the method adopted by our Constitution is that by vesting the entire power in the President, the following important elements are introduced :\n\n(I) a popular element in the matter of administration of justice,\n\n(2) linking with judicial system the dynamic goals of a progressive society by subjecting the principles of governance to be guided by the Directive Principles of State policy,\n\n(3) in order to make the judiciary an effective and powerful machinery, the Constitution contains a most onerous and complicated system by which judges can be removed under Art. 124(4), which in practice is almost an impossibility.\n\n(4) in order to create and subserve democratic processes the power of the appointment of the judiciary in the executive has been vested so that the head of the executive which functions through the Council of Ministers, which is a purely elected body, is made accountable to the people.\n\nJ...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazai Aii, i.) 781\n\nIf absolute powers were to be vested in the judiciary alone for all its spheres of activities (appointment retirement, removal, etc.) then the element of absolutism may have crept in, resulting ia irreparable harm to the great judicial institution.\n\nAnother reason why the power of appointment in the judiciary was not vested absolutely was to avoid judicial interference in the day-to-day working of the legislative or parliamentary institutions.\n\nDr. Singhvi submitted that independence of judiciary comprises two fundamental and indispensable elements, viz., (I) independence • _.. of judiciary as an organ and as one of the three functionaries of the State, and (2) independence of the individual judge.\n\nThere can be no quarrel that this proposition is absolutely correct. Our Constitution fully safeguards the independence of Judges as also of the judiciary by a three-fold method-\n\n(I) by guaranteeing complete safety of tenure to judges\n\nexcept removal in cases of incapacity or mishaviour f'\\ which is not only a very complex and complicated procedure but a difficult and onerous one,\n\n(2) by giving absolute independence to the Judges to decide the cases according to their judicial conscience without being influenced by any other consideration and without any inference from the executive. Art. 50 clearly provides that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. This important Directive Principle enshrined in Art. 5U has been carried out by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which seeks to achieve complete separation of judiciary from the executive;\n\n(3) so far as the subordinate judiciary is concerned the provisions of Arts. ~233-236 vest full and complete control over them in the High Court. Only at the initial stage of the appointment of munsiffs or the District Judges, the Governor is the appointing authority and he is to act in consultation with the High Court but in all other matters like posting, promotion, etc., as interpreted by this Court in Shamsher Singh's case(1),\n\n(1) [1974] I SCR 814.\n\n782 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS ( l 982i i s.c.R..\n\nthe High Court exercises absolute and unstinted control over the subordinate judiciary.\n\nPromotion, holding disciplinary inquiry, demotion, suspension of Sub Judges lie with the High Court and the Guvernor has nothing to do with the same.\n\nHinting on the nature of the separation of powers brought about by our Constitution, this Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of\n\nUP. and Ors(1), made the following observations :\n\n\"The Indian Constitution, though it c!oes not accept the strict doctrine of separation of powers, provides for an independent judiciary in the States; it constitutes a High Court for each State, prescribes the institutional conditions of service of the Judges thereof, confers extensive jurisdiction on it to issue writes to keep all tribunals, including in appropriate cases the Governments, within bounds and gives to it the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the territory over which it has jurisdiction.\n\nThis Court has in several cases held that the condition of consultation which the Governor has to exercise implies that he would have to respect the recommendations of the High Court and cannot turn it down without cogent reasons and even if he does\n\nrn, it is manifest that his order is always subject to judicial review on the ground of mo/a fide or exceeding his jurisdiction.\n\nThese are sufficient safeguards to ensure the independence of judiciary. The argument of Dr Singhvi goes a step further so as to\n\nin::port the American concept of absolute independence in our Constitution which, however, is not permissible because as indicated above the provisions relating to judiciary of our Constitution and American Constitution are essentially different.\n\nDr. Singhvi then advanced the same argument which was put forward by Mr. Seervai that a transfer without consent would be punitive both in concept and consequences and would promote a relationship of master and servant which is inapplicable to the case of Judges and the Chief Justices. We are, however, unable to accept this extreme argument because for the reasons that we have already given a transfer in public interest is an exraordinary provision which does not entail any stain or stigma and is a constitutional step which completely excludes the concept of master-servant relatiorirhip.\n\n(1) [1967] 1 SCR 77.\n\n. \"\"'\n\nS, P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 783\n\nDr. Singhvi later rightly laid greater stress on the nature and extent of the consultative process in the case of transfer. It was also submitted that even if a judge is transferred_ individually, public interest, which leads to his transfer, would also have to be examined by the court.\n\nWe propose to examine this aspect in greater detail when we deal with Transferred Case No. 24/81.\n\nAt the moment it is sufficient to state that for the reasons that we have already given a non-consensual transfer cannot be treated as punitive, penal or punishment.\n\nFurthermore, we might state here that aftr a general policy is evolved by the Government for transfer of Judges of the High Court in order to ensure the goal of having I/ 3rd judges in each State from outside the State, such a policy would be fully justified not only on the ground of public interest but in the larger interest of the country as a whole to promote integration and crush parochialism and provincialism. If this is done, then the question of effective consultation would have to be looked from a different angle.\n\nSimilarly, a general policy to have CJs from outside in every State would serve the same national interest and there also the effective consultation is to be confined only to the just exceptions that may be made while pursuing this policy.\n\nThe last question that remains to be determined is as to whether the proposal for transfer of judges from one High Court to another\n\nshculd emanate from the CJI or from the President. In this connec- E tion, the Solicitor-General has produced a memorandum showing the procedure tu be adopted in connection with the appointment and transfer of judges.\n\nThis Memorandum cannot take the place of a statute or a constitutional document.\n\nIt merely prescribes the manner in which the proposal can be processed.\n\nFrom a plain language of Art. 22 ! it is manifest that the proposal for transfer can emanate either from the CH or from the President through the\n\nUnion Minister for Law and Justice. What is important is whichever authority initiates the transfer, the conditions prescribed under Art. 222 must be complied with, viz,\n\n(a) if the proposal emanates from the President, he must ascertain the views of the CH which are entitled to great weight, and\n\n(b) as Art. 222 contemplates comultation with the highest judicial authority in the whole country, it is obvious that the CJI also represents the judge or the judges who are sought to be transferred,\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nAs a logical result of this concept, it would be necessary for the CJI, on receiving the proposal from the President, to ascertain the views of the judge concerned and his personal circumstances or objections, if any, and then after applying his mind to them, place the same before the President through the Law Minister. Thereafter, the matter would have to be processed according to the Rules of Business and advice sent to the President for formal orders.\n\nWhere, however, the proposal emantes from the CJI himself, then he should collect the necessary facts and examine the reasons given by the Minister concerned for the transfer and before giving his opinion or advice to the Minister he would have to consult the judge concerned and ascertain his views and 'give due consideration to them. Thereafter he should also communicate the views expressed by the judge\" concerned-whether against or in favour of the proposal-to the President through the Minister concerned so that even if the en does not agree with the view of the judge, the President may be in a position to give his decision finally one way or the other.\n\nThese are the essential requirements of Art. 222 which are briefly contained in the Memo. though not strictly in consonance with what we have said above.\n\nWe might hasten to add here that although the Constitution does not mention either the Chief Minister or the Governor of the State being consulted in the manner of transfer of a judge from one High Court to another but the Memo. provides for this procedure in order to solve some practical difficul ties because when a judge is transferred from one State to another the transferor State must be told to make necessary arrangements for appointing his successor and similarly at the oth:r end the receiving State would have to make adequate arrangements for the residence and other facilities which are to be given to the judge concerned.\n\nIn this process, the Chief Minister or the Governor of the two States may express their opinion but the President is not bound under Art. 222 to accept their views. It does not appear to be the intention of the Memo to supplant two additional authorities for the purpose of consultation, for that would be in direct contravention of Art. 222 which merely stipulates consultation with the CJI and impliedly the judge concerned.\n\nThus, the information given by the Cliief Ministers and the Governors of the States is merely for the limited purpose of ascertaining their views and other matters referred to above and is not, therefore, a part of the consultative process enshrined in Art. 222 otherwise if 11ddition11l 11uthoritie$\n\n• >.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 785\n\nare introduced for the purpose of being consulted, then the Memo.\n\nA will be clearly violative of Art. 222.\n\nThus, the Memo. while prescribing that the proposal should emanate from the President does not exclude the other alternative, viz., that the proposal should emanate from the CJI In Transferred Case No. 24/81 it is clear that the proposal of transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh and others emanated from the CJI and that in our\n\nopinion was perfec1Jy legal and constitutional and does not offend the provisions of the Memo. as suggested by counsel for the petitioners because the Memo. does not and cannot in any way debar the CJI from initiating the proposal if he wants to do so .\n\nThis, therefore, disposes of all the contentions of the counsel for the parties so far as the various aspects of interpretation of Art. 222 is concerned.\n\nOn a consideration, therefort\", of the facts, circumstances and authorities the position is as follows :\n\n(I) that Art. 222 expressly excludes 'consent' and it is not 0 possible to read the word 'consent' into Art. 222 and thereby whittle down the power conferred on the President under this Article,\n\n(2) that the tramfer of a judge or a CJ of a High Court under Art. 222 must be made in public interest or E national interest,\n\n(3) that non-consensual transfer does not amount to punishment or involve any stigma,\n\n(4) that in suitable cases where ma/a.fide is writ large on the face of it, an order of transfer made by the President would be subject to judicial review,\n\n(5) that the transfer of a judge from one High Court to another does not amount to a first or fresh appointment in any sense of the term,\n\n( 6) that a transfer made under Art. 222 after complying with the conditions and circumstances mentioned above does not mar or erode the independence of judiciary,\n\nFor the reasons given above, the contentions of Mr. Seervai, Dr. Singhvi &nd others f&il &nd !!re overruled.\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nPoint No. 3-Policy of General Transfers\n\nWe now come to the question of evolving a general policy of transfers (for short, to be referred to as the 'Policy') of Judges or Chief Justices from the home State to other States so that each State or a majority of them has a CJ from outside.\n\nPolicy has two important limbs-(!) transfer of CJ or Judges from one High Court to another, and (2) recruitment of one-third judges in each High Court from outside the State in which the High Court is situate.\n\nThe earliest roots and the foundation for evolving the aforesaid policy are to be found even when Art. 222 was in the process of its birth.\n\nThe most prophetic and pregnant observations of Dr.\n\nAmbedkar give a clear clue to the desire expressed and the goal sought to be achieved by introducing Art. 222.\n\nThese lines from his speech may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Secondly, it might be desirable to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court because it might be desirable to have a man who is unaffected by local politics and local jealousies.\n\nWe thought therefore that the power to transfer should be placed in the hands of the Central Government.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\n(p. 580, Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 11 (1949)\n\nThese observations have a historical significance having been made by one of the greatest jurists, constitutionalist and one of the eminent Founding Fathers of our Constitution and perhaps the hi ; hest tribute that we can pay to the dedicated service of Dr.\n\nAmbedkar is to evolve a Policy and thus fulfil the pious wish and the last desire of the great jurist.\n\nNevertheless, the idea of evolving the Policy came to be seriously thought of when the States Reorganisation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 'S RC') was entrusted with the arduous task of recommending reorganisation of States on lingustic basis-a step which was long overdue having been the subject of one of the earliest Resolutions passed by our freedom fighters-a solemn promise made to the Nation by its political leaders to be fulfilled as soon as the cot.ntry attained frt'edom.\n\nThis process of reorganisa tion was not a bed of roses but was fraught with grave consequences leading to parochialism and provincialism which, if not properly checked, controlled or safeguard1:; d, might have brought about\n\n. -·\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 787\n\ndisintegration of the entire country.\n\nPerhaps this was one of the A main reasons why the SRC being fully alive to these dangers tried its best to see that the reorganisation of States did not lead to disintegration and accordingly suggested a number of measures including a strong and independent judiciary free from parochial and fissiparous tendencies.\n\nWe, therefore, start the question of policy of transfers with the Report of the SRC which tried to tackle B the second limb of the policy of importing one-third judges in the High Court from outside. In this connection, it might be appropriate to refer to certain observations made by the SRC in the concluding portions of its Report :\n\n\"846.\n\nWe have now come to the end of our appointed C task. The problem of reorganisation of States has aroused such passions and the claims which have been made are so many and so conflicting that the background against which this whole problem has to be dealt with may quite often be obscured or even forgotten.\n\nIn order that the recommendations which we have made may be viewed in proper D perspective.\n\nWe should like to emphasis two basic facts.\n\nFirstly, the States, whether they are reorganised or not, are and will co11tin11e to be integral parts of a\n\nUnion which is far and away the more real political entity and the basis of our nationhood.\n\nSeco11d ly, the constitution of India recognises only one citizenship, a common E citizenship or the entire Indian people, with equal rights and opportunities thro11gh-out the Union.\"\n\n(page 229).\n\nrll peaking in the same strain the SRC further observed thus :\n\n\"849.\n\nUnfortunately, the manner in which certain administrations have conducted their affairs has itself partly contributed to the growth of this parochial sentiment.\n\nWe have referred earlier to the domicle rules which are in force in certain States, governing eligibility to State services.\n\nThe desire of the local people for the State services being manned mainly be \"the sons of the soil\" is understandable' but only up to a point.\n\nWhe11 such J devices a'> domicle rules operate to make the public services an exclusive preserve of the majority language group of the State, this is bound to cause discontent among the other groups, apart from impeding the free flow of talent and impartingdmjnistra, tiv~ efficiency.\" (p. 230)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe SRC repeated the same concept in paras 854 and 856 of its Report thus :\n\n\"854. There are certain other measures which, if adopted, will, we hope, help in corrPcting particularist trends and also in securing greater inter-State coordination for the efficient implementation of all-India policies.\n\n856 ......... The Central and State Governments have to work in very close cooperation!in executing important development projects, which necessitates that technical personnel should be recruited and trained on a common basis and that they should have uniform standards of efficiency and the feeling of belonging to common and important cadres.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nThe SRC made the following further observations in paras 868, 870 and 871 :\n\n\"868. From the point of view of national unity, it is also of great importance that there should be closer understanding between the north and the south.\n\nAll institutions and establishments which help to bring about such an understanding should receive particular encouragement from the Government of India ..... ~\n\n870.\n\nThe proposals which we have made in the preceding paragraphs are intended to bring about greater adminstrative integrity and to provide against any particularist trends being promoted within the administration itself or in the country at large.\n\nImportant as these measures are, it is obvious that they are by themselves not adequate to give a deeper content to Indian nationalism.\n\nNational unity can develop into a pJsitive and living force capable of holding the nation together agai:1>t the disruptive and narrower loyalties only if there is a real moral and mental integration of the people.\n\nFortu11ately, forces making for such integration are already at work.\n\nWhat is necessary is that nothing should be done to impede their freeplay.\n\nWe should like to say something on this subject before we conclude.\n\n871.\n\nIndia is now on the eve of vast econ0mic and social changes. These changes must affect every ihstitution and\n\n, .. _.\n\n.. _J.,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 789\n\nwill calI for a constant review of our traditional methods of A thought and ways of life.\"\n\nHere also the SRC took special care to lay great emphasis on the feelings of commonness, unity and integration in alJ spheres of activity so as to give a deeper content to independence and nationalism. In para 861 of its Report while dealing with the judiciary the 8 SRC recommended that at least one-third of the number of judges in a High Court should consist of persons recruited from outside the State and in this c'Jnnection observed as follows :-\n\n\"Guided by the consideration that the principal organs of State should be constituted as to inspire confidence and to help in arresting parochial trends, we would also recommend thut at least one-third of the number of Judges in a High Court should consist of persons who are recruited from outside that State In making appointments to a High Court bench, professional standing and ability must obviously be the overriding considerations. But the suggestion we have made will extend the field of choice and will have the advantage of regulating the staffing of the higher judiciary as far as possible on the same principles as in the case of the Civil Service.\"\n\nAnd at page 263 in para 58 the SRC reiterated the policy indicated in para 86 l extracted above.\n\nThe SRC consisted of a very eminent Judge of the Supreme Court and two persons of very great public and political eminence like Shri K.M. Panikkar and Shri H N.\n\nKunzru. When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt. Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was the Chairman of the SRC. Thus; the ideas coming a~ they did from such great and important personalities who had varied experience not only in all branches of the law but also in other socio-economic activities are undoubtedly entitled to great weight.\n\nThe SRC tried to face some hard facts and prophetically foresaw what has now come to be a stark reality and the need to crush the fissiparious and parochial tendencies which may lead to the disintegration of the country is felt much more today than ever before. The concluding words of the Report light up the entire history, apprehension and views of the SRC. If the need to , achieve unity in all spheres of activities, judiciary not excluded, is not only in public interest but also in national interest, we fail to see\n\nw4at else co1M be in public interet,\n\n$UPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Perhaps it was due to the terse observations, recommendations\n\nand suggestions of the SRC that a high-powered Law Commission was set up by the Government in 1958 which was headed by Mr.\n\nM.C. Setalvad, ex-Attorney General of India, and this high-powered Commission fully endorsed the SRC Report and even suggested a mechanism to implement the recommendations.\n\nIt is true that at that time the idea of having judges or CJs from outside the State had not been suggested or conceived though, as pointed out above, Dr. Ambedkar hadl hinted at it even during the formative process of Art. 222.\n\nThis now brings us to tl:\\e 14th Report of the Law Commission, headed by Mr. Setalvad, where for the first time the policy of having a CJ in every High Court from outside was not only suggested but supported by a large body of independent persons.\n\nDwelling on this aspect of the matter the Law Commission in its 14th Report at page 76 (para 26) observed thus:\n\n\"26. A large body of evidence before us has suggested, that it should be made an invariable practice to fill a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice by appointing a judge from outside the State. Such course, it is said, will have the advantage of giving the Chief Justice of India a wide choice in recommending a person suitable for that office. it has also been pressed upon us that bringing a Chief I ustice from outside the State will have a very healthy influence, in thar, it will promote a sense of unity in .the country and prevent the Chief Jutice being swayed by local connections and local influences.\n\nIt may be mentioqed that Chief Justices from outide the State have been appointed in some of the States a!ld these appointments have proved a success.\n\nThough the analogy may not be very pertinent, we may refer to the practice of appointing Governors who do not belong to the State, which has been in vogue since the advent of the Contitution.'\n\nThe observations referred to above clearly show that as far back as 1958 there was a strong view in favour of filling up the vacancies of CJs by appointing a judge from outside the State.\n\nAlthough the Law Commission did not entirely agree with this opinion but it did notice that there was sufficient evidence to justify the same. As regards the otber limb of the Policy to appoint qnethird judges in each High Court from 9utside the State, tlw Law\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. uNioN (Pazai Ali, J.)\n\n~ ' ' 791\n\nCommission fully endorsed it and its recommendations on this A\n\nsubject may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"74 The recent creation of various zones in the country and the efforts to treat the States forming part of these zones as one unitJfor various purposes would, we hope, lead to the States forming part of each zone to be the recruiting ground for appointments to the High Court from the members of the Bar in these States. It is hoped that in this manner the expectation of the States Reorganisation Commission that at least one-third of the High Court Judges would be persons drawn from outside the State will be realized.\"\n\n(page 100)\n\nIn September 1963 a Study Team was a-ppointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'ARC Study Team') to give its report on Centre-State relations.\n\nThe said Study Team in its Report at page 190 (paras 13-20) suggested that so far as practicable one third of the number of judges of the High Court should be from outside.\n\nIn other words, the ARC Study team also endorsed the SRC Report and the 14th Report of the Law Commission.\n\nImmediately following the ARC Study Team Report, a meeting \"\" of the Committee of Zonal Council for National Integration was held on 31st August 1964 and in its Report of item l(viii) (b) the said Committee made the follo\\\\fog recommendation :\n\n\"The Committee also commended the idea that as a F convention, the Chief Justice of tlie High Court of a State\n\nshould be a person from outside the State.\"\n\nIt would appear that the said Committee gave full effect to the large body of public opinion which had expressed its intention before the Law Commission (14th Report) that in every High Court the Chief Justice should be from outside the State, and the Committee fully endorsed this view.\n\nThus, the inescapable conclusion seems to be that right from 1954 upto 1964, the two limbs of the Policy referred to above were being debated and ultimately definite views were expressed by independent persons that a policy, consisting of the two limbs, be evolved and followed.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.il.\n\nA In 1967 the ARC Study Team headed by Mr. M. C. Setalvad, passed a clear Resolution that as far as practicable, one-third of the number of judges should be from outside.\n\nAnother Law Commission was set up some time in 1978 and the Bar Council of India in its reply dated 8.9.79 to questions Nos.\n\nU 11 and 12 answered thus :\n\nQuestion\n\n11.\n\nWhat is your view with regard to the suggestion that we should more frequently appoint a judge from outside the State as Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\n12.\n\nWhat is your view with regard to the suggestion that we should have a convention according to\n\nAnswer\n\nYes\n\nwhich one-third of the judges in each High Yes Court should be from anotber State.\n\nD In his speech on 26.2.1979 in the Lok Sabha Debates, Mr. P.\n\nShiv Shanker, who was then a Member of Parliament only and not even in the then Ruling Party, expressed his opinion thus :\n\n\"Various reports of the Law Commission with reference to recruitment policy and the policy on transfer of Judges from one High Court to the other, have been only gathering dust. While I am one among those persons who will fight till the last for the independence of Judiciary, I would say that the policy as to the transfer of Judges as enunciated by the Law Commission in the year 1958, under the chairmanship of late Shri Setalvad, of which one of our very eminent members of the profession, viz., Shri Palkhivala was also a member was salutary which opined that one-third of the Judges of a High Court must be from outside. This would have achieved a better national ioteg ration in the field of Judiciary. I am not one of those people VlhO would support transfer if it is based on extraneous considerations.\"\n\n(Lok Sabha Debates: Vol XXII No. 6,\n\nSixth Series-seventh session )\n\nIn a meeting of the Consultative Committee for the Law Ministry, held on 7.6.80, where Members of Parliament belonging ti> opposition parties were also present, the unanimous views was :\n\n. -·\n\nS.i'. OUilTA v. UNION (Fazal Ail, J.) 193\n\n\"(2) the Chief Justice of a High Court should be from A outside the State, and\n\n(3) at least one-third of judges in a High Court should be appointed from outside the State.\"\n\nAnother meeting of the Consultative Committee for the 8 Ministry of Law held on 24.7.80 fully reiterated and affirmed the view taken by the earlier Committee mentioned above.\n\nAnother meeting of the Consultative Committee held on 17.12.80 which consisted of Members of Parliament of the opposition parties including Bapusaheb Parulekar, also favoured outside appointments.\n\nIn its 80th Report, the Law Commission headed by an eminent Judge of this Court, Mr. Justice H. R. Khanna, in paras 6 21 and 6.22 made the following observations :\n\n\"6.21...Likewise, the Study Team on Centre State Relations appointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission also suggested that so far as practicable one-third of the number of judges of a High Court should be from outside.\n\nWe have given the matter our earnest con&ideration and are in substantial agreement with the recommendations mentioned above. In our opinion, there should be a convention, according to which one-third of judges in each High Court should be from another State. This would normally have to be done through the process of initial appointments, and not by transfer. It would also in the very nature of things be a slow and gradual process and take some years before we reach the proportion.\n\n6.22 Evolving such a convention would, in our opinion, not only help in the process of national integration but would also improve the functioning of various High Courts.\n\nIt would secure on the Bench of each High Coirt the presence of a number of judges who would not be swayed by local considerations or affected by issues which may rouse local passions and emotions .. We in India are in the fortunate position of having a vast country. There can, therefore, be no difficulty in.having a certain percentage of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS t l 9s2j 2 s.c.il.\n\njudges who hail from other States. The advantages gained by having person from other States as judges would be much greater compared with any disadvantage which might result therefrom.\"\n\nA national Seminar was held on judicial appointment between 17-19 October 1980 at Ahmedabad, in which various eminent speakers participated and freely expressed their views The Seminar was organised by the Bar Council of India Trust and its deliberations may be extracted thus :\n\n\"The Seminar was of the view that the principle of transfer of Judges in all circumstances _is not to be considered as violative of independence of judiciary. In fact, in certain situations transfer of a judge may be a very desirable course to follow for preserving independence of the judiciary, promoting national integration and avoiding balkanisation of the country on linguistic or other similar considerations.\n\nThe ideal of having one-third of High Court Judges from outside the State helps promotion of national integration and the preservation of a unified judicial system. However, it is desirable that this composition of the High Court should be accomplished by way of initial appointments rather than by transfers.\"\n\nThus, the preponderance of opinion in the Seminar favoured the dominant aspects of the Policy, viz., principle of transfer of Judges and that one-third judges should be from outside the State,\n\nin order to promote national integration and preservation of a unified judicial system.\n\nAnother meeting of the Consultative Committee of Members of Parliament for the Law Ministry was held on 3.9.81, in which Members belonging to the opposition parties were also present, and there also the preponderance which emerged was in favour of having CJs from outside the State and one-third of judges to be recruited ia each High Court from outside.\n\nIn this connection, it may be useful to extract certain relevant portions from the speeches of the Members.\n\nShri Nanda (Congress (S)) observed thus :\n\n'Participating in the discussion, Shri Nanda Congress\n\n(s) made particular reference to the Seminar organised by\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. duPtA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 195\n\nthe Bar Council of India at Ahmedabad and the discussions held there on the issue of transfer of Judges and appointments from outside.\n\nHe wanted to know Government's reaction to the various proposals made at the Conference on this aspect.\n\nHe emphasized that on the question of appointments of outsiders and transfers, the Consultative Committee had made definite and positive recommendations and Government should implement them ... \"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nShri S.C. Mohanta (LD) expressed his views thus :\n\n\"Shri S.C. (Mohanta (LD)) said that initially he had C reservation about supporting the policy of transfers but ever since the Law Minister had said that he would leave the mechanism and modalities to the Supreme Court, he was convinced that wch a policy should be followed and pressed that those who were newly appointed, should be transferred to outside courts. There could be no status-quo approach D in the present times.\n\nA suitable mechanism should be evolved and implementation left to the judiciary.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nShri Jamil-ur-Rahman (Congress) observed thus :\n\n\"It would be in the national interest to transfer judges from one High Court to other, and there should be no hesitation in doing this.·\"\n\nthus: Shri Dandapani (DMK) supported the view and observed\n\n\"Shri Dandapani (DMK) supported the view that judges should be transferred from the High Courts in their own interest to other High Courts.\n\nHe was of the view that in many cases, judges continuing in the High Courts of their own State were likely to develop vested interests Fresh appointments could certainly be made from outside the State.\n\nThis should be done as a matter of policy so that there was no pick and choose.\"\n\nShri Hari Nath Mishra (Congress) was of the following view :\n\n79fi\n\nSUPREME Coi.Jk'J REPORtS [1982) 2 s.c.k.\n\n\"Shri Bari Nath Mishra (Congress) mentioned that it had been agreed at earlier meetings that one-third of the judges and tbe Chief Justice should be from outside the State.\n\nThe need for such a policy arose not from any theoretical consideration but from the reality of the situation.\n\nHe wished to project this need to the Law Minister and through the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India.\"\n\nShri Bhogendra Jha {CPI) observed thus :\n\n\"Shri Bhogendra Jha (CPI) supported the idea of transferring judges of High Courts outside their own State ••.\n\nHe also observed that while members of the Committee belonging to the different parties had agreed that transfer and appointments of outsiders should be made, the idea should be propagated amongst the respective parties\"\n\n{Emphasis supplied)\n\nD The Law Minister presiding over the deliberations of the\n\nConsultative Committee pointed out that the delay in. evolving a policy was due to the fact that he was ascertaining the views of the Chief Justice of India but a final decision was yet to be taken.\n\nIn this connection, he observed thus :\n\n\"The Law Minister mentioned that be had sought the views of the Chief Justice of India on the policy of having Chief Justices from outside, as that by itself would considerably improve the functioning of the High Courts. He apprised the members of the approach of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of transfers and appointments of outsiders.\n\nA final decision in the 1matter of a policy of transfers was still to be taken.\"\n\nSo far as the CJI is concerned, he was firmly opposed to the wholesale transfers of all CJs from one High Court to another without objective reasons though selective transfers could be made in appropriate cases for objective reasons.\n\nOn 18.3.198], the CJI observed that at least a few of the new appointments to every High Court were in fact made from outside the State.\n\nJn April 1981 he opined that at least one-third of the new appointments to the High Court should be made from outside.\n\nSo far as the second limb of the Policy in concerned, viz., that each High Court should have one-third of its strength of Judges\n\n'- .\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, 1.) 191\n\nfrom outside the State, the CJI clearly concurred with this view but A his main grievance seems to have been against the wholesale transfers of CJs so that each High Court had a CJ from outside. According to the CJI, such a policy was fraught with grave consequences and serious inconvenience which may be caused to most of the CJs.\n\nIn spite of the stand taken by the CJI the Law Minister on behalf of the Central Government, tried his best to persuade him (CJI) to agree to a uniform policy of transfer of CJs-a policy which had found favour with eminent jurists, politicians, lawyers and parliamentarians, but the CJI seems to have posed stiff resistence to the aforesaid Policy.\n\nThe Law Minister participating in the discussions in the Rajya Sabha on 30.7.80 on the question of transfer of CJs from one High Court o another spoke thus :\n\n\"Mr. Chagla and Mr. Palkhivala-they supported the approach that one-third of the judges should be from outside so that it would be in the interest of national integra- D tion; regionalism will not come in, and also it would be in the interest of a caste ridden society.\n\nThat was the approach they had taken.\n\nI will go only into the recent past.\n\nEven my predecessor, Mr. Shanti Bhushan felt that a Chief Justice should be from outside on the same grounds which were urged by the Law Commission in its 14th Report. ... The policy is whether a Chief Justice should be from outside or not, and if so, whether the seniormost person based on the all-India seniority should be appointed wherever the vacancies occur, or any other mechanism has to be evolved which should be in the best interest of the society ... This very Bar Councilexcept one or two members who have changed; otherwise, the personnel are the same-said : \"yes, the policy should be that the Chief Justice should be from outside.\" The other question that was posed by the Law Commission was question No. 12 which said : \"What is your view with regard to the suggestion that we should have a convention according to which one-third of the judges of each High Court should be from outside the State\" ? This very Bar Council answered in the affirmative.\"\n\n(Rajya Sabha Debates : Vol. CXV\n\nNo. 6 dt. 30.7.80, pp. 219-221)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Ii 982! 2 s.c.il.\n\nIn his speech, the Law Minister also said few things about the manner in which the mechanism to give effect to the Policy may be devised.\n\nIn a later speech on 24. 7. l980 in the Lok Sabha while dealing with the question of mechanism for giving effect to the Policy, the Law Minister observed as follows ;\n\n\"Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, on the first question of mechanism I must frankly bring to the notice of this hon.\n\nHouse that even my predecessor Shri Shanti Bhushan j i seems to be of the view that a Chief Justice should be from outside because of the various factors.\n\nAnd I am glad that the hon. Member, Shri Agarwal, did support this approach. As I said we have not finally come to a conclusion .. The matter of mechanism is an affair where we have to necessarily seek the guidance of the Supreme Court.\n\nAnd in this matter I can assure you that as and when we come to a final conclusion, we will see to it that the least injustice is done to the persons concerned. I am at the disposal of the Supreme Court to suggest any mechanism which they feel would be suitable in the interest of the independence of the judiciary.\n\nI am proposed to leave everything to the Supreme Court to decide the mechanism of the whole approach.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nIn order, however, to be fair to the CJI for having expressed a strong view , against the proposal for giving effect to a uniform policy of transfer of CJs, it may be necessary to go through the various letters exchanged between the CJI and the Law Minister to know the reasons and the circumstances under which the-CJI had voiced his opposition.\n\nTo begin with, in a Note dated 15.5.80 (which is contained in one of the Jiles disclosed under the majority Order of this Court), the Law Minister once more wanted to ascertain the final view of the CJI thus :\n\n\"While this file may be referred to the CJI for his advice, I feel that we should also examine about evolving the poiicy to appoint the Chief Justice of a High Court from the High C0urt other than the High Court to which\n\n....._.\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 799\n\nthe Chief Justice is to be appointed.\n\nI had passingly disclosed this issue some time back with the CJI. The fact remains that in the various High Courts the problems of caste and regionalism, etc., are looming large.\"\n\nIn reply to this, the CJ! drew the attention of the Law Minister to the following facts which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"It would become necessary in the very near future to evolve an All India policy for appointments of Chief Justices in the various High Courts. The difficulties in taking any ad hoc decision on that question are of such grave magnitude that it would be impossible at this stage to appoint an outsider as a Chief Justice either of the Delhi High Court or of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\"\n\nH would appear from the contents of the Note extracted about that the CJI was opposed only against any ad hoc decisions without evolving an All-India policy for appointment of CJs. He had deliberately remained silent on th~ question of the Policy re garding transfer of CJs.\n\nIn his Minute dated 31.7.80 while expressing his opposition to the Uniform policy the CJI clearly stated that he had an open mind, the relevant portion may be extracted thus :\n\n.\"The heart of the matter however is whether, as a general All India policy, a Judge of a High Court ought never to be appointed as the Chief Justice of that High Court. I am prepared to keep an open mind on this question because the pros and cons of the issue has still to be thrashed out. But the better view may be that transrers of sitting Chief Justices may be made only in appropriate cases, that _is to say, when a strong case for the transfer has been made out.\n\nAt this stage it is unnecessary to say anything more on the subject except to clarify that though I recognise the need to evolve an All India policy for appointments of Chief Justices in the various High Courts, I do not think that it will be either feasible or proper to transfer each and every sitting Chief Justice of the High Court to another High Court, or to appoint an outside Judge as the Chief Justice whenever a vacancy of a Chief Justice arises.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n\\ 800\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS -[1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nIt appears that the CJI himself appears to be in two mindswhetber or not t~ accept the uniform policy-and was weighting the merits and demerits in the balanced scales of justice. Ultimately, it seems that he appears to have finally made up his mind to oppose the policy of wholesale transfer of CJs. This would be clear from his letter dated 7.12.80 addressed to the Law Minister where he had expressed his opinion fairly, frankly and without any reservation thus :\n\n·_ .. Though I am firmly opposed to a wholesale transfer of the Chief Justices of High Courts, I take the view, which I have expressed froni time to time, that such transfers may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons.\n\nPerwnal considerations must, in the matter of such transfers, be wholly kept out.\"\n\nThis, therefore, marks the end of the epoch so far as the CJI was concerned.\n\nAfter examining the entire history of the case, the I) various opinions expressed by top legal luminaries, statesmen, politic{ans and jurists right from 1958 to 1981, we are absolutely convinced that the idea of the Central Government of a uniform policy of transfer of CJs, so that each State has a CJ from outside, is a very essential, useful, sensible and a wise one which cuts at the roots of so many evils with which not only our country but even the E higher judiciary is faced.\n\nSome of these aspects have been dealt with by the Law Minister and other legal luminaries in the various extracts quoted above.\n\n - -- Secondly, such a uniform policy will be in the better interest of the concerned Judge himself because however disinterested or independent he may be, he is bound to be influenced either conschusly or unconsciously by interested persons who choose to exploit him even ' , without his knowledge.\n\nA clear instance of this is to be found in the case of Justice K.D, N. Singh which has been fully clarified by the CJI in his counteraffidavit in Transferred Ca>e No. 24 of 1981. As, -however, this is a very sensitive matter we would not like to go into the details or comparative merit or demerit of the Policy but by and large we are absolutely confident that such a Policy would enhance the prestige of the judiciary, ensure its i1dependence aod make the working of the head of the judiciary in the State more efficient and generate a greater confidence in -the pe.ople of the new State where be is transferred.\n\nThe only objection which has beeri pointed out against this Policy fa ti:\\e Linguas• problem but ti:\\1t al>~ clues not appeu to b;\n\ns P. <lUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 801\n\nan insurmountable obstacle because while laying down the policy the Government can start with transfers of CJs within the Zone> a; recommended by the Law Commission which will minimise the language difficulty. In making the transfers, there would be no serious objection if the CJ is allowed to indicate his choice regarding the State where he would he prepared to be transferred and the same may be accepted a~ far as practicable.\n\nSo far as recruitment of one-third judges at the initial stage is concerned, this will no doubt present s'Jme difficulties in the beginning because several constitutional authorities would have to be consulted but this difficulty can be overcome either by the appropriate method adopted by the Circular or any mechanism similar to the same.\n\nWe would like to suggest that the Chief Justice of each High Court should be asked to prepare a panel of suitable persons who are considered for appointment as High Court Judges both from the Bar and from f e. subordinate judiciary.\n\nBefore including the name of the persons concerned their previous consent for being appointed outside the\n\nState may be obtained by the CJ.\n\nThis can be done by determining the strength of the panel so that it may form one-third of the total strength of permanent judges already fixed by the Pre>ident or as may be fixed from time to time.\n\nThe Civil List of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts gives the sanctioned strength of permanent and Additional Judges.\n\nOne-third of the strength of the permanent judges according to the vacancies that fall should be reserved for the persons found suitable and who are willing to serve outside the State. It would be better if the persons whose names are included in the Panel are appointed outside the State as permanent judges which would provide an'!attractive offer and give a better impetus to the persons aspiring for judgeship and would tempt them to serve outside the State.\n\nThis procedure should be continued without any break through a phased programme and the ultimate result would be that after a few years, the outside judges in each High Court will pick up their seniority and would become eligible for being appointed as CJ of the High Court in which they were appointed Thus, after the retirement of the present CJs or the transferee CJs a time may come when automatically every High Court will have a CJ from outside because the seniormost judge who was initially recruited from outside would, if found suitable in all respects,\\•be appointed Chief Justice of the said High Court.\n\nSuch a scheme would be a continuous implementation of the Policy,\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nMoreover, once the Government takes a final decision considering the diverse views expressed by politicians, jurists, lawyers, parliamentarians and respectable citizens, in respect of having a uniform policy by which every CJ should be from outside the State, the Government can lay down such a policy by a Presidential Order.\n\nIf that is done, there would be no just or lawful cause for the CJI to withhold his consent to implement such a uniform Policy because once a Policy is evolved and given effect to, the idea of making selective transfers would lose its significance and value and would perhaps be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because selective transfers would always ! result in some sort of discrimination, for in each case, the CJI would have to justify the classification made by him.\n\nIt is true that neither the Law Commission set up in 1958 nor the one set up in 1978 had totally agreed with the first limb of the policy, i.e. transfer of CJs from one State to another so that each D State has a CJ from outside although they did find in unequivocal terms that there was a sufficiently vocal section of the public favouring such a policy of transfers. This was perhaps because by that time all the various shades and aspects, mechanisms and methods of evolving such a policy had not been fully explored nor did the State policy till that time ripen into a wholesome policy after having E considered the various facets of the matter with frankness, forthrightness and objectivity.\n\nIndeed what had been noticed by the Law Commission in 1958, that is about more than two decades hence, has become absolutely essential today in view of the modern trends of casteism, nepotism and patronage in the higher echelons of judiciary. Furthermore, as a result of the insufficient emoluments and poor conditions of service, we are not able to muster men of high calibre and eminence for appointment to the High Courts. With great reluctance we have to observe that an atmosphere seems to prevail today in most. of the High Courts where Judges are being exploited and in some cases perhaps without their knowledge, which has brought the most sacred and sacrosanct institution of the judiciary into serious disrepute.\n\nThe only honourable remedy for this malady is the implementation of the first limb of the Policy.\n\nNevertheless, regarding the second limb of the Policy in regard io recruitment of one-third judges from. outside the State, as far ~$\n\n.....\n\n,_,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 803\n\npossible at the initial Stage, both the Commissions have unanimously acclaimed and approved such a step.\n\nBrother Venkataramiah has taken the view that although the CJI was opposed to the wholesale transfers of all CJs, his opposition was only with respect to all these transfers being made at a particular time.\n\nIn other words, Venkataramiah J. suggests that the CH was quite agreeable to the Policy being carried out if the CJs are transferred not in a block but by stages and in due course of time.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this argument because this ru11s counter to the clear intention expressed by the CJI in the letters discussed above.\n\nMoreover, it will be rather unfair to the CJI also to say that he had merely opposed wholesale transfers made at one time but had agreed to the Policy of uniform transfers if made by stages. The view taken by the CJI may not appeal to us or perhaps to the majority of the jurists but it cannot be said that there is absolutely no substance in the stand taken by the CJI.\n\nHis point of view is also quite understandable but, with greatest respect to him, what he has missed is the great public interest, the policy subserves by promoting national integration and curbing fissiparous tendencies that have started raising their heads and completely excludes discrimination which may result in cases of selective transfers.\n\nBrother Venkatarmiah has also expressed his view that the transfers proposed by the en. which were quite a number of them, were actually in aid and implementation of the policy formulated by the Government and, therefore, even if there was no effective consultation, the transfers would be valid.\n\nWe regret that we are unable to accept this view because it is the common case of all the parties that although the suggestion to evolve a Policy has been mooted no such Policy has yet been evolved or finalised because even according to the Law Minister, the mechanism is yet to be determined which would have to be left to the Supreme Court. This is, further supported by the statement of the Law Minister which was produced by the Solicitor-General where the Law Minister merely says that the Policy view was put across to the CJI who expressed his opposition to all the CJs of the High Courts being from outside.\n\nThe Government, however, acceded to the transfers proposed by the CJI as (1) it was felt that not agreeing to these transfers may be construed as though the Government was departing from its view of having CJs from outside, l\\nd (2} the _policy aspect could still be pressed into service later.\n\n\n[I 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nThus the statement of the Law Minister clinches the issue and establishes the fact beyond doubt that no uniform Policy has so far been evolved and the said Policy, if any, is still in the making. This being so, the question of the CJI proceeding to implement the Policy by proposing the transfers would not arise.\n\nB On other points, we entirely agree with Brother Venkataramiah\n\nand other Brother Judges that the Policy is good, reasonable, fruitful and constitutionally valid.\n\nThus, a close and careful scrutiny fof the correspondence between the Law Minister and the CJI over a year on the issue of evolving a General policy of transfer of CJ s so that each State has a CJ from outside could not be finalised and what happened was that only sporadic transfers were recommended by the CJT.\n\nAs indicated above Brother Venkataramiah has in his lucid judgment seems to have construed the letter dated 7.12.80 of the en to indicate merely that he was against wholesale transfers to be made at one stroke and what he suggested was that these transfers should be made in stages and not on a single day.\n\nIn other words, Venkatararniah J, is of the view that the transfers recommended in the CJl's letters dated 7-12-80 and 20-12-80 were merely in implementation of the general policy of transfer of CJs so that every High Court has a CJ from outside. With due respect, we are unable ro spell out such an intention of the CJI from the clear contents of the letters which in fact and in purpose rejects the general policy of wholesale transfers of the CJs as suggested by the Law Minister.\n\nHe has ultimately expressed himself very clearly and strongly that he was against such a universal policy of wholesale transfers and would be willing only to consider individual cases on their merits leaving apart, personal considerations and for objective reasons.\n\nSecondly, since it is the admitted case of the Government that while they were thinking of evolving a general policy of transfer of CJs, the policy had not yet taken any final shape nor did the Government take any conclusive decision on this important matter, with due respect, therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by brother Venkataramiah J. on this point.\n\nAs regards the Government's idea of evolving a general policy to effect transfers of CJs in a manner which puts every High Court under the CJ from outside the State, is undoubtedly a very sound ifnd acceptable policy as founq by us.\n\nWe have pointed out from\n\n.._,\n\nS.P. GUPTA I'. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 805\n\nthe various Reports discussed above that eversince the date of the Report of the SRC was given tbe idea of having Judges from outside the State was clearly mooted.\n\nFurthermore, while we are examining the Policy sought to be evolved by the Government, at the present moment we cannot shut our eyes to the stark and hard realities of life.\n\nEversince the linguistic provinces came into existence as a result of the SRC Report, attempts have been made to see that the linguistic division of the State does not create disintegration of our big country which is the largest democracy in the world.\n\nIn fact, lawyers, Judges, politicians, jurists, members of the Bar and other statesmen have applied their minds and expressed themselves strongly in favour of the policy sought to be. evolved by the Government In view, however, of the changed circumstances, in our opinion, such a policy is not only proper but essential as being the prime need of the hour. We cannot but take notice of the fissiparaous and parochial tendencies that have started raising their heads threatening disintegration of the country.\n\nThe dark clouds of separatism, conservatism and parochialism have started casting their shadows on the entire country and it is high time that such a sacred and sacrosanct institution like the High Courts should be protected and kept aloof from such evil forces.\n\nIt is manifei; t that a CJ from outside will apply an independent approach both in discharging his judical duties as a Judge and in recommending appointment of member of the Bar or service to the High Court and his selection will not be inspired or tainted by any local or personal consideration because he would be an outsider in the High Court of a State where he presides.\n\nFurther, even the litigant would have much greater confidence in such a CJ than in a local person.\n\nWe would like to reiterate at the risk of repetition that having regard to the inadequate emoluments of the High Court Judges and their conditions of service which leave much to be desired, there has been a fall in the standards of efficiency and competency. Lawyers possessing great calibre and eminence are extremely reluctant to accept judgeship of a High Court. Thus, the choice and selection of suitable persons has become extremely difficult and experience has shown that in a number of High Courts suitable persons have not been appointed.\n\nIt has been vehemently argued by Mr. Seervai as also by Mr.\n\nSorabjee who followed him that their main concern is that independence of judiciary should be maintained at all costs.\n\nIndeed, if they are really concerned that we should bµijd up an independentJudiciar~\n\n'SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 S.C.k.\n\nthen it is absolutely essential th:, t new talents from outside should be imported in , every High Court either to man it or to head it so that they may generate much greater confidence in. the people than the local Judges.\n\nThe position of a CJ is indeed a very high constitutional position and our Constitution contains sufficient safeguards to protect both his decision making process and his tenure. It is a well-known saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.\n\nAs man is not infalliable, so is a Chief Justice, though a person holding a high judicial post is likely to be incorruptible because of the quality of sobriety and restraint that the judicial method contains.\n\nEven so, if a CJ is from outside the State, the chances of his misusing his powers are reduced to the absolute minimum.\n\nWe have pointed out that the power to formu-. late or evolve this policy clearly lies within the four corners of Art. 222 itself which contains a very wide power conditioned only by consultation with CJI who is th! highest judicial authority in the country. It is always open to the President, which in practice means the Central Government, to lay down a policy, norms and guidelines according to which the presidential powers are to be exercised and once these norms are followed, the powers of the President would be beyond judical review.\n\nWe might also mention that as against policy transfer selective transfers of CJs to High Courts other than the one where they are working or may be appointed, contains the colour of discrimination and arbitrariness because however careful the CJI may be if he starts picking and choosing CJs from outside the High Courts the element of discrimination or arbitrariness cannot be reasonably excluded.\n\nOn the other hand, if a general policy applying to all and sundry (CJs) is evolved by which every State would have a CJ from outside no complaint of discrimination can ever be made.\n\nIn fact, the very foundation of discrimination would disappear.\n\nThe view taken by the CJI, with greatest respect to him, does not appear to be correct or acceptable and perhaps in his own interest selective transfers should not be made because even if in one or two cases discrimination is made due to oversight or bona fide lapse, it will amount to a great slur on such a high position as the CJl holds.\n\nOn the other hand, if a uniform policy of appointing or promoting CJs to High Courts outside the State is followed it will promote national integration and curb the fissiparous and parochial tendencies and preserve and protect the purity of judicial administration.\n\nWe cannot conceive of any better policy which would be in greater public jnterest than the policy of having CJs jq every State from outside.\n\n>--•\n\ns P. CTtiPTA I>. UNION (Paza/ Ali, J.) 807\n\nWe have already observed that whenever a general policy or radical change of this kind is made it has to be subject to just exceptions and the formulation of such a policy would also have to take within its fold exceptional circumstances applicable to a particular CJ or CJs-a matter which we shall discuss hereafter.\n\nEven as regards the constitutional validity of the general policy which may be evolved by the Central Government.\n\nThis Court in Seth's case had clearly expressed the view that such a Policy would be in public interest.\n\nIn this connection, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority judgment observed as follows :\n\n\"As re2ards the first, no onetcan deny that whatever measures are required to be taken in order to achieve national integration would be in public interest.\n\nWhether it is necessaary to transfer Judges from one High Court to another in the interests of national integration is a moot point. But that is a policy matter with which courts are not concerned directly. x x x Policy transfers on a wholesale basis which leave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our Constitution.\"\n\nDoubtless, there appears to be some apparent contradiction between the two passages extracted above from the judgment of Chandrachud J.\n\nOn a closer scrutiny of these observations his view that policy transfers on wholesale basis would leave no scope for considering facts of each particular case cannot be read out of the context and have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of Seth's case in which transfers were made by the Government not in pursuance of a Policy or public interest but purely with political motives to punish Judges for sharing a particular ideology.\n\nThis is, however, not the case here and therefore as we read the observations of Chandrachud J. he has not held the Policy of transfer to be not in public interest in order to promote national integration.\n\nFor the reasons that we have already given above, we are unable to agree with the observations where the learned Judge has said that interest of national integration is a moot point. We have already shown from the opinions expressed by high constitutional and legal authorities that a policy of having CJ in every High CQurt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA from outside is in great national interest and perhaps very necessary in order to curb and crush fissiparous tendencies which seem to sway our entire country. Bhagwati J. while adverting to this aspect of the case observed as follows :\n\n\"It was admittedly part of mass transfers of 16 High Court Judges and though a suggestion was made by the Government of India in its affidavit in reply that the transfers were made with a view to strengthening national integration but cutting at the barriers of regionalism and parochialism, the Government of India did not choose to disclose the principle on which these 16 High Court Judges were picked out for being transferred.\"\n\nThese observations show that Bhagwati, J. did not dispute the correctness of the Policy of National integration but found fault with the manner in which it was applied by justifying the transfers on a ground which was not supportable in law. It is obvious that if the D transfers would have been made to strengthen national integration in order to cut the barriers of regionalism and parochialism, the Judge would have no hesitation in upholding the State Policy.\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. and one of us (Fazal Ali J.) also sounded a similar note and observed thus :\n\nE \"But to promote the community's concern for impeccable litigative justice policy-oriented transfer of judges after compliance with constitutionally spelt-out protocols may not be ruled out. x x x Salutary safeguards to ensure judicial independence with concern for the All-India character of the superior courts in the context of the paramount need of national unity and integrity and mindful of the avantages of inter- State cross-fertilization and avoidance of provincial perviciousness were all in the calculations of the framers of the Constitution.\"\n\nEven Untwalia J. who had dissented from the majority judgment had admitted that the purpose of national integration was a good thing to be achieved and in thii connection observed thus\n\n\"The purpose of national integration if otherwise it is a good thing to be achieved ... \"\n\n\"'>\n\nS.P. OUP't'A v. UNION (Ji'aza/ Aii, i.) 809\n\nThus, it would appear that even the judicial pronouncements of this Court in Seth's case extracted above fully favour the formulation of such a policy. Added to this the commitment made by the Law Minister that once the Policy of wholesale transfers of CJs is evolved the mechanism would be left to the Supreme Court and the Policy be started from the grass-root level by taking consent of the persons nominated for appointment of Additional Judges who have not yet been made permanent, the policy can be fully worked out without any hitch or hindrance.\n\nThe next question that arises for consideration is as to how the two limbs of the Policy, viz., (I) transfer of CJs from outside, and (2) recruitment of one-third of judges from outside the State at the initial level, can be effectuated.\n\nHere, we do not find any difficulty whatsoever.\n\nArt. 222 confers an express power on the President to transfer a judge (which includes the CJ) from one State to another.\n\nThis power is not circumscribed or hedged by any conditions or stipulations excepting that the CJI has to be consulted.\n\nIn determining as to how this power can be exercised, the President\n\nundoubtedly posseeses an implied power to lay down the norms, the principles, the conditions and the circumstances under which the said power is to be exercised so long as he does not overstep the limits or confines of the power enshrined under Art. 222.\n\nSince the implied power lies with the President it is not at all necessary that this power should be regulated by a legislation or an Act or a Rule or a bye-law or any other instruction.\n\nA declaration by the President regarding the nature and terms of the policy which virtually means declaration by the Council of Ministers is quite sufficient and absolutely legal and constitutional to effectuate the policy decided upon.\n\nSecondly, as the policy is a general one which applies to all and sundry without any discrimination or selection, it cannot be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because the policy will operate equally on all the Judges or the CJs without any difference or distinction.\n\nThirdly, it is necessary to put the policy beyond the charge of unreasonableness or arbitrariness that the State policy must be subject to just exceptions which may be very few, so that the excep tions do not become a rule or a ruse to destory the effect of the main policy itself.\n\nFor instance, while evolving or formulating a\n\n$10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.a.\n\ngeneral policy the following exceptions can be made by the President-\n\n(I) that where the personal circumstances of a judge, purely on humanitarian grounds, are such as may endanger his life, e.g., be may be a heart patient and so he may not be transferred to a High Court which is situated in a hill station or at a particular height or he may be suffering from such disease which may imperil him there or such other circu_mstances of a very compelling or pressing nature,\n\n(2) where the judge or the CJ concerned is about to retire and is to serve only for a very short term before retirement, his transfer to some other court would not serve any useful purpose and would be very inconvenient to him-such a period may vary from one day to six months but not more,\n\n(3) where due to some physical infirmity the CJ concerned has become immobile and cannot be moved beyond his home State, this may be a just and humanitariaa ground for bringing him under the exceptions to the policy, and\n\n(4) such other circumstances either similar to or identical with the circumstances mentioned above, which in the opinion of the CJI or the President requires due consideration on humanitarian grounds.\n\nIt is manifest that even if a Policy has been finally evolved and formulated and transfers are sought to be made in pursuance of the policy, the President has to consult the CH or where the CJI initiates the proposal he is to consult the Judge concerned as also the President but the process of consultation would have to be confined to the four corners of the just exceptions indicated above and not beyond the same which form part of the Policy laid down by the President.\n\nAt the same time, the exceptions should not be so broadly construed as to destroy the effect and fruitfulness of the Policy.\n\nAnother aspect of the matter is as to whether or not the policy is legally justifiable and is in public 'interest so as to be legal and\n\n;..\n\nS.f>. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 811\n\nconstitutional. On this aspect of the matter unimpeachable materials have been placed before us to show that right from the framing of the Constitution uptodate public opinion has always favoured the transfer of judges as a matter of uniform policy.\n\nAs late as 1949 when the Draft Constitution was made, Dr. Ambedkar, as already indicated, had expressed a pious wish that judges should be transferred to other States so that they can apply an independent approach and generate more confidence being above all local or parochial interests.\n\nWe must hasten to add that the President before formulating the Policy should consult the en and have his views because the laying down of the Policy would be under Art. 222 and consultation with the CJI being a necessary concomitant of the said power, even while laying down the Policy, the consultative process is essential.\n\nAlthough the en has at present shown his stiff opposition to the Policy we hope and trust that when the matter is reassessed and a Policy is finally formulated, the CTI would eschew his opposition in view of the various factors and circumstances indicated above as also in due deference to the view ; of some of the Judges of this Court who have decided these cases, which, as pointed out by us, is not only in great public interest but also in national interest to the country. Moreover, the Policy has been amply supported and sponsored not only by the Government but also by a very large body of publicmen including jurists, politicians, lawyers, parliamentarians and others. If despite these circumstances the CJI does not change his view and sticks to his opposition of the Policy, then we think this will be a fit and proper case where the President might overrule the en and enforce the Policy.\n\nWe however solemnly hope and trust that such an eventuality would not arise.\n\nBefore closing this Chapter, we would like to say a few words about the mechanism of giving effect to thia Policy. The Law\n\nMi•ister has already made a statement in the Parliament as indicated above that he is prepared to leave the mechanism to be devised to the en or to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court, which represents cream of all legal and judicial master minds of 70 crores of the people of our country, is left to adopt the mechanism, viz., as to which CJ should be posted where and judge the suitability and the atmosphere of the place of posting, then we think that nobody 'can ever complain of any injustice or discrimination against the mechanism adopted by the Court.\n\nWe might further state that only the mechanism is to be left to the Supreme Court which will require\n\n\n[1982] 2 S, C.R.\n\na small Constitutional amendment in Art. 222 which uses the word CJI alone. For the time being the mechaniom could be left to the CJI who, we hope and trust, will consult his colleagues before adopting the mechanism in each case.\n\nBefore closing this chapter we should now say a. few words about the legal and constitutional effect of the Circular said to have been written by the Union Law Minister. In order to understand the real import of the said Circular, the same may be extract.ed in full :\n\n''D.0. No. 66/10/81Jus\n\nMy dear\n\nMinister of Law, Justice & Company Affairs, India New Delhi-110001.\n\nMarch 18, 1981.\n\nD It has repeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Reorganisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one-third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as E possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. Somehow, no start could be made in the past in this direction.\n\nThe feeling is strong, growing and justified that some effective steps should be taken very early in this direction.\n\n2. (a) In this context, I would request you to obtain from all the Additional Judges working in the High Court of your State their consent to be appointed as Permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country. They could, in addition, be requested to name three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as Permanent Judges: and\n\n(b) Obtain from persons who have already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment : their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in the country along with a similar preference for three High Courts.\n\n.'\"J..J..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 813\n\n3. While obtaining the consent and the preference of A the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it may be made clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of Government either in regard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the preferences given.\n\n4. 1 would be grateful if action is initiated very early by you and the written consent and preferences of all Additional Judge as well as of persons recommended by you for initial appointment are sent to me within a fortnight of the receipt of this letter.\n\nS. I am also sending a copy of this letter to the Chief Justice of your High Court.\n\nWith 1,1egards\n\nYours Sincerely, D Sd/- (P. Shivshankar)\n\nTo:\n\nGovernor of Punjab.\n\nChief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States)\"\n\nIn the first place, the contents of the letter have to be understood against the background of the uniform Policy sought to be evolved by the President whicla we have dealt with above exhaustively.\n\nBefore we make any comments it seems to us that what was purely a useful and innocuous, meaningful and pointed document has been described by the petitioners as a most mischievous act of the Law Minister which endangers and erodes the independence of the judiciary. In our opinion, with due respect to the counsel for the parties, the Circular neither does nor does it intend to do any such thing.\n\nTo begin with, the preamble of the Circular clearly gives the reasons and the background why the letter was written, viz., _that the unanimous view that has now emerged is that one third of the Judges should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. From the elaborate discussions in respect of the various circumstances and documents to which we have referred while dealing with the question of Policy, It is mani-\n\n814 SUPREME COUR't REPOR'tS [1982] 2 s.c.Il.\n\nfest that nobody has ever objected to the second limb of the Policy, that is to say, taking one-third of the judges in a High Court from outside the State. We have shown that even the CH has expressed his entire agreement with this part of the Policy.\n\nThe Circular merely seeks to provide an easy and practical, a rough and ready, and an ingenious and scientific mechanism to achieve this end.\n\nLet us assume that all parties agree that one third of the Judges in each High Court should be taken from outside, which seems to be the absolute consensus that has emerged from the evidence produced by both the parties. The question is how is this objective to be achieved ? One method may be as suggested by some Commissions that each High Court should maintain a panel of members of the Bar and the services who are suitable for appointment as Judges of the High Court and exchange these panels with the CJs of all High Courts.\n\nBefore making the panel, it is manifest that the State Government also would have to be consulted, which is also the requirement of the statute.\n\nThis is, however, a very complex and complicated procedure and will take quite a few years before the panel is formed.\n\nSo far as Mr. Seervai is concerned, he argued that this cannot be done.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with him that merely because it may not be very easy to evolve this limb of the Policy, it should be rejected as being impossible of performance. After all, eminent jurists like Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali, Justice R.R. Khanna, Mr. M.C. Setalvad and lot of others must be given the credit of possessing great knowledge of law and if they thought that this was an idea which was most impracticable, they would never have suggested it.\n\nThe Law Minister by virtue of the Circular seeks to hit upon a device by which this limb of the Policy can be achieved. It is obvious that in almost all the High Courts apart from the permanent judges, additional Judges are working according to the strength fixed by the President in each High Court. The Circular does not cover the permanent judges of the High Court at all but it applies only to two kinds of Judgee-(1) persons who are about to be appointed as Additional Judges, and (2) persons who are working as Additional Judges and whose term is likely to expire.\n\nThe Circular merely says that the CJs may obtain the consent of the aforesaid Additional Judges if they would like to be appointed as permanent judges in\n\n--.-\n\n8.1>. GUPt A v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 815\n\nany other High Court in the country and they could name three A High Courts of their choice. There is no compulsion on the Judges to give their consent : it is merely an option or suggestion which they may or may not accept.\n\nSecondly, consent is to be obtained from persons who had B already been or may in future be proposed for initial appointment as Additional Judges to give their consent to be appointed in any other High Court.\n\nHere also, there is no element of compulsion.\n\nClause (3) of the Circular, which has been severely criticised by Mr. Seervai and those who followed him, merely says that furnishing of the consent or indication of the preference would not imply any C commitment on the part of the Government. While criticising this part of the Circular the counsel for the petitioners have however completely overlooked the most important circumstance that it was impossible for the Government to have made by commitment without ascertaining the views of the State Governments concerned, the CJs as also the en. It could only be after these functionaries D would have intimated their option that the ball could be set rolling and the CJs of the High Courts where they were proposed to be sent could be sounded for consultation as also the Government.\n\nFnrthermore, the en would come into the picture only after the proposal has passed through the High Court and the State Government concerned and it would be open to the CJI at this stage either to agree with this proposal or to drop it.\n\nWe, therefore, fail to see what harm is done to the Judges, On the other hand, the Circular provides an additional facility to the Judges who may like to go out of the State in accordance with the Policy. It appears that in actual practice quite a few of the Judges have given their consent.\n\nMr. Seervai vehemently contended that the tone and tenor of the Circular amounts to pressurising the Judges and putting them under coercion to give their consent at the peril of their being dropped at the initial stage.\n\nThe plea of coercion or undue influence is to be pleaded by the persons on whom undue influence or coercion is used.\n\nNone of the Judges have either by any statement or affidavit complained that they had given their consent under duress.\n\nMr. Ser.rvai submitted that Judges are not used to indulge in litigation and if they chose to remain silent, the lawyers can take up\n\n816 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ntheir cause and prove that duress and coercion has been practised on them.\n\nWe are really amazed that such an argument has been advanced before us which completely ignores the :elementary norms of law.\n\nManifestly before the highest court, a Judge of a High Court cannot be governed by a law or rufo of evidence different from the one which applies to all citizens. It is now well settled by several authorities that allegations of coercion or undue influence must be expressly pleaded by the party who is the victim, and proved to the satisfaction of the Court.\n\nIn the instant case, there is neither any plea nor any proof by the socalled victims.\n\nA mere statement in the petition that undue influence or coercion or duress was practised on the Judges is not sufficient for this Court to come to the conclusion that the consent of the Judges was obtained under duress or coercion.\n\nMr. Seervai contended that although there was a clear indication in the potition, none of the Judges bas come forward to deny the same. This is indeed a most unusual way of proving a case of fraud or undue influence.\n\nSuppose today we accept the argment of Mr. Seervai and hold that by virtue of the Circular the Ji.idges who have given their consent did so under coercion or duress and tomorrow the very Judges who bad given consent come forward to this court protesting against our finding and inform us that they had voluntarily given their consent, what shall be the answer of this Court. On what principle of law or equity can we decide the plea of fraud, undue influence or coercion. This argument which is the sheet anchor of Mr. Seervai, with due respect to him, cannot be accepted for a moment.\n\nAnother comment against the Circular was that by the indirect process of obtaining consent of the Judges concerned, the provisions of Art. 222 have been rendered otiose because when the matter goes to the CJI, he would be faced with a fait accompli and would have no discretion in the matter. This argument also, in our opinion, is wholly untenable.\n\nA erson of the status and calibre of the Head of the judiciary in India would not be worth his salt if he exercises his constitutional power of consultation merely on the consent of a judge without at all applying his mind.\n\nThere is no question of presenting a fait accompli to the CJI because he has to consider all the shades, aspects and problems of the matter in its entirety and would also have to consult the judge concerned and if he feels that a proper case for transferring the Additional Judge to .other High\n\nCourt ha$ not \\Jeen made out, he can refuse to give his consent in\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 817\n\nwhich case in all probability the proposal would die a natural death.\n\nA We are, therefore, unable to accede to the contention that the Circular tries to interfere with the supreme authority of the CJI in the matter of consultation under Art. 222\n\nAnother circumstance that furnishes a complete answer to this problem is that no question of transfer is involved in the mechanism B sought to be devised by the Circular. The Additional Judges have only to be appointed for the first time in other High Courts and are not to be transferred. Even if the Judges concerned give their consent and are appointed in an outside High Court, they would not be transferee judges and therefore not entitled to the facilities which are available to transferee Judges like compensatory allow- C ance, visiting his home State every year, etc. Therefore, the entiro\n\nargument stands on a pack of cards.\n\nLastly, the Circular issued by the Law Minister is not mandatory but purely directory.\n\nIt is open to the Judges to refuse to answer the queries made from them by the CJs in pursuance of the Circular and no adverse inference can be taken against them, though the law will take its own course.\n\nWe are clearly of the opinion that once the Policy is finally formulated and translated into action, it would enhance the image and independence of the judicial institutions and verily the judiciary would see its halcyon days where the judges would be able to function with drive and dedication in a free and independent atmosphere without the fear of any local or parochial influence entering into their verdict either consciously or unconsciously. The grateful nation shall pay its homage to our great Founding Fathers for giving unto this country a most ideal, flexible, sound and solid Constitution which has sustained the largest democracy in the world and has stood the test of times despite severe storms and crises like an impregnable rock.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are unable to agree with the\n\ncounsel for the petitioners that the Circular in any way tarnishes G the image of the Judges or mars the independence of judiciary.\n\nThis, therefore, disposes of Point No. 3 relating to Policy of General Transfers and the question of validity of the Circular.\n\nAs regards the question of appointment of Additional Judges H under Art. 224, the interpretation of Art. 217, the questions of locus iind primacy, the exposition of the concomit11nts of consult11tive\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nprocess, I generally agree with my Brothers Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. who have elaborately dealt with these points.\n\nSo far as the question of privilege is concerned, the matter was argued with all its ramifications by counsel for the parties.\n\nAll my Brother Judges after hearing the arguments passed an interim\n\nOrder on 16.10.81 directing disclosure of the documents concerning the secret correspondence between various authorities. I, however, found myself, with due respect to my Brother Judges, unable to agree with the view taken by them and passed the following Order\n\non the same date :\n\n\"I am afraid, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with and express my respectful dissent from the Order passed by Brother Bhagwati J. and other Brother Judges , directing disclosure of the contents of the documents. I am clearly of the opinion, after inspecting the documents and considering the pros and cons, various shades and aspects of the matter with all its ramifications, that it is not in public interest to disclose the contents of the documents and I accordingly uphold the plea of privilege taken by the Union of India. I am aware that my voice is a lone dissent but I am satisfied that I am in good company with my judicial conscience.\n\nReasons for this Order will be given by me alongwith the judgment rendered in the cases.\"\n\nI now set out to give the detailed reasons which led me to dissent from the views taken by my learned colleagues.\n\nI had mentioned in my interim Order that mine was a lone voice of dissent but I felt consoled that I was in good company with my judicial conscience.\n\nTo begin with, in dealing with the question of privilege, we G cannot view this important branch of law divorced from the socio economic conditions of our own country nor can we overlook the special conditions-political. economic and social-prevailing in the largest democracy of the world.\n\nAny judicial reform however\n\nradical or meaningful it may be, must like a sage counsel be slow and gradual because it is the r last refuge for those who seek justice from the courts of law.\n\nOne of the most prominent distinctive features of the laws of our country on the question of privilege is\n\n..._- 1\n\n' \"\"-··\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 819that the doctrine of privilege is governed not merely by case law but by statute law as also bY Constitutional. provisions. These provisions are contained in ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act, s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Art. 74(2) of the. Constitution of India. In deciding the plea of privilege taken_ by the State or the party concerned, the provisions of the codified law, which have not been changed so far, must receive full and effective consideration at our hands. It is not for the firsr time that a claim of pivilege\n\nhas been taken by the Government in this case but the law is now well settled by the decisions of this Court as also of various High 'Courts including the Privy Council. I would not' like to burden this judgment, which has already become unduly long, with the long course of decisions of the High Courts covering a period of more than a century but would like to confine myself to the authorities of this Court and some English and American cases on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioners.\n\nBefore proceeding to the decisions, it may be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the codified law of our country.\n\nArt. 74(2) which contains a constitutional mandate by preventing any inquiry into an advice tendered by the Minister to the President runs thus:\n\n\"74. (2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court.\"\n\nSection 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act may be extracted thus:\n\n\"123. Evidence as to affairs of State : No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withold such ..permission as he thinks fit.\n\n124.\n\nOfficial communications: No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.\"\n\nSection 162(1) of the Code of Criminal Pr99gµr~ runs thus:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2.s.c.'R:\n\n\"162(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of. an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether n a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save a:s hereinaft.er provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any ?ffence under investigation at the time when such statement was made.\"\n\nA plain reading of these provisions would show that these provisions areexpressecj in a negative form which is the clearest C possible proof of the fact that the legislature has incorporated a' direct prohibition against the use of documents mentioned in the aforesaid provisions.\n\nThus, a disclosure can be allowed only in exceptional circumstances where there is' no injury to public interest because 0 public interest is always paramount to private interest. In fact, these provisions clearly contain four important attributes of the doctrine of disclosure :\n\n(I) public interest,\n\n(2) confidentiality,\n\n(3) candour, and\n\n(4) expediency.\n\nA reading of these provisions would also show that the Jegis- F Jature seems to have laid the greatest possible emphasis on public interest and confidentiality aspects of these documents. I shall now refer to some of the leading decisions of this Court which have construed the doctrine of privilege as contained both in s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and s. 123 of the Evidence Act, . and have laid down principles which should be adopted by courts G in allowing disclosure or upholding the plea of privilege.\n\nI would first refer to the case of State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh(1) which may justly be regarded_ as the locus classicus regarding the doctrine of disclosure where Gajendragadkar J., H . with whom Sinha CJ and Wanchoo J agreed, obsrved as follows :\n\n(I) [1961) 2 S.C.R. 371,\n\n... .---'\n\nS.P; GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, .!,) 821\n\n' \" ... A valid claim for privilege made under s. 123 proceeds on the bas.is of the theory that the production of .the document in question would cause injury to public • interest, and that, where a conflict arises between public and private interest, the latter must yield to the former.\"\n\nIt may be noticed here that Gajendragadkar J. was fully alive to the fact that even as a result of the non-production of the relevant material or documents the litigant may feel dissatisfied but that will not affect the basic principle that public good an'l interest must override conRiderations of private good. Here this Court made a distinct departure from the view taken by the American Courts where the concern .for the amount of prejudice caused to the litigant is so paramount as to form the bulwark and fundamental consideration for directing disclosure and in some cases even injury to public interest has to yield to the requirements of the litigant. It is, therefore, clear that this Court has not accepted and, in my opinion rightly, the extreme view of the American courts This. Court in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) made the following observations :\n\n\\ \"Care has howeve_r, to be taken to see that interests other than that of the public do not masquerade in the garb of public interest and take undue advantage of the provision of s. 123.\n\nSubject to this reservation the maxim situs populi est supreme !es which means that regard for public welfare is the highest law is the basis of the provisions contained in s. 123. Though s. 123 does not expressly refer to injury to public interest that principle is obviously implicit in it and indeed is its sole foundation.\"\n\nHaving regard to the notion about governmental function and duties which then obtained, affairs of State would have meant matters of political or administrative character relating, for instance, to national defence, public peace and security and good neighbourly relations.\n\nThus, if the contents of the documents were such that their disclosure would affect either the national defence or public security or good neighbourly relations they could claim the character of a document relating to affairs of State. There may be another class of documents which could claim the said privilege not by reason of -'their contents . as such but by reason of the fact that, if the said documents were disclosed, they would. materially !lffect the freedom and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\ncandour of expression of opinion in the determination and execution of public policies.\n\nIn this class may legitimately be included notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files:· opinions expressed or reports made and gist of official decisions reached in the course of the determination or the said questions of policy.\n\nIn other words, if the 'proper functioning-of the public service would be impaired by the disclosure of any document or class of documents such document or such class of documents may also claim the status of documents relating to public affairs.\n\nIt is, however, necessary to remember that where the legislature has advisedly refrained from defining the expression \"affairs of State\" it would be expedient for judicial decisions to attempt to put the said expression into a strait jackefof a definition judicially evolved.\n\nIt must be clearly realised that the effect of the document on the ultimate course of litigation or its impact on the head of the departmentor the Minister incharge of the' department or even the Government in power, has no relevance in making a claim for privilege under s. I 23.\n\nThe sole and only test which should determine the decision of the head of the department is injury to public\n\ninterest and nothing else.\n\nThus our conclusion is that reading ss. 123 and 162 together the Court cannot hold an inquiry into the possible injury public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question.\n\nThat is a matter for the . authority concerned to decide; but the court is competent, and indeed is, bound, to hold a preliminary inquiry and determine the validity of the objections to its production, and that necessarily involves an inquiry into the question as to whether the evidenc.e relates to an affair of State. under s. 123 or not,\"\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) -r\n\nDuncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co. (1) was also noticed by this Court and it was pointed out that it was not necessary to consider the tue nature and effect of the principle as adumbrated in that case, because in India we are coverned by the provisions of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which clearly confers powers on the court to determine the validity of objections raised in section 123 of the Evidence Act.\n\nHence, there would be no occasion to exercise the inherent power of the Court. In this connection, this Court made the following observations in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (Supra) : ·\n\n\"Without knowing more about the contents of the said documents it is impossible to escape the conclusion that C these documents would embody the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers and would indicate the advice which the Council ultimately gave to the Rajpramukh. It is hardly necessary to recall that advice. given by the _Cabinet to the Rajpramukh or the Governor is expressly\n\nsaved by Art. 163, sub-art. (3), of the Constitution; and in the case of such advice no further question need to be considered.\n\nThe same observation falls to be made in regard to the advice tendered by the Public Service Commission to the Council of Ministers.\"\n\n' These observations come very close to the matters in dispute contained in the secret correspondence sought to be disclosed because here also they dealt with the Minute of the meeting of the Ministers, viz.,. the Law Minister, the CJI and the CJ, Delhi which form the . foundation, though not an actual part of the advice tendered to the\n\nPresident.\n\nThese do~; uments were held to be fully privileged.\n\nKapoor J, in a concurrent judgment in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), however, clarified the positio'n thus :\n\n\"Thus the documents, which are protected from production, are those the production of which would be prejudicial to the public interests or . those which belong to that class which as a matter of practice, are kept secret for the proper. maintenance of the efficient working of the public service. (Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe learned Judge after summing up the entire English law on the subject observed as follows :\n\n(1) (1942) A.C. 624. r\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\n\"Thus the law as stated in these old English cases shows that what was injurious to the public interest or prejudicial to the proper functioning of the public services was not to be disclosed and if the objection was based on these grounds it must prevail.\"\n\n Construing the provisions' of s. 123 of the Evidence Act, the learned Judge observed thus :\n\n\"The words of s. 123 are very wide; and the discretion to produce or not to produce a document is given to the head of the department and the court is prohibited from permitting any evidence to be given which is derived from any unpublished documents relating to affairs of State.\"\n\nSubba Rao J. also in a concurring judgment while maintaining the claim of privilege pointed out that the earlier decisions of English courts stated that the ground of privilege was sustained only in regard to the documents pertaining to matters of administration, defencJ for foreign relations whose disclosure would be against public interest.\n\nIll the instant case, the documents in q4estion undoubtedly relate to matters of administration of high-powered constitutional functionaries and would, therefore,\" fall within the ambit of the Rule of Law laid down by the English COU!tS.\n\nSubba Rao J. (as he then was) took care to point out that the Evidence Act was enacted when the concept pf a Welfare State had not arisen\n\nbt even after independence the interpretation of the words 'affairs of the State' cannot be given a separate meaning but have to be construed on the basis that our Constitution aims at setting up of a Welfare State.\n\nIn this connection, the learned Judge observed as follows :\n\n\"But when the words are elastic there is no reason why they should not be so construed as to include such activities also, provided the. condition of public injury is also satisfied. It is, therefore, clear that tne words \"affairs of State\" have acquired; a secondary meaning, namely, those matters of State whose disclosure would cause injury to the public interest.\n\nStressing that. the cardinal test for upholding the plea of privilege should be that the disclosure of the documents would be injurious to the public interest the learned Judge observed as, follows :\n\n\"I cannot, therefore, give a wide meaning to words \".records relating to affairs of State\" so as to take in every\n\ns.t>. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nunpublished document pertaining to the entire business of State, but confine them only to such of the documents\n\nwhose disclosure would be injurious to public interest.\n\nThe learned judge furrher pointed out that there was no conflict between ss. 123 and I 62 of the Evidence Act even on the interpretation sought to be put on the doctrine of privilege by the learned Judge. In this connection he observed thus :\n\n\"There is no conflict between s. 123 and s. 162 of the Act : the former confers a power on a head of a department to withhold permission from the stand-point of State Administration, whereas s. 162 recognises the overriding\n\npower of a court in the interest of higher public interest to C overrule the objection of privilege.\"\n\nFinally, while laying dQ.wn the working rules of guidance regarding matters of privilege. the learned Judge laid down the following guidelines :\n\n\"Subject to the overriding power of the court to disallow the claim of privilege in exceptional cases, the following provide working rules of guidance for the courts in the matter of deciding the question of privilege in regard to unpublished documents pertaining to matters of State : (a) \"records relating to affairs of state\" mean documents of State whose production would endanger the -public interest;\n\n(b) documents pertaining to public security, defence and foreign relations are documents relating to affairs of State;\n\n(c) unpublished documents relating to trading, commercial or contractual activities of the State are not, ordinarily, to be considered as documents relating to affairs of State; but in special circumstances they may partake of that character.;\n\n(d) in cases of documents mentioned in (c) supra, it is a question of fact in each case whether they relate , to affairs of State or not in the sense that if they are disclosed public interest would suffer.\" - In Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India(1) another Constitution Bench adopted the same view which was taken in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh' s (Supra). Gajendragadkar CJ speaking for the Court observed thus. (1) -\n\n'.'In view of the fact that s. 123 confers wide powers on the head of the departmen_t, this Court took the precaution\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1964 s.c. 1658 .\n\n826 SUPREME cOURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.~.\n\nof sounding a warning that the heads of departments should act with scrupulous care in exercising their right under s. 123 and should never claim privilege only or even mainly on the ground that the disclosure of the document in question may defeat the defence placed by the State.\n\nConsiderations which are relevant in claiming privilege on the ground that the affairs of the State may be prejudiced . by disclosure must always be distinguished from considerations of expediency which may persuade the head of the department to raise a plea of privilege on the ground that if the document is produced, the document will defeat the defence made by the State.\"\n\nIn this case, a clear distinction was sought to be drawn between the doctrine of confidentiality and that of expediency. In other words, this Court dec.ided that where a particular documents did not relate to affairs of the State as such, but if the document was produced it may defeat the defence taken by the State, that alone would not be sufficient to uphold the plea of privilege. In the instant case, however, this doctrine does not apply at all. .\n\nIn State of U.P. v. Raj Narain and Ors., (1) another Constitution Bench of this Court observed thus :\n\n\"A witness, though competent generally to jive evidence, may in certain cases claim privilege as a ground for refusing to disclose matter which is relevant to the issue.\n\nSecrets of State, State papers, confidential official documents and communication. between the government and its officers or between such officers are privileged from production on the ground of public policy or as being detrimental to the public interest or service.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n\"The several decisions to which refer, ence has already . been made establish that the foundation of the law behind\n\nSections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act is the same as in English law.\n\nIt is that injury to public interest is the reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed would injure public :and national interest.\n\nPublic interest which demands that evidence be withheld is to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should have. the ullest\n\n(1) [1975] 4 sec 42s. •\n\n'-..\n\nii.I>. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 827\n\npossible access to all relevant materials.\n\nWhen public interest outweigh the latter, the evidence cannot be admitted.\n\nThe Court will proprio motu exclude evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest.\n\nIt is in . public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded.\n\nThe reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents.\n\nConfidentiality is not .a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the contents contained materialSwhich it would be damaging to the national interest to divulge but ra_ther , that the documents would be of class which demand protection.\"\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nThe aroresaid observations of Ray CJ appear to be on all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case because the documents consisting of the secret correspondence, amply answer the description of the docun:ients which were being dealt with in that case.\n\nMathew J. in his concurring judgment expressed a similar view and after dealing with a large number of English cases observed as follows :-\n\n' \"In other words, if injury to public interest is the foundation of this so called privilege, when once the Court has enquired into the question and found that the disclosure of document will injure public interest aµd therefore it is a documont relating to affairs of State, it would be a futile exercise for the minister or the head or the department to consider and decide whether its disclosure should be permitted as he would be making an enquiry into the identical question. It is difficult to imagin• that a head of the department would take the responsibility to come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by a court as\n\nregards tlie effect of the disclosure of the document on public interest unless he has or can have a different concept of public interet.\"\n\nThe learned Judge, however, was prepared to make exceptions in cases of documents which related to common routine business which had no relation to interests o( the public.\n\nThe Judge pointed out that a mere . veil of secrecy put on such socuments would not prevent the court from directing disclosure and observed thus : ·\n\n\"To justify a privilege, secrecy must be indispensable to iaduoo freedom of official communication or efficiency in\n\n828 SUPREME COURt REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.B..\n\nthe transaction of official business and. it must be further a secrecy which has remained or would have remained inviolable but for the compulsory disclosure.\"\n\nThe documents in question fall squarely within the test . laid down by Mathew J.\n\nThe Privy Council in Henry Greer Robinson v. State of South Australia(1) held that the foundation upon which the protection against disclosure of official record is based is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest, and Lord Blanesburgh observed as follows :\n\n\"As the protection is claimed on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience, the papers protected, as might have beeh expected, have usually been public official documents of_ a political or administrative character.\n\nYet the rule is not limited to these documents.\n\nIts foundation is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interests and not that the documents are eonfidential or official,' which alone is no reason for their non-production.\"\n\nThus, in theinstant case the two-fold tests laid down by Lord Blanesburgh are fully satisfied because (I) the .papers are in the nature of public official documents of administrative character, and\n\n(2) the disclosure of these documents will lead to serious injury to the public.\n\nIn Duncan's case (supra) the following observations were made:\n\n\" ...... but the rule that the interest of the State must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administering. justice, quite unconnected with the interest or claims of the particular parties in litigation, and, indeed, is a rule on which the Judge should, if necessary, insist, even though no objection is taken at all.\"\n\n\"The minister in deciding whether it is .his duty to object, should bear these considerations in mind, for he\n\n(1) [1931] A. C. 704.\n\n.,....,.\n\n>-.•\n\nS, P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 829\n\nought not, to take the responsibility of withholding produc tion except in cases where the public interest would other wise be damnified for example; where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic rela tions or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service.\n\nWhen these conditions are satisfied and the minister feels it is his duty to deny access to material which would otherwise be available, there is no question but that tlk public interest must be preferred to any private consideration.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThis case goes even to the extent that if the Minister does not claim the plea .of privilege, it is for the Court itself not to allow disclosure where the disclosure would be injurious to national defence, good diplomatic relations or proper functioning of the public service. fhis decision, therefore, is fully in accordance with the principles .rnunciated by this Court as referred to above.'\n\nIt was contended that the validity of Duncan's case has been considerably weakened by a later English decision in Conway v. Rimmer and Anr.(1) and therefore no reliance should.be placed on Duncan's case.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this argument because Conway's case has not only not overruled Duncan's case but has held that it was rightly decided.\n\nIn this connection Lord Reid made the following observations :\n\n\"I have no doubt that the case of Duncan v. Carnrnell, Laird and Co. Ltd. was rightly decided.\"\n\nLord Reid reiterated the same principle which has been enunciated by the English courts and followed by this Court and observed thus :\n\n\"It is universally recognised that there are two kinds\n\nof public interest which may clash. There is the public G interest that harm shall not be done t~ the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents, and there is the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by the withholding o( documents which must be produced if justice is to be done.''\n\n(!) [1968) AC 910.\n\n. /\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe twin tests which flow from these observations fully apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.\n\nWe are, therefore, u:;.- able to regard Conway's case has having overruled the ratio in Duncan's case. On the other hand, even on the authority of Conway's case, the disclosure of the documents in question ought not to be allowed. Moreover, these observations clearly shows that the principles enunciated by Lord Simon in Duncan's case were approved.\n\nIt is true that the ratio in Duncan's case after having been approved was explained away and limited to cases where disoiosure of documents was not in public interest and disclosure could be permitted only by striking a just balance between the public and the private interest.\n\nThus, Conway's case does not fully support the contention of Mr. Sorabjee. So far as this Court is concerned, it has not gone to the extreme limit to which Conway's case goes and, therefore, I would like to prefer the decisions of this Court to that of Conway's case wh.ere the law appears to have been somewhat overstated by Lord Reid.\n\nReliance was also placed by Mr. Sorabjee in the case of Rogers v. Home Secretary(1) and particularly on the observations of Lord Pearson which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"The court bas to balance the detriment to the public interest on the administrative or executive side, which would result from the disclosure of the document or information, 11gainst the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side, which would result from non-disclosure of a document or information which is relevant to an issue in legal proceedings. Therefore, the court, though naturally giving great weight to the opinion of the appropriate minister conveyed through the Attorney General or his representative, must have the final responsibility of deciding whether or not the document or information is t.o be disclosed.\"\n\nAnother passage which explains the ratio in clear terms may be extracted thus :\n\n\"It is true that the public interest which demands -that the evidence be withheld has to be weighed aga; nst the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should have the fullest possible access to all relevant\n\n(1) [19731 AC 388,\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 831\n\nmaterial (Rex v. Hardy (1794) 24 State Tr. 199, 808; Mai ks v. Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494; Conway v. Rimmer\n\n(1968) A.C. 910); but once the former public interest is held to outweigh the lattr. the evidence cannot in any circumstances be admitted.\"\n\nUltimately while taking a broad and practical view on the B question, Lord Salmon observed. thus :\n\n' \"In my view, any document or information that comes to the board from whatever source and by whatever means should be immune from discovery. It is only thus that the board ill obtain all the material it requires in order to carry out its task efficiently.\n\nUnless the immunity exists many persons, reputable or disreputable, would be discouraged from communicating all they know to the board.\n\nThey might well be in fear not only of libel actions or prosecutions for libel but also for their safety and may be their lives.\"\n\nTaking the facts of this case at their face value, I do not see how it can help the argument of Mr. Sorabjee on the question of disclosure of the d.ocuments.\n\nIn fact, this case also does not depart from the previous views taken by the House of Lords and the Privy Council regarding the importance of public interest or injury to public interest in respect of the documents sought to be disclosed. This case, however, takes a step forward by insisting that the principles enunciated in Conway's case would show that a just balance should be struck between, the ground on which the Union of India claims privilege and the claim of the petitioners for disclosure. Applying the ratio of this case to the facts of the present case, it would be seen that if the documents are not disclosed, the petitioners would not suffer serious prejudice because the undisputed facts show that the Chief Justice o( Delhi High Court had for reasons given by him opined that the term of Justice Kumar ought not be extended. The CJI, however, expressed a contrary view.\n\nIt was, therefore, fol' the President to choose any of the two views.\n\nThus, disclosure of details would have undoubtedly caused serious damage to public interest by exposing not only the petitioner-Kumar '\n\nbut also the CJ, Delhi High Court and the CJI to public gaze and criticism which would be highly derogatory to the high position that these high constitutional functionarfes hold and would in future deter them from expressing any opinion on the merit of future appointments which might result in an insoluble stalemate. Thus1\n\nc_ -\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA balancing the two fac; tors, there can be no doubt that the weight is on the side of the Union of India.\n\nStrong reliance was placed by Mt. Sorabjee in Sankey v.\n\nWhit/am & Ors.(1) where Stephen J. relying on Rogers' case (Supra) and other cases d\"'.elt on the doctrine of balancing process and B observed as follows :\n\n\"If in the balancing process the circumstances of a particular case can affect the relative weight to be given to each of the respective public interests when piaced in the scales, the outcome in the present case seems to me to be clear.\"\n\n\"The affidavits sworn by members of the present ministry and by senior public servants make it clear that all the claims to Crown privilege are class claims, not contents claim: it is not suggested that to disclose the.contents of any of the documents, the Loan Council documents apart, will of itself result in detriment to the public interest fl.owing directly from the nature of what is disclosed.\" ·\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nA perusal of the facts of this. case would show that in the said case the documents were really not of a secret nature so as to fall within the contours of the claim of privilege There was also a finding given by the court that the documents would not result in any detriment to public interest fl.owing directly from the nature of what is disclosed.\n\nContrary appears to be the case so far as the documents, which are the subject matter of disclosure, in the instant petitions are concerned.\n\nThese observations do not help the petitioners because they are based on a clear finding of fact that there was nothing remarkable about the documents in ordr to tilt the scale in favour of non-disclosure. It was also held that the affidavits did not clarify whether the claim of privilege was class-claim and not contents-claim.\n\nAs already indicated, the documents in this case pertain to high official secrets revealed in the documents of high constitutional functionaries regarding matters which if discloed would doubtless cause serious injury to the public and has in fact\n\n(1) 21 Australian L.R. 505.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pazal Ali, J.) 833\n\ncaused the most colossal damage not only to thi:i Government but A also to the judicial institution itself.\n\nIn Sankey' s case the following observations were made :\n\n\"An explanatory memorandum and schedule relating to a meeting of the Executive Council held on 7 January\n\n1975. It should be explained that when a matter is brought before a meeting of the Executive Council a minute paper is prepared; it sets out the advice tendered to His Excellency\n\nth~ Goyernor-General in Council and is signed by the minister concerned.\n\nEach minute is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum which usually sts out the reasons for the advice.\n\nAll minutes to be submitted to the Executive Council are listed on a schedule, which is signed by tl:io.se present at the meeting. If the Governor-General is not present at the meeting the minute and schedule are later sul:Jmitted to him for signature. The Commonwealth did n'ot claim privilege for the minute paper to which the explanatory memorandum and schedule now in question related.\"\n\nGibbs, ACJ upholding' the. claim of privilege observed as follows:\n\n\"Privilege was claimed for the documents in category I by the affidavit of Mr. Carmody, which stated that all members of the Executive Council are required to make on oath or affirmation of secrecy. The affidavit contained the following : \"The documents referred to .. relate to advice given and recommendations made to the Federal Executive Council and the deliberations and decisions of that Council as to the inner Workings of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.\n\nIn my opinion such documents belong to a class of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed.\n\nFurther, disclo-\n\n- sure of such documents would inhibit the proper functioning of the Executive Government ano non-disclosure of such documents is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service\".\n\nIn Murconi's Wireless Telegraph Co, Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commonwealth(1), Isaacs J. observed as follows :\n\n(I) 16 Commonwealth L.R. 178.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\n\"Now, when that \"State paper'', or, as here, a \"State wireless instrument\", is sought to be produced, and its official character is unquestioned, the plaintiffs' contention is, as I have already said, the court must still in some way and to some extent satisfy, itself by some further inquiry, that the object is within a privileged class, I suppose by reason of its being of a nature that may require concealment, because it can accept the minister's assurance as to public prejudice.\"\n\nIn this case. also, the Court merely h'eld that where an instrument is judged by th~ court to be of an official character the Minister's plea of public prejudice must be upheld.\n\nEven so, the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case.\n\nIn Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners,(1) Lord Cross of Chelsea while dwelling on the nature of confidentiality which is doubtless one of the aspects of privilege, observed as follows :\n\n\"Confidentiality\" is not a separate head of privilege, but it may be a very material consideration to bear in mind when privilege is claimed on the ground of public interest.\n\nWhat the court has to do is to weigh on the one hand the considerations which suggest that it is in the public interest that the document in question should be disclosed and on the other .hand those which suggest that it is in the public interest that they should not be disclosed and to balance once against the other.\"\n\nHere also it was held that while dealing with the question of confidentiality the most material consideration would be whether privilege was claimed on the ground of public interest and the duty . of the court is to balance the considerations of public interest against the injury which may be caused by disclosure and if it finds that the injury to public interest would be minimal, disclosure can be allowed. This case also does not in any way seem to be of any assistance to the petitioners.\n\nMr. Sorabjee strongly relied on the famous American case of\n\n(1) [1974] AC 40~.\n\n......\n\n'\" .\n\nl >.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 835\n\nUnited States Richard M. Nixon(1) and particularly on the following A observations made by the court :\n\n\"Neither the doctrine or separation uf powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under B all circumstances.\"\n\nThese observations must be read in the light of the peculiar provisions of the American Constitution contained in Articles II and III. The doctrine of absolute candour so as to prevail over the unqualified privilege of immunity from judicial process is absolutely foreign to the nature and character of the provisions enshrined in Art. 74(2) of our Constitution and ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, these observations cannot be called into aid by our courts in dealing with the question of privilege.\n\nI have already pointed out that this Court has clearly held that we ought not to be guided by American decisions because in framing our Constitution, we have chosen to select the English pattern even though the American Constitution was available and was in fact considered by the Founding Fathers of our Constitution.\n\nThus, the United States decision referred to above must be\n\nunderstood in the light of its own facts and the special provisions E of the American Constitutional law under which there is a complete separation of powers unlike our Constitution where to some extent there is separation of power but by and large all the powers of the appointment of the higher judiciary and their transfer vest in the executive, viz., the President of India. In these circumstances, therefore, the doctrine of 'candour' or 'confidentiality' propounded by the American Supreme Court cannot be blindly applied to the provisions of the Indian Constitution which has features of its own substantially different from those of the American Constitution as indicated while dealing with interpretation of Art. 222. The extreme limit to which the U.S. Supreme Court appears to i have gone is directly opposed to thescope of ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act as interpreted by this Court in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh' s case (Supra).\n\nThis Court in Shyamla/ Mohanla/'s case (supra) has clearly held that the plea of privilege cannot be determined on the principles\n\n(1) 41 L Ed 2nd 1309.\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R,\n\nenunciated by the American Judges which could not apply to our country.\n\nThis is particularly so, when the habits and tempers of our people, their outlook and vision, and their concepts and way of life are quite different froni the ways of life of the American people.\n\nIn Shynmlal Mohan/al v. State of Gujarat (supra) this Court B observed thus :\n\n\"In the United States of America where the immunity against self-inc; imination is constitutional, the Fifth Amendment provides :\n\n\"No person shall be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.\"\n\nBy judicial interpretation the rule has received a much wider application.\n\nThe privilege is held to apply to witnesses as well as parties in proceedings civil and criminal : it covers documentary evidence and oral evidence, and extends to all disclosures including answers which by themselves support a criminal conviction, or furnish a link in the chain of evidence, and to production of chattel sought by legal process.\n\nThe rule of protection against self-incrimination prevailing in the United Kingdom, or as interpreted by Courts in the United States of America has never been accepted in India.\n\nScattered through the main body of the statute law of India are provisions which establish beyond doubt that the rule has received no countenance in India. Section\n\n132 of the Evidence Act enacts in no uncertain terms that a witness shall not be excused from answering any questions as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate,_ such witness, or that it will expose, or tend\n\n0directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. This provision 5runs directly contrary to the protection against self-incrimination as understood in the common law in the United Kingdom.\"\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nOn a parity of reaoning it can be safely concluded that the statutory provisions of ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act as also\n\n. ,\n\n.. '\n\nS.P. GUPTA ~·. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 837\n\nthose of Art. 74(2) of the Constitution have fully safeguarded high Government and official secrets and disclosure is prohibited in public interest unless the Court is fully satisfied that disclosure will not harm the public interest. Thus, this Court has clearly pointed out that on this aspect of the matter, the rule of protection against selfincrimination as prevalent in the United lUngdom .or U.S.A. has never been accepted in India.\n\nThis is yet an additional reason why I am not in a position to rely on the American doctrine of candour or the recent decisions of the English courts referred to above.\n\nCross on Evidence (6th Edition) clearly states that documents may be withheld in public interest on account of their contents.\n\nIn this connection the author observes as follows :\n\n\"The judgment shows that the production of a document may be withheld in the public interest either on account of its contents, or else because it belongs to a class which, on ground of public policy, must as a class be withheld from production (e.g. cabinet minutes).\" (p. 307)\n\nWigmore on Evidence (Third Edition-vol. VIII) at page 801 summarises the conclusions regarding State secrets and official documents derived from American decisions on the question of privilege thus :\n\n\"The privilege, when recognised, should therefore be subjected to the following limitation :\n\n(I) Any executive or administrative regulation purporting in general terms to authorize refusal to disclose official\n\nrecords in a particular department when duly requested F as evidence in a court of justice should be deemed void.\n\n(2) Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed G in court of justice.\n\n(3) The procedure in such cases should be : A letter of request (like a letter rogatory) from the head of the Court to the head of the Department (accompanying the subpoena to the actual custodian), stating the circumstances of the litigation creating the need for\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe document followed (in case of refusal) by a reply from the 1 Departmental head stating the circumstances deemed to justify the refusal; and then a ruling by the Court, this ruling to be appealable and determinative of the privilege.\"\n\nThe view of the author, therefore, fully reflects the summary of the decisions given by the American Courts on the question of privilege. It may be noticed that clause 2 particularly recognises that where official records are declared to be confidential by a statute, the statute should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice. The principle contained in clause (2) of the aforesaid extracts is clearly enshrined in ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act without the exceptions which have been carved out by American decisions.\n\nOn the other hand, the position under the Evidence Act is that official or confidential records or documents cannot be disclosed unless the court comes to the conclusion that the disclosure will not cause any injury to public interest.\n\nThe American doctrine of candour, as already stated, cannot be applied to the conditions in India in view of our own statute laws containing expre.ss provisions contrary to the principles enunciated by the American courts.\n\nDavid Foulkes in his book 'Introduction to Adminimative law' has observed thus :\n\n\"It laid it down that Crown privilege Ca'> be claimed for a document on two alternative grounds : (a) that the disclosure of the contents of a particular document would injure the public interest, for example, by endangering national security or prejudicing good diplomatic relations;\n\n(b) that the document falls within a class which must be withheld from production to ensure the proper functioning of the public service.\" (p. 228)\n\nIt appears that whereas the English, Australian and our own courts have consistently and without any exception categorically held that military or defence secrets are absolutely privileged and the contents of the document containing these secrets can never be divulged under any circumstances, the American courts seem to have taken a contrary view and while leaning on the side of non-disclosure even in the case of military secrets they have not excluded the possibility of allowin.1c: disclosure under certain circumstances. This is\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 839\n\nclearly spelt out by the decision of U.S. Supreme Court in United States of America v. Patricia J. Reynolds. (1) The American courts do not seem to follow the threefold tests laid down by our courts as also the English courts in judging the plea of privilege, viz.,\n\n(I) documents containing military or defence secrets,\n\n(2) the direct conflict between public interest and individual interest, and\n\n(3) the doctrine of expediency regarding affairs of the State and injury to public interest or national interest.\n\nIn fact, the correct legal position seems to be that whereas mere expediency may not be a ground to claim privilege so as to avoid production of a document which, if produced, may defeat the defence, where the documents consist of highly confidential matters in respect of constitutional functionaries like Chief Justices or High Court Judges, the Law Minister, the President of India, C.B.I, I.B. and such other Departments 'are concerned, the question of public injury, which may be caused, becomes a decisive factor in upholding the plea of privilege.\n\nThe court is, however, not powerless to hold its own enquiry in order to test the bona fide of the plea at privilege.\n\nOne form of such an enquiry may be, as pointed out in the cases referred to above, the inspection of the documents themselves by the court before disclosure.\n\nIf after inspection the court finds that the plea of privilege is well-grounded and its disclosure will lead to great public injury, it will be justified in upholding the plea of privilege.\n\nIt is true that recent English decisions have made a slight departure from the consistent and some what conservative view\n\ntake11 by them in the earlier cases, but despite this change, the central\n\nF , theme and the contours and parameters within which the plea of privilege can be allowed have not been totally discarded.\n\nAs far back as 1916 the Court of Appeal in England while dealing with the question of privilege clearly held that the protection of documents from discovery was not only based on the broad principles of State policy of public convenience but extended to public confidential documents of a political or administrative character. In this connection in Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anzlo- Persian Oil Co. Ltd. (') Lord Swinfen Eady observed as follows :\n\n(I] 345 us!.\n\n(2) [1916] l KB 822, 829.\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n\"Although the instances in which documents have been held to be protected from discovery on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience have usually been cases of public official documents of political or administrative character, yet the rule is not limited to these documents.\n\nThe foundation of the rule is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest, and not that the documents are confidential or official, which alone is no reason for their non-production.\"\n\nIn taking this view the court had relied on an earlier decision in Hennessy v. Wright.(1)\n\nIn the Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. The Central Land Board(2) Lord Radcliffe observed thus :\n\n\"I do not understand that the existence of the power involves that in Scotland, any more than in England, it is open to the Court dispute with the Minister whether his view that production would be contrary to the public interest is well founded, or to arrive at a view, contradictory of his, that production would not in fact be at all injurious to that interest.\"\n\n\"The power reserved to the Court is therefore a power to order production even though the public interest is to some extent affected prejudicially.\"\n\nThis decision clearly spells out the proposition that though normally the claim of privilege made by the Minister should be accepted by the Court but at the same time some aspects of public interest may be considered where withholding disclosure or a document may defeat the very claim of the plain tiff.\n\nLord Radcliffe has, however, made it very clear that documents containing matters of high politics, diplomatic relations or such secrets would undoubtedly be privileged. Thus, so far as this case is concerned it fully supports the position taken by the Union or India in claiming the plea of privilege in respect of the documents concerned.\n\n(1) 21 QBD 509.\n\n(2) 1956 Sessions Cases 1/18.\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 841\n\nIn D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cru?fty to Children(1) it was held that the administration of justice was a fundamental public interest though not an exclush1e public interest.\n\nAthough the facts of this case are quite different from the facts of the present case, yet the case cited above undoubtedly recognised administration of justice as a fundamental public interest. Once this B is so, then by the force of s. 123 of the Act, disclosure cannot be permitted and the Government would be entitled to take the plea of privilege.\n\nIn none of these cases, the documents in respect of which privilege was claimed related to top secrets of high officers involving C Government decisions on important policy matters relating to higher judiciary as in the present case.\n\nIn these circumstances, these cases are not of much assistance to the petitioners.\n\nIn Science Research Council v. Nasse(2) a complaint was filed with the Industrial Tribunal alleging discrimiaation on grounds of sex and marital status.\n\nAt the hearing a prayer was made for the petitioners for inspection and discovery of certain documents which were in the nature of confidential assessments of each employee.\n\nThe Tribunal ordered the disclosure and the Appellate Tribunal also confirmed it.\n\nOn appeal to the court of Appeal, a fresh affidavit was filed showing the nature of the confidentiality of the documents.\n\nThe appellate court held that if the documents were disclosed it would amount to breach of faith and could lead to industrial trouble thus causing injury to public interest. The appellate court, however, set aside the order allowing the plea of privilege and held that the documents were not entitled to privilege. The decision of the appellate court was confirmed by the House of Lords in appeal where it was held that no principle of public interest immunity protected such confidential documents and they were not immune from disclosure on the basis of confidentiality alone Great reliance has been placed by the petitioners on this aspect of the matter decided by the House of Lords.\n\nIt is true that the plea of privilege on the ground of confidentiality was overruled but the decision given by the House of Lords cannot be divorced from the facts before them. What was sought to be disclosed were merely confidential reports of the employees concerned. No great constitutional or legal importance was attached to the documents as such or for that matter the docu-\n\n{I) [1977] l All, E.R. 589.\n\n(2) [1980] AC 1028.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS f 1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nA ments as we have in the instant case.\n\nIn this connection, Lord Edmund-Davies observed as follows :\n\n\"Whether a tribunal or court should decide that they themselves should inspect must always depend on the particular facts and issues, though it is difficult to see how they can ever properly conclude that discovery is \"necessary\" without such inspection.\n\nBut where a court inspection is decided upon, there can be no hard-and-fast\n\nrule as to when it should take place.\n\nThe Court of Appeal rightly held that discovery should not have been ordered in either of these two cases without the respective industrial tribunals or the appellate courts first inspecting the withheld documents. That unfortuntely not having been done, it follows that both appeals should be dismissed.\"\n\nLord Fraser spoke in the same strain and held that confidentiality was not a separate head of privilege but may be a very material consideration to bear in mind when the question of privilege is raised.\n\nThus, what the House of Lords held was that the element of confidentiality in the {documents was not so acute or sensitive as to create any public interest. On the other hand, public interest itself in the circumstances required disclosure. This case, therefore is of no assistance to the petitioners because the facts of the present case are essentially different from the facts of the case.\n\nIn the instant case, after inspection of the documents it cannot be said that only private interests were involved and that there was no injury to public interest. The disclosure of the confidential notes and correspondence between three very high constitutional functionaries, viz, en, Law Minister and the CJ, Delhi High Court containing matters on which no public debate could be allowed were undoubtedly matters of great public interest.\n\nOn the other hand, the interest of Justice Kumar was a purely individual interest which must yield to public interest. On the face, therefore, of the ratio of this case, the plea of privilege would have to be upheld straightaway.\n\nJn Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England(1) the following observations were made by Lord Wilberforce :\n\n(l) [1980] A.C. 1090.\n\n• <!'\n\n• <I\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pazal Ali, J.) 843\n\n\"It is, in my opinion, necessary for the proper functioning of the public service that the documents in Category A and Category B should be withheld from production, Theyare all documents falling within the class of documents relating to the formulation of Government policy. Such policy was decided at a very high level, involving as it did matters of major economic importance to the United Kingdom. The documents in question cannot properly be described as routine documents. Those in Category A are all documents passing at a very high level, including communications intended for the guidance and recording the views of the Prime Minister or recording discussions at a very high level.\n\nThe basis for an immunity claim, then, having been laid, it is next necessary to consider whether there is any other element of public interest telling in favour of produc tion. The interest of the proper and fair administration of justice falls under this description.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to state that the mere fact that the documents are or may be 'relevant' to the issues, within the extended meaning of relevance in relation to discovery, is not material. The question of privilege or immunity only arises in relation to 'relevant' documents and itself depends on other considerations viz, whether production of these documents (admittedly relevant) is necessary for the due administration of justice.\"\n\nIt may well be arguable whether, when one is faced with a claim for immunity from production on 'public interest' grounds, and when the relevant public interest is shown to be of a high, or the highest, level of importance, that fact is of itself conclusive, and nothing which relates to the interest in the administration of justice can prevail against it.\n\nA claim for public interest immunity having been made, on manifestly solid grounds, it is necessary for those who seek to overcome it to demonstrate the existence of a counteracting interest calling for disclosure of particular documents.\n\nWhen this is demonstrated, but only then, may the court proceed to a balancing process.\"\n\n, .•.\n\n' SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nIt was thus held. that the documents should be produced for in spection by the House of Lords. As the said case was not one where without inspection of documents it was possible to decide whether the balance of interest lay for or against disclosure, after inspecting the documents tlie majority of the Lords arrived at a finding of fact that none of the documents contained such confidential matters as could form the basis of' a plea pf privilege.\n\nLord Wilberforce, however, dissented and held that the Minister's certificate would amount to public intere.st immunity, and the documents could not be inspected.\n\nThis case also has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case because this Court after hearing the arguments of the parties on the issue of privilege by an interim order held that the court was entitled 'to inspect the documents and after inspecting the documents I am clearly of the view that having regard to the matter, the heavy stakes involved, the disclosure would amount to denigration of not only the judiciary but also the other constitutional functionaries who have figured in the case, resulting in the gravest possible injury to public interest and to the running of public services.\n\nIn the aforesaid case, Lord Edmund Davies classed the docu- E ments into three categories, which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Category A\n\nThese consist of communications between, to and from ministers (including ministers' personal secretaries acting on behalf of ministers) and minutes and briefs for ministers and memoranda of meetings attended by ministers.\n\nAll such documents relate to the formulation of the policy of the government ..... \" The minister thereafter sets out various aspects of government policy in relation to the financial difficulties of Burmah.\n\nG Category B\n\nThese consist of communications between, to and from senior officials of the Department of Energy, of the Treasury, and of the bank including memoranda of meetings H . of and discussions between such officials and drafts prepared by such officials (including drafts of minutes and . briefs comprised in category A), all such communications\n\n' -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal .(l.li; J.),\n\n' . . ..\n\nI - 845\n\nand drafts relating to the formulation of one or more\n\naspects, of the policy described iri category f\".·\"\n\nCategory' C\n\nThese consist of memoranda of telephone, Co!lversations and meetings between senior representatfves of major companies and other businessmen on the one .. hand and a minister or senior officials of government departments and of the bank on the other and memor\"nda of meetings of such o'fflcials ai; id briefs for ministers and drafts of such briefs, all recording or otherwise _referring to commercial or financial inform-ation communicat, ed in confidence by Such' company representatives and businessmen.\" ,,\n\nAfter mentioning the categories, Lord Davies observed as follows:-\n\n\"There can be no doubt that the 'court has power to inspect the documents privately.\n\nThis much clearly laid down in Conway v.\n\nRimmer (1) I qo not consider th.at existence of such power, in cases reponsibly regarded by the court as doubtful, can be treated as itself detrimental to the public interest.\n\nIndeed, I, am of opinion that it is cal'culated to promote the public interest, by adding to public confidence in the administration of justice.\" ·\n\nIt is true that ihe majority opinion was that the plea of privilege should be 'overruled. but although the categories, mentioned above, consisted of confidential documents they all related to purely commercial transactions and did not contain any' constitutional colour or any lemen, t of affairs of the State. The same cann-ot be said so far as the documents in the instant case are concerned. These documents are not only of great public importance but are directly concerned with the affairs of the State in that the Council of Ministers while giving advice to the President for not'extending the term of Justice Kumar had expressly relied on these documents though it has not been shown to our satisfaction that these documents form part of the Memo. of Advice tendered to the President.\n\nIn such a case, the documents would have been beyond any enquiry under Art. 74 (2), apart from the question of the application of ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.\n\n(I) [1968J A.C. 910.\n\nH ..\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nAnother case relied upon by the petitioners was Neilson v.\n\nLaugharne(1) Lord Denning approached the question with his usual ingenuity and observed as follows :\n\n\"This modern development shows that, on a question of discovery, the court can consider the competing public interests involved. The case is decided by the court holding the balance between the two sides. One of them is asserting that, in the interest of_ justice, the documents should be disclosed. The other is asserting that, in the public interest, they should not be disclosed.\n\nConfidentiality is often to be considered.\n\nSo is the need for candour and frankness.\n\nOnce it is decided that the public interest is in favour of non-disclosure, the decision is regarded as a precedent for later situations of the same kind.\"\n\nLord Denning ultimately held that in his opm10n the documents were privileged. It may be noted that the documents in respect of which privilege was sought were merely .statements before the police.\n\nThus, even though the documents were doubtless confidential, a possible view could be taken that the plea of privilege should not be allowed.\n\nIn spite of these facts, the majority of the Law Lords agreed with Lord Denning and held that there was a real danger to public interest if disclosure was made. In this connection Lord Oliver observed thus :\n\n\"Taking all these considerations into account, I think that there is a very real danger that the prospect of disclosure on discovery of material gathered in the course of such an inquiry will inhibit the proper conduct of the inquiry and thus frustrate the purpose of the legislature in making statutory provision for it.\n\nIn my ijudgment, therefore, the public interest requires that these documents should be protected as a class, and I accordingly concur in the conclusion of Lord Denning M.R. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.\"\n\nThus, although this case makes a slight departure from the view taken by the earlier cases it has not favoured the : extreme\n\n(I) [1981] l All ER 829.\n\n. -\n\n. .\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 847\n\nposition which seems to have be!ln taken by the petitioners op the plea of privilege and which has been clearly negatived by the decisions of our own court.\n\nReliance was also placed by Mr. Sorabjee on a book 'Public Law ( 1980)' by I.G. Eagles where at page 275 the author makes the following observations regarding Cabinet papers :\n\n\"If the reason for excluding cabinet or related documents is to safeguard the proper functioning of the higher organs of the state, then that reason is wholly inappropriate where what is charged is the grossly improper functioning of these very org ms.\n\nThe interest of the wider community in getting to the bottom of such charges is so great that it should not be impeded by a mere rule of evidence.\n\nNor can the decision to admit or exclude be safely left to those who are themselves charged with misconduct; (nor for that matter can it be left to their political associates or even their opponents).\"\n\nWith due respect to the learned author, the principles have been rather broadly stated and do not fit in either with the democratic set-up of our country or with the spirit of our Constitution.\n\nFor instance, Cabinet decisions, however wrong or proper they may be, are, undoubtedly secret documents and if any such document forms part of the advice tendered to the President then there is a clear constitutional mandate by virtue of Art. 74(2) preventing the court from embarking on any inquiry into these documents. Thus, the question of disclosure cannot arise in such cases and the observations of the author become wholly inapplicable to the situations contemplated by our Constitution and the statutory laws. In these circumstances, therefore, I cannot accept the view of the author, extracted above.\n\nIt would thus be seen that even from E1glish decision>, it is\n\nclear that the court itself should prevent disclosure of documents G whose production will be contrary to public interest even if no claim is made by a Minister or other high official on his behalf. This was held, as we have pointed out, in Swkey's case (supra) as also in Conway's case (supra) where Lord Reid has clearly 1stated that it is the duty of the court to prevent disclosure of documents even H without the intervention of a Minister, where serious injuries to the national interest is apparent. Thus both the leading cases of Eagland\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nand Australia have not accepted the liberal doctrine of candour expounded by the American authors. In the instant case, it is 1 manifest that the Union oflndia bas not taken the plea of privilege merely to hide the truth or to prevent the court frorr knowing the truth. In fact, both the Attorney-General andthe Solicitor-General had frankly conceded and voluntarily produced the documents before the court for inspection in order to judge whether the disclosure of documents would injure the public interest. This shows the bona fide of the stand taken by the Union of India. As, however, my Brother ' ' Judges after inspection decided to disclose the documents.. the Union of India gracefully accepted the decision.\n\nI might mention that this is not one of those cases where a litigant is trying to conceal a document which may destroy his case.or scuttle his defence .. This seems to be the cardinal principle behind the doctrine of Candour adumbrated by the American decisions.\n\nI have summarised the opinions of the English, American and Australian courts on the question of privilege.\n\nWhile applying the law to Indian conditions which are essentially different from those prevailing in England, America or Australia, two important factors - have to be borne in mind-\n\n(I) that so far as our country, is concerned we have chosen to base it on the British pattern with some additions, alterations or innovations to suit our. own local, social and economic conditions because our ways of living and thinking, our attitude towards life and its various phases and above all, the mode of governance of the country are very different from and have nothing in common with the United States of America. Whereas in America there is mass education, illiteracy is the common feature of the masses of our country. We are no doubt making fast progess but it will require quite sometime before we become as advanced as the United States of America.\n\nEven though the recently decided English cases may have taken a much broader and a more liberal view, the founding fathers of our Constitution had before them the old view and this Court has consistently followed the English decisions so far as the question of privilege is concerned.\n\n,._.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\n (2) Whileneither in England, Australia nor America there is any codified law laying down the principles and the grouuds on which privilege can be claimed, in India we have ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act which govern the conditions under which a plea of privilege can be allowed or disallowed.\n\nAnother law which affects the question of privilege is s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which has also to be read in conjunction with ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.\n\nApart from these two sections there is also a constitutional provision which is enshrined in Art. 74(2) under which no enquiry can be made by any Court in respect of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the.President. .In the instant case, the order impugned has been passed by the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nAlthough it has been alleged in the note of arguments that the contents of the documents were part of the material on the basis of which advice was given to the President, it has not been shown to our satisfaction that the correspondence contained in the documents formed part of the actual Memo. of advice sent to the President. If such evidence was produced before us then the matter wou!d have been put beyond controversy because apart from the question of privilege arising. under SS. 123 and 124 of the EvidenceAct, the enquiry or disclosure would be barred by the constitutional mandate contained in Art. 74(2).\n\nIn view of these drcumstances, therefore, before importing the\n\ndoctrines or the liberal trend of modern cases across the seven seas, F we cannot overlook the, mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act and the Gode of Criminal Procedure. Furt)lermore, while in England and America the.democratic syst.em of Government has been existing for more than two or thre centuries, our democracy is only three decades old, which is a very small period In the life of a nation and we hve yet to develop: our '1aw by a process of adaptation and G accommodation,· rejection ot mbdification or by a trial-and-error method. This Court while construing ss. 123 and 124 of tl}e Evidence Act was fully alive to the conditions prevailing in our country and the manner in which the public services were run and the Central Government or the State Governments took important decisions.\n\nH Any revolutionary decisions so as to expose high confidential matters to public gaze by following a policy of liberal disclosure of docu ·\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R,\n\nments ignoring the provisions of ss. 123 and 124 of the Act would not only be detrimental to our progress but may cause serious obstruction in the practical running of day-to-day affairs of the Government or for that matter the governance of the country itself.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, while I have referred to the foreign decisions I would like to confine my decisions mainly to those English cases which apply to our present day conditions and to the principles laid down by our own courts in their leading judgments which have been discussed and analysed in this judgment.\n\nWhile I am prepared to take a liberal view having regard to the fact that we have by our recent decisions widened the horizon of Art. 21 so far as the inspection of the documents by the court is concerned, but if after inspection of the documents the Court is satisfied that the tests laid down by this Court in several cases are not fulfilled then the plea of privilege must be upheld.\n\nThus, after a full and complete analysis of the various factors indicated above, it is establishec beyond doubt that so far as this Court is concerned it bas chosen to follow the principle of English law with suitable adjustments and modifications in determining the plea of privilege under ss. 123 and 124 of the Act. This is, as it should be, because as pointed by Kapoor J. in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) that since the Evidence Act was enacted during the British rule and we have generally adopted the English system in procedural matters, we should not depar(from the basic and essential principles of of interpretation as laid down by the English law. I, however, respectfully agree with Subba Rao, J. that while construing ss. 123 and 124 and applying the principles of English law, we must do so against the background of the Socialist State and the egalitarian society which is the goal of our Constitution instead of confining the contours of privilege in a strait-jacket; in suitable cases a liberal view can bf' taken by this Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act. I might mention that so far no case has ever held that ss. l 23 and l 24 are unconstitutional and this could not be so because these p1ovisions deal with matters relating to great public interest.\n\nEven in _the course of arguments before us it has not been suggested that these sections are violative of any of the Articles of the Constitution. Mr. Garg appearing in Tarkunde's case had hinted that the aforesaid sections should beinterpreted in the light of Art. 21 but he has not categorically contended that the\n\n. --~\n\n)..- .\n\n.....\n\n)I .\n\n~, P, GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J,, 851\n\naforesaid sections are violative of any of the provisions of the A Constitution.\n\nAnother important circumstance that has .to be taken into consideration is that even after more than three decades of our independence, the Parliament despite so many socio-economic changes all over the world has not thought it advisable or necessary to amend the provisions of the Evidence Act so as to liberalise or widen the scope or the policy of privilege contained in ss. 123 and 124 of the Act by incorporating the principles laid down in the recent English or American cases. This intrinsic circumstance demonstrably proves that the view taken by the Supreme Court over the years is correct and does not call for any amendment of the Evidence Act by the Parliament.\n\nOn a parity of reasoning, the irresistible conclusion that follows and the natural presumption that arises is that our legislature did not intend to make a departure from the earlier English decisions either by incorporating or adapting the principles of American law on the subject. I might even go to the extent of saying that it will not be unreasonable to presume that the Founding Fathers of the Constitution and the Parliament thereafter having been fully aware of the view taken by the American courts fo. recent decisions has affirmatively chosen. to raject the liberal and somewhat dangerous doctrine of candour. For instance, as discussed above one of the American case11 has gone to the extent of holding that even military secrets can be disclosed in suitable cases.\n\nOur courts have clearly .held that so far as Defence secrets or good neighbourly relations with Nher countries are concerned, there is complete bar to the disclosure of these matters or documents relating to these matters which are clearly covered by s. I 23 or. s. I 24 of the Act.\n\nThere is another fact of life which, however unpleasant, cannot be denied and this is that precious little are our masses or litigants concerned with which Judge is appointed or not appointed or which one is continued or not continued. The high sounding concept of independence of judiciary or primacy of one or the other of the Constitutional functionaries or the mode of effective consultation are matters of academic interest in which our masses are least interested. On the other hand, they are mainly concerned with dangerous . forces at work and evils reflected in economic pressures, inflationary, tendencies, gruelling poverty, emancipation of women, maintenance of law and order, food and clothing, breacl ~.ns\\ butter, and abQve an. the serious problem of unemployment •.\n\n852 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c, R,\n\nIt is only a sizeable section of the intellectuals consisting of the press and the lawyers who haye made a prestigious issue of the the independence of judiciary. I can fully understand that lawyers or other persons directly connected with the administration of'justice may have a grievance however ill-founded that improper selection of Judges or interference with the appointment of Judges strictly according to constitutional provisions may mar the institution of judiciary and therefore they may to some extent be justified in vindicating their rights.\n\nBut at the same time, however biting or bitter, distasteful and diabolical it may seem to be, the fact remains that the masses in general are not at all concerned with these legal niceties\n\nand so far as administration of justice is concerned they merely want that their cases should be decided quickly by Judges who generate confidence.\n\nThey are least concerned with individual Judges or the mode or manner of their appointment. Carried by the stormy and emotional debate of the lawyers appearing for the petitioners and their egoistic slogan that independence of judiciary was in danger, this Court ought not to have broken the ageold solid and sacrosanct tradition of upholding the plea of privilege which caused serious injury to the public interest.\n\nBut lo and behold ! the result of the disclosure has revealed widespread dangers and ills, for anybody in the street .without appreciating the niceties of law looks upon the judiciary as suspect. Did we disclose the documents to produce such disastrous results ? It is difficult to construct an edifice but very easy to demolish the same.\n\nBut, alas ! we have demolished it and caused irreparable damage. for which our future generation will never forgive us.\n\nWhether I was right in upholding thr plea of privilege, or my Brothers in ordering disclosure of documents, only time will tell.\n\nComing to the practical side of the dangerous consequences of disclosure which might highlight my view that after inspecting the documents, it was not in public interest to order disclosure of the contents of the documents, the following considerations have swayed with me : ..\n\n(a) appointment of High Court judges are highly confidential matters containing frank and free legal views ex. pressed by the CJ of the High Court, CJI and the Central Government represented by the Law Minister and the Council of Ministers. These authorities have expressed their views in the secret correspondence on\n\nhe distinct 1lsur11ni;:~ !Ind belief .that for the last two\n\n;..- .\n\n.S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 853\n\ncenturies such documents have always been treated as secret, confidential and privileged and until today no disclosure of such documents has ever been allowed by any court. Thus, in my . opinion, any disclosure of the contents of the documents. would be extremely derogatory to the High constitutional position that these Constitutional functionaries enjoy and would in the long run prove counter-productive and destroy the sacrosanct consultative, process as envisaged by the Constitution.\n\n(b) If disclosure is allowed, it will bring into disrepute the judicial institution itself and lead to a continual pro- , cess of washing of dirty linen and perpetual mudsling- . ing by allowing the so called wronged persons to make allegations and counter-allegations against the Government and the CJ concerned as was sought to be done in this very case. It is true that even after the contents of the documents are disclosed, the petitioners cannot be allowed to travel beyond the material disclosed by the documents but even that material could be exploited and affect the secrecy of such high constitutional officers and raise a controversy which will ultimately lead to opebing a pandora's box which is neither in the interest of the judiciary nor even of the lawyers.\n\nI fail to see how in the long run the disclosure benefits the Judge.\n\nIn the ultimate analysis such a course of action apart from involving the CJI and CJ, Delhi High Court and Law Minister into serious controversy would destroy the reputation of the judge himself howsoever loudly he might proclaim his innocence.\n\nTaking the case of the petitioner-Kumar at the highest and assuming that the petitioner is reinstated and he ultimately gets the satisfaction of his right having bee.n vindicated, can he deny that in view of the serious differences of opinion between the .CJ, Delhi High Court under whom he had worked and the CJI, a sizeable section of the people might still believe that the integrity of the Judge was not beyond doubt which may have prompted the CJ under whom he worked not to recommend his case for extension. Even if this im pression is carried by a small section of the people, it will be a great slur on. ti:\\<; functioning of the Judge.\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nMy personal conception of a Judge is that he should be above all criticism and controversy; be should be blameless and spotless, full of virtues and free from vices like a 'diamond in the sky', like Caesor's wife above reproach. It is in my opinion better not to be a Judge at all than to be a controversial Judge.\n\n(c) It is not that for the first time that the term of an Additionnl Judge has not been extended or a Judge has been dropped. The various schedules given by the respondents show quite a few instances where Add!.\n\nJudges were sent back after their period was over without any protest or objection. '\n\n(d) Indeed, if a really conscientious judge would have been in the position of petitioner-Kumar he would. have silently walked out of the show in the larger interests of the great and sacrosanct institution which he was serving instead of insisting on disclosure and thereby drawing himself into a serious controversy to vindicate his supposed right.\n\nI have already pointed out that it is not for the first time that the term of an Additional JU<; lge has not been extended : in the past also Judges have been dropped and one of the schedules • given by the Solicitor-General is full of such instnces.\n\nSuch Judges never raised any controversy regarding their not being reappointed and got reconciled themselves without any protest or objection perhaps in due deference to the maintenance of the purity of the great institution of justice.\n\nI cannot help commending the conduct of Justice Ismail who actually resigned and chose to quit his office instead of pursuing the matter further in the larger interest of the purity of administration of justice.\n\nThe life of a judge is th it of a hermit and he must inculcate a spirit of self-sacrifice and should take his profession in this holy spirit.\n\n(e) The subsequent events following the disclosure of the documents which have been fully published by the press and other media clearly show that there has been a serious charactr assasination of a high constitu-\n\n..._.\n\nt .\n\nS.1>. GUPTA v. UNION. (Fazal Ali, J.) 8$$\n\ntional functionary for merely expressing his opinion in a very frank and honest manner and that too behind bis back.\n\nThe contents of confidential notes and letters have been exploited for their personal ends by interested parties. Thus, the apprehension and danger which I had predicted from disclosure has come to be true and henceforward there would be hardly any Head of a Department who can function properly of effectively with the sword of Democles banging over his head.\n\nNo high authority would now venture to record adverse annual confidential reports on the conduct of his subordinates or express bis honest opinion howsoever unsatisfactory the conduct of subordinate may be.\n\nThere is yet another distressing feature 'of the disclosure of documents. It would appear that the CJ, Delhi High Curt was castigated as being dishonest and prejudiced against Justice Kumar for having refused to recommend his extension or reappointment.\n\nThe same is being openly said in the Press regarding the CJI in respect of his adverse comments on Mufti Bahauddin, Acting Chief Justice_ of J & K High Court.\n\nWhile CJ, Delhi has given cogent reasons for not recqmmending the reappointment of Justice Kumar in his proposal to the Law Minister (a copy of which was sent to CJI) which was followed by a full and frank discussion . between CJ, oelhi and CJI, there is nothing to show that the materials or the data on which the CJI formed his opinion against Justice Mufti Bahauddin and as he says in his proposal found some substance in the complaints yet all this was done when Justice Bahauddin was neither a party to the present proceedings, nor was he ever heard in his defence and yet he has b.een publicly condemned thanks to the disclosure.\n\nHowever, in the instant case, we are not at' all concerned with the case of Justice Mufti Bahauddin but I have given this instance to show that if disclosure of confidential doucuments are liberally allowed by throwing public interest to the winds., what dangerous consequences can follow which may injure innocent constitutional functionaries. In the case of Justice Kumar, CJ, Delhi High Court and CJI have not revealed the source of their infor-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I ~82) 2 s.c.R..\n\nmation and in my opinion rightly because anyone who gave them the information must have done so in confidence and according to the correspondence, it, appears that senior colleagues of the CJ, Delhi High Court and eminent lawyers had supplied the information to him and similar authorities had given some counter information to the en.\n\nThus, such an awkward and embarr; ssing situation is bond to develop if disclosures are liberally made as a result of which serious injury is caused to public interest. The most unfortunate part of the disclosure in this case is that persons who are not before the court have been involved in serious I: gal and political controversy which has, in my opinion, caused seious damage to the high judicial institutions of the country, posing a very serious problem to the Central Government a.nd the public services.\n\nThe Solicitor-General made a feeble attempt to argue before me that since I have dissented from the majority view and upheld the plea of privilege I should not deal with the contents of the documents in my judgment.\n\nThis argument, which appears to me to be somewhat extraordinary, cannot be accepted because the decision of the majority amounts to .the law laid down for the whole country under Art. 141 of the Constitution and is as such binding on me as on others.\n\nAs a result of the mafority decision, the documents disclosed form part of the record and. if I shut my eyes to these documents merely because I have dissented frqm the majority view, it would perilously amount to being subversive of judicial discipline.\n\nI have, however, carefully waded through the documents and I do notthink that much can be made of the contents and recitals in the documents.\n\nThese are my reasons for upholding the plea of privilege taken by the Union in the cases of Mr. Kumar and Mr.\n\nKBN Singh.\n\nA careful perusal of the letters written by the CJ, Delhi High Court to the Government as also to the CJI would reveal that the stand taken by CJ, Delhi has been consistent throughout.\n\nHe has honestly and frankly taken the stand that in his view as the reputation of Justice Kumar was not above board and his performance was rather slow, he was not prepared to recommend his reappoint- ·\n\nment after the expiry of his term.\n\nHe has diselused in his letter the grounds for coming to this conclusion which were derived partly\n\nJ.· .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Aii, J.) s57\n\nfrom knowledge which be got from senior lawyers or senior colleagues and partly from certain facts.\n\nAfter sending the letter he had a full discussion with the CJI on all the points which are contained in the first letter which the CJ, Delhi wrote to the Law Minister.\n\nThe CJI, however, took the stand that on his inquiry made from the lawyers and Judges of the High Court, he had no reason to doubt the .integrity or honesty of Justice Kumar. It is also admitted that the CJ, Delhi had no animus against Justice Kumar and there was no reason why he should have expressed his opinion refusing to recommend his reappointment, without any sufficient reasons or due to enmity. The only argument advanced against the CJ, Delhi was that he had sent a letter to the Law Minister in which he had disclosed some data and details, and had requested him to keep them secret, and had also prayed that the letter may not be shown to anybody else as \"it was meant for him.· The argument was that there is no evidence to show that the materials disclosed to the Law Minister were shown to the CJI.\n\nIt is, however, not disputed that the CJ, Delhi wrote such a letter to the Law Minister after his discussion with the CJI and the possibility that he may have discussed all matters including the materials put in writing to the Law Minister with the CJI cannot be excluded.\n\nAt any rate, without going into further details as several constitutional functionaries were involved, two facts emerge :-\n\n(I) that CJ, Delhi who had undoubtedly a better chance of observing the performance and the functioning of Justice Kumar,· was in a position to get first-hand knowledge of his reputation, has honestly believed that Kumar's reputation of integrity was doubtful. He has not revealed the sources from which he came to know about the reputation of Justice Kumar.\n\nThe CJI, however, took a contrary view but he has also not disclosed the names of the lawyers or Judges who had . given him a contrary version.\n\nIn my opinion both of them did not disclose the names because the Judges or the lawyers concerned must have given the information in confidence and they would have been seriously einbarrassed if their names were disclosed: ·\n\n(2) These views were put before the Central Government and it was open to the President to accept one view or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe other.\n\nThe President chose to 11ccept the view taken by the CJ, Delhi more particularly because he WaS in a position tO have first-hand information both I regarding the reputation and working of the Additional Judge.\n\nIn these circumstances, it cannot be said that the action of the President was tainted by malice or that there was no effective consultation. This aspect of the matter has be en elaborately dealt with by my Brothers Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ with whom I am in general agreement.\n\nC I might just state that even if the documents were not disclosed,\n\nthe conclusion would have been the same because in the affidavits it was not disputed that the two CJs had taken a contrary viw regarding the doubtful reputation of Justice Kumar, nor was it &uggested that CJ, Delhi had any ill-will or animus against Kumar.\n\nThe disclosure of the documents, however, unfortunately resulted in grave and serious consequences of far-reaching effect on the future of not only the judicial institutions but also almost all the Government departments.\n\nWhile agreeing with Brothers Bh.agwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. regarding the interpretation of Art. 224, Iwould, however, express my short opinion on the subject.. Although it is true that by fixing the strength of permanent and Additional Judges of each High Court, the Central Government appears to have created two parallel lines of recruitment so that the appointment of an Additional Judge was a sort of training ground for being appointed as a Permanent Judge whenever a permanent vacancy arose; It has already been pointed out by Brother Venkataramiah J. that this procedure was against the very spirit and tenor of Art. 224 which is extracted thus :-\n\n\"224.\n\nAppointment of additional and acting Judges.\n\n(I) If by reason of any temporary increase in. the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the Pretident that the number of the judges of that Court 5hould be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\n\n--.\n\nJo- •\n\n,..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 859\n\n(2) When any Judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is by reason of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, the President may appoint a duly qualified person to act as a Judge of that Court until the permanent judge has resumed his duties.\n\n(3) No person appointed as an additional or acting Judge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty-two years.\"\n\nIf properly read, this Article envisages certain conditions C precedent before an appointment under_ Art. 224 can be made and also prescribes the nature and the term of the judge appointed. In• the first place, it requires that an Additional Judge can be appointed _only if-\n\n(I) there is any tern porary increase in the business or' a High Court, for instance, where by virtue of some new temporary law passed, a spate of litigation crops up but that ends with duration of the Act or with the completion ol the temporary reforms, etc.I contemplated by the statute. Such an appointment is a kind of an emergency appointment which is to last until the temporary increase or arrears are disposed of;\n\n(2) where by reasons of heavy ar\"rears of work it becomes necessary to appoint an Additional Judge, the appointment is made under Art. 224.\n\nThe Article, therefore, contemplates only a tenure appointment to meet a particular contingency and is not meant to be permanent feature so as to form a training base for recruiting judges from the training base to the permanent cadre.\n\nThis point need not detain us any further in view of the statement made by Mr. Mridul on behalf of the Law Minister that it has now been decided as a matter of policy by the Government not to appoint Additional Judges for a period of less then one year in special cases and two years normally.\n\nIf this is done in future, then the spirit of the Constitution would be amply fulfilled and the controversy would be set at rest.\n\nA more important feature is that the nature of the appointment under Art. 224 ii; a pure tenure appointment for a fixed period and\n\nS60 SUPREME totm'r. ~EPOlnS [1982] 2 s.c.k.\n\nonce the period expires, there is no question of extension of that period or reappointment. In other words, once the time for which a Judge bas been appointed expires, the appointment of the _Judge ceases to exist.\n\nThat being so, whenever a judge is sought to be appointed afresh, the constitutional functionary will have to go back to Art. 217 even if a judge is to be appointed under Art. 224 and the question of suitability would be the first criterion.\n\nAs in the case of initial appointment under Art. 217, so in the case of a fresh appointment after the period mentioned in Art. 224 expires, there is no legal right to be appointed nor does non-appointment give rise to any legal or constitutional infirmity so as to be the subject of a 'judicial review.· It is a different matter that if an additional judge is considered for a permanent appointment afresh, the fact that he has acquired some experience would undoubtedly be an important • factor to be taken into consideration while judging the suitability of the candidate concerned.\n\nAt the same time, the constitutional functionaries cannot shut their eyes to the facts which may have come to their knowledge either against the Addition.al Judge or in his favour.\n\nThus, the position is that even if an Additional Judge is not appointed afresh and somebody else is appointed, there is no question of judicial review nor .is there any question of the non-appointment of an Additional Judge afresh casting any reflection or aspersion on: the reputation or character of an Additional Judge because he was appointed only for a particular period and for a particular purpose and is not on probation: Both Brother Desai and Brother Venkataramiah JJ. have stressed this aspect of the matter in their own way and I agree with their views.\n\nWhile dealing with the facts of Justice Kumar's C,!ISe, Brother Venkataramiah has observed that although there was full and effective consultation between the CJ, Delhi, the CJI and the Law Minister, therefore, the non-appointment of Mr.\n\nKumar is not vitiated by any constitutional infirmity.\n\nAt one place, however, Brother Venkataramiah has observed as follows :-\n\n\"Perhaps it would have been acceptable if the case ws that the Prime Minister was favourably disposed towards Shri S.N. Kumar but the Law Minister had tried to mislead her.\"\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nS.i'. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J~> .\n\nS6t\n\nWith due respect to my learned Brother I am unable to agree with these observations which cannot be spelt out from the correspondence between the constitutional functionaries mentioned above.\n\nIn fact, a close and careful perusal of the c0rrespondence between all the constitutional functionaries, (CJ, Delhi, CJ!, and the Law Minister) would clearly show that the role of the Law Minister has been very fair and just from start to finish.\n\nThe Law Minister insisted on the materials before taking a decision against Mr.\n\nKumar. These materials were supplied to the Law Minister by the CJ, Delhi.\n\nHe had also discussions with the CJI.\n\nEven thereafter the Law Minister wante!i to plug all loopholes in order to satisfy hiinself fully before taking a final decision in the nfatter, and that is why he wrote to the CJ, Delhi to furnish a complete data and better particulars which was done by him (CJ, Delhi), through his letter dt. 7.5.31. ..\n\nIt is. obvious that the CJ, Delhi expressed his desire that the full material which was supplied to the Law Minister may not be sent to the CJI but that was perhaps because the CJ, Delhi had oral discussions with the CJI in respect of all relevant material.\n\nThe Law Minister also took care to ignore the CBI reports against Mr. Kumar because he wanted to proceed purely on legal and relevant materials before him.\n\nThis shows the objectivity and the fairness of bis attitude in coming to a final decision. Merely because he bad advised the Prime Minister to accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi, it cannot be said that he tried to mislead the Prime Minister.\n\nIn my opinion, to suggest even indirectly that the Law Minister attempted to mislead the Prime Minister, in view of the circumstances mentioned above, would br to make a most uncharitable remark against him amounting to inflicting an 'unkind cut indeed'. My Brother Bhagwati, J. has demonstrably shown that there is nbt a shred of evidence nor any reasonable basis for holding that there was a conspirary between CJ, Delhi and Law Minister to oust Mr. Kumar.\n\nThe allegation of the alleged conspiracy is totally unfounded and smacks of absolute recklessness.\n\nIndeed if the Law\n\nl!l\n\nMinister wanted to drop Mr. Kumar without any further inquiry he G could have used the I.B. Reports-that he completely ignored them,· proves his honesty of purpose.\n\nMerely because while exercising a constitutional function the Law Minister preferred the opinion of CJ, Delhi to that of CJI, no motive could be imputed to , him, particularly when we have rejected the doctrine of Primacy of CJI, as H dealt with by Desai J., with whom I fully agree.\n\n• . SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 R.S.C •\n\nI entirely agree with the very clear and adroit exposition of the constitutional aspect of the Art. 224' by Brothers Bhagwati and Desai JJ. as also with the most elaborate, careful and detailed analysis of Kumar's case in the light of the correspondence disclosed.\n\nI also agree with the opinion expressed by Brother Venkataramiah J. but would like to add a few lines to highlight some aspects of the reasons given by Brothers Bhagwati and Venkataramiah JJ. which seem to me to be either inconsistent with the stand taken by them or do not accord with my view.\n\nHence, I find myself bound to express my short opinion on these matters .only.\n\nBrother Bhagwati J after carefully analysing the facts of Kumar's case as spelt out from the correspondence disclosed and the affidavit filed by Mr. Kumar has returned a clear finding that the conduct of CJ, Delhi was throughoot honest and bona fide and he had acted as a responsible and honest CJ. I fully agree with this conclusion but Brother Bhagwati J. appears to have found fault with the CJ, Delhi for expressing his desire to the Law Minister to keep the contents of his letter dated 7.5.81 secret and not to place the same before the CJI. Brother Bhagwati, J . has himself pointed out that CJ.\n\nDelhi had given cogent reasons for requesting the Law Minister not to disclose the contents to CJI atld yet in his concluding portion while not doubting the bona fide of the CJ, Delhi, he seems to suggest that he (CJ, Delhi) ought to have shown greater courage of conviction so as not to have been cowed down by the apprehension that CJI might feel offended and in this connection observed as follows:-\n\n\"We must, of course, observe .that in our opinon, howsoever strong and cogent might be the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice of the Delhi should never have asked the Law Minister not to place his letter dated 7th May, 1981 before the Chief Justice of India ....... He should not have bothered whether by his action in putting the facts on record jn the letter dated 7th May, 1981 the Chief Justice of India would be offended and his relations with the Chief Justice of India would be spoilt.\"\n\nPerhaps in making these observatioons with great respect, .\n\nBrother Bhagwati J., did not fully appreciate the substantial and H compelling reasons why CJ, Delhi had made a somewhat unusual though fully justifiable request to the Law Minister not to place the letter before the CJI.\n\nAs the data and material supplied to the Law\n\n. •\n\nSJ'. GUl>TA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 863\n\nMinister in the letter dated 7,5.81 had already been supplied to the C.tl or, at any rate; oraily discussed with him, it was not necessary for the Law Minister to have disclosed the contents of the said letter which would be more or less a surplusage and would have naturally embittered the relations between the two high constitutional functionaries (CJ, Delhi and CJI).\n\nSecondly, if we put ourselves in the place of CJ, Deihl we would have done the same in the circumstances.\n\nHete was a Chief Justice who was only recently made permanent and was to continue as CJ for quite some time and so Was 'the Ci!.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is natural and obvious that CJ, Delhi would not like to join issue With CJI at any stage or at every step which would create difficulties in the smooth tunning of the High Court.·\n\nThirdly, since CJ, Delhi was frank, forthright and firmto stick to his stand despite pressures. till the last, disclosure of contens to\n\nCJI, was wholly unnecessary and, in my opinion, CJ, Delhi rightly D thought that there was no use entering in an endless controversy and a consistent legal tug of war with CJI for whom not only he but every Judge has the greatest respect.\n\nFinally, CJ, Delhi at the time when he niade the request could hardly imagine or conceive that the majority of our Brother Judges would perm!t disclosure of the documents leading to a public debate in respect of high official secrets which for the last two centuries had never. been disclosed. CJ, Delhi may have thought that if the matter leaked out, it was likely to be exploited by M\"r. Kumar and his friends which would bring his court to serious disrepute.\n\n1 I feel that in view of the conspectus of the circumstances mentioned above and those detailed by Brother Bhagwati J., CJ, Delhi was fully justified in requesting the Law Minister not to reveal the contents of his letter dated 7.5.81 and to let the matter rest where it was. It is true that occasions may arise when a judge in the discharge of his judicial functions has sometimes to perform an unpleasant duty but where awkward situations can be avoided with tact and wisdom, the exercise of power is most laudable and beyond criticism .\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, I am unable to agree with the observations made by Brother Bhawati J. on, this as\\'ect of the matter only.\n\n.SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n( J 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nAs regards the documents pertaining to Justice K.B.N. Singh's case which have been disclosed I shall discuss them while dealing with Transferred case. No. 24 of 1981.\n\nTransferred Case No. 24 of of 1981.\n\nWe now propose to deal with the case of D. N. Pandey and others in which Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court has now been transposed as petitioner No. 3.\n\nAll the connec- . ted petitions in respect of the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh from Patna to Madras High Court involve common points. The:;,'petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh was a practising Advocate of the Patna High Court and was appointed a Judge of the said High Court on September 15, 1966 and was made permanent Judge from March 21,\n\n1968. Thereafter, he was appointed Acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court for a short while and as permanent Chief Justice on July 6, 1976.\n\nHe was administered the oath of office on. July 19,\n\n1976. Since then, the petitioner continues to be the permanent CJ of Patna High Court.\n\nBy virtue of a notification dated January 19, 1981, the petitioner was informed that the President, after consultation with the CJI, was pleased to transfer him to Madras High Court as Chief Justice with effect from the date he assumes charge of that office.\n\nA similar notification was issued by which Justice M.M,'.K. Ismail, CJ Madras High Court was transferred as CJ of the Kerala High Court but as Justice Ismail proceeded on leave and ultimately retired from service the petition which was filed against the order transferring him to Kerala no longer survives.\n\nMiss Lily Thomas who appeared on behalf of Justice Ismail, however, confined her arguments only to the question that the petitioner (Justice K.B.N. Singh) should not have been transferred to Madras.\n\nIt appears that after the notification, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu took great exception to the appointment of the petitioner as CJ, Madras High Court mainly on the ground that he was not conversant with Tamil language and, therefore, he would not be able to function properly in the jMadras High Court. We are, however, not concerned with thes\n\n0e matters at the present moment.\n\nComing now to the facts which are germane for the purpose\n\n<,>f deciding these petitions, the same may be summarised thus. The\n\n.. :\n\nli.1>. OtJl>tA v. tJNlON (FazaJ Ali, J.) 865\n\npetition et was appointed acting Governor o'f Bihar from 31st January 1979 to 31st September 1979. The cir, who is respondent No. 2 in T, C. 24/81, visited Patna in February 1980, according to the petitioner, for inaugurating the International Rotary Conference. The petitioner met the CJI in Patna and accompanied him to Nalanda and Rajgir. It was alleged by the petitioner that during his visit to Bihar, the Hon'ble CJI did not give him any inkling of his transfer to Madras or for that matter to any other place. It was for the first time on January 5, 1981 that he received a telephone call from the CJI informing him that Justice Ismail was being transferred to Kerala and the petitioner would have to go to Madras. He then asked the CJI why he had decided to send him to Madras to which the CJI replied that it was the Government's policy that had necessitated his transfer from Patna to Madras. The petitioner states that he was quite upset and told the CJI that his mother who lives with him was seriously ill and bed-ridden and was not in a position to leave Patna without the risk. of her life and also mentioned other circumstances and difficulties and requested that his transfer may not be insisted upon. The CJI is alleged to have told him that he was making a note of these circumstances. Three-four days later the petitioner came to Delhi and called on the CJI and told him 'of his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties to wliich reference had been made by him during his telephonic talk with the CJI. The petitioner was with him (CJI) for about 10-15 minutes at his residence but he found the CJI absolutely non-commital in respect of his transfer. The petitioner informed the CJI that he might be given a chance to remove any wrong impression that may have been created in his mind. The CJI, however, did not put any question or material to the petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner alleges that his transfer was notified without his previous consent nor did he give his consent, nor was he even consulted in any manner about his transfer to Madras. The petitioner _further submits that no reasons, groun, ds or material necessitating or justifying his transfer from Patna to Madras were ever disclosed to him or discussed by the Piesident or the Government of India or anyone acting on their behalf or even by the CJ I. He also denies that the transfer was necessary in public interest. This matter is a question of Jaw for the courts to examine. His main griev.ance was that had he been given a chance to express his opinion he would have pointed out his compelling personal circumstances and difficulties, more particularly the advanced age of his mother who wa& more than 85 years and was bed-ridden for two years,\n\n866 sui>ttEME cotJRt REoHs ii 9s2j 1 s.c.rl\n\nThe petitioner took the plea that he was not conversant with Tamil language, which was the official language of the State of Tamil Nadu, and this would therefore be a serious impediment in his functioning as the Head of judiciary in that State He further alleged that his transfer was made without any effective consultation between the Government of India and the CJI and that it was based on irrelevant and non•existent factors which were never disclosed to him.\n\nThereafter, he took some legal pleas regarding the validity of the transfer, which as pure questions of law we have already dealt with whlie dealing with other cases. Then, he laid great stress .on the statement made by en at Jaipur on January 19, 1981 that the judges who were recruited with the understanding that they would not be transferred to other, States should not be asked after their appointment to go to other States and according to the petitioner the CJI said that in su.:h transfers the problem of language, education of their children could not be brushed aside. The petitioner seems to suggest that by agreeing or sponsoring his transfer to Madras, the CJI completely overlooked the .observations made by him in Jaipur.\n\nAnother technical objection taken by the petitioner was that the transfer order was bad because no notification had been issued by the President determining the compensatory allowance until a Parliamentary legislation was passed as required by the provisions E of Art. 222.\n\nHe then made reference to the recommendations of various Chief Justices Conferences held before his appointment.\n\nA number of other pleas were taken by the petitioner, but Dr. Singhvi appearing for him, in view of the delicate and sensitive questions. that aroe, very rightly decided to argue the case on the convergence rather. than divergence of the issues raised by the petitioner in his F petition or in his affidavits.\n\nAs a plea for disclosure. of the documents in the nature of correspondence which led to the transfer of the petitioner from Patna to Madras was also prayed for, a counter,.affidavit was filed G by Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, Home Secretary opposing the disclosure an\\f taking the plea of privilege under ss. 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.\n\nThe court by a majority of 6: I, . as in other cases, in this case also overruled the plea of privilege and directed disclosure of the documents concerning the correspondence but omitting the notes and some minutes which fell within the ambit of Art. 74(2) of H the Constitution. The Hon'ble CJI, who is respondent No. 2, filed in his counter-affidavit on 29.9.8 l, as directed by us, where he oenied\n\nor rebutted most of the allegations of fact made by the petitioner\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 867\n\nin his affidavit. The petitioner filed another rejoinder on 16.10.81 to the counter-affidavit of the CJI.\n\nSo far as the CJI is concerned, he admitted the fact that he visited Patna in February ! 980 but denied that he had gone there only for the purpose of inaugurating the Rotary International Conference.\n\nHe averred that he visited Patna in the exercise of his official duties particularly in order to meet the Judges and the members of the Bar and had informed the petitioner regarding his visit to Patna on-23.2.1980. According to the CJI, inauguration of Rotary International Conference was merely an incidental matter which he did during his presence at Patna. He has also stated that even before his visit to Patna he had received a letter from the petitioner enclosing a list of some senior Advocates whom be would like to meet individually but the CJI asked him to add names of five more Advocates.\n\nOn reaching Patna, the CJI met the members of the Bar individually on 24.2.80 and on the next day in the evening he met the members of the Advocates Association in the High Court premises.\n\nHe also admitted his visits to Nalanda and Rajgir. He further states that during his visit to Patna he did not give the petitioner any inkling about his proposed transfer to Madras because in February\n\n1980 there was no proposal to transfer him anywhere. The proposal of his transfer matured almost one year after.\n\nThe CJI further states that be did have a talk over the telephone with the petitioner on 5.1.81 and apprised him of the likelihood of his being transferred to Madras and asked him if he had anything to say.\n\nThe CJI denied that he merely said that the petitioner was being sent to Madras in view of the Government policy but added that apart from the Government policy be bad expressly told him that it was proposed to transfer him to Madras because he was an experienced and senior Chief Justice.\n\nThe CJI admits that the petitioner had informed him that his mother was bed-ridden and not in a position to go to Madras but he did not tell him (CJJ) about any other difficulty. The CJI further states that the petitioner had hinted that if his transfer was insisted upon he would prefer to resign. Thereupon, he (CJI) requested him not to act in haste and to give the matter a close thought. He also informed the petitioner that he was making a note of the difficulty expressed by him. He also requested him to come to Delhi and discuss the question of his transfer. The CJI further states that the petitioner met him in Delhi 3-4 days later and was with him fo.r\n\n\n(J 982) 2 S.C.R.\n\n10-15 minutes and acquainted him (CJI) of his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties in the event of his transfer to Madras.\n\nThe CJI further admitted that the petitioner was at his residence on 8.1.1981 at 7.30 p.m. and during their discussion the question of his mother's advanced age and illness also c.-i.me up which was the only personal difficulty stressed by him (petitioner). The CJI told him that he was unable to agree with him because there were other dependable persons in the family, including his brother S.B.N.\n\nSingh, who could look after his mother. The CJI also states that the petitioner gave him an impression that perhaps some complaints may have been made against him to the CJI which he would like to remove, on which the CJI assured him that he did not believe that his conduct was in any way blameworthy but certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. Other matters were also mentioned by the petitioner to the CJI which have no direct bearing on the issue.\n\nIn para 5 of his counter-affidavit the CJI has averred that there was full and effective consultation between him and the President on the question of the transfer of the petitioner from Patna to Madras and that every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by him fully with the President both before and after he proposed the transfer. The other allegations made by the petitioner were denied. The CJ! also stated that he was personally aware since February 1980 that his (petitioner's) mother was advanced in age and was not in a good state of health.\n\nAdmitting the allegation of the petitioner regarding his speech at Jaipur, the CJI mentioned in his affidavit that he had given thoughtful consideration to the personal difficulty narrated by the petitioner during bis meeting.\n\nLastly, the CJI mentioned that as the petitioner was one of the seniormost High Court CJs, he could function efficiently even despite the language difficulty.\n\nG The petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit on 16.10.81 (hereafter referred to as the 'second affidavit') where he reiterated the allegations made in his first affidavit and denied some of the facts mentioned by the CJI. In his second affidavit he stated that the CJI had said it was the Government's policy to effect transfers in batches H of 2 or 3 judges. This statement is a little inconsistent with his pre- \\ious statement in his first affidavit where he had mentioned that he was informed by the CJI that it was the Government's policy.\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 869\n\nthat affidavit he did not say about the transfer in batches of 2 or 3, which seems to have been added in the second affidavit. '\n\nThis is a most difficult and delicate situation where two high Constitutional functionaries are involved and have given affidavits and counter-affidavits. In a matter of such a serious magnitude, the Court has to make a very careful and cautious approach having regard to the respectability of the persons who have sworn the affidavits.\n\nWe would, therefore, like to avoid unnecessary details and, as rightly contended by Dr. Singhvi, confine our attention only to the points of convergence without touching the issues of divergence.\n\nBefore, however, we deal with the admitted facts which emerge from the affidavits concerned, it may be necessary to refer to the well settled law on the subject of effective consultation which is necessary concomitant of a valid and constitutional order of transfer passed by the President.\n\nArt. 222 constitutes a clear mandate that the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another can be made only in consultation with the CJI. As the connotation of the word 'consultation' has now been well-settled by a long course of decisions of this Court, it is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this issue.\n\nWe shall, therefore, refer only to th0se decisions which lay down complete and objective test for determining what constitutes effective consultation in a particular case. To begin with, we shall start with Seth's case which is the only decision directly in point and where the matter was discussed fully covering all shades and aspects of this important question.\n\nBefore referring to that case a few introductory remarks may be necssary.\n\nWe have already indicated above that on an interpretation of Art. 222 the proposal for transfer of a judge (which includes Chief Justice) from one High Court to another may emanate either from the President or from the CJI. Although according to the Memo. which was produced before us, the practice is that the proposal is to emanate from the President through the law Minister but, as we have already pointed out that the Memo, cannot override the provisions of Art. 222 being only in the form of a guideline, there is nothing to prevent the proposal emanating from the CJI.\n\nIn either case, however the process of effective consultation is to be gone through according to the principles laid down and directions given by this Court. In the instant case, the admitted position is that the proposal for transfer of the petitioner for the first time\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nemanated from the CJI by virtue of his letter dated 7.12.80.\n\nAt that time the recommendation of the CJ[ was to transfer the petitioner to Rajasthan which was later changed and by a subsequent letter dated 20.12.80 the CJI proposed that t)le petitioner be transferred to Madras and Justice Ismail from M adra5 to Kerala. This is the proposal which is in dispute in the present case.\n\nIn Seth's case this Court proceeded on the footing that the proposal had emanated from the President and laid down detailed guidelines and principles which should be followed in order to make consultation effective.\n\nIt is obvious that where the proposal err.anates from the CH the same principles would apply though in the reverse process.\n\nIn other words, what the President is required to do under Art. 222 if the proposal emanates from him has to be done by the CJI if he is the author of the proposal of transfer. The present CJI in his majority judgment has considered the matter fully and exhaustively and his judgment contains the most brilliant and scientific exposition of the doctrine of consultation. While dwelling on the attributes of effective consultation, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed as follows :\n\n\"It casts an absolute obligation on the President to\n\nconult the Chief Justice of India beforP transferring a Judge from O!le High Court to another.\n\nThe word \"may\" in article 222(1) qualifies the last clause which refers to the transfer of a Judge and not the intervening clause which refers to consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe President may or may not transfer a Judge from one High Court 10 another.\n\nHe is not compelled to do so.\n\nBut if he proposes to rransfer a Judge, he must consult the Chief Justice of India before transferring the Judge. That is in the nature of a condition precedent to the actual transfer of the Judge.\n\nIn other words, the transfer of a High Court Judge to another High Court cannot become effective unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted by the President in behalf of the proposed transfer.\n\nIndeed, it is euphemistic to talk in terms of effectiveness, because the transfer of a High Court Judge to another High Court is unconstitutional unless, before transferring the Judge, the President consults the Chief Justice of India.\n\nBut \\here can be no purposeful consideration of a matter, in the absence of facts and circumstances on the\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 871\n\nbasi' of which alone the nature of a problem involved can A be appreciated and the right decision taken. It must, therefore, follow that while consulting the Chief Justice, the President must make the relevant data available to him on the basis of which he can offer to the President the benefit of his considered opinion. lf the facts necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are not made available to the Chief Justice, he must ask for them because, in casting on the President the obligation to consult the Chief Justice, the Constitution at the same time must be taken to have imposed a duty on the Chief Justice to express .his opinion on nothing less than a full consideration of the matter on which he is entitled to be consulted. The fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation to place full facts before tile Chief Justice and the performance by the latter, of the duty to elicit facts which are necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are parts of the same process and are complementary to each other The faithful observance of these may well earn a handsome dividend useful to the administration of justice.\n\nConsultation within the meaning of article 222(1) therefore, means full and ejj'ective, not formal or unprodurtive consultation.\n\nThus, deliberation is the quintessence of consultation.\n\nThat implies that each individual case must be considered separately on the basis of its own facts.\n\nThe word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct, or at least, a satisfactory solution. In order that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact, it is essential that each must have for its consideration Juli and identical facts, which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision.\n\n(Emphasis mine)\n\nSimilarly, Krishna Iyer J. speaking for 'himself and one of us (Fazal Ali J.) described the consultative process thus :\n\n\"The consultation, in order to fulfil its normative function in Art. 222(1), must be a real, substantial\n\n\n( 1982 J 2 S.C.R.\n\nand effective consultation based on full and proper materials placed before the Chief Justice by the Government. Before giving his opinion the Chief Justice of India would naturally take into consideration all relevant factors and may informally ascertain from the Judge concerned if he has any real personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer may not be directed.\n\nSuch grounds may be of wide range including his health or extreme family factors. It is not necessary for the Chief Justice to issue formal notice to the Judge concerned but it is: sufficient-although it is not obligatory-if he ascertains these facts either from the Chief Justice of the High Court or from his own colleages or through any other means which the Chief Justice thinks safe, fair and reasonable. Where a proposal of transfer of a Judge is made the Government must forward every possible material to the Chief Justice so that he is in a position to give an effective opinion.\"\n\nD Bhagwati J. (One of us) agreed entirely with the observations extracted above.\n\nIn an earlier Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors.(1) while E dealing with the intent and purpose of Art. 233, the principles of which equally apply to consultation under Art. 222, Mitter J. observed thus :\n\n\"Consultation with the High Court under Art. 233 is not an empty formaliry.\n\nSo far as promotion of officers to the cadre of District Judges is concerned the High Court is best fitted to adjuge the claims and merits of persons to be considered for (promotion ..• Consultalion or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known lo the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits or their views.\n\nIf one party makes a proposal to the other who bas a counter proposal in his mind which is not communicated to the proposer r the direction to give effect to the counter proposal withoutanything more, cannot be said to have been issued afterconsultation.\" (Emphasis mine)\n\n[ ( 1) [I 970] 2SCR 666.\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 873\n\nThis case was followed both by Chandrachud J. and Krishna A Iyer J, and one of us (Fazal Ali J) in Seth's case where it was held that the observations made in this case constitute the true meaning and content of consultation as envisaged by Art. 222(1) of the Constitution.\n\nIn Chandra Mohan's case (supra) this Court made the following B observations regarding the process and purport of consultation :\n\n\"That this constitutional mandate has both a negative and positive significance is made clear by the other provisions of the Constitution wherever the Constitution intended to provide more than one consultant, it has said so : see Arts. 124 (2) and 217(1).\n\nWherever the Constitution provided for consultation of a single body or individual it said so; see Art. 222.\n\nArt. 124(2) goes further and makes a distinction between persons who shall be consulted and persons who may be consulted. These provisions indicate that the duty to consult is so integrated with the exercise of the power that the power can be exercised only in consultation with the person or persons designated therein.\n\nAnalysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandramouleshwer Prasad's case (supra) the following necessary concomic\n\ntants of an effective consultation may be stated : E\n\n(I) that the conclutation contemplated by Art. 222 must\n\nbe: full and effective and is an essential ingredient of the exercise of power under Art. 222.\n\n(2) that once when the President decides to transfer a judge, he must consult the CJI before transfer; the consultation before transferring a judge is, as it were, a condition pn, cedent to the actual transfer of the judge.\n\n(3) if the consultation with the CJI has not been done before transferring a judge, the transfer becomes\n\nunconstitutional.\n\n(4) The President must make the relevant data and the necessary facts available to the CJI so that he (CJI) may arrive at a proper conclusion. In case any facts are wanting the same should be supplied to the CJI and B this is an imperative duty or obligfltion cast on the\n\nPresident who initiates the proposal.\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(5) The fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation and performance of his duty by the en are parts of the same process and after this process is fully complied with, the consultation becomes Full and effective and not formal or unproductive.\n\n(6) That sufficient opportunity should be given to the authorities concerned to express their views so as to tender advice as deliberation is the quintessence of consultation.\n\n(7) After the data, facts or materials are placed before the consultee and the consultant, there should be a full and complete application of minds in respect of the subject to enable them to reach a satisfactory conclusion.\n\nIn other words, the two minds must be able to confer and produce a mutual impact on the indentical facts which would constitute both the source and the foundation of the final decision.\n\n(8) The (; JI owes a corresponding duty both to the President and to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred to consider every relevant fact before tendering his opinion to the President.\n\n(9) Before giving his opinion the CJI must take into consideration all relevant facts and should informally ascertain from the Judge if he has any personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer is proposed to be made and having done so, must forward the same to the President.\n\n(These principles were laid down in Seth's case)\n\n(IO) Consultation or deliberation is not complete until the parties make their points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merit of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal which is not communicated to the proposer, the direction to give effect to the counter-proposal without anything more will not amount to consultation.\n\n(This was held in Chandramouleshwar' s case (supra)\n\n...\n\n. .\n\n'\\.-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 875\n\nWe shall now state the admitted facts which emerge from the A two affidavits of the petitioner and the counter-affidavit of the CJI to show whether the tests mentioned above have been fully satisfied or not. It is clearly established both from the petitioner's affidavit and the counter-affidavit of CJI that during his (CJIJ visit to Patna there was absolutely no suggestion or proposal to transfer the petitioner from Patna to Madras. The petitioner categorically states B this in para 8 of his first affidavit (filed on 16.9.81). This fact is endorsed and admitted by the CJI in para 2(e) of his counter-affidavit where he says thus :\n\n\"it is true that I did not tell him then that he was to be transferred from Patna.\n\nThat was because in February 1980 there was no proposal to transfer him. He was trans ferred nearly one year later.:•\n\nThus, the first fact on which there is no controversy or divergence is that during his visit to Patna in February 1980 the CJI did\n\nnot give any indication to the petitioner regarding his transfer to D Madras as there was no such proposal.\n\nA persual of the two affidavits would clearly show that there is no averment either by the-petitioner or by the CJI that they ever met at any other place between February 1980 and January 5, 1981.\n\nIt must, therefore, be taken to be established that after his visit in E February 1980 the first time CJI had a talk with the petitioner was only on 5.1.1981.\n\nIn this connection, averments are to be found in para 8 of petitioner's first affidavit and in para 2(f) of CJl's counter affidavit where he states thus :\n\n''It is true, as stated by Shri K.B.N. Singh in paragraph 8 of his affidavit, that I conveyed to him on the evening of January 5, 1981 over the telephone that it was proposed to transfer Shri Justice M.M. Ismail to Kerala and that he, Shri K.B.N. Singh, may have to go to Madras.\"\n\nAnother conclusive fact which inevitably follows from the aforesaid two averments is that even when the CJI sent the proposal dt. 20.12.80 of the transfer of the petitioner from Patna to Madras and that of Justice Ismail from Madras to Kerala, there was neither any talk or discussion nor any consultation with the petitioner. We have highlighted this important fact because from the observations extracted above one of the essential ingredients emphasised by this Court and even by the CJI himself ws that there should be a com-\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nA munication of ideas before the proposal of transfer emanates.\n\nWe shall elaborate this aspect a little later.\n\nAccording to the petitioner he was told by the CJI on telephone that he was to be sent to Madras in pursuance of a Government policy. The CJI in his counter-affidavit in para 2(g) stated that he did not merely indicate Government policy but also stated that it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior CJ in place of Justice Ismail. In the circumstances, therefore, we would prefer the statement of the CJI to that of the petitioner particularly in view of the fact that in his second affidavit the petitioner has introduced an additional fact to the effect that the CJI had told him that it was the Government policy to effect transfers in batches of two or three.\n\nThis minor contradiction is, however not of much value because the fact remains that the petitioner was sounded by the CJI for the first time on 5.1.81 over the telephone.\n\nThe petitioner states that he explained to the CJI that his mother was seriously ill and bed-ridden and was not in a position to be moved and added that if his transfer was insisted upon, he might be compelled to resign.\n\nThe statement is to be found in para 8 of the petitioner's first affidavit.\n\nThis fact is admitted by the CJI in para 2(h) of his counter-a::!idavit which runs thus:\n\n\"It is true that Shri K.B.N. Singh told me over the telephone that his mother was bedridden and was not in a p0sition to go with him to Madras.\"\n\nThe CJI however denies that the petitioner told him of any other personal circumstance by reasons of which he was unable to go to Madras. We will accept this statement of the CJI also in preference to the statement made by the petitioner. The CJI admits that the petitioner had indicated his intention to resign if his transfer was insisted upon but he cautioned him to consider the matter more thoroughly before taking a final decision.\n\nOn this point also there does not appear to be any controversy as there is a large measure of agreement in the statements contained in the affidavits of the petitioner and the CJI.\n\nWe then come to the finale of the drama which ii the most important factor to determine a~ to whether or not tl1ere was an\n\n. ;\n\n• •\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 877\n\neffective consultation as contemplated by Art. 222.\n\nBefore however we deal with aspect of the matter we might mention that in the present case the letter dated 7.12.80 sent by the CJI to the Law Minister clearly shows that it was the CJI who had initiated the proposal unlike in Seth's case where the proposal was initiated by the President through the Law Minister. If this was the position then the fqrmalities and the duties that the President had to comply were now to be observed by the CJI, that is to say, it was for the CJI to consult the Judge concerned, consider his difficulties and then come to a final conclusion.\n\nFurther, it was also for the CJI to have placed the entire facts, data, difficulties and viewpoints mentioned to him by the petitioner, before the President.\n\nEven if the CJI was not impressed by the difficulties expressed by the petitioner the materials and data given to him either 0rally or in writing had to be commuicated to the President because the possibility of the President taking a different view cannot be reasonably excluded.\n\nAccording to the averments made by the petitioner in para 8 of his &econd affidavit, he was not with the CJI for a period of more than 15 minutes. He further denied that apart from his mother's advanced age and illness no other facts were mentioned before the\n\nCJI.\n\nAccording to him, he had told the CJI that being the eldest son it was a sacred obligation to keep his mother with him and having regard to the close attachment with her, he could not leave her, with any of his brothers or other members of the family which was divided and partitioned.\n\nIt may be relevant to note that in para 9 of his first affidavit the petitioner merely stated that he told the CJI of his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties without detailing them.\n\nHe also admits that he was with the CJI at his residence on 8.1.81 for 10-15 minutes.\n\nHe further mentioned that the CJI might have received complaints against him and he wanted to remove the wrong impression created against him.\n\nPara 9 of his first affidavit which contains details of the discussions he had with the CJI, does not at all mention the further facts which the petitioner has mentioned in para 8 of his second affidavit about the sacred obligation, his mother's illness, inability of other members • of her family to look after her. In view of this ommission we would accept the affidavit of the CJI which is fully corroborated by what the petitioner himself stated in his first affidavit.\n\nAlthough we may not go to the extent of saying that the subsequent statement of the petitioner made in para 8 of his second affidavit was an afterthought but in the circumstances it is sufficient to state that we would prefer to rely on the affidavit of the CJI as tbe subsequent facts were not indicated in the first affidavit of the petitioner. On the other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.a.\n\nhand, the CJI in para 3 of his counter-affidavit replying to the state ment of the petitioner that he (CJI) may have received baseless complaints, averred that he tried his best to convince him (petitioner) that he did not believe this bis (petitioner's) conduct was blameworthy and left him free to explain any matter which according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court.\n\nThereupon the petitioner narrated to him that there were number of persons inspired by commercial and other extraneous considerations who tried to influence him (petitioner) administratively or judicially.\n\nThe en however assured him that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction.\n\nThese details, mentioned by the CJI, have not been contradicated or denied by the petitioner and we fully accept what the CJI had said in para 3 of his conteraffidavit.\n\nAs regards others matters, the CJI does say that other issues were also discussed on the evening of January 8, 1981 but they had no bearing on the matters in issue. In para 4 of his counter-affidavit the en admitted the statement of the petitioner, made in para 10 of his first affidavit, that he did not convey his consent to the proposal of his transfer, but the en added that he was consulted about his transfer to Madras. The consultation referred to by the en is obviously to the telephonic talk on 5.1.81 and the personal meeting between them on the evening of 8.1.81.\n\nThese are the points of convergence on which by and large there does not appear to be any serious controversy and even if there is any, we have preferredto rely on the affidavit of the CJI as in the normal course of business we must, so long as the law permits.\n\nThe most crucial averment by the CJI which forms the bulwark of the essential ingredient of effective consultation is to be found in para 5 of his counter-affidavit which runs thus:\n\n\"I deny the statement in paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Shri K. B. N. Singh that his transfer to Madras was made without effective consultation between me and the Government of India. There was full and effective consultation between me and the President of India on the question of Shri K. B. N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. Every\n\n. '\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 879\n\nrelevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer ...... Every relevant circumstance, including the personal difficulty mentioned by Shri K. B. N. Singh was considered by me carefully and objectively before coming to the conclusion that he should be transferred to Madras. I was personally aware since February 1980 that his mother was advanced in age and was not in a good state of health.\"\n\nSo far as the first part of the affidavit is concerned that is a pure question of law, viz. whether on the facts effective consultation was proved or not. The CJI categorically states that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed by him fully with the President both before and after he proposed the transfer. It may be noticed that the name of petitioner figures in the first proposal sent by the CJI to the Law Minister on 7.12.80 wherein he had clearly recommended that the petitioner be transferred as CJ, Rajasthan High Court.\n\nThis proposal was, therefore, not merely an information but a regular proposal by which the CJI had recommended Justice K.B.N. Singh to be transferred to Rajasthan.\n\nWe have already pointed out that between February 1980 and January 5, 1981 there is no evidence at alL nor any allegation or avcrment either in the affidavits of the petitioner or of the CJI to indicate that he had either orally or in writing ascertained the views of the petitioners when he (CJJ) by his aforesaid proposal recommended the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh to Rajasthan as Chief Justice. It must, therefore, taken to be established that there was no discussion at all nor any consultation between them when for the first time the ball was set in motion through the proposal of recommendation sent by the CJI to the Law Minister on 7.12.80.\n\nEven so we may not attach much significance to this fact because this proposal ultimately fell through and was substituted by a later proposal sent on 20.12.80. In his Jetter dated 20.12.80 the CJI wrote\n\nto the Law Minister that in view of the fact that a vacancy G would occur in the office of CJ, Madras High Court he proposed that Justice K. B. N. Singh be transferred as CJ, Madras High Court. This is the proposal which is in dispute in the present case. It is common ground that even between 7th and 20th December\n\n1980, there was no talk or consultation between the petitioner and H the CJI. The position is that until 5.1.81 the petitioner was not given\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA any idea or inkling about his being transferred to Madras High Court. Admittedly, for the first time the petitioner was informed by the CJI over the telephone on 5.1.81.\n\nThis was followed by a meeting and detailed discussion by the CJI with the petitioner at the former's residence in Delhi on 8.1.81 at about 8.00 p.m.\n\nThe fact before the proposal recommending the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh to Rajasthan or to Madras, there was no consultion between the CJI and the petitioner, conclusively proves one of the first ingredients of the consultative process, viz. consultation by the CJI with the proposed transferee should always be held as a first step towards making the consultation constitutionally effective was not observed. This was held, as extracted above, by CJI in Seth's case where he has gone to the extent of holding that if there is no such consultation before the transfer, then the transfer becomes unconstitutional. This, therefore, appears to be the first constitutional infirmity in the consultative process as contemplated by Art. 222.\n\nThis now brings us to January 8, 1981 when there was a full discussion between the petitioner and the en. We shall accept the statemennt of the en made in bis counter-affidavit, in toto that he had discussed the matter threadbare with the petitioner and considered his difficulties. This limb of the consultative process was no doubt fully complied with as required by the constitution.\n\nThen we come to the third aspect of the consultative process.\n\nAccording to the en he has met the President and discussed every aspect of the matter, disclosed to him by the petitioner. Unfortunately, the en does not disclose the exact constitutional authority with whom he had discussed these matters, although it,, would have been much better if he had done so and that would have put the entire matter beyond any controversy.\n\nOn this point, Dr. Singhvi as also Mr. B.e. Ghosh appearing for one of the petitioners vehemently contended that as the CJI was making a statement in an affidavit before a court of law, there was no justification for him to use the word 'president' and he should have mentioned the name of the exact authority with whom he had disscussed the matter, failing which this part of the affidavit should be rejected as being vague. Having regard to the very high position that the CJI\n\n• •\n\n\"' .\n\n\\•·\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 881\n\noccupies, his word is entitled to the greatest weight and respect, we would draw all presumptions within the bounds of law in favour of the CJI and presume that by using the word 'President', the CJI obviously intended the constitutional authority, who was being consulted generally before or after the proposals for transfers were made viz., the Law Minister. We will also go even to the extent of holding that perhaps he may have had some discusdon with the Law Minister also. What facts he may have revealed and. in what way he put forward the point of view of the petitioner we are not able to say, because the affidavit of the CJI is absolutely silent on this point.\n\nGiving however the widest possible connotation to the words used\n\noy the en. viz., 'every relevant aspect of question', would include all the personal difficulties which were mentioned to him by the petitioner, we are yet faced with another serious difficulty.\n\nIn Seth's case the CJI has himself clearly held that deliberation is the quintessence of consultation. Thus, according to the CJ! bimsel f even if he had disclosed or placed all the materials before the Law Minister, he ought to have been given sufficient time for deliberation over the matters so as to be able to make up his mind, whether to agree or disagree with the CJI, and to advise the President accordingly.\n\nIt may be that the personal difficulties may not have weighed with the CJI but the possibility of the Law Minister being impressed by them cannot be excluded. But as things stood, we find that the Pri .ne Minister had already signed the file relating to transfer on 9-1-81 and it can safely be presumed that the file must have been sent by the Law Minister to the Prime. Minister either sometime in the morning of 9th or late at night on 8th. This would leave no time at all to the Law Minister or the Prime Minister to deliberate on the various personal issues raised by the petitioner in his discussion with the CJI. Indeed, if prior to sending the formal propJsal recJm.nending the transfer of the petitioner the en would have taken the precaution of as 1certaining his views there would have been sufficient time for the Law Minister or the President to deliberate.\n\nIt was strongly urged by the petitioner that from the statement of the Law Minister produced by the Solicitor-General before us it would appear that no minutes were recorded and the CJI had only mentioned to the Law Minister about his proposal to transfer the\n\nS1JYR£ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\npetitioner. Thus, rrom the facts it should be inferred that there was no discnssion between the en and the Law Minister about the personal difficulties of the petitioner. It is true that from the file prcjuced before us no minutes seem to have been recorded about the discussion which the CJ[ had with Law Minister either on the 8th night or before that but that by itself would not exclude oral discussions having taken place after the detailed talk the en had with the petitioner on the evening of Stb. This, therefore, does not advance the case of the petitioner any further.\n\n Apptyllig the ratio of Chandramouleshwar' s case {supra) to the facts of this case, the position may be stated thus-here the CJI made a proposal for transfer of the petitioner to Madras but this proposal was not communicated to the petitioner who may have had a counter-proposal in his mind which also was not communicated to the President who was the person who decided the matter . finally.\n\nThus, even though we may not disbelieve every letter and every word contained in the counter-affidavit of CH and give him the iull benefit of all possible legal presumptions, we come to the inescapable ccnclusion that the constitutional requirements of an effective conclusion have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as-\n\n(l) the petitioner was not consulted before the fot1Dal proposal, recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government.\n\n(2) that there is no mention at all in any of the proposals\n\ndated 7·12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner. \\\n\n(3) that there is nothing to show that the President or the concerned constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over the pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner,\n\n(4) the case squarely falls within the ratio laid down in\n\nClumdramouleshwar' s case\n\n(supra) discussed above which had been approved by the en himself and\n\n,~,\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 883\n\nKrishna Iyer J. and one of us (Fazal Ali J.) in Seth's A case.\n\nIn view of the circumstances discussed above the consultative process as contemplated by Art. 222 is clearly vitiated which renders the order impugned passed by the President constitutionally invalid.\n\nWe must hasten to add that we have taken the greatest possi- ' ble care to see that no finding is given or observations made by us which may either directly or indirectly cast any kind of aspersion on the recitals in the counter-affidavit of the CJ I nor is there any circnmstance proved in this case which may amount to such an asper sion. As already observed by us we have accepted the affidavit of the CJI in toto giving the due respect that it deserves.\n\nWe have decided this case purely on the constitutional infirmities present in the consultative process and that too on the basis of the observa. tions made and the decision given by. the CJI himself in Seth's\n\ncase.\n\nThe last point of law that was urged by the petitioner was that the transfer was constitutionally invalid because one of the essential \"\" conditions of Art. 222 had not been fulfilled in this particular case. It was argued that Art. 222(2), which is extracted below, requires a Presidential Order by which the transferee Judge would be entitled to such compensatory allowance as the President may by. order fix :\n\n \"222(2). When a judge has been or is so. transferred, he shall, during the period be serves, after the commencement of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, as a judge of the other High Court,. be entitled to receive in\n\naddition to his salary such compensatory allowance as may G be determined by Parliament by law and, until so determined, such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.''\n\nIt was contended that this mandatory provision of Art. 222 (2) has not been complied with, w~. however, find absolutely no substa\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R,\n\nnee in this argument because while A rt. 222 (2) does require that on transfer from one High Court to another, compensatory allowance may be paid; it does not state that the Presidential Order should issue pari passu the order of transfer. Such an order could follow transfer.\n\nMoreover, as the petitioner never cared to join his new assignment and before he could do so the writ petitions were filed and proceedings were stayed, there was no occasion for the President to pass the order directing compensatory allowance to be paid to him until the validity of the transfer of the petitioner was finally adjudged by this Court. This is not a case where a judge or a CJ having been transferred had joined his new assignment and started working and still no Order of compensatory allowance was made by the President.\n\nBefore finally closing this Chapter we might mention that another reason given by Brother Venkataramiah J. for upholding the impugned Order was that under S. l 14(e) of the Evidence Act there is a pres um pt ion that official acts must be deemed to have been actually done, this Court must presume that if there was any infirmity in the consultation the same must have been complied with. With great respect to our learned Brother, we are however unable to agree with this argument. The presumption applies only where there is no challenge to the constitutional validity of an official act. Where an act is found to be per se unconstitutional, the question of raising a presumption does not arise because once it is held, as found in this case, that the consultation did not fulfil the constitutional requirements, the order impugned would become void ab initio and 1non.est.\n\nWe are fortified in our view by a decision of this Court in F Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinhgji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd.(1) where Subba Rao J. (as he then was) made the following observations :-\n\n\"The High Court in effect drew a presumption in favour of the regular performance of an official act.\n\nBut this presumption is only optional. In a case like this when the validity of an order depends upon the fulfilment of a condition, the party relying upon, the presumption should at least sl, ow that the order on the face of it is regular and is in conformity with the provisions of the stat\\lte.\"\n\n(1) (1962] 1 SCR 896. . '\n\n• ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.J 885\n\nAn identical view was taken in an earlier case repoted in AIR 1943 FC 75. In the instant case in view of our clear finding that the essential ingredients of effective consultation as required by Art. 222 not being proved, the question of drawing a presumption under S. 114(e) of Evidence Act does not arise.\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that the Order of the President transferring the petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh from Panta to Madras is constitutionally invalid and we hereby quash the notification dated 19-8-81 passed by the President.\n\nThe fact that the Order of transfer in this particular case has been held to be invalid and quashed, will not preclude the Government from making fresh orders of transfers after formulating a general policy of transfers on the lines and the manner indictated by us so that every High Court has a Chief Justice from outside and at the initial stage one-third of the strength of the Judges is recruited from outside the State.\n\nThus, the position is that while I have expressed my separate opinions on Art. 222 (T.C. No. 22/81), the Circular and the policy of Transfer, question of Privilege and Transferred Case No. 24/81 and have made some observations on other questions also but subject to the observations made I would entirely agree with Brother Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramia'1 JJ. in respect of Arts. 217\n\nand 224, on primacy with Brother Desai J. and regarding Kumar's case (T.C. No. 20/81) and the question of locus with Brother Bhagwati J.\n\nThe result is that petitions ansmg out of transferred cases Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 of 1981 are accordingly dismissed. Writ Petition No. 274 of 198 l, Transferred Case Nos 2 and 6 of 198 ! are accordingly disposed of. Special Leave Petition (civil) No. 1509/81 is dismissed as withdrawn.\n\nPetitions arising out of Transferred. case No. 24/8 l are allowed but without any order as to costs.,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nOn March 18, 1981 Hon'ble Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed the following Circular letter to the (I) Governor of Punjab and (2) Chief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States) :\n\n\"D.O. No. 66/10/81-Jus\n\nMy dear,\n\nMinister of Law, Justice & Company Affairs, India, New Delhi-11000 I.\n\nMarch 18, 1981\n\nIt has respeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations th at to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated.\n\nSomehow, no start could be made in the past in this direction. The feeling is strong, growing and justified ti. at some effective steps should be taken very early in this direction.\n\n2. In this context, I would request you to-\n\n(a) obtain from all the Additional Judges working in the High Court of your State their consent to be appointed as Permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country. They could, in addition, be requsted to name three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as Permanent Judges; and\n\n(b) Obtain from persons who have already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in the country along with a similar preference for three High Courts.\n\nWhile obtaining the consent and the preference of the pers011~ )ll\\:ntiOQ\\lQ ip paragraph 2 above, it may be\n\n~.i>. OUPTA v. UNI~N (Tuizapurkar, i.)\n\nmade clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of Government either in regard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the preferences given.\n\n 4. I would be grateful if action is initiated very early by you and the written consent and preferences of all Additional Judges as well as of persons recommended by you for initial appointment are sent to me within a fortnight of the receipt of this letter.\n\n5. I am also sending a copy of this letter to the Chief Justice of your High Court.\n\nWith regards,\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (P. Shivshankar)\"\n\nIt further appears that prior to as well as after the issuance of the aforesaid Circular letter.by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981, in several High Courts, including High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi. the President of India acting under Art. 224 granted short-term extensions for three months, six months or a year to sitting Additional Judges whose initial terms were about to expire but since such. short-term extensions became a frequent phenomenon. particularly after the issuance of the aforesaid Circular letter, it created great consternation in the legal and judicial circles in the country. These two actions of the Union 'Government, namely, the issuance of the Circular letter dated March IS, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions led to legal action being taken challenging the same which is the subject matter of the instant adjudication.\n\nHaving regard to their high position as a consitutional functionary all the sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, though agitated by these two actions of the Union Government understandably felt reluctant to adopt legal steps against the same (barring the exception of Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar who as a party-respondent to the writ petition filed in Delhi High Court has actively supported the challenge to these actions and has also challenged the further action of dropping him\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS (19821 2 s.c.A.\n\nout-right that occurred during the pendency of the pettition) but the legal profession which was vitally interested in the maintenance of an indepenent and fearless Judiciary-with its concomitant power of judicial review-a basic feature of our Constitution and also a necessary postulate for the legal profession, felt terribly disturbed and thought of taking action challenging the same and the sequel was the filing of four writ petitions one in Allahabad High Court, two in Delhi High Court and one in the Bombay High Court, all of which were transferred to this Court, being Transferred Case No. 19 of 1981\n\nShree Gupta's Writ petition No. 4845/81 in the Allahabad High Court), Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981 (Shri Tarkunde's Writ Petition No. 882/81 in Delhi High Court), Transferred Case No. 21 of 1981 (Shri Kalra's Writ Petition No. 636/81 in Delhi High Court) and Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981 (Shri Iqbal Chagla's Writ Petition No. 527/81 in the Bombay High Court). Excepting the Transferred Case No. 21 of 1981 where only short term extensions are challenged, in the other three cases both the actions have been challenged.\n\nAccording to the petitioners both the aforesaid actions of the Union Government forming part of a Scheme constitute a direct attack on ihe independence of the Judiciary, which is a basic feature of our Constitution, and being .ilegal and unconstitutional are liable to be and deserve to be quashed or struck down. As regards Circular letter it is pointed out that it is in two parts; (i) in relation to sitting Additional Judges in all the States of India(except Noth-Eastern States) it seeks to obtain their consent in substance to their transfer as Permanent Judges to states other than their own and(ii)in relation to the proposed appointees(either from the Bar or services) for initial appointment (either as Additional or Permanent Judges) it seeks to obtain their consent for being appointed to any other High Court in the country '.meaning other than their home-State High Court); and in this behalf it also seeks from them their choice by naming three High Courts ia order of preference to which they would prefer to go; and this is being done with a view to implement the policy of having one-third of the Judges of a High Court, as far as possible, from out side the State in which that High Court is situated on grounds of furthering national integration and combating narrow parochial tendencies, bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations.\n\nAccording to the petitioners this Circular letter seeks to effect, in substance and reality, a mass transfer of sitting Additional Judges as also of\n\nS.1'. GUPTA v. UNION (Tu/zupurkar, J. ) 889\n\nthe proposed appointees based on a policy decision unilaterally taken by the Law Minister/Uni0n Government and as such violates the requirements of Art. 222 (1) of the Constitution as laid down by this Court in Shankal Chand Seth' s(1) case inasmuch as such mass transfers on alleged grounds of policy are outside its scope and further it reduces the efficacy of the consultation with the Chief Justice of India contemplated therein to a meaningless formality by presenting a transfer proposal to him as a fait accompli, the same being backed by the consent of the concerned Judge or the proposed appointee to his transfer. It is also contended that the Circular Jetter is illegal as being without authority of law. Thirdly, as far as the sitting Additional Judges are concerned, it is contended that. inasmuch as para 3 of the Circular letter makes it clear that even if consent is given and preference is indicated there is no commitment on the part of the Government either to appoint them as Permanent Judges or accept their preference, the said letter contains, by implication, a threat, to them that if they do not give their consent they will not be either continued as Additional Judges or confirmed as Permanent Judges, the said statement in para 3, by necessary implication, also contains a threat that the Government would watch their performance in matters to which the Government, Government Bodies and Corporations are parties before them and would appoint them as Permanent Judges only if they were found to toe the Government line and as such it constitutes gross interference with administration of justice and is subversive of judicial independence; moreover, the consent is sought to be obtained under threat, coercion and duress and also in advance and in abstract and the same would be no consent in law. As regards the proposed appointees it introduces any additional qualification for being appointed as additional or Permanent Judge not warranted by\n\nthe Constitution. Fourthly, it is contended that the said statement in para 3 of the Circular letter also shows that there was no justification for writing the said letter at all and the same was written mo/a fide for a collateral purpose, namely, to by-pass Art. 222 and confront the Chief Justice of India with a fait accompli when the proposal to transfer such Judge would be forwarded to him; further to exercise the power of appointing additional Judges not for the purpose for which that power has been conferred but for the purpose of carrying out the so-called \"policy\" o the Goverment is also ma/a fide in the sense that th: power is being exercised for a collateral purpose foreign to the purpose indicated in Art. 224.\n\nFifthly, the petitioners have contended that the Circular letter, under\n\nfl) [1978] ISC R 423.\n\n890 SUPREME COtiRT REPORTS [1982j 2 s.c.ii.\n\nwhich absolute power and discretion is claimed to the effect that there is no obligation on the part of the Union Government to continue the sitting Additional Judges after the expiry of their initial term notwithstanding pendency of arrears of work or to make them permanent as and when permanent vacancies become available and to appoint different persons for different periods as Additional Judges in the vacancies of sitting Additional Judges after their initial terms have expired, is a clear abuse of the power conferred by Art. 224 (I) of the Constitution, because the power being purposive is coupled with a duty to exercise the same when the conditions precedent mentioned in the provision exist and the Circular letter which claims such absolute power is violative of the provisions of Art. 224; in any case the course proposed in the said Circular letter in exercise of such absolute power claimed thereunder is contrary to the established constitutional convention and practice (specified later) that has grown over the years in the matter of appointment of A, dditional Judges and confirming them as Permanent Judges and, therefore, bad in law inasmuch as Art. 224 (I) has been interpreted and worked having regard to the said convention and practice. Sixthly, the petitioners have contended that the Circular letter is violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes invidious discrimination against those who would be refusing to furnish their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent will be at an advantage and even within the class of those who would be furnishing their consent it gives to the Government unfettered and unguided power or discretion to pick and choose i. e. select some for being shifted to High Courts other than their home State\n\nHigh Courts and to retain and appoint others in their home- State High Courts-which power can be exercised either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism; and in this behalf reliance is placed on the Law Minister's statement made in Parliament in response to a Calling Attention Motion by some Hon'ble Members on 16th April, 1981 to the effect \"it is not the intention of the Government _to appoint all Additional Judges to outside Courts\". Without prejudice to these contentions, it is lastly contended by the petitioners that in the appointment of Additional Judges of one High Court as Permanent Judges of another High Court or in the appointments of the Members of the Bar practising in one High Court as Additional or Permanent Judges of another High Court pursuant to the consent obtained under the said Circular letter. the consultation with the Governor of that other State and particularly with the Chief Justice of that other High Court would be illusory and an empty formality and as such the said Circular\n\n...\n\nU>, GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) Mt\n\nletter is violative of the . Art. 217 of the Constitution.\n\nFor these reasons the petitioners have prayed for the quashing of the said Circular letter as also of the consent, if any, obtained thereunder. as being illegal, unconstitutional and void and its withdrawal, non. use and non implementation by the Government.\n\nAs regards shortterm extensions for three months, six months or a year granted to sitting Additional Judges upon the expiry of their initial term, which have become a frequent phenomenon after the issuance of the Circular letter dated March 18, 1981, the petitioners have contended that such shortterm extensions are directly subversive of the independence of Judiciary and not contemplated by the Constitution.\n\nAccording to the petitioners the power to appoint an Additional Judge \"for such period not exceeding two years as the President may specify\" in Art. 224(1) has invariably been exercised by appointing Additional Judges initially for a period of two years, which has come to be regarded as the 'normal term', that when the said period is about to expire if there is no vacancy of a Permanent Judge in that Court it has been the practice to continue such Judges for a further term of two years and if a permanent vacancy arises to confirm the seniormost among them as a Judge of that High Court.\n\nThe petitioners have contended that such a constitutional convention and practice has grown over the years and the provisions of Art. 224(1) have been worked in accordance with such convention and practice. Itis further pointed out that when a member of the Bar is appointed as an Additional Judge of a High Court an undertaking is usually given by him to the Chief Justice that if and when a .Permanent Judgeship of the Court is offerred to him he will accept it but if he declines to do so he will not practise before that High Court or any Court or Tribunal subordinate to it; (at any rate, such an undertaking is obtained in the Bombay High Court), the postulate of such undertaking is that an Additional Judge appointed from the Bar should not be allowed to revert to the Bar and, far from being dropped, will be offered a permanent vacancy as and when it arises in that court.\n\nIn other words a member of the Bar who accepts the appointment of an Additional Judge has legitimate expectation that he will be confirmed as Permanent Judge of that High Court when a vacancy occurs and in the past he has been confirmed except in the rarest of cases.\n\nAccording to the petitioners the power claimed under Art. 224(1) not to continue the Additional Judge, even if temporary increase in the Court's business persists or pendency of arrears justifies such continuance, after the expiry of the initial term\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nand not to make him permanent even if a vacancy of permanent post occurs and to appoint another person as Additional Judge by ignoring the legitimate expectancy of the sitting incumbent whose initial term has expired, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognised and established practice, amounts to breach of faith with the concerned Judge and further to ask such Additional Judge who has given such undertaking to agree in advance to a transfer (or even to accept fresh appointment) to other High Courts as a Permanent Judge also involves similar breach of faith . with that Judge; such departure and breach of faith amounts to a clear abuse of power and the purported exercise of the power in that manner would be illegal and void. So also the claim made by the Government that Art. 224(1) only fixes the maximum period of two years at a time, tbat the Article does not limit the discretion of the Government in the matter of the period for which an Additional Judge can be appointed except in regard to the ceiling of two years, and that the appointment can be for a shorter period and that period is not justiciable is untenable in law and clearly wrong because, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognized and established practice, it introduces an element of insecurity of tenure having serious repercussions on the independence of Judiciary and also undermines people's confidence and faith in it.\n\nIt may be stated that the petitioners have cited specific instances of Additional Judges having been granted shortterm extensions for three months, six months or a year in Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi High Courts and have also cited instances of Additional Judges being dropped in the purported exercise of such absolute power claimed under Art. 224( I).\n\nGrievance has specifically been made in respect of the individual cases of three Judges of the Delhi High Court, (a) Mr. Jmtice 0.N. Vohra (as he then was), (b) Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar (as he then was) and (c) Mr. Justice S.B. Wad. It is pointed out that these three Judges were initially appointed with effect from 7.3.1979 as Additional Judges in the Delhi High Court for a term of two years but on the expiry of the said initial term each one of them was granted a short-term extension of three months with effect from 7.3.1981 and at the expiry of their said period of three months on 6.6.198 l the first two have been dropped out-right and Mr. Justice Wad has been granted an extension for a further period of one year with effect from 7.6.1981. Such short-term extensions for three months granted to all the three after the expiry of their initial term of two years, as also the short-term extension of\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\none year granted to Justice Wad with effect from 7.6.1981 have been challenged as being illegal and unconstitutional and the out-right dropping of the first two Judges has been challenged also on the ground of malafides both legal and factual in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981; however, relief is claimed only in respect of the dropping of Mr. S.N. Kumar and not of Mr. O.N. Vohra.\n\nJn the context of their challange to short-term extensions the petitioners have submitted that Art. 216 of the Constitution casts a primary obligation upon the President mandatorily to provide adequate strength of Permanent Judges to cope with the normal business in every High Court so as to ensure its disposal within reasonable time and to review such strength from time to time so that arrears do not accumulate and justice to litigants is not unduly delayed, while the power to appoint Additional Judges under Art. 224( I) (a provision substituted in its present form by the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956) and the exercise thereof are only dependent upon the fulfilment of either of the two conditions mentio ned therein, namely, (a) temporary increase in the business of a High Court or (b) arrears of work therein; and it is only upon the fulfilment of either one or the other or both the conditions in a High Court that the President can appoint duly qualified persons to be Additional Judges of that Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify, but if the said conditions are not fulfilled and the objective facts unmistakably demonstrate that the increase of business is not of a temporary character but is a permanent increase every year or that the arrears have increased and accumula ted to an appreciably disturbing level with no reasonable prospects of substantially reducing the same over a period of years, the President cannot resort to Art. 224( 1) but has to increase the permanent strength by making permanent appointments under Art. 217. In any case Additional Judges cannot be appointed while keeping permanent posts vacant as is happening at present frequently.\n\nThe petitioners have further submitted that in view of undisputed data of the regular increase in the normal business of almost all High Courts and mounting arrears therein-a reality being within the knowledge of the President-the decision to keep a large number of sitting Judges as Additional Judges would be arbitrary and unconstit1.1tional and a clear case exists for declaring them to be deemed to have become permanent or directing the President to make them permanent by appropriately increasing permanent strength in the concerned High Courts and this Court should pass appropriate orders in this behalf.\n\nSUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS [19&21 2 s.c.it.\n\nThe contesting respondents (who are mainly the Union of India and the Union Law Minister) through Counter-Affidavits filed by Shri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, have resisted the writ petitions on several grounds. In the first place it is contended that the petitioners (barring Shri S.N. Kumar who as party-respondent in Transfer Case No. 20 of 1981 has supported the challenge and sought relief) who are legal practioners have no direct interest in the subject matter of the writ petitions and cannot be regarded as the persons aggrieved by the impugned actions of the Government and therefore have no locus standi and as such the petitions are liable to be dismissed.\n\nSecondly, it is contended that though Shri S.N.\n\nKumar could be regarded as a person aggrieved by the impugned actions of the Government, he being a sitting Additional Judge from whom consent under the Circular letter was sought and was granted a short-term extension, his tenure having come to an end by effiux of the period for which he was appointed he is no longer concerned with the impugned Circular letter nor with the short-term that had been granted to him and after he has ceased to be a Judge of the Delhi High Court he does not have any vested or enforceable right against the President or the Union Government in the matter of either continuation as an Additional Judge or appointment as a Permanent Judge and, therefore, bis challenge as a party-respondent to the governmental action is not maintainable; in other words, even on the assumption that the Government's actions are not warranted by the constitutional provisions, the invalidity or unconstitutionality thereof does not give any corresponding right to him to sustain the petition; in any .event the tenure fixed by the warrant of his appointment as an Additional Judge having expired Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar has no enforceable right either to continue as an Additional Judge or to be appointed as Permanent Judge inasmuch as the power to appoint a person a Judge of a High Court is discretionary with the President and such discretion cannot be controlled by judicial review by issuance of a mandamus and he is not entitled to any relief.\n\nAs regards the impugned Circular letter it is contended that it does not deal with transfer of sitting Additional Judges or of the proposed appointees from one High Court to another nor does it seek to obtain consent for such transfer but in relation to sitting Additional Judges it seeks to obtain their consent for being appointed as Permanent Judges to another High Court and in relation to the proposed appointees it seeks to obtain their consent for their\n\n.,.\n\n~.t>. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 895\n\ninitial appointment (either as Additional or Permanent) to a High Court other than their home-State High Court and the action proposed to be taken thereunder is for purposes of Art. 217 of the Constitution; it is the case of the contesting respondents that when an Additional Judge on the expiry of his initial term or extended term is appointed as a permanent Judge it is a fresh appointment by warrant under Art. 217 and there is no question of any transfer being involved in such a case and obviously in the case of a proposed appointee (either from the Bar or services) when he is being initially appointed there is no question of any transfer in his case either; in othar words, according to the contesting respondents Art. 222(1) of the Constitution is not attracted at all and as such there is no question of the Circular letter violating the requirements of the said article, much less there being any intention on the part of the contesting respondents either to by-pass Art. 222(1) or to reduce the efficacy of consultation of the Chief Justice of India contemplated therein in any manner. It is emphatically denied that any mass transfers or individual transfers based on any policy decision are being effected under the impugned Circular letter.\n\nIt is denied that the Circular letter is intended to affect the independence of the judiciary in any manner or that the Circular letter contains any threat of the type suggested or at all to the sitting Additional Judges while seeking their consent. It is also denied that the consent that is sought to be obtained under the Cireular letter is being obtained under threat, coercion or duress or that the same is in abstract and it is pointed out that for making fresh appointments of sitting .Additional Judges, after the expiry of their term, to another High Court and for making initial appointments of the proposed appointees to a High Court other than their home-State High Court their consent would naturally be required under Art. 217 and it is such consent that is being obtained from them under the Circular letter. It is further denied that the statement contained in para 3 of the Circular letter shows that there is no justification for writing the said letter at all or that the same was written ma/a fide for collateral purposes as suggested or otherwise; it is pointed out that the legal and constitutional position even before the sending of the Circular letter was that there was no commitment on the part of the Government to appoint every Additional Judge as the Permanent Judge and the true purport of para 3 of the said letter is that the furnishing of consent will not change that position and will not now imply a commitment and it was necessary to make the legal and constitutional position clear lest a different impression was created as also to avoid any kgal arguments based . on the theory of promissory estoppel.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.11.\n\nAccording to the contesting respondents it is for the purpose of implementing the policy of having one-third of the Judges of a High Court from outside that the Circular letter has been issued and it is a preliminary step in the direction of obtaining and collecting data and information from persons who would be willing to get appointed in other High Courts so that such information could be made available to the Chief Justice of India as also to the State authoritie> and the Chief Justices of .the concerned High Courts for effective consultation as envisaged in Art. 217 and as such the Circular letter is perfectly legal and within the authority of Jaw. It is denied that the Circular letter confers unbridled or unguided power on the Executive to pick and choose certain Judges for being transferred or shifted to other High Courts; it is pointed out that such a contention is wholly mis-conceived for two reasons, namely, that the letter does not speak of transfers at all but appointments to other High Courts and secondly it cannot arm the Executive with any powers, for whatever powers the Executive has are derived from the provisions of the Constitution and that the Law Minister's statement in the Parliament on 16th April, 1981 has to be understood in the context in which it was made.\n\nIt is further denied that in appointing Additional Judges of one High Court as Permanent Judges of another High Court or in appointing Members of the Bar practising in one High Court as Additional or Permanent Judges of another High Court pursuant to the consent given under the Circular letter, the consultation with the Governor of that other State or with the Chief Justice of that other High Court would become illusory or an empty formality because the data and particulars of the person proposed to be appointed collected from other sources can and would be made available to the Governor of that other State as also to the Chief Justice of that other High Court and it is not the requirement of Art. 217 that the constitutional functionaries mentioned therein should be aware of such data and particulars of their personal knowledge; in fact, even the Chief Justice of the home-State High Court, it is conceivable, may not have personal knowledge in that behalf and may have to collect the data and particulars from other sources.\n\nIn other words, it is contended that if the data and particulars of the person proposed to be appointed is collected by a Chief Justice from other sources, his advice does not become illusory or an empty formality and as such the Circular letter cannot be said to be violative of Art. 217.\n\nAs regards short-term extensions for three months, six months, of il yeilr grilnted to sitting Additional Judges upon the expiry of the\n\n...\n\n!l.ti. otJtitA \\i, tJNI01'1 (Tulzapurkar, J.) 891\n\nInitial term and the other submissions made by the petitioners in regard to the President's powet undet Arts. 216, 211 and 224(1) the contesting tespondettt!i have relied Upon the provisions of these Articles ror their true and proper construction; according to them reading Arts. 217(1) and 224(1) together the position in law is clear\n\nthat no Additional Judge has any legal or constitutional right to be continued as an Additional Judge on the expiry of his initial or extended term or to be made a Permanent Judge even if a vacancy occurs in a permanent post in his High Court. Strictly speaking, the tenure of an Additional Judge is fixed by the warrant of his appointment and on the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court and in either extending him for a further term as an Additional Judge in the same High Court or in making him permanent in the vacany in a permanent post, a fresh appointment is involved, and the consultative process envisaged in Art. 217(1) is attracted; in other words he is in the same position as a proposed appointee for initial appointment and the same position obtains if it is intended to make him a Permanent Judge in some other High Court. It is further contended that the provisions of the concerned Articles being very clear and unambiguous no convention or practice that might have grown in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges and confirming them as Permanent Judges (which is denied) can alter or affect the interpretation of the said provisions.\n\nEven an undertaking of the type indicated 'by the petitioners if obtained from a member of the Bar while appointing him as an Additional Judge cannot affect the true meaning and construction of the concer ned provisions.\n\nIt is further contended that assuming (without admitting) that an Additional Judge of a High Court gives the kind of undertaking mentioned by the petitioners, particularly of the type that is said to be usually obtained from him in the Bombay High Court, no illegality takes place in asking him if he would agree to be appointed as a Permanent Judge in any other High Court, as he shall be so appointed only in pursuance of his consent. It is further contended that if on true construction of these two Articles it is clear that an Additional Judge has no vested legal or constitutional right to be continued or to become permanent then it must be open to the President to appoint different persons, who are fully qualified, to be Additional Judges during different periods for disposing of the arrears, though such appointments will have to be necessarily made in accordance with the constitutional requirements of Art.\n\n217. The contesting respondents have contended that the volume of work in a High Court is of rc;)c; vl111ce in deciding whethel'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.i.\n\nAdditional Judges should be appointed and the same is of no relevance with regard to a particular person to be appointed. Regardiug short-term extensions that were granted it is explained that they became necessary pending completion of inquiries into the complaints that had been received against the concerned Additional Judges and the constitutional functionaries desired to satisfy themselves in that behalf before taking a final view.\n\nAs regards the individual cases of the three Judges of the Delhi High Court it is pointed out that so far as Justice Wad is concerned he has now been granted a long term of one year with effect from 7.6.1981 and he can have no grievance and as regards the out-right dropping of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar it is denied that the same is illegal\n\nor unconstitutional or mala fide either in law or in fa ct; and it is pointr.d out that since Shri Vohra is not seeking any relief before the Court the action of dropping him need not be pronounced upon by this Court and so far as Shri S.N. Kumar is concerned, action being proper no relief can be granted to him. It is disputed that this Court can grant the relief by way of declaring the sitting Additional Judges to be deemed to have become permanent or by directing the President to make them permanent by appropriately increasing the permanent strength in the concerned High Courts.\n\nAs stated at the outset by these writ petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution the legality or constitutionality of the two actions of the Union Government, namely, the issuance of the Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions to sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, is being challenged and the first question raised by the contesting respondents relates to the locus standi of the petitioners, who are legal practitioners in Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi High Courts, to maintain their petitions seeking relief against these two impugned actions.\n\nJn my view the question of locus standi of the petitioners in these cases has become academic inasmuch as admittedly in the writ petition filed by Shri Tarkunde in Delhi High Court (being writ petition No. 882/81) Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar (as he then was), impkaded as a party-respondent, has supported the challenge and sought reliefs in respect of these impugned actions and as such the challenges made will have to be gone into and decided by this Court.\n\nIn the case of Dwarkadas Srinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. and others(1) the constitutionality of the impugned Ordinance II of 1950 as well as of the Act XXVIII of 1950 which re-\n\n(1) [1954) SCR. 674.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 899\n\nplaced it, whereunder the management of the Mills was taken over and run by the Directors appointed by the Central Government, was challenged by Shri Dwarkadas Srinivas (plaintiff), a preference share-holder of the Company and he also sought relief by quashing the demand made for calls in respect of unpaid share capital by the nominated Directors; a contention was raised about the locus standi of the plaintiff to maintain the suit on the ground that it was the Company who ought to have filed the suit as it was affected by the impugned Ordinance and the Act. This Court took the view that the contention was of no avail because the Company had been impleaded as a defendant to the suit and its old Directors had made an application to the Court supporting the case of the plaintiff on the ground that the Ordinance and the Act were void as they infringed the Company's fundamental right under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. At page 714 of the report Justice Mahajan (as he then was), who delivered the main judgment of the Court, observed thus :\n\n\"I am further of the opinion that the question of the locus standi of the plaintiff to raise the plea that the Ordinance being void against the Company the Directors had no authority to make the call, is really of academic interest in this case because here the company has been impleaded as a defendant. Its old directors have made an application to this Court supporting the case of the plaintiff on the .ground that the Ordinance is void as it infringes the company's fundamental right under Article 31(2).\"\n\nIii view of this legal position the learned Attorney-General for the Union of India made a statement at the Bar that he would not be pressing the contention relating to locus standi of the petitioners.\n\nHowever, Counsel for the Union Law Minister, one of the contesting respondents, argued the contention at great length, by referring to a large number of decided cases English, American and Indian as well as by relying on passages and extracts from treatises of wellknown authors, on the ground that in the other three writ petitions none of the concerned sitting Additional Judges had come forward to support the challenge and the maintainability of these writ petitions will have to be decided by this Court. Since the said contention has been fully and elaborately discussed and dealt with by my brother Bhagwati in his judgment, I purpose to deal with it very briefly.\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nCounsel for the Union Law Minister. has urged that the petitioners who are legal practitioners have no direct interest in the subject-matter of the writ petitions and cannot be regarded as 'person aggrieved' by the two impugned actions, which really affect, if at all, the sitting Additional ludges, who would be the aggrieved persons and it is not as if they are under any disability to approach the Court for redress, as is shown by the fact that one of them has done so and supported the challenge. It is contended that though as practising lawyers either in their individual capacity or as representing some of the Lawyers Associations the petitioners may be professionally interested in having a fearless and independent Judiciary for proper administration of justice that by itself is not sufficient to give them the 'standing' to prosecute the petitions for the reliefs sought, which really concern the sitting, Additional Judges and not the lawyers. It is further submitted that even in 'public interest litigations', (usually called 'public injury cases') though a liberal approach is adopted by the Courts to reach all forms of injustice, the personal injury test is not ruled out but at times the test of 'sufficient connection or 'special interest' is applied but in the ins1ant case the petitioners neither qualitatively nor quantitatively have sufficient connection or special interest to prosecute the petitions, the result of which would not affect them either directly or even indirectly.\n\nSince several decisions cited at the Bar on the question of locus standi show that the attitudes of the Courts in England, United States and this country have not been uniform but have varied from case to case any attempt at laying down a general principle for universal application would be futile.\n\nI would, however, prefer to confine my attention to a few decisions of this Court, which, according to me, throw sufficient light on this issue. It may be stated that in two decisions, namely Adi P Gandhi'(') case and Dabholkar' s(') case the question of locas standi was considered in the context of the interpretation of the expression \"persons aggrieved\" occurring in ss. 37 and 38 of the Advocates Act of 1961.\n\nJn the former case, in relation to certain disciplinary proceedings which had ended in no action being taken against the advocate concerned, the question was whether the Advocate General of the State was an \"aggrieved person\" within the meaning of s. 37 of the Act\n\n(I) [1971] 1 S.C.R: 863.\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 901\n\nfor the purpose of preferring an appeal under that section and this Court by majority held that he was not and his appeal was incompetent while the minority took a contrary view.\n\nAfter this decision had been rendered, ss. 37 and 38 (which provided for an appeal to the Bar Council of India and an appeal to the Supreme Court respectively) of the Act were amended by expressly giving the right of appeal to the Advocate General and the Attorney General suggesting hy implication a legislative approval and acceptance of the minority view in that case.\n\nIn the latter case, the errant advocate having succeeded before th~ Bar Council of India, the State Bar Council preferred an appeal to this Court under s. 3 8 and the question arose whether the State Bar Council was a 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of s. 38 and a Bench of 7-Judges of this Court held upon a survey of the provision:; of the Act and its scheme and purpose that the State Bar Council was a 'person aggrieved'.\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. while delivering a concurring judgment quote_d with approval Lord Denning's observations on the Attorney General's standing in the well known case of the Attorney- General of the Gambia v. Pi err a Sarr N Jie(1) to the following effect :\n\n\"... The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive intepretation They do not include, of course, a mere busy-body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudically affects his interest.\n\nHas the Attorney-General a sufficient interest for this purpose? Their Lordships think that he has.\n\nThe Attorney- General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring before the Judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action.\"\n\nThereafter he proceeded to plead for a wider view being taken of locus standi in public interest litigations and derived support for his plea from certain observations of Professor S.A. de Smith and Professor H.W.R. Wade, which he quoted, and then went. on to observe thus:\n\n\"The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced\n\n(1) [1961] A.C. 617.\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nbecause public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to tthe justice system. In this very case, to grant an exclusionary wind-fall on the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards.\"\n\nIn Municipal Council Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand and Ors.(1) this Court upheld the right of the residents of a certain locality in Ratlam town to adopt proceedings under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the Municipal Council compelling it to provide certain basic amenities like sanitary facilities on the roads, public conveniences for slum dwellers who were using the road for that purpose and to abate nuisance by constructing drain pipes with flow of water to wash the filth and stop the stench.\n\nWhile permitting such legal action ventilating public grievances Krishna Iyer, J. observed thus :\n\n• \"The truth is that a few profound issues of processual jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal system face us and we must zero in on them as they involve problems of access to justice for the people beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of British India vintage.\n\nIf the centre of gravity of justice is to shift, as the Preamble to the Constitution mandates, from the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community orientation of public interest litigation, these issues must be considered. In that sense, the case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the citizens of a ward, is a path-finder in the field of people's involvement in the justicing process, sans which as Prof. Sikes points out (Melvyn P. Sikes, Administration of Justice), the system may 'crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity'.\n\nThe key question we have to answer is whether by affirmative action a court can compel a statutory body to carry out its duty to the community by constructing sanitation facilities at great cost and on a timebound basis. At issue is the coming of age of that branch of public law bearing on community actions and the Court's power to force public bodies under public duties to implement specific plans in response to public grievances.\"\n\n(I) [1981] I SCR 97.\n\n..,..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 903\n\nIn the Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Unions(1) case the question for consideration was whether the workers in a factory owned b' Government could question the legality and or validity of the sale of certain plants and equipment of the factory by the management and though the Court ultimately did not interfere because it did not find the sale to be unjust and unfair or mala fide on the maintainability of the challenge the Court has made certain observations having a bearing on the aspect of the workers' locus standi.\n\nChief Justice Chandrachud at p. 65 of the Report has observed thus :\n\n\"Hut, we feel concerned to point out that the maintainability of a writ petition which is correlated to the existence and violation of a fundamental right is not always to be confused with the locus to bring a proceeding under Article 32.\n\nThese two matters often mingle and coalesce with the result that it becomes difficult to consider them in watertight compartments. The question whether a person has the locus to file a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Art. 226 or under Art. 32 of the Constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or at least a section of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations.\n\nPublic enterprises are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people.\n\nThe accountability of the public sector to the Parliament is iQ.effective because the Parliamentary control of public enterprises is \"diffuse and haphazard\".\n\nWe are not too sure if we would have refused relief to the workers if we had found that the sale was unjust, unfair or mala fide.\"\n\nSince the question as regards 'access to justice', particularly under Art. 226 of the Constitution, was dealt with Krishna Iyer, J. at some length, Chief Justice Chandrachud did not consider it necessary to\n\n(I) [l9ol] 2 S.C.R. 52.\n\n\n[1982] 2 S, C.R.\n\ndwell upon that topic.\n\nOn that aspect Krishna Iyer, J. has at p. 74 of the Report made the following observations :\n\n\"Public interest litigation is part of the process of participative justice and 'standing' in Civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial doorsteps.\n\nThe floodgates argument has been nailed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission :\n\n'The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the court room.' (Prof. K.E. Scott : \"Standing in the Supreme Court : A Functional Analysis\" (1973) 86.)\n\nAgain at p. 77 of the Report this is what he has observed :\n\n\"If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the Court will not be ajar for him.\n\nBut he belongs to an organization which has special interest in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busy-body, he cannot be told off at the gates. although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered. I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Art. 226.\"\n\nIn the instant case the impugued Circular as well as the shortterm extensions, according to the petitioners, are directly subversive of judicial independence, which is a basic feature of our Constitution, in the upholding of which not merely the sitting Additional Judges but also the lawyers practising in various High Courts are keenly interested. In fact, in the task of administration of justice the role of Judges and the role of lawyers are complementary to each other and the practising lawyers as a class are an integral part of justicing machinery rendering assistance to the Judges in the discharge of their function of reaching justice to the litigants appearing before the Courts; in other words the practising lawyers who are nothing short of partners in the task of administration of justice undertaken by the Judges, are vitally interested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent Judiciary to ensure fair and fearless\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 905\n\njustice to the litigants. That being the position, can it be said that the petitioners either in their individual capacity or as representing some cf the Lawyers' Associations (as is the case in the Bombay petition) are way-farers, interlopers, officious interveners or busybodies without any interest or concern of their own in the subjectmatter? In my view, the petitioners either in their individual capacity or representing Lawyers' Association have not merely sufficient interest but special interest of their own in the subjectmatter of the writ petitions and they cannot be told off at the gates and the petitions at their instance are clearly maintainable.\n\nThe next contention urged on behalf of the contesting respondents has been that though Shri S.N. Kumar could be regarded as a person aggrieved by the two impugned actions of the Government, he being a sitting Additional Judge from whom consent under the Circular letter was sought and was also granted a short-term extension, the issues raised in the case are not ju, ticiable at his instance, much less at the instance of the petitioners. The contention is that Shri Kumar's term having come to an end by efflux of period for which he was appointed he is no longer concerned with the impugned Circular-letter nor with the short-term extension that had been granted to him and after he has ceased to be a Judge of the Del.hi Hlgh Court he does not have any vested or enforceable right against the President or the Union Government in the matter of either continuation as an Additional Judge or appointment as a permanent Judue and, therefore, his challenge to the governmental action is not maintainable.\n\nIn this behalf Counsel contended that in either extending an Additional Judge for a further term or in making him a Permanent Judge in the vacancy of a permanent post, a fresh appointment is involved by issuance of a fresh warrant under Art. 217(1) and the position of an Additional Judge on the expiry of his initial or extended term is exactly the same as that of a proposed candidate for initial appointment in that neither has any enforceable right to be considered for the post, much less to be appointed to it. Counsel pointed out that Art. 217( I) confers power upon the President to appoint High Court Judges subject to the consultations mentioned therein but the President has a discretion in the matter which cannot be controlled by judicial review by issuance of a mandamus; in any event, non-appointment of a proposed candidate for initial recruitment or non-continuance of an Additional Judge on the expiry of his term does not give rise to any enforceable obligation against the President/Union Government and in favour of the person who is not appointed or not continued and, therefore,\n\n.906\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOTTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\neven a breach of the constitutional mandate, such as total lack of consultation or lack of full and effective consultation or consultation getting vitiated by malafides, merely amounts to a case of complete non-sequitor. In other words, Counsel contended that even on the assumption that the Government's actions are not warranted by the constitutional provisions, the invalidity or unconstitutionality thereof does not give any corresponding right to Shri S.N. Kumar to sustain the petition.\n\nThe aforesaid contention of Counsel for the contesting respondents directly raises two questions : (i) whether the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or services), who are being recommended for their initial appointments, and the sitting Additional Judges, whose cases for their continued appointments either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges on the expiry of their initial term are to be decided, stand in the same class or category or is there any difference-a valid difference between the two and (ii) whether the nonappointment either at the stage of initial recruitment or at the stage of continuance furnishes any actionable wrong for issuance of a mandamus? In the context of these questions Articles 217(1) and 224(1) will have to be considered. Art. 217(1) runs thus:\n\n\"217(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty two years.\"\n\nArticle 224 runs thus :\n\n\"224.(1) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the Judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\"\n\nIt cannot be disputed that Judges of the High Court occupy a high constitutional position and a special machinery is provided for\n\n\" S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 907\n\ntheir appointment. For obvious reasons, the post of a High Court Judge is not filled in by inviting applications through advertisements nor by holding test interviews; funher, the minimum qualifications for appoinment as a Judge (prescribed in sub-Art. (2) of Art. 217) would be possessed by numerous advocates and by a fair number of service Judges but even so, the special machinery for making appointments is indicated in Art. 217(1), obviously designed to recruit persons of great ability, high character and unquestioned integrity to the Bench.\n\nAll these factors go to show that at the stage of initial recruitment under Art. 217(1), no one has a right to be appointed a Judge of the High Court nor the right to be considered for such appointment and, therefore, it does appear that the writ of mandamus at the instance of an aggrieved person would not lie.\n\nBut at the same time I am quite sure whether simply because a mandamus directing the President to reconsider the case of a nonappointee may not lie it would be correct to say that in the case of non-appointment at the stage of initial recruitment the mandate of consultation becomes otiose, superficial or inconsequential, or that a positive breach thereof may not provide any relief whatever to the aggrieved person but since that question does not arise in the instant case I would rather leave it open for decision in an appropriate case and proceed on the basis that a mandamus for reconsideration of his case would not lie as the aggrieved person does not have the right to be considered. But question is whether the sitting Additional Judges, whose continuance either for an extended term or as Permanent Judges is to be determined on the expiry of their initial term, stand in the same position as that of proposed appointees for initial appointment ?\n\nIt is true that, unlike a Permanent Judge whose tenure is fixed by reference to his age, the tenure of an Additional Judge when appointed under Art. 224(1) is fixed by the warrant of his appointment and on the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrnnt he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court. It is also true that this continuance as an Additional Judge for any further term or as a Permanent Judge in the vacancy of a permanent post cannot be thought of unless for continuance as Additional Judge either one or the other or both the pre-conditions mentioned in Art. 224(1) obtain in that High Court, and for continuance as a Permanent Judge the normal business of the High Court justifies the filling up of the vacancy in the permanent post. In other words pendency of work must justify such continuance-temporary increase in the business of the High Court or arrears of work therein or both for extension\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nof his term and normal business (current institutions) for making him permanent. The question whether obtaining of the pre-conditions mentioned in Art. 224(1) or the pendency of normal business is alone enough for such continuance or any other requirement (suitability as adjudged during the consultation under sub-Art. (I) of Art. 217) is also necessary is a different aspect, which I propose to deal with later and need not be mixed up with the question under consideration at the moment. In other words, granted the preconditions in Art. 224(1) and also the pendency of the normal business, the question is whether an Additional Judge whose term is about to expire has any enforceable right to be considered (even assuming that suitability is also required to be taken into account at this stage) for his continuance either as an Additional Judge for a further term or as a Permanent Judge if a vacancy in the permanent post is available ?\n\nIn order to deal with the aforesaid question, Art. 224(1), inserted in our Constitution by the 7th Amendment Act, 1956, will have\n\nto be considered in proper perspective having regard to the reasons and purposes for which and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted.\n\nPrior to that, in the Government of India Act, 1915 the provision to appoint Additional Judges to any High Court 'as may be required' by the Governor-General in Council was contained in the proviso (i) to Sec. 101 (2) while in the Government of India Act, 1935 the provision was to be found in Sec. 222(3) which was almost in similar terms as the present Article except that the power was conferred on the Governor-General acting in his discretion.' When the Constitution was framed the provision Draft Article 199 was deleted because of the strong plea made against it by several Members of the Constituent Assembly including eminent authorities in this field like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Shri K.M. Munshi and others, mainly on the ground that Members of the Bar recruited as Additional Judges will revert to the Bar on the expiry of their term and such reversion to the Bar was manifestly dangerous to the fair administration of justice and opposed to public interest. In 1956 it was felt that the provision for recalling retired High Court Judges to function on the Bench for short periods (loosely called Ad-hoc Judges) was found to be neither adequate nor satisfactory and the same (original Art. 224) was deleted and replaced by \"a provision for appointment of Additional Judges to clear off arrears\" (vide statement of Objects and Reasons) and the present Art. 224(1) came to be enacted.\n\nIn other words the existence of a large volume of mounting arrears in several High Courts and the necessity to clear\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 909\n\noff the same provided the basis for inserting the provision in the Constitution. That this is the rationale of the provision for appointment of Additional Judges has been clearly indicated by the Madras High Court in Kandasami Pillai v. Muthuvenkataba!a( 1) where in the context of the provision contained in the Government of India Act, 1915 that Court held that \"the object of the proviso to S. 101 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, clearly was to provide for occasions when the permanent strength of the High Court is unable to cope with the work of disposal, but the work is not sufficient to justify the appointment of . another permanent Judge, by enabling additional Judges to be appointed from time to time for such fixed periods not exceeding two years as may be found necessary; the proviso mu&t therefore be read as meaning that appointments may be made from time to time for such period, not exceeding two years, as may be required from time to time on each occasion when the power is exercised.\" (vide Head Note in the Report). Thus, the very purpose and raison d' etre of Art. 224(1) being the existence of arrears of work and clearance thereof, it stands to reason that sitting Additional Judges who have already been selected and appointed for the very purpose must be considered for continued appointments if the arrears obtain and go on mounting in their High Courts.\n\nSecondly, on a comparison of Arts. 216 and 224(1), it will appear clear that the former deals with the appointment of Perma\" nent Judges to dispose of the normal business whereas the latter deals with appointment of Additional Judges whenever there is either a temiJorary increase in the normal business of a High Court or arrears of work therein. It seems the work in a High Court has been classified into three categories. namely, (a) Normal business indicated by the current annual institutions (suits, writs and other proceedings), (b) Sudden temporary increase in business over and above the normal institutions, such as filing of hundreds of petitions challenging an enactment, like for instance Money Lenders Act, which will disappear when the validity or otherwis~ of the enactment is pronounced upon and (c) Arrears of work meaning the normal or ordinary work which the permanent strength has not been able to cope with and dispose of within a reasonable or stated period, say one or two years and has accumulated; and it is clear that Art. 216 has to be resorted to for the first category of work and Art. 224( I) for the other two categories. But it was not disputed\n\n(I) [1917] 33 Mad.L.J. 787.\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nbdore us that Art. 224(1) appears to have been construed and worked by; all concerned under sorre misapprehension in the sense that it has been resorted to even in situations where Art. 216 ought to have been resorted; for, since the insertion of Art. 224(1) in the Constitution it has been the invariable practice to appoint every Judge (whether from the Bar or Services) initially as an Additional Judge for two years and then to make him permanent in due course. i.e. as and when a permanent vacancy arises in that High Court.\n\nSuch a practice, though contrary to the clear intendment of the said two Articles, followed by')he President or the Union Government has given rise to a legitimate expectancy on the part of the sitting Additional Judges (whether from the Bar or Services) to be considered for their continuance either for an extended term or for making them permanent on vacancies arising in permanent posts. fn fact after following such practice over the years and thus putting all the Additional Judges into the belief that they will be confirmed in normal course it does not behove the appointing authority to say that the sitting Additional Judges have no right to be considered for their continuance either for an extnded term or for making them permanent. Clearly, by reason of the said practice though followed under some misapprehension they have such a right.\n\nThirdly, so far as the sitting Additional Judges recruited under Art. 224(1) from the Members of the Bar are concerned, they would be having such legitimate expectancy and the right to be considered for continuance for two additional reasons, namely (a) a well estab lished constitutional convention or practice has grown over the years since after the insertion of the provision in the matter of appointment of such Additional Judges and confirming them as permanent Judges-the convention or practice being, that notwithstanding the words \"for such period not exceeding two years as the President may specify\" occurring in Art. 224( I), the appointing authority has invariably exercised the power under that Article by appointing Additonal Judges initially for a period of two years, which has come to be regarded as the 'normal term', that when the said period is about to expire if there is no vacancy of a permanent Judge in that Court to continue such Judges for a further term of two years and if a permanent vacancy arises to confirm the senior most among them as a Judge of that High Court, and (b) the undertaking taken from them at the time of their initial appointment that \"if and when a permanent Judgeship of that Court is offered to them they will accept it and not decline the same.\" It may be stated that so far as the Born bay High Court is concerned a further undertaking is\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 911\n\nobtained by the Chief Justice of that High Court from such Judges to the further effect that \"if they decline to accept such permanent Judgeship though offered or in case they resign from the Office of Additional Judge even before the question of their confirmation is taken up they will not practice in that High Court or in any Court or Tribunal subordinate to that High Court.\" It may be pointed out that since 1956 barring very few or exceptional instances the aforesaid convention or practice has almost invariably been followed and the same has grown out of two weighty considerations : (I) that it is not in public interest to permit them to revert to the Bar, and\n\n(ii) not to lose or fritter away the experience and expertise gained by them in administering justice during their initial term, and as regards the undertaking mentioned-above the same became necessary because at the time of the insertion of Art. 224(1) into the Constitu tion no provision wa~ inserted imp:>sing any ban or prohibition on practice by such Additional Judges after expiry of their term, as was thought of in 1949 when Draft Articles 199 (dealing with Additional Judges) and 196(b) (dealing with ban on their practice) were consi dered together and deleted together. It will be pertinent to mention here that during the Parliamentary debate over the relevant Bill which sought to introduce Art. 224(1) into the Constitution great anxiety was shown by several Members to see to it that such Addi tional Judges, when recruited from the Bar were not permitted to revert to the profession on the expiry of their term and a categorical suggestion was put forward that when a Member of the Bar was appointed as an Additional Judge it must be done with a view to make him permanent in due course and if that was not possible an Additional Judgeship should not be offered to a Member of the Bar.\n\nIn fact in Lok Sabha, Shri Tek Chand, M.P. from Ambala-Simla had opposed the recruitment of any Member of the Bar as an Additional Judge and suggested that such recuritment should be confined to District Judges, whik in the Rajya Sabha Shri P.N. Sapru from Uttar Pradesh strollgly pleaded that in appointing Additional Judges care should be taken to appoint Members of the Bar who were not likely to revert to the profession on the expiry of their term, that is to say \"appoint a man whom you are going to appoint as a Permanent man\". These views expressed during the debate on the Bill have been referred to merely to bring out the genesis out of which the aforesaid convention or practice grew and the undertaking commenced to be taken from Members of the Bar.\n\nEven as late as on June 29, 1967 in a Note prepared by him Justice K.N. Wanchoo had also stated thus :\n\n\n\"When a Member of the Bar is appointed an Additional Judge, it must be with a view to make him permanent in due course. If that is not possible, Additional Judgeship should not be offered to a Member of the Bar. I agree that an undertaking should be taken from Members of the Bar that they will accept a permanent Judgeship when offered to them in due course ............ \"\n\n(Note quoted in the Shah Commission's Interim Report-I Para 7.23 at page 52)\n\nIf the genesis of the aforesaid convention or practice as well as the undertaking is nothing but public interest in the sense that public interest is served : (al by not permitting them to revert to the Bar on the expiry of their term, and (b) by not losing or frittering away the experience or expertise gained by them in administering justice during their initial term, then it is these very aspects of public interest which form the compelling reasons to consider their cases for their continuance either by extending their term or making them permanent in preference to outsiders or freshers.\n\nIt is not as if that these two aspects of public interest giving rise to the convention or practice and the undertaking are merely factors to be taken into account while deciding upon their continuance but along with the disability emanating from the undertaking these aspects confer upon them a legitimate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for such continuance in that High Court.\n\nThere has been no answer from the side of the contesting respondents and in fact it was not disputed by Counsel on their behalf that the practice to appoint every Judge (whether from Bar or Services) initally as an Additional Judge for two years and then to make him permanent in due course ,.without considering the question as to which one of the two Articles was attracted has been followed by the appointing authority and 'therefore, it it clear that on this ground alone it can be held that the sitting Additional Judges have an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for their continuance either by extending their term or making them permanent until this practice is changed and a proper practice is introduced which can be done only after having made a complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths of Permanent as well as Additional Judges for every High Court depending upon statistical\n\n....._,\n\n.--.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tufzapurkar, J.) 913\n\ndata to be collected throwing light on 'normal business, 'temporary A increase' and 'arrears of work' after fixing rate of disposal per Judge per year and defining what should be termed as main cases, miscel laneous cases or interlocutory cases etc.\n\nAs regards the constitutional convention or practice and the undertaking which have been pressed into service in relation to Bar recruits as Additional Judges for basing their right to be considered for their continuance on the expiry of their initial term, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India raised a two fold contention. Regarding the former he urged that a constitutional convention or practice, howsoever wholesome, can not affect, alter or control the plain meaning of Art. 224(1) which according to him gives absolute power and complete discretion to the President in the matter -0f continuance of sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term, the pendency of arrears being relevant only for deciding whether or not Additional Judges should be appointed and not relevant with regard to a particular person\" to be appointed. As regards the undertaking he pointed out that the usual undertaking obtained from a Member of the Bar in all High Courts-and for that matter even the additional undertaking that is being obtained in the Bombay High Court if properly read will sh ow that it merely creates a binding obligation -0n the concerned Member of the Bar but does not create any -0bligation or commitment on the part of the appointing authority to make the offer of permanent Judgeship to him.\n\nIt is difficult to accept either of these contentions of the learned Attorney General.\n\nIt was not disputed before us tha(constitutional conventions and practices have importance under unwritten as well as written Constitutions and the position that conventions have a role to play in interpreting Articles of a Constitution is clear from several decided cases.\n\nIn U.N.R. Rao v. Smt. Indira Gandhi(1) Chief Justice Sikri observed thus : \"It was said that we must interpret Art. 75(3) according to its own terms regardless of the conventions that prevail in the United Kingdom. If the words of an Article are clear, notwithstanding any relevant convention, effect will no doubt be given to the words. But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act of Parliament, a Constitution which establishes a Parliamentary system of Government with a Cabinet. In trying to understand one may well keep in mind the conventions prevalent at the time the Constitution was framed.\" In State of Rajasthan v.\n\nUnion of India( 2) also the importance of a constitutional convention\n\n(!) [197!1 Suppl. SCR 46.\n\n(2) (1978] 1 SCR 1.\n\n\n(198 2] 2 S.C.R.\n\nor practice by way of crystalising the otherwise vague and loose content of a power to be found in certain article has been emphasized. In the State of West Bengal v. Naripendra Nath Bagchi(1) the entire interpretation of the concept of \"vesting of control\" over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto in the High Court was animated by conventions and practices having regard to the history, object and purpose thatl ay behind the group of relevant articles, the principal purpose being, the securing of the independence of the subordinate Judiciary.\n\nIt is true that no constitutional convention or practice can affect, alter or control the operation of any Article if its meaning is quite plain and clear but here Art. 224(1) merely provides for situations when Additional Judges from duly qualified persons could be appointed to a High Court and at the highest reading the Article with s. 14 of the General Clauses Act it can be said that the power conferred by that Article may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires but on the question as to whether when the occasion arises to make appointment on expiry of the term of a sitting Additional Judge whether he should be continued or a fresher or outsider could be appointed by ignoring the erstwhile incumbent even when arrears continue to obtain in that High Court the Article is silent and not at all clear and hence the principle invoked by the learned Attorney General will not reply.\n\nOn the other hand, it will be proper to invoke in such a situation the other well settled principle that in construing a constitutional provision the implications which arise from the structure of the Constitution itself or from its scheme may legitimately be made and looking at Art. 224(1) from this angle a wholesome constitutional convention or practice that has grown because of such implications will have to be borne in mind especially when it serves to safeguard one of the basic features which is the cardinal faith underlying our Constitution, namely, independence of the judiciary. In other words a limitation on the otherwise absolute power and discretion contained in Art. 224(1) is required to be read into it because of the clear implication arising from the said cardinal faith which forms a fundamental pillar supporting the basic structure of the Constitution, as otherwise the exercise of the power in the absolute manner as suggested will be destructive of the same. That it is not sound approach to embark upon 'a strict literal reach' of any constitutional provision in order to determine its true ambit and effect is strikingly illustrated in the case of Art. 368 which came up\n\n(I) [1966] l SCR 771.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J. ) 915\n\nfor consideration before this Court in Keshavanand Bharti' s(1) case A where this Court held that the basic or essential features of the Constitution do act as fetters or limitations on the otherwise wide amending power contained in that Article. In Australia limitations on the law-making powers of the Parliament of the Federal Commonwealth over the States were read into the concerned provisions of the Constitution because of implications arising from the very Federal nature of the Constitution : (vide-T/ze Lord Mayor Councillors and Citizens of the City of (1-f elbourne v.\n\nThe Common wealth & Anr.(2) and the State tJf Victoria v .. Th~ Commonwealth of Australia.(3) As regards the undertakings of the type mentioned above, it is true that strictly and legaliy speaking these undertakings only create a binding obligation on the concerned Member of the Bar and not on the appointing authority but it cannot be forgotten that when such undertakings were thought of, the postulate underlying the same was that there was no question of the appointing authority not making the offer of permanent Judgeship to t.he concerned Member of the Bar but that such an offer would be made and upon the same being made the sitting Additional Judge recruited from the Bar should not decline to accept it and revert to the Bar. r am therefore clearly of the view that the aforesaid convention or practice and the undertaking serve the cause of public interest in two respects as indicated above and those two aspects of public interest confer upon these sitting Additional Judges recruited from the Bar a legitimate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for continuance in that High Court, either by way of extending their term or making them permanent in preference to freshers or outsiders and it is impossible to construe Art. 224(1) as conferring upon the appointing authority, absolute power and complete discretion in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges to a High Court as suggested and the suggested construction has to be rejected.\n\nIn view of the above discussion it is clear that there is a valid classification between proposed appointees for initial recruitment and the sitting Additional Judges whose cases for their continuance after the expiry of their initial term are to be decided and the two are not in the same position.\n\nThe next question hotly debated at the Bar has been whether while exercising the power under Art. 224(1) of the Constitution at\n\n( 1) [1973] Suppl. SCR I.\n\n(2) 74 C.L. Reports p. 31.\n\n(3) 112 C.L. Reports 353.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe time of determining whether the sitting Additional Judges should be continued either by way of extending their term or by way of making them permanent it is open tJ the President (Appointing Authority) to resort to the consultative process under Art. 217(1) on the aspect of suitablility again or the exercise of the power should be strictly governed by the consideration as to whether the preconditions mentioned in Art. 224(1) obtain in the concerned High Court and pendency of work justifies the filling up of the permanent vacancies or not ?\n\nCounsel for the petitioners have contended that while deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges of a High Court, who have already been selected and appointed as , such, the consultative process mentioned in Art. 217(1) is not attracted for the purpose of considering suitability again, the same having been gone througa on~~ and for all at the stage of their initial recruitment and the appointing authority has merely to see whether one or the other or both the pre-conditions obtain or not and on being satisfied about their existence it must continue the sitting Additional Judges for a further term and if vacancies in the permanent posts are available to make them permanent in that High Court on being satisfied that pendency of normal business justifies the same.\n\nIn support of this contention reliance has been placed on the fact that for all purposes the sitting Additional Judes of a High Court are in no way different from its Permanent Judges as regards\n\n(a) qualification for the appointment; (b) salary and other service conditions; (c) criteria for their selection; (d) their position, jurisdiction, powers and privileges; (e) oath of office to be taken by them and (f) the grounds and procedure for their removal and it has been pointed out that Additional Judges are not on probation and cannot be regarding or dealt with as probationers.\n\nPrincipally, the bringing in of the consultative process under Art. :'.17(1) on the point of suitability again at the stage of deciding upon their continuanc~ is objected to on three grounds : (a) it amounts to making their continuance dependent upon the evaluation of their capacity, character, integrity and fitness as emerging from their work, performance and behaviour during their initial term and runs counter to the well-settled position that they are not on probation, (b) if in that process they are dropped because of suspected misbehaviour or reported lack of integrity, it would, in substance and reality, mean their removal merely on the basis of n:ports, rumours and gossip jeopardising their security and independence without resorting to the regular process of removal laid down in Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act No. 51 of 1968, and (c) it is bound to affect the quality or character of justice administered\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 917\n\nby them during their initial term or at any rate towards the end of their term because human nature being what it is their work, performance and behaviour will be guided by the anxiety to keep themselves on the right side of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief Justice of India and the appointing authority and every litigant will be entitled to complain that as against the State he has been denied equal protection of the laws and equality before law; in other words, violation of Arts. 14 and 21 is involved and in this behalf reliance has been placed on Krishna Gopal v. P.C. Sethi(1) and In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978.(2)\n\nOn the other hand Counsel for the contesting respondents have urged that since in either granting an extension to these Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term or in making them permanent a fresh appointment is involved the consultative process covering suitability under Art. 217( I) is clearly attracted; even otherwise, going through the consultative process at this stage is both necessary and desirable inasmuch as an erroneous appointment of an unsuitable person produces irreparable damage to the faith of the community in the administration of justice causing serious injury to public interest though failure to appoint a deserving person is not likely to inflict such irreparable injury and therefore it is but proper that at the time of their reappointment these sitting Additional Judges should pass the test of suitability (i.e. capacity, character, integrity and fitness) under Art. 217(1) and it is unthinkable that if all the constitutional consulting functionaries are of the agreed view and the appointing authority shares the same view that by reason of what has happened in the mean time an erstwhile Additional Judge is no longer fit to be appointed he should nonetheless be appointed.\n\nCounsel for the contesting respondents refuted each one of the grounds urged by the petitioners in support of their objection to bringing in the consultative process inclusive of suitability again at the stage of reappointment of the sitting Additional Judges. Regarding the aspect of probation, Counsel accepted the position that Additional Judges are not and cannot be said to be on probation but according to him what is meant by that is that, unlike a proba- tioner who is liable to be removed during his probationary period if he is found unfit or unsuitable and who is confirmed only upon satisfactory completion of the probationary period, the sitting Additional Judges, not being on probation, have an indefeasible tenure though\n\n(1) [1974] 2 SCR 206. (2)\n\n(1979] 2 SCR 476.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nfor short periods fixed in their warrants of appointment and during the fixed tenure they can be removed only by following their regular process laid down in the Constitution and Judges (Inquiry) Act, I 968; any further appointment is always the result of a fresh consideration and fresh consultation with the consulting functionaries mentioned in Art. 217(1) To suggest that they should be reappointed as a matter of course if the pre-conditions of Art. 224(1) subsist or pendency of work justifies their confirmation and then take steps for their removal under Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 would be manifestly unsound, if not absurd. Counsel disputed that if as a result of the consultative process undertaken they are dropped it amounts to their removal because, according to him, it becomes a case of non-appointment after their inital term has expired.\n\nCounsel strenuously disputed that bringing in the process of consultation under Art. 217(1) inclusive of suitablity again at the stage of reappointment would affect the quality or character of justice administered by them during their initial term or towards the end of their term as suggested hy the petitioners and no question of any violation of Art. 14 or 21 as involved and the two decisions relied upon by Counsel for the petitioners do not support that contention.\n\nI have already come to the conclusion that there is a valid classification between the proposed appointees for initial recruitment and the sitting Additional Judges whose cases for their continuance on the expiry of their initial term are to be decided and have further held that unlike the former the latter have a legitimate expectancy and an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority and to be considered for their continuance either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges in their High Court.\n\nFrom this conclusion certain consequences logically ensue.\n\nFirst, if the sitting Additional Judges have this enforceable right to be considered for their continuance, it must follow that the eventual non-continuance, if any, can become a justiciable issue open to judicial review, if such non-continuance is based on extraneous or non-germane considerations or is ma/a fide in law or in fact, and in that sense it will not be a case of nonappointment as is the case qua the proposed appointees at the stage of their initial recruitment. Secondly, it also follows that in substance and reality in extending their term or making them permanent in their High Court no 'fresh appointment' in the sense of initial or fresh recruitment is involved, except for the formality of issuing a fresh warrant of appointment and taking a fresh Oath.\n\nIf that be the\n\nJ-.\n\n' .--\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 919\n\ncorrect position then all the submissions made on behalf of the A contesting respondents on the basis that granting them extension or making them permanent involves a 'fresh appointment' must be rejected and logically speaking the consultative process in so far as suitability under Art. 217(1) is concerned is not attracted at all.\n\nEven so, in view of the aspects of public interest that have B been pressed into service, the question may be considered as to whether, when their continuance on the expiry of their initial term is being determined, the test of suitability under the consultative process of Art. 217(1) should be invoked or gone through afresh ?\n\nThe question thus posed assumes great significance but is ticklish and defines easy solution in view of the cogent and C almost convincing rival submissions made on either side as summarized above but the answer to the same will have to be found only on objective considerations.\n\nAt the outset it may be stated that it was not disputed before us that sitting Additional Judges are not on probation and cannot be regarded or dealt with as probationers. Question is what is the implication of admitting D the position that \"an Additional Judge is not a Judge on probation'~\n\nas has been done by Shri Kankan in his counter-affidavit dated July 22, 1981 (filed in the Transfer Case No. 20 of 1981)?\n\nIt is true as has been pointed out by the learned Attorney General that they are not probationers in the sense that they have an indefeasible tenure E though for the periods fixed in their warrants of appointment and that during such fixed tenure, like the Permanent Judges, they can be removed only by following the rugular process for it as indicated in the Con stitutfon and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 but in the . context of their having an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally and to be considered for their continuance, will it be F possible to confine the concept of probation to these two aspeet\n\nmentioned by him ? Does it ean that for deciding upon . their continuance they should be treated as on probation ?\n\nThe learned Attorney-General did not mince words when he contended that they should pass the test of suitability again at the time of declcling upon their continuance because he asserted that what has , happened int.he G mean time during their short tenure (meaning their work, performance and behaviour as throwing light on their capacity, character, integrity and fitn'ess) should be taken into cnsideration.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that aspects like slow disposal, unsatisfactory perfor\n\nmance; inefficien'cy, incompetency, suspected misbehaviour. and/or H reported la.Ck of integrity all converge on suitability and therefore all\n\n\n[I 982J 2 S.C.R.\n\nthese will have to be taken into consideration as suggested by him.\n\nHowever, the full implication of the admission made on behalf of the contesting respondents is that Additional Judges are not appointed to try out their fitness pending their further continuance either as Additional Judges or as permanent Judges; they are appointed, having passed the suitability test at the initial stage, to dispose cases instituted in the High Court in accordance with their Oath \"Without fear or favour, affection or ill-will\" from the very first day of their assuming office, though the occasion to appoint them arises because of a sudden increase in the work of High Court or arrears of work therein; in fact appointment of Additional Judges on probation would be destructive of judicial independence.\n\nIf, therefore, the Additional Judges are not on probation in any sense of the term, how can their continuance either as Additional Judges or Permanent Judges be made to depend upon the evaluation or assessment of their suitability as emerging from their work, performance and behaviour during their initial term ?\n\nClearly the answer would be in the negative. On this reasoning aspects like slow disposal, unsatisfactory performance, inefficiency and incompetency get easily ruled out but the real problem that requires to be faced is what should happen whom aspects like suspected misbehaviour and/or reported lack of integrity on their part during their short tenure come to the fore? This is the knottiest problem that has engaged my long and anxious consideration.\n\nBaldly put, the question is : Should an Additional Judges whose misbehaviour or lack of integrity has come to the fore be continued as an Additional Judge or confirmed as a Permanent Judge ? The answer at the first impulse and rightly would be in the negative but the question requires deeper consideration.\n\nIf the misbehaviour or lack of integrity is glaringly self-evident the. question of his continuance obviously cannot arise and in all probabilities will not engage the attention of the appointing authority, for, the concerned Judge in such a situation would himself resign but when we talk of misbehaviour or lack of integrity on the part of an Additional Judge having come to the fore, by and large the instances are of suspected misbehaviour and/or reported lack of integrity albeit based on opinions expressed in responsible and respectable quarters and the serious question that arises is whether in such cases the concerned Additional Judge should be dropped merely on opinion material or concrete facts and material in regard to allegations of misbehaviour and/ or lack of integrity should be insisted upon ? In my view since the question relates to the continuance of a high constitutional functionary like the Additional Judge of High Court\n\n,.L,\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 921\n\nit would be jeopardising his security and judicial independence if action is taken on the basis of merely opinion material.\n\nMoreover, no machinery having legal sanction behind it for holding an inquiry-- disciplinary or otherwise against the concerned Judge on allegations of misbehaviour and/or lack of integrity obtains in the Constitution or any 1aw made by the Parliament, save and except the regular process of removal indicated in Art. 124( 4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.\n\nTherefore, the important question that arises in such cases of suspected misbehaviour and/or reported lack of integrity is who will decide and how whether the concerned Judge has in fact indulged in any misbehaviour or act of corruption ? In the absence of satisfactory machinery possessing\n\nlegal sanction to reach a positive cone! us ion on the alleged misbehaviour or an act of corruption the decision to drop him shall have been arrived at merely on the basis of opinions, reports, rumours or gossip and apart from being unfair and unjust to him such a course will amount to striking at the root of judicial independence. The other alternative, namely, to continue him as an Additional Judge for another term or to make him permanent if a vacancy is available and then take action for his removal under the regular process indicated in Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 may sound absurd but must be held to be inevitable if judicial independence, a cardinal faith of our Constitution, is to be preserved and safeguarded.\n\nNot to have a corrupt Judge or a Judge who has misbehaved is unquestionably in public interest but at the same time preserving judical independence is of the highest public interest. It is a question of choosing the lesser evil and in inevitable course has to be adopted not for the protection of the corrupt or dishonest judge but for protecting several other honest, conscientious and hard-working Judges by preserving their independence; it is a price which the Society has to pay to avoid the greater evil that will ensue if judicial independence is sacrificed. Considering the question from the angle of public interest therefore, I am clearly of the view that while considering the question of continuance of the sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Art. 217(1) should not be invoked-at least until such time as proper machinery possessing legal sanction is provided for enabling a proper inquiry against an alleged errant Judge less cumbersome than the near impeachment process contemplated by Art. 124 ( 4) and (5) of the Constitution.\n\n\nHowever, the third ground of objection to bringing in the consultative process covering suitability under Art. 217(1) at the stage of deciding upon their continuance does not impress me much.\n\nIt is difficult to accept the contention that bringing in the suitability test under Art. 217(1) at that stage is bound to affect the quality or character of justice adminstered by the sitting Additional Judges during their initial term or towards the end of their term.\n\nIn fact, so far on every occasion the consultative process inclusive of the suitability test under Art. 217(1) has been resorted to while considering the question of granting extension to the Additional Judges or making .them permanent on the expiry of their initial term and no one has suggested that because of this their work, performance or behaviour was or has been guided by the anxiety to keep themselves on the right side of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Chief Justice of India or the Appointing Authority. Instances are not wanting when within the first few days of their assuming office they have deliverec-1 judgments dissenting from their Chief Justice as also of having rendered decisions un-palatable to the Executive when their term was about to expire.\n\nIf the basic assumption made while putting forward the argument is not well-founded then there will be no question of any violation of Arts. 14 and 21 being involved. The two decisions on which reliance has been placed also do not support the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nIn the former decision (P.C. Sethi's case) (supra) though the Chief Justice's order transferring the election petition from a Permanent Judge and allocating it to an ad hoc Judge appointed under Art. 224A was set aside on the facts of the case, this Court at page 215 of the report observed thus :-\n\nIt seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be entrusted for trial to a permanent Judge of the High Court, even though we find that additional or acting judges or those requested under Article 224A of the Constitution to sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters.\"\n\nIf anything the observation suggests is that there is nothing illegal or improper if Additional or Acting or ad hoc Judges hear and dispose of election petitions, though in that particular case because of 'special facts and circumstances' obtaining therein the Chief Justice's order was interfered with. In the other case (In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra) Cl.'7 of the Special Courts Bill\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 923\n\nprovided that Special Courts were to be presided over either by a sitting Judge of a High Court or by a person who had held the office of a Judge of a High Court to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and this Court pointed out a couple of infirmities in that Clause, namely, a retired Judge of the High Court unlike a sitting Judge did not enjoy security of tenure and would be holding his office as a Judge of the Special Court during the pleasure of the Government and it was conceivable that such a Judge presiding over the Special Court, if he displayed strength and independence might be frowned upon by the Government and there was nothing to prevent the Government from terminating bis appointment as and when it liked. It was further pointed out that though his appintment was required to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of India there was nothing in the Bill to show that his termination will also require similar consultation and even if it were assumed that such consultation would be made even for his termination the process of consultation, with its own limitations, would be a poor consolation to an accused whose life and honour was at stake.\n\nIt is true that these infirmities in CI. 7 of the Bill were pointed out by this Court to emphasize the aspect that appointing a retired High Court Judge as a Judge of the Special Court who is to be nominated by the Central Government to try a special class of cases may not inspire confidence not only in the accused but\n\nin the entire community. It is also true that on these infirmities being E pointed out the then Central Government accepted the suggestion of the Court that only a sitting Judge of a High Court would be appointed to preside over a Special Court and that such appointment will be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nHowever, all these observations and views that emerge from the opinion or advice which this Court gave to the President in a Reference under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution, on which Counsel for the petitioners placed great reliance, must be understood in the context of the Special Courts Bill which had been drafted by the then Central Government for the purpose of trial of special type of offences allegedly committed by persons holding high public or political offices in the country in the peculiar circumstances that obtained during the last Emergency and for some period prior thereto, under which a special expeditious procedure for trial other than the normal procedure contained in the Criminal Proeedure Code has been prescribed and those observations and views, therefore, would be inapplicable to the issue raised before us, for parity of reasoning, in the absence of parity of situation, is of no avail.\n\nHowever, for th11\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA reasons indicated earlier, in my view, at the time of deciding upon the continuace of the sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term the consultative process should be confined only to see whether the pre-conditions mentioned In Art. 224(1) exist or not or whether pendency of work justifies their confirmation or not and the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process B under Ari. 217(1) cannot and should not be resorted to at all.\n\nThe next question that requires consideration is whether in the consultative process contemplated by Art. 217(1) is any primacy intended to be given to the views or advice to be tendered by the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of a High Court Judge or whether from amongst the three consulting functionaries the President (appointing authority) is entitled to choose or perfer the views or advice of anyone to those of the other or others ? It may be stated that this question really arises only in regard to the views or advice tendered on the suitability aspect and not on the aspect touching the existence of the pre-conditions of Art. 224(1) or pendency of work justifying confirmation, because the former aspect is a matter of subjective assessment while the latter depends on objective facts over which no difference is likely to arise.\n\nI would also like to observe that the aforesaid question cannot at all arise in view of my conclusion that the test of suitability falling within the consultative process under Art. 217( I) cannot and should not be resorted to, while deciding upon the continuance of sitting Additional Judges. Obviouly the question cannot arise in cases of non-appointments qua proposed appointees at the time of their initial recruitment, for such non-appointments are cases of non-sequitur. My conclusion thus completely obviates dilemma posed in the question.\n\nHowever, I shall be considering this question on the assumption that I am wrong in my view that the test of suitability is attracted and should not be invoked at the time of deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges. The question of primacy obviously has to be considered by keeping in mind the object or purpose of providing for such consultation which was explained by Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly thus :-\n\n''There can be no difference of opm10n in the House that our judiciary must both be independent of the executive and must also be competent in itself. And the question is how these two objects could be secured.\n\nThere are two different ways in which this matter is governed in other countries ...... {Here follows a reference to the practices\n\ns. P. GUPTA v. UNION Tulzapurkar, J.) 925\n\nobtaining in Great Britain and the United States) ........... .\n\nThe Draft Article, therefore, steers a middle course. It does not make the President the supreme and the absolute authority in the matter of making appointments.\n\nIt does not also import the influence of the Legislature.\n\nThe provision in the article is that there should be consultation of persons who are ex-hypothesi, well qualified to give proper advice in matters of this sort, and my judgment is that this sort of provision may be regarded as sufficient for the moment.\n\nWith regard to the question of the concurrence of the Chief Justice, it seems to me that those who advocate that proposition seem to rely implicitly both on the impartiality of the Chief Justice and the soundness of his judgment. I personally feel no doubt that the Chief Justice is a very eminent person.\n\nBut after all, the Chief Justice is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and all the prejudices which we as common people have; and I think, to al/ow the\n\nChief Justice practically a veto upon the appointment of judges is really to transfer the authority to the Chief Justice which we are not prepared to vest in the President or the Government of the day.\n\nI therefore, think that, that is also a dangerous proposition.\"\n\n(Vide Constituent Assembly debates 1949. Vol 8, page.\n\n258) (Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn other words the object of providing for such consultation clearly is that the same should act as a controlling or limiting factor on the discretion vested in the President while performing his executive function of making appointment of High Court Judges and neither) the President nor the Chief Justice should have a power to veto a proposal. Further, this question will have also to be considered in the light of what this Court has said . about the almost binding character of the resultant advice flowing from the consultative process. In Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra) dealing 'with the efficacy of consultation with the Chief Justice of India under Art. 222(1) Krishna Iyer, J. at page 502 of the report, observed :\n\n\"It must also be borne in mind that if the Government\n\ndeparts from the opinion of the Chief Justice of India it has H to justify its action by giving cogent and convincing reasons for the same and, if challenged, to prove to the satisfaction\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA of the Court that a case was made out for not accepting the advice of the Chief Justice of India ........... Of course, the Chief Justice has no power of veto, as Dr. Ambedkar explained in the Constituent Assembly.\"\n\nIn Shamsher Singh's case(1) the Court was dealing with consultation B with the High Court under Art. 234 read with Art. 235 and in that behalf Krishna Iyer, J at p. 873 of the report has observed :\n\n\"In all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Ihdian justice will and should be accepted by the Government of India and the Court will have an oppor tunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have enterec:l into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given -by the Chief Justice of India. In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order.\"\n\nKeeping both the above aspects in mind one has to consider the question of primacy and in order to consider the same it will be necessary to set out Art. 217( 1) which runs thus :\n\n\"217( I) Every Judge of the High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office in the case of an Additional or Acting Judge as provided in Art. 224 and in any other case until he attains the age of 62 years.\"\n\nOn the question as to whether any primacy is intended to be accorded to the views or advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India. during the consultative process over the views or advice of the other two consulting functionaries (Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court) or whether all the three consulting functionaries are of co-ordinate authority so as to acccord equal efficacy to each one's views or advice, the Article is clearly silent and simply because the expression 'consultation' has\n\n(I) [1975] I S.C.R. 814.\n\nr-.\n\n.......\n\n. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 927\n\nbeen used, it does not mean that the President has absolute authority or discretion in the matter because as explained by Dr. Ambedkar consultation has been provided with the object of limiting the authority or discretion of the President.\n\nQuestion is whether when the three functionaries differ in their views or advice had not the President a choice to prefer the views or advice of one of the three?\n\nCounsel for contesting resondents contended that the President must have the right to make a choice as no one functionary has been given any primacy and in support Counsel strongly relied upon the fact that during the constituent assembly debates a specific amendment was moved by Mr. B. Pocker Saheb from Madras to the original Draft Article 193( I) (which was in identical terms as the present Article in so far as is material) to the effect that the every Judge should be appointed by the President \"on the recommendation of the High Court concerned, after consultation with the Governor of the State concerned and with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India\"' clearly seeking to give higher importance or status to the Chief Justice of India in the matter (vide Constituent Assembfy Debates 1949, Vol VIII page 658) but the &aid amendment was rejected and the Draft Article became the present Art. 217(1). It was urged that the rejection of the amendment is a clear pointer indicating that the Constituent Assembly wanted to give coordinate authority to each one of the three consulting functionaries and no primacy was intended to be given to the views or advice of any particular functionary .\n\nIn the first place in the very nature of things it is difficult to accept the submission that all the three consulting functionaries under Art. 217(1) must be regarded as of co-ordinate authority for the simple reasons that on aspects like capacity, character, merit, efficiency and fitness which converge on the suitability of the person proposed for appointment the Governor of the State will be least informed and will have nothing to say whereas the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of India, being best informed, are well equipped to express their views and tender advice; further it is an accepted position which has been alluded to by the Law Commission in its 14th Report, that it is because of the financial aspect (salary and emoluments of a High Court Judge being charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State) and information about the antecedents, local affiliations and like other matters, capable of objective proof. concerning the proposed appointee which the State Executive would be possessing, that consultation with the Governor haseenb provided\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nfor. It is, therefore, difficult to regard the Governor of the State as being of co-ordinate authority with the other two consulting functionaries especially on the aspect of suitability which is the primary thing in the matter of making appointment of High Court Judges.· Secondly, in my view. Mr. Pocker Saheb\"s rejected amend ment has nothing to do with the primacy question at all because . it was concerned with the effort at complete exclusion of the executive interference in the matter of appointment of the High Court Judges .. If the amendment had been accepted the result would have been that the appointment shall have been made with the initiation of the proposal by the Chief Justice of the H; gh Court, the consultation with the State Executive being retained because of the financial aspect and information regarding antecedents, etc. and only upon the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, which, in other words, means the Chief Justice of India would have had the power to veto any-proposal.\n\nIn my view, conferring a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India is entirely different from the prim1cy being given to his views or advice over and above the views or advice of the other consulting functionaries, as a limiting factor on the President\"s discretion. Dr. Ambedkar also understood the proposed amendment of Mr. Pocker Sahib in this manner and pleaded for its rejection on the ground that it sought to confer a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India which he thought was undesirable. The rejection of the amendment, therefore, has no bearing whatsoever on the question of primacy with which the Court is concerned at the moment: Thirdly, once it is realised that the scope and ambit of fa:! and effective consultation requires that all the material facts and records concerning the proposed candidate must be made available to both . these consulting functionaries by placing the same before each during the consultative process and that each consulting functionary must consider the same or identical material and exchange eachone's views thereon with the other there js no merit left in the argument that the Chief Justice of the High Court has a closer opportunity to assees the suitability of the proposed appointee; surely it is not a case of watching the demeangur of a witness so as . to put the assessment cir the Chief Justice of the High Court on any higher footing.· Having regard to these aspects, particularly the last one, one will have tci consider \\Vhethcr any primacy could be and should be given to the views and advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India to the President in the matter of appointing High Court Judges. l must confess that the Article does not expressly suggest that any primacy is to be accorded to his advice during the consul-\n\n}--\n\ns. P •. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 929\n\ntative process undertaken in Art. 217(1) but, in my view, the scheme of consultative process contemplated by that Article evisages consideration of identical facts and materials bearing on the suitability of the candidate by both the consultingfunctionaries, namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, as also an exchange of their views on such material, and thereafter placing of the entire material together with each one's vieWs thereon and the tendering of the advice or final recommendation by the Chief Justice of India to the President whose decision should be guided by such advice or final recommendation so tendered.\n\nIf such be the scheme envisaged by Art. 217(1)-and I am of the opinion it does envisage such a scheme, then cl early by implication primacy is intended to be given to the advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India to the President. In any event, I would suggest that evolving such a scheme regarding the consultative process under Art. 217(1) would be in fitness of things as primacy shall have been given to the advice or final recommendation to be tendered by the Chief Justice of India who happens to occupy the highest .constitutional position as the head of the Indian Judiciary.\n\nIt may be noted that giving primacy to the advice of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of High Court Judges is not to give power to veto any proposal as was contemplated by Mr .. Pocker Saheb's amendment nor would giving such primacy to his advice mean that the Chief Justice of India would be enjoying unfettered arbitrary powers, for, if his advice has proceeded on extraneous or non-germane considerations the same shall be subject to the judicial review just as the President's final decision is so subject if he were to disregard the advice of the Chief Justice of India unless the same is justified for cogent and convincing reasons.\n\nBut the point I would like to emphasise is that construing Art. 217(1) as envisaging the scheme of the nature indicated above would go a long way in preserving judicial independence rather than not according primacy to Chief Justice of India's advice and permitting the President to act 'as an arbiter between the divergent views of the two high constitutional functionaries and leaving him to prefer the views of one to the other.\n\n' Having considered the question of primacy as aforesaid, I would like to make a couple of observations on the basis that the suitability test is required to be passed by the sitting Additional Judges over again at the time of deciding upon their continuance either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges.\n\nThe consul tative proC1 ss even on this occasion must be full, complete and . effective as is the case with the consultative process that is required\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nto be gone through under Art. 222(1) when the question of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court is considered.\n\nFurther, the procedure to be followed at the time of undertaking such consultative process must also ensure fair play qua the concerned sitting Additional Judge.\n\nIn other words, though the principie of natural justice in its full vigour is not contemplated, the sitting Additional Judge should not receive a raw deal at the bands of the consulting functionaries. and either one or the other or if necessary both should hear him, especially if any adverse material\n\n1, is weighing in their minds against him, just as in a case under Art. 222(1) the personal difficulties and other grounds of objections of the proposed transferee are considered by the consulting functionary.\n\nIn other words, in my view the scope and ambit\n\n~ of the consultr.tive process under Art. 217(1) and 222(1) are and must be the same.\n\nI shall next deal with the question of short term extensions which have been challenged by the petitioners as being directly subversive of the independence of Judiciary and, therefore, not contemplated by the Constitution.\n\nThe contesting respondents in that respect have placed strong reliance upon the provision contained in Art. 224(1) to suggest that such short-term extensions are contemplated and fall within the power conferred upon the appointing authority under that Article.\n\nIt is true that Art. 224(0 confers power on the President to appoint duly qualified persons to be Additional Judges of a High Court if the pre-conditions mentioned therein exist \"for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify\". Relying on the phrase \"for such period not exceeding two years as be may specify\" occurring in the Article, the contesting respondents have claimed that that phrase only fixes the maximum period of two years at a time, that the Article does not limit the discretion of the appointing authority in the matter of the period for which an Additional Judge can be appointed except in regard to , the ceiling of two years and that the appointment can be for a shorter period which period is not justiciable and what has been urged is that the period must of necessity get co-related to the continued existence of the pre-conditions relating to the volume of work for which the appointments are to be made, Such a literal construction is difficult to accept because no provision of the Constitution can be interpreted in a manner which will be in conflict with any of the basic features of the Constitution and the cardinal principle of independence of Judiciary is one such basic feature;\n\n...\n\ns.P, GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 931\n\ntherefore, the construction to be put on the phrase in the Article must be consistent with the said principle.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that security of tenure ensures judicial independence and tenures for short-terms like three months, six months or nine months bring in insecurity directly impinging on judicial independence and also tend to shake the faith of the community in the administration of justice and, therefore would be unconstitutional. Moreover, granting short term extensions for periods Hke three months, six months, or nine months 'pending inquiry into the complaints' said to have been received against some of the sitting Additional Judges, as has been admiKed by Shri Kankan in his counter-affidavit on behalf of the . contesting respondents, would be clearly outside the contemplation of the Constitution for no machinery having legal sanction behind it has been provided for either in the Constitution or any other law authorising such inquiry or investigation into the complaints against sitting Additional Judges and the practice of giving short-term extensions on such ground must be deprecated and regarded as unconstitutional. I have already held that the suitability test is not attracted while deciding upon th~ continuance of the sitting Addi· tional Judges but assuming that it is requited to be gone through the process must be completed well in advance of the date of expiry of their initial term or if for any reason it cannot be so completed the concerned Additional fodge must be given extension for at least one year. In this behalf I would again like to refer to the constitutional convention or practice that has grown over the years, notwithstanding the phrase \"for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify\" occurring in Art. 224(1), which is to appoint Additional Judges initially for a period of two years, which has come to be regarded as the 'normal term' and on the expiry of this term to continue them for a further period of two years and so on till they are confirmed as Permanent Judges, subject, of course, to the pre conditions continuing to obtain in that High Court and it has been pointed out that Art. 224(1) has been worked in that manner over the years. In any case. n\" extension for less than a year should ever be granted irrespective of whether volume of work justifies it or not simply with a view to give the Judge concerned fixity of tenure for that period. Further, it is extremely desirable and necessary that orders granting extensions to sitting Additional Judges or making them permanent are issued and intimated to the concerned Judges and not merely to the Constitutional authorities as was suggested during the vacation hearing, well in advance of the date of expiry of their term and not at the eleventh hour keeping them on tenterhooks till the last moment.\n\nAfter all the sitting Additional Judges\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nare high Constitutional functionaries possessing the same position, powers and privileges as the Permanent Judges, and deserve due consideration and respectful treatment at the hands of the appointing authority.\n\n, Apropos their challenge to short-term extensions the petitioners have contended that Art. 216 of the Constitution casts a primary obligation upon the Presiden~ mandatorily to provide adequate permanent strength to every .High Court to cope with its normal business so as to ensure its disposal within reasonable time and to review such strength from time to time so that arrears dp not accumulate and justice to li.tigants is not unduly delayed, while the power to appoint Additional Judges under Art. 224(1) is only to meet, (a) temporary increase in the business of the High Court or\n\n(b) arrears of work therein, and the complaint is that the appointing authority or the Union Government has failed to discharge its mandatory obligation under Art. 216 and has gon~ on appointing Additional Judges even when a substantial increase in the normal business is there in almost every High Court justifying the reviewing of the permanent strength of those High Courts. The contention has been that the objective facts obtaining in many High Courts unmistakably demonstrate that the increase of business is not of a temporary character but is a permanent increase every year and that the arrears have increased and accumulated to an appreciably disturbing level with no reasonable prospects of substantially reducing the same over a period of years and, therefore, the President cannot resort to Art. 224( I) but has to increase the permanent strength by making permanent appointments under Art. 217 read with Art. 216.\n\nIn any case it is urged that Additional Judges cannot be appointed while keeping permanent post vacant as is happening at present frequently.\n\nThe submission of the petitioners therefore has been that in view of such reality, obtaining in various High Courts the action on the part of the appointing authority in keeping a large number 0f sitting Additional Jud!jes as Additional Judges would be arbitrary and unconstitutional and a clear case exists for declaring them to be deemed to have become permanent or for directing the President to make them permanent by appropriately increasing the permanent strength in the concerned High Courts and it will be within the powers of this Court to pass appropriate orders or give necessary directions in this behalf. In support of these submissions statements containing statistical materials pertaining to Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court were relied upon .and on the\n\nI !\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 933\n\nquestion of Courts' power to grant appropriate reliefs reliance was A placed upon two decisions of this Court, namely, Shewpujanrai lndrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs and Ors. (1) and Y.\n\nMahaboob Sheriff and Ors. v. Mysore Stat~ Transport Authority and Ors.(2)\n\nOn the other hand,. Counsel for the contesting respondents denied that the appointing authority has failed to discharge its obligation to provide adequate permanent strength in the High Courts.\n\nIt was not disputed that the volume of work in almost every High Court has increased tremendously and heavy arrears have accumulated and are ever mounting but it is pointed out that whenever any Chief Justice of any High Court had asked for a.n increase either in the permanent strength or in the strength of Additional Judges such request was always considered and responded to satisfactorily. On the ques; tion of liquidating arrears it has been pointed out that the problem is not merely related to the strength of either permanent or Additional Judges obtaining in a High Court but depends on numerous other factors and several suggestions in the directiOn of finding a solution to that problem have been under active consideration of the Union Government. Counsel, however, strenuously disputed th:it in this area appertaining to executive function of the appointing authority and/or the Union Govern.ment this Court can grant relief by way of declaring the sitting Additional Judges to be deemed to have become permanent or by directing the President to make them permanent by appropriateJy increasing the permanent strength in the concerned High Courts as has been prayed for by the petitioners.\n\nOn a consideration of the two relevant Articles, namely, 216 and 224(1) it seems to me quite clear that Art. 216 unquestionably casts a mandatory obligation on the President (appointing authority) . to provide adequate strength of permanent Judges in every High Court to cope with and dispose of its normal business and further to review periodically such permanent strength.\n\nThe word \"shall\" and the further words \"such other Judges as the President ma\" from time to time deem it necessary to 'appoint\" occurring in the A; ticle are a clear pointer in that direction.\n\nArt. 224(1) as has been stated earlier, confers power on the President to appoint Additional Judges only to meet the situation arising from (a) temporary increase in the business of the High Court, or (b) arrears of work therein.\n\nIn other words\n\n(I) [19591 2 S.C.R. 821 at 840 and 841.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nif the increase in the work or business of the High Court is not of a temporary character but a permanent increase every year resort will have to be made to Art. 216 and not to Art. 224(1).\n\nFurther I would also like to observe that ordinarily it will not be proper to appoint an Additional Judge in a High Court while keeping a permanent post vacant or unfilled.\n\nBut beyond making these observations which should guide the exercise of the power both under Art. 216 and Art. 224(1) by the appointing authority I am satisfied that it will not be proper for this Court to give the directions or reliefs sough. t by the petitioners for the reasoas which I shall presently indicate.\n\nIn the first place it cannot be disputed that appJinting Judges to a High Court either as permanent Judges or Additional Judges is purely an executive function entrusted by the. Constitution to the appointing authority and it will not be proper for this Court to usurp that function to itself or is1ue any directions in that behalf unless forced by glaringly compelling circumstances. Secondly, no directfon or relief as sought is possible unless a full, complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths of Permanent I as well as Additional Judges of every High Court as on a particular date is made available to the Court.\n\nThirdly such assessment about the requistite strengths for every High Court must depend on statistica~ data to be collected thtowing light on 'normal business', 'temporary increase', and 'arrears of work' in each Hfgh Court after fixing the rate of disposal per Judge per year and defining what should be regarded as 'main cases', 'miscellaneous cases' or 'interlocutory cases' etc; the norm in regard to such matters being a variable\n\ncriterion requiring refixation depending on facts, circumstances and situation as and when they devefop. It would therefore, be extremely difficult for this Court to issue directions or grant reliefs of the nature sought by the ptitioners.\n\nMoreover, relief by way of declaring the sitting Additional Judges to be deemed to have become permanent is sought on the footing that the President sb.ould be deemed or taken to have done what. be ought to have done in the circumstances of the case but it will be difficult to accept the position that when the President has appointed a duly qualified person as an Additional Judge for two years be should he deemed to have appointed him as the permanent Judge under Art. 216.\n\nThough no particular Article is referred to in the warrant of appointment reference in the warrant to the fact that the person has been appointed \"an Additional Judge\" and the mentioning of the short-period therein will clearly negative any intention on the part of the President to appoint him a permanent Judge, notwithstanding the duty having arisen in\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 935\n\nthe circumstances of the case to 111ake a permanent appointment., For these 'reasons I do not think that this Court should issue the directions or grant reliefs sought by the petitioners in this behalf and it is hoped that the observations made above will guide the future course of action of the appointing authority.\n\nThe next question on which a great deal of argument was advanced at the Bar by Gounsel for the p::titioners is whether before effecting a transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another his '.consent' to such transfer should he obtained or not, that is to say, whether the words \"with his consent\" should be read into Art. 222(1) of the Constitution or because a. transfer involves a 'fresh appointment'. Article 222 (1) runs thus :\n\n\"The President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other-High Court.\"\n\nIt must be observed that this question was considered and decided by this Court in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) in the negative by a majority of 3:2 but according to Counsel for the petitioners the majority view requires reconsideration and since these cases were heard by a larger Bench of seven Judges he addressed the. Court elaborately on the point. Before a dealing with the various aspects of the contention urged by the Counsel for the petitioners in this behalf it will be desirable to set-out in brief the background in which that question arose for consideration and in what manner the same was dealt with in that case both by the Gujarat High Court at the initial stage and by this Court in appeal. During the last Emergency a mass transfer of Permanent Judges from one High Court to another was attempted in the name of national integration and in May 1976 it had been proposed to transfer 56 JudgC<s of the various High Courts and as the first instalment 16 Judges, including Cb.ief Justices, were in fact transferred.\n\nJustice Sankalchand Sheth, one of the transferees, was shifted from Gujarat High Court to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 'He filed a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court against the Union of India and Chief Justice A.N. Ray challenging the order of transfer as void :and inoperative, inter-alia on grounds of promissory estoppel, no effective consultation: and want of consent on his part which should be read into Art. 222(1).\n\nThe Union of India in its affidavit in reply supported the impug11ed\n\norder, inter-alia, on the ground that the power of the President to transfer a Judge was absolute save and except that he had to co11sult the Chief Justice of India and as this had been done the transfer was\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nvalid; that there was no question of promissory estoppel and that no consent was required.\n\nNo reasons were given for the transfer but the policy of transfer was justified on the ground of national integration. No affidavit in reply was filed by the Chief Justice of India who was the 2nd respondent .to the petition. The matter was heard by a Full Bench of Gujarat High Court which unanimously rejected the petitioner's plea of promissiory stoppel. By a majority, consisting of Metha and D.A. Desai, JJ. the Full Bench rejected the petitioner's contention that 'consent' must be read into Art. 222(1) and also the contention that as a transfer of a Judge involves fresh appointment such appointment could not be made without the Judge's consent. A.D. Desai, J. however, in a minority view, upheld the petitioner's contention as regards 'consent' on both the grounds, that is to say, he held that 'consent' must be read into Art. 222(1) and that since a transfer of a Judge involves a fresh appointment it could only be done with the Judge's consent. However, all the three Judges unanimously held that the order of transfer was void as it had been made without the requisite consultation with the Chief Justice of India as contemplated by Art. 222(1) on its true interpretation. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment of the Gujarat High Court the Union of India preferred an appeal to this Court under Certificate granted by the High Court, which was heard by a Constitutfod' Bench of five Judges of this Court. On a statement being made by the learned Attorney-General for the Union of India to the effect that on the facts and circumstances of the case on record the then Government did not consider that there was any justification for transferring Justice Sheth from Gujarat High Court and propo sed to transfer him back to that High Court, Counsel for Justice Sheth stated that his client was prepared to withdraw his writ petition with the leave of the Court. Though the appeal got settled as above to the satisfaction of Justice Sheth, the Constitution Bench desired to consider important issues arising in the case which related to the aspect of judicial independence involved in transfer of High Court Judges and after hearing arguments from Counsel on either side delivered its judgment expressing its views on the issues involved. It may be stated that the plea of promissory estoppel was not pressed and was not considered by this Court. On the aspect of 'consent' of the Judge concerned qua Art. 222(1) the Bench was divided in its opinion, the majority of the Court (Chandrachud, Krishna Iyer and Fazal Ali, JJ) upon a consideration of the wording of the Article itself in the context of the scheme, other provisions and\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 937\n\nall relevant aspects held that as a matter of construction 'consent' could not be read into Art. 222(1) and further that consent of the Judge who was transferred was not necessary as transfer involved no fresh appointment; the majority further held that the power to transfer could not be exercised by way of punishment but could e exercised only in public interest and after consultation with the Chief Juetice of India and that public interest and consultation with the Chief Justice of India were sufficient safeguards against the abuse of power under Art. 222( I) and with these built-in-safeguards it was unnecessary to read 'consent' in that Article. Bhagwati, J. upheld both the contentions of the original petitioner, namely that as a matter of construction 'consent' should be read into Art. 222(1) and secondly consent of the concerned Judge who was transferred was necessary as a transfer involved a fresh appointment.\n\nUntwalia, J. held that although consent could not be read into Art. 222(1) as a matter of co'nstruction, such consent was necessary because the transfer of a Judge involved a fresh appointment.\n\nIt may be stated that before arrivin.g at the aforesaid conclusions the Judges have expressed their considered views on several aspects concerning the power of transfer vested in the President under Art. 222(1) in the -context of the concept of independence of judiciary to which a brief reference will be appropriate. In the first place all the Judges have emphasised the fact that the framers of our Constitution had taken the utmost pains to secure the independence of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and in that behalf several provisions in the Constitution were referred to-a position which was not disputed by the Attorney-General for the\n\nUnion of India. Further, all the Judges rejected the claim made on behalf of the Union Government that the power conferred on the\n\nPresident under Art. 222(1) was absolute or that if he were to \"consult\" the Chief Justice of India there was an end of the matter and the order of transfer could riot be questioned.\n\nThe Court held that the power of transfer conferred on the President under Art. 222(1) was subject to two built-in-safeguards : (i) that it must be exercised in public interest alone and not in order to punish a Judge or to make him toe the Government line and (ii) that it must be exercised after full, complete and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India; in other words an order of transfer would become a justiciable issue and. be liable to be quashed or set-aside if\n\n(a) it was not in public interest or (b) it was passed without full, complete and effective consultation or (c) if the opinion or advice\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nof the Chief Justice of India was ignored or brushed aside without cogent reasons.\n\nOn the sco~ and efficacy of consultation contemplated under Art. 222(1) two learned Judges Chandrachud, J. and Krishna Iyer, J. dealt with those aspects at some length and the other learned Judges have substantially expressed their agreement with their views on the point. The effect of the observations ori the scope of consultation can be briefly stated thus : Consultation with the Chief Justice is obligatory and a condition precedent to lhe exercise of that power by the President; such consultation must be a real, substantial and effective consultation and in order that it should be so, all relevant facts in support of the proposed action of transfer must be placed before the Chief Justice and all his doubts and queries must be adequately answered; the consultation casts an obligation and a duty on the Chief Justice to elicit information not merely from the President and the Judge concerned but from such quarters as he thinks fit on . all relevant aspects bearing on the desirability, advisability and necessity of the proposed transfer including factors personal to the Judge concerned such as his health, extreme family factors involving dislocation etc. so as to leave him no grounds to complain of arbitrariness or unfairplay.\n\nOn the efficacy of the resultant advice tendered by the Chief Justice, Krishna Iyer, J observed at page 502 of the Report thus :\n\n\"Secondly, although the opinion of the Chief Juslice of India may not be binding on the Government it is entitled to great weight and is normally to be accepted by the Government because the power 1under Art. 222 cannot be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily.\"\n\nAgain after quoting a passage from the judgment in Chandramoulehwar' s(1) case and after referring to his own judgment in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) in -which he struck the same chord, he observe.d thus:\n\n\"It must also be borne in mind that if the Government departs from the opinion of the Chief Justice of India it has to justify its action by giving cogent and convincing reasons for the same and, if challenged, to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a case was mad.e out for not accepting the advice of the Chief Justice of India.\"\n\n(1) [1970] 2 SCR 666.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 939\n\nThe learned Judge has further gone on to .observe thus :\n\n\"The dangers of arbitrary action or unsavoury exercise has been minimised by straight-jacketing of the power of transfer.\n\nLikewise, the high legal risk of invalidation of the Presidential .order made. in the teeth of the Chief Justice's objection, runs in an added institutional protection.\n\nFor, it is reasonable for the Court, before which a Judge's transfer 'is challenged, to take a skeptic view and treat it as suspect if the Chief Justice's advice has been ignored.\"\n\nIt may also be stated that according to Chandrachud, J just as the safeguard of public interest kept transfers. by way of punishment outside the purview of Art. 222(1) the safeguard of effective consultation also indicated that policy transfers on a whole-sale • basis were also outside the scope of that Article.\n\nAs regards the plea of natinal integration on the basis of which the transfers of 16 permanent Judges were sought to be justified, Chandrachud, J expressed the view that it was a moot point whether it would be necessary to transfer Judges from one High Court to another in the interest of national integration but since it was a policy matter the Court was not concerned, with it directly but suggested that consi dering the great inconvenience, hardship and possibly a slur which a transfer from one High Court to another High Court involves, the better view would be to leave the Judges untouched and take other measures to achieve that purpose, and further . added that if at all on mature and objective appraisal of the situation it was still felt that there should be a fair sprinkling in the High Court judiciary of persons belonging to other States, that object could be more easily and effectively attained by makii; ig appointments of outsiders initially but he categorically observed that the record of the case before the Court did not bear out the claim that any of the 16 High Court Judges had been transferred in order to further the cause of national integration and the true position was far from it.\n\nOn the question of non-consensual transfers being within the Article Krishna Iyer, J. summed up the position thus :\n\n\"Logamachy may confuse, philosophy may illumine,\n\nteleology may shed interpretative she.en.\n\nWe have consi- H dered the design, the source, the impact and the engineering aspects of Article 222.\n\nAt the end of the journey we feel\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nclearly that the powl.lr of non-consentaneous transfer does exist. Salutary safeguards to ensure judicial independence with concern for the All-India character of the superior courts in the context of the paramount need of national unity and integrity and mindful of the advantages of interstate cross-fertilisation and avoidance of provincial perviciousness were all in the caiculations of the framers of the Constitution. A power is best felt by its aware presence and rare exercises.\"\n\nCounsel for the petitioners principally urged two grounds before qs which according to him necessitate a reconsideration of the majority view in Sankalchand Seth's case about non-consensual transfers being within the purview of Art. 222(1). which I propose to discuss one after the other. In the first place according to Counsel one of the principal reason's why the majority felt that there. was no need to read the words \"with his consent\" into Art. 222(1) was that • the power to transfer thereunder could not be exercised , by way of punishing a High Court Judge, which aspect was exclusively governed by Art. 218 read with Art. 124( 4) and (5), but had to be exer cised only in public interest and after effective coasultation with the\n\nChieOubtice of India and that public interest and such consultation were sufficient safeguards against the abuse of power under that Article but the safeguard of public interest so as to prevent the exercise of the power by way of punishment will be found to be illusory if the examples of transfers in public interest as have been given by Chandrachud, J. in his judgment are carefully scrutinised; for, according to Counsel the illustrative cases of transfers in public interest as given by the learned Judge on analysis will be found to involve misbehaviour' mentioned in Art. 124(4) and therefore fo those illustrative cases though the transfers may appear to be in public interest in one sense they would be really by way of punishment and as such there is a contradiction at the heart of the judgment.\n\nReliance in this behalf was placed on the following passage occurring in the judgment of Chandrachud, J. at page 446 :\n\n\"Experience shows that there are cases, though fortunately they are few and far between, in which the exigencies of administration necessitate the transfer of a Judge from H one High Court to another.\n\nThe factious local atmosphere sometimes demands the drajiing of a Judge or Chief Justice from another High Court and on the rarest occasions which\n\nK '\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 941\n\ncan be counted on the fingers of a hand, it becomes neces$ary\n\nto withdraw a Judge from a circle of favourites and.non- ! avourites. The voice of compassion is heard depending upon who articulates it. Though transfersin such cases are preeminently i'n public interest, it will be impossible to achieve that purpose if a Judge cannot be transferred without his consent. His personal interest may lie in continuing in a Court where his private interest will be served best, whereas, public interest may require that this moorings ought to be severed to act as a reminder that . \"the place of justice is hallowed place.\"\n\nIt is pointed out that in the cases mentioned above, if the veil of the language of judicial courtesy was lifted, it will appear clear that the power of transfer that would be used would be to punish a Judge for misbehaviour, for which, as the judgment points out, action has to be taken only under Art. 218 read with Art. 124(4) and (5).\n\nFor instance, a transfer brought about by '.'the factious local atmosphere\" put in plain language means that a Judge or Chief Justice is failing to administer justice impartially by favouring or disfavouring 'a faction; similarly, where a transfer is effected in order \"to withdraw a Judge from circle of favourites and non-favourites\" it would be a clear case of the Judge being guilty of gross misbehaviour in clear violation of his judicial oath. It is, . therefore, urged that though in such cases, the transfers may apparently be in public interest they are really by way of punishment and as.such the safeguard of public interest is of no avail. In fact, according to Counsel transfers of such Judges would run counter to public interest as these Judges should not be inflicted on other High Courts to vitiate the atmosphere there.\n\nCounsel further urged that if regard be had to the ordinary dictionary meaning of tlie word 'punishment' it is clear that punishment means : \"pain, damage or loss inflicted\" (without any retributive or judicial character) and in this sense every transfer of a High Court Judge from one High Court to another without his consent would amount to punishment since it inflicts on hm:: personal injury, loss or damage in the sense of uprooting him from his moorings, his being required to have two establishment, suffering a dislocation in family affairs, etc., apart from the slur involved in\n\nI being so transferred.\n\nIt is further pointed out that the main safeguard is of public interest and the safeguard of effective consultation is secondary arising out of and in furtherance of the main safeguard and as such if the principal safeguard fails the secondary safeguard,\n\n942 SUPRl!Mll COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nwhich is in furtherance of it, would also fail. If, therefore, both the safeguards, the principal as well as the secondary, become illusory and if punishment is involved in every transfer without consent then one of the principal reasons suggested by the majority for not reading consent into the Article must disappear and there would be the need to read 'consent' into the Article so as to obviate the element •of punishment.\n\nIt is difficult to accept the aforesaid line of argument as necessitating the reconsideration of the majority view in Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra) for the reasons whbh I shall presently indicate.\n\nBut before dealing with the contention I would like to observe that I am in agreement with Counsel for the petitioners that the illustrative cases given in the passage quoted above are in substance where Judges could be. said to be guilty of. misbehaviour falling under Art. 124(4) and that their transfer to other High Courts, apart. from being by way of punishment, would amount to doing great dis service to public interest. In this context I would like to emphasize that the safeguard of public interest read into Art. 222(1) is not intended for protecting any black-sheep in the judiciary but for protecting the numerous honest, conscientious hard-working Judges and I have always been of the confirmed view that no corrupt or dishonest Judge, and nor a Judge, who contrary to his oath of office, indulges if' any kind of favouritism while discharging his dutieswho could be likened to a rotten egg, should -be tolerated m the judicial basket and he deserves to be dealt with under Art. 218 read with Art. 124(4) and (5) but not by transferring him to another High Court, for, such a transfer would be contrary to public interest.\n\nThat is why I would reiterate that a transfer by way of punishment for misbehaviour is clearly outside the purview of Art. 222(1) and similarly, any transfer with an oblique motive or for an oblique\n\npurpose, such as for not toeing the line of the Executive or for rendering decisions unpalatable to the Executive or for having for some reason or the other fallen from the grace of the Executive, would also be outside its purview and liable to be struck down, if oblique motive or purpose is established.\n\nTurning to the contention, it must, in the first place be pointed out that the mere fact that the illustrative cases of transfers given by Chandrachud, J. in his judgment as being in public interest are in substance and reality cases of transfers by way of punishmnt\n\n... .>'\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNI (Tulzapurkar, J.) 943\n\ndoes not mean that there can be no cases of transfers purely in public interest without any element of punishment being involved.\n\nCases of transfers .in public interest pure and simple without involving any element of punishment are conceivable with the result that the safeguard of public interest dwelt at length in the judgment cannot be said to be illusory or otiose. When Art. 222, as inserted anew by Drafting Committee in the Revised Draft Constitution prepared on November 3, 1949, was discussed in the Constituent Assembly on November 16, 1949.\n\nDr. B. R. Ambedkar indicated the purpose of inserting the provision in the Revised Draft and gave at least two instances of transfers which would purely be in public interest. This is what he said :\n\n\"T1e Drafting Committee felt that since all the High Courts so far as the appointments of Judges is concerned form now a Central subject it was desirable to treat all the Judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single cadre like the I.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred from one High Court to another. If such power was not reserved to the Centre the administration of justice might become a very difficult matter. It might be necessary that one Judge may be transferred from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High Court elsewhere by importing , better talent which may not be locally available.\n\nSecondly, it might be desirable to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court because it might be desirable to have a man unaffected by local politics or local jealousies.\n\nWe thought, therefore, that the power to transfer should be placed in the hands of the Central Government.\n\nWe also took into account the fact that this power of transfer of Judges from one High Court to another may be abused.\n\nA Provincial Government might like to transfer a particular Judge from its High Court because that Judge had become very inconvenient to the Provincial Government by the particular attitude that he had taken with regard to certain judicial matters or that he had made a nuisance of himself by giving decisions which the Provincial Government did not like.\n\nWe have taken care that in effecting these transfers no such considerations ought to prevail.\n\nTransfers ought to take place only on the ground\n\n\n(1982) J S.C.R.\n\nof convenience of general administratidn.\n\nConsequently, we have introduced a provision that such transfers shall take place in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. who can be trusted to advise the Government in a manner which is not affected by local or personal prejudices.\" (vide : Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 11 p. 580).\n\nIt is thus clear that transfers under Art. 222(1) have to be made only in public interest the ground being convenience of the general administration and the two instances given by Dr. Ambedkar (vide : the underlined portion in first para) would clearly fall within the ambit of this ground and such transfers would be purely in public interest without any element of punishment being involved therein.\n\nYet another instance of a transfer which' could be said to be purely in public interest would be where the same is effected for remedying unsatisfactory working conditions obtaining in a High Court for reasons beyond the control of the Judge concerned and for which he js not responsible in any manner; similarly if a particular Judge by reason of his nature and temparament is unable to get along with the Chief Justice.or any of his colleagues in a High Court his transfer would be in public interest and not by way of punishment in the sense in which that expression is to be understood in the context of the power to transfer under the Article. In such cases the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another without his consent would be appropriate and justified.\n\nComing to the aspect\"of punishment put forward by Counsel for the petitioners it must be observed that when it is said that the power of transfer under Art. 222(1) cannot be and should not be exercised by way of punishment what is intended to be conveyed is that the judge concerned should not be 2ransferred for misbehaviour falling under Art. 124(4). or with oblique motive or for oblique purpose indicated above, which alone would be by way of punishment in the co1 rect sense of that expression in the context of the power as contained in the Article and not that he should not be subjected to the kind of punishment which is inherent in the transfer.\n\nIn my view, there is a clear distinction between the punishment involved in making the transfer for misbehaviour or out of oblique motive and the punishment which 'is inherent in the order of transfer in the sense of infliction of personal injury, loss or ·\n\ndamage arising out of his moorings being severed, he being required to have two establishments of his suffering a dislocation in his\n\n' l\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 945 • family affairs, etc. Further, it is not as if this latter aspect of punishment which is inherent in an order of transfer is being totally ignored before passing the order of transfer, for, preciselythese very aspects concerning the Judge proposed to be transferred are required to be taken into consideration and given due weight by .the Chief Justice of India during the consultative process which he is required to undertake for observing the second safeguard of full and effective consultation. It is, therefore, not. possible to accept the contention that the two safeguards of public interest and effective consultation subject to which the power of transfer is to be exercised are either illusor; or unreal and if they afford real protection to the Judge concerned agabst the abuse of power as suggested in the majority view there would be no need to read consent into Art. 222(1).\n\nThe other ground which necessitates the reconsideration of the majority view, according to the Counsel; for the petitioners, is that\n\nwhile rejecting the contention of the original petitioner that a transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another involves \"a fresh appointment\" and, therefore, his consent to the transfer would be necessary, both Chandrachud, J. and Krishna Iyer, J. have proceeded on the basis that the Government oflndia Act 1935 did not contain any provision for the transfer of a Judge and contrasted s. 220(2) proviso (c) of that Act with Art. 217(i)(c) of the Constitution and took the view while enacting the latter provision the framers of the Constitution had made a distinction between \"appointment\" and 'transfer' by using these two expressions in contra-distinction with one another while providing that \"the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or his being tranferred by the President to another High Court within the territory of.India\" (see : Art. 217 (I)(c)). In other words, by contrasting the provision contained in s. 220(2) proviso (c) of the Government ofindia Act 1935 with Art. 217 (I)(c) of the Constitution both the learned Judges took the view that the expression- 'appointment' in the first part : of. the latter provision meant 'fresh appointment' while the expression 'transfer' used in the latter part did not mean fresh appointment .and for taking such a view and that the two expressions had not been interchangeably used reliance was placed on the supposed absence of any provision for a transfer of a Judge in the Government of India Act, 1935.' But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935, did contain a provision for the transfer of a Judge and in that behalf reliance was placed\n\nSUPREMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nupon the fact that proviso (c) to s. 220 (2) was introduced with retrospective effect from April I, 1937 bys. 2 of the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 enacted by the British Parliament and it was pointed out that though the actual proviso (c) used the word 'appointment', the Marginal Note of s. 2 ran thus : \"Judges to vacate office on 'transfer\" and even during the discussion that took place on the Bill, Earl of Munster addressing the House of Lords and the Secretary of State for India Mr. Amery addressing the House of Commons while explaining the provision that was being inserted with retrospective effect stated that the said provision was being made providing for vacating !ht< office of a . Judge on his transfer to another High Court or to the Federal Court. In other words, what bas been urged by counsel for the petitioners is that the Marginal Note to s. 2 of the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 as well as the debates in the House of Lords and House of Commons clearly indicate that proviso (c) which was added with retrospective effect to s. 220(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 really dealt with transfer of a High Court Judge when he was either appointed to another High Court or to the Federal Court, that is to say, the expression 'appointment' had been used really to connote a transfer, suggesting an interchangeable use of the two expressions by the British Parliament and, therefore, the basis adopted by the learnedPudges for drawing a distinction between 'appointment' and 'transfer ' would disappear and, therefore, the conclusion arrived at would not be correct. Counsel fairly stated that Reports of British Parliamentary Proceedings compiled by Hansard were not available to him when Sankatchand Sheth's case (supra) was argued by him before this Court but have since been made available now and he was making his submission before us.\n\nThere may be some force in the submission but in my view the submission is not adequate to\n\nnecessitate a reconsideration of the majority view for two reasons.\n\nIn the first place the assumed basis (which is now found to be wrong for making the distinction between 'appointment' and 'transfer' in Art. 217(1)(c) was merely used for refuting an argument of the original petitioner that since ins. 220(2) proviso (c) of the Government of India Act, 1935 appointments to Federal Court were clubbed with the appointments \"to another High Court\" and since the Judges consent was necessary in both the cases the Court should read the corresponding provision of the Constitution in Art. 217 (l)(c) to mean that a process of the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another involves a fresh appointment and in that connection it\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (T'u/zapurkar, J.) 947\n\nwas said that the Government of India Act, 1935 did not contain any provision for a transfer of Judge.\n\nSecondly, apart from that reason, several other reasons have been indicated in the judgment why a transfer of a Judge does not involve a fresh appointment, such as non-issuance of a fresh warrant of appointment, no consul tation as contemplated under Art. 217 taking place but only of the kind contemplated by Art. 222(1), etc. The first reason does smack. of formality but the second cannot be regarded as unsubstantial, for the nature of the two consuitations is different and the fact that only that kind of consultation contemplated nnder Art. 222(1) takes place emphasises the position that it is not a fresh appointment.\n\nIn view of this position the second ground on which the reconsideration of the majority view is sought is of no avail.\n\nHaving regard to the aforesaid' discussion, in my view, no caie could be said to have been made out for reconsidering the decision of the majority in Sanka/chand Sheth's case (supra), according to which nonconsensual transfers are within the purview of Art. 222(1).\n\nThe other submissions in support of the conte11tion that 'consent' should be read into that'Article as a matter of construction or that consent of the concern€d Judge is necessary as a transfer involves fresh appointment, which were reiterated in brief before us, have all been dealt with and answered by the learned Judges who pronounced the majority view in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra).\n\nI am, therefore in agreement . with the majority view that non-consensual transfers are within the purview of Art. 222(1).\n\nBefore parting with the decision in Sankalchand Sheth's case\n\n(supra) I would like to refer to certain observations made by Chandrachud, J. in connection with policy transfers as I feel that they need some clarification and apropos those observations I would like to deal with and make my observations with regard to the two policies which appear to have been accepted in principle, though not fully formulated and formally declared by the Union Government in connection with the transfer of HighCourt Judges.\n\nIn Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) a view has been expressed by Chandrachud, J. that the . safeguard of effective consultation . suggests that policy transfers on wholesale basis are outside the purview of Art. 222(1) and in tbis behalf the pertinent observation's made by him are as follows:-\n\n\"Thus, deliberation is the quintessence of consultation.\n\nThat impli\\!~ that each. i11djvidual case must be considereq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ·\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nseparately on the basis of its own facts. Policy transfers on a wholesale basis which leave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our Constitution.\" (vide p; 454 of the Report).\n\nThe last sentence in these observations is likely to create a wrong impression that if large number of transfers are made pursuant to a general policy these would be outside the purview of Art. 222(1) of the Constitution but that is not what is really intended to be conveyed. The emphasis clearly is on wholesale transfers without considering each individual case on its own merits being outside the purview of Art. 222(1) and more so when such wholesale or mass transfers are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations which would be outside the purview' of the A_rticle. In other words, it is clear that even if a transfer is effected pursuant to a general policy adopted by the Government the same must satisfy requirements of Art. 222(1), that is to say, it must be in public interest and made after full and effective consultation.\n\nOrdinarily no general policy will be adopted unless it clearly serves some public interest and hence when a transfer is stated to be pursuant to such general policy it will be a difficult task for the Judge concerned to establish that it has been made for extraneous considerations but all the samea transfer based on a general policy will have to satisfy the requirements of Art. 222(1) and if extraneous considerations are established the same will have to_ be struck down.\n\nIn this context I would like to refer to one aspect which was debated at the Bar, whether before any such general policy is adopted by the Government any consultation with the Chief Justice of India is necessary or questions of policy are exclusively to be deciped by the Government?\n\nIt is true that Art. 222(1) merely refers to consultation of the Chief Justice of India on specific individual proposals for transfer as and when these are made and nothing is mentioned therein as regards consultation with him on points such as whether and if so what policy or policies should be adopted . for . effecting transfer of Judges from one High Court to another. It is also true that ordinarily policy matters would be decided upon by the Government.\n\nBut propriety requires and perhaps smooth workin? thereof ma~ nessitate consultation with he <;:hic; f Justice::\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. NION (T'ulzapurkar, J.) 949\n\nwho is the highest administrative head of the country's Judiciary especially as the policy or policies to be adopted are in relation to transfer of High Court Judges.\n\nBut, as stated earlier, even after a general policy in the matter of transfers of High Court Judges is framed and adopted whnever a transfer is to be made in pu.rsuance of such policy the proposal, before it culminates into an order, will have to satisfy the requirements of Art. 222(1).\n\nComing to the two policies which the Union of India seems to have accepted in principle though not fully formulated by fixing the mechanism or modality of procedure, it may be s.tated that one such policy is to have one-third of the Puisne Judges in a High Court from outside the State-a policy which has been referred to in the Circular dated March 18, 1981 and the other is the policy to have Chief Justices of all the High Courts from outside-a policy that became the subject-matter of debate in Shri K.B.N. Singh's case.\n\nWith; ut going into the merits or demerits of either of them and without going into the question whether there are proper or justifiable grounds for adopting either of them, that is to say, whether either of them serves any public interest ornot, I would like to deal with a couple of aspects touching these policies which I feel it is necessary to clarify at this stage. It was suggested at one stage during the arguments that individual selective transfers are prone to be punitive in character but once a general policy is adopted there will be no scope for raising a contention that the transfer made in pursuance thereof is a punitive transfer.\n\nIn fact, the argument went to the length of equating individual selective transfers with punitive transfers and policy transfers as being always above board. Such an extreme contention is difficult to accept.\n\nIt will not be correct to say that a policy transfer, that is to say, a transfer based on or made in pursuance of a general p.Jlicy would necessarily be non-punitive in character nor would it be correct to say that every selective transfer i.s necessarily punitive.\n\nTaking the policy of having one-third Puisne Judges in a High Court from outside, it will be clear that in the absence of any mechanism or modality of procedure giving guidelines as to how that one-third complement will be chosen for implementing it, such a policy would obviously be fraught with the danger or vice of discrimination; further, if a. vacancy a'rises in that complement of that High Court then filling it up in the absence of proper guidelines would again be arbitrary. Similarly, even the policy of having the Chief Justices of all the Hig4 <;:ourts from outside staqds the risk: of\n\nSUPREME\n\nCO~RT REPORTS\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nr being abused by the Executive in the absence of proper guidelines\n\nbeing provided in the matter of regulating which Chief Justice shall be posted in what particular High Court; this assumes significance in federal polity like ours.\n\nIt is t bus clear that a policy transfer withuot fixing the requisite mechanism , or modality of procedure which ensures complete insulation against the Executive interference could be a punitive transfer in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive.\n\nEven with proper mechanism or modality of procedure a transfer can be made for extraneous considerations' and will be liable to be struck down if it is so established.\n\nBut admittedly no mechanism or modality of procedure of any kind bas been fixed or decided upon so far and, therefore, bow can it be asserted that every policy transfer made in pursuance of either of these two policies-wo_uld necessarily be above board? In other words, merely adopting a general policy, which is or may be broadly supportable for reasons of public interest, would not be sufficient to insulate transfers hr High Court Judges against Executive interference unless adequate mechanism or modality of procedure in that behalf is also fixed and followed in practice. Conversely, a selective transfer in an appropriate case for strictly objective reasons and in public interest of general administration could be non-punitive.\n\nIn other words, each case of transfer, whether based on :i policy_ or a selective trans fer, will have to be judged on the facts and circumstances of its own for deciding whether it is punitive fo character in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive or not.\n\nComing to the impugned Circlar letter dated March 18, 1981 it is clear that the petitioners on .the one band and the contesting respondents on the other are at great variance with each other on the true nature, content and effect thereof whereas according to the petitioners the Circular letter seeks to effect, in substance and reality, a mass transfer of sitting Additional Judges as also of the proposed appointees based on a policy decision unilaterally taken by the Law Minister and or the Union Government and in that behalf seeks to obtain tpeir consent under threat, coercion and duress, according to the contesting respondents no such transfers are intended at all but the Circular letter merely seeks to obtain consent from sitting Additional Judges for their appointment as Permanent Judges of other High Courts on the expiry of their initial term or extended term and consent from the. proposed appointees for their initial or first appointment to High Courts other than their home-State High \\:ourts and the action proposed to be takn thereunder is for t4i;\n\n...\n\nS.1>. GUPTA v. UNlON (Ttilzapurkar, J.) 9si\n\npurposes of Art. 217 of the Constitution and no threat, coercion or duress is involved in obtaining such consent.\n\nThe impugned Circular letter has already been set out verbatim at the commenceof this judgment and a careful analysis of the contents thereof brings out the following seven aspects very clearly : 1 n the first place the action proposed in para 2 thereof (of obtaining consent) is being taken with a view to implement a policy suggested by several bodies and forums \"to have one-third of the Judges of a High Court, as far as possible, from outside the State in which that High Court is\n\nsituated\" for \"furthering national integration an'd combatting narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations\"; secondly the letter records that as'no start could somehow be made in the past in that direction the feeling was strong, growing and justified that some effective steps should be taken very early in that behalf; thirdly, para 2, which specifies the action to be taken, is in two parts; (i) in relation to sitting Additional Judges in all the States of India (except North-Eastern States), it seeks to obtain their consent \"to be appointed\" as Permanent Judges to High Courts in States other than their own and (ii) in relation to the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or services) for initial appointment (either as Additional or Permanent Judges) it seeks to obtain their consent for being \"appointed to\" in any other High Court in the country (meaning other than their home-State High Court); fourthly, in this behalf it also seeks from them their choice by naming three High Courts in order of preference to which they would prefer to go; fifthly, the sitting Additional Judges and the proposed appointees from whom such consent and preferences are sought are to be told clearly that furnishing of the constent or the indication of a prefer ence does not imply any commitment on the part of the Government either in regard to their appointment or to accommodation in accordance with the preferences given; sixthly, the letter strikes a note of urgency and requests the addressees thereof to initiate action very early and after obtaining the written consent and preferences from the persons concerned to forward the same to the Law Minister within a fort-night of the receipt of the letter; lastly, the Circular letter has been addressed by the Law Minister to the Governor of Punjab and all Chief Ministers of the States (except North-Eastern States) requesting them to obtain such consent and preferences from all Additional Judges as well as the proposed appointees, with merely a copy of the letter being sent to each of the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nCounsel for the contesting respondents pointed out that.when an Additional Judge is appointed under Art. 224 (1) jiis tenure is fixed by the warrant of his appointment and on the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court and he has no vested right either to be continued or to be made .. perma11ent and in_ either extending hini for a further term as an\n\nB Additional J udje or in making him permanent in the vacancy of a permanent post, a fresh appointment is involved by issuance of a . ~\n\nfresh warrant under Art. 217 (1) and as such there is no question of any transfer being involved in such_ a case, while in the case of a proposed appointee (either from the Bar or services) when he is being initially appointed obviously there is no question of any transfer in his case either and it is from such persons that consent is being sought under para 2 of the Circular letter and the same is for 'afresh appointment' in the case of the former and 'an initial appointment' in. the case of the latter under Art. 217 (l) of the Constitt1tion. Counsel further pointed out that para 2 of the Circular letter uses the expression \"to be appointed\" in the case of sitting' Additional Judges as also in the case of proposed appointees and the word \"transfer\" has not been used at all and as such counsel contended that the Circular letter does not deal. with the topic of transfer of Judges at all.\n\nReliance io this behalf is also placed on the Law Minister's statement in Parliament made on. 16th April, 1981 in response to the Calling Attention Motion by Shri Rashid Masood and other M.Ps. and the answers given by him to the questions put to him by several Members during the discussion that followed, wherein he clarified the position that consent from sitting Additional Judges was sought under the Circular letter for their fresh appointments under Art. 217 and not for their transfers and Art. 222 was not attracted at all. It was further contended that para 3 of the Circular letter merely clarified the legal and constitutional position that obtained even before the sending of the letter • that there will be no commitment on the part of the Government either in regard to the appointment or in regard to the accommodation in accordance with preference given and that such clarification of the legal position was necessary lest a wrong impression was created that furnishing of eonsent or indication of preference would imply such a commitment as also to avoid any legal arguments based on the theory of promisory estoppel and no threat, coercion or duress could be inferred from the contents of para 3 of the Circular letter. The question is whether this is the true nature and effect of - the Circular letter.\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (1'ulzapurkar, J.) 95j\n\nIt is true that according to its dictionary meaning the word 'transfer' means 'removal from one place or position to another', but it is not such physical shifting of a person from one place to another with which the Court is concerned in the case; the Court is concerned with the concept of transfer contemplated in Art. 222 (1) of the Constitution which says: \"The President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to another High Court\".· This clearly refers to the transfer of a person, who is already a Judge of a High Court. As stated earlier, para 2 of the Circular letter refers to two categories of persons, namely, sitting Additional Judges and the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or services) and it would be clear that in the case of the latter who are being initially appointed Judges, either as Additional or Permanent, to .some High Court there would be no question of any transfer in their case as contemplated in Art. 222 (I). It is difficult to accept the petitioners / contention that in regard to these proposed appointees recommended for their initial appoin tnient the . Circular letter seeks to obtain their consent for their transfer, though in being appointed to other High Courts they would within the dictionary meaning of that expression be shifted and perhaps uprooted from their usual place of . work, namely, their home-state High Courts. The question really is whether in the case of the former category, namely, sitting Additional Judges whose consnt is sought for 'being appointed' to High Courts other than their own High Courts a transfer is involved and whether the Circular letter in substance and reality effects their transfers as contended by the petitioners. In the earlier part of this judgment it has been pointed out that a valid classification subsists between proposed appointees who are being recommended for their initial appointments and sitting Additional Judges whose initial or extended term is about to expire. In the case of the former they have no right to be considered for the post of a High Court Judge nor have they, even after being recommended on completion of the consultative process by the three constitutional functionaries mentioned in Art. 217 (1), any right to be appointed and, therefore, have no remedy against their non-appointment but in the case of the latter the position is entirely different.\n\nIt is true that under Art. 224 (1) read with Art. 217 (I) the tenure of an Additional Judge fixed by his warrant of appointment comes to an end at the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant and he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court, but .for reasons already discussed in the earlier part of this judgment he has a legitimate expectancy and an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe appointing authority but to be considered for being continued as Additional Judge or made permanent in that High Court. The convention or practice and the undertaking taken from the member of the Bar at the time of his initial appointment make it clear that he has such enforceable right to be considered for being continued or made permanent in that very High Court. That is how Art. 224 (1) ha8 all along been understood and worked.\n\nHe is not in the same. position as a proposed candidate for initial appointment.\n\nIn substance and reality in extending his term or making him permanent in that High Court no \"fresh appointment\" is involved, except for the formality of issuing a fresh warrant of appointment and taking a fresh oath. If in the case of such sitting Additional Judge his consent is sought for being 'appointed to' another High Court it is virtually and in substance seeking his consent for his transfer from his own High Curt to another High Court' falling within the concept of transfer contemplated in Art. 222 (1). It is true that para 2 of the Circular letter uses the expression \"to be appointed\"\n\nbut it is not the nomenclature or label used that would be decisive of the matter but one has to look to the substance and looked at the Circular from this angle it is clear that in so far as sitting Additional • Judges are concerned their consent is sought for transferring them from their own High Court to other High Courh and the attempt in substance is to transfer them under the guise of making fresh appointment on the expiry of their initial or extended term.\n\nFurther, considered in the light of the historical background, there appears to be some force in the petitioners' contention that the Circular letter is another attempt on the part of the Union Government this time to effect mass transfers of sitting Additional Judges, the previous attempt to effect mass transfers of Permanent Judges during the last Emergency having failed. (One such transfer was successfully challenged and all the transferred Judges, except those who were unwilling, were repatriated to their own High Courts). This Court in Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra) has laid down the safeguard of public interest and the stringent condition of full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India which are required to be observed before the power of transfer under Art. 222 (1) can be exercised and the Circular letter appears to be an attempt .to circumvent the safeguard and the stringent condition by resorting to transfers of sitting Additional Judges under the garb of making fresh appointments on the expiry of their initial or extended term.\n\nReliance on the Law Minister's statement made in Parliament on 16th April, 1981 clarifying the position that consent from sitting\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 955\n\nAdditional Judges is being sought under the Circular letter for their fresh 'appointment' and not for their transfers and that Art. 222 was not 'attracted at all will be of no avail in view of the conclusion reached above that it is not a case of fresh appointment but in substance their consent is being sought for their transfer. This apart, the fact that the Circular letter was intended to effect transfers of sitting Additional Judges be..:omes amply clear from what transpired during the debate that followed the Calling Attention Motion of Shri Rashid Masood and other M.Ps. and particularly from admissions made by the Law Minister himself under stress of questions in the nature of cross-examination put to him by Members of Parliament. It will be pertinent to mention that the subject matter of the Calling Attention Motion moved by Shri Rashid Masood and other Members as a matter of urgent public importance is captioned in te relevant proceedings of Lok Sabha Debates as \"Circular letter to Chief Ministers of States about the consent from Additional Judges for transfer to other High Courts\". This clearly suggests that even Members of Parliament regarded the Circular letter as dealing with the topic of obtaining oonsent from sitting Additional Judges for their transfer from their own High Courts to other High Courts but apart from what several Members of Parliament felt about it, even the Law Minister, while asserting that the Circular letter dealt :with th~ subject of fresh appointments of sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term or extended term and not their 1ransfer and the consent thereunder was merely sought for making their fresh appointments under Art. 217 (1), explained the genesis and reasons which prompted him to issue the Circular and in that behalf stated that the various complaints were pouring in about prejudiced attitudes bred by kinship and other local links and affiliations etc., that political links had also. been mentioned in certain cases and various State authorities had expressed their reservations about the continuance of some Additional Judges and it was felt that in some cases of this kind if Additional Judges could be made permanent in other High Courts there could be no valid objections to. sus:h appointments as their service would then be outside the local setting in which they had the roots.\n\nSuch a statement on the part of the Law Minister by way of explaining the genesis and reasons for the issuance of the Circular letter undoubtedly lends considerable force and support to the petitioner's contention that 'furthering national integration and oombating parochial trends' is merely a garb used and the real intention is to transfer such sitting Additional Judges who have become unpalatable to the State authorities because of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS {1982) 2 s.c.ll. ·\n\nalleged political links obviously not to their liking; or whom the concerned State authorities have come to regard as black-sheep from their point of view.\n\nAt one stage during the deba'te when the facts, that the Law Commission in its 80th Re?ort had made a distinction between initial appointees and the sitting Additional J1!_dges in the context of their recommendation of having -0ne third of the Judges of the High Court from outside and that it had suggested that their recommendation should be implemented in the case of the former, were brought to the notice of Law Minister this is how the Law Minister reacted:\n\n\"May be that according to him (Hon'ble Member who brought the aforesaid facts to his notice) the Additional Judges would not come within the purview of the initial appointment. Then I would put it in a different form. I have given the reason as to why we have to ask for the Additional Judges (consent) also.\n\nThings being what they are, I would like to ask the Hon'ble Member, when complaints come where it is not possible to convincingly prove, then, what should be done with such Additional Judges i Are they to be dropped ? I take a safer approach, namely, if they are appointed elsewhere, then this allegation which persists c_ould be avoided.\"·\n\nThis statement clearly suggests that in regard to sitting Additional Judges against whom complaints are received but it is not possible to convincingly prove them the Law Minister clearly contemplated the shifting of sµch Judges elsewhere so as to avoid allegations being persisted against them and presumably for doing so an opportunity presents itself when their term is about to expire. Then follow two important sets of question an~ answer which put the matter beyond doubt that even the Law Minister admitted in terms that what is being done under the Circular is a transfer of Additional Judges.\n\nThe following are the questions and answers : •\n\n'Shri Satish Aggarwal.' \"Excuse me, Mr. Law Minister.\n\nYou have stated a particular situation, where there is evidence but not sufficient, what should be done : a transfer can be made. It is only applicable in cases which are ad hoc.\n\nBut what about cases when complaints are there with regard to those who are permanent Judges ? That does not solve the problem. You are applying your stick\n\nr -\n\nS.P. OUl>TA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 957\n\nonly to those who have finished a two or three years period.\"\n\nShri P. Shiv Shankar : \"I have never said 'ad hoc.' Where the additional Judges are there, each complaint will have to be considered on its own merit and a decision could be either to drop a person based on evidence or to see if lie could betransferred.''\n\nShri Bapusaheb Parulekar : \"You have stated : 'I may add that it is not the intention of the Government to appoint all Additional Judges from outside the State.' What is the criteria ? You can victimise any person if this is the policy of the Government. Is it not ?\"\n\nShri P. Shiv Shankar : \"I can assure my friend, it is not a question of victimisation. As I said each case will be considered on its own merit. It is not the intention that everyone should be transferred, That is all. (Interruptions).\n\nPerhaps he is going back to the same ground on the question of sporadic transfer of Chief Justice and Judges and so on. The position is very simple. Supposing there is any material bearing on a particular case, that would be . considered on its own merit. It is not the intention that everyone should be transferred. I think I have covered all the points raised.'.'\n\nIt is significant that though in the first set of question and answer both the Hon'ble Member and the Law Minister have used the expression. 'transfer' in the context of what is being done to the Additional Judges on receipt of complaints against them and evidence in respect thereof is not sufficient, in the second set the Hon'ble Member specifically used the expression 'to appoint' in the context of Additional Judges intended to be brought from outside but even then the Law Minister in his reply stated that \"it is not the intention that everyone should be trans! erred.\" This shows that under the stress of questions truth has come out that the Circular is intended to effect transfers of sitting Additional Judges from their own High Court to another High Court fa respect of whom complaints have been received but evidence in support is insufficient and that will be done at the time of expiry of their initial or extended term. The reference to other portions of the\n\nLaw Minister's statement and answers given by him on the Floor\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [982] 2 s.c.a..\n\nof the House has been made with a view to ascertain the real intention behind the issuance of this Circular letter because it is the Law Minister alon_e, and not a Deputy Secretary in his department, who can depose about it and the Law Minist_er in spite of being impleaded eonominee a . party to the proceedings has chosen not to file his own affidavit in the case.\n\nOn the question whether the consent sought thereunder from the sitting Additional Judges is induced by threat; coercion or duress or not, regard will have to be had to four or five aspects about the Circular letter that emerge clearly on the record.\n\nIn the first place instead of seeking their consent through the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts, which would have been in keeping with decorum and dignity of the high office held by them, the Circular letter in utter impropriety .requests the Executive Head (the Governor of Punjab and all Chief Ministers. of the States) \"to obtain from all the Additional Judges ... their consent to be appointed as Permanent Judges in any . other High Court\" together with their order of preferences, which smacks of demonstrating the power of the Executive over the Judiciary.\n\nSecondly, the tenor of the letter in executive arrogance presumes that the consent sought will be forthcoming from all the sitting Additional Judges in as much as the possibility of consent not forthcoming from some or any of them has not been considered or dealt with in the letter. Thirdly, paragraph 3 of the letter, by necessary implication, contains a threat to the Additional Judges that they would not be continued as Additional Judges or confirmed as Permanent Judges and inay be dropped unless they furnish their consent in as much as without more it merely states that furnishing of consent as well as indication of the preferences does not imply any commitment on the part of the Government either in regard to their appointment or accommodation in accordance with the preferences given; such misgiving which naturally arises from this kind of a statement ought to have been \"removed by clearly indicating the consequences of non-furnishing 'of the consent.\n\nIt ought to have been stated clearly and categorically that non-furnishing of the consent will not be held against any Additional Judge and wilf not come in his way of being continued or being made permanent and further that furnishing of consent by an Additional Judge will not enable him to steal a march over those who have either not furnished or refused to furnish their consent in the matter of making them permanent. Both these things were vital and ought to have been stated in order\n\n' ,-.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 959\n\nto remove all misgivings and omission to do so clearly leads to the inference . that the statement in para 3 of the letter, by implication, contains a threat to the Additional Judge of the type Indicated above. The explanation given on behalf of the contesting respondents that para 3 was by way of merely cfarifying the legal and constitutional position obtaining in the matter even before the sending of the Circular letter, namely, that there was no commitment on the part of the Government' to appoint every Additional Judge as a Permanent Judge and that it was necessary to make legal and constitutional position clear lest a different impression was created as also to avoid any legal argument based on the theory of promisory estoppel is hardly convincing; for, if para 3 was inserted only with a view to clarify the legal and constitutional position it. was all the more necessary to state the consequences of non-furnishing of the consent in the manner indicated above to remove all misgivings.\n\nFourthly, the Circular letter is obviously intended to have adverse impact on the sitting Additional Judges' right on the expiry of their initial term or extending term,-:--it being merely a right to be considered for being continued or made permanent.\n\nFifthly, the timing of the Circular is significant in considering its effect and impact on the sitting Additional Judges; the Circular letter . has been issued by the Law Minister\"on March 18, 1981 at about the time when politicians and persons occupying high positions had been indulging in a campaign of denigrating the nigher Judiciary, treating every Court decision adverse to Government as a deliberate and motivated attack on the Executive. A Chief Minister of a pro minent State had described it as the \"Dictatorship of the Court\" while a Cabinet Minister in the Central Government had bracketed the J ueliciary with the opposition parties and had been complaining that they were not cooperating with the Government; the highest Executive Head at the Centre had prior to March 18, 1981 publicly stated: \"The former Janta Regime had made a lot of appointments in the Judiciary on political basis . that a dilemma , faced by the ruling party , was whether these persons appointed .on political basis in Judicial Services should be allowed to continue and if they ar.e continued how can we expect justice from them ? What is their credibility ?\" It is true that in this behalf the petitioners have relied upon extracts from Newspaper reports of such statements and utterances but when . these have been made part of their pleadings by the petitioners (vide para 2 of Shri Tarkunde's petition and para 43 (0) of Shri Gupta's petition)\n\n~ duty is cast on the conteting respondents to deal with the same . ' . . - . . . . ' .. '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nin reply and from the counter-affidavits filed in reply by Shri Kankan on their behalf it will appear clear that there is no denial that such statements and utterances were made by the persons concerned. In reply to para 2 of Shri Tark.unde's petition, Shri Kankan has merely averred that \"the views stated to have been expressed by the Chief Minister of a State and a Cabinet Minister would have been their personal views and do not and could not have conveyed the policy of the Government\", while there is no specific reply to para 43 (0) of Shri Gupta's petition at all but an omnibus general submission in regard to para 43 (H) to para 43 (Q) has been made by Shri Kankan by stating thus : \"with regard to paras 43 (H) to 43 (Q) I submit that these paras are full of surmises and conjectures\".\n\nFrom this state of pleadings it will appear clear that there is no denial that the concerned Chief Minister and the Cabinet Minister and the highest Executive Head at the Centrehad made the Several statements and utterances attributed to them as quoted from the extracts of the Newspaper reports and at the highest Shri Kankan .desired to suggest that these statements and utterances were their personal views and not of the Government.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that such statements and utterances from persons . occupying high positions in the Government help create an atmosphere of fear-psychosis for the not-so-sterner stuff in the 'judiciary; secondly, even taking the assertion of Shri Kankan that these statements and utterances. -represented their personal views at its face value (which it is difficult to do) one cannot be sure when these personal views imperceptibly or unobtrusively become the views of the Government and the basis of a Government policy, as has happened here, for, the Circular letter does reflect partly some of the views contained in this statements and utterances.\n\nThe question is what impact the Circular letter will create on the minds of the sitting Additional Judges whose terms would be coming to an end on the expiry of the. periods specified in their warrants in the light of the atmosphere of fear: psychosis created by such statements and utteranCt(S made by persons occupying high positions in the Government ? The answer is too obvious to be stated.\n\nReading 'it as a whole and in the light of the aspects discussed above, the Circular letter clearly exudes an odour of executive dominance and arrogance intended to have coercive effect on the minds of the sitting Additional Judges by implying a threat to them that if they do not furnish thefr consent to be shifted else-where. they will not be continued nor made permanent but would be dropped. The Circular Jetter, th\\:refore1 which sc,:es to o1;>tajn t4e consent of the;: sitting\n\n...\n\ny . -\n\nS.i'. GtJPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 961\n\nAdditional Judges to their transfers from their own High Court to another High Court induced by threat, coercion or duress clearly amounts to Executive interference with the Judiciary and impinges on its independence and as such is illegal, unconstitutional and void and the consent if any either already obtained thereunder or that may be obtained; would be equally void,\n\nOnce the conclusion ls reached that the Circular letter seeks to effect in substance and feality transfers of sitting Additional iudges from their own High Courts to other High Courts oli the expiry of their initial tetrn ot extended term and .the consent sought from them thereunder is for such transfer and not for their 'fresh appointment' as permanent Judges of other High Courts, the challenge to the same . as being violative o(Art. 222( I) of the Constitution becomes quite apparent. . It was sought to be urged at one stage that if on tue construction of Art. 224(1) the sitting Additional Judges during their tenure are outside the pale of transfer under Art. 222(1) then the question of the impugned Circular being violative of Aft. 222(1) does not arise. It is difficult to accept this contention because even assuming that Art. 224(1) is construed in the manner suggested the Circular aims at transferring the sitting Additional Judges not during their tenure but just on the expiry of their term and if their continuance as permanent Judges (and not as Additional Judges because the Circular talks of appointing them as Permanent Judges) does not involve a fresh appointment as held above, the question of.challenge to the Circular as being violative of Art. 222(1) very much survives.\n\nIn Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) this Court took the view that full and effective consultation by the President with the Chief Justice of India under Art. 222( I) of the Constitution implies that each individual case must be considered separately on the basis of its own facts and \"policy transfers on a whole-sale basis which leave no scope for considering each particular case and which are influenced by one sided Governmental considerations are outside the contem- .plation of our Constitution\" (vi de observations of Cbandrachud, J. as he then was, at page 454 of the Report). The transfers of sitting Additional Judges contemplated by the Circular (for which their consent is sought thereunder) are based on the policy to have one third of the Judges of a High Court from outside without each individual case being considered on its own facts and merits and therefore such transfers based on policy accepted or adopted by the Law Minister and/or the Union Government would be outside the purview of Art. 222(1).\n\nIn any case,-and this is important-it cann?t be disputed that by procuring the consent of the sittin~\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nAdditional Judges for their transfers from their own High Court to another before undertaking any consultation with the Chief Justice of India clearly reduces the full and effective consultation contemplilted under that Article to a mere formality, if not to a mockery, for, it is obvious that such consultation and the advice which Chief Justice will be tendering following upon such consultation will not be of any use or avail as the consent to such transfer shall have already been procured from the concerned Additional Judges.\n\nThe consultation and the resultant advice of the Chief Justice will be robbed of its real efficacy in face of such pre-obtained consent.\n\nThe Circular which has such effect is clearly violative of Art. 222( I); in fact it will have to be regarded as having been issued mala fide for a collateral purpose namely to by-pa11s Art. 222(1) and confront the Chief Justice of India with fait-accompli when the proposal to transfer such Additional Judge would be forwarded to him and as such the same is illegal and unconstitutional and deserves to be struck down.\n\nThe 'next challenge to the impugned Circular letter based on Art. 14 also seems to be well-founded and the same is irrespective of whether the Circular Jetter deals with transfers of Additional Judges or their fresh appointments and the initial appointments of the pro posed appointees. Briefly stated the contention is that in regard to the sitting Additional Judges it makes an invidious distinction between those who would not be furnishing their consent and those who would not be doing so or would be refusing to furnish their consent, in-as-much as the former would be at an advantage . while the Jetter will suffer a disadvantage and even within the class of those who would be furnishing their consent it gives to the Government unfettered and unguided power or disc etion to pick and choose, that is, to select some for being shifted to High Courts other than their own while retain and appoint others in their own High Courts-which power can be exercised either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism. It is further pointed out that the Circular letter will encourage an ig11ominous race amongst self-seeking Judges to look to the Government for appointment as Permanent . Judge~ out of turn or select placis which are centres of power.\n\nCounsel further contended that even in regard to the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or Services) recommended for their initial appointments, though no question whatsoever may arise in case of .non-appointment, discrimination is bound to result in the case of those who are appointed and who have furnished their con sent inasmuch as from amongst such con11enting appointees the (Jovernment has unfettred and unguided power to select som~ for\n\n.. -,,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 963\n\nbeing appointed to other High Courts and to appoint others to their home-state High Courts.\n\nThus discrimination is writ large on the face of the Circular letter and the seeds of destruci\"ion of judicial independence are inherent therein.\n\nDealing with the case of sitting Additional Judges first, it cannot be disputed that the Circular letter intends to confer advantage to those who would be furnishing their consent and make those who would not be giving their consent or would be refusing to give their consent suffer a disadvantage.\n\nThis position emerges very clearly from what has been stated by Shri Kankan in paragraph 6 of his counter-affidavit filed in reply to_ Shri Iqbal Chagla's petition. This is what he has categorically asserted: \"It is_ not, however, the intention of the letter that a permanent or further appointment will be denied to a Judge only on the ground that he has not given his consent; in fact, a further appointment to an Additional Judge has recently been given even though he had not given his consent. By no stretch of construction or from the facts and circumstances existing can it be sought to be inferred that failure to give consent would necessarily involve an Additional Judge ceasing to be a Judge.\" The first sentence clearly means that the ground that an Additional Judge has not given his consent could along with other grounds be the basis of denying to him a permanent or a further appointment and this is put beyond doubt by the last sentence where it is stated that failure to give consent would not necessarily invol•e the dropping of an Additional Judge which means failure to give consent may involvo the dropping of such Additional Judge.\n\nIn other words, there is no doubt that failure to furnish consent under the. Circular letter is bound to put the concerned Additional Judge to disadvantage of not being extended or not being made permanent or of being dropped altogether and correspondingly it confers some advantage on those who would be furnishing their consent, That the Circular letter was not a preliminary step in the direction of collecting data and information from sitting Additional Judges which coul.J be placed before the Chief Justice or India when the consultation process under Art. 217( I) would be gone into, ai; has been now stated by Shri Kankan for the contesting respondents, but was arid is intended to be acted upon forthwith by conferring an advantage on those who would be furnishing their consent is clearly borne out by the stand taken by Shri \"Kankan on behalf of the contesting respondents at the stage of the appeal preferred by them against the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge in Shri Iqbal Chagla's writ petition; by the interim relief g_(~.n.ted by the learned\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nSingle Judge the contesting respondents were restrained by an injunction from implementing the Cirular letter or from acting in any manner upon the consent if obtained from any person following on or arising from the said Circular letter and while challenging this order of interim relief as being erroneous and ought not to have been made at least on the ground of balance of convenience, Shri Kankan in para 3 of his affidavit dt. 23rd April, 1981, (filed in the Bombay High Court) asserted that the balance of convenience lay in refusing to grant an injunction rather than to grant one because it was claimed that persons who would be willi.ng to give their consent to be appointed as Judges in High Courts other than their own should not be deprived of the chance of such appointment merely by reason ofthe petitioners' having moved the Hon'ble Court questioning the validity of the Circular and that it would be against the public inter.est to delay or hold up appointments of persons as Judges to other High Courts by reason of pendency of the writ petition. It is thus clear that the contesting respondents were and are interested in forthwith acting upon the consent that would be obtained from the sitting Additional Judges under the Circular letter by giving them a chance in the matter of their appointments as Permanent Judges in preference to those who would not be furnishing their consent. The Circular letter thus makes invidious discrimination against those sitting Additional Judges who would not be furnishing their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent will be at an advantage.\n\nSecondly, the Circular letter see.ms to confer unfettered and unguided power on the Government to indulge in picking and choosing even within the class of those Additional Judges who shall have furnished their consent in the sense it will be up to t be Government to select some from that class for being shifted to High. Courts other than their own and to retain and appoint others in thc; ir own High Courts. In this behalf reliance bas been placed upon the statement made by the Law Minister on the floor of the Parliament on April 16, 1981 to the effect that it is not the intention of the Government to appoint all Additional Judges to outside High Courts This statement clearly suggests that the Government will be indulging in picking and choosing while appointing some Additional Judges to outside High Courts and retaining and appointing others in their own High Courts and in the absence of any guidelines the power can be exercised arbitrarily, either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism as pointed out by the petitio1rers.\n\n' \"• • . ' I •\n\n. L.\n\n.....\n\n'(\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 965\n\nAs regards the proposed appointees (either from the Bar or services) recommended for their initial appointments, there will be no question of discrimination in the case of those who have not been appointed at all but in the case of consenting appointees dis crimination is bound to arise because of unfettered and unguided power or discretion vesting iri the Government to pick and choose from amongst the consenting appointees, for, in their case also it will be up to the Government to decide and select some for being appointed to High Courts other than their home-State High Courts and appoint the others in their home-State High Courts.\n\nHaving regard to the aforesaid position it is abundantly clear that invidiou>\n\ndiscrimination is writ large on the face of the Circular letter and the same is clearly violative of Art. 14 and as such unconstitutional and liable to be struck down .\n\nIn the result the impugned Circular. letter, in my view, deserves to be struck down for the aforesaid three reasons.\n\n. -\n\nComing to the specific individual case of Shri S.N. Kumar (respondent No 3 in Transfer Case No. 20 of 1981) it may' be stated that the gravamen of the challenge is directed against the President's action in dropping him outright on the expiry of his extended short term on June 6, 1981, i.e. during the pendency of the case before this Court and the action is challenged by the petitioners as well as by Shri S.N. Kumar as being violative of Art. 224 (1) as also Art. 217(1) and hence illegal, unconstitutional and void. Principally, it is contended that the decision of the appointing authority not to continue but to drop him is vitiated by legal mala-fides inasmuch as assuming that the case is governed by Art. 217( I) there . has been no full o.r effective eonsultation between the President and the other constitutional functionaries, particularly the Chief Justice of India as contemplated by that Article and therefore the said decision must be regarded as void and non-est. The contesting respondents have joined issue by asserting that there was full and effective consultation\n\na-s required by Art. 217(1) .\n\nAt the outset it may be stated that the petitioners had pleaded (vide para 11 (w) of Shri Tarkunde's petition) that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India had recommended extension to three Judges (including Shri S.N. Kumar) for the\n\n.'( . full period of two years but there was a half-hearted and vague H denial thereof by Shri Kankan in his Counter-affidavit dated July 22,\n\n1981 who merely stated that the ;\\foresaid statement that both the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 ~.c.tt,\n\nChief Justices had recommended extension to the concerned three Judges for two years was untrue and incorrect, without specifying whether, if not both, any one had done so and if so who had recommended it, and further if the recommendation was not for all the three Judges it was for whom and if not for two years for what period? A vague denia I like this meant no denial at all.\n\nShri S.N. Kumar in his 'Counter Affidavit dated July 17, !981 had also asserted that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had told him and a number of his colleagues that he (Chief Justice) had recommended the extension to the concerned three Judges (including himself), to which there was a reply from Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, Secretary (Justice) Government of India, in his Affidavit dated August 25, 1981 to the effect that in the nature of things the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court could not have told Shri S.N. Kumar that he had made a recommen<:lation in his (Shri S.N. Kumar's) favour and Shri Chaturvedi further averred categorically : \"I state that as a matter of fact there was real and effective consultation with the two Chief Justices and the President preferred the views of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court which were not favourable for a further appoint ment of.S.N. Kumar:\" By implication it became obvious that there was complete divergence between the two Chief Justices in their views on the point of Shri S.N. Kumar's continuance and that the Chief Justice of India had made a recommendation favourable to Shri S.N. Kumar. In such state of pleadings a question naturally arose whether this divergence has arisen oi; i. a consideration of the same or identical material by both the Chief Justices or otherwise ?\n\nMeanwhile, a Newspaper Report appearing in the issue of Hindustan Times of July 10, 1981 under the. caption \"Govt. overruled Chandrachud's. views'', not merely stated that, though the Chief Justice of India had dismissed the allegations against Shri S.N. Kumar as \"unsubstantiated\" and had recommended his confirmation, the Government had placed greater reliance on the views of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court but went fQrther and asserted, the reporter claiming to have had a look into the files, that certain correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and ·\n\nUnion Law Minister had been marked for \"Law Minister's eyes\" suggesting thereby that the same was meant for being kept away from the Chief Justice of India. On the aforesaid Newspaper Report being made a part of his pleading by Shri Tarkunde by annexing a copy thereof to his Rejoinder Affidavit dated August .3, 1981, Counsel for the petitioners repeatedly sought information from the learned Attorney General appearing for the .Union of India on the\n\nI i\n\n\ns.P_. GUPTA v._ UN(ON (Tulzapurkar, J.) 967\n\npoint whether any . part of the correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Union Law Minister had been kept away from 1he Chief Justice of India as, if that were true, it would directly vitiate the consultation contemplated by Art. 217(1) but instead of making any statement furnishing the correct information on the point the learned Attorney General claimed privilege even in regard to ; such information. It was in these circumstances that this Court on October 16, 1981 directed disclosure of relevant documents contained in the file relating to Shri S.N. Kumar concerning his short term extension and eventual non-continuance for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has or has not been full, complete and effective consultation between the appointing authority on the one hand and the constitutional functionaries on the other, particularly the Chief Justice of India. On the question of privilege claimed by the contesting respondents in respect of the relevant files and documents my learned brother Bhagwati has dealt with and discussed the issue elaborately and exhaustively after referring to all the relevant authorities cited at the Bar and since I am agreeing with his view on the point I am not dilating on it at all.\n\nI adopt all that he has stated on the issue in his judgment. The position needs to be made perfectly clear that the disclosure has been ordered by the Court only for the limited purpose mentionedabove and. not for deciding upon the merits or demerits of the grounds on which each of the Chief Justices made his own recommendation nor is the Court concerned with the truth or otherwise of the facts or materials on the basis of which each one acted. After the disclosure was made Counsel for Shri S.N. Kumar was understandably anxious to address the Court on the merits and demerits of the grounds which prompted the two Chier' Justice to make their divergent recommendations and desired to vindicate his client's honour and fair name before the Bar of this Court but we prevented him from doing so by-categorically telling him that it was not the function of this Court to go into the merits or demerits of the grounds or truth or falsity of the material and that the disclosure had a limited purpose and if upon the scrutiny of the disclosed material the Court came to the conclusion that there was no full or effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India the appointing authority's decisionldropping his client may have to be quashed and the matter may have to be sent back to the appointing authority for fresh consideration and passing appropriate orders after undertaking the requisie consultation under Art. 217(1) again and in that process fair-play will require that his c!ien t gets full opportunity to have his say in vindication of his honour and fair name. The main question, therefore, that arises for\n\n968 SUPREME COURt RilPbRts [ 1982] 2 s.c.tt.\n\nour consideration is whether it could be said on a perusal of disclosed documents that full and effective consultation as contemplated by Art. 217(1) between the President on the one band and the Constitutioual functionaries on th<; other, particularly the Chief Justice of India, had preceded the impugned action of dropping Shri S. N. Kumar outright. It is clear that if the answer is in the affirmative the impugned action will have to be upheld, but if it is in the negative the sarri, e will have to be regarded as vitiated by legal ma la fides and will have to be struck-down.\n\nHaving regard to the decisions of this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad's case (supra) and Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) it can now be regarded as well settled that consultation implies a conference of two or more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution and that in order that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact it is essential that each must have for its consideration full and identical facts, which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision.\n\nIt is equally well settled that consultation or deliberation! is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective •\n\npoints of views known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views.\n\nIn the latter decision Chandrachud, J. as he then was has at page 453 of the Report observed :\n\n\"It must therefore follow that while consulting the Chief Justice, the President must make the relevant data available to him on the basis of which, he can offer to the President the benefit of his considered opinion . ,. ,, ,, ,, ,. .\n\nThe fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation to place full facts before the Chief Justice and the performance by the latter of the duty to elicit facts which are necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are parts of the same process and are complementary to each other\".\n\nAgain, Krishna Iyer, J (for himself, Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ) has (at p. 495 of the Report) observed thus :\n\n\"We consult a physician or a lawyer, an engineer or an architect and thereby we mean not casual but serious, deliberate seeking of informed advice, competent guidance and considered opinion. Necessarily, all the materials in the\n\ny '' -\n\ns.P. GUPTA Ji. UNION (Tufzapurkar, J.) 969\n\npossession of one who consults must be unreservedly placed before the consultee.\n\nFurther, a reasonable opportunity for getting information, taking other steps and getting prepared for tendering effective and meaningful advice must be given to him. The consultant, in turn, must take the matter seriously since the subject is of grave importance.\n\nThe parties affected are high-level functionaries and the impact of erroneous judgment can be calamitous\". (Emphasis\n\nsupplied)\n\nIt is in the light of these well settled principles concerning consultation that the disclosed material will have to be scrutinised for deciding whether in the instant case there has been full and effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India in the matter of the impugned decision that was taken in regard to ·\n\nShri S.N. Kumar.\n\nIn all I3Udocuments compnsmg correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High -Court and the Union Law Minister, between the Chief Justice of India and the Union Law Minister and between tlie Chief Justice of Dlhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India and some notings made by the Union Law Minister have been disclosed. A perusal of this material clearly shows that, though initially the non-recommendation of extension to Shri S.N. Kumar was thought of on four grounds : (a) his behaviour in Court, (b) his slow disposal, (c) his doubtful integrity based on unverified and uninvestigated complaints and (d) adverse IB reports, ultimately the decision to drop him, according to the Union Law Minister's noting dated May 27, 19l, was based-on and confined to the aspect concerning his 'reputation and integrity' and the correspondence clearly shows that the two Chief Justices held exactly divergent and opposite views regarding the said ground on which the final decision was based: The correspondence and notings bring out the following facts very clearly: (a) the Delhi Chief Justice's view regarding Shri\n\nS.N. Kumar's integrity was based on (i) serious complaints (both oral and in writing) received by him against Shri S.N. Kumar, including some received from the Union]Law Minister himself and\n\n(ii) doubts expressed by some responsible Members of the Bar and some of his colleagues about his integrity; and while admitting that he had no investigating agency to. find out whether the complaints were genuine or not, he informed the Union Law Minister that he could not recommend Shri S.N. Kumar's continuance as injhis view \"reputation of integrity is just as important las the person actually\n\n, 970\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nbeing abo•e board\"; (b) the Chie( Justice of India felt that the material mentioned by the Delhi Chief Justice for <loubting Shri S.N.\n\nKumar's integrity was too vague and his independent inquiries from the Members of the Bar and the Bench of the Delhi High Court showed that Shri S.N. Kumar was a man of unquestioned integrity and justified a favourable recommendation for his continuance; (c) the Chief Justice of India by his letter of the March 14, 1981 had requested the Delhi Chief Justice to furnish him with \"further details\" and \"concrete facts\" in regard to the allegations against Shri S.N. Kumar and the Union Law Minister also, in view of the\n\ninsistnce of the Chief Justice of India, had by his letter of April 15, 1981 called for such \"concrete material\" with hisEcomments thereon from the Delhi Chief Justice so that the . basis on which he had formed his view about Shri S.N. Kumar's reputation for integrity would be available to Government; (d) no \"further details or concrete facts or material\" as desired by the Chief Justice of India were ftrnished to him by the Delhi Chief Justice but the Delhi Chief, Justice ent a lengthy Jetter of five pages dated May 7, 1981 to the Union Law Minister marked \"Secret-for personal attention only\" whieh contained \"further details and concrete material~\" including references to specific cases (with suits Numbers and titles) wherein according to him Shri S.N. Kumar's integrity had been doubted; and\n\n(e) the Delhi Chief Justice had, both before and after the issuance of the aforesaid letter, during his discussions with the Law Minister requested the latter that his letters marked as above may be kept secret for his personal attention only, that is to say, these may be avoided from being brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India and he also explained to him the reasons for the same and the Law Minister's notings show that he responded to that request; in fact, by his letter of May 29, 1981 addresed to the Delhi Chief Justice, which happens to be last letter in the file, the Union Law\n\nMinister has placed on record the fact that, as per the request of the Delhi Chief Justice, letters marked \"Secret-:-for ; iersonal attention only'', including the Jetter of May 7, 1981, had been kept confidential from the Chief Justice of India and had not been shown to him.\n\nG In other words, it is abundantly clear from the correspondence and _ notings that \"further details\" or \"concrete facts or material\" regarding Shri S.N. Kumar's integrity, though specifically asked for by the Chief Justice of India, were not furnished to him and the letter dated May 7, 1981 which contained such further details and H; concret_e facts or. materials was deliberately kept out of his way.\n\n'y . ,\n\n• S.P. GUPTA v. UNION lTulzapurkar, J.) 971\n\nCounsel for the contesting respondents, however, pointed out that after the Chief Justice of India bad sent bis letter of March 14, 1981 to the Delhi Chief Justice calling for \"further details\" and \"concrete facts\", the two Chief Justices had a meeting on March 26, 1981 and an oral discussion bad taken place between the two, and counsel contended that during this oral discussion the Delhi Chief Justice must have given these \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" to the Chief Justice of India and such iference\n\nbecomes probable from tbefact that long.before the letter dated May 7, 1981 was disclosed under this Court's order dated October 16, 1981, Sbri S.N. Kumar bas in bis counter-affidavit dated July 17, 1981 made a reference among others to three suits being Summary Suits Nos. 1408/79, 1409/79 and 1417/79 which happen to be very three suits wherein, according to Delhi Chief Justice, his integrity bad become questionable and presumably be got particulars of these suits from the Chief Justice of India when the Chief Justice of India had a lengthy.discussion with him about his work and other general matters. True, there was a meeting and oral discussion between the two on March 26, 1981 but it is impossible to accept the aforesaid contention of the Counsel that in the oral discussion \"further\n\ndetaiis\" and \"concrete facts or material\" must have been disclosed to the Chief Justice of India for three reasons. First, what transpired between them during the said discussion has been referred to and recorded by the Chief Justice of India in his letter of May 22, 1981 addressed to the Union Law Minister and this is what he has said in that letter : \"The Chief Justice (meaning Delhi Chief Justice) met me on March 26, 1981, when he told me that Justice S.N.\n\nKumar was very slow in his disposal and that he doubted his integrity because even after Justice S.N. Kumar's allocation of work changed from the Original Side to the Appellate Side he still continu• ed to hear the part-heard cases on the Original Side.\" As regards the latter aspect the Chief Justice of India had all along maintained that that conduct on Shri Kumar's part by itself could not be regarded as blame-worthy in view of long standing practice obtining in that behalf in Delhi High Co:irt, and without more from that alone no inference of corruption or lack of integrity could be drawn.\n\nIn other words, details of the com.plaints received against Shri S.N.\n\nKumar cir particulars of specific cases wherein Sbri Kumar's integrity had become suspect were not mentioned to the Chief Justice of India otherwise the Chief Justice or India would have referred to this aspect while recording what transpired between them.\n\nThe Delhi Chief Justice's letter to the Chief Justice of India on March 28, 1981, immediately following upon the meeting and oral\n\n972 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.C.R.\n\ndiscussion is of no use because beyond stating that he had an opportunity \"to discuss this delicate matter with yotl\" and further stating that as regards the complaints about Justice S~N. Kumar's integrity and general conduct '\"the matter has already been discussed between us\" no further details are recorded as to what transpired between them during their meeting.\n\nEven in his letter of even date (March 28, 1981) addressed to the Union Law Minister the Delhi Chief Justice merely records baldly thus-\"I have since had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\" without mentioning what was discusssed. Therefore, the only record of what was discussed between them is to be found in the letter of May 22, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of India to the Union Law Minister and as stated earlier this record of what transpired between them in the meeting does not show that \"further details\" and \"concrete facts and materials\" in relation to complaints about lack of integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar were disclosed or discussed by the Delhi Chief Justice with the Chief Justice of India. Secondly, if during the oral discussion \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or . materials ' which find a place in the letter of May 7~ 1981 had been disclosed, discussed or placed before the Chief Justice of India it was simply pointless for the Delhi Chief Justice to mark his letter dated May 7, 1981 'Secret-for personal attention only' and further to request the Union Law Minister to keep it away from the Chief Justice of India and for the Union Law Minister to comply with such request.\n\nAdmittedly the letter was kept confidential from him and was not sown to him. The very fact that this letter dated May 7, 1981 was kept away from him at the insistance of the Delhi Chief Justice clearly shows that \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" asked for by the Chief Justice of India were not placed before him. Thirdly, just as the Chief Justice of India during his discussion with Shri S.N. Kumar put to him and got his explanation regarding aspects like his behaviour in Court, his slow disposal his, dealing with Original Side part-heard matters notwithstanding change in his assignment from the Original .Side to Appellate Side\n\netc., he would have also put to him and got \"his explanation about the \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or material\" in regard to the allegatjons against his integrity, had he (the Chief Justice of India) known such \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" and this has not happened.\n\nThe reliance on Shri S.N. Kumar's counter affidavit dated July 17, 1981 wherein a reference has been made by him to the three Summary Suits Nos. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 is of no avail, for, if his counter-affidavit in that behalf is carefully scrutinised it wiil appear clear that he has made a referec\n\n' I\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 973\n\nto these three suits alongwith six or seven others suits and all in. connection with explaining he charge of impropriety on his part in taking up these part-heard matters even after his assignment had . been changed from the Original Side to the Appellate Side and he explained it on the basis of a long standing practice obtaining in that behalf in Delhi High Court.\n\nHe has not referred to these suits by way of explaining the allegations of corruption or behaviour raising doubt about bis integrity. Any one who goes through the disclosed material carefully cannot fail to come to the conclusion that vital material in the shape of \"further details\" and. \"concrete facts\" was deliberately kept away from the Chief Justice of India; The conten- . . ... . tion has, therefore, to be rejected. . --.......... __ __\n\nIf the reasons, which prompted the Delhi Chief Justice to keep away his communication of May 7, 1981 containing vital material in the shape of \"further details\" and \"concrete facts\" from the Chief ..\n\nJustice of India, are scrutinised and these have been mentioned in the Law Minister's noting of May 19, 1981 and .his letter of May 29,\n\n1981-it\"willappear clear that apart from being vague they show a lack of proper perception on his part of the true nature of the obligations cast. on him under the Constitution. In substance the sum total of his reasons comes to this :-(i) that he did not want to\n\nbe embarrassed by the likely disclosure of the contents of his communication dated May, 7, 1981 to Shri S.N. Kumar as had happened in the case of his e.arlier communication dated 19th February, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India and (ii) that as he could not desist from expressing without fear or favour what he felt about certain matters (in relation to Shri S.N. Kumar) he communicated all that he wanted to say about him to the Union Law Minister through his letter of _May 7, 1981.but at the. same time because he was particular that his relations with Chief Justice of India should not be spoiled he desired that the contents of that communication should not be shown or made known to the Chief Justice of India. As . regards (i), all that can be said is that it is surprising how he expected the Chief Justice of India not to put to Shri S.N. Kumar and seek his explanation on whatever he had come to kriow against him from any source including the Delhi Chief Justice, in fact, before supplying any material to the Union Law Minister he himself ought to have apprised S.N.· Kumar of all the material and all that he had heard about him and'held discussion with him to ascertain his version thereon and then conveyed both sides of the picture to . the other functionaries.\n\nAs regards (ii), it must be first observed that full and effective consultation as contemplated by Art. 217(1) required of him to place all relevant and material facts about Shri S.N. Kumar before the Chief\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nJustice of India even at the cost of spoiling of his relations with the Chief Justice of India if it came to that and secondly, it was an unreal as well as erroneous apprehension on his part that a full disclosure of facts and material about Shri S.N. Kumar accompanied by his frank and honest opinion thereon would have spoiled his relations with the Chief Justice of India; in any event maintaining good and cordial relations with the Chief Justice of India was thoroughly irrelevant in the context of discharging constitutional obligation. Having regard to the well-settled principles concerning consultation referred to above it is clear that both the Union Law Minister as well as the Delhi Chief Justice have failed to discharge their cons{itutional obligation in the matter of consultation contem plated under Art. 217(1). In the first place, contrary to the principles laid down-by this Court in Sankalc hand Sheth' s case (supra) that the President must make the relevant data available to the Chief Justice of India for obtaining his considered opinion, the Union Law Minister did not forward the complaints which he had received against Shri S.N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India (which he forwarded to the Delhi Chief Justice); secondly, the Chief Justice did not forward \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" touching Shri S.N. Kumar's integrity to the Chief Justice of India inspite of the latter having specifically called for the same, and thirdly between them the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice saw to it that the communication of May 7, 1981 (from the Delhi Chief Justice to the Union Law Minister) which contained \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials in regard to the allegations of lack of integrity against Shri S.N. Kumar was kept confidential from the ChiefJustice of India and was not shown to him. It is thus amply clear from the record that , the facts which were taken into consideration by the Union Law linister and the Delhi Chief Justice and which provided the basis to the. appointing authority to arrive at the impugned decision were not placed before the Chief Justice of India, and, therefore, there was neither full nor effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India as required by Art. 217(1) of the Constitution.\n\nThere is another aspect relating the procedure that has to be\n\nfollwed while undertaking such full and effective consultation namely, that the procedure must iensure fair play qua the concerned Judge. That the scpe and ambit of con$ultation includes fair-play qua the concerned Judge is clearly laid down in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra) in the context of question of the Ju<;!ge's ransfer and the same position must obtain in regard to consultation under\n\ny ' . -\n\ns.i>. oi:Ji>TA ii. tiNION (Tulzapurkar 1 J.) 91$.\n\nArt. i 17(1) in the Icon text of the question of the continuance of an Additional Judge on the expiry of. bis initial or extended term, especially when it has been held that the such Additional Judge has a legitimate expectancy and a right to be considered for co, itinuance either for another term or as a Permanent Judge and the considera- • tion of his case would suffer grave infirmity and illegality unless the consultation is again full and . effective, that is to say, all facts concerning him are before all the functionaries undertaking the consulta\" tion including his version on facts allegedly adverse to him. In other words, the procedure to be followed in such consultation under Art. 217(1) qua an Additioni+I udge must ensure fair-play !n rel!ltion to him. If a person has a right to be considered how can such right be effective unless he has an opportunity to meet or explain the alleged adverse material against him.\n\nSans such opportunity his right to be considered will be illusory and unreal. The question is whether the procedure followed in Shri S.N. Kumar's case ensured fair-play qua him. It is clear from the record that \"further details\"\n\nand \"concrete facts or materials\" in regard to the allegations of lack of integrity against Shri S.N. Kumar were not put to him nor was his explanation thereon sought; and there is no reason why Shri S.N. Kumar's averment that the said material was never disciosed to him nor put to him by anvbody should not be accepted.\n\nThe question of Chief Justice of India disclosing or putting to him the said material obviously does not arise, for he himself was not apprised of such \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\"\n\nbut the same constituted the basis on which the Delhi Chief Justice and the Union Law Minister acted leading to the impugned decision and therefore it was up to the 'Delhi Chief Justice to have apprised Shri S.N. Kumar of such. material by telling him.that the same is likely to be held against him and by' seeking his explanation or version thereon and it was up to the :Union Law Minister to see to it that such procedure was followed through the Delhi Chief Justice before advising the appointin'g authority to act on the same.\n\nThe record does not show that anything of the kind was done and in. that sense also there wa> no full and. effective consultation which vitiates the impugned decision. In short in Shri S.N. Kumar's case it is quite clea, r that both these high constitutional functionaries, namely the un; on Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice abdicated their constituti onal responsibility or to use Justice Krishna Iyer's language they utterly failc; q tq <; lischare their \"accountability to the ju$tice constitut; ncy ,\"\n\n3UPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [ 19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe result is that the impugned decision against Shri S.N . .Kumar is vitiated by legal ma/a fides and as such must. be held to be void and non-est and his case must go back to the President for re-consideration and passing appropriate orders after the requisite consultation ris undertaken afresh, with due observance of adequate fair-play,\n\nWrit Petition No. 274of1981.\n\nand\n\nTransferred Cases Nos. 2, 6 and 24 of 1981.\n\nIn the above matters, with the resignation of Shri M.M. lsma, il Chief Justice of Madras High Court which has become effective, this Court is only concerned with the challenge made to the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Co11rt to Madras High Court. Initially by a writ petition No. 2224 of I 98 I filed in the Patna High Co'11rt the challenge was made by two lawyers, Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thak11r Rampeti Sinha, the Secretary and President respectively of Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association which Shri K.B.N. Singh was impleaded as respondent No. 3 but after it was transferred to this Court and became the subject matter of transfer Case No. 24 of 1981 at his request by this Court's order dated September 15, 1981 Shri K.B.N. Singh was transposed as co- , petitioner and he has filed a self-contained comprehensive affidavit dated September I 6, 1981 making all the necessary averments and submissions in support of the challenge.\n\nThe brief facts c'ollcerning Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer are there : while he was practising as an advocate of the Patna High Court, Shri K.B.N. Singh was appointed as Judge of that High Court on September 15, 1966; he was made permanent fodge of that High Court on March 21, 1968; he was first appointed Acting Cief Justice and later-on Permanent Chief Justice of that Court by the Presidential Notification dated July 7, 1976 and he assumed charge of that office on July 19, 1976. For about 9 months, i.e. from January to September 21, 1979 he functioned as an Acting Governor of State of Bihar whereafter he resumed work as the Chief Justice. By the impugned Notification dated January 19, 1981 the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, was pleased to transfer\n\nJ:!i~ as the <;:hief Justice of the Hi$h Coµrt of Madras wit!:\\ effect\n\n\"'\n\n§.P. GUPTA JI, tiNiON (tuizapurkar, J.) 977\n\nfrom the day he would assume charge of his office. It is this transfer that is being challenged by Shd K.B.N. Singh and other petitlonets on four or five grounds, namely, (a) Art. 222(1) does not ret'er to a Chief Justice and hence the impugned transfer is outside\n\nIts purview; (b) since the said Article properly construed covers only Consensuai transfers the irnpugued transfer, which is admittedly nonconsensual, is bad in law; (c) it has not been effected in public interest; (d) it has been effected without full and effective consultation contemplated by Art. 222(1) and (e) the procedure followed in effecting the same did not ensure fair-play in relation to him and the transfer is punitive in character. On behalf of the contesting respondents, amongst wMm is included the Chief Justice of India who has been impleaded as party-respondent No. 2, the challenge is refuted under each of the heads. It is contended that the transfer of a Chief Justice falls within the purview of Art. 222(1), that nonconsensual transfers also fall within its scope and purview, that the impugned transfer bas been effected in public interest, that there . wasfull and effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India as contemplated by Art. 222(1) and that the procedure followed in effecting the same was quite fair and that the impugned order had been made after giving Shri K.B.N. Singh full opportunity to place his point of view and difficulties before the Chief Justice and after these were objectively considered. It is categorically denied that it is a punitive transfer.\n\nAt the outset it may be stated that Counsel for Sbri K.B.N.\n\nSingh and the other petitioners did not seriously press the contention that the transfer of. a Chief Justice from one High Court to another was not within the purview of Art. 222( l) for the reason that it was difficult to maintain that a Chief Justice was not included or could not fall within the expression \"a Judge of a High Court\"; similarly, having regard to the conclusion reached in the earlier part of the judgment that consent cannot be read in Art. 222( l' .and that the said Article covers non consensual transfers it is unnecessary to deal with the second contention again at this stage.\n\nThe real questions that arise for determination in regard to the transfer of Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh, therefore, are whether the transfer has been ordered in public interest, whetQ.er there has been full and effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India as required by Art. 222( I) and whetr the procedure that , was followed ensured fair-play in the sense that Shri K.B.N. Singh was heard fully and his say wa~ taken into consideration before effectin~ 4is transfer,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nOn the aspects or the scope and limits or the power to transfer a Judge under Art. 222(1) and the built-in-safeguards to prevent its abuse this Court in Sankalchand Sheth' s case (supra) has , clearly laid down that the said power is circumscribed by two important safeguards, namely, : (I) the exercise of the power is conditioned by the requirements of public interest and cannot be exercised by way of punishment and (2) cthere must be a full, complete and effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India before an order under that Article can be made.\n\nChandrachud, J. (as he then was) has observed (at p. 456 of the Report) thus :\n\n\"Article 222(1) postulates fair play and contains builtin-safeguards in the interests of reasonableness.\n\nIn the first place, the power to transfer a High Court Judge can be exercised in public interest only.\n\nSecondly, the President is under the obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India which means and requires that all the relevant facts must be placed before the Chief Justice.\n\nThirdly, the Chief Justice owes a corresponding duty, both to the President and to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred, that he shall consider every relevant fact before he tenders his opinion to the President.\n\nIn the discharge of this constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice would be within his rights, and indeed it is his duty whenever necessary, to elicit and ascertain further facts either directly from the Judge concerned or from other reliable sources.\n\nThe executive cannot and ought not to establish rapport with the Judges which is the function\" and privilege of the Chief Justice. In substance and effect, therefore, the Judge con\"cerned cannot have reason to complain of arbitrariness or unfair play, if the due procedure is followed.\"\n\nIt is by reference. to these principles that the question will . have to be considered whether the impugned transfer is vitiated on any of the three grounds mentioned above.\n\nLearned Counsel for the petitioners (including Shri K. B. N.\n\nSingh) urged that the three grounds or aspects really get . intermixed and will have to be considered together in light of the relevant material on record and according to counsel the material on record clearly shows that the impugned transfer stands vitiated by the injp firmities indk11ted each of the; said wounds. Counsc; I contended that\n\n,. '.-,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (T'ulzapurkar, J.) 979\n\na mere recital in the Presidential Notification that the transfer has been ordered by the President \"after consultation with the Chief Justice of India\" is not enough and will not avail the contesting respondents and when the factum of full and effective consultation. has been put in issue the respondents have to show demonstrably that there has been such full and effective consultation as contemplated by Art. 222(1) and the material produced is lacking in this behalf particularly when the normal procedure was reversed in that the proposal for transfer in the instant case emanated from the Chief Justice of India and further there was nothing to show whether the communication received from the Chief Minister of Madras containing grounds of his objection to the proposed transfer had been placed before the Chief Justice of India. It was further contended that it has not been shown that the transfer is in public interest or what category of public interest is being served thereby. It was pointed out that there is a divergence between the transferring authority (the President) and the Chief Justice of India as to the reasons for which the impugned transfer has been made; whereas according to the transferring authority it was in pursuance of a policy of having all Chief Justices in every High Court from outside, according to the Chief Justice of India it was a selective transfer made in an appropriate case for strictly objective reasons, but the tramfer could not be for the reasons of the policy because that policy had not been then and has not been even now finally formulated or adopted and if it is a selective transfer it has been by way of punishment and therefore bad in law. It was also contended that no reasons or gmunds necessitating or justifying the transfer nor materials in support thereof were ever disclosed or discussed with Shri K.B.N. Singh by any one on behalf of the transferring authority or by the Chief Justice of.India, that the advanced age and serious illness of his mother and his other difficulties were not properly considered and as such ' fhe procedure followed lacked fair-play and for all these reasons the\n\nimpuned transfer deserves .to be quashed or set-aside.\n\nIn view of the aforesaid contentions raised by the Counsel for the petitioners it will be necessary to indicate briefly the relevant material on the record and ascertain what facts or aspects emerge clearly therefrom so as to adjudicate upon the V!!lidity or otherwise of the grounds of attack levelled against the impugned transfer. The entire relevant materi.al requiring analysis and consideration consists of: (a) Self-contained compre4eqsive ffidavit dated September 16,.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\n1981 of Sbri K.B.N. Singh filed after be was transposed as a copetitioner containing all the relevant averments arid submissions in support of the challenge; (b) Counter-affidavit dated September 24, J 981 of Sbri Kankan filed on behalf of the Union of India; (c) Rejoinder-Affidavit dated September 28, 1981 of Sbri K. B. N. Singh in reply to Shri Kankan's counter-affidavit; (d) Counter-affidavit dated September 29, 1981 of the Chief Justice oflndia, re>pondent No. 2 (e) Rejoinder-affidavit dated October 16, 1981 of Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh in reply to the counter-affidavit of Chief Justice of India;\n\n(f) Relevant correspondence between the Chief Justice of India on the one hand and the Union Law Minister and the Prime Minister on the other and between the Chief Minister of Madras and the\n\nUnion Law Minister contained in a file pertaining to the impugned transfer disclosed by the Union Government pursuant to this Court's order dated November 2, 1981; (g) Relevant notings in file No. 50/6/80-Jus pertaining to the appointment of Chief Justices of Delhi High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court in the context of the proposed general policy of having all Chief Justices in various High Courts from outside also disclosed pursuant to this Court's order .dated November 18, 1981.\n\nReading items (f) and (g) together the following facts or aspects emerge very clearly on the record :\n\n(I) a general policy to have Chief Justices of all the High Courts from outside was being evolved by the Union Government, who had almost decided to accept the basic principles underlying it but had not finally formulated or adopted the same because the mechanism or modality of procedure had yet to be decided upon and fix:!d and the notings in file No. 50/6/80-Jus clearly show that the appointments of the two Acting ChiefJustices as Permanent Chief Justices of Delhi High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court were made on the understanding that they will be liable to be transferred \"if eventually a decision is taken that every Chief Justice must come from outside\";\n\n(2) that the Government's view in regard to such policy was put across to the Chief Justice of India but the Chief Justice of India was \"firmly opposed to a whole-sale transfer of the Chief Justices of the High Courts\" and had stated,\n\n\"~ take the view, whch I b21, ve expressed from time to time\n\ny J,\n\n:._,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNiON (tulzapurkar, J.) 981.\n\nthat such transfers may be made iii appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons\"(vide letter dated December 7,1980 from the Chief Justice of India to the Union Law Minister).\n\nReading the correspondence at item (f) above, the following additional facts or aspects emerge clearly :\n\n(3) that transfers of some of the Chief Justices had been engaging the attention of the Chief Justice of India for the past few months; and he had made personal inquiries in this behalf and had met several lawyers and Judges of the concerned High Courts and on the . basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . . Singh should be transferred as te Chief Justice of the\n\nMadras High Court ;\n\n(5) that these suggested transfers including that of Shri K.B.N. Singh, apart from being discussed in the correspondence were also discussed orally in meetings and over telephone by and between the Chief Justice of India on the one hand and the Union Law Minister and the Prime Minister on the other an inference arising from the corresponndence at item (f) itself.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOTTS [1982] 2 s.c.:l.t\n\n Reading items (a) to (e) above; and particularly the selfoontained comprehensive affidavit of Shri K.B.N. Singh, counteraffidavit of the Chief Justice of India and rejoinder-affidavit of Shri K. B. N. Singh in reply thereto together and proceeding on the basis of points of convergence only and excluding or ignoring the points of divergence between ihem arising from their respective affidavits, the following additional facts or aspects emerge very clearly :\n\n(6) that much prior to his suggesting the transfer of Shri\n\nK.B.N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan High Court on 7-12-1980, the Chief Justice of India had paid a visit to Patna High Court in February, 1980 after disclosing to Shri K.B.N. Singh the purpose of his visit and had during thafvisit met on February 24, 25 and 26, 1980 the Hon'ble Judges of that High Court and the Members of that Bar individually, the Members of the Advocates' Association collectively and the Judges of the District Court at Patna and held discussions with them, and on his objective assessment of the situation and the data collected he concluded that dissatifactory working conditions obtained in the High Court;\n\n(7) that in regard to the proposai to transfer Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh from Patna to Madras High Court, Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh and the Chief Jm; tice of India had discussions with each other on two occasions-one on the 5th January, 1980 over phone and the other on January 8, 1981 at the residence of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nWhat transpired between the two on these two occasions is very material and again leaving points of serious divergence and proeeeding on the points of broad convergence between the two it can safely be stated that this is what transpire.cl between them :\n\nOn January 5, 1981 the Chief Justice of India informed Shri K.B.N. Singh over phone that it was proposed to transfer Sbri M.M. Ismail to Kerala and that he (Shri K.B.N. Singh) may have to go Madras; on fur~ ther query as to the reason for it, the Chief Justice of India referred to Government policy but further specifically conveyed to him that it was proposed to transfer Shri M.M. Ismail from Madras and it was ·\n\n'r< ( -\n\n$. P. GUPTA v. UNION ('f'ulzapurkar, J.) 983\n\nnecessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place; during the telephonic talk Shri\n\nK.B.N. Singh told the Chieflustice oflndia that his mother was seriously ill and bed ridden and was not in a position to move out of Patna and accompany him to Madras and further told him that if his transfer was insisted upon he would prefer to resign whereupon the Chief Justice of India requested him not to act in haste and to give the matter a close thought; the Chief Justice of India also added that he (Chief Justice) was making a note of the personal difficulty mentioned by him and that it will have to be taken into consideration before a final decision was taken; the Chief Justice of India also requested him to go over to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer. During the meeting that tbOk place at the residence of the Chief Justice of India on 8th January, 1981 !lt about 7.30 p.m. the proposed transfer was further discussed and when during the discussion the question of his mother's advance age and illness cropped up, the Chief Justice of India told him that he was unable to agree with his view on the matter as there were other dependable persons in his family who could look after his mother, that in any case his brother Shri S.B.N. Singh, who was practising in the High Court, was quite capable of looking after his mother, to which Shri K.B.N. Singh replied that his mother had a special attachment to him and that he could not leave her to the care of his brother and other members of the family; during the discussion Shri K.B.N. Singh told the Chief Justice of India that it was possible that baseless compla.ints, which were the bane of Bihar, might have been made to him, and if so, he would like to remove any wrong impression tha.t might have been created, whereupon the Chief Justice of India told him that he never went by baseless ccmplaints and he did not believe that his (Shri K.B.N. Singh's) conduct was blame-worthy but that if he wanted to explain any matter, which according to him, had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court, he was free to do so; further, during the dis cussion the Chief Justice of India assured him that he\n\n984'.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 S.C.It\n\ndid not bold that he (Shri K.B.N. Singh) himself was to blame but certain persons were exploiting . their prox, imity to him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. It may be stated that Shri K.B.N. Singh in bis rejo.inder aflidavit has admitted that during the discussion the Chief Justice of India did mention to him that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him and that there was misunderstanding and dissatisfaction in the High Court;\n\n(8) the Chief Justice of India has in terms stated on oath that there was full and effective co°; isultation between '1im and the President of India (meaning the President act- ( ing on advice of Council of Ministers) on the question of\n\nShri K.B.N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras and that every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by him fully with the President (acting as such) both before and after he had proposed the transfer and that ever-y\n\nrelevant circumstance, incluc\\ing the personal difliculty mentioned by Shri K.B.N. Singh was considered by him carefully and objectively before coming to the conclusion that be should be transferred to Madras; he has further stated that the paramount consideration in the impugned transfer was public interest and that it was not i:>Y way of any punishment at all and that he came to the conclusion on a dispassionate assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances, including the language difficulty involved, • that Shri K.B.N. Singh was suited for being transferred to Madras High Court and that it was necessary so to transfer him. The Union of India through the counter-affidavit of Shri Kankan bas denied that the impugned order was passed without effective consultation between the President\n\nof India (meaning acting on the advice of Council of Ministers) and the Chief Justice of India and asserted that relevant considerations were taken into account by the President (acting as above) and that the imp\\lgned transfer has been made only in public interest and is not punitive in character.\n\nTo the aforesaid facts or aspects that emerge clearly from the relevant materials on the record two more facts will have to be added as having come on\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 985\n\nrecord through the statements made by the learned Solicitor-General in answer to pointed queries made by the Court.to elicit requisite information and such a course was adopted by the Court with a view to avoid burdening the record with additional files containing the notings which were, however, produced for Court's inspection and these facts 'are :\n\n(9) that pursuant to the executive instructions contained in the 1972 MEMORANDUM dealing with the procedure to be adopted in connection with the appointment and transfer. of Judges of. High Courts the Union Law Minister had ascertained the views of the concerned Chief Ministers, namely, the Chief Minister of Madras, the Chief Minister of Kerala and the Chief Minister of Bihar on 3rd, 4th and 6th January, 1981 respectively, in the matter of the proposed transfers;\n\n(10) that the effective decision on the impugned transfer was taken by . the Prime Minister on 9th January, 198·1 whereafter the necessary and relevant papers were forwarded to the President of India and the impugned Notification was issued on 19th January, 1981.\n\nAt the outset, I wotild like to observe that a needlessCOR tr()versy was raised as to whether the impugned transfer has been a policy transfer. (i.e. a transfer pursuant to the policy of having Chief Justices of all the High Courts from out.side) ora selective transfer and a great deal of confusion was added to it by the statement which the learned . Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the 'Union of'lndia was instructed to make .during the haring As discussed and explained in the earlier part of this judgment it can- not be accepted as an invariably correct proposition that a policy transfer would always be .non-punitive in character or that a selective transfer would necessarily be a punitive transfer. It has been pohted out earlier .that a policy to have one-third of the 'Puisne Judges ofa High Court from outside, in the absence of any 'tnechanism or modality of procedure giving guidelines as to how •that onetthird number will be chosen for implementing it, would obviously be fr mght with the vice of discrimination; similarly even the policy of having the Chief Justices of all the High Courts from outside stands the risk of being abused by the :i;!xecutive in the\n\n\n[I 982] 2 S.C, R.,\n\nabsence of proper guidelines being provided in the matter of regulating whic; h Chief Justice will be posted in what particular High Court. A policy transfer, therefore, without fixing the requisite mechanism or modality of procedure that ensures complete insulation against executive interference, could be a punitive transfer in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive whereas a selective transfer in an appropriate case for strictly objective reasons and in public interest could be non-punitive, with the result that each case of transfer, whether based on a policy or a selective transfer, will have to be judged on the facts and circumstances of its own for deciding whether it is punitive in character in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive or not. :In the instant case, having regard to the facts mentioned at Nos. 1 and 2 above, the impugned transfer must be regarded as a selective transfer and not based on the policy in the comtemplation of the Union Government, notwithstanding the reference to 'Government Policy' made by the Chief Justice of India during his telephonic talk with Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh on January 5, 1981.\n\nSince the impugned transfer order in the ultimate analysis is of the transferring authority (the President) this Court wanted to know from the learned Solicitor General as to what were the reasons which prompted the transferring authority to pass the impugned order and therefore, a clarification was invited, but the statement that was made by him on November 12, 1981, o( course, under instructions from proper quarters, instead of clarify- 'ing the position made it more puzzling.\n\nThe statement in substance was that the Chief Justice of India bad suggested certain transfers, including the impugned transfer, in pursuance of his own view that transfers should be made in appropriate cases strictly for objective reasons but the Government had acceded to the transfers proposed by him as \"(!) it was felt that not agreeing to these transfers may be construed as though the Government is departing from the view of having Chief Justices from outside; (2) the policy aspect could still be pressed into service later\". The statement gives the impression that the transferring authority agreed to the transfers\n\nbecause it did not want to depart fr0m its view of having Chief Justices from outside but at the same time it categorically states that it was felt that the policy could be pressed into service later; the second part of the statement clearly suggests that the policy, which had not been till then clearly formulated, could be a'nd was to be pressed into service later meaning thereby that the instant transfers were not in pursuance of the policy.\n\nPerhaps what is\n\n, x ,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) - 987\n\nsought to be conveyed is that each one of the instant transfers was a selective transfer appropriately made strictly for objective reasons and justified by reasons for which the Chief Justice of India had. recommended them but at the same time they indirectly helped the Government in achieving the same result which would have been achieved had the transfers been made in pursuance of the policy which the Government intended to have.\n\nThat this was intended to be conveyed by the statement of 'Nov.ember, 12, 1981 has been made clear by the learned Solicitor General later on, for, in his written note filed before this Court on November 18, 1981, he has made the following categorical statement : \"The impugned transfer, though not in pursuance. of a policy decision, yet ls a step forward which is consistent with the view of appointing Chief Justices from outside. The impugned transfer order, is, however, valid in that it satisfies the requirements of Art. 222\". In other words, even as a selective transfer the Union Government found it justified for reasons given by the Chief Justice of India and valid under Art. 222 (I) but at the same time accepting his advice and recommendation amounted to taking a step forward in the direction of their intended policy. But even if it were assumed at the highest that the two parties to the consultation (the Transferring Authority and the Chief Justice of India) had different reasons for agreeing to the ultimate result this cannot vitiate the consultation contemplated by Art. 222 (!), for, consultation, as has been pointed out by this Court in Sankalchand Sheth's case (supra), requires the parties thereto to make their respective points of view known to each other and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views and as has been put aptly by Krishna Iyer, J. at page 496 of the report \"Consultation is different from consentaniety. They may discuss but may disagree; they may confer but may not concur.\" But, apart from this aspect of the matter it seems sufficiently clear that the impugned transfer has been a selective transfer in the instant case and it will have to be decided whether it properly falls within Art. 222 ( 1), the same having been made after observ.ing the safeguards of public interest and effective consultation and after following the procedure that ensured fair play\n\nThe main question that arises in the case is whether the impugned transfer, being a selective transfer, has been really made in public interest or by way of punishment. In this behalf Counsel for. Shri K.B.N. Singh 4as raise\\! a two-fold contention wtiich has to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 2 s.c:R.\n\nbe squarely dealt 'with. In the first place it has been urged that merely asserting that the said transrer has been made in public interest without categorising the public interest served thereby would be of no avail; and secondly, it is clear on record that during his visit to Patna in February, 1980 the Chief Justice of India had collected some data and information which showed that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to Sbri K.B.N. Singh and this bad created considerable misunderstanding and dissatisfaction in the working of the High Court which seems to have necessitated or justified Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer and this certainly implies some reflection on Shri K.R.N. Singh's behaviour and the inference is inescapable that the transfer is by way of punishment and that too is made without disclosing the data or particulars to him amounting to unfair-play. It is not possible to accept either of these two contentions for the reasons which I will presently indicate.\n\nIt is not correct to say that the contesting respondents have been merely 'asserting baldly that the impugned transfer has been made in publio interest without categorising the public interest served thereby. Actually two categories of public interest have been indicated by the Chief Justice of India in bis counter-affidavit; so far as the shifting of Shri K.B.N. Singh from Patna High Court is concerned the reason indicated is that cert.ain persons were exploiting their proximity to Shri K.B.N. Singh which had created considerable misunderstanding and dissatification in the working of the High Court and surely reinedying dissatisfactory working conditions in a High Court serves one kind of high public interest; and so far as his posting at Madras High Court is concerned, the Chief iustice of India felt that it would be in fitness of things that an experienced and senior Chief Justice like Sbri K.B.N. Singh be posted as the Chief Justice of one of the premier High Courts in the country. It is difficult to countenance any suggestion that either of these considerations which weighed with the Chief Justice of India does not serve public interest. The first contention, therefore, must be rejected. Coming to the punishment aspect strenuously pressed by Counsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh I would like to observe that it will not be correct to draw an inference of the concerned Judge's connivance or complicity in . every case where persons close to him exploit their proximity to him while handling their matters in the High Court and in the absence of any connivance or complicity on his part, such exploitation of close proximity would not imply any reflection on the Judge concerned. It is conceivable that undesirable\n\niu;:tivities are indulged in without !lis nowJdci or consentnay even\n\n)<,\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) . ' 989\n\nagainst his wishes and sometimes despite counter measures adopted by him, and yet such exploitation of close proximity and the undesirable activities would spoil the atmosphere and lead to dissatisfactory working conditions in the High Court. In such a case if the atmosphere has to be improved and dissatisfactory working conditions have to be remedied it may become inevitable to transfer the concerned Judge without any blame attaching to him whatsoever; it is obvious thllt such a transfer will not carry any reflection on him. Further if the data or information, which leads to the discovery of dissatisfactory working conditions in the High Court, were also to indicate the concerned Judge's connivance or complicity in the exploitation then only the question of putting the same to him will arise but not otherwise. The instant case seems to be of that type, for, during his discussion with Shri K.B.N. Singh the Chief Justice of India had repeatedly told him that it was not his practice to take into account any baseless complaints, that he did not believe that his (Shri K.B.N. Singh's) conduct was blameworthy in any manner and even when he mentioned this particular aspect about certain persons exploiting their proximity to him which had led to needless misunderstanding and dissatisfactory working conditions in the High Court he specifically assured hili; l that he was not to blame for it nor responsible for it.\n\nNo material appears to have been placed before Chief Justice of India by anyone even remotely suggesting that there was any connivance or complicity on the part of Shri K.B.N. Singh in the matter of exploitation of pro ximity leading to dissatisfactory working conditions in Patna High Court and there is no reason why the statement of the Chief Justice of India that Shri K.B.N. Singh was not responsible nor was to blame for it should not be accepted. In the absence of any connivance or complicity on his part in the matter of the exploitation, no reflection on Shri K.B.N. Singh is implied simply by reason of his transfer, which must be regarded as having been made, with a view to remedying the dissatisfactory working conditions in that High Court and no unfair play was involved in the proceduce followed by the Chief Justice of India. In the circumstances it is clear that the impugned transfer has been in public interest and not by way of punishment. ·\n\nOn the question whether there has been full and effective consultation between the transferring authority (the President) and the Chief Justice of lridia it is true that a mere recital in the\n\n990 . StJl>REME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S, C, ll\n\nimpugned Notification dated 19th Jnuary, 1981 about such consultation will not be of much avail especially wheh the factum of such full and effective consultation has been put in issue but here the contesting respondents' case on that aspect does not rest merely on the recital to be found in the impugned Notification but they have produced sufficient material on record to show that there was full and effective consultation as contemplated by Art. 222 (I} before the impugDed order was made.\n\nPn the question as to whether there was consultation between the transfecring authority on the one hand and the Chief Justice of India on the other and if so, what transpired during such consultation. Sbri K. B. N. Singh obviously has no personal knowledge and one will have to consider what one or both the parties to the consultative process have to say on the matter. It is well-known that in writ proceedings the affidavits counter-affidavits and rejoinder-affidavits filed by the parties con stitute not merely their pleadings but also partake of the character of evidence in the case and it is from this angle that the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the contesting respondents, particularly that of the Chief Justice of India, a party to the consultative process, will have to be examined.\n\nKeeping the recital •about the consultation with him that is to be found in the impugned Notification aside, t11ere is a positive statement on oath made by the Chief Justice of India in his counter-affidavit dated September 29, 1981 that there was full and effective consultation between him and the . President of India on the question of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras and that every relevant aspect of that question, which would include the language difficulty involved as well as the personal difficulty of Shri K, B.N .. Singh, was discussed by him fully with the President both before and after he had proposed the transfer and it is obvious that this statement of the Chief Justice of India partakes of the character of the evidence seeking to prove the factum and contents of the consultation. Far from there being\n\nanything on record which may detract from this averment, there is positive other . material on record to corroborate the same. The correspondence file disclosed by the Union Government clearly shows that lhe question of Sh.ri K.B.N. Singh's transfer was discussed and considered fully by and between the Chief Justice of In.dia on the one band and the Union Law Minister and the Prime Minister representing the transferring authority on the other not merely through correspondence but also orally in meetings and over telephone. Presumably basing himself on this correspondence file\n\nShri Kankan in his counter-affidavit dated September 24, 1981 has\n\n. I\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurar, J.) 991\n\ndenied that the impugned order was passed without effective consultation between the Chief Justice of India and the President of India (of course meaning --the President as the constitutional head acting on the advice of Council of Ministers) and has further asserted that the relevant considerations were taken into consideration by the President (acting as such). It was argued that the data collected by the Chief Justice of India during his visit to Patna High Court in February, 1980 does not seem to have been placed before either the Union Law Minister or the Prime Minister but such an argument has to be rejected because the Chief Justice of India's letter dated December 7, 1980 to the Union Law Minister,· wherein the referenct to the col.lection of such data by the Chief Justice of India as a result of his discussion . with several lawyers and Judges of the concerned High Courts and to his having considered the same with greatest objectivity has been made, itself states ' that the same was written \"in furtherance of\" the discussion which both of them had on the previous day i.e. on December 6, 1980, on many an impt>rtant matter concerning the High Courts. It was also argued that the statement of the Chief Justice of India in his counter-affidavit that he had discussed the question of impugned transfer with the President of India is vague inasmuch as it has not been clarified as to with whom from the side of the transferring authority he had these discussions, whether with the 'l.Jnion Law Minister or with\n\nthe Prime Minister or with the {'resident himself personally; this argument has also to be rejected, for the relevant correspondence disclosed by the Union Government clearly shows that the Chief Justice of India had these discussions about the impugned transfer both with the Union Law Minister, and the Prime Minister and\n\nneither the . Chief Justice of India nor Shri Kankan has suggested that the Chief Justice of India had discussed the question personally with the President of India. When the correspondence indicates clearly the two functionaries from the side of the transferring authority with whom the Chief Justice of India had discussions and there\n\nbeing no whisper either from the Chief Justice of India or from Shri Kankan that there were personal discussions with the President, it is ridiculous to suggest that the statement of the Chief Justice of India in that behalf is vague. With this material on record I did not appreciate the necessity ?r desirability of any clarificatory statement coming from the President that the issue was never discussed by the Chief Justice of India with him personally. What is more, it is surprising that in face of such correspondence showing discussion on the subject with. the Union Law Minister the Solicitor General\n\n992 SUPIU!ME COtJRT kE1>01ltS [1981) 1 s.c.1:\n\nshould have been instructed to make a statement which he did on November 11, 1981 to the effect \"the Chief Justice of India mentioned to the Law Minister about his proposal to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh\". The twist given in the statement that the Solicitor-General was instructed to make cannot escape this Court's attention. Why was it necessary? Be that as it may the material on record clearly shows that the impugned transfer was fully discussed by the Chief Justice of India with the Union Law Minister and the Prime Minister. It was also faintly argued that the last discussion between the Chief Justice of India and Shri K.B.N. Singh having taken place in the evening at about 7.30 p.m. on 8th January, 1981, the matter could not have been discussed further between the Chief Justice of India and the transferring authority before the effective and final decision was taken by the Prime Minister which is said to have been done by her on 9th January, 1981. The argument is merely required to be stated to be rejected, for even after the last discflssion between the Chief Justice of India and Shri K.B.N. Singh ' was over there was ample time and opportunity for the Chief Justice of India to pilt across all that transpired between him and Shri K.B.N. Singh together with his reaction thereon either to the Union Law Minister or .the Prime Minister or to both orally either in a meeting or on the telephone before the final and effective deci- • . sion on the impugned transfer was taken by the Prime Minister.\n\nFrom the materi~I produced on record, therefore, it is abundantly clear that there was full and effective consultation between the transferring authority on the one hand and the Chief Justice of India on the other in regard to the impugned transfer as contemplated by Art. 222(1) before the effective decision thereon was taken, and if the consultation has been full and effective as contemplated by Art. 222( I),. as is shown by the material produced on record, the contention that the normal procedure ought not to have been reversed and th'e proposal should have emanated from the President1\n\nand not from the Chief Justice of India as is the case here loses its significance.\n\nMoreover, there is no hard and fast rule as to from whom a proposal for transfer should emanate.\n\nOn the last aspect as to whether the procedure followed by the Chief Justice of India ensured fair-play in relation Shri K.B.N. Singh or not the material on record clearly shows that the Chief Justice of India had discussed all the relevant aspects concering the impugned. transfer with Shri K.B.N. Singh including his personal difficulty' pertaining to his mother's advanced age and'\n\n)\" i\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 993\n\nserious illness. That the Chief Justice of India took a different view about .it does not mean that any unfair-play was involved. After all in his view p.ublic interest outweighed the considerations of personal difficulty as well as the language difficulty which were put before him. As discussed earlier there being no charge nor any imputation against Shri K.B.N. Singh there was no question of giving him an opportunity to meet any. It is thus clear that the procedure that was followed ensured complete fair-play qua Shri K.B.N. Singh.\n\nIt was next contended by Counsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh that the Executive Instructions in Para 12 of the Memorandum of 1972, containing the procedure to be adopted in connection with transfers of High Court Judges issued by the Central Government, in the matter of consultation or ascertainment of the views of the Chief Ministers of the States involved in a transfer had not been followed in this case. The contention was, however, not pressed when the learned Solicitor-General after consulting the relevant files, made a statement at the Bar that in the instant case the Union Law Minister had consulted and/or ascertained the views of the Chief Ministers of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Bihar on 3rd, 4th and 6th January, 1981 respectively in. the matter of the proposed fransfers.\n\nFurther, in my view the question whether the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's letter pointing out language difficulties was actually placed before the Chief Justice of India or not would not be material if the Chief Justice of India was apprised o~ the grounds of o_bjection based on language difficulty and he had considered them and the material shows that the Chief Justice of India had taken into consideration the objections based on language difficulty.\n\nCounsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh in the last resort faintly urged that simultaneously with the passing of the impugned order the provisions of Art. 222(2) ought to have been complied with and since no order fixing compensatory allowance to Shri K.B.N. Singh was passed upon his transfer the impugned transfer order would be invalid. It is impossible to accept such a contention, for, Art. 222(2) does not provide that the order fixing compensatory allowance to the transferee Judge has to be issued simultaneously along with the transfer order; all that it provides is that when a Judge has been or is transferred after complying with the requirements of sub-Art.(1) he shall, during the period he serves as a Judge of the other High\n\nCourt, be entitled to re!ieive, in additi<:>ll to his sala1?', such compe~-\n\n. 994\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nsatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and, until so determined, such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix. It is obvious that such an order fixing the com pensatory allowance could follow and would have followed in the instant case within reasonable time but there the occasion to make such order got postponed because of the stay of transfer that was ordered by this Court.\n\nIn the result it is clear that the impugned transfer must be held to be a valid transfer under 'Art. 222( I) of the Constitution.\n\nBefore parting with these cases I would like to place on record my sense of appreciation and gratitude to all the learned Counsel who have rendered great assistance to the Court by' arguing their respective points with exceptional ability and skill. I have always held the view that the quality of a judgment rendered by a Court varies in direct proportion to the quality of assistance received by it from counsel appearing before it and whatever little I have been able to do in these cases it is mainly due to the excellent assistance received from counsel and I thank them. At the same time I cannot help keeping on record a feeling of uneasiness which I entertained during the hearing of Shri K.B.N. Singh's case because of the manner in which that case was conducted by the contesting respondents through the learned Solicitor General, for which I hasten to add, that the Solicitor General is not at all responsible, though on occasions he was required to do sorpe tight-rope walking, obviously under instructions. On more occasions than one I was left in. doubt whether they were really interested in having the transfer order upheld. The statement which the Solicitor General was instructed to make on November 12, 1981 in which a twist was given suggesting, contrary to the documentary record, that the Chief Justice of\n\nIndia had, instead of \"discussing\" the proposal of transfer, \"mentioned\" the same to the Law. Minister, ca!!not be otherwise explained. I have !ii ready mentioned that I have failed to appre~ ciate the desirability or necessity of the statement made on behalf of the President of India disowning the \"personal discussion\" with the Chief Justice of India on the issue of transfer, especially when the latter had not raised a whisper about such personal discussion.\n\nAfter all is said and done, it must be observed that while acting administratively the attitude and behaviour of the Chief Justice of India was befitting the paterfamilias of the Judiciary. The way he dealt with the cases of Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri K.B.N. Singh has\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tu!zapurkar, J.) 995\n\nbee, objective and judicious-by refusing to rely on unconfirmed reports, rumours or gossip in the case of the former. and by following a procedure that ensured fair play in the case of the latter.\n\nThe other aspect, I would •like to refer to is the manner in which a section of the Press bas behaved in this case.\n\nI am constrained to observe that a section of the Press while reporting the proceedings of this Court in this case seems to have, without fully realising the scope and purpose of the disclosure ordered by the Court, exceeded its limits of fair reporting and fair comment by discussing the merits and demerits of the grounds on which recommendations were made concerning the Judges or the truth or falsity of the disclosed material; assuming that this Court was intending to adjudicate on the merits or demerits of the gr11unds of the recommendations made or on.tnith or falsity of the materials even then how could the Press, before this Court has finally adjudicated upon the issues involved, pronounce its verdict-which it almost did-on the high constitutional functionaries involved by holding a trial by Press ? The disclosure, which became necessary in the highest public interest of administration of justice-for seeing that injustice was not perpetrated and justice was meted .out to high judicial functionaries under the Constitution, was not intended for being useJ for such purpose.\n\nSuch behaviour of a section of the Press has been most distressing and bas unnecessarily affected the image of Judiciary and the high constitutional functionaries involved.\n\nIn conclusion I would pass the following order :\n\n(I) Writ Petitions in Transferred Cases Nos. 19-22 of 1981 F are allowed.\n\n(2) The impugned Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 is quashed and struck down as impinging .on judicial independence and as being violative of Articles 22Z(l) and 14.\n\n(3) In future extensions to sitting Additional Judges should normally be for two years and no extension to •any Additional Judge for less than a year be ever ·. granted,\n\n\n( J 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(4) The decision to drop Shri S.N. Kumar is quashed and his cas,• is sent back to the President for reconsideration ano passing appropriate orders after the requisitw consultation is undertaken afresh, with due observance of adequate fair play. ·\n\n(5) 'Since Sbri K.B.N. Singh's transfer is held to be valid, Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981 and those in transferred Cases Nos. 2 6 and 24 of 1981 are dismissed.\n\n(6) Each party will bear its own costs in these cases.\n\ns:P. GUPTA V.>UNIO:N (Desai, J.) 997 .\n\nDESAI, J.\n\nMarch 18, 1981, till law courts and lawyers in their present form and structure survive, would be remembered as a day that raised storm of controversy leading to a spate of writ peti-tions in different High Courts in the country. The Law Minister of the Government of India selected that fateful day for iswing a circular, forwarded it .to the Chief Ministers of all States and the\n\n.• ;-<, Governor of Punjab requesting them to obtain the consent of additional judges working in the High Court in their respective\n\n\\ ·.\"·\n\nStates with preference limited to three stations, for being appointed as permanent judges in High Court other than the High Court in which they are, at present, appointed and functioning. A similar consent was also to be obtained from those who may be recommended in future for appointment as judges of the High Court.\n\nIt appears that the first salvo was fired by Shri S.P. Gupta, Advocate practising in the Allahabad !Jigh Court who filed a writ petition in the . Allahabad High Court impleading President of India, Union of India, Chief Justice of. India, Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court and Governor of State as respondents praying 'for a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus directing the President to appoint judges of the High Court in accordance ith the constitutional scheme etc. There was also a\n\npryer for a , ijirection to appoint three named judges as permanent judges but t6is prayer was not pressed. This petition was filed, it appears, on the very day on which the circular was issued.\n\nAfter it was admitted, the petition was twice amended with the leave of the Court, the first order being dated May I, 1981 and the l>econd being July 20, 193·1.\n\nRespondent I, President of India, Respondent 3, Chief Justice of India and Respondent 5, Governor of\n\nUttar Pradesh .were subsequently dropped and their names from the array of respondents were deleted. This petition stood. transferred to this Court by the order dated May I, 19$1, 11; nd i~ w11~ reistered as Transferred Cas~ NC?, I? of 1981.\n\nSUPREME C::OURT REPORTS\n\n\n• After the issue of the impugned circular dated March 18, 1981, some events occurred which may be briefly noticed. The initial term of appointment of three additional judges of Delhi High Court, Mr. O.N. Vohra, Mr. S.N. Kumar and Mr. S.B. Wad expired on March 6, 1981, and each of them was appointed as an additional\n\njudge for a period of three months. This short-term extension presumably provoked Shri J.L. Kalra and some others, practising advocates, to file Writ Petition No. 636 of 1981 on March 26, 1981, in the High Court of Delhi impleading Union of India as the sole respondent. A number of prayers have been made in this petition, one C which deserves mention is that a direction be issued that Shri N.N.\n\nGoswami, Shri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N. Vohra, three additional judges of the High Court of Delhi be appointed as permanent judges and a further direction that the term of Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges functioning in the same Court be extended for a period of two years. By an order made by this Court on May 1, 1981, his writ petition stood transferred to this Court and is registered as Transferred Case No. 21 of 1981.\n\nAs a sequel io the issuance of the impugned circular dated March 18, 198 J , a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of western India was held at Bombay on April 3, where a resolution was adopted questioning the propriety of obtainin:i the consent of additional judges to be appoined as permanent judges in F other High Courts in advance and further resolved to lodge a strong protest with the Union of India. A. similar resolution appears to be adopted by the Bombay Bar Association at its Extraordinary General Meeting held on April 7, 1981. Ultimately Shri Iqbal\n\nM. Chagla and three other advocates filed a Writ Petition No. 527/81 in the High Court of Bombay questioning inter alia that the circular issued by the Law Minister on March 18, 1981 be declared ultra vires and voi\"d and as a consequence, consent, if any given, and consequent action, if any, taken, be declared null and void. An injunction was sought restraining the respondents from Implementing the impugned c; irc; ular and an interim relief in terms of this prayer\n\n.-\\.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 999\n\nwas also sought. The respondents impleaded were the Law Minister, Union of India and ten additional judges of Bombay High Court.\n\nThis Petition was admitted and rule nisi wa' issued and ad interim injunction was granted.\n\nThis led to filing of an appeal by Union of India before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Subsequently by an .order of this Court, this case stood transferred to this Court under Article I 39A and is registered as Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981.\n\nShri V.M. Tarkunde, former Judge of Bombay High Court and Senior Advocate practising in the Supreme Court, General Secretary of the Citizens for Democracy and President of the People's Union for Civil Liberties filed writ Petition No. 882 of I 9s.I in the High Court of Delhi on April 22, 1981, im.pleading initially Union of India as the sole respondent. It appears that subsequently the Law Minister and one Mr. P.K. Kathpalia, Additional Secretary, Department of Justice were impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively.\n\nThe petitioner also filed CMP. No. 13425/81 requesting this Court to direct that Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra and Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar be impleaded as respondents.\n\nCMP. was allowed by the order dated July 7, 1981.\n\nShri.O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar, Additional Judges of Delhi High Court who were given extension for three months commencing from March 6, 1981, to June 5, 1981, were impleaded as respondents 4 and 5'.\n\nOf the two additional judges so impleaded respondent 5 Shri S.N. Kumar has participated in the proceedings and has appeared through his counsel Shri R.K.\n\nGarg. The principal question raised' was that independence of judiciary being the basic and fundamental feature of our constitution, any action of the executive which would be subversive of the independence of judiciary, must be declared unconstitutional. It was stated that the circular of the Law Minister of March 18, 1981, directing the Chief Ministers of States to obtain consent of an additional judge for being posted as permanent judge in other High\n\n~Court giving him an option to disclose his preference limited to three stations and a similar consent to be obtained in 'advance from a person to be recommended for appointment as a judge of the High Court is subversive of the independence of judiciary. It was submitted that the extension of the term of an additional judge or bis appointment as a permans:nt judge cannot be left to the unfettered discretion of 'the executive because it would make a serious inroad on the independence of )udiciar~. ;\\n<;>ther important on\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ,\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\ntention raised in the petition was whether short-term extension of additional judges is permissible under Article 224 and whether it is open to the executive to appoint additional judges leaving vacancies in the permanent strength of the High Court judges unfilled, even though the arrears are mounting.\n\nA specific contention was raised with specific reference to the position of the Delhi High Court alleging that it would be contrary to the constitutional intendment underlying Article 216 to maintain half the strimgth of the Delhi High Court as additional judges. This petition under an order made by this Court stood transferred to . this Court under Article 139A and is registered as Transferred Case No. 20of1981.\n\nIn all these petitions, Mr. K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary in the Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs has filed bis counter-affidavit with regard to the circular of. the Law Minister and other contentions. It was stated that the prese, nt Government is vitally concerned in maintaining the independence of judiciary and in the administration of justice according to the rule of law.\n\nWith regard to the circular dated March 18, 1981, issued by the Law Minister, it was submitted that the circular is not meant to be covert method to transfer judges from one High Court to other High Court circumventing the requirements of Article 222(1) or ratio of the decision in Union of India v. S. H. Sheth.(1) It. was in terms stated that the failure of the judge to give consent would not be a relevant factor while considering him for appointment as a permanent judge or for a second term as an additional judge, as the case may be.\n\nIt was stated that the appointment of additional judges for two years or for shorter period bas been done after following the constitutional provision in this regard and keeping the\n\npublic interest in view.\n\nWith regard to tqe second appointment of an additional judge after the expiry of the first term, it was stated that it is a fresh appointment and fresh warrant has to be issued and judge bas to take a fresh oath as prescribed and, therefore, the full round of consultation under Article 217 will have to be gone through. Reference was made to the guidelines prescribed for the disposal of cases by a High Court Judge and these guidelines provide a yardstick for calculating the nun 1 ber of additional judges. It is also stated that the strength of the Delhi High Court was raised in June, 1979, and a proposal of the Chief J1,1tice of Delhi High\n\n~1) p978] 1 S.c; R. 4231\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, 1.) 1001\n\nCourt for sanction of two extra judges was approved. Short term appointments were sought to be justified on the plea that there were valid reasons for such short term appointments and privilege was claimed against disclosure of papers relating to appointment of additional Judges. It was specifically denied that the circular was pieant to be .utilised for transfer of judges circumventing the requirements of Article 222.\n\nIt was stated that complaints have been received about the prejudicial attitude of certain judges including additional judges, bred by kinship and other local links and affiliations. Political links have also been mentioned in certain cases and various State authorities have expressed their reservations about continuance of some additional judges. These matters were generally mentioned tothe constitutional authorities. There is an averment in the affidavit that it is not the intention of the Government to appoint every additional judge in another State. This is specifically referred to because a serious controversy developed that the Government wants to arm itself with power to pick aqd choose judges for transfer outside the State and that this would provide an opportunity for extending political patronage so that judges, to avoid harassment of being appointed to a High Court outside their . State may lean towards the Government for their survival. Explaining the raison d'etre it was stated that the purpose behind the circular dated March 18, 1981, was to take steps in the direction of having outsider in the High Court to help in the process of national integration and also to improve the functioning of various High Courts by having in each High Court the presence of a number of judges who would not be swayed by local considerations or affected by the issues which arouse passions and emotions. Support was drawn for this statement from the 14th Report of the Law Commission and from the latest 80th Report of the Law Commission presided over by Mr. H.R. Khanna and from the study group set up by the Administrative Reforms Commission. It was in terms admitted that the additional judge is not a judge on probation. It was stated that short term appointments are made pending the final decision, a thing which would appear objectionable in view of the mandate of Article 224.\n\nPower was claimed by the executive to appoint any additional judge for any shorter period as may be considered justified. If conceded, this can lead to a logical absurdity, namely, from day to day, the situation very difficult even to conceive in any form of political society one may think of.\n\nHowever, mitigating circumstance was pleaded that additional judges for shorter periods have\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.lt\n\nbeen appointed in special circumstances and only when there are exceptional factors necessitating appointments for shorter periods.\n\nIn respect of Shri 0. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar, it was stated that the short-term appointment was made to enable the Govern~ ment to take a final view having regard to the complaints that have been received against some of them after consultation with the constitutional authorities.\n\nThe statement in the petition that the- Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Chief Justice of India both had recommended the appointment of these two judges for a further period of two years was denied. It appears that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had not recommended Shri S. N. Kumar for appointment as additional judge after expiry of his initial term of two years on March 6, 1981.\n\nThe incorrect averment in the petition has found its place in an order made by' the vacation Judge on June 6, 198i. At the appropriate place, it will be pointed out that Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had; for .his reasons, declined to recommend appointment of Shri S. N. Kumar as an additional judge on the expiry of his first term on March 6, 1981.\n\nAs almost identical contentions have been raised by Mr. Kankan in the various affidavits filed by him in every case, it is not necessary to recapitulate them here except recalling one averment made in his counter affidavit filed on July 6, 1981, in reply to the petition filed by Sbri Iqbal M. Chagla and others in Bombay High Court because it was the subject matter of debate. In para 9\n\n(vii) it is stated that the data collected pursuant to the circular issued by the Law Minister would be made available to the Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and the Governor of the State.\n\nThe submission was that the circular was issued for data collection is a subterfuge resorted to, to provide an innocent cloak to a dagger aimed at independence of judiciary.\n\nIt may be briefly mentioned here that Writ J>etition No. 274/81 filed in this Court and Transferred Cases No. 2, 6 and 24/81 were listed to be beard along with the present batch of cases with a view to avoiding the repetition of the arguments on points common to . both sets of cases.\n\nIn the first group of cases the question of construction of Articles 217, 224 and other connected articles prominently figured in the context of circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, seeking consent of additional judges for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, },) 1003\n\nbeing appointed as permanent judges in ot, her High Courts and the short term extensions given to Shri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court and the final non-appointment of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar.\n\nThe submission was that the circular of the Law Minister manifests a covert attempt to transfer additionaljudges from one , High Court to other High Court withoiit consulting the Chief Justice of India as required by Article 222 (1) and thereby circumventing the majority decision in Mr. Sheth's case.\n\nThe Central theme was the scope, ambit and content of consultation which the President must have with the three constitutional functionaries set out in Article 217 (1).\n\nIn the second group of cases, the question arose in the context of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of Madras High Court consequent upon the transfer of Shri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court as Cl\\ief , Justice of Kerala High Court by Presidential Notification dated January 19, 1981, in exercise of the power conferred upon him by Article 222. The controversy centred down the scope, ambit and content of consultation that the President must have with the Chief Justice of India before exercising the power to transfer under Article 222. Thus, the scope, ambit and content of Consultation under Art. 217 as also one under Article 222 which, as Mr. Seervai stated, was more or less the same though the different facets on which consultation must be focussed may differ in the case of transfer and in the case of appointment, figured prominently in both the groups of cases.\n\nThe parameters of scope, ambit and content of consultation both under Article 217 (1), 222 and 224, were drawn on a wide canvass to be tested on the touchstone of independence of judiciary being the fighting faith and fundamental and basic feature of the Constitution. It was stated that if the consultation itself is to provide a reliable safeguard against arbitrary and naked exercise of power against judiciary; the procedure of consultation must be so extensive as to cover all aspects of the matter and it must be made so firm and rigid that any contravention or transgression of it would be treated as mala fide 'or subversive of independence of' judiciary and the decision can be corrected by judicial review. Therefore, at the outset it is necessary to be properly informed as to the concept of indepedence of judiciary as set out in the.Constitution.\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe entire gamut of arguments. revolved principally round the construction of Articles 217 and 224 in one batch of petitions and Articles 222 in another batch but the canvass was Sf)read wide covering various other Articles of the Constitution, analogous provisions in previous Government of India Acts, similar provisions in other democratic constitutions and reports of Law Commission.\n\nRival construction canvassed centred upon the pivotal assumption that independence of judiciary is a basic and fundamental feature of the Constitution which has its genesis in the power of judicial\" review which enables the. court to declare executive and legislative actions ultra vires the Constitution. In this connection we are not starting on a clean slate as the contention in this very form and for an avowed object was widely canvassed in S.H. Sheth v. Union of Jndia,(1) and in Union of India v. S.H. Sheth (supra) some additional dimen sions were added to this basic concept of independence of judiciary while both the parties vied with each other as in the pa$! (See state~ ment of Shri S.V. Gupte, then Attorney General in Mr. Sheth's case), on proclaiming their commitment to independence of judiciary though in its scope and content and approach there was a marked divergence. ·\n\nPetitioners in both the batches of petitions passionately asserted that independence of judiciary is the basic postulate of our Constitution and any interpretation of the articles in the fasciculus of articles relating to judiciary must keep it inviolate. The construction, asserted the petitioners; which would make any inroad on tlie absolute independence of judiciary must be rejected because the entire edifice of Parliamentary democracy as envisioned in our Constitution rests on. the firm structural foundation of the indepen dence of judiciary. It was asserted that Parliamentary democracy of Westminster model with a written Constitution and with division of functions amongst the three branches of the Government; the executive, the legislature and the judiciary postulate that where a transgression of power takes place there must be a body of inde pendent persons with power to correct deviations, so that a11 con stitutional functionaries act within the framework of the power and perform duties as envisaged by the Constitution. This role, it wa11 averred, rightly belongs and has been unreservedly assigned to the judiciary 'as a sentinel on qui vive' and in order that this branch\n\n(1) 17 GLR 1017.\n\ns. P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1005\n\nwhich has a duty to check excess or transgression of or arbitrary exercise of power, functioned 'without fear or favour and solely committed 'to the upholding of the Constitution' must be free wholly and unreservedly from the other more powerful organs of the Indian polity, namely, the executive and the legislature.\n\nDeveloping this submission reference was made to various provisions of the Constitution and the interpretation put on some of those provisions by the decisions of this Court. It was urged that independence of judiciary bas been put beyond the pale of controversy in the Court but this Court must spell out its contours and limits, the fringes and the horizon, so that wherever an intrusion takes place or an erosion is threatened it can be checkmated by judicial review.\n\nA reference to some of the important provisions of the Constitution would bear repetition though they have been enumerated at length in Mr. Sheth's case. .Taking cue from the Act of Settlement of the United Kingdom and section 220(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, whereby tenure of judges was altered from King's pleasure to one during .good behaviour in U.K. and. India respectively, Article 217(1) and Art. 124(2) ensure tenure during good behaviour up to the age of 62 and 65 years respectively to the High Court and Supreme Court Judges. Article 202(3)(d) and Art. 112(3) (d)(i) provide that expenditure in respect . of the salaries and allowances of High Court Judges and the salaries and allowances and pensions payable to Judges of the Supreme Court of India is charged on the consolidated fund of each State and of India respectively. Article 203(1) and Art. 113(1) ensure that so much of the estimates as relate to the expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of a State and Consolidated Fund of India. shall not be submitted to the vote of the legislative assembly and the Parliament respectively.\n\nHigh Court Judges and the Judges of .the Supreme Court are assured salaries guaranteed by the Constitution as set out in Schedule II by virtue of Art. 221 (I) and Art. 125(1) and a further assuranc!l is held out by the provi-so to Art. 220 and Art. 125 that the same shall not be varied to the disadvantage of a judge after his appointment. Article 211 in respect of Judges of High Court and Supreme Court, and Art. 121 in respect of Judges of the Supreme Court as also of a High Court immunise them i11 discharge of their duties from discussion in the legislature of a State and Parliament respectively save and /\n\n1006 su:PRllMll COURT RllPoiltS 11982} 2 s.C.tl.\n\nexcept where an address to the President is presented praying for removal of the Judge as provided in Art. 124(4) and (5). Article 215 and Art. 129 make the High Court and -Supreme Court respectively a Court of Record with power of such Court inciuding the power to punish for cvntempt of itself. The power to appoint officers and servants of the High Court and officers 'and servants of the Supreme Court is conferred on the Chief Justice of the State under Art. 229 and upon the Chief Justice oflndia under Article 146 and conditions of service of the officers and servants of High Court as well as officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the Chief Justice of India, as the case may be, but in each case this power is to be exercised subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of any State or the Parliament, as the case may be, and in case of rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pension would require in case of High Court the approval of the Governor of the State and in case of Supreme Court approval of the President. ·\n\nBy Article 233 . and 235 members of the subordinate judiciary are brought under the control of the High Court and except for initial entry and final exit they are under the direct control of the High Court.\n\nIn cases dealing with subordinate judiciary by a catena of decisions commencing from State of West Bengal v. N.N. Bagchi(1), and ending with Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab(2), it has been authoritatively laid down that in matters concerning the c0nduct and discipline of District Judges, their further promotion and confirmations, disputes regarding their seniority, their transfers, the placing of their services at the disposal of the Government for ex cadre posts, considering their fitness for being retained in service and recommending their discharge from service, exercise of complete disciplinary jurisdiction over them including initiation of disciplinary inquiries and their premature retirement, the members of the subordinate judiciary are under the direct control of the High Court.\n\nIn Shamsher Singh'.< case, the learned Chief Justice observed :\n\n\n(2) [1975] I S.C.R 814 ..\n\n1 ' -\n\nu•; GtJPtA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1001\n\n\"The members of the subordinate judiciary are not only under the control of the High Court but are also under the care and custody of the High Court\".\n\nIt has been said that subordinate judiciary have no two masters.\n\nAfter reviewing all these provisions and the decisions in Mr. Sheth's case, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in his leading judgment observed that: \"it is beyond question that independence of the judiciary is one of the foremost concerns of our Constitution, Constituent Assembly showed great solicitude for the attainment of that ideal devoting more hours of debate to that subject than to any other aspect of the judicial provisions\". \"If the beacon of the judiciary were to remain bright, the courts must be above reproach, free from coercion and from political influence' (see The Indian Constitution--Cornerstone of a Nation by Granville Austin, pp. 164-65). Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel tersely observed that the judiciary should be above suspicion and should be above party influence. Dr. A:rnbedkar concluded the debate saying that there would be ng difference gf opinion that the judiciary had to be independent of the executive\".\n\nIn another judgment forming part of the majority vie.w, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali at p. 485, after referring to various provisions of the Constitution, observed that \"these muniments highlight the concern of the founding fathers for judicial insulation, a sort of Monroe doctrine\". Tuning in his own words in Shamsher Singh case that fearless justice is a prominent creed of our Constitution and the independence of. judiciary is the fighting faith of our founding document, he reasserted that the creed of judicial independence is our constitutional 'religion'.\n\nJustice Bhagwatl in his dissenting judgment at p. 473 observed that 'independence of judiciary was held to be a part of our ancient tradition which has produced great judges in the past and judicial independence is prized as, a basic . value and so natural and inevitable that it has come to be regarded and so ingrained in the life and thought of the people that .it is now almost taken for granted and it would be regarded an act of insanity for any one to think otherwise.\n\n1008 StJPlltlME COURT tlEPOll.TS\n\n(i982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\nHaving showered encomiums on the independence of judiciary, Justice Krishna Iyer was not oblivious to the fact that judiciary a non-elective institution, has an elitist approach with little or 'no accountability. Having bew immunised from any discussion in the Parliament or the Legislature of a State and by the sword of Contempt of Court Act from public criticism, it remains within it!i' insulated vaults and more often has been found to be utterly unaware of the mores of the day. Conceding that indepndence of judiciary must be ensured and its immunity from executive and legislative overt and covert pressures or intrusions,' must be guaranteed in larger public interest, the role of judge power and the immunity of the judiciary must be studied, \"with aware allegiance to the scheme and sweep of the Constitution with insightful homage to the soul of the Paramount Parchment and with sociological appreciation that our economic and political order of which the legal order is but a juridical reflection is sharply pluralist. The apparatuses of activist justice, working under such societal strains and stresses and charged with engineering progressive change through the law, may .have to enjoy more than traditional functfonal freedom.\n\nFor, in a dynamic democracy with goals of transformation set up by the Constitution, the judge, committed to uphold the founding faiths and fighting creeds of the nation so set forth, has to act heedless of executive hubris, socio-economic pressures and diahard E obscurantism\".\n\nMr. Sorabji reinforced the conclusion reached in Mr. Sheth case that independence of jud; ciary is the fighting faith of the founding fathers when he drew our attention to 'the Government of Canada' by Dawson, 2nd edn. Revised 1954, wherein it is said that the unique functions which the judiciary perform in the Government make imperative that they should be given a position quite different from that of the great majority of Government officials. It was, however, conceded by the same author that the judges cannot remain completely unaffected by their envirnoment and cannot and should not be indifferent to the effects of their decisions on the social and political needs of the nation.\n\nThere will alway!! be some interplay among the habits of mind of the judge, the society in which he lives, 11nd the decisions which be renders.\n\nThis view reflects wl at was urged as value pa1:king in the matter of appointment of judges to which i reference will be presently\n\n' r\n\nS.P. GUPTA II. UNION (Dsai, i.) 1009\n\nmade. The auhor concludes that the 'fundamental decisions in a democracy arise from a constant .interchange of desires and com mands, tentative advances and retreats, experiments and consolidations, the adoption of cine policy, the rejection of another, the haphazard and almost unconscious acceptance of a third, compromises without number-all forming a part of the extremely complex process of determining and applying public policy'. Awareness of these constitutional changing values must inform the judicial personnel and in the superior judiciary the value system of the judge unconsciously but invariably. reflects in his judgments. Thus the coincident that what is disclosed by the people to the Parliament which in turn went to the Cabinet and to the administration and the resulting action, has to be remembered so that 'the stream of command-albeit somewhat uncertain and wandering, and sometimes showing little perceptible motion-and also a means whereby honesty and efficiency and devotion to public duty can be appraised and suitably recognised'.\n\nNo doubt, people do see in judicial independence a greater promise of justice than could be obtained through the application of ordinary political sanctions but it has a continuous interplay of forces and interaction of various organs ultimately converging on realisation of constitutional goals.\n\nAttention was also drawn to 'Judges on Trial' by Shetreat, E 1976 Edn., and after reading out the struggle for judicial independence, p<'inted reference was made to the fact that since Coke's disgrace 'the Crown could no longer expect to obtain the moral support which it had hitherto received from decisions pronounced by the Bench of the judges who were comparatively at least, with the men who held office subsequently to Coke's disgrace, indepen- F dent of the favours and the anger of the Crown'.\n\nNor independence of judiciary is some a priori concept, a fact when judges attempt on their own insulation is occasionally clouded or overlooked. Independence of judiciary under the Constitution has to be interpreted within the framework and the parameters of the Constitution. There are various provisions in the Constitution which indicate that the Constitution has not provided something like a 'hands off attitude' to the judiciary. The power of appointment of High Court Judges and the Judges of the Supreme\n\nourt vests in the Presidept nd the President bein¥ a contitution~\n\nHHO stJPR.ilMll coutti 11.litioitts Ii ~82i 2 s.c.k.\n\nhead, he ls constitutionally hound to act according to the advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nOne can profitably refer to a number of Articles in the Constitution conferring power on other constitutional institutions such as the executive which when it acts within . the limits of power will have a direct'impact on the functioning of the judiciary. To briefly refer to some of these provisions, Art. 32 (3) confers power on the Parliament to frame a law, inter alia, empowering any other Court to exercise within local limits of its jurisdiction any of the powers exercisable by the. Supreme Court under Article 32. Article 133 (3) confers power on the Parliament to enact a law enlarging the jurisdiction of the Supreme . Court.\n\nArticle 135 preserves the existing jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but makes it subject to the law made by Parliament which might otherwise provide. . Article 138 enables Parliament to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of certain matters.\n\nArticle 139 contemplates confe'rment on Supreme Court by a Jaw of Parliament all powers to. issue writs. for any purpose other than those mentioned in clause (2) of Art. 32.\n\nArticle 140 provides for parliamentary legislation even in regard to supplemental powers of the Supreme Court.\n\nArticle J 30 enables the Chief Justice of India with the approval of the President to provide fr sitting of Supreme Court at places other than Delhi. Similarly, Articles 225, 230, 231 and 237 confer power on Parliament to make law directly impinging upon the jurisdiction of the High Courts. Article 126 vests power in the President to appoint acting Chief Justice and it does not postulate consultation with any functionary in the judiciary. The position under Arts. 127 (1) and 128 point in the si; ime direction, subject, of course, to the construction canvassed for on behalf of the petitioners which would be examined a little while after. This conspectus of articles, not meant to be exhaustive, do indicate that Parliament has power to regulate Court's jurisdiction and as Hart and Webster in the 'Federal Judicial System' at p. 317 said that \"the bald truth is, isn't it that power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to regulate rights to judicial process whatever they are and substantive. rights generally.\"\n\nUndoubtedly judiciary, the third branch of the Government cannot act in isolation.\n\nThey a\"le ensured total freedom, of course, after entering the office, from any overt or covert pressure or interference in the process of adjudicating causes brought before them and to this end they are ensured tenure, l?ay, I, Jension, J?rivileges and\n\n-1- •\n\n...\n\n...\n\ns.P. GUPTA V. UNION (Desai, J.) 1011\n\ncertain basic conditions of service. The judiciary like any other constitutional instrumentality has, however, to .act towards attainment of constitutional .goals. This in one sense is conceded by Mr. Seervai who led on 'behalf of the petitioners when in his Sir Chimanlal Seta:Jvad Lectures styled : 'The position of the Judiciary under the Constitution of India', he tersely observed as under:\n\n\"The Court is essentially a check of the past upon the present.\n\nBut it is the present that represents the will of the people and it is that will that must ultimately be given effect in a democracy. If the democratic bases of our system are to be respected, the review power of one nondemocratic organ in our government should be exercised with seJf. restraint\".\n\nIt would thus unquestionably appear that the independence of judiciary is not to be determined in all its ramifications as some a priorrconcept but it has to be determined within the framework of the Constitution. True, that the thrust is to ensure that adjudications are untramelled by external pressures or controls and it was conceded that independence of judiciary under the Constitution is confined to the adjudicatory functions of the .Courts and tribunals and they are insulated from executive control in that behalf. It .is not unlikely that the total insulation may breed ivory tower attitude, a bishop delivering sermon from the pulpit and therefore no claim to be imperium in-imperio can be extended to the judiciary or for that matter to any other instrumentality under the Constitution. It is not as if judicia( indepen(lence is an absolute thing like a brooding omnipresence. Nothing is more certain in a modern society, declared U.S. Supreme Court in the mid century, than the principle 'that there are no absolutes'.\n\nNor should judges be independent of the broad accountability to the nation and its indigent and injustice ridden millions.\n\nTherefore, consequently one need not too much idolise this independence of judiciary so as to become counterproductive.\n\nA further submission. was that the concept of judicial independence may be examined in the context of parliamentary democracy where other. organs of tbe Government, namely, the executive and the legislature are elected people's representat.ives while we have\n\nschewed the c; l~1ttive leme'!-t in appointment of judges. Thjs\n\n1012 StJl>Rl'!Mtl COURt lll'!PORts [1982) 2 s:c.1t\n\nabsence of elective element in judges with guaranteed tenure, conditions of service and immunity from criticism denies any method of accountability of judiciary l!nd the power ofjudicial review often described as undemocratic {see Schwartz 'A Basic History of U.S.A. Supreme Court, p. 87) can set at naught the will of the people expressed through its chosen representatives.\n\nJn order to mitigate the trend disclosed by total aloofness, the constitution makers conferred power of appointment in the President advised by the council of ministers an elected body so as to make judiciary accountable 'and responsible to the constitutional goals.\n\nIt was urged that this methodology will permit 'value packing' in the judiciary. The expression 'Packing' raised a derisive laughter.\n\nIt is a much misunderstood word.\n\nOne must reject emphatically any packing of courts of persons of the belief, hue and colour of tte party in power but it is equally undeniable that all the.three organs of the Government must work towards realisation of constitutional goals and the judiciary has to be inspired by the values enshrined in the Constitution if rule of Jaw is to run akin to rule of life and a feudal society is to be transformed into an egalitarian society by the rule of law, an introduction of the element of reflection of popular will so as to make judicial system more viable and effective as an instrument of change is inevitable and total aloofness of judiciary is inconceivable.\n\nWhile undoubtedly political packing must be abhored, in putting the independence of judiciary on pedestal one cannot lose sight of the fact that the judiciary must keep pace with the changing mores of the day, its decision must be informed by values enshrined in the Constitutibn, the goals set forth in the fundamental Jaw of the land, peoples' yearning desire for a change for the better and the promised millennium. An activist role in furtherance of the same is a sine qua non for the judiciary. If value packing connotes appointment of persons otherwise well qualified as required by the constitution but having the additional qualification of awareness of the high priority task of eradication of poverty, removal of economic disparity, destroying the curse of illiteracy, ignorance, exploitation, feudal overlordship, coupled with conscious commitment to administering socio-economic justice, establishment of a just social order, an egalitarian society, then not only the va, lae packing is not to be frowned upon nor thwarted by entrenched establishment prone people but it must be advocated with a crusader's zeal.\n\nAnd judiciary cannot stand aloof and apart from the mainstream of society.\n\nThis will en$ure it!i ;..\n\nS.P. GUPTA :V. UNION (Desai, J.), 1013\n\n:broad accountability to injustice ridden masses and therefore.it is not :unnatural that the status quoists can enter . their caveat to value packing but which does not commend. while appointing each individual the constitutional .philosophy of each individual ought to be a vital consideration and if this is labelled as value packing, it is neither unethical nor .unconstitutional nor a weapon to strike at independence of judiciary.\n\nWhat should be the ideal method for selecting personnel entrusted with the task of dispensing justice has been 'an endless source of discussion. In the democracies the world over till today there are two known methods of selection appclintment and election.\n\nAs election method haS' not been accepted by the Constitution, it need not detain us. Constitution provides for appointment of judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court by the highest executive in the country, the President.\n\nAnd even in this sphere, in view of the provisions contained in Article 74, the President will be guided by the advice of fhe Council of Ministers. Undoubtedly, therefore, the power to appoint judges vests in the executive. This power was specifically conferred after a long debate to which reference will be presently made. But before coming down to the debates of the Constituent Assembly bearing on the subject, a brief survey of the methodology adopted by various democratic countries in the matter of appointment of judges would prove illuminating. 1n U.S.A. all the federal court judges are appointed by the President subject to confirmation by a simple majority vote of the Senate. The Attorney General has a d'ecisive voice in the nomination made by the Presi- , ' dent.\n\nIn the later months of the Truman Administration, the 12 member committee of federal judicial set up of the American Bar Association has come to play an increasingly significant role in the appointive process of the fderal judiciary in tbe U.S A. but the power still vests in the President whose nomination must be ratified . by the Senate meaning thereby the power is in the executive with a legislative veto over it. In the United Kingdom Lord Chancellor is the Queen's chief adviser on the selection. Lord Chancellor presides from the Woolsack over the House of Lords .• He is a member of the Cabinet. He is also the head of the Judiciary and thus combines in his person the threefold function of executive, legislative and judicial.\n\nEv!!n though tlJ.y§ tp~ power js jn ee<; utiv~ 1 Richard\n\n\n[19821 2 S.C.R.\n\nM. Jackson in his 'Study on the Machinery of Justice in England', noticed that political considerations have hardly entered the process of judicial selection since 1907.\n\nIn France the President of the Republic who is charged by the Constitution to be \"guarantor of the independence of judicial authority\", selects the judges. They are chosen either by the 11 member Counsei/ Superieur de la Magistrature in the case of Cour d' Appeal and Cour de Cassation, or by th~\n\nMinister of Justice who may consult with, or receive advice from, the High Council in the case of lower courts. The High Council consists of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice, and nine persons with legal background chosen by the President for a once-renewable term of four years (see The Judicial Process by Henry J. Abraham p. 31).\n\nGarner, in bis \"Political Science and Government\" at-p. 726 notices tha_t in nearly all countries other than the U.S.A., the judges are appointed by the executive and even in the U.S.A., it is the method followed for the selection of the federal judges. In countries having the cabinet system of Government this in effect means appointment by the Minister of Justice. In Foot-note No. 107, he notices that in Belgium the judges of the Court of Cassation must be appointed from two lists of nominees, each containing twice as many names as there are vacancies to be filled, one presented by the court itself, the other by the Senate. This system represents a com bi nation of co-operation, election and appointment.\n\nIn principle, it has much to commend and it has been advocated in: France by various jurists and commissions on judicial reform.\n\nGarner at p. 728 recalls the statement of Dean Hal~ in his study wherein he thus evaluates the system of appointment by the executive : \"Of all the methods of selecting judges, of which we have actually had considerable experience in this country, that of appointment by the executive has unquestionably produced the ablest and most satisfactory courts.\" Prof. Laski in his Grammar of Politics, p. 545, notices that there are two methods of selection-election and nomination, and in England where practically all judicial appointments are under the control of the Lord Chancellor the nomination system is followed and there is similar practice in France, Italy and Germany where all judicial appointments are nominated by the executive.\n\nHe proceeds to point out that of 'all methods of appointment, th.at of election by the people at large is withol!_t exception the worst. He notices with satisfactiolil that most of the great judges in recent English history, µi.en like lllackburn, Boweni W11tson: Macna&hten: wm: entirely\n\n§.I'. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1015\n\nunknown to the public outside and they were all ap?ointed by nomination.\n\nHe concludes that by a process of elimination the choice is thrown back upon nomination as the best method available for choice. This method is also not fruitful because it leaves the door too wide open for measurement of fitness in terms of political eminence rather than judicial quality and he illustrates this statement by pointing out that Lord Halsbury used his power of nomination to elevate members of his own party. As a via media, he suggests a compromise by recommending that the appointment should be made on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice with the consent of a standing committee of judges which would represent all sides of their work.\n\nBe that as it may, this bird's eye view of the world phenomena should be sufficient to convince us that power to · appoint judges where election method is eschewed is always vested in the, executive and that' it has not been found to be subversive of independence of judiciary. At this stage it would be advantageous to recall that in the 80th Report of the Law Commission of India, it has been frankly admitted that most of .the High Courts to which a refe1ence was made by the Law Commission about the existing system of appointment of judges, have in their replies to the • questionnaire, expressed the view that the existing system is by and large sound. Therefore, it is not possible to accept a sweeping statement that the vestingof the power of appoin(ment in the executive is subversive of independence of judiciary.\n\nI would here briefly refer to the relevant debate in Constituent Assembly bearing on this topic.\n\nWinding up th~ debate on the articles concerning judiciary, Dr. Ambedkar observed that : · ,\n\n\"With regard to the question of concurrence of the Chief Justice, it seems to be that those who advocate that proposition seem to rely implicity both on the impartiality of thi: Chief Justice and the soundness of his judgment.\n\nI personally feel no doubt that the Chief Justice is a very eminent person,. But after all, tht( Chief Justice is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and all the prejudices which we as common people have, and I think to allow the Chief Justici: practically a veto upon the appointment of Judges is really to transfer the authority to the Chief Justice which we are riot prepared to vest in .the Presideµ!\n\n.•'\n\n10.16 StJPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.it\n\nor the Goverment of the day.. I, therefore think that thai is also a dagerous proposition.(1)''\n\nWhat is specifically moved and rejected while drafting the Consti tution cannot be introduced by the back door through the process of interpretation. A specific amendment was moved to. the draft Article 193 (corresponding to Article 217 of the Constitution)• The proposedamendment reads as under(2) :\n\n\"That.for, clause (I) of Article 193, the following shall be.substituted:\n\n(I) Every judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President• by a warrant under his liand and seal on the rec.ommendation of the . Chief Justice of the\n\nHigh Court. concerned after consultation with the Governor of.the State concerned and with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India and shall•hold office until, he attains the age of sixty-three years.\" (Underlini11g mine)\n\nA similar proposal was also contained in the memorandum representing the viewil of the Federal Court and of the Chief Justices representing all the Provincial High Courts of the Union of India submitted to the Constituent Assembly. (See Shiva Rao : The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Documents, Volume 4, page 195)~ The implication of the amendment is that proposal for. appointment of\\ a judge of High Court can only be initiated upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice which would imply that no one else can initiate the proposal for appointment of a High Court judge, aaspect which has 11ome relevance on the construction of Article 217(1) but for the present discussion the importance.is of ihe word 'Concurrence' in'. the proposed amendment. If the amend- . ment had been accepted no appointment of a.judge of High, Court could be made unless the Chief Justice of India concurred in the appointment. In other words, if the Chief Justice of India does not approve the proposal, be would have a veto on the proposal and bis lack of concurrence would kill the proposal. The power of ' appointment which at present Vllts in tfi• Prident would thus\n\n. (1) C.A.O., Vel. g, !Si.\n\n(2) c .•. D. Vol. 8, 674\n\ns. ii. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1017,\n\nstand transferred to the Chief Justice and if sucli a situation emerge.d, it would have accord.ep great strength to the submission.\n\nBe it. noted. that this amendment was negatived. In other words, the Constituent Assembly in terms rejected any veto tq be vested in t\\le.\n\nChief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of a High Court judge. And. it is too late in the day to contend that debates in Constituent Assembly do not provide an aid to construction of articles of constitution or it is impermissible to refer to them. (See State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidap (1974) l SCR' 589 at 592; Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (1972) 2 SCR 33 and Sagnata Investment .\n\nL Ltd, v. Norwitch Corporation, (1971) 3 W.L.R. 133 at 137).\n\nIn this cotntext, Mr. S.P. Gupta, petitioner appearing in person contended that much of the evil flowing from the. power of appointment of Judges of High Courts and Supreme Court being vestedin the President would be eliminated if by a process of interpretation the Court can eliminate the binding character of the advice that may oe tendered to the president in discharge of his function of appointing the judge. Article 74 (1) provides that there\n\nshaII be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice.\n\nA proviso has been added by the Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978, which enables the Pre.sident to require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice either generally or. otherwise but makes it obligatory on the President to act accqrding to such advice tendered after reconsideration. The contention is that the President in discharge of his function of appointing judges of Supreme Court and High Courts is to ct on his own after consultation with the constitutional functionaries set out in Articles 124 and 217 and is not to act according to the advic!l offered ey the executive in this bi!half. This would have necessitated the ascertainment of tho position of the President in our Constitutional scheme but a decision of the seven judges Cons.titution Bll!llch of thii Court in Shamsher Singh'.s case has authoritatively concluded this point. A.N. Ray, C.J. speaking for himself, Palekar, Mathew, Chandrachud and Alagiriswami, JJ. has held that the President is a constitutional or formal head and he must exercise• his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Consti~ tution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. An exception was noted in the case of Governor wl!i.ere the Constitution has coJ11ferred upon him an obligation to exercise his function is l!is diseretion but tltere is no suoh pPovision in oasS' of. President\n\n1018 SUPREME COOllT ilEPOR.ts [I 982) 2 s.c.k. . . and it was concluded that the decision of any minister or officer under the rules of business made under Article 77(3) is the decision of the President. lna concurring judgment Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati J. succinctly observed that it is the function of the Council of Ministers to advise. the President over the whole of the central field and nothing is left to his discretion or excepted from that field by this article.\n\nAfter referring to the debates in the Co?stituent Assembly, Iyer, J. concluded as under:\n\n\"We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executiye and other powers under variou~ articles, shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well known exceptional situations.\n\nThese exceptional situations need not be enumerated because they do not touch upon the subject under discussion. Add to this the consi.stent view of this court that the position of the President under the Indian Constitution is akin to the position of the Crown under the British Parliamentary system (See Ramjawaya Kapur v.\n\nState of Punjab,(1) A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras(2) U.N.R.\n\nRao v. Indira Gandhi,.(3) In the case of U.N.R. Rao, the Constitution Bench held that Article 74 (1) was mandatory and, therefore, the President could not exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The larger Bench overruled the decision of this Court in Sardarilal v. Union of India & Ors.(4) Mr. Gupta, however, relied upon the decision of this Court in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodan v. F.N. Rana & Ors., (6) some observations from which may at first blush seem to support the conclusion reached in Sardari Lal'.< case.\n\nHowever, once the decision in Sardari Lal' s case is overruled, observations in Shodhan's case may\n\nbe hardly of any assistance. Now, even Mr. Gupta concedes that .the power to appoint judges of the Supreme Court and High Court\n\n(!) [1955] 2 SCR 236-237.\n\n(2) [1970] 2 SCR 505 at 511.\n\n(3) . [1971] Supp. SCR 46.\n\n(4) . [1971] 3 SCR 461.\n\n(5) [1964] 5 SCR 294.\n\n...\n\n~.f>. GtJl>tA v. tJNION (Desai, J.) 1019\n\nconferred by Article 217 (!) and 124 is executive power and tl)e function . is executive function.\n\nBut after an eleborate reference to the debates in the Constituent . Assembly and especially the stage at which an instrument of instructions was sought to be prepared for providing guidelines to the President as to the manner of discharging his function in the matter of appointment of judges of High Courts and Supreme Court, it was urged that while exer cising the power in the matter of appointment of judges of High Courts and Supreme Court the President was to act not according to the advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nToo much reference to piecemeal debates at the drafting stage, provisions in the draft Con stitution and views expressed by different speakers during the debates in the Constituent Assembly is likely 'to raise , a picture in support of some of the provisions of the Constitution which 1:nay be misleading. After a long debate, discussion, suggestions, amend ments, the ed product namely, the provision finally inserted in tqe\n\nCostitution must be examined.\n\nThe history of the provision may occassionally assist in illuminating the blurred contours. But an over emphasis on the history and debates divorced from the provision which finally emerged after mature deliberation would not hell? in bringing out the clear intendment underlying the provision.\n\nDrawing inspiration from the scheme of Section I 3 and 14 of Government of India Act, 1935, an idea to prepare an instrument of instruct_ions was certainly mooted but finally shelved. In this connection, it would be advantageous to remember that in the memorandum of May 13, 1947, prepared by the Constitutional Adviser for the use of the.Union Constitution Committee, the principal pro- -vision em bodied in this respect stated that there should be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions, but it went on to add \"except in so far as he is required by this Constitution to act in his discretion.\" A note was appended to this clause which referred to the discretionary powers of the President.\n\nCertain special responsibilities were set out in the memorandum in respect of which, according to the note, President. was required to act in his discrection.\n\nWhile discharging his functions in respect of his special responsibilities wherein he was\n\nrequired to act in his discretion, a Council of State whose composition_ was set out in the memorandum was proposed to be set up.\n\nAt a later stage, a suggestion was made that the subject-matter of appointment of judges of High Court and Supreme Court should be included in the instrument of instructions. The draft of instrument pf instruptjon~ was also prepa, rd b~ !the~Orafting ~Committee. Thy\n\nio2o SuPREMil COURT Rili>otrs f 1982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\ninstrument listed six categories of appointment In regard to which the President was required to consult the Advisory Boatd.\n\nOf the six categories, two are : The Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice and the other judges of the High Court. Finally th1: very idea of instrument of instructions and setting up of the Council of State or Advisory Board was dropped. (See Shivarao : The Framing of India's Constitution, Vol. 4, Pages 338, 374, 491 and 492).\n\nA long debate spreading .over somtime took place as to where the power to appoint judges must be centered.\n\nA ve, ry passionate plea was made for centering this power in the Chief Justice of India. As has been pointed out above this suggestion was specifically negatived and the power was conferred on the President. Thus, if the power to appoint judges is conferred on the President and that power is an executive power, and fa the absence of a provision in the Constitution which permits the president to act in his discretion, bereft of the advice of the Council of Ministers, it is not posssible to hold that in the matter of 'appointment of judges of High Court and Supreme Court, the advice offerred under Article 74 is not binding on the President.\n\nWhere the President is not x pected to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers a clear indication is given in the Constitution.\n\nTo illustrate the point, a reference to Article 103 would be profitable.\n\nArticle 103 provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause (I) of Article 102, the question shall be referred for the decision of the President and his decision shall be final.\n\nSubarticle (2) provides that before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. The Constitution itself has made it obligatory upon the President not to act on the advice of Council of Ministers but in accordance with the opinion given by the Election Commission. Jn other words, the opinion given by the Election Commission is binding on the President. Similarly, Article 217 (3) confers .power on the President to decide the question of age of a judge of the High Court if any such question arises, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the decision of the President shall be final. The question arose in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter,(1) as to the nature of the function discharged by the President while determining the question of age of a High Court judse. Aftef\n\nrn p97tJ 3 s.c.R. 483. '\n\n,...\n\n...\n\n. ..,.. .\n\nS.P. GIJPTA v. UNION (D2Jai, J.) 1021\n\nnoticing tliat the President hy Article 74 of the Constitution is the Constitutional head who acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers in exercise of his function, this Court held that the President acting under Article 217(3) per form~ a judicial function of grave importance under the scheme of our' Constitution. It was, there- . fore; held that he cannot act on the advice of the ministers. Once\n\nthe function of the President while exercising power under Article 217 (3) is held to he judicial it follows as a necessary carol- . Ia'.ry that the President has to act on his own after consultation with . the Chief Justice of India but he cannot . act OD the. advice of. the Council of Ministers because a person discharging a judicial or quasi-judicial function cannot act at the behest or dictate of some other authority. But it cannot be said that while. exercising the power of appoitment of jYdges of the Supreme Court and High Courts; the President is either performing a judicial or quasijudicial function. It is admittedly an executive function and howsoever one may like to wish away the interference of the . Council of Ministers in the matters of appointment of judges of High Courts and Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution after having examined various aspects of the matter . conferred power on the President rejecting simultaneously the veto of Chief Justice or of India: Once this funition is held to be an executive function, Article 74 world come into operation with all its rigours and the President will have to act on the advice of Council of Ministers.\n\n Turning now to the group of cases in which circular dated March 18, 1981 issued by the Law Minister, short term extension ·.given to Shri S.N. Kumar, additional judge of Delhi High Court and his subsequent non-appointment on June 6, 1981 figure prominently, what is put in the forefront is position, privilege and status of an additional judge appointed nuder Article 224. Article 224 is iuch an inseparable adjunct of Article 217 that it was not. possible to lay down precisely the construction of Article 224 divorced from or de horse Article 217. Therefore, as a first step, one\" must. now dwell upon the proper•and precise construction of Article 217 and\n\n224. Construction of a constitutional provision is of long term . utility and therefore to eschew the heat and passion •, and dust of raging controversy, it is always considered prudent to approach the question of construction in abstract and thereafter I.he facts of a given case may be examined in th~ light qf ti:!~ i;<!!l$truction put on a provisk>n of the Constitution, - ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.11..\n\nThe fasciculus of artic:les in Chapter V, Part VI, provide for a High Court for each State. Article 216 provides for constitution of High Court It reads as under :\n\n\"Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.\"\n\nDraft Article 192 corresponding to Article 216 may be referred to here. It reads as under :\n\n\"Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.\"\n\nThere was a proviso to the draft J\\rticle 192 which has not been adopted while enacting Article 216. Article 217 provides for appointment and conditions of office of a judge of the High Court.\n\nIt reads as under : •\n\n\"2l 7. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court-(!) Every judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief fostice of the High Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting judge, as provided in Article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years :\n\nProvided that-\n\n(a) a judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to .. ,4fe. President, resign his office ;\n\n(b) a judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of Article 124 for the.removal of a judge of the Supreme <;:ourt ;\n\n./ 1\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1023\n\n(c) the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to bE a judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to any other High Court withiq the territory of India.\n\n(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and-\n\n(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office\n\nin the territory of India ; or C\n\n(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession.\n\nExplanation-For the purpose of this clause-\n\n(a) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be included any period, after he has held any judicial office, during which the person has been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or any post, under th~ Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law ;\n\n(aa) in computing the period during which a person has been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period during which the person has held judicial office or the office of a member of tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law after ht became an advocate;\n\n(b) in computing the period which a person has held\n\njudicial office in the territory of India or been an G advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period before the commencement of this Constitution during which he has held judicial office in any area which was comprised .before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, within India as defined by the Governl{ ment of India Act, 1935, or has been an advocate of any High Court in any su9h !lr~!l, as the case may be,\n\n• G\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R,\n\n(3) If any question arises as to the age of a judge of High Court, the question shall be decided by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the d.ecision of the President shall be fial.\"\n\n Article 222 confers power on the President to transfer a judge from one High Court to another. Article 224 provides for appointment of addtional and acting judges. It reads :\n\n\"224.\n\nAppointment of additional and acting Judges-\n\n(1) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\n\n(2) When any judge of a High Court other than the\n\nChief Justice is by reason of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, the President may appoint a duly qualified person to act as a judge of that Court until the permanent judge has resumed his duties.\n\n(3) No person appointed as an additional or acting judge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty-two years;\"\n\nArticle 224 initially enacted in the Constitution corresponding to Draft Article 200 was deleted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and present Article 224 was substituted in its place.\n\nBy the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1962 original Article 224 deleted in 1956 was reintroduced as present Article 224A.\n\nArticle 217 confers po\"'.er on the President to appoint a judge of the High Court after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in case of appointment of a judge\n\npihr tban tl)e <;:)lief J~~jce, t)l~ Chief Justice of the High Court .\n\n...\n\ns. J>. GtJP'tA v. tJN10N (l>esai, J.) 1025\n\nThe power to appoint a judge of a High Court vests in the President but it is hedged in with a condition that it can be exercised 'after consultation with' the three constitutional functionaries set out in the article.\n\nThe use of the expression 'after consultation with' instead of 'in consultation with' was harped upon to indicate that the expression 'after consultation with' means that the power of the President remains intact but before exercise of the power the duty is cast upon him to consult the three functionaries. If on the other hand the expression 'in consultation with' was used it may have indicated that the President shared his power with the three , constitutional functionaries. Looking to the language of Article 217, I see no distinction in the use of the two expressions which may have an impact on the construction of the article. The power is the power to appoint and the limitation on the power is to consult the three functionaries.\n\nUltimate power of appointment unquestionably vests in the President. Before the power to appoint is exercised the President is under a constitutional obligation to consult the three constitutional functionaries.\n\nJn practice the procedure for appointment has more or less proceeded along the lines as indicated by the Law Commission in its 14th Report, Vol. I. p. 71.\n\nBriefly recapitulated, it appears that the Chief Justice of the High Court forwards his recommendation to the Chief Minister who in turn forwards his recommendation in consultation with the Governor to the Minister of Justice. Formerly it used to be Home Minister. If the Chief Minister does not agree with the recommendation of the Chief Justice he makes his own recommendation but in such a situation the Chief Justice is given an opportunity to make his comments on the recommendatfon made by the Chief Minister. Either agreed or the rival recommendations • are then forwarded to the Minister of Justice who forwards the recommendation to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nAfter obtaining opinion of the Chief Justice of India the Minister submits his advice to the President as to the selection to be made. The Law Commis sion noticed that this procedure places the Chief Justice in an awkward position. In practice occasionally the Chief Justice may have a judge appointed at the instarce of the locar executive and against his own preference.\n\nIn order to obviate executive interference in the matter of appointment of judges the Law Commission recommended that Article 217 must be suitably amended to provide\n\nB .\n\nio26 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [I982j 2 s.c.tt.\n\nfor appointment of a High Court Judge on the recommendation of the Chief Jugtice of the High Court which would in practice lead to a situation where one not recommended by the Chief Justice can never be appointed as a High Court judge.\n\nUndoubtedly Chief Justice of the High Court would be the most competent / person to evaluate the merits, ability and efficiency of a person recomrnended but as noticed by the Law Commission there may be and frequently there are other matters relating to the person recommended which the State executive would alone be in a position to know and of which they may inform the Chief Justice. Such\n\nother matters may include, factors such as the local posit ion of the person proposed, his character and integrity, his affiliations, which may have considerable bearing upon his efficient functioning l:\\S a . judge and all these may not at all be within the knowledge of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Approaching the matter from ti).is angle the Law Commission rejected the submission that the State executive should have no share in the decision making process for appointment of a judge of the High Court and ultimately expressed a considered opinion that where the Chief Justice of the High Court recommends a person for a judgeship, the State executive should have an opportunity to offer its comments upon that recommendation but that such consultation with the State executive should be limited to other factors such as have been enumerated hereinbefore It may be mentioned that this recommendation of the Law Commission was not accepted by the Government. The fact remains that even a body Iie the Law Commission was of the considered opinion that it would not be conducive to appointment of suitable persons to totally exclude the State executive in the decision making process for appointment of a judge of the High Court. Fourteenth report\n\nas submitted in 1958 but as late as 1980 in Eightieth Report the Law Commission has reafhrmed the view that the present procedure. is good. Therefore, it is not possible to accept rather° au extreme argument that.participation of the executive in the decision making process for appointment of a judge would be subversive of the ii:J.dependeoce of the judiciary. In fact, viewed from another angle\n\naio it wQuld be impermissible to exclude participation by the State executive in this process. The power to appoint a judge of the High Court is in the President.\n\nWhen appointed by the President th'e judge would be working as a judge of the High Court to which he is appointed.\n\nHis salary, pension, aliowances, etc. would be chargeable on the Consolidated Fund of the State.\n\nProbiJ.bly influenced by these considerations the Constitution itself provides\n\n......\n\n; -\n\ns.P. ouf>fA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1021\n\nfor giving a share to the State executive in the decisio_n making process and it would be contrary to the intendment of the constitution to exclude it by process of interpretation.\n\nThe Constitution-makers attached a high degree of importance to the office of a judge of the High Court.\n\nBy a conscious effort they were insulating the judiciary against executive interference and, therefore, made the task of removal of a judge once appointed very difficult, if not impossible. It was conceded on all sides that the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has provide~ such an elaborate and cumbersome procedure that it would be rather next to impossible to impeach a judge. Once, therefore, someone is appointed as a judge of the High Court under Article 217, he is to be suffered even though his continuance may not be conducive to the fair adminis- tration of justice.\n\nExtreme care was, therefore, focussed on the question of initial appointment, probably in order to see that error of judgment of one or the other constitutional functionary may not go unnoticed. Three qigh constitutional functionaries were involved in the process of appointment of a judge o(the High Court, and each one, namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State, are the highest judicial and executive functionaries in the State and the Chief Justice of India holder of the highest judicial office in thti country, were to be consulted before the President took the step of making an appointment under Article 217.\n\nWhen three such high constitutional functionaries participate in the process of consultation there would be a remote or minimal chance of some infirmity being over-looked or any vital consideration relevant to the process of appointment being ignored and the best man will be selected. In the ultimate analysis consumers of justice are interested in securing undiluted jstice free not only from b}as or subservience but free from predilections, aberrations, preconceived notions and personal philoscrphies of incumbent of the office of a judge. In a country ruled by rule of law, respect for the Jaw is a sine qua non and the respect for law would increase and enhance directly in the proportion to the work of judges in law courts which would inspire confidence. Mr. Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in the \"Challenge on Law Reforms\" (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 4 and 5 vividly stat.ed which bears quotation :\n\n\" ......... it is in the courts and not in the legislature\n\nGthat our citizens primarily feel the keen, cutting edge of the H law. If they have respect for the work of the courts, their respect for law will survive th'e short-comings of every other\n\n1028 SUPREMll COURT RlJPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nbranch of government; but if they lose their respect for the work of the courts, their respect for law and order will vanish with it to the great detriment of society.\"\n\nThere seems to be, therefore, no doubt that actuated with a burning desire that the best one is selected for appointment, while vesting the power in the highest executive of the country three high constitutional functionaries were involved in the decision making process.\n\nThe State executive, therefore, must participate as intended by the Constitution in this process and its role cannot be minimised by the\n\nspecious plea that it might erode independence of judiciary.\n\nExperience gained for a period of three decades in working Article 217 undoubtedly with some rare exceptions would show that the framers of the Constitution envisaged that by a process of discussion amongst themselves, by cross fertilisation of inforn:iation from each other, if these three high constitutional functionaries reached a consensus it will eliminate even the microscopic error in making the appointment. Undoubtedly, in saying this the role of the President ill making the final appointmen_t is not to be minimised.\n\nBut Mr. Garg contended that looking to the position of the Chief Justice of lndia as the incumbnt of the highest office at the apex of the judiciary, in the event of an unfortunate, albeit undesirable situation of the difference of opinion amongst the three constitutional functionaries, the view expressed by the Chief Justice of India must have prima9y.\n\nThis submission may be examined ftom two independent standpoints. First, is there anything in the language of Article 217 which places Chief Justice of India on a pedestal in relation to the other tw<5 constitutional functionaries ? And secondly, is the Chief Justice of India in a position more advantageous compared to other two functionaries to be infallible in his view ? Brusquely stated, does he have a veto over the view expressed by the other two constitutional functionaries ?\n\nThe last question can be answered at once.\n\nIn the earlier portion of this judgment a statement by Dr. Ambedkar opposing an amendment to draft Article 193 (corresponding to Art, icle 217) making concurrence of Chief Justice of India for appointment a sine qua non describing it as a dangerous proposition has been noticed.\n\nWhat is specifically rejected cannot be brought in by the back door.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1029\n\nI Article 217 on its own language and intendment repels the contention. The President is under constitutional obligation to consult\n\nthethree constitutional functionaries. Bach is on par. They are coordinate authorities.\n\nThere is no relative hierarchy. At any rate, the appellate jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of India functioning as ' a judge of the Supreme Court over a decision of the Chief Justice of the High Court would not provide an indicium that the view of the Chief Justice of India in administrative matters has predominance or overriding effect over the view of fhe Chief Justice of the High Court. It must be recalled that in the process of drafting the Constitution there was some suggestion that the Supreme Court shall have administrative1 supervision over the High Court and this suggestion was rejected.\n\nInitiation of proposal for appointment of High Court Judge is not a judicial function of the Chief Justice of the High Court. While performing this function Chief Justice of the High Court is not under the administrative subordination of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nFurther, as the system functions, proposal for appointment of a High Court judge is initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The person recommended may be a member of the Bar or from the subordiaate judiciary, say a District Judge.\n\nAs the High Court has both administrative and judicial control over the subordinate judiciary, the Chief Justice'of the High Court is more knowledgeable about the capacity, ability and eligibility of a District Judge for being considered for the post 9f High Court Judge. Chief Justice of India will have very little information about the capacity, eligibility and quality of a District Judge. Similarly, while recommending a person from the Bar in the State, Chief Justice of the High Court is more advantageously placed compared to Chief of India. And, Chief Justice of India will have t9 depend upon his sources of information which may not either exclude grapevine or hearsay. He has little or no opportunity of seeing the member of the Bar functioning as a lawyer in the Court. Cumulatively, therefore, Chief Justice of the High Court is more advantangeously placed compared to the Chief Justice of India in this behalf. About the various other factors which enter into the verdict, the State executive will be more favourably placed than the Chief Justice of India because it has its own instrumentalities for inquiry and information.\n\nTherefore, the view of the Chief Justice of India cannot have any primacy in this behalf.\n\nReference in this connection to an observation in Shamsher Singh' s case that : \"in practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must.belong to the Chief Justie9 of India, the rejection of\n\nsui>RIJME couit'f REPORfs [19821 2 s.c.a.\n\nhis advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order'' (at p. 873), is not opposite; Shamsher Singh belonged to the subordinate judiciary and whileexamining his case reference was made to Union of India v. Jyoti. Prakash Mitter(1), in which case the question of determination of the age of a judge and the construction of Article 217(3) .figured. Article 217(3) obliges the President to consult the Chief Justice of India before deciding the question as to the age of a judge of the High Court. The view expressed therein would not support the contention about primacy, because unlike Article 217 and similar to Article 222, ChiefJ ustice of India is the only constitutional functionary required to be consulted by . the President while discharging his function under Article 217(3).\n\nMr. Seervai in this t:ontext urged that the Chief Justice of ln<!ia has been given the position of primacy because hi, s training as a judge gives him a judicial outlook which would help him to consider the appointment of judges in a judicial spirit. Further, the C::hief Justice of India having reached the qighest position in the. judiciary is free from even a suggestion that his action was actuated by a desire to secure a promotion for hims<; lf in the judicial hi<; rachy. Add to this the consideration thp.t if p11roc; hi; t) and locaJ considerations are to be excluded in the appointment of High Court\n\njudgs, the Chief Justice of India is more likely to e11clude such considerations than the Chief Justice of a High Court. To say that high constitutional functionaries like the Chief Justice of a High Court would not be free from sucp short:comings set out above and that the Chief Justice of India wold be free from such shortcomings appears to be an unwarranted assumption. It is well-known tat some Chief Justices declined to come to the Supreme Court and had they come atleast one of them was likely to be the Chief Justice of India by vertical movement according to seniority. If he declined to become the Chief Justice of India and continued to remain Chief Justice of High Court, merely because he opted for Higli Court judgeship would not be sufficient to reje9t h_is opinion. or merely because Chief Justice of India who opted to come to the Supreme Coui:( and became the Chief Justice of India, his view as Chief Justice of India should have greater weight. The submission is not basically sound to over reach the plain intendment of Article 217.\n\nIt was said that if the submission that the view of the Chief Justice\n\n\\\\ ' .\n\n(1) [1971] 3 S, C, R. 483.\n\n...\n\n,-..-<.'\n\ns.t>. Gi:JPTA v. UNION (Desai, 1.J i6Ji\n\nof India should be accorded primacy is rejected, in the unfortunate event of divergence of opinion between the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of High Court, the executive would function like an umpire and that this would erode independence of judiciary and to avoid this undesirable situation the Court must lean in favour of according primacy to the view of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nIn support of the submission, the expression 'pater familias' used by me in my judgment in Mr. Sheth's case in reference to the Chief Justice of India was relied upon and it was urged that this very description would unerringly point in the direction of the primacy being accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of India. Undoubtedly, I described the Chief Justice of India as pater familias of judiciary. And that was in the context of the consultation which the President must have with the Chief Justice of India before exercising the power under Article. 222.\n\nBut let it not be overlooked tha.t there was no question ofprimacy to be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of India with regard to the advice proferred by him when consulted under Article 222 because he is the . only constitutional functionary required to be consulted. The very expression 'primacy' envisages two or more coordinate authorities, one having a preferential position over the other.\n\nSuch a situation does not arise under Article 222 and, therefore, torn out of context the use of the expres- . sion paterfamilias would not help. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that the view of the Chief Justice of India when consulted under Article 217 would have primacy over the view of the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\nInterestingly a reference in passing may be made to the divergent views on this aspect even amongst the petitioners. Article 222 which confers power on the President to transfer a judge of the High Court to another High Court provides that the power to transfer can be exercised in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. While hearing the petition challenging the transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N.\n\nSingh of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court, Dr. Singhvi appearing for Mr. K. B. N: Singh vehemently traversed the argument of Mr. Garg that the view of the Chief Justice' of India must have primacy and it was aid that no such primacy as is contended for can be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of Ind; a. Specific submission was that if the proposal for transfer is initiated by Chief Justice of India it would be violative of Article 222.\n\nIf Article 222 which confers power on the President to transfer a judge from one High Court to another High Court is hedged in .with a\n\n1032 SuPREME COURT REPOllTS [1982) 2 S.C.lt.\n\ncnndition that it can be exercised after coasultation with the Chief Justice of India and this consultation has been held to be an adequate safe¥uard against improper transfer in Mr. Sheth's case, and even though that being the only safeguard, it was submitted that the view of the Chief Justice of India cannot have primacy; how would it be proper to accord primacy when Article 217 mandates consultation with three constitutional functionaries including the Chief Justice of India? Primacy has the flavour of veto and if conceded the authority to be consulted would become the final decision making authority. No canon of construction permits such a thing to be done.\n\nAs stated by Dr. Ambedkar the Court cannot assign to one authority powers explicitly granted to another.\n\nThis will be elaborated at a later stage. Therefore, also, the contention about primacy of the view of the Chief Justice of India must be negatived.\n\nThe next limb of the argument is as to whether the proposal ' for appointment can be initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India only or it can be initiated by any of the four constitutional functionaries adumberated in Article\n\n217. In this context the practice followed till the 14th Report of the Law Commission and till the 80th Report has been set out earlier in this judgment. Even, the LJlW Commission, after noticing the defects and drawbacks in the procedure followed for appointment under Article 217 ultimately recommended that Article 217 be suitably amended so that the proposal for appointment of a High Court judge must initiate upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice meaning thereby that the Chief Justice alone would be able to initiate the proposal. It expressly stated that it should not be open to the State executive to propose a nominee of their own and forward the name of such nominee to the Centre. In its view, if the State executive disagrees with the recommendation of the Chief Justice for such other reasons as mentioned in.the Report it should be open to it to disagree with the !ecommendation and request the Chief Justit:e to make a fresh recommendation. The weighty recommendation of Law Commission that a proposal for appointment of a High Court judge can originate only upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice was in terms negatived by the Constituent Assembly.(1) There is nothing in the language of Article 217 that\n\n(1) C.A.D. Vol. 8 p. 674.\n\n.~ .. ·~\n\nU'. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, i.) 1033\n\nthe proposal cannot he initiated by any of the four constitutional functionaries set out in the article. If elaborate provisio:: was made for appointment of a High Court Judge with a view to securing the appointment of the best available man at the relevant time it would not be co'-?ducive to effectuating the purpose underlying the article if the proposal can be initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court alone. Cases are not unknown where the Chief Justice of the High Court having his own philosophy adopted the same as his yardstick to determine suitability for appointment and thereby excluded from his consideration a sizeable section of the Bar. Similarly the Chief Justice of India can also initiate a proposal because if he finds someone practising in the Supreme Court as one suitable for appointment to the High Court, we see nothing objectionable or improper in his initiating the proposal. Similarly, there could not be a blanket embargo on the State executive initiating the proposal.\n\nWe agree that the State executive shnuld not make its own recommendation and forward it directly to the Centre. The State executive initiating the proposal must first forward it to the Chief Justice of the High Court who would be better informed about the practising advocates as well as the District Judges subordinate to the .High Court, and seek the views of the Chief Justice. The view of both may be 'forwarded to the Chief Justice of India. The process of consultation must go on whatever new facts relevant to the consideration are elicited or obtained by any of the constitutional functionaries for consideration of the other constitutional functionaries and this may ultimately lead to a possible consensus, amongst all the constitutional functionaries and translate the purpose underlying Article 217 into reality by appointing the best man to this high office. The submission that any proposal from the State executive or even from the Central Executive fcir consideration of the other two constitu ti on al functionaries would make a serious inroad on the independence of judiciary is to ignore the role assigned to these two constitutional functionaries in the process of appointment.\n\nHowever, the consultation must be not merely formal but of substance and the scope aod the content of the consultation will be presently examined.\n\nBut before spe}ling out the scope and content of consultation envisaged by Article 2J.7, it is necessary to refer to Article 224.\n\nFrankly, the scope, ambit and the underlying purpose of Article 224 H , hjj.s i:onsumed maximum tinw llt tqe beai\"in¥ of thsc; rriatters: lq\n\nl034 iUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nthe draft constitution there was no provision similar to present Article 224, which was introduced by Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.\n\nHowever, Article 192 of the Draft Constitution provided for constitution of a High Court consisting of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to\n\ntime deem it necessary to appoint. There was a proviso to this article which provided that the judges so appointed together. with any additional judges appointed by the President in accordance with the next following provisions of the Chapter shall at no time exceed in number such maximum as the President may by order fix in relation to that Court. Article 216 corresponding to draft Article 192 without proviso has not cast any obligation on the President to fix maximum nu)llber of judges that can be appointed in a given High Court. It provides for a flexible situation, in that the President niay, from time to time, appoint such other judges when deemed necessary to appoint. If the number was fixed, by the Constitution, every time a constitutional amendment would become necessary if more judges were required to be appointed.\n\nPragmatism and flexibility informed the approach of the Constituent Assembly in deleting the proviso and thereby removing the obligation of the President to fix maximum number of judges in relation .to each High Court.\n\nArticle 224 makes provision for appointment of additional judges.\n\nThe concept of additional judges also figured in the proviso lo draft Article 192. Therefore,. when the draft constitution envisaged appointment of additional .judges, the expression 'additional judge' may be understood in contra-distinction to permanent judge or an acting judge or recalling of a .retired High Court judge. The expression 'permanent judge' in relation to High Court judge is to be found in Article 220 which pro.hibits a permanent judge of a High Court from pleading or acting in any court or before any authority in India except the Supreme Court and the other High Courts. One can legitimately say that the framers of the Constitution envisaged . appointment of an additional judge in the High Court in contradistinction to a permanent judge or acting judge. A retired judge . of a High Court who is requested to sit and act as a judge of the High Court is not deemed to be a judge of the High Court, and can be given no label or nomenclature and is certainly not an additional judge as contemplated by Article 224.\n\nArticle 224 ~(l) enables the President to appoint . additional judg'.!s of a High Court if the conditions enabling the exercise of •\n\n--\\\n\nSJ>; OUt>TA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1035\n\npower are satisfied. There are two situations. contingencies or eventualities in which alone an additional judge can be appointed in a High Court and they must ore-exist before an additional judge can be appointed. These are: (I) if by reason of. any temporary increase in the business of a High Court; or (2) by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that to deal with the aforementioned situations it is necessary to increase the number of High Court judges for the time being, he may dq so and may proceed to appojnt duly qualified persons to be additional judges of the court for such period not exceeding two years, as he may specify.\n\nThere is thus the power to appoint .additional judges with a limitation on power that it can be exercised if one or the other or both of the aforementioned pre-conditions for the exercise of the power are satisfied. If one or the other or both of the pre-requisites are satisfied the President may proceed to appoint an additional judge but in the absence of both there is no power in the PreRident to appoint an additional judge in the High Court. Appointment cannot be made for a period exceeding two years and before or while making the appointment the number of judges in the High Court may be increased for the time being that is not permanently.\n\nRecalling Article 217 (I) which confers power on the President to appoint a judge of the High Court, one can say without the fear of contradiction that the expression 'judge' in Article 217 includes an additional judge. If the pre-conditions set out in Article 224 are satisfied and the President proceeds to exercise the power to appoint an additional judge, he can appoint only such person who is qualified. . The eligibility qualifications for being appointed as a judge of the High Court are set out in sub-article (2) of Articles 2 I 7 and it is unnecessary to recall those qualifications save and except saying that the qualifications for a judge to be appointed under Article 2 I 7 or an additional judge to be appointed under Article 224\n\n(1) are the. same.\n\nHowever, the tenure of a judge appointed under Article 217 and one appointed under Article 224 materially differs.\n\nA High Court judge appointed under Article 217 is entitled to hold office until he attains the age of 62 years, but in the case of an additional judge the period has to be specified and the maximum period that can be specified by the President for which .he can hold office is two years.\n\nThe view that the expression 'judge' in Article 217 includes an additional judge is reinforced by the fact that while introducing Article 224 by Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, a consequential amendment was insert\\:d in Article 217. In the absence of the. amendnm1t1 an dditional judge would enjoy tenur~\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\ntill he reached the age of sixty-two years.\n\nIn order to avoid any confusion in this behalf the words \"shall hold office in case of an additional judge or acting judge as provided in Article 224 and in any other case, until he attains the age of 62 years\" were added in Article 217. If the expression judge in Article 217 were not to include an additional judge it would be redundant to incorporate the maximum tenure of two years prescribed in Article 224 for an additional Judge in Article 217. It was however, foreseen that if the necessary amendment was not incorporated in Article 217 one could have argued with confidence that even the additional judge would retire on attaining the age of 62 years. Therefore, to put the matter beyond the pale of controversy while introducing Article 224 in 1956 a consequential amendment was made in Article 217 that the tenure of an additional judge shall be as set out in Article 224 and that it cannot exceed .two years. It is nof necessary to refer to the tenure of an acting judge as envisaged in Article\" 224 (3) because that aspect is not relevant to the present discussion.\n\nSo far there is no controversy.\n\nIt may be mentioned that an additional judge appointed under Article 224 and a judge of a High Court appointed under Article 217 as far as pay, privileges, duties, obligations, adjudicatory powers are concerned, are on par, the glaring difference being in the tenure.\n\nBut, in this context our attention was drawn to Krishan Gopal v.\n\nShri Prakash Chandra & Ors. (1) An election petition was filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court which in course of time came to be assigned to Suraj'Bhan, J. who had retired on Fe1iruary 2, 1971, but the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, after obtaining previous consent of the President, requested Suraj Bhan, J. to sit and act as a Judge of that Court under Article 224A of the Constitution. Before the allocation of the election petition to Suraj Bhan, J. the same was being heard by Vyas, J. and when an intimation was ent to the petitioner that his petition was allocated lo Suraj Bhan J. he objected to the same.\n\nSuraj Bhan, J. rejected his application upholding the order of allocation of the petition to him.\n\nThis order was challenged by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. directing Suraj Bhan, J. to forbear from giving effect to the order of the Chief Justice.\n\nA Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed this writ petition. Upon a certificate under Article 132, an\n\nP> [1974) 2lSG~ 2()(i,\n\n.}-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1037\n\nappeal was filed in this Court. In this case construction of Article 224A caine up before this Court.\n\nTwo contentions were urged on behalf of the appellant. They were: (i) that a person requested to sit and act as judge of the High Court under Article 224A was not a judge of the High Court for the purpose of Section 80A of the Representation of the People Act, and (ii) that even assuming that he was a judge for th(f puose of Section 80A of the Act, the election petition could not, after it had been entrusted to a permanent judge, be allocated to a judge appointed under Article 224A.\n\nThis Court rejected both the contentions but finally observed as under :\n\n\" ..... All the same, looking to the special facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it is fit and proper and in the interest of justice that the election petition filed by the appellant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice <0f that Court. lt seems indeed desirable that the election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be entrusted fo.r trial to a Permanent Judge of the High Court, even though we find that the 'additional or acting judges or those requested under Article 224A of the Constitution to sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Cbief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters.\"\n\nThis question is hardly ofany assistance on the question of eligibility, capacity .and competence of an additional judge to undertake any adjudicatory process of any matter assigned to him by the Chief Justice.and'no distinction can be made between a permanent judge, if one. appointed under Article 217 can be so designated and an ,\n\nadditional judge appointed under Article 224.\n\n If an additional judge can only be appointed either by reason of temporary increase in the business of the High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, what would be the position of such an additional judge at the expiration of his period of two years constitutionally fixed if the temporary increase and/or the arrears to deal with which he was appointed remain unabted ? In other words, if the temporary increase to clear which he was appointed continues to remain uncleared or the arrears to tackle which he was appointed not only neither decrease nor wholly get eradicated but remain at the same level or may be found mounting up what would be the rigt to further continuance of the additional judge? Some vital questions arise qua the position and continµan<; c, of im additional judge,\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R,\n\nThe questions posed are of such dimension and magtiitu<le in the field of constitutional law and of such far-reaching effect, defy ing simple and straight forward solutions _bee ause extreme position\n\nas adopted on both sides.\n\nWisdom and circumspection should therefore be our watch words. ,\n\nThe questions posed are : is the additional judge, given the continued existence of situation which necessitated his initial ap?oint ment, entitled as a matter of right to be 'reappointed for a further period of two years ? If in the mean time there is a vacancy in the permanent strength of the High Court, is the additional judge without anything more entitled to be appointed as permanent judge ? If additional judge was appointed by reason of any temporary increase in the business of the High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein or if the temporary increase has become a permanent feature of the High Court and if the arrears have not only not been reduced but are mounting up meaning thereby that the pre-requisites, exis-\n\n- tence of which enabled the President to exercise the power of appointment of additional judge, continue to exist, is he entitled to be re-appointed as a matter of right ? Could he be deemed to be deemed to be permanently appointed ? Answer posed on the other side was that( he had no right to be considered nor is he deemed to be appointed as permanent judge even if he is available and it would be open to the President to appoint any one else without considering the case of the additional judge whose tenure has come to an end. In other words, he has neither weightage nor a right to be considered.\n\nHe is on par, according to the learned Attorney General, with \"\"any other person in the Bar or in the subordinate judiciary.\n\nOne submission may be disposed of at the outset. Conceding the contention of Mr. Seervai that the position, powers, privileges and jurisdiction of permanent and additional judges of High Court and the qualifications for their appointment are the same, but the marked contract in the raison ~'etre of their appointment and the tenure for which they are appointed cannot be overlooked.\n\nThe present agonising situation arose from a common understanding of the requirements of Article 224 both by the judiciary and the execu tive in making appointments of High Court Judges since 1956 till today: Every High Court has a sanctioned strength of permanent judges. and additional judges.\n\nSave rare exceptions, not easily noticeable, whenever a vacncy ar()se in the permanent trength, the eniormost\n\n-- / '\n\nS, P, GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1039\n\nadditional judge was offered the permanent vacancy and in the vacancy so caused in the strength of additional judges a fresh appointment was made.\n\nWhen I say seniormost additional judge, I only refer to the length of period for which the judge has worked and one who has worked for the .longest duration amongst additional judges is described by me as seniormost.\n\nIf the tenure of an additional judge specified by. the President in the warrant of appointment expires and there is no vacancy in the permanent cadre of High Court judges obviously such additionai judge was u&ually offered a further tenure. of ordinarily two years.\n\nWhile making the fresh appointment the procedure followed was one prescribed in Article 217. Article 224 cannot be divorced fro, m Article 217 because an additional judge appointed under Article 224 is a judge witqin the meaning of the expression in Article 217 and such an additional judge before entering upon his office has to make and subscribe an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the Third Schedule. Article 224 obliges the President to specify the tenure of the additional judge for such period npt exceeding 2 years. Now, therefore, if the additional judge with the knowledge of the specified period of tenure enters upon his office, makes and subscribes to the oath and starts functioning as a judge of the High Court, undoubtedly when the period expires, if nothin.g else takes place he ceases to be a judge of the High Court. Assuming that 'be has to be appointed again, the whole gamut of consultation as constitutionally ordained in Article 217 bas to be gone through over again. Harsh though this may appear, it is an inescapable situation flowing from the provisions of ihe Constitution. Now if the process of consultation starts over again :undoubtedly the various constitutional functionaries are bound to express their opinion on the relevant merits and demerits off the judge and the expression of opinion would be more or less\n\n-on the same lines as when a prson is being appointed for the first time as a judge. of the High Court. Whatever canon of construction one may resort to, it is not possible to hold -that the consultation in respect of an additional judge who has been once appointed and whose tenure has expired and being eligible, is being considered for appointment afresh for a fresh tenure', the relevant consideration which would govern the decision for appointment would be different, save and except saying that the constitutional functionaries will have the additional benefit of the ex:periencc:i <.>f th!.! person cMcerned a&\n\n, c\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS {1982] 2 S.C.Jl\n\na judge of the High Court for the period he was appointed and he\n\nworked~\n\nThree different contentions have been advanced in this behalf and each one will have to be separately examined. One submission of Mr. Garg strongly supported by Mr. Seervai, and learned advocates for the other petitioners is that the additional judg~ is not on probation and, therefore, his eligibility or all those relevant considerations in service jurisprudence which 0are taken into account while offering a substantive appointment to a probationer could not be brought into consideration. The contention is that his qualifications for being appointed as a judge have once been examined and accepted, when he was appointed as additional judge, these considerations cannot be re-examined. And at any rate, it is not open to the Chief Justice of the High Court to sit in appeal over the judgments of the judge concerned and reach his own conclusions about the judicial capacity as flowing from the judgments of the judge. Another limb of the submission is that in order to ensure independence of judiciary, an additional judge who has functioned as a judge and\n\n- has had numerous occassions to deal with a litigant, namely, the executive which has the power to make fresh appointment, should not be at the mercy of the executive and, therefore, it was urged by Mr. Seervai that if one or other of the two pre-conditions in Art. 224 which enabled the President to exercise the power of appointing an additional judge continues to exist a fresh appointment must either follow as a matter of right or if the conditions for exercise of the power continue to exist he must be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent judge. The submission is that the permanent judge is appointed for the routine work of the High Court including the work to deal with the arrears and if the work load is sufficient for the permanent strength at the time of initial appointment and continues to disclose the same position, the initial appointment of the additional judge was not within the purview of Article 224 but it must be deemed to have been within the purview of Article 217 and, G therefore, mch a judge would be a permanent judge. On the other hand, learned Attorney General contended that if the appointment is made within the four corners of Article 224, the assumption is that ' the judge so appointed wou!d either deal with the problem arising out of the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or H tackle the arrears to clear which he was appointed and it is not a relevimt consideration whether be bas suq:eeded or not succeeded n<; I it\n\n·--\n\nS.1>. Gul>TA v. UNION (.Desai, J.) io4i\n\nwould be open to the Government to appoint him or to appoint anyone else completely ignoring any claim of such an additional judge whose tenure has expired. it was asserted with emphasis that such an additional judge has. no right to be reconsidered and the situation at the expiry of his tenure is the same JlS it was at the time of his entry and he or any other person could have been appointed and he is not entitled to be considered in priority or preference to any other person who can be picked up from the Bar or from the subordinate judiciary. Extreme illustrations were given to make good either point df view by both sides but the illustrations hardly if ever provide a reliable yard-stick to interpret a constitutional rovision.\n\nIn an emotionally surcharged voice we were told that there were more than 65 additional judges on April 1st, 1980 all over the country whose fate is in balance and, therefore, the Court should be very careful and circumspect in putting such construction on Article 224 which would not leave these 65 additional judges to the vicissitudes of executive smile or frown.\n\nOn the other hand we were told that the whole conspectus of the Articles with which the Court is dealing with in these matters were debated over a long period in the Constituent Assembly and the trend indicates that speaker after speaker repeatedly asserted that the mechanism for appointment of judges must be so devised that the best in the country is available for this high constitutional office and that the checks and balances provided must be such as to weed out and eliminate the unworthies.\n\nIt was therefore, said that such rigid construction should be avoided which would enable an additional judge who made himself thoroughly undesirable during the period of his tenure be foisted upon the society and the consumers of justice booause the .door against his exit is tightly bolted.\n\nWe have thus to steer clear of all these extreme propositions.\n\nWe were told that constitutional conventions and practice are a sure guide to. ascertain, decipher and unravel the intendment of the various articles. The constitutfonal conventions and practices as a11 aid to construction were canvassed because Article 224 has been so implemented under a common belief albeit mistaken of the executive and judiciary that the present impasse is the end-product of it.\n\nThe proviso to draft Article 192 envisaged appointment of H addititional judges but the tenure of such additional judges was not specified. However, when the Constitution was adopted and Article\n\n1042 SUPREME COURT REPOkTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.ll.\n\n216 took the place of draft Article 192, the proviso wa.i deleted.\n\nArticle 216 casts _an obligation on the President to appoint a Chief Justice and such other judges from time to time as he deems it necessary to appoint. T)lerefore, the power to appoint coupled with a duty to appoint bas been cast on the President. It is not necessary to consider whether this duty can be enforced by a mandamus.\n\nAn extreme illustration was taken that the President may appoint one Chief Justice and one additional judge and the consumers of justice would suffer inordinate delay in disposal of their cases if the judiciary denies to itself power to issue a mandamus to the President to perform his function to appoint such number of judges keeping in view the institution, disposals and arrears, to be able to dispose of cases speedily and within a reasonable time. Such an illustration overlooks a vital point that the arrears in the courts are not attributable solely to the inadequate number of judges in each High Court. It would be merely adding to the length of this judgment if all the causes more vital than the inadequacy of the number of judges contributing to the mounting arrears are enumerated here.\n\nBut I cannot resist the femptation of referring to what Mr. Seervai bluntly stated to the Court that to a considerable extent the senior members of the Bar are responsible for the sorry state of affairs more so because the courts have refused to enforce the provision in Order XVII, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure namely that non availability of counsel ii not a ground for adjournment.\n\nPresent malaise in this court was also touched upon by him. Be that as it may, the Committee appointed by the Government presided over by the 'then Chief Justice of India, Shri J. C. Shah, extensively examined the question of mounting arrears in the High Courts and found that the inadequacy of number of judges in each High Court is relatively a minor factor contributing to the mounting arrears but there are more weighty factors which.are to be tackled with.\n\nIn a parliamentary democracy with a written . Constitution in which three organs of . the Government are clearly marked out, it becomes a primary duty of the State to provide for fair atld efficient administration of justice. Justice must be within tl)e easy reach of the lowest of the lowliest, Rancour of injustice hurts an individual leading to the bitterness, resentment and frustration and rapid evaporation of the faith in the institution of judiciary. Two vital limbs of the justice system are that justice must be within the easy reach of the weaker sections of the society and that it must be attainable itb-\n\n\ns.1>. GUl'TA v. UNION (Desai, J.)\n\nin a reasonably short-time, in other words, speedily.\n\nLeaving aside other factors contributing to the arrears in courts, it cannot be gainsaid that in each High Court adequate number of judges must be appointed an<! the situation in each High Court must be regularly reviewed by the President so as to efficiently discharge the duty cast on him by Article 216.\n\nIn the course of hearing a statement was, made on behalf of the Union of India that the Government is taking steps to review the strength of each High Court to determine the adequate strength of each High Court and then to take steps to .make appointments according to the targets so devised.\n\nAs thi; statement . is a solemn undertaking to this court, it may be reproduced in extenso :\n\n\"The Union Government has decided to increase the number of posts of Permanent judges in the various High Courts keeping in view the load of work, the guidelines prescribed and other relevant considerations.\n\nIn fact in 1980 itself, on the basis of institution, disposal and arrears of cases and the guidelines prescribed, the ' Governments of seven Siates where the problem was more acute, had been addressed to consider augmenta tion of the Judge strengths of their High Courts. It has been decided that where necessary the guidelines prescribed will be suitably relaxed by taking into account local circumstances, the trend of litigation and any other special or relevant factors that may need consideration. The Union Government will take up the matter with. the various State Governments so that after consulting the Chief Justices of tlie High Courts, they expeditiously send proposals for the conversion of a . substantial number of posts of Additional Judges into those of permanent judges.\n\n (2) The Union Government has also decided that ordina-\n\nG rily further appointments of Additional Judges will not\n\nbe made for periods of less than one year.\"\n\nBut to say that_ a litigant who wants his case to be disposed of as early as possible being convinced that his case is not handled by the 9 Court for want of adequate number o(judges can bring an action to\n\n1044 SUPREME COl:JR't REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.IL\n\nissue a mandamus to the Government to appoint adequate number of judges requires more elaborate arguments and :in view of the statement it is not necessary to deal with the submission.\n\nAn additional error in the submission founded on a mistaken belief is .that all shortcomings and infirmities in the system can be rnmedied by judic.ial process.\n\nThere is no greater error than entertairning such unwarranted belief. Courts cannot cope with all infirmities in the system.\n\nThat is the admonition of Frank Purter, J. I quote :\n\n\"In a democratic society like ours, relief n:iust come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of people's representatives.\"' (Baker v. Car) 16.\n\nFailure to perform duty of appointing adequate\" number of judge~ in High Courts cast on the President by Article 216 would make him answerable to the Parliament and not to the Court.\n\nThe problem of: arrears is much too complex to be referable to one single cause, namely, inadequate strength. Obligate the President by a mandamus to appoint adequate numbe1r of judges in High Courts and this intractable problem defying solution would evaporate like the morning dew, betrays woeful lack of appreciation of Parkison's Law that large number of judges may result in further mounting of arrears.\n\nNot the number the system is cancer ridden. The justice delivery system of this country is utterly alien to the genius of this country.\n\nThis is a smuggled system from across the shores imposed upon us by the empire builders for their own political motives and during the foreign rule a class came into existence which has enormously benefited by this justice delivery system. to the detriment of teeming millions and, therefore, they have become the protagonists of the system.\n\nA society composed of 70% illiterates living• in rnral backward area having some simple easily solveable problems by the common sense approach of local populace is being served with a highly complex time consuming, cost mounting, justice delivery system evolved over centuries for a cent percent literate society.\n\nWhat a paradox? The utter failure of the system stems from the fact that it is an alien system unsuited to our genius. It has become static and non-functioning if not counter-productive. Both the judges and the lawyers failed to 11uitably revise the system to suit the needs of a republican form of Government and egalitarian society with emphasis on socio\n\nI \"\n\ns.i. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1045\n\neconomic justice. We adiµinister justice in a foreign language not understood by a very large number of litigants. If the litigant is present in the Court he hardly understands what is going on.\n\nThe judgments are written in a foreign language and the seeker of justice hardly knows what has happened to his cause or controversy which be has brought before the Court.\n\nIn search of justice he is chasing a mirage, in the process spending his hard-earned fortune. This is. , the basic draw-back and this aspect can be examined in meticulous detail but this is neither the place nor the environment for elaboration.\n\nExamining first. the contention whether an additional judge is on probation during the period of his initial tenure or till he is offered a permanent vacancy, it must at once be said that in case of a High Court judge, a high constitutional functionary holding a high constitutional office the expression 'probation' is wholly inept and inappropriate and apt to prove misleadin.g. . Such worda from the service jurisprudence would be of no assis.tance.\n\nOne must keep in view the scheme envisaged by the Constitution for deciding the position of the additional judge.\n\nBefore the scheme is examined the common error of executive and judiciary in making appointments of High Court judges for a period commencing from 1956 till today must'be examined. Article 224 was not meant to provide an entry door for becoming a judge of a High Court under Article 217.\n\nArticle 224 was for a specific and specified purpose. When the Constitution came into force in January 1950 present Article 224 A was Article 224.\n\nArticle 224 A enables the Chief Justice of a High Court with the previous consent of the President to request any person who has held the office of a judge of a High Court to sit and act as a judge of the High Court. It was believed that whenever work-load in the High Court temporarily goes up, retired ju, dges of the High Court may be requested to sit and act as judges of the High Court and the problem of work-load in the High Court can be solved.\n\nIn 1956 it was found that this system has not worked satisfactorily. This becomes clear ftom the 'objects and reasons' set out in the Bill seeking to amend the Constitution by substituting Art. 224 in its presnt form. Therefore, the present Art. 224 was introduced and as pointed out earlier, it was meant to confer power on the President to increase for the time being the number of\n\n1046 SUl>llEME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.a.\n\njudges in a High Court and to appoint additional judges to fill in the increased strength.\n\nThis power can be exercised if one or the other of two pre-requisites set out in Article 224 is satisfied, namely, temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears therein.. The J\\rticle was enacted to meet these two specific situations only. In practice it appears and not controverted by anyone, in fact admitted, that the article was worked as if an entry in the High Court for a permanent judgeship is via Article 224, namely, by first being appointed as an additional judge and then when a vacancy occurs in the permanent strength of the High Court, to be appointed as a permanent judge.\n\nThis has been invariably the practice save in rare cases ascertainable by microscope.\n\nEvery one was ordinarily first appointed as an additional judge and in course of time.even after once, twice or thrice being appointed as an additional judge till the vacancy occurred in the permanent . strength that one became a permanent judge. This is clearly contrary to the intendment of Article 224, and the present malaise arises out of this imper~ missible, yet. without exception or with rare exceptions, use of Article 224 both by the executive and judiciary. This has also led to inaction on the part of the President in not reviewing regularly and at regular intervals the permanent strength of the High Courts. Even Chief Justices were unconcerned about the undesirable situation in that they have asked for increase in the strength of additional judges.\n\nIn 1979, Chief Justice of Delhi. High Court even with 10 additional judges asked for two more without any attempt at reviewing the strength of perman<:nt judges.\n\nIf permanent strength was reviewed from time to time the renewal of . tenure of an additional judge twice or thrice could have been avoided.\n\n If an additional judge was appointed to deal with te!Jlporary increase in work and his term is renewed twice or thrice and the temporary increase has become a permanent feature of the High Court, what was needed was increase. in the permanent strength of the High . Court. It is 1.mbecoming for a High Court judge to be on two years tenure repeatedly. That is clearly contrary to what. was intended by Article 224.\n\nOrdinarily an additional judge save in rare cases was always offered a permanent judgeship unless he himself wanted to opt. In order to curb and thwart an undesirable practice of a. person returning to the Bar after adorning the Bench for a short-time, a system of\n\ntaking an undertaking from ari additional judge, that if offered he\n\n-- \\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1047\n\nwill accept the permanent judgeship was commenced upon a note of the former Chief Justice of India, Mr. Wanchoo, though the practice does not appear to be universal. The tendency to return to the Bar after adorning the Bench for some time was to be thwarted. The undertaking was devised to meet this situation. This would however show that save in rare exceptional case, first appointment was as an additional judge. An additional judge will have a fixed tenure and can safely return to Bar with a perceptible added advantage because it was felt that there was no other way except to offer first appointment as an additio.nal judge, and therefore a system of taking the undertaking was devised.\n\nBut again save in rare exceptional cases an additional judge on the occurring of a vacancy in the permanent strength was always offerred a berth; From this invariable practice, a firm belief, therefore, deveioped that an additional judge enters upon office with almost an unwritten albeit incontrovertible assurance to be appointed a permanent judge.\n\nHowsoever strong the belief may be, it is not borne out by the constitutional provision. After all, the appointment was as an additional judge within the:; constraints and limitation of Article 224 and no canon of construction would permit the court to treat the appointment as one under Article 217.\n\nIf therefore, the tenure was of two years, on the expiry of it the appointment will have to be a fresh appointment and for making such a fresh appointment, consµltation as ordained by Article 217 is inescapable. Once the consultation starts, all pos.sible hazards in the process of consultation cannot be wished away and the appointment has to be afresh.\n\nIt w9uld be at this stage worthwhile to examine the submission that constitutional convention and practice provide a reliable aid to construction of constitutional provisions. It was also urged that in interpreting a constitutional provision implications arising from the constitution have to be borne in mind. The submission is that the court should not dismiss the universal practice invariably followed for a quarter of a century in the matter.of appointment of additional and\n\npermanent judges of the High Court as a common error or common\n\n. G undergtandin:g qf the scope, content and ambit of Article 224, but the Court must proceed on the basis that both the executive and the judiciary who have a vital role to play in the matter of appointment of additional and permanent judges of the High Court unambiguously understood Article 224 to provide the only entry door for permanent H judgeship and made recommendations leading to appointments on the clearest and unquestionable understanding that once an additional ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\njudge is appointed in course of time when a vacancy arises in the permanent strength he would become the permanent judge. In other words, from the day of his entry he is more or less a permanent judge and there was no question of examining his merits and demerits on the expiration of each tenure during the period of his additional judgeship leading in a given situation to his n01; i-appointment.\n\nConstitutional interpretation has .been a fruitful subject of discussion amongst judges, jurists and authors. Number of canons have been devised for interpretation. Language being an imperfect vehicle of translating thoughts and intend1Uents, when the legislature finishes its task and produces a legislation in more general terms, while applying its various provisions to cases and controversies brought before the Court, a debate always ensues as. to what was intended by the legislature in usinl; l a certain expression. 'A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used'.(1) Word when ' used in a certain context may mean a different thing than when used in a different context and therefore, while construing particular word or expressfon in a statute it is better to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question : 'Jn this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true m1:aning of the word'. If this is true of an Act of Parliament, it is equally true of the fundamental law of the land, viz., the Constitution.\n\nAids to construction help in finding out the intendment of the provisions.- It is the duty of the Court to ascertain the intendment of a provision which comes up for construction. What was the purpose in enacting the provision and whether it was to meet or remedy a certain situation or provide for a certain eventuality, :are all relevant considerations in ascertaining the. intendrnent of the Constitution.\n\nAscertain the underlying purpose and give suc.h construction to the provision as would effectuate the purpose. One such aid, it was urged; is the prevalent conventions and ccnstitutional practices.\n\nWhere a Constitution has wor.ked for a reasonably long time, conventions which grow up relevant to the constitutional provisions or the constitutional practice can be a torch-bearer in ascertaining\n\n(I) Holmes, J. in Towne v. Eigner, 2-45 U.S. 418 at 425.\n\n(2) [1948] 2 All E. R. 995, 998.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1049\n\nthe intendment of the provisiOns because over a period the provision has been so understood and worked that it can be safely said that it was correctly and wisely understood and accurately applied. , Coupled with this is the fact that implications which arise from the structure of the Constitution itself or from the constitutional scheme may be legitimately made.\n\nAn implication was raised from the federal character of the Australian Constitution in The Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne v. The Commonwealth & Anr.(1) wherein it was observed that the intention is to be plainly seen in the very frame of the Constitution, namely, the federal character of the Constitution. As a corollary the provision contrary to the implications to be derived from the federal character of the Australian Constitution was challenged as ultra vires in The State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth of Australia,(2) wherein the State of Victoria had challenged the power of Parliament of the Commonwealth requiring the State to pay payroll tax upoq wages paid by it to its employees in certain departments claiming that the legislation was contrary to the implications of the Australian Constitution.\n\nA question was raised in that case as under:\n\n\"Does the fact that the Constitution is federal carry with\n\nit implications limiting the law-making powers of the E Parliament of the Commonwealth with regard to the States\".\n\nThe question was answered in the affirmative both on principle and authority.\n\nSimilarly, in Commercial Cable Co. v. Government of New foundland,(3) the Privy Council read a limitation on the prerogative power of the Governor conferred by the Letters Patent imposed by the constitutional practice of the colony. The Privy Council again in British Coal Corporation & Ors. v. The King,(4) after referring to its Constitution under the Act for the Better Administration of Justice in His Majesty's Privy Council and further referring to the\n\n(1) 74 Commonweatth Law Reports 31 at 70, . (2). 122 Commonwealtd law Reports 353.\n\n(3) [1916] 2 A.C. 610,\n\n(4) (1935] A.C. 500.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nprovisions set out in the Act for the conduct of appeals, observed that the Judicial Committee as established by the Act after hearing the appe~I could make a report or recommendation, to. His Majesty in Council for his decision, the nature of . such report or recommendation being always read out in the open court. Proceeding further it was held that even if the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is regarded as a judicial body or court, all it can do is to report and recomn; end to His Majesty in Council by whom alone the order in Council, which is made to give effect to the report of the Committee, is made.\n\nHaving determined the legal position of the Judicial Committee, it was further held as under to which specific reference was made ;\n\n\"But according to constitutional convention it is unknown and unthinkable that His Majesty.in Council should not give effect to the report of the Judicial Committee, who are thus in truth an appellate Court of law, to which by the statute of 1833 all appeals within their purview are referred\".\n\nSimilarly, in Re. Alberta Legislation,(1) it was held that the Parliament of Canada posseses authority to legislate for the protection of the right. of freedom of press. That authority, it was said, rests upon the principle that thepowers requisite for the protection of the Constitution itself arise by necessary implication fr_om the British North America Act as a whole. A little further it was observed that the provincial legislature is not entitled to interfere with the working of parliamentary institutions of Canada as contemplated by the provisions of British North America Act and the Statute of Dominion in Canada. Such limitation, it was neld, is necessary in order to afford scope for the working of such parliamentary institutions and in this region of constitutional practice it is not permitted to a provincial legislature to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. This decision was followed in Saumur v.\n\nCity of Quebec and Attorney General of Quebec .(2)\n\nJn the State of South Australia & Anr. v. The Commonwealth and Anr.,(3) it was held that some implications arise from the struc-\n\n(0 (1938) 2 Dominion Law Reports 81 at p. 107.\n\n(2) (1953r4 Dominion Law Reports 641 at 672.\n\n(3) 65 Commonwealth La.w Reports 373; at 447.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1051\n\nture of the Constitution itself, but it is inevitable also that these implications can only be defined by a gradual process of judicial decision.\n\nrn U.N.R. Rao v. Smt. Indira Gandhi,(1) a question was in terms raised thaCthe Court should interpret Article 75 (3) according to its own terms regardless of the conventions that prevailed in the United Kingdom.\n\nRejecting this contention, this Court observed as under:\n\n\"If the words of an article are clear, notwithstanding any relevant convention, effect will no doubt be given to the words. But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act of Parliament, a Constitution which establishes a parliamentary system of government with a Cabinet.\n\nIn trying to understand one may well keep in mind the conventions prevalent at the time the Constitution was framed\".\n\nThis would show that in arriving at the. true intendment of Article 75 the Court not only took assistance of the form of Government\n\nestablished in India by the Constitution but simultaneously referred to the conventions in the United Kingdom and other countries having similar political system being adjuncts of parliamentary form of Government.\n\nImplication but not the spirit arising from the Constitution is another aid to construction. After referring to some of the Canadian decisions, Sikri, C. J. pointed out in His Holiness Keshavananda Bharti Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera/a,(2) that some of the judges in Canada have implied that . freedom of speech and freedom of the Press cannot be abrogated by Parliament or Provincial legislatures from the words in the Preamble\n\nto the Canadian Constitution, i. e. \"with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom\". Examining the submission in th1t case about implied and inherent limitations on the amending power of Parliament, Shelat, J. recalled the statement that the rule is established beyond cavil that in construing the Constitution of the United States, \"what is. implied is as much a part of the\n\ninstruent as what is expressed\"(3) and after reviewin~ a large\n\n(I) [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 46 . . (2) (1973] Suppl. S.C.R. 1 @ 152.\n\n!J) American Jurisprudence (2q), Vol. 16, p. 25!,\n\n1052 SUPREME COURt REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nnumber of foreign decisions it was observed that the concept of implications can be raised from the language and context of the various provisions (seep. 258).\n\nAt page 316, Hegde, J. observed that implied limitations on the powers conferred ullider a statute constitute a general feature of all statutes. The positiolll cannot be different in the case of powers conferred under a Com>titution. A grant of power in general terms or even in absolute term's may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment or may be qualified by the implications of the context or even by consideration arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the statute.\n\nC In Chapter III, Sir Ivor Jennings in The Law and the Constitution, refers to the conventions of the Constitution.\n\nAt p. 80, the author observes as under : ·\n\n\" 'Political institutions', said John Stuart Mill, 'are the work of men; owe their origin and their whole existence to human will.\n\nMan did not wake on a summer morning and find .them sprung up.\n\nNeither do they resemble trees, which, once planted, 'are aye growing', while: men 'are sleeping'.\n\nIn every stage of their existence they are made what they are by voluntary human agency'. But men being what they are, they tend to follow rules of their own devising; they develop habits in government as elsewht:re.\n\nAnd when these men give place to others, the same practices tend to be followed.\n\nCapacity for invention is limited, and when an institution works well in one way it is dee'med unnecessary to change it to see if it would work equally well in another.\n\nIndeed, people begin to think that the practices ought to be followed.\n\nIt was always so done in the past, they say; why should it not be dom: so now ?\n\nThus within the frame work of the law there is room for the development of rules of practice, rules which may be followed as consistently as . the rules of law, and which determine the procedure which the men conct:rned with government must follow\".\n\nConstitutional convention is broadly defined as rul, es of political practice which are regarded as binding by those to whom they apply but which are not laws as they are not enforced by the Courts (p. J 21).\n\nIt may be an aid to construction but not positive rule of Jaw! brea.ci:i of which is remediable by court action. It must, '!\\ow-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.} 1053\n\never, be remembered that the conventions grow around and upon the principles of a written constitution.\n\nThe conventions generally grow where the powers of the Government are vested in different persons or bodies or where, in the words of Sir William Holdsworth,(1) there is a mixed Constitution.\n\nBut conventions do presuppose the law and any convention contrary to the written context is of no validi_ty.\n\nThe conventions are built, in the first instance, on the foundation of law but once they are established, they tend to form the basis for the Jaw. It may, however, be noticed that these rules of law which are conventions are a mere matter of . practice and their effect must change with the changing circumstances of national life.\n\nThat apart, what is sought is not enforcement of the convention in the court but its being invoked as an aid to construction of Article 224.\n\nDoes it help in that behalf? W. A.\n\nWynes in Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, p. 29 foot note 20, noticed that in the Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, etc. Co. Ltd.,(Z) Isaacs, J. drew attention to the duty of the Judiciary to recognise and give effect to new positions and circumstances in the national life.\n\nThe conventions of the Constitution, he said, are not to be omitted from construction in its interpretation.\n\nImplications arising from the provisions of the Constitution, constitutional conventions and constitutional practice all stand on a different footing.\n\nA constitutional convention when spread over a long period, of immemorial antiquity, followed invariably becomes . entrenched as a rule of law but any convention contrary to the written provision is of no validity.\n\nImplications may arise from the context' in which a provision is placed or the use of the language in the provision or from the nature of the power claimed vis-a-vis the whole constitutional scheme.\n\nThat was how implied limitations on the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution were spelt out in Keshavananda Bharti's case.\n\nConstitutional practice may be spelt out as a course of conduct over a rea-; onably long period which may indicate how the authorities charged with a duty to implement the constitution have worked out or implemented a certain provision of the\"Constitution.\n\nTo begin with as pointed out earlier, a constitutional conven tion must be founded on some provision of law.\n\nThey provide 'the\n\n(I) The Conventions of the 18th {:\\lqtµry Consti\\l!li91! 17 Lowa Law Review, p. 162. {2)\n\n(1922) 31 CLR at pp. :438-439,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\nflesh which clothes the dry bones of the law, they make the legal situation work, they keep in touch with the growth of ideas; a constitution does not work itself, it is worked by men. It is an instrument of national co-operation and the spirit of cooperation is as p.ecessary as the instrument.\n\nConventions are ruks elaborated for effecting that co-operation'.(1) As Oppen Heimer in the Constitution of the German Republic, p. 9, observes, that 'conventions which have already begun to quite a considerable extent, not only to supplement, but also to modify, if not actually supersede express provisions' grow within a short time.\n\nIt would thus distinctly appear that any convention contrary to the provisioµ of the Constitution and its basic intendment cannot be given i:ffect to as a convention. Its genesis must be in the provision itself.\n\nIf Art. 224 conferred power on the President to appoint additional judge only in the specified situations s:et out in the article and for a fixed limitec1 duration beyond which even the President had no power to appoint, it cannot be said that because the way in which the article has been worked, a constitutional convention has grown up that every additional judge right from the day of his entry irrespective of his two years' tenure would be deemed to be appointed as a permanent judge or would be entitled as a matter of rigbt to a renewal of his tenure till a permanent vacancy occur~. Such a construction of Article 224 would run counter to the plain intendment of the Constitution and no such convention can be spelt out as would pro tanto amend Article ; 24.\n\nNor any such implication can be raised that an additional judge is deemed to be appointed as a p.ermanent judge or he is entitled as of right to a renewal of his tenure till a permanent berth is found for him.\n\nFrankly, there is some force in the submission that a practice has grown up for over last quarter of a century (I 956-81) that whenever an additional judgeship is offered to a person, he accepts it in the reasonable belief that in course of time he would get a berth as a permanent judge. It may generate hope in him and his expectations could be said to be well-founded and reasonable more so it is, save in rarest of rare cases, invariably done so far.\n\nAt the minimal most he is entitled to be first considered for a fresh tenure of two years or when the permanent vacancy arises for appointment to that permanent vacancy before any rank outsider is considen:d given the . situation that the prerequisites which necessitated his initial appointment continue to exist.\n\n0,) The Law and the Constitution br Sir lv9r Jeannings, p. St,\n\n-- -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1055\n\nNo cases were pointed out to us that where there were additional judges in the High Court and a permanent vacancy occurred someone was appointed who had not functioned as an additional judge. An additional judge was usually offered permanent judgeship.\n\nMaybe, there might be some rare cases in which some fortunate few were directly appointed as permanent judges but no case was brought to our notice where there were additional judges in a High Court and a permanent vacancy occurred and overlooking the claims of all additional judges either a member of the Bar or a District Judge was directly appointed to that permanent vacancy.\n\nTherefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that a practice was followed for over 25 years that an additional judge was always first considered and he was entitled to be considered for a fresh tenure if there was no permanent vacancy and if there was a vacancy in the permanent strength, for being appointed as a permanent judge..\n\nA contention of the learned Attorney-General to the contrary that he has no priority, preference, weightage or right to be considered and that he is on par with any other man who can be brought from the market would be subversive of the constitutional scheme and must be rejected.\n\nAn additional judge who has worked for the period of his tenure has a weightage in his favour compared to a. fresh appointee and any process of appointment while filling in a vacancy must commence with the additional judge whose tenure has come to an end and has led to the.vacancy.\n\nTwo consequential limbs of the same submission may be dealt with here. If Article 216 postulates fixing of a permanent strength of the High Court and review of the strength at regular intervals and if Article 224 enables the President to appoint additional judges in the two contingencies mentioned therein, would it be open to the President to appoint an additional judge when there is a vacancy in the permanent strength of the High Court. The constitutional scheme is that ordinarily there should be permanent judges of the High Court. Article 224 is an enabling provision conferring power\n\n-00 the President. to appoint additional judges to meet a specific :situation, namely, a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or the arrears in the High Court. Ordinarily, therefore, the •constitution envisages appointment of permanent judges. Permanent judges are appointed to deal with the regular work of the High Court and the strength is fixed keeping in view the institutions and disposals and minimum work-load which each judge is supposed to hand, l~, When permanent stren?th gf the High Court is fixe(\\\n\n\n(1982] 2 S, C, R\n\nand there is a vacancy, it would mean that for the routine work of the High Court the number of judges is inadequate and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the President to fill in the vacancy unless it can be made out that the workload in the High Court does not justify the appointment. But if the permanent vacancy is not filled in and the President proceeds to appoint an additional judge, which can only be done if there is a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or if there are arrears, it would mean that the regular work is not sufficient for the sanctioned strength of permanent judges and vacancy may remain unfilled, an additional judge is necessary as if temporary increase in the work of High Court or arrears cannot be dealt with by permanent judges. Two situations cannot co-exist.\n\nAdditional judges can be appointed when the permanent judges while dealing wit~ the regular work of the High Court are unable to. deal with such temporary increase in the work of the High Court or clear the arrears. If the permanent strength is reduced by not filling in a vacancy and it is considered not necessary to fill in such vacancy it would only imply that not \"only regular work of the High Court is being adequately handled but any other work in the High Court can also be handled by the number of judges • then working in the High Court. in such a situation appoint ment of additional judge cannot be justified and in the absence of preconditions set out in Article 224 the appointment of an additional judge would. be plainly outside the purview of Article 224 and contrary to the intendment of Article 224. Therefore, when a permanent post is vacant an additional judge cannot be appointed.\n\nBut having said this, it must also be conceded that an addi tional judge even if appointed, could not be deemed to be a permanent judge. If the President appoints an additional judge and specifies his tenure as two years in the warrant of appointment. it is not open to the appointee to ignore the tenure and to expect the appointment as being of a permanent judge. A reference in this connection was invited to the waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander Ltd.( 1) Section 12 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act provided , for the appointment of a President The provision was to the effect that \"the President shall be appointed by the Governor-General from amongst the Justices of the High Court. He shall be entitled to hold office during good behaviour for seven years, ... \" The Constitution pro\n\nvided for tenure of High Co1,1rt Judgt)~ guring good behaviour and\n\n(1) 25 CLR~434.\n\n~ ..\n\ns. i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1057\n\nthey were not removeable except by the Governor- General in Council on address from both houses of Parliament praying for such removal on specified grounds (see s. 72). The contention was that if the President was to be Justice of the High Court and the tenure was only for a period of seven years, this was contrary to section 72 of the Constitution and the appointment is invalid and that the appointment being non-severable from the main Act, the whole Act . was invalid. The Chief Justice who presided over the Bench held that the word 'appointed; is used in the sense of assignment and the life tenure is not whittled down by making a specific appointment for a certain period. Views contrary to the view of the Chief Justice I . are also expressed but this decision hardly helps in resolving the problem posed in this case.\n\nIf the President even by a misconception bf a situation, makes an appointment specified in Article 224 limited for a duration of two years, it is inconceivable that the appointee can ignore the tenure and claim to be appointed as a permanent judge. Undoubtedly consultation for the purposes of Article 224 and for appointing a permanent judge under Article 217 is of the same width and dimension and the constitutional functionaries involved in the process of appointment are all the same, nonetheless power of the President to appoint for a fixed duration in a given situation even if the situation is shown not to exist, cannot be understood to mean that the President had some other power under some other Article and is deemed to have acted under that Article. In such a situation it may. possibly appear that the initial appointment was bad.\n\nIt was, however, urged that while purporting to appoint an additional judge under Article 224, the clear and unmistakable intention was to appoint a permanent judge, this intention cannot be defeated by use of such words as 'additional' and 'for two years'. The Court must give effect to the intention. It was said that the judge was appointed not because tliere was temporary increase in the work of the High Court or the arrears therein but to deal with the cases in the High Court and in such a situation the appointment has 10 be under Article 217. If it is so, the judge would be dtiemed to be appointed a permanent judge with the tenure prescribed in Article 217. The submission is that the intention was to exercise power under Article 217 but by a mistaken understanding it was treated under Article 224 and the tenure was, therefore, limited to two years but thi\"s is done in disregard of the duty of the President under the Constitution, and the Court should not disregard the intention and must enforce the duty Specific submission is that in a conflict between a qualified intention and an\n\ntoss\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R..\n\nobligatory duty, the Court would enforce the latter.\n\nReliance was placed on Shewpujan Rai v. Collector of Customs(1), wherein the Collector of Customs ordered confiscation of gold and imposed , penalty of Rs. 10 lacs on payment of which gold was to be released.\n\nPenalty was levied with two conditions and it was conceded that he had no power to impose conditions. The question, was whether the whole order was void, or two impermissible conditions could be severed and order upheld.\n\nThis Court he!d that the iimpermissible conditions were severable and they were struck down and order was upheld. In this connection, reliance was also placed on the decision of Y. Mahaboob Sherif} and Others v. Mysore State Transport Authority and Ors.,(2) wherein the question was whether a permit granted for one year was according , to law. Section -58(l)(a) read with section 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act enabled the Authority to grant permit for a period not t less than three years. It was urged that order granting permit was bad being outside the provision. This Court held that the intention to grant permit was manifest and giving effect to the intention directed the Authority to issue a permit for a period not less than three years and not more than five years as the Authority may specify.\n\nI fail to see how these would render any assistance in this case.\n\nHere the President has specifically set out in the warrant of appointment that the Judge is appointed as 'additional. judge' for 'a period of two years'. Even if the prerequisite for exercise of power was absent and, therefore, it was an impermissible exercise of power under Art. 224, there was no inten tion to appoint a permanent judge which this Court by a deeming fiction can enforce. Doctrine of severability is not attracted. The intention not shown to be to appoint permanent, as: two years' tenure furnishes contrary indication the submission that Court must F enforce it must be negatived.\n\nI may then turn to the next submission incidental to the points under discussion. It was said that if an additional judge bas to be appointed.either for dealing with the temporary increase in the work of the High Court or for tackling arrears in the High Court the constitution-makers believed that the situation has reached such a stage that an additional judge if appointed for a period of two years would be able to bring relief. It may be that the problem may not be wholly solvt:d within the period of two years but the reasonable expectation was that i} period of two years would pro-\n\n(I) [1959] 2 SCR 821.\n\n(2) (1960) 2 SCR 146.\n\n-~-\n\n-;-\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (besai, J.) 1059\n\nvide adequate length of time to the additional judge to deal with the problem for. tackling which he is appointed. Therefore, Article 224 provides for a tenure not exceeding two years. By and large save with very recent rare exceptions the appointment or\"additional judge in the first instance has always been for two years.\n\nAnd it should be so, because no one is unaware of the three dimensional , _problem of arrears corroding the vitals of the justice delivery system . and presenting a formidable threat to it.· There is no short-cut and there are no readymade solutions and the problem cannot be overnight wished away. In fact, with sadness the agonising fact must be confessed that no serious efforts have been made to tackle the problem and whatever spasmodic or sporadic attempts have been made have proved counter-productive. It was, therefore, assumed that a period of reasonable duration such as two years would give adequate opportunity to an additional judge appointed for a specific task and the approach in appointment would be a result oriented approach. If this was the underlying assumption in enacting Article 224, the appointment of short-term duration of six months or in the two cases before us, of three months, is inconsistent with the intendment of Article 224 ancl unbecoming of the dignity of a High Court . Judge. Article 224 confers power on the President.\n\nIt is enacted for a specific purpose. There is an underlying purpose while conferring such power on the President. To effectuate that purpose not only a power of appointment is given but the President'' is authorised to make such an appointment for a period not exceeding two years. If when making the appointment for an additional judge it must be deemed to have been assumed that there is such temporary increase in the work of.the High Court or there are such arrears that it has become a compelling necessity to appoint additional judges to deal with the situation, the appointment for such a ridiculously short duration of three months or six months appears not only to be an exercise iii futility but is inconsistent with the in tendment of Article 224.\n\nAppointment under Article 224 can only be made as repeatedly pointed out, to meet the specific contingencies. Such appointment cannot be made for the purpose of making inquiry into the uitability, eligibility or fitness of the incumbent additional judge at the time of consideration of his appointment for a fresh term. In this behalf both the judiciary and the executive are in the same bracket. In the case of Mr. S. N. Kumar and Mr. O. N. Vohra, the Chief Justice of India recommended an extension for a period of six months in order to gain time to make inquiries in respect of complaints which appear to have been menio60 SUPREME CoURT REPORtS [19821 2 s.c.i.\n\ntioned by the Law Minister in the correspondence.\n\nThis is utterly impermissible. Chief Justice of India could not have recommended extension of six months, not for dealing with temporary. increase nor for tackling arrears, but for gaining time to complete his inquiry.\n\nThe Law Minister in bis turn presumably must have advised the President to grant extension .for three months. Such short-term appointments are wholly inconsistent and contrary to the clear intendment of Article 224 and unbecoming of the dignity of a High Court Judge. I am not prepared to believe even on a hypothetical case that in foreseeable future a situation may arise when an appointment of an additional judge is necessary for such ridiculously shortterm of three months or six months to dispose of temporary increase in work or to tackle arrears. If such a situation can be imagined, better let that work be dealt with by permanent judges rather than appointing persons to such high constitutional office for a ridiculously short period.\n\nTo put the position beyond the pale of controversy, it must be emphasised, even at the cost of repetition, that whenever the t::nure\n\nof an additional judge is about to expire, sufficiently in advance the process of consultation for considering his case for appointment as envisaged by Article 217 must start and it must proceed along the hitherto chalked out lines.\n\nIt bas to be completed sufficiently in advance before the tenure is to expire and a decision has to be taken.\n\nIf the incumbent of the office is considered suitable for a fresh tenure, keeping in view the only two relevant considerations, namely, the existence of the temporary increase in the work of the Court or the continued existence of the arrears for resolving or tackling which the judge was appointed, his fresh tenure should be fixed.\n\nIf on objective consideration it appears that the situation is not likely to improve even within a period of two years, normally the fresh tenure should be of two years unless a contrary legitimate\n\ndecision verifiable on• 0bjective facts is reached that the problem can be resolved within a short riod which should in no case be less than one year. One cannot appoint the lowest grade servants on such a short term duration of six months or three montns. It violently hurts the dignity of a Judge of a High Court to be appointed for a period of six months or three months and that during this period he is not supposed to clear the arrears. to deal with which be was appointed but during the.period of three months either the executive or the Chief Justice of India will be holding their inquisitions to consider his future suitability; a decision which these two high constitutional functionaries could not reach within a period of\n\n~··.\n\n. :iL\n\n!.~. OUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J'.) 1061\n\ntwo .years for which initially the additional judge was appointed.\n\nWe emphatically declare that short-term extensions of three months or six months are beyond the intendment of Article 224. Ordinarily,\n\n- as herein indicated the fresh tenure 'must b.e for two years subject\n\nto the overriding consideration that if an honest and legitimate opinion can be formed by all the constitutional functionaries that the temporary increase in the High Court or the . arrears to tackle which the additional judge was appointed could be resolved to.the satisfaction of all within a period of say one year, the duration can he of one year, b!!t not less than that. in any case. ·\n\nIn passing it was briefly stated that there can be a short-term appointment when in a near future . a vacancy in the permanent cadre of the High Court is likely to occur. • That approach is hardly relevant because even if the additional judge is appointed, say for a period of one year, and a vacncy occurs 'within three months of his appointment, there is no bar in law in offering him the permanent appointment and if the workload still justifies, 'to appoint some- ' one else as an additional judge. ·\n\n. . . The stage is now reached where it 'would be appropriate to deal with the scope a~.· content. of. consultation as envisaged. by Article 217. It may be reca !led .that . Article 222 also provides for consultation with the Chief Justice of India when the President proposes . to transfer a judge of. a. High Court to another High Court. The question posed is. whether. consu !talion as envisaged .by Article 217 and, the. consultation envisaged by Article 222 is the same or there is some. marked divergence in ii. Mr. Seervai\n\nin terms said that scope and ambit of consultation with constitutional functionaries both under :Article .. 217(1) and Article 222(1) is the same only content may differ because the. purpose of consultation . under both the articles is different, to wit, under. Aticle. 217, con\n\nsultation is to be had for appointment as High Court Judge while 'under Article 222(1) consultation is rfor the purpose of transfer of a High Court judge from one High Court to another High Court.\n\nThere are a number of articles in the. Constitution . which provides for consultation with different authoriiies. Article 124(2) provide for appointment of a judge of. the Supreme Court by the President after consultation with the Judge of the Su.preme Court and of the High courts in States as the. President may. deem necessary and the • proviso to Article 124(2) makes it obligatory on the President to consult the Chief Justice oi'India ill case of appointment of a Judge.·\n\nici62 SUPRllMB CoURT REPORTS f 1982J 1 s.c.il..\n\nothtr than the Chief. Justice of India. The . marginal note of Article 143 which confers advisory jurisdiction on the Supreme Court specifies the power of the President to consult Supreme Court. Article 217 provides for consultation with the Chief Justice _of the High _ . Court, Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State while making appointment of a Judge of the High Court; Article 222 provides for consultation with the Chief Justice of India before transfer.ring .a Judge of the High Court to any other High Court.\n\nArticle 233 provides for appointment of the District Judges by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court. Article 234 provides for recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service in accordance with the rules made by the Governor in that behalf after consultation with the State Public . Service Commission an'd with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State. Article 320(3} makes consultation obligatory with the Union Public Service Commission or State Public Service Commissions, in respect of inatters specified in the article.\n\nThe word 'consultation' has thus been used in different contexts and different 'authorities are required t~ be consulted for different purposes before exercise of certain power. Obviously, therefore, the scope and content of consultation may vary from situation to situation. The word 'consult' has been defined to mean •fu discuss something together, to deliberate', deliberation being the quinte(sence of consultation .. The word 'consult' would ta!ce its colour and its content and scope will depend upon .the context in which it is used. If the consultati'on is for appointment all those relevant considerations . which enter the verdict before an appointment is made would be the subject matter of consultation. If the consultation is for transfer- . of a High Court Judge under Article 222(!} the word 'consultation' would mean examination of all those relevant aspects to be presently mentioned including the consequences of transfer. Chandrachud, J. affirmed the observatfon in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors.,(') on what constitutes consultation within the meaning of Article 233(1}. It reads as unde~:. • \"Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points •of view known to the other or others and discuss and exa mine the relative merits of their views. If one party makes a proposal-to th~ other who has. a counter proposal in his . mind which is not communicated to _the propo_ser the ..\n\n(I) [1970} 2 SCR 666:\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNiqN (Desai, J.) 1063\n\ndirection to give effect to the counter proposal without anything more cannot be said to have been issued after consultation\".\n\nThe observation provides the content and ambit of the process of consultation.\n\nThough this observation has been made in the context of Article 23 3( I) but it is accepted as applicable to consultation in Article 222( I) and in my opinion it is good law even for Article 217(1).\n\nAt another stage it was observed that 'deliberation is the quintessence of consultation'. That implies that each individual case must be comidered separately on the basis of its own facts. Iyer, J. in bis concurring opinion in Mr. Sheth's case, recalling the observation in Chandramouleshwar Prasad's case extracted hereinbefore, observed that consultation in order to fulfil its normative function must be real, substantial and effective consultation based on full and proper materials placed before the constitutional functionaries. In the context of consultation@for transfer be examined various facets\n\non which consultation must be focussed and concluded that the D Government must forward every possible material to the Chief Justice of India so that he is in a position to give an effective opinion.\n\nMaybe, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India may not be binding on the Government, but it is entitled to great weight and is normally to be accepted by the Government in order to avoid the charge that the power is exercised whimsically or arbitrarily. These observations on the scope and content of consultation in the context of Article 222 would mutatis mutandis apply to the scope and ambit of consultation in Article 217. To recall the words of Justice K. Subba Rao ask them was in R. Pushpam & Anr. v. State of Madra1,(1) the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct, or at least, a satisfactory solution, would provide a rational, legal and constitutional yardstick to measure and ascertain the scope and content of consultation as contemplated in Article 217( I). It must 'not be forgotten that the consultation is with reference to the subject-matter of consultation, and therefore, the relevant facets of the subject-matter must be examined, evaluated and opined upon to complete the process of consultation.\n\nReverting to Article 217(1 ), the consultation is for the. purpose\n\nof appointment of a judge of High Court. The constitutional func- H\n\n(1) AIR 1953 Madras 392 .\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA tionaries to be consulted are the Chief Justice of the High Court, Governor of the State and Chief Justice of India. Attention must first be focussed on what are the relevant considerations apart from the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution while making a proposal for appointment of a High Court Judge.\n\nThe questions, one\n\nwould pose to oneself are : (i) does he satisfy the qualifications prescribed in Article 217(2); (ii) whether he is of sufficiently mature age which is generally considered a good guide for a sombre approach in a Jaw court; (iii) is he of unimpeachable integrity; (iv) has he a spotless character; (v) is he a man of reliable habits; (vi) what is his equipment in.law; (vii) does he subscribe to the social philosophy and values enshrined in the Constitution; (viii) does he suffer from any insurmountable aberrations; (i, X) does he disclose a capacity to persuade and be persuaded; (x) would he have a team spirit;\n\n(xi) has he a quick grasp, a .smart intellect and a compassionate heart. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. As pointed out earlier, the Chief Justice of the High Court who would ordinarily and generally speaking be the initiator of the proposal would evaluate the candidate in his mind froni all these angles and set out his opinion in the proposal formulated by him.. The State executive will focuss on the aspects other than his legal acumen and equipment, his grasp, his ability to deal with complex legal problems being brought before him, because in that behalf the Chief Justice is more advantageously placed. Undoubtedly, on character and integrity with the resources at the command of the State it could express its opinion. If it has some other opinion which runs counter and contrary to what the, Chief Justice of the High Court has stated, it must inform the Chief Justice of the High Court of whatever is in its possession and permit the Chief Justice of the High Court to react. After this two-way discussion has followed, the. proposal may be sent to the Union Minister of Justice who in turn must pass it on to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India, free from local, parochial, regional, caste considerations prevailing at the State level would in meticulous detail examine all aspects of the matter. If he has reliable sources for collecting further information it would be open to him to do so. If he collects something which appears to be. not known either to the Chief Justice of the High Court or the State executive, he may set out the same and refer the proposal back for the consideration of the aforementioned two authorities. After this exhaustive discussion not expected to be the oral or telephonic discussion or personal discussion-if there is a meeting of the minds on relevant aspects of the matter with possible\n\nS.P. tlUPTA v. UNION (l>esai, J.) 1065\n\ndifferences of opinion, the same has to be dealt with by the Minister of Justice who may in turn give his advice, not examinable by the Court, to the President. The consultation has to be meaningful, purposeful, result oriented and of substance. Much water has flown below the bridges when initially it was said that when a duty is cast to consult the authority, one who has to consult, has to inform of its proposal to the authority to be consulted and wait for some time for reply and forget the whole thing. After the decision in Mr.\n\nSheth' s case it is now the law of the land that wherever the President can exercise power in consultation with the Chief Justice of India or oth r constitutional functionaries, the consultation has to be on all relevant aspects which would eater the final verdict. All the parties involved in the process of consultation must put all the material at its command relevant to the subject under discussion before all other authorities tv be consulted.\n\nNothing cao be kept back.\n\nNothing can be withheld. Nothing can be left for the eye of any particular constitutional functionary. To recall the words of Justice Iyer io Mr; Sheth' s case at p. 506, all necessary facts in support of the proposed action of transfer must be communicated to him aod all his doubts aad queries m'JSt be adquately atuwered by the Government. The President has, however, a right as rightly conceded by Mr. Seervai upon consideration of all relevant facts to differ from the other constitutional functionaries for cogent reasons and take a contrary vie\\\\'..\n\nChandrachud, J. in his judgment stated as under : ·\n\n\"Article 222(1) which requires the President to consult the Chief Justice of India is founded on the principle that in a matter which concerns the judiciary vitally, no decision ought to be taken by the executive .without obtaining the views of the Chief Justice of India who, by training and experience, is in the best position to consider the situation fairly, competently and objectively. ut there can be no purposeful consideration of a matter, in the absence of facts and circumstances on the basis of which alone the nature of the problem involved can be appreciated and the right decision taken. It must, therefore, follow chat while consulting the .Chief.Justice, the President must make the relevant data available to him on the basis of which he can offer to the President the benefit of his considered\n\n,.,\n\n'-J\n\nopinion. If the facts necessary to arrive at a proper con- H plusion ar~ pot made avail\\\\l?!e.i to the Chief Justice, he\n\n\n• [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nmust ask for them because, in casting on the President, the obligation to consult the Chier Justice, the Constitution at the same time must be taken to have imposed a duty on the Chief Justice to express his opinion on nothing less than a full consideration of the matter on which he is entitled to be consulted. The fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation to place full facts before the Chief Justice and the performance by the latter, of the duty to elicit facts which are necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are parts of the same process and are complementary to each other. The faithful observance of these may well earn a handsome dividend useful to the administration of justice. Consultation within the meaning of Article 222(1), therefore, means full and effective, not formal or unproductive consultation\".\n\nSo far there is no controversy.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, however, contended that the consultation is obligatory when the Pres!dent proceeds to exercise his power of appointment but in the case of non-appointment consultation is not obligatory. There is an apparent fallacy in this submission. This argument proceeds on the erroneous assumption that there is something like a process of appointment and a distinct and independent process of non-appointment.\n\nCan one start a process of non-appointment either in case of a fresh appointee or in case of a fresh tenure of an additional judge who bas already served as High Court judge for the period for which he is appointed by the President under Article 224 ? What has to start is a process of appointment. The Chief Justice, when there is a clear vacancy, has to initiate the proposal for appointment.\n\nHe may think of selecting someone from the Bar or from the subordinate judiciary.\n\nBut what he initiates is a proposal for appointment.\n\nIt is unthinkable that the Chief Justice of High Court would start a proposal for non-appointment for the first time.\n\nSuch a situation is possible in case of an additional judge, an aspect to be presently examined.\n\nBut save such a situation what happens is that the Chief Justice of the High Coiltt thinks of certain names and ultimately reaches his own decision and initiates his proposal for appointment. This is a process of appointment. The. proposal is forwarded to the State executive as consultation with the Governor is obligatory. Assuming the Governor does not agree, is it that the further examination of\n\nthe proposal must come to an end ? That is not the constitutional\n\ns P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1061\n\nscheme. The Governor may disagree or set out his valid reasons for disagreeing with the proposal of the Chief Justice but he cannot put an embargo on further examination of the proposal by the other constitutional functionaries.\n\nIf the view advanced by Attorney- General that once of the constitutional functionaries does not assent to the proposal the proposal falls there and cannot be further examined is accepted, it would be putting the power of veto on a constitutional functionary only entitled tl'> be consulted. On a true interpretation of Article 217, the proposal must move further. It must reach the Chief Justice of India and the Minister of Justice.\n\nThere might be differences of opinion as they have surfaced in the case of Mr. S. N. Kumar and Mr. o. N. Vohra. That is inevitable when four constitutional functionaries are involved in the decision making process.\n\nUltimately the President may. not accept the proposal and drop the proposal resulting in non-appointment.\n\nThe non-appointment is the end product of a process of appointment.\n\nThere is nothing like an independent process of non.-appointment.\n\nThis aspect becomes vital in the case of additional judge.\n\nWhen initial term for which the additional judge was appointed is about to expire, if one can legitimately think of a process of nonappointment, the Chief Justice of the High Court may sit silent till the last day and the judge walks out.' Does he have a veto subsi/entio over other constitutional functionaries ? The answer is an emphatic no.\n\nIf must be the obligatory duty of the Chief Justice to initiate the proposal.\n\nMaybe, his initiation of the proposal may start with a recommendation that he is not in favour of a fresh term for the concerned additional judge. He is entitled to express his opinion. Proposal has, however, to be proceeded further and must be sent to the Governor of the State who with his own opinion endorsed in the proceeding should forward the same to the Minister of Justice and who in turn must send it to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nNo constitutional functionary merely entitled to be consulted has a right to kill the proposal on his own.\n\nWhen there re differences of opinion qua a person amongst the three constitutional functionaries entitled to be consulted, it is inevitable in the very scheme of things that the President will have to choose keeping in view the fundamental assumption underlying this complex scheme that the best must be appointed and the doubtful must be eliminated. Therefore, there is nothing like a process of non-app9jntrqeqt ill respect of which (:On.sultation ~n pe ~~9e\\Ved'. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R\n\nHow far the provision contained in Article 124 would be helpful in ascertaining the scope of consultation in Article 217 as also the contention about primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India and the response to the argument on behalf of the respondents that the three constitutional functionaries to be consulted are coordinate authorities.\n\nIn fact, reference to Articles 124 and 126 ill only incidental because the construction of these two articles did not figure directly in the contentions canvassed in these cases.\n\nAttention was drawn to them to point out that there are situations envisaged by the framers of the Constitution where the President, the highest executive in the country, may proceed to appoint Chief Justice of India, the highest at the apex cif the judicial hierarchy, without consultation with any functionary in the judicial branch of the State. Article 124 provides for establishment and constitution of Supreme Court. Sub-article (2) provides that every judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold . office until he attains the age of sixty-five years.\n\nThere is a proviso which is material. It reads as under :\n\n\"Provided that in the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.\"\n\nSub-Article (2) of Article 124 which provides for appointment of every judge of the Supreme Court will comprehend appointment of Chief Justice of India also.\n\nIncidentally it was also pointed out that upon a superficial view of Article 124, Chief Justice of India may be appointed by the President without consultation with any functionary in the judical branch. Article 126 caters to a situation where an Acting Chief Justice of India is required to be appointed.\n\nIt provides that when the office of the Chief Justice of India is vacant or when the Chief Justice is, by reawn of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his office, the duties of the office shall be performed by such one of the other judges of the Court as the President may appoint for the purpose.\n\nNow, power is conferred on the President to make appointment H of judge of Supreme Court after consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary. The submission is that the expres-.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1069\n\nsion 'may deem necessary' qualifies the expression 'consultation' and that if he deems 'otherwise the President can proceed to make appointment of the-Chief Justice of India without consultation with any of the judges of the Supreme Court and.of the High Courts. In\n\noth<:r words, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents, the President has a discretion to consult or not to consult judges of he Supreme Court and High Courts before making appointment of Chief Justice of India.\n\nIt was pointed out. that where consultation is obligatory it is specifically provided and reference was made to the proviso extracted hereinabove wherein it is stated that it would be obligatory upon the President to consult the Chief Justice of In.dia before making appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice of India.\n\nUndoubtedly, the proviso leaves no option to the President but to consult the Chief Justice of India while making appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court other, than the Chief Justice of India, but it is rather difficult to accept the construction as suggested on behalf of the respondents .that in making appointment of the Chief Justice of India the President is at large and may not consult any functionary in the judicial branch of the State before rr aking appointment of Chief Justice of India. The expression 'may deem necessary' qualifies the number of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts to be consulted.\n\nWhat is optional is selection' of number of judges to be consulted and not the consultation because the expression 'shall .be appointed after consultation' would mandate consultation. An extreme submission that the President may consult High Court judges for appointment of the Chief Justice of India omitting altogether Supreme Court judges does not commend to us, because the consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts would clearly indicate that the consultation has to be with some judges of the Supreme Court and some judges of the High Courts.\n\nThe conjunction 'and' is clearly indicative of (be intendment of the framers of the Constitution. If there was disjunctive 'or' between Supreme Court and High Courts in. sub-article (2) of Article 124 there could have been some force in the submission that' the\n\nPresident may appoint Chief Justice of India ignoring the Supreme Court and after consulting some High Court judges.\n\nUndoubtedly, sub-article (2) does not cast an obligation t0 consult all judges of the Supreme Court and all judges of the .High Courts but in practical working the President in order to discharge his function of selecting the best suitable person to be the Chief Justice of India must choose\n\n\n[I 982] 2 S.C.R\n\nsuch fair sprinkling of Supreme Court and High Court judgts as would enable him together enough and relevant material which would help him in decision making process.\n\nMr. Seervai submitteJ that this Court must avoid such construction of Article 124 which would enable the President to appoint Chief Justice of India without consultation with any judicial functionaries.\n\nThat is certainly correct. But then he proceeded to suggest a construction where, by a constitutional convention, any necessity of consultation would be obviated and yet the executive power to be choosy and selective in appointment of Chief Justice of India can be controlled or thwarted.\n\nHe said that a constitutional convention must be read that the seniormost amqngst the puisne judges of the Supreme Court should as a rule be appointed as Chief Justice of India except when he is\n\nphysically unfit to shoulder the responsibilities.\n\nThis constitutional convention, it was said, when read in Article I 24(2) would obviate any necessity of consultation with any functionary in the judicial branch before making appointment of Chief Justice of India and yet would so circumscribe the power of the President as not to enable the executive to choose a person of its bend_ and thinking. In this very context is was pointed out that Article I 26 permits the President - to appoint even the junior-most judge of the Supreme Court to be an Acting Chief Justice of India and it was said that such an approach or such construction of Article 126 would be subversive oft he independence of judiciary. It was said that if the junior-most can be appointed Acting Chief justice of India, every judge in order to curry favour would decide in favour of eKecutive.\n\nAnd as far as Article I 24 is concerned it was said that if the conventioR of seniority is not read in Article 124(2), every judge of the Supreme Court would be a possible candidate for the office of Chief Justice of India and on account of personal bias would be disqualified from being consulted.\n\nThere is no warrant for such an extreme position and the reflection on the judges of the Supreme Court is equally unwar- . ranted. On the construction as indicated above there will be positive limitation on the power of the President while making appointment of Chief Justice of India and it is not necessary to read any limitation on the power of the President under Article 126 while making appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court as Acting Chief Justice of India.\n\nBut the observation is incidental to the submission and may be examined in an appropriate case.\n\nAnd the question of construction is kept open.\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNIO~ (Desai, J.) 1071\n\nIf it is held that an additional judge before he is not appointed for a fresh term on the expiry of bis initial term of apointment has a weightage in that he has a right to be considered before he is dropped and that this consideration must proceed along the line of consultation under Article 217 with three constitutional functionaries .md if in the ultimate analysis he is not appointed without completing the process of consultation, is the decision open to judicial review ?\n\nSimultaneously, the question would be whether in the case of a first appointment from the Bar when the 1 Chief Justice may proceed to cast his glance on the Bar for selecting the best person and initiate the proposal for appointment of a particular person which gets stuck up or dropped before completing the process of consultation. is such a decision subject to judicial review ? Is the Court in a position to grant any relief? There is no doubt in my mind on one point that whenever a proposal for appointment i~ initiated by any of tl1e COflS titutional functionaries before it can be killed at any stage the process of consultation must go through in its entirety. When I say that the process of consultation must go through in its entirety I mean that the initiator of the proposal must forward the proposal to other constitutional functionaries according to the channel and the proposal must reach ultimately the President.\n\nIt is not open to any pf the constitutional functionaries entitled to be consulted. to sit tight over the proposal without expressing opinion on the merits of the propJsal and by sheer inaction kill the proposal.\n\nViewed from this angle when a term of additional judge is about to expire it m!lst b~ demd obligatory on the Chief Justice of the H•gh Court in which the alJitional judge is functioning to initiate the proposal very much in time for completing the process of consultation through various stages before the period of initial appointment expires.\n\nMaybe, that the Chief Justice is not willing to recommend him fo( his own reasons.\n\nHe may say so and forward his own view through the appropriate channel of communication for consultation. The Chief Justice of tl:ie High Court has no veto by sheer inaction to deal with tile fate of an additional judge. That is not the role assigned to him and he cannot arrogate the same to himself by his own inactioil.\n\nIt mw b' that in case of a fresh appointment the Chief Justic~ may nit initiate the proposal at all be<'.ause he may not be inclined to fill i 1 th~ vac1ncy.\n\nBut it is equally possible that in such a situation any other constitutional functionary entitled to be consulted in the matter of appointment of a judge of the High Court can iniaite the prnpJs:d and the proposal must move along and reach each c.Jnstititional\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nfunctionary entitled to be consultrd ultimately culminating in the proposal reaching the President with all the collected material in the process of consultation. So far there is no . controversy. The. question is, if in case of an additional judge in whose favour there is a weightage and he is entitled to be considered as held above, a proposal is killed or an affirmative decision is reached not to appoint him without completing the process of consultation in its letter and spirit, would the additional judge be entitled to question the validity of the decision and would the decision be subject to judicial review.\n\nThe answer is in the affirative. This right to question tl:ie decision and the power in the Court to grant relief whatever may be the form in which the relief may be moulded, flows directly from the right of the additional judge to be considered for being appointed for a fresh term or as a permanent judge.\n\nRight to be considered for a further term or as permanent judge necessitates full and effeptive consultation.\n\nAny .drawback, defect or deficiency in the process of consultation may invalidate the decision.\n\nSuch invalid decision when questioned, the court may not be able to direct appointment, but the court can certainly give a direction to complete the process of consultation which may lead to a different result because the assumption is that high constitutional functionaries involved in the process of con sultati'on will act bona fide and in the highest tradition of fair administration. If the decision is shown to be based on extraneous or irrelevant consideratins or malafide such' executive decision is always open to judicial review. I need not affirm this well-established proposition by precedents. The case of a seniormost District judge may be on par with the additional judge. But the same cannot be said for a fresh appointee.\n\nHe was not entitled to be appointed. He had no right to the post.\n\nWhen a person is being selected from the Bar, even if a proposal is initiated and is killed without completing the process of consultation there being no right in such person to the post or he is not entitled as a matter of right to be. appointed, the decision not to appoint him will not be a subject-matter of judicial review, because it is not possible to grant him any relief.\n\nHaving examined the true'meaning and effect of the relevant articles of the Constitution and keeping in view what is discussed hereinabove, it is now time to turn to the two petitions, one filed by the four Bombay Advocates brought before this Court in Transferred Case No. 22/81 and the second filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi and brought before this Court in Transferred\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1073\n\n' Case No. 20/81. These two cases specifically challenge the constitutional validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981, sent by the Law Minister, Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all States in India, and secondly granting of shortterm extension to three judges of Delhi High Court, Sarvashri O. N.\n\nVohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad, and subsequently not appointing Shri 0. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. -Kumar by not granting them a fresh tenure of High Court judgeship.\n\nLaw Minister appears to have stirred up the hornet's nest by the impugned circular dated March 18, 1981.. This circular in its preamble recites that repeated' suggestions have been made to the Government by several bodies and forums including the States Reorganisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State -in which the High Court is situated. With a view to taking first step towards this goal the circular was issued. The circular desired the Chief Minister of each State and the Governor of Punjab to obtain from all the additional judges working in the High Court of the. State their consent to be appointed as permanent judges in any other High Court in the country. An opportunity was given to. such judges to riame three preferences in which each of them would like _to be appointed as permanent judge. A further request was that whenever in future a proposal is made for initial appointment as a High Court judge is must be accompanied by the consent of the person so recommended to be appointed to any other High Court in the country coupled with the preference limited to three. It was made abundantly clear that uption to give preferences does not imply on the part of the Government a commitment either to appoint the person concerned or to appoint him necessarily at anyone of the three preferences. A copy of the letter was also\n\nsent to the Chief Justice of each High Court. Constitutional validity of this circular is questioned in the petition filed by Shri Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla and Others. The submission is fiat with a view to circumventing the rat.io in the majority judgment in Mr. Sheth's case this is a covert attempt at transferring judges under coerced consent. The web of the argument was woven around the alleged covert attempt by the circular to transfer each Additional judge to a High Court other than the High Court in which he is functioning. The circular\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982) 2 S.C.R\n\nwas read and re-read before the Court. Having examined it with microscopic meticulousness I find it impossible to read any overt or covert attempt at transferring judges from one High Court to other High Court by this Circular. There is 'not even a whisper of transfer in the circular.\n\nBut in this connection our attention was invited to the statement made by Law JV, inister in connection with calling attention motion on the impugned circular in Lok Sabha on April 16, 1981.\n\nIn course of the discussion Law Minister appears to have . stated that if there is a complaint against an additional judge, 'it has to be examined on merit and a decision taken.\n\nThe decision could be eirher to drop a person based on evidence or to see if he could be transferred.(1) At a later stage it would be made abundantly clear that transfer power conferred by Article 222 cannot be exercised by the executive to punish a judge because of complaints against him which may on enquiry be found to be of substance.\n\nBut that is another aspect. Circular is not devised as a weapon of mass transfer outside the Constitution.\n\nBut use of word 'transfer' in the discus- • sion cannot be read torn out of context. A little later at column 273 Law Minister states that Chief Justice of India inquired whether it was the intention of the Government to transfer each and every judge and this showed that Chief Justice of India was labouring under a mistaken impression that circular was devisd for mass transfer but Law Minister explained to him that it is not a case of transfer at all but it is a case of fresh appointment and it is not the intention 'to appoint every additional judge outside.' The later part of the statement has raised another crop of controversy to be presently dealt with but there is no whisper of transfer in the circular. As has been pointed out earlier, an additional judge has a J!laximum tenure of two years. At the end of two years he gets a fresh appointment either as a permanent judge or an additional judge for a further period of two years. The consent for fresh appointment is a must. It is open to an additional judge whose tenure comes to an and to decline the fresh appointment at least in the High Courts where undertaking is not taken to accept permanent appointment, if offered. If . he' is, therefore, to be appointed again, necessarily it can be done with l is consent. The consent to be obtained i& of additional judge.\n\nAdditional judge is now being told that it is possible that he may, be appointed in some other High Court, and that therefore, while giving consent for being appointed for a fresh term or as permanent judge H I . (l) Lok Sabha Debates Fifth Series, Vol. XVI, No. 42, Column 27 I.\n\nI ' '-\n\nS.P.\" GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1075\n\nhe is informed that he may be appointed in some other High Court and that he may give his consent with the knowledge of it. The fresh appointment is not a transfer. In fact, in the course of this judgment it will be succinctly thrashed out that a judge who is transferred cannot be said to be appointed afresh to the High Court to which he is transferred. Once it is held that the circular was not a covert way of transferring a judge because transfer was not even on the distant horizon, the whole edifice of argument built over the decision in Mr'.\n\nSheth's case tumbles down. To be specific, a fresh appointment cannot be bracketed with a transfer more so when the submission that transfer i_mplies fresh appointment has been rejected in the past and is being rejected by this judgment. Consent is sought from an additional judge whose tenure is about to expire and to whom a fresh tenure is to be offered. Ipso facto it will be a fresh appointment.\n\nInitial tenure having come to a close, he is offerred a fresh appointment, in another High Court. It being a fresh appointment, it is being done with his consent. In case of such a fresh appointment one cannot say that the additional judge is transferred on the eKpiry of his fir.st tenure, to another High Court where . he is appointed afresh with a fresh tenure. The concept of transfer is foreign to the situation. Once the alleged noxious feature of transfer being in the circular is taken out, there is nothing in the circular which . would be in contravention of any particular constitutional provision.\n\nIt was also stated that the expression 'obtain' in the circular has the element of coercion and a consent ceases to be consent if it is obtained under coercion. It was said that consent and coercion go ill together because forced assent would not be consent in the eye of law. It was said that the threat implicit in the circular becomes evident because the Chief Minister, the strong arm of the executive is being asked to obtain consent. If every little thing is looked upon with suspicion and as an attack on the independence of judiciary, it becomes absolutely misleading.\n\nLaw Minister, if he writes directly to the Chief Justice or the judge concerned, propriety of the actio~ may be open to question. Chandrachud, J. has warned in Mr. Sheth's cdse that the executive cannot. and ought not to establish rapport with judges (p. 456 CD).\n\nTaking this direction in . its letter and spirit, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Ministers.\n\nThe Chief Minister in turn was• bound to approach the Chief Justice This is also known to be a proper communication channel with judges of High Court. In this context the expression 'obtain' would only mean request the judge to give consent if he'so desires. If he\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\ngives the : consent, well and good, and if does not give, no evil consequences are likely to ensue. I am not impressed by the submission of the learned Attorney-General that one who gives consent may have some advantage over the one who does not. I do n'ot see any remote advantage and if any such advantage is given and if charge of victimisation is made out by the judge not giving consent, the arm of judicial review is strong enough to rectify the executive error.\n\nIt was, however, said that what is not stated in the circular is more objectionable and of devastating effect than what is stated. It was urged that omission to mention in the circularthat one who would not give consent would not suffer -any evil consequences or would not be placed at a comparative disadvantage to one who gives consent, ad this would precisely convey a threat to the judge either to give consent or suffer consequences because the negative assurance is not offered. That i~ hardly the correct way of reading the circular.\n\nLet it be noted that no positive advantage was to accrue to one who gives his consent. . If any positive advantage was to be givn to one who gives consent and if it had been spelt out, there would have been some force in this submission but mere omission to mention any evil consequences fl.owing from not giving consent would not necessarily imply that such would be the case.\n\nSimilarly, the statement in the circular that giving an opportunity to indicate preferences would not imply that the Government would be bound to give the additional judge an appoin1rr.e1 t or he would be at least given a station of his choice out of the three preferences indicated by him would mean that while unillaterally obtaining consent on one hand, there was 'no quid pm quo that the appointment would be given.\n\nThis .is clearly reading the circular with coloured glasses and the submission is unwarranted by the language used in it. If an option to indicate preferences is given and option is exercised, undoubtedly that by itself cannot obligate the Government to appoint an additianal judge for a fresh term or a new entrant either an additional or a permanent judge, because various factors will have to taken into consideration over 'and above his consent and preferences in making the appointment. Consent is asked for at a stage prior to the decision to appoint is taken. Therefore, this caution was 11bsolutely necessary and bas been rightly stated, that it implies any promise to do a certain thing. It was then urged that if every additional judge was not to be posted outside the State, the executive will have an\n\noppoitunily to pick and choose, favourites protected, disfavoufttes\n\nS.P. GUPTA v .. UNION (Desai, J.) 1077\n\npushed out and this would strike a heavy or a near fatal blow at the independence of judiciary.· Apprehension vioced is utterly unwarranted because in every appointment of an additional judges as permanent judge in any High Court, the Chief Justice of India is to be consulted and his views would always receive the weight they enjoy.\n\nTherefore once Chief Justice of India gives his considered opinion with respect to every proposal, the element of picking and choosing is effectively curbed or controlled. With these observations, I broadly agree with the view taken by Bhagwati J. in his judgment that there is nothing in the circular which would render it constitutionally invalid.\n\nTurning now to the petition filed by Shri V.M. Tarkunde in which Shri S.N. Kumar has been joined as respondent 5 and who has participated in the proceedings questioning the validity of the short-term extension granted to him and his subsequen(non-appointment. Shri Kumar was appointed an additional judge of Delhi High Court for a period of two years by a Presidential Notification dated March ~. 1979., His term was to expire on March 6, 1981.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi Court by his letter dated February 19, 1981, addressed to the Law Minister, did not recommend an extension for Shri Kumar. While stating that the oendency in the Court still justified the appointment of addi.tional , judges, he considered it his painful duty not to recommend Shri Kumar for three reasons : (i) that there have been serious complaints against Shri Kumar both orally and in writing and on examination he was of the opinion that the 'complaints were not without basis', (ii) responsible members of the Bar and some of his colleagues whose names he was reluctant to mention have also complained about Shri Kumar ;\n\n(iii) that Shri Kumar has also not been very helpful in disposing of cases. He said that he has no investigating machinery to conclusively find out whether the complaints were genuine1or not but all the same the complaints have been persistent. A copy of this letter was sent to Chief Justice of India. Response of the Chief Justice of India as evident from his note dated March 3, 1981, and his letter dated March 14, 1981, was that he. would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri Kumar because in his view the letter of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court dated February 19, 1981, 'was too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity'. Consistent with his desire to look carefully into the charges and to gain time for the same he recommended that the term of Shri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad be extended for ix µJ\\)nhs, This js bow tht!\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nball was set rolling for short-term extension. The duration for which extension was to be given and the reasons for such short-term extension are both contrary to the mandate of Article 224 as has been pointed out earlier. As a matter of fact, taking cue from the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the Law Minister improved upon it by granting extension of three months which would expire on June 6, 1981. To continue with the chronology by the letter dated March 19, 1981, the Law Minister conveyed to the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court the reaction of the Chief Justice of India to the observations made by the Chief Justice for not recommending extension of Shri Kumar especially the charge of Vagueness and requested the Chief Justice to offer his omments on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Kumar in the light of the view . expressed by the Chief Justice oflndia. On March 28, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court replied to the letter dated March 19, 1981, of the Law Minister.\n\nIn this letter the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court informed the Law Minister that he had since received a letter from the Chief Justice of India asking him to furnish him with \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar\". This has reference to the letter of Chief Justice of India dated March 14, 1981, to Chief Justice of Delhi High Court.\n\nHe proceeds further to state that he has since had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India. This sentence was relied upon by the learned Solicitor General to submit that the Court should note that prior to March 28, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court met the Chief Justice of India and discussed the entire matter in detail wfth the Chief Justice of India with reference to the recitals in his letter dated February 19, 1981.\n\nHe said that read in juxtaposition, the only permissible inference is that at this meeting there was full and elaborate discussion with regard to what Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had written in his letter dated February 19, 1981, by which he had declined to recommend the extension of the term of Shri Kumar. It was, therefore, said that the three reasons which prompted the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court not to recommend Shri Kumar must have been thoroughly discussed and thrashed out because the expression 'entire matter in detail' would leave no room for doubt that nothing was withheld, nothing was assumed and every aspect was gone into.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi High Court proceeds further to state that afier this discussion which appears to have taken place on March 26, 1981, he addressed lettr dated Mn; h 281 1981, to the Chief\n\n$.I'. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1079\n\nJustice of India, a copy of which was annexed to the letter dated March 28, J981, to the Law Minister. Thus on March 28, 1981. the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court wrote two letters, one to the Law Minister and another to Chief Justice of India and a copy of the . . ' Jetter to Chief Justice of India was annexed to the letter addressed to the Law Minister.\n\nReverting to the letter dated March 28, 1981, written by the Chief Jmitice of Delhi High Court to the Chief Justice of India, it may be noted that in this letter the Chief Justice .of Delhi High Court in terms says that since receiving the letter dated March 14, 1981, with regard to Mr, Justice Kumar, he had also had an opportunity to discuss this 'delicate matter' with the Chief Justice of India. He refers to the three points made by him in his letter dated February 19, 1981, which means that at the meeting on March 26, 1981, the very three points referred to by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in' his letter dated February 19, 1981, came up for discussion and the discussion was in details and the matter is styled as delicate because it involved the painful task of talking about the integrity of a colleague. But there is a further averment in the letter which leaves no room for doubt that during this meeting inte!!rity and general conduct of Shri Kumar was discussed between them.\n\nWith regard to 'the other point about Shri Kumar not being helpful in the work of the High Court he appears to have enclosed a statement of disposals of Shri Kumar. Bven in this letter it is conceded that t.he Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not. Then he proceeds to make a point that in such a delicate matter as reputation of a colleague working in the High Court, 'there would be some who would support the allegatiOns and there will be some who would refute them', and, therefore, an affirmative decision of a conclusive nature is by its very nature not possible.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi High Court also noticed the divergence\n\nof opinion that may be expressed by different people. One thing that emerges clearly from this correspondence is that question of .character and integrity of Shri Kumar came up for detailed discussion 'between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice oflndia at their meeting on March 26, 1981. I propose to ignore any other complaint against Shri Kumar or inadequacy of his disposals because these aspects are not relied upon for non-appointment of Shri Kumar.\n\nUltimately, the decision not to appoint him was founded upon his reputation about integrity. On April 15, 1981, the La'Y Minister wrote to Chief Justice of Delhi High Court requesting him that it may be that he ma~ t!Q~ lll\\Vll investigating machine~\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nto conclusiveJy establish the truth of the complaints against Shri\n\nKumar; nevertheless he must have had some material which provided the basis on which he concluded that Shri Kumar's reputation for integrity was not above board and recommended that he may not be continued, and it would be necessary for the Government to have the material and his comments.\n\nThere is some reference to a complaint by Shri Sabir Hussain against Shri Kumar in this letter but I propose to ignore it because it is hardly relevant save and except saying that it was relied upon by the learned Solicitor-General to urge that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had acted most objectively and in a wholly unbiased manner. That may come later on.\n\nIn the meantime on April 22, 1981, a writ petition was filed by Shri V.M., Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court questioning the validity of the Circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, and in this writ petition, inter alia, relief was sought in the form of a direction to convert 12 posts of additional judges in Delhi High into permanent judges and to appoint Shri N.N. Goswami, Sbri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N.- Vohra as permanent judges and to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court for a full term of two years. By an order made by this Court on May I, 1981, this case stood. transferred to this Court. When the matter was pending before this Court an Order was made on May 8, 1981, directing the Union of ldia to decide not less than 10 days before June 6, 1981, whether any. of the three additional judges which included Shri S.N. Kumar should be appointed for a further term . as additional judge or they should be appointed as permanent judges or otherwise.\n\nIn the mean time on May 7, 1981, in response to the letter dated April 15, 1981, of the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has written a long letter and which bas been the subjectmatter of intensely ferocious controversy both as to the significance of its contents, propriety of the request contained in the letter not to show the same to the Chief Justice of India and the violation of the constitutional mandate of consultation as prescribed by Article 21.7, in the letter not being shown to the Chief Justice of India enabling him to offer bis comments and takiQg a decision not toITappoint Shri Kumar. The letter dated May 7, 1981, is a long epistle. At the top it i~ µientioneq \"ecret (for personal attention\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) °1081\n\nonly)\". The Chief Justice of Delhi High Court refers to his meeting with the Chief Justice of India on March 26, 1981, and then pro ceeds to state that as desired by him, he wrote his letter ·.dated March 28, 1981, a c9py of which was forwarded to the Law Minister.\n\nThe expression 'as desired by him' has been a subject-matter of rival contentions.\n\nThe learned Solicitor- General urged that this statement clearly conveys that the Chief Justice, of India himself desired after discussion at the meeting on March 26, 1981, that. the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court should not refer to the details of discussion and, therefore, wrote his letter dated March 28, l 981, to the Law Miilister in abstruse terms.\n\nThe specific suggestion is that even in the letter dated March 28, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court did not furnish details to the Law Minister as it wa> so desired by the Chief Justice of India.' Then he proceeds to state that somewhere early in May 1980, one of his colleagues met him and said that he was rather perturbed about information with him to the effect that if a substantial amount was paid to Shri Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance company would be decided in favour of the party.\n\nThe Chief Justice states that he did not pay much attention to the earlier reports but when this was brought to his notice and he not being the Chief Justice at tat time, he thought that after summer vaca!ion to save Shri Kumar from. any embarrassment, he should be put on a jurisdiction other than original jurisdiction and accordingly when he became the Acting Chief Justice and constituted the Benches for the second half of 1980, Shri Kumar was assigned to a Division Bench on the appellate side.\n\nHe then proceeds to state that even though Shri Kumar was assigned the work of the Division Bench, he carried with him amongst others, three suits Nos. 1409 of 1979, 1417 of 1978 and. 1408 of.1979 filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Jain Export Pvt. Ltd. against the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.\n\nHe further states that in August 1980 the same col)eagu_e talked to him and another , colleague joined saying that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Shfi Kumar vis-avis the aforesaid cases and some others. As the Chief Justice was an Acting Chief Justice, he did not want to take any precipitate action but he, however, made discreet inquiries from some of the leading counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations. This impelled the Chief Justice to look into the allegations more carefully when it transpired that it was not only the three suits mentioned bereinabove but other single Bench matters were also retained . by\n\nShri Kumar on his bord despite being put in the Division Bench.\n\n,_c\n\nSUPREME coutt REPoRTS [1~821 i s.c.l\\.\n\nHe points out ' there. was a. long list of such suits carried by\n\nShri Kumar with him and that some of the parties in the suits were rich and influential parties including some former Princes. He proceeds to state that in January 1981, he looked into the matter a little more deeply and made further inquiries and even though some lawyers were non-committal, others however asserted with some force that Sbri Kumar's reputation was not above board. This led to his discussing the matter with some of his colleagues beside11 the two who had earlier spoken to him, and they also said that unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were not very complimentary to Shri Kumar. This made the Chief Justice to conclude that reputation for integrity of Shri Kumar 'was not what . should be for a Judge of the High Court'. He then proceeds to refer.to the complaint of Shri Sabir Hussain against Shri Kumar in which he exonerates Shri Kumar. He deals with the quantum of work disposed of by Shri Kumar, an aspect which is not relevant for the present purpose. There is some reference to the conduct of\n\nShri Kumar in his work as a judge in the Court. He concludes the letter by saying that he has already ex pressed his view that Shri Kumar should not be continued but it is for the Government to decide whether it would like Shri Kumar to continue as a Judge of-the Delhi High Court.\n\nUndoubtedly, this letter has not been brought to the ntice of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThereafter the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice ofJndia on May .::1, 1981, enquiring from him whether he had completed his inquiry in regard to the complaints regarding Shri Kumar's integrity and general conduct which the Chief Justice of Delhi High\n\nCourt had discussed with him as mentioned by him in bis letter dated March 28, 1981. He requested the Chief Justice oflndia to forward the advice in regard to the continuance or otherwise of Shri\n\nKumar and Shri S.B. Wad. To this letter the Chief Justice of India replied by his letter dated May 22, 1981, in which after referring to the three points made by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in his first Jetter dated February 19, 1981, for not recommending continuance of Shri S.N. Kumar, he proceeded to state that the Chief Justice of Delhi- High Court met him on March 26, 1981, and amongst others, he stated that he doubted the integrity of Shri\n\nKumar because even though his assignment was changed he still continued to hear part-heard cases on the original side.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India then proceeds to state that he has made the most careful and extensive enquiries in regard to both these matters and\n\n~.i>. GUP'i:A v. UNION (f>esai, J.) 1083\n\nhe was satisfied that there was no substance in any one of them.\n\nHe proceeded to state that he made enquiries not only from the membets of the Bar but from the sitting Judges of the Delhi High Court which showed that it is a common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a judge is changed from the original side to the appellate side and vice versa, he continues to take up partheard cases on which a substantial amount of time has been alrnady spent.\n\nIn his view, therefore, Shri Kumar did nothing out of the way or unsual in taking up part-heard cases after the allocation of his work was changed. He specifically disagreed with the view of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court for non-continuance of Shri Kumar and further proceeded to assert that . not one member of the Bar or of the Bench doubted the integrity of Sbri Kumar, and on the other hand several of them stated that he is a man of unquestionable integrity. He concluded the letter by saying that Shri Kumar's term should be extended by a further period of three months .. I have not been able to appreciate the last line of this letter as to why a further three months' extension is recommended. If Shri Kumar's integrity in the opinion of the Chief Justice of India was beyond reproach, the fact whether he was slow in the disposal of work or other minor considerations should not have come in the way of the Chief Justice of India recommending a full term extension. It appears, however, that this three months' extension was recommended because some reports of the intelligence branch in respect of Shri Kumar were also forwarded to the Chief Justice of India and probably the Chief Justice of India was to respond to the same.\n\nThat the Chief Justice of India did by his letter dated May 29, 1981, and after having expressed his opinion with regard to . the details of the report not disclosed to the Court the Chief Justice of India rcommended a full term extension for Shri Kumar.\n\nThe sole contention raised by Shri R.K. Garg in this behalf is that the consultation envisaged by Art. 224 read with Art. 217(1) must be full, and meaningful and if that is the criterion, failure of the Law Minister, may be on the request of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, to disclose the letter dated May 7, 1981, of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court or its contents to the Chief Justice of India would unmistakably show that the process of consultation was not complete and, therefore, the C'.onsequent decisiori not to accept Shri Kumar by not giving him any extension beyond June 6, 1981, is violative of the constitutional mandate and, there-\n\n1bS4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS t 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nfore, invalid.\n\nKeeping aside for the time being the propriety of the request made by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court that his letter dated May 7, 1981, should not be shown to the Chief Justice of India, what is required to be determined is whether the contents of the letter and more particularly the reasons and materials which prompted the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to come to the conclusion that the reputation for integrity of Shri Kumar was not .what should be for a judge of the High Court, were brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India at any point of time and whether he had a chance to think and deliberate over it.\n\nAnd if the answer is in the affirmative, mere failure to show the letter dated May 7, I 981, would not invalidate the decision.\n\nWithout going into the further details in this behalf, it clearly transpires that at the meeting betw. en the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court-on March 26, 1981, there was a specific discussion of all the three points, including one of lack of integrity of Shri Kumar.\n\nOnce the question about the integrity of Shri Kumar came up for discussion between these two high constitutional functionaries with a specific reference to the view of the Chief Justice of- Delhi High Court not to recommend Shri Kumar for further continuance, the conclusion is inescapable that all aspects hearing upon the integrity of Shri Kumar must have been discussed between the two high constitutional functionaries.\n\nThat is why the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court says in his letter dated March 28. 1981, that he had discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis is further borne out by what the Chief Justice of fndia writes in his letter dated May 22, 1981, that at the meeting between them on March 26, 1981, the reasons which prompted the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court not to recommend continuance of Shri Kuinar were discussed and this discussion included the complaint of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court about Shri Kumar's integrity.\n\nThere is a specific reference to Shri Kumar keeping to himself the partheard cases after his assignent was changed, in the letter of the Chief Justice of India. This clearly indicates that there was thread bear discussion on this point and the discussion would include the material wh.ich the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had and whicl1.i he would necessarily refer to, to justify the view taken by him. There is another internal evidence to bear out this conCiusion.\n\nShri Kumar himself filed an .affidavit on July 17, 1981, much before the hearing commenced in this case and much before disclosure of the relevant correspondence was ordered by this Court. In this affidavit he clearly refers to his retaining some of the part-heard\n\nU>. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.)\n\ncases after Q.is assignment was changed and this list includes the three suits referred to in the Jetter of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court dated May 7, 1981.\n\nWhat has prompted this explanation about the aforementioned three suits by Shri Kumar much before the disclosure was directed and he had a chance to look into the correspondencd would be self-evident. The only permissible inference is that in his meeting with the Chief Justice of India which he refers to in para 18 of his affidavit he must have been informed by the Chief Justice of India that with reference to his handling of the aforementioned three suits and bis tugging on to it after his assignment was changed gave rise to the belief that. it was being done with some ulterior motives and the Chief Justice of India could have only gathered this information from the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court at their meeting on March 26, 1981. This is further internal evidence to buttress the conclusion that everything including all details set out in the letter dated May 7, 1981, concerning Shri Kumar's integrity was the subject-matter of discussion between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Chief Justice of India at their meeting on March 26, J 98 t. If that be so, the conclusion is inescapable that the consultation is complete.\n\nConsultation need not take any particular form. The essence of consultation is deliberation. And if the two high constitutional functionaries met for the avowed object of discussing continuance of Shri Kumar with specific reference to the doubt about his integrity, it would be rea~ sonable to hold that all aspects were considered, gone into and thrashed out.\n\nIn this view of the matter non-showing of the letter dated May 7, 1981, to Chief Justice of India wQuld not detract from the fullness of consultation as required by Art. 217.\n\nFor these reasons and some more discussed by Bhagwati, J. with whom I agree, it must. be held that there was fuH and effective consultation on all relevant points including those set out in the letter dated May 7, 1981, and the submission must accordingly be rejected.\n\nBefore I conclude, would like to record my disapproval of the request made by the. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to the Law Minister for not showing the Jetter dated May 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India. If independence of judiciary is likely to be threatened, it may or may not emanate fr.om the executive or from some outside agency but it would be corroded by the action of the members of the judiciary itself,' by internal corrosion, and if proof for this were needed, it is demonstratively supplied by a very improper request made by the Chief Justice of Deihl High Court to the\n\n1086 SOPRB~B cOUkT kilt>ORts [ t 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nLaw Minister not to show the letter dated May 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nI am unable to conceive a situation where in the correspondence, assertions, statements, expression of doubts concerning a high judfoial functionary like a judge of the High Court can be made by the Chief Justice of a High Court which be is not willing to show to the Chief Justice of India. I am not implying any hierarchy. I put them on par and accord status and dignity to the high offices occupied by both. They may differ.\n\nHealthy difference is the life blood of honest opinion.\n\nBut it is unthinkable albeit wholly improper for a Chief Justice of a High Court to write to the Law Minister something which he is not prepared to show to the Chief Justice of India. This conduct, if allowed to pass uncensured, would give rise to such fissiparous tendencies which would wholly undermine the independence of judiciary.\n\nI also feel that the way in which the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has dealt with the case of Shri O.N. Vohra leaves much to be desired.\n\nThe Chief Justice of Delhi High Court seems to be completely unaware of his duty and obligation while recommending or refusing to recommend a colleague for extension. He holds no position superior tci a High Court Judge functioning in his Court.\n\nHe is only first amongst equals enjoying the status not on merits but on accident of seniority. He is not supposed to sit in judgment over the decisions of his colleagues. Where does he get this authority passes comprehension ? Mr. O.N. Vohra took a dignified stand and did not participate in this squable, undignified as the whole episode appears to be. Had he come and participated, may be the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court would have found his position so untenable that there would have emanated a strong censure about the method and manner of his dealing with his colleagues. These may appear to be strong words but they still fail to express my feelings adequately. I say no more.\n\nThere was one more submission which may be noticed in passing and I refer it only for future purpose. If a Chief Justice of a High Court gets information reflecting upon the character and . integrity of a colleague or complaints about his behaviour in the Court, fair play in action demands that before relying upon it and taking a st :p of f'ar reaching c_onsequence concerning the career and dignity of the colleague, he should in confidence talk to the\n\n·-----\n\nS.1>, auP'tA v. UNION lDesai, J.) 1087\n\ncolleague.\n\nIn these days when relations betwee11 the Bench and the Bar have sunk abysmally low, that ruinours, canards, character assessination flourish in the grapevine, if credence is to be given to such . rumours because about integrity usually foolproof facts are not available, but reputation for integrity being relevant, apart from any principle of natural justice which does not surface in this discussion, fair play in action demands that they should first be brought to the notice of the colleage not for his explanation but even for future rectitude. If the whole thing stops the decisive action can be deferred. If it continues to flourish, the Chief Justice or a High Court in discharge of his constitutional duty of recommending or not recommending continuance of an additional judge may proceed to act as he considers befitting the high dignity of the office he holds; but to make assertion in secret and confidential letters without giving the slightest inclination to the colleague and then to shrink back to the extent of not permitting the same to be shown to the paterfamilias in the judiciary scales the height of impropriety .. Let the past be buried and bygones be bygones but in future a conduct and approach commensurate with the high office held by the Chief Justice of High Court must inform his action.\n\nFair play in action is the watchword of judiciary and if it is extended to all others, a colleague in the High Court should not be at a comparative disadvantage.\n\nI would, therefore, like to recall what happened in the course of hearing of these matters.\n\nAt one stage the. Bench unanimously suggested to the learned Attorney-General that even accepting his contention that the consultation was full and meaningful and there was no defect or deficiency in it, a person who has worked as a Judge of a High Ceurt for two years and three months should not be made:; to leave the institution with a wrench that a raw deal has been done to him and, therefore, Government of India may show the letter dated May 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India, request him to give his comments on the same and after considering the same in the light of the comments of the Chief Justice of Delhi High may mould the final decision concerning Shri Kumar. The learned Attorney-General replied that the Government of India has no objection to showing the letter dated l\\lay 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice.of India. That is poor solace because the Jetter since disclosure had become public property, the media having published the same. But the learned Attorney Gtneral informed us that 'the Government of\n\nJOSS SUPREME (; OURt REi>otrs f 1982] i s.c.il.\n\nIndia was not prepared to reconsider the decision. Apart from the\n\njudiiry and the. public, Goverment. ?f India must be equally sens1t1ve and considerate about mamtammg both the dignity and independence of judiciary. It would add 'to the statute of the Government of India and reject unsubstantiated criticism that unwarranted attacks are made on the judiciary by the executive if the letter dated 7th May 1981 is shown to the Chief Justice of India and his comments are invited and then a decision is taken whether or not to reappoint Shri Kumar as an additional Judge.\n\nWhile holding that _there was full, effective and meaningful C consultation, and on this account the petitions in this group are liable to be dismissed, I suggest that the Government of India may show the letter dated May 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India, request him to give comments and after receiving the comments, decide whether Shri Kumar should or should not be appointed as an additional Judge of Delhi High Court. This is not a direction D but merely a suggestion for the acceptance of the Government if thought fit.\n\nIn the second group of cases the first is a writ petition No. 274/8 l filed by an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court, Miss Lily Thomas, impleading therein the Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Law as the sole respondent and in which the only prayer in the last paragraph is that this Court may be pleased to give true interpretation of Article 222 of the Constitution of India. In the body of the petition it was averred that President of India in exercise of the power conferred by Article 222 (I) of the Constitution has made an order transferring Mr. lustic!\n\nM.M.\n\nIsmail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice, Kerala High Court. The question posed was whether the power to transfer a Judge of a High Court conferred on the P.resident under Article 222 can be used to defeat the right of puisne judges of the High Court to be considered for the post of Chief Justice of the High Court wherein a vacancy may have occurred, It was averred that on the elevation of Mr. V. Balakrishna Eradi, the then Chief Justice of Kerala High Court to. the Bench of the Supreme Court of India, the office of Chief Justice, Kerala High Court has been rendered vacant and other considerations being equal, the next senior-most pui°me judge who should legitimately occupy the same office is Mr.\n\nJustice Subramania Poti or any other judge of the Kerala High Court. It was contended that the expression 'judge' in Article 222\n\n....\n\nS.'P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1089\n\ndoes not comprehend Chief Justice and, therefore, the transfer of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail as Chief Justice of Kerala High Court is ex facie illegal. It was also contended that this power to transfer was to be exercised in public interest and the power has not been conferred for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon to punish a judge who does not toe its line and that exercise of such power would be subversive of the independence of judiciary. An application for adding parties was made in which 9 other persons were so'ught to be impleaded as respondents, one of them being Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court who was under an order of transf\\:r as Chief Justice Madras High Court. There was also a prayer for urging additional grounds and the whole of the prayer clause was amended and by the amended clause a declaration was sought that Article 222 of the Constitution is illegal and unconstitutional.\n\nA further declaration was sought that the transfers\n\n- of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chief J, ustice K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras and Kerala respectively being not in public interest and also pecause Article 222 does not confer ariy power to transfer a Chief Justice, is unconstitutional by an order made by this Court -on February 4, 1981, from amongst those sought to be arrayed as respondents, the prayer to join Mr. M.M. Ismail and Mr. K.B.N . . singh alone was granted and in respect of others the application was rejected. - Rule was issued after recording a statement that the petitioner will not press ground No. 5 challenging the constitutional validity of Article 222 of the Constitution.\n\nOne Shri D.N. Pandey, Advocate, filed C.W.J.C. No. 2224/81 in the High Court of Patna impleading the Union of India, Chief Justice oflndia, Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Registrar of Patna High Court as respondents, praying for an appropriate writ or order directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the order of the President dated January 19, 1981, transferring Sbri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court. as Chief Justice, Madras High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office.\n\nBy an order made by a Bench of the Patna High Court, Shri Thakur Rampati Sinha, President, Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association, was permitted to be added as petitioner No. 2.\n\nVarious contentions have been raised in this petition and they will be dealt with at tlie appropriate place.\n\nBy an order made by .this Court the petition stood transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. 24/81. After the petition was transfem;<j !<? his 9ourt, hfi K.~.N. Sin?h applied for tran~-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 S.C.l.\n\nposing him from the array of respondents as petitioner and the same having been granted, Shri K B.N. Singh is now petitioner No. 3, in this case and be is represented by counsel Dr. L.M. Singhvi.\n\nIn this petition Shri K.B.N. Singh has filed a short affidavit on September 7, 1981, followed by a detailed affidavit on September 16, 1981.\n\nShri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, filed the counteraffidavit on September 24, 1981. Shri K.B.N. Singh filed a rejoinder affidavit on September 28, 1981. The Chief Justice of India filed his counteraffidavit on September 29, 1981, to which a rejoinder affidavit was filed by Shri K.B.N. Singh on October 16, 1981.\n\nA rejoinder affidavit was also filed by Thakur Rampati Sinha on behalf of petitioners 1 and 2 on October 16, 1981.\n\nOne P. Subramaniam filed Writ Petition No. 553 of 1981 in the Madras High Court challenging the constitutional validity of Notification dated January 19, 1981, by which Shri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice, Madras High Court was transferred as Chief Justice, Kerala High Court.\n\nJn this petition Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs was impleaded as the sole respondent. Union of India moved this Court under Article 139 A (I) requesting the Court to withdraw to itself the aforementioned Writ Petition pending in the Madras High Court on the ground that petitions raising identical questions have already been transferred to this Court.1 This Court having granted the request, the writ petition stood traM°ferred 'to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. 6/81.\n\nOne A. Rajappa, an Advocate of Madras, filed Writ P.etition No. 390/81 in the Madras High Court questioning the constitutional validity of the Notification transferring Chief Justice Ismail to Kerala High Court, inter alia, contending that Article 222 does not comprehend power to transfer a Chief Justice. In this petition he impleaded the Union of India, Registrar of the Madras High Court, Registrar of the Kerala High Court and Registrar of the Patna High Court as respondents. An application to transfer this petition to this Court under Article 139A was moved.\n\nThis Court accepted the transfer application by its order dated February 3, 1981, and accordingly the ca8e stood transferred to this Court an, d numbered. as Transferred Case No. 2/81.\n\nl -\n\n·--\\.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1091\n\nOne Ripudaman Prasad Sinha had filed C.W.J.C. No. 312/81 in the Patna High Court for a writ of quo warranto seeking information as to how after the Notification dated January 19, 1981, transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice, Patna High Court, as Chief Justice, Madras High Court, he continued to occupy the office of Chief Justice, Patna High Court.\n\nThis petition came up for admission before a Bench of the Patna High Court. At the oral hearing a question was posed to the petitioner why he had not produced the presidential notification and on this short ground the writ petition was rejected. An oral prayer . for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected.\n\nHence he filed Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1509 of 1981. He has impleaded Shri K.B.N. Singh\" Union of India and the Chief Justice of India as respondents.\n\nMr. K.C. Kankan filed his counter-affidavit in 'fransferred Case\n\nNo. 24/81, inier alia; contending that the .fact that the mother of D Shri K.B.N. Singh is aged about 85 years and is ailing and bedridden for last two years was present to the mind of the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India can certainly be presumed to have knowledge not only about this fact but the other fact that Tamil language is freely used in Tamil Nadu and Shri K.B.N. Singh is not conversant with it. It is stated that Shri K.B.N. Singh had E an effective opportunity to represent his case before the Chief Justice of India. Then it is further averred that Chief Justice of India had visited Patna as mentioned by Shri K.B.N. Singh himself. It is further stated that the Chief Justice of India while making recommendations for transfers pointed out that he had met several lawyers and judges of the concerned High Courts and expressed the view F that on the basis of data which he collected and which he had considered with greatest objectivity, Shri K.B .. N. Singh should be transferred. It is not disputed that for misbehaviour as adumberated in Article 124, transfer is not the remedy and that transfer can only be ordered in public interest without regard to any complaint of misbehaviour. Denying the averment of Shri K.B.N. Singh that trans- G fer was based on considerations which are not genuine and germane, it was stated that Shri Singh has given no basis for his averment that the transfer order i' likely to have been made because either the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India or the President of India or both of them have been misled by interested parties. It was asserted that H considerations relevant to transfer were taken into account by the Chief Justice of India !\\~ lso by the P~siden~ of !ndi~, The re'luest .\n\n\n(1982] 2 S, C.R.\n\nof Shri K.B.N. Singh for disclosure of documents bearing upon his transfer was resisted by Shri I.N. Chaturvedi, Secretary Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Cpmpany Affairs, claiming privilege against disclosure of documents.\n\nTransferred Case No. 24/81 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri D.N. Pandey in which Mr. K.B.N. Singh at his request was transp<.'sed as petitioner No. 3, was heard as the main care and other petitioners an.d their learned counsel were permitted to intervene at the hearing of this case.\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi who led, ably supported by Shri H.M.\n\nSeervai and Shri Soli Sorabjee, put in the forefront the contention that the power to transfer a judge of the High Court is an extra-ordinary power vested in the President, the highest exec'utive in the country, which has to he exercised according to the advice of the council of ministers, if not properly controlled and adequate safeguards provi <led, would render indepedence of judiciary a myth. Keeping aside, therefore, the facts of the case, it would be advantageous at this stage to find out the purpose for which such power is conferred on the President under Article. 222, the circumstances in which the power can be exercised highlighting the constraint or limitations on the exercise pf power which would be .safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power.\n\nTo repeat, on the question of construction of Article 222 we are not breaking a fresh ground. It was the subject-matter of a very intelligent and enlightened debate in the Gujarat High Court wherein Mr. S.H. Sheth, a judge of the Gujarat High Court challen ged his transfer to Andhra Pradesh High Court. This debate continued unabated in the apP.eal against the decision of a special bench of the Gujarat High Court to this Court. Barring some additional submissions the arguments covered the familiar ground. I say familiar because I had the privilege of bearing arguments at the time of admission of the Special Civil Application filed by Mr. S.H.\n\nSheth in the Gujarat High Court and also when the petition was finally beard. The appeal against the decision of the Gujarat High ·\n\nCourt quashing the order of transfer of Mr. S.H. Sheth and issuing a mandaus to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the transfer order was heard by a Constitution Bench or this Court presided over by Shri Y; V. Chandrachud, who,\n\n11s the quirk of fate shows, in his capacity [as Chief Justice now is\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.)' 1093\n\none of the respondents in this group of cases.\n\nAs we are to a considerable extent on a familiar grourid, in order to avoid inere repeat performance, it would be conducive to proper adjudication of issi:tes raised, to recall what has been the view of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mr. Sheth's case.\n\nAfter briefly referr-· ing to the position thus established, I would refer to additional contentions and also a fervent appeal for accepting the minority view in Mr. Sheth's case be.cause very persuasively it was argued that this larger Bench must re-examine the issue in its entirety. The emotional appeal was founded on the submission that since the\n\ndecision in Mr. Sheth's case disturbing trend_s have appeared in the Indian polity and even though once thwarted, a claim to naked and arbitrary exercise of power for transfer having been made on behalf of the Union of India and it being further shown that the safeguard which appealed to the majority view in Mr. Sheth's case havhg been found to be of slender strength, the Court should fuither insulate the judiciary from continuing threats emanating from powerful executive quarters.\n\nIn constitutional interpretation while value system may have a fair sprinkling, emotions, sentiments, unfounded su.spicions, wild apprehensions and imaginary threats have no place. Equally, a possible chance of abuse of power would not permit denial of power if it is conferred. We will have to be all the more circumspect, imbued with wisdom and restraints because let it not be said by the posterity that the judges interpreting the judiciary provisions in the Constitution 'have re-written the Cons'itution for their own total and absolute insulation from any quarter so .that an otherwise irremoveable elitist in.stitution may. become so entrenched as to be impervious to the realities of the situation. We wish to steer clear of what Professor Friedmann stated, between the scylla of subservience to Government and the charybdis of remoteness from constantly changiag social pressures and economic needs (see Law in a Changing Society by W. Friedmann).\n\nLet us then first recapitulate what has been the majority view in Mr. Sheth's case.\n\nS.H. Sheth, a judge of the Gujarat High Court was transferred\n\n.\".\\ c\n\nas per the Presidential Notification dated May 7, 1976 as Judge of H the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Mr. Sheth challenged the order of transfer in a petitiou t!it lw tiled in Gujarat High Cour~ ' '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\non June 16, 1976, in which he impleaded Union of India and the then Chief Justice of India as respondents. This petition was heard by a special Bench of Gujarat High Court which by a unanimous order dated November 4, 1976, voided the order of transfer.\n\nAn appeal by certificate was preferrd by the Union of India to this Court which was heard by a Constitution Bench of this Court.\n\nLet me recapitulate the contentions canvassed on behalf of Mr. S.H. Sheth in his petition questioning the validity of the order made under Article 222(1) by which he was transferred from the C office of the judge of the High Court of Gujarat to the office of the Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The constitutional validity of the order of transfer was challenged on the following grounds :\n\n(i) The order was passed without bis consent, such consent must be necessarily implied in Article 222(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, the transfer of a judge from one High Court to another High Court without his consent is unconstitutional;\n\n(ii) The order was passed in breach of the assurance given on behalf of the Government of India by then Law Minister Shri A.K. Sen who, while moving the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, said in the Lok Sabha that \"so far as High Court Judges are concerned they should not be transferred except by consent.\" Mr. sheth having accepted judgeship of Gujarat High Court on April 23, 1969, on the faith of the Law Minister's assurance, the Government of India was bound by that assurance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel;\n\n(iii) The order of transfer militated against public interest.\n\nThe power conferred by Article222(1) was conditioned by the exigencies and requirements of public interest and since his transfer was not shown to have been made in public interest it was ultra vires; and\n\n(iv) The order was passed without effective consultation ' with thr <;:!hief /ustice of India. 'Consultation' in '\n\n---ti,\n\nI l\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1095\n\nArticle 222( 1) means 'effective consultation' and since the pre-condition of Article 222(1) that no transfer can be made without such consultation was not fulfilled, the order was bad and of no effect.\n\nThough the full bench of the Gujarat High Court by an unanimous order struck down the order of transfer they arrived at this conclusion by different processes of reasoning, one judge took the view that in not consulting or informing Mr. Sheth of even the proposal of transfer, it being an administrative executive action in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence the order was bad. The second judge took the view that the order was unconstitutional because it was passed without Mr. Sheth's consent and secondly because it was passed for a collateral purpose. The • third judge took the view that the mass transfers of 16 judges which were effected with one stroke though each judge Play have had peculiar personal difficulties to contend with and considering that the Union of India had failed to disclose the nature and content of the consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the consultation was not meaningful and that the pre-condition for exercise of power in Article 222(1) was not satisfied and, therefore, the order was void.\n\nAll the three judges unanimously rejected the challenge to the order pf transfer on the round of promissory estoppel.\n\nIn the appeal preferred by the Union of India only two contentions were examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court.\n\nThey were : (i) the independence of judiciary being the basic and fundamental feature of the Constitution power of non-consensual transfer to be exercised by the executive, a litigant before the judge in large number of cases, would be subversive of the independence of judiciary and therefore, the Court-must read in Article 222(1) that the power to tranllfer. can only be exercised with consent of the judge proposed to be transferred; and (ii) that the power to transfer High Court judge having been conferred on the President it can only be exercised in public interest and that before exercise of such power there must be full, effective and meaningful consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nUnder the second submission, the scope and content of the consultation necessary to satisfy the strin&ent requirem¥1lt~ Qf Article 222 have been. fully thrashed out. ·\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe leading judgment of majority view by Chandrachud, J. after referring to various articles of the Constitution held that the provisions set out in the judgment indisputably are aimed at insulating the High Court judiciary and even officers and servants of the Court from the influence of the executive.\n\nThe observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in Shamsher Singh's case that fearless justice is a prominent creed of our Constitution and the independence of judiciary isthe fighting faith of our founding document, was affirmed.\n\nIt was also held that power to transfer the High Court judge is conferred by the Constitution in public interest and .not for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon fo punish a judge who does not toe its line or who for some reason or other has fallen from its grace. Thirdly, it was held that the two-fold limitation on the power of the president to transfer a High Court judge, namely, that it can be exercised in public interest and that it can only be exercised after full, effective and meaningful consultation with the Chief Justiceof India would provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power and accordingly the contention that in order to insulate the judiciary from executive interference the Court should rea.d into\n\nArtkle 222 the words 'with his consent' was rejected. What constitutes meaningful, effective, full and substantial consultation h~:s been succinctly set out in a paragraph at p. 453 which has been extracted hereinbefore.\n\nBriefly to recapitulate in the present context, 'president must make relevant data available to the Chief Jus1ice of India on the basis of which he can offer to the president the benefit of bis considered opinion. If the facts necessary to arrivf: at a proper conclusion are not made available to the Chief Justice of India, he must ask for them because in casting on the President the obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India, the constitution at the same time must be taken to have imposed a duty on the Chief Justice of India to express his opinion on nothing less than a full consideration of the matter on which he is entitled to be consulted. The fulfilment by the President of his constitutional o bligation to place full facts before the Chief Justice of India and the performance by the latter of the duty to elicit facts which are necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion are 'parts of the same process , and are complementary to each other. The faithful observance of these may well earn a handsome dividend useful to the admin.istration of justice.' Consultation within the meaning of Article 22:~ (I), therefore, means full and effective, not formal or unproductive con sultation, Concluding on this point, it was observed as under :\n\n' )-\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) _- 1097\n\n\"Article 222(1) . post{Jlates fair play, and conain~ built in safeguards in the interests ofreasonableness. In.the\n\nfirt place, the power to transfer a High Court judge caq be exercised in public interest only.\n\nSecondly, the President is under an obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India. which means and requires that all the. relevant facts must be placed before the Chief Justice. Thirdly, the Chief Justice owes a corresponding duty, both to the President and to the judge who is proposed to. be transferred, that he shall consider every relevant fact before - he - tenders his opinion to the President. In the discharge of this constitutional obligation the Chief Justice would be within his rights, and indeed it is his duty whenever necessary, to elicit and ascertain 'further facts. either directly from the judge concerned or from other reliable sources. The executive cannot and ought not to establish rapport with the judges which is the function and privilege of the Chief Justice. In substance and effect, therefore, the judge concerned cannot have reason to complain of. arbitrariness or unfair play, if the due procedure is followed. (p. 456).\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., while concurring with this view, observed that the President must communicate to the Chief Justice all the material he has. and the course he proposes. T, he Chief Justice in turn must collect necessary information through responsible channels or directly, acquaint himself with the requisite data, deliberate on the information he possesses and proceed in the interests of the administration justice to give the president such counsel of action as he thinks will further the public interest, especially the cause of the justice system. (p. 496). At another place it was observed as under:\n\n\"Before giving his opinion the Chief Justil:e of India would naturally take into consideration all relevant factors and may informally ascertain from the judge concerned if he has any real personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer may not be directed. Such grounds may be of a wide range including his health or extreme family factors.\n\nIt is not necessary for the C::hief Justice to issue formal notice to the judge concerned but it is sufficient-although it is not obligatory-if he\n\nSUPREME CotJR.t Rl!POR.ts ( 19821 2 s.c.A.\n\n• ascertains these facts either from the Chief Justice of the High Court or from his own colleagues or through any 'other means which the Chief Justice thinks safe, fair and reasonable. Where a proposal of transfer of. a judge is made the Government must forward every possible material to the Chief Justice so that he is in a position to give an effective opinion. Secondly, although the opinion of the Chief Justice of India may not be binding on the Government it is entitled to great weight and is normally to be accepted by the Government because the power under Article 222 cannot be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily.\" (pp. 501-502).\n\nThe majority view is that it is not possible to read words 'with his consent' in Article 222 and non-reading oi these words would not jeopardise independence of judiciary otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution. It was held that a non-consensual transfer is within the purview of Article 222.\n\nOn the question of policy transfers which loomed large in the present case, Cbandracbud, J. observed that whether it is necessary to transfer judges from one High Court to another in the interest of national integration is a moot point, but that is a policy matter with which Courts are not concerned directly (see p. 450). At another place he held that policy transfers on a wholesale basis which leave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our constitution (p. 454). Krishna Iyer, J'. in this context expressed himself in a forceful way when be said that : 'to promote the community's concern for impeccabl~ litigative justice, policy oriented transfer of judges after compliance with constitutionally spelt out protocols inay not be ruled out' (see p. 501).\n\nUntwalia, J. after, attempting to spell out specific public interest to subserve which a transfer of a High Court judge can be ordered, ultimately concluded that 'these are matters of policy decision e11tirely within the realm of the governmental power' (p. 507). The\n\nminority view of Bbagwati, J. and Untwalia, J. held that non- consensual transfer is outside the purview of Article 222 but both of .them reached. the conclusion by a different process of reasoning.\n\nBbagwati, J. held that having examined various provisions _of the Constitution unerringly pointing towards assuring independence of\n\njudciary fro111executive pressure, to further fortify and insulate it,\n\nS.t>. OtJi>TA .v. UNION (besai, J.) 1099\n\nthe Court should r, ive to the expression 'transfer' in Article 222 a limited meaning that it only comprehends consensual transfer and compulsive transfer is not within the purview of the Article.. Untwalia, J. held that 'there may be necessity and justification on the ground of public interest or policy for the transfer of judges from one High Court to another, although it may be few and far between or even punitive in character, but to do so without the consent of the judge concerned will bring about devastating results and cause dam-·\n\nage to the tower of judiciary and erosion in its independence.' He was, therefore, of the view that an additional safeguard is necessary to insulate the judiciary and he found that safeguard by holding that a judge cannot be transferred under Article 222 without his consent.\n\nBhagwati, J. agreed with Krishna Iyer, J. on the scope and content of consultation and Untwalia, J. agreed with Chandrachud, J. on the scope and content of consultation under Article 22~. Scope and ambit of consultation under Article 222 (I) has been dealt with in the earlier part of this judgment and it is unnecessary to repeat it here.\n\nThe obligation to consult may arise in different contexts and in different circumstances and situations and for different purposes.\n\nDuty or dbligation to consult inheres full, effective and meaningful consultation. The situation and context and purpose of consultation would define parameters of consultation. Within the parameters all relevant considerations on which consultation to be effective must be focussed, must be precisely laid down.\n\nIt was admitted on all hands. that transfer is likely to cause hardship and inflict injury both private and to some extent public. In Shamsher Singh' s case it is in terms stated that sometimes transfer is more harmful than positive punishment.\n\nBefore the judge is made to suffer hardship or he is required to suffer injury, certain relevant question have to be examined and answered so that even a remote chance of transfer by way of punishment may be scrupulously avoided and a firm decision is reached that it is for achieving an avowed public interest. In the context of transfer of a judge frm one High Court to another High Court, the questions which must engage the attention of the concerned authorities may be briefly e11:umerated.\n\nThey are : (i) why this particular judge is selected for transfer ; (ii) what would be the personal difficulties faced by him in the event transfer is ordered, such as whether his .. wife is gainfully employed, whether his children are taking education or are gainfully e_mployed, whether the old parents dependent on Mm would be seriously inconvenienced, whether he is being pushed out' froin a station which is considered good to a station not so good;\n\n1100 SU.llltEME COllR.1' RllPOltTS [1982) 2 s.C.k.\n\nwether it, is likely to attach any stigma, whether he would have to\n\naintain two establishments, and finally ; (iii) whether the public interest for which he is required to be transferred would far outweigh his inconveniences, difficulties and even a possible stigma. Selective transfers generally give rise to canards because ordinarily High Court judges are not transferred and as fate as 1963 the then Law Minister Mr. A. K. Sen assured the Parliament that a High Court judge should . not be tranferred except by consent and this policy is departed from.\n\nOnce one or the other judge is specifically selected for transfer, even if it is proclaimed to be in public interest, such as a senior, experienced and competent judge is required for other High Court, this hardly satisfies anyone and the judge really suffers character assassination.\n\nIt is, therefore, absolutely necessary that all these aspects and many more that can be enumerated, must be specifically and individually examined, discussed, deliberated upon and finally a decision must be\n\nrached that the public interest for which transfer is proposed would be served by the transfer.\n\nSpecific public interest must Qot be left to guess worJ.c but must be precisely stated. and must be such that it would far outweigh the personal difficulties, inconvenience and the possible stigma.\n\nPrincipal contention canvassed in the High Court and in this Court in Mr. Sheth's case was that non-consensual transfer is outside the purview of Article 222.\n\nThis contention would have . stood conclded by the majority decision of the Constitution Bench but as the inatter is before a larger Bench, M.r. Seervai made a valiant effort to persuade us t9 hold that in view of the recent disturbing trends surfacing in the. Indian polity, such as continuous denigration of judiciary and experience proving the safeguards spelt out in Mr. Sheth's case against the abuse of transfer power, broken reed, coupled with the claim for naked and arbitrary power, the time has come to reconsider the majority view in Mr. Sheth's case by further buttressing independence of judiciary and completely insulating it against com pulsive transfers by accepting the minority view in Mr. Sheth's case, that a non-consensual transfer is beyond the purview of Article 222.\n\nIn support of this submission Mr. Seervai drew attention to some observations in the judgipent of Chandrachud, J. and Iyer, J. which according to him a, re factually incorrect and a decision based on shch.incorrect assumption would render the majority view not sustainable.' I remain unconvinced. In my detailed judgment in Ivlr.\n\nSheth's case. in the Gujarat High Court I have given long and elaborate reasons for rejecting the contention that non-consenual trims-\n\nS.1'. GUPTA v. UNI6N ([Jesai, J.)\n\n. fers are not within the purview of Article 222.\n\nI would not reiterate them because I unreservedly accept the majority view of this Court in Mr. Sheth's case as cotrect. I would, however, briefly deal with some of the submissions of Mr. Seervai in this behalf.\n\nThe first error in the majority judgment which, it was contended, would necessitate reconsideration of the majority view that it is not necessary to read the words 'with his consent' in Article 222 (!), was that the majority view proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain any provision for transfer of a High Court Judge. Chandrachud, J. has observed that the Government of India Act (1935) did not contain any provision for the transfer of a judge. That . is why it provided that the office of a judge shall be vacated either on the judge being appoin. ted to be a judge of the Federal Court or on being appointed as a_ judge of another High Court (p. 448). Krishna Iyer, J. 'who concurs with the majority view has in this context observed that ithas already been pointed out above that the Government of India Act did not contain any provision for transfer which was effectuated by appointing a judge of one High Court to be a judge of another High Court' (p. 493). In this connection it may as well be J?Ointed out that in the minority judgment, Bhagwati, J. who accepted the contention that Article 222 (I) comprehends only consensual transfer bas also observed that ' ... there was no specific provision in the Act (Government oflndia Act, 1935) conferring power to transfer a High Court judge.\n\nThe po_wer to transfer a High Court judge was expressly conferred for the first time under the Constitution ... .' (p. 473). Therefore, the assumption that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain a provision for transfer, which on further examination turns out to . be erroneous, did not materially affect the outcome because while accepting this position that there was no such provision, the majority reached the conclusion that Article 222 (I) does not cater to only consensual, and that lion-consensual transfer is within the purview of Article 222 (1). The minority reached an exactly opposite conclusion relying on this very aspect. It would, therefore, appear that the assumption is not so material as to necessitate reconsideration of the majority view.\n\nEven otherwise Jet me see whether presence or absence of the provision to transfer a judge in the Government of India Act 1935, has any bearing on the question of construction of Article 222 (1).\n\n-._ :.i...€\n\n1102 SUPREME COURT llEPORt$ t 19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nSection 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided for constitution of High Courts. Sub-section (2) of section 220 provided that 'every judge ofa H!gb. Court shall be appoited by His Majesty by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty years'. There is a proviso to this sub-section, paragraph (c) of which states that the office of a judge shall be vacated by hjs being appointed by His Majesty to be a . judge of the Federal Court or of another High Court; It was assumed during the course of arguments in Mr. Sheth's case before this Court that paragraph (c) of the proviso to section 220 (2) formed part of the Government of India Act, 1935, as originally enacted. On investigation that does not appear to be correct. It is now pointed out that paragraph (c) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220 was introduced by section 2 of the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944.\n\nBy section 6 of the 1944 Act retrospective operation was given to the amendment introduced by section 2 from the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935. The marginal note to section 2 of the 1944 Act reads: \"Judges to vacate office on transfer.\" Referring to this provision it was urged that the word 'appointed' in paragraph (c) also comprehends transfer and it was spelt out that the 'office of a ju'dge of the High Court would be vacated not only on his appointment as a judge of the Federal Court but also on his being transferred to another High Court. Earl of Munster during the debate on the provision pointed out that a judge of a High Court on being appointed to the Federal Court or on being transferred to another High Court would not retain his office of the judge of the High Court from which he was transferred. In this context he made reference to section 10 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, which provided that the office of any judge of a High Court shall be vacated on his being appointed as a judge of the Court of Appeal.\n\nMr. Pethick Lawrence explaining the provision pointed out that the transfer of a judge of a High Court'to another High Court was implicit in the provision itself and that the proposal is merely intended to be beyond question what was certainly the intention in regard to it.\n\nIn this context the provision contained in section I 03 of the Government-. oflndia Act, 1915-19 was recalled. In section 103 provision was made for rank and precedence of the High Court judges inter se according to the seniority of their appointment unless otherwise provided in the patents. This provision was omitted from the Government of India Act, 1935, but it was said that it makes no difference because a similar provision existed and continues to exist i.n the High C:::ourts Act or the Charter Act of 1861.\n\nAt this stage it would be\n\n_, J_ .. ...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1103\n\nworthwhile to recall that in the draft constitution there wa11 no specific and positive provision for transfer of a High Court Judge. Draft Article 193 (I} proviso paragraph (c) had almost bodily incorporated paragraph (c) of sub-section (2) of section 220, Government of India Act, 1935, in that it was provided that the office of a judge shall be vacated on his being appointed by the President to be a judge of the Supreme Court or of another High Court. And recalling the amendment made to section 220, paragraph (c} of the proviso to sub-sec.(2} by the 1944 Act while retaining the word 'appointed' in the body of the paragraph, the marginal note set out the word 'transfer' meaning that the expression'appointed'in the context of a judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court obviously comprehends his transfer. However, when the drafting committee forwarded the revised draft constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly at the second reading, it recommended certain amendment and changes.\n\nOne such amendment was present Article 222. The Drafting Committee while forwarding its report with a draft constitution as revised by it, stated that it has 'proposed the insertion of Article 222 to enable the President to transfer a judge of a High Court from one High Court to another. The proposed provision of the Constitution would not permit of any compensatory allowance being given to judges on such transfer. Power has accordingly been reserved to Parliament to determine by law the compensatory allowance to be paid in case they are so transferred, and, until, Parliament so determines, to the President to fix by order the quantum of such allowance.' This insertion of Article 222 was accepted by the Constituent Assembly and simultaneously clause (c) of the proviso to Article 217 (I) was amended to read the word 'transfer' in place of the word 'appointed'.\n\nIt thus transpires that there was a provision in the Government of India Act, 1935, sinee its commencement for transfer of High Court judges from one High Court to anoth@r High Court and to that extent the assumption of absence of such a provision as stated in Mr. Sheth's case is erroneous. What is the sequeter? If there was power to transfer a High Court judge in 1935 Act, logically the argument that our Constitution has adopted the basic scheme of that Act must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Constitution makers wanted such power to be conferred and made an explicit provision in Article 222.\n\nWhether on ransfer a fresh appointment is made so as to necesssitAte the consent of the transferred judge will be presently examined. But presence or absence of a power to transfer a judge in the Government of Inqia Act 1935, would not be decisive of the matter because the Constituent Assembly demonstrably ex\n\n1104 SUPREl.JE COURT REPORTS ( 1982} 2 s.C. It\n\npressed its intention to confer power on the President to transfer a judge as indicated in Article 222 {I). The statement, therefore, in the judgements of Chandrachud, J., Bhagwati, J. and Krishna Iyer, J. in Mr. Sheth's case that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain any provision for transfer <;>fa judge would not in any manner detract from the binding character of the ratio of the majority judgment, nor on this account a re-examination become.s necessary.\n\nIt was urged that transfer of a judge of one High Court to another High Court constitutes fresh appointment and, therefore, if initially a man cannot be appointed without his consent because if such a power was to be conferred on any one it would be a conscription or we may be thrown back to the days of slavery and, threfore, if transfer of a judge of the High Court amounts to a fresh appointment, ipso facto it cannot be done without his consent. The majority view in Mr. Sheth's case has rejected this contention and in my opinion for very cogent and valid reasons.\n\nBriefly, the reasons for accepting the majority view may be stated.\n\nSubmission is that on transfer a High Court judge ceases to be a judge of the High Court where he was functioning and is appoint ed a judge of the High Court to which he is transferred and, therefore, it is a fresh appointment and therefore it can only be with his consent.· When it was pointed out that the framers of the Constitution used the words 'appointment' and. 'transfer' in Article 217 (I) proviso (c), in collocation, they must be aware that the connotation of the two words are different and the word 'transfer' in itself does not involve a fresh appointment, it was said that the words have been used interchangeably and recourse was taken to the definition of 'actual service' set out in clause {I I) to Second Schedule which includes joining time on transfer from a High Court to the Supreme Court or from one High Court to anothe~. It was submitted that the word 'transfer' if it does n'ot include appointment is inappropriate when used in the context of a transfer from High Court t0 the Supreme Court because that is unquestionably an appointment which cannot be made without consent of the person concerned. Proceeding further it was said that it is well recognised that use of different words does not necessarily produce a change in the meaning (see Maxwelrs Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp. 286-289). Reliance was placed on State of\n\nS, P, GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1105\n\nBombay v. Heman Alreia,(1) which decision was referred to with approval in Keshvananda Bharati' s case by Chandrachud, J. (p. 966).\n\nAttention was also invited to Edward Mill.~ v. Ajmer,(2) where this Court did not find any materi.al difference between two expressions 'existing law' and 'law in force. While defining the expresstion 'actual service' in clause 11 (b) of the second Schedule to the Constitution the word 'transfer' is used in the context, of physical movement, that is, leaving one place and going to another place and the time spent in the process.\n\nBut the expression 'transfer' is used in Article 222 to mean transfer from one High Court to another High Court, the person so transferred continuing to be a High Court judge wih continuity of service and there is no break. Undoubtedly the oath to which a judge of the Higti Court must subscribe provided that he takes oath as Judge on being appointed to a designated High Court and, therefore, on transfer when he goes to another High Court he has to subscdbe to a fresh oath as being appointed to that High Court. But in service jurisprudepce appointment by transfer is a well recognised concept involving continuity of office without break.\n\nThus fresh oath does not imply that his appointment as High Court judge comes-to an end. What comes to an end is his appointme.nt as a judge of a particular High Court and not the holder of the constitutional office of High Court judge and Article 217( I) provides . for appointment of a High Court judge and not judge of a parti- . cular High Court. He continues to hold office even when transferred.\n\nBut when he reaches the other High Court he subscribes to an oath to be a judge of that High Court, not that he subscribes to an oath to be a judge. The jurisdiction to function as a High Court judge is not ambivalent but the judge functions as a judge of a particular High Court and enjoys the jurisdiction of a High Court judge in relation to the HighCourt to which he is thereby attached.\n\nSame conclusion inevitably follows when viewed from another\n\n- angle.\n\nArticle 217 (I) prescribes consultation with three constitu- • tional functionaries before appointing a person as a High Court judge while Article 222 (I) obligates consultation only with Chief Justice of India while transferring a judge from one High Court to another High Court. If transfer were to mean a fresh appointment and yet it can be carried out by mere recourse to Article 222 (l), the only limitation on the power of the President while ordering transfer is to have consultation wHl:i tq~ <;:hief Jµtice of India, while\n\n(!) AIR 1952 Bombay 161\n\n(2) [1955] 1 SCR 735,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nif the President is making an appointment of a High Court judge within the contemplation of Article 217 (I) the President is under a constitutional obligation to consult not only the Chief Justice of India but the Chief Justice of High C0urt to which appointment is being made as also the Governor of the State in which the High Court is situated. Mr. Seervai in this context urged that the two articles must be harmoniously construed and achieve the harmonious construction he submitted that even though in the case of a transfer under Article 222 (I) the Chief Justice of India is not bound to consult the Chief Justice of the High Court but normally it is his d.uty to do so as a responsible person and that Article 222( I) does not preclude such consultation. One cannot read into an article what is not prescribed because if consultation is obligatory it cannot be left to the discretion of the Chief Justice of India to consult someone as a responsible person. Maybe, that the field of consultation, i.e. the aspects to be taken into consideration in the process of consultation for Article 217 (I) and Article 222 (I) are different but the difference cannot be wished away by merely suggesting something as a matter of prudence. This is inherent evidence suggesting that transfer of High Court judge does not mean a fresh appoint- ·\n\nment.\n\nBut the most insurmountable impediment I find in the sug gested construction is that the court is not merely called upon to construe the word 'transfer' but re-write the Article in the name of construction. Is it permissible? Should the judges constitute them\n\nselves a Constituent Assembly ? To answer it in the affirmative would be a dangerous proposition. In fact, in this context the caution adminis!ered by Mr. Seervai himself in his Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Edn., Vol. III, while commenting upon the decision of this Court in Manohar v. Maruti Rao,(1) may be profitably referred to. He says at p. 1878 'th at no doubt there is a limited senoe in which in interpreting the law the judge may make law in the sense of adopting one of two or more alternatives, if such alternatives are open, or evolving a new principle to meet a new or unusual situation.\n\nBut it is not given to him to write his own theories, likes and dislikes into the Constitution and the law'. The further comment is that 'the personal views of a judge are irrelevant in the matter of interpretation of a constitutional provision.\n\nA further warning was administered that no scientific theory propou.nded in a i:)ook: can\n\n(1) AIR 1979 $.C. 10~4.\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) i 101\n\nform the basis of a judgment, for it is opinion evldefice, and such an evidence is admissible on condition that the scientific witness goes into the bolt and is cross-examined.\n\nThe serious objection is to the Judge Writing philosophical and social thesis.\n\nNow, interpretation or a constitutional provision is both an art and a science but while resorting to wellknow canons of construction unwittingly the pet theory that the independence of judiciary is prized so high that in order to achieve it if it becomes a compelling necessity the provi sion of a constitution may be re-written, no canon of construction permits this to be done. We must always remember that we are called upon to construe the Constitution, the fundmental law of the land.\n\nNo doubt 'a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty if is to interpret it, but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory or even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors' .(1) The Constitution-makers clearly envisaged a power to transfer a High Court judge and conferred it on the President and howsoever we may disapprove this power we cannot wish this power away by re-writing the Article. There is no power in-the Court to re-write the Article.\n\nDr. Ambedkar who piloted the Constitution in his speech on November 25, 1949, on the motion that the Constitution as settled by the Constituent Assembly be pssed, adopted the following observation with approval : -\n\n''.Courts may modify, they cannot replace.\n\nThey can revise earlier interpretations as new arguments, new points of view are presented, they can shift the dividing line in marginal cases, but there are barriers they cannot pass, definite assignments of power they cannot reallocate.\n\nThey can give a broadening construction of existing powers, but they cannot assign to one authority powers explicitly granted to another\".\n\n{Underlining mine)\n\nIf we read the words 'with consent' not -only the power of the President is totally taken away blft the power is re-allocated to the fjudge who is to be transferred, namely, he cannot be ordered to -be\n\n(1) Jn.Fe: 1h {q1tr?l f1c, irct ad l'oar Act, 1938 F.C.R.18 at 37. - . ' ' ,; ,. . : ... ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\ntransferred but he can be requested a request which can be finally turned down.\n\nThe suggested construction is contrary to jurisprudential concept of power. It was never disputed that Article 222 (I) confers power on the President to transfer a judge from one High Court to another High Court. The only limitation on the power is a prior consultation with the Chief Justioe of India. Now, if the power to transfer vested in the President can only be exercised with the consent of the judge who is to be transferred, does there reqiain any power in the President to discharge his constitutional function entrusted to him by Article 222 (1) ? When power is vested in a person or a constitutional functionary there ought to be •he subject and object of power. Power is generally defined as 'ability conferred upon a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that end, the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, either of himself or of other persons. Powers are classified either as public or private. Power is said to be_ public when it is vested in a person as an agent or instrument of the functions of the State Amongst others, it contains executive authority.(1) The correlative of power is liability. This connotes the presence of power vested in someone else, as against the person under liability. It is the position of one whose legal rights may be altered by the exercise of a power. Hopefield describes power and disability as jural contradiction. Now, if the power is in the President, there is a liability as jural correlative in thejudge who can be transferred. And that power remains power if the liability can be imposed without consent. The moment the concept of consent is imported the power ceases to be power and becomes disability. It either becomes immunity or disability, more appropriately disability, in the sense of lack of pow1:r. (2) Is it open to the Court by a process of interpretation to neutralise the powet and thereby remove the disability which was constitutionally provided? I consider it impermissible and, there- ·\n\nfore, also the contention that the Court should read the words 'with his consent' in Article 222 (1) must be rejected. ·\n\nWhat then is the check against arbitrary exercise of power conferred by Article 222(1) once the argument that it can only be exercised with the consent of the juge to be transferred is rejected.\n\n(I) Salmond:on Jurisprudence by Fitzgerald, 7th Edn. pp. 229-230\n\n(2) (See for; this'_discussion pages.229 _and 230 of Salmond on. mis!lrudf(llce bl;'\n\nfiti:erald,_ 7th Edn.).\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v.· UNION (Desai, J.) 1109\n\nThis power to transfer a High Court judge has rightly been described as an extra-ordinary power. The question then is, unless a positive check on its arbitrary exercise emanating from judiciary is found, this extra-ordinary power is likely to undermine independence of judiciary. It was said that the best check would be if this power can be hedged in . with conditfon that it can only be exercised with the consent of the judge, a submission which has not commended to me.\n\nNow, if this safeguard of reading consent in Article 222 is rejected, is there any other safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power ? We were repeatedly' remiiided that this power was positively abused in 1976 when 16 judges were transferred en masse and it is well recognised that what bas been once done, if not restrained or checked, may be done again. In Mr. Seth's case the first safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power waa found in the obligatio11 cast on the President to consult the Chief Justice of India and, therefore, the parameters of consultation were drawn very wide so that the power may not be exercised to the detriment of the judge for a collateral purpose. The second safeguard was found in reading into Article 222 that the power to transfer a High Court Judge can ouly be exercised in public interest. Chandrachud, J. held that the power to transfer a High Court Judge is conferred by the Constitution in public interest and not for purposes of pro\"viding the executive with a weapon to punish a judge who does not toe its line or who for some .reason or the other has fallen from its grace.\n\nAt another place it was observed that if the power of the President who is to act on the advice of Council of Minister to transfer a High Court judge under Article 222(1) is strictly limited to cases in which the transfer becomes necessary in order to subserve public interest, in other words, if it be true that the President has no power to transfer a High Court Judge for reasons not being in public interest but arising out of whim, caprice or fancy of the executive, or its desire to bend a judge to its own way of thinking, there is no possibility of any interference with the independence of judiciary if a judge is transferred without his consent. The same view is shared by Krishna Iyer, J. in his concurring judgment.\n\nTherefore, the majority declined to read the words 'with his consent' in Article 222( !).\n\nThe majority, therefore, concluded that nonconsensual transfer is within the purview of Article 222(1). Even the minority does not question the view that the power to transfer a. judge can only be exercised in publi~ inen; s~.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe public interest me public policy is an unruly horse and is incapable of any precise definition and, therefore, it was urged that this safeguard is very vague and of doubtful utility. It was urged that these safeguards failed to checkmate the arbitrary exercise of power in 1976, This approach overlooks the fact that the Lakshman Rekha drawn by the sfeguards when transgressed or crossed, the judicial review will set at naught the mischief.\n\nTrue it is that it is almost next to impossible for individual judge of a High Court to knock at the doors of the Courts because access to justice is via the insurmountable to mountain of costs and expenses.\n\nThis need not detain us because we have seen that in time of crisis the Bar has risen to the occasion twice over in near past though it must be conceded that judicial re.view is increasingly becoming the preserve of the high, mighty and the affluent.\n\nBut the three safeguards, namely, full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and t):iat the power to transfer can be exercised in public interest, and judicial review, would certainly insulate independence of judiciary against an attempt by the executive to control it.\n\nThere was a lively debate as to whether transfer of a judge who has to some extent becomes obnoxious in a High Court would be in public interest. Chandrachud, J. observed that \"experience shows that there are cases, though fortunately there are few and far between, in which the exigencies of administration necessitate the transfer of a judge from one High Court to another. The factious local atmosphere sometimes demands the drafting of a judge or Chief Justice from another High Court and on the rarest of rare occasions which can be counted on the fingers of a hand, it becomes necessary to withdraw a judge from a circle of favourities and non favourities.\n\nThe voice of compassion is heard depending upon who articulates it.\n\nThough transfers in such cases are pre-eminently in public interest, it will be impossible to achieve that purpose if a judge cannot be transferred without his conset. His personal interest may lie in continuing in a Court where his private interest will be served. best, whereas, pubiic interest may require that his m,1orings ought to be served to act as a reminder that 'the place of justice is a hallowed place'. \" This approach mixes up two independent problems.\n\nWhile transfer in public interest is conducive to independence of judiciary, such power when exercised with a view to punishing a judge becomes counter-productive. To punish a High Court judge by an impermissible method is not in public interest. And if a\n\n~--.---\n\nS.P. OUP1'A v. UNION tDesai, J.) 1111\n\njudge is uprooted from one place because he has made himself. obnoxious, the transfer its::lf may inflict punishment. In the whole controversy in this case this is the grey area and it is difficult to give precise answer either way. •\n\nPublic interest is an expression incapable of any precise definition nor what constitutes public interest is capable of specific enumeration.\n\nA negative definition was attempted by learned . Attorney- General when he said that if a judge is guilty of misbehaviour or is suffering from incapacity he ought to be removed and not transferred but if the judge is not guilty of. any misbehaviour but because of activities of some others bas become ineffective his transfer could be said to be in public interest.\n\nOne can visualise a situation when a judge having an expertise in some specialised branch of law may be required to be transferred to another High Court where it becomes necessary to strengthen that department. Transfer in sue~ a situation would indisputably be in public interest. Unquestionably such transfer may cause some inconvenience or hargship to the transferred judge, bu by no stretch of imagination it can be said to cast either a slur or that the order was passed with a view to punishini him. Such a situation in our vast country with number of High Courts can be easily envisaged. A transfer of this nature even if it involves to the judge concerned some hardship, some inconvenience some pecuniary loss, yet his outstanding merit which necessitated his transfer for strenghening another High Court would far outweigh the personal considerations. If it is recognition of merit, the judge would himself hardly make any grievance about it. To question such a transfer as not being in public interest by illustration that there are three judges of same eminence in three High Courts, what basis can be adopted for the transfer of a judge is too hypothetical to need an answer. No rule can be framed to meet with such a situation. A threat of a resignation by such a judge is inconceivable. One can visualise a number of situations where a transfer can be in public interest and when a transfer is effected . in public interest and when questioned, the authority exercising the power of transfer must make good the claim of public interest. To say that public interest is not a sufficient safeguard is to deny what is being day in and day out done in Court, viz.; that a certain action being in public interest. is upheld.\n\nBut the serious and fairly difficult question is, whethe, r a judge can be transferred on account of complaints against him or on accoib12 stJPRilM£ COURT RJiPOR'rS [1982) s.c.tt.\n\nunt of anythin_g in his conduct or behaviour. Let us put the negative inJhe.majority view in the forefront. Chandrachud, J. has in most\n\nuneq!Vvocal terms stated that 'the power' to transfer a High Court judge is conferred by the Constitution in public interest and not for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon to punish a judge who does not toe its line or who, for some reason or the other, has fallen from its grace (p. 444)'. At another place he said that he has taksn the view that a High Court judge cannot be transferred as matter of punishment as for example the views which he bona fide holds and that his transfer, being conditioned by the requirements of public interest, cannot be effected for an elltraneous purpose (p. 446), Bhagwati, J. observed that 'it would be gross abuse of power to displace him from his High Court and transfer him to another High Court by way of punishment because he has decided cases against the Govt. lt is a power conferred on the President to be exercised in furtherance of public interest and not by way of victimisation for inconvenient decisions given by a High Court judge' (p. 460).\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. in this context has observed that 'the nature of judicial process is such that under coercive winds the flame of justice flickers, faints and fades. The still small voice is smoothened by subjective tirbulations and anxieties and, if coerced, trembles to objectify law and justice. The true judge is one whose soul is beyond purchase by threat or temptation, popularity or prospects'. At another stage it is observed that 'environmental protection of the judicial echelons from executive influence, by transfer or other deterrent, is in public interest'. Coupled with this is the view expressed that 'considering the great inconvenience, hardship and possibly a slur which transfer from one High Court to another involves the better view would be to leave the judges untouched and take other measures to achieve the purpose pleaded, namely, national integration'. Transfer thus casts slur. If, therefore, a judge is transferred because he is involved in local factious atmosphere o~ has a circle of favourities and disfavou'rities it would be obviously by way of punishment and would cast a slur and stigmatise the judge.\n\nMr. Seervai pointed out that while conceding in the majority view that transfer involves a slur, the illustrations given by Chandrachud, J., clearly show that transfer in such situa- .tions would be by way of punishment. Power conferred by Article 222 (1), (rankly, cannot be exercised with a view to punishing the judge. It can only be exercised in public interest for achieving some larger public good. But it was urged that if a judge is not guilty of high misdemeanour sufficient to impeach him but behaves in a manner which brings administration of justice into disrepute a transs.P. OUPTA v. U~ION (Desai, J.) 1113\n\nfer which with a view to uprooting him from an atmosphere in which he has become inconvenient, would be to the good of that judge and in the interest of purity of administration of justice and such a transfer cannot be said to cast a slur of stigma on the judge concerned.\n\nOn an earlier occasion this view appealed to me.\n\nIn my judgment in Mr. Sheth's case, I observed in this behalf as under :\n\n\"I specifically asked Mr. Seervai, taking cue from his Sir Cliimanlal Setalvad Lecture titled 'Tipping the Scales' where he refers to 'reigning favourite' that there is a judge in the High Court. He i.s a very competent judge. But he has developed certain local angularities which have vitiated the court's atmosphere. He is a good judge and the drawback is not so grave to call for his impeachment; what was. required was to free him from local peculiar undesirable influence. Would not his transfer solve the problem to the satisfaction of all.\n\nHe was asked whether he would not mind being transferred. He candidly said 'No'. How is the problem to be solved ? Transfer of such a judge is in public interest, cannot be gainsaid. He is not willing to be transferred and he would not give his consent. If the power to transfer is further limited by reading into ·\n\nArticle 222 the words 'with his consent' by process of interpretation, Article 222 becomes a constitutional deadwood. He cannot be transferred. He cannot be continued at that place, and there is no tangible sufficient proof for impeachment. Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report, Vol. I, p. 99 rejected a transferable cadre of High Court Judges. But Mr. Seervai in his lecture observed that the Commission did not consider separately 'whether the power to transfer a Judge would not in the last resort be used as a remedy for an admitted evil (p. 118). Then there must be power in s0me one to transfer the Judge albeit without his consent. And if we read down the Article as suggested there is no way out. Mr. Seervai said that the resultant situation is that there are two public interests in the field and they appear to be in conflict with each other, to wit\n\n(i) transfer of a judge without his consent by a litigant, namely, executive would undermine judicial independence which is a cardinal feature of the Constitution;\n\n1114 SUPREMll COURT RllPORTll\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nand (ii) image of dame. justice would be tarnished 'unless the Judge is transferred-so as to. save him from the undesirable environmental influence affecting his integrity. The answer is that the Court, in such a situation; must determine the dominant public interest and give precedence to it over the . confliciing subservient interest which must give way. Said Mr. Seervai, tolerate the situation rather than undermine judicial inde-\n\n- pendence by compulsory transfer by the Executive. It often happens that the principles when pushed, to logi- '- cal end lead to two irreconcilable positions. In such a\n\n conflict choice has to be made. Cardozo in his Nature of Judicial Process (p. 40-41) vividly describes. this conflict by saying that force of logic of one should prevail . . over the other, and the choice is made by the judicial inind born of its conviction that the one to be selected , . would lead to justice. in the end, the principle which , is thought to be most fundamental to represent the Iar-\n\n1. ger and deeper social interests must put its competitors to fight. Approaching from this angle, he said, if you cannot . impeach the judge, tolerate but you cannot transfer him without his consent becanse that 1 . would impinge upon the higher public interest, namely, independence of judiciary and would nullify the cardinal feature of the Constitution.\"\n\n,; But on deeper thinking l believe that selective transfer . of individual judge for something improper in his' behaviour or . conduct would Fcertainly cast a slur or attach a stigma and would leave .such indeli- .. hie mark on the character of the judge that even in the High Court to which he is transferred he would be shunned and the consumers of justice-would have little or no faith in his judicial integrity •. This is an inevitable outcome of selective transfer on the ground of some improper.streak in the conduct or behaviour of the judge. It is true G that the procedure for impeachment is rather . very cumbersome and it ought to be so because the ultimate power to impeach rests with the Parliament. ·. Alld in. a .Parliamentary democracy the 'e:i:ecutive . which controls a majority in Parliament would. be able to carry out the threat of impeachment. •It may .be, as was urged, that the judge\n\n, H may behave fn an impeccable manner but there are others functioning in the Court who would render judge's task of judicial justic~ . ,, ' .\",.' ';.. ... . . . ~- .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1115\n\nimpossible. I fail to see bow transfer of such a weak and indecisive judge unable to controi his relations, friends or associates would be better of by transfer.\n\nSociety would dub him a weak and imbecile judge. One thing i~, therefore, certain that the power conferred by Art. 222 (I) cannot be exercised with a view to punishing the judge for anything improper in bis behaviour or conduct.\n\nWhat a deep resentment and consequential character assassination a High Court judge suffers by such selective transfer can be gauged from the reaction of Shri M. M. Ismail. former Chief Justice of Madras High Court who resigned only because according to him. the transfer was by way of punishment and casts stigma on his judicial poise and bearing. \"Law Minister in his highly controversial circular dated March 18, 1981, has stated that 'to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendeneies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations', some fresh steps are required to be taken. Transfer to achieve such objects may apparently be in public interest.\n\nTherefore, whenever the transfer answers to some objective norms even if it causes personal inconvenience and hardship, it Ci!n be said to be in public interest.\n\nBut the transfer of a judge noi answering to any objective norms but selectively made and founded upon complaints and grievances relatable to the conduct or behaviour of the judge would certainly cast stigma or slur and would be by way of punishment and that cannot be inflicted by exercise of power under Art. 222 (!). If transfer can be efft.>cted because there are complaints and grievances against a judge of a High Court on account of his behaviour or conduct it would permit the executive after going through the process of consultation to rotate inconvenient judges and this rotation causes such character assassination. on one band and hardship and inconvenience on the other that it will be sufficient to drive out even a strong willed judge. Therefore, a transfer on account of any complaint or grievance against a judge referable to his conduct or behaviour is impermissible in exercise of power under Art. 222 (!)~\n\nOne more submission may be examined here. It was contended that upon a true construction of Art. 222(1 ), a proposal for transfer cannot be initiated by the Chief Justice of India, it can only be initiated by the President because the Chief Justice of India is the 'consultee'. The power of transfer is conferred on the President and it can be exercised after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Chief Justice of India is thus the constitutional functionary to be consulted. Would initiation of a proposal for transfer c:maMting from the Chief Jqtice of India1 a constitqtion; d fqn9-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.a.\n\ntionary required to be consulted, by itself vitiate the proposal'? In other words, can it be said that Art. 222 (I) envisages proposal for transfer to be initiated by the President alone and after due del iberation and consultaion with the Chief Justice of India the proposal can be carried out if deemed proper or be dropped ? Undoubtedly the power is in the President to transfer and as a pre-condition the Chief Justice is required to be consulted. But on that account alone it cannot be said that the Chief Justice of India cannot initiate the proposal. Where power to do a thing is vested in a certain constitutional functionary it is immaterial who draws the attention of the constitutional fun.ctionary, the repository of power, for exercise of the same. If the power is exercised after fulfilling all the pre-conditfons, the mere fact that somebody irivited the repository of power to exercise power which may tantamount to • saying that someone initiated the proposal for exercise of the power, such initiation of proposal would not l; ie unconstitutional or contrary to the constitutional mandate. The only caution that must be required to be administered is and it has assumed importance in this case, that if Chief Justice of India who is the authority to be consulted in respect of a proposal for transfer himself becomes the initiator of the proposal, the whole process of consultation must move in such a manner as to ensure that the President who is invited to exercise the power at the instance of the Chief Justice of India has to apprise himself of all relevant considerations and has to fully inform himself of all the aspects of the matter and then the power is to be exercised.\n\nWhen in Mr. Sheth's case it was said that while consulting the Chief Justice of India the President must make the relevant data available to him on the basis of which he can offer to the President the benefit of his considered opinion, the process ould have to be reversed when the Chief Justice of India is the initiator of the proposal for transfer. It would be the constitutional obligation of the ChiefJustice of India to place all relevant data and material having an impact on the fina.1 verdict before the Persident and the President in his turn must apprise himself of all the relevant considerations. If there are either grey or blurred areas, it would be the donstitutional obligation of the President to call ·for necessary information from the Chief Justice of India who being the initiator of the proposal must. have considered all of them and having brought to bear upon the subject his mature consideration must have initiated the proposal and after all the relevant data thus supplied, including the missing links, if any, as required by the President, the President may either exercise the\n\n11.r. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J;) 1117\n\npower '.or on mature consideration may decline to exercise the power.\n\nCollection of i; elevant material, public interest involved, and the decision recommending transfer must precede the proposal and the same must accompany the proposal. A bald proposal unaccompanied by relevant material and the reasons for proposing transfer and total absence of public interest sought to be served by the proposal would certainly not satisfy the constitutional mandate of Art. 222 (I}. The fulfilment of the constitutional obligation in this back1, round would be on the Chief Justice of India and the performance by the President of his duty to elicit all facts which are necessary to arrive at an appropriate conclusion are parts of the same process and are complementary to each other. But with this pre•caution, who initiates the proposal is irrelevant. In this context, however, my attention was drawn to a passage in my judgment in Gujarat High Court in Mr. Sheth's case which gives an impression that the President alone can initiate the proposal. In paragraph 140 it is stated that : 'it is not for a moment suggested that the proposal for transfer must emanate from the Cllief Justice That is not expected and it is bound to emanate from the. President. The process for inception of the proposal is not to be reversed. Such a thing may also be open to objection and the reason is apparent'.\n\nAt first blush this passage gives an impression that upon its true construction Art. 222 (I) precludes anyone except the President of Inch to initiate the proposal for transfer and that in any case the Chief Justice of India cannot inititiate the proposal. The observation was in the context of a submission that exercise of power of transfer by the executive would be subversive of independence of judiciary and that in order to eliminate arbitrary exercise of power conferred on the President the Court must so construe Art. 222 (1) that the proposal for transfer must originate with the Chief Justice of India. The submission presently examined is exactly the converse but answering the submission before the High Court it was observed that in order to ensure independence of judiciary it is not obligatory that a proposal for transfer must emanate from the Chief Justice of India.· The passage, therefore, must be •ead in this light.\n\nSumming up the discussion, following propositions emerge both on principle and authority.\n\nWhile testing the validity or otherwise of an order of transfer of a High Court judge made by the President in exercise of the power conferred by Art. ~22 (I)~ below. mentioned tests will have; ~Q '2~ applied:. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982],2 s.c.R.\n\n(i) power to transfer a Judge of High Court is conferred on the President which as part of the executive function of the President he would, in view of Art. 74, discharge according to the aid and advice received by him from the Council of Ministers ;\n\n(ii) the power to transfer a High Court Judge thus is in the executive which is the litigant in a very large number\n\nof cases coming before a Judge of a High Court ;\n\n(iii) the power to transfer a High Court Judge is extra\n\nordinary power ;\n\n(iv) the limitation on the exercise of power is a full, effective and meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of India;\n\n(v) the power to transfer can be exercised only in public interest and not according to the whim, caprice or fancy of the executive or to remove an inconvenient udge not toeing its line ;\n\n(vi) the consultation to be effective must be focussed upon such very personal factors as the family problems of the judge, which include the position of his wife and children and parei; its, the reasons for transfer whether the transfer is actuated on account of anything in the conduct or behaviour of the judge, whether the injury, inconvenience and difficulties experienced by the judge consequent upon his transfer are such as to be inconsequential in view of the larger public interest f c r which the transfer is being ordered ;\n\n(vii) would the transfer cast a slur or stigma on the judge proposed to be transferred?;·\n\n(viii) the policy universally followed till 1976 of not transferring a judge of High Court without his consent is being shelved for achieveing some larger public interest or the so-called public interest is 3 Qloii.k or devici.i to .strike at all inoon- Ye!lient judge. :\n\n1.-\n\n.... -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (D€sai, J.J 1119\n\n(ix) is the transfer intende\\i to inflict punishment for misbehaviour not of adequate magnitude to invoke proceedings analogous to impeachment as contemplated by Art. 124 (4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968?\n\nThe allegations made and coun.tered in this group of petitions may be examined on the touchstone of aforementioned well settled propositions so as to reach an affirmative conclusion one way or the other, whether the order dated January 19, 1981. transferring Shri K.B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna as Chief Justice, Madras, is constitutionally valid or otherwise. ·\n\nFactual averments are set out in petitions as well as numerous affidavits filed in the course of hearing of these petitions. Two important affidavits are Shri K.B N. Singh, dated, September 16, 1981, and counter affidavit of the Chief Justice of India dated September 29, 1981.\n\nShrl K.B.N.Singh filed on Octoher 16, 1981, an affidavit in reply to the affidavit of the Chief Justice of India. It is rather unfortunate that there is divergence between the affidavits of Shri Singh and the affidavit of the Chief Justice of India but the painful and agonising task of searching where the truth lies is spread by the stand taken by Shri Singh's learned counsel, Dr.\n\nSinghvi, that he would not refer to any divergence between these affidavits and base his submissions on the points on which they converge. The only difficulty we experienced is that in the course of discussion some queries emerged and had to be left at that stage because Mr. Parasaran, learned Solicitor-General to whom we addressed our queries, frankly confessed his inhability to help because he did not appear for the.Chief Justice of India.\n\nIn Mr .\n\nSheth's case the Chief Justice on India appeared through counsel his did not file his affidavit.\n\nIn this case Chief Justice of India filed but affidavit but did not appear through counsel to assist the Court. We are therefore, left to fend for ourselves. But let it be made distinctly clear that the affidavit of Chief Justice of India would be looked upon as setting out the truth, and is entitled to undiluted respect\n\nI befitting the dignity of his office.\n\nShri K.B.N. Singh has filed as many as four affida.vits. It is\n\nnot necessary to recapitulate the averments in , these affidavits. The broad allegations which have a bearing 011 tl:ie i&sues under discusion may be briefly stated.. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nIn his first affidavit dated September 7, 1981, the only averment worth referring to it that he had not at any titne consented to his transfer to Madras and that no reasons, grounds, questions or materials necessitating or justifying his transfer from Patna to Madras were ever disclosed to him or discussed with him by the President of India or the Government of India or by the Chief Justice of India.\n\nHe also states that it was not possible for him to give consent to his transfer on account of a compelling personal problem, namely, that his mother of advanced age is staying with him and she is seriously ailing and bed-ridden for over two years and who is not in a position to be moved out of Patna without risk to her life and is not in a position to leave her alone.\n\nCoupled with this affidavit there was a request that from the array of respondents he may be transposed as petitioner 3, which request was granted.\n\nConsequent upon transposition of Shri K.B.N. Singh as petitioner 3, detailed amendments to the petition preferred by two advoc:ates, would have been inevitable. With a view to avoiding the same, Shri K.B.N. Singh was given liberty to file a detailed affidavit setting out therein all his contentions. Pursuant to this liberty . reserved in his favour he has filed a detailed affidavit dated September 16, 1981, inter alia, contending that in February 1980, the Chief Justice oflndia visited Patna for inaugurating International Rotary Conference. The fact that such a conference was held on 23rd and 24th February 1980 and that it was inaugurated by the Chief Justice of India is not disputed but what is controverted is that the visit was not specifically for the purpose of inaugurating Conforence but it was an official visit incidental to which the invitation to inaugurate the confernce was accepted. Shri Singh then proceeds to state that during this visit the Chief Justice of India did not give him any inkling of a proposal to transfer him. This is admitted by the Chief Justice of India saying that at that time no proposal for transfer of Shri Singh was even mooted and, therefore, there was no question of giving him any inkling in this behalf. Shri Singh then proceeds to state that on January 5, 1981, for the first time he received a telephonic message from the Chief Justice of India that as Shri M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of Madras was proposed to be transferred to Kerala, in the consequential uacancy in the office of Chief Justice, Madras, Shri Singh was proposed to be-transferred. -Shri Singh enquired why he was being transferred to Madras and the Chief Justice of India said that it was 'Qovernment policy'. The fact that there was such a telephonic\n\n. ~\n\n\\ -.t\n\ns.i>. GUPTA .... UNION (Desai, i.) • 1121\n\nconversation between Shri Singh and the Chief Justice of India on January 5, 1981, is admi.tted _and also that during this conversation there was reference to 'Government policy' bearing on the question of transfor was also referred to.\n\nWhat is disputed is thatfor; the proposed transfer 'Government policy' was not the only reason:given by the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of India in his counter-affidavit has stated that over and above referring to Goyernment policy, Shri Singh was informed that it was proposed fo transfer Chief Justice M.M. Ismail from Madras and it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place. Shri Singh then asserts that he informed the Chief Justice of India that his mother who lives with him was seriously ill and bed-ridden and was not in a position to be moved from Patna without risk to her life.\n\nThis is admitted. The additional averment of Shri Singh that he also stated certain other compelling and personal circumstances and difficulties was disputed and denied.\n\nUndoubtedly the further averment of Shri Singh that despite all these difficulties, if his transfer is insisted upon he might be compelled to resign and such a statement having been made by him in the telephonic conversation is admitted by the Chief Justice of India. ShriSingh was also informed that the Chief Justice of India has taken note of the difficulties mentioned by him and that it would be taken into consideration before a final decision was t'aken. The Chief Justice of India also requested Shri Singh . during this conversation to come over to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer. Shri Singh further avers that he reached Delhi three or four days after this telephonic conversation and according to Chief Justice of India Shri Singh came to Delhi on January 8, 1981, and met him at his residence. There is some divergence on the ques- . tion as to the duration of time for which Shri Singh was with the Chief Justice of India. According to Shri Singh he was with CJiief Justice of India for IO to 15 minutes while according to Chief Justice of India he was with him for a period much 'longer than 10 to 15 minutes.\n\nDuring this discussion according to Shri Singh the Chief Justice of India was non-committal in the matter of Shri Singh's transfer.\n\nShri Singh proceeded to tell the Chief Justice of India during this conversation at the residence of the latter that it was pos- . sible that baseless complaints which are the bane of Bihar might have been made to him and if so, he would like to remove any wrong impression that might have been created. Even after this suggestion, according to Shri Singh, the Chief Justice of India did not put any question or material to him which necessitated or justified his transfer .• The version given by the Chief Justice of India in his counter-\n\n1122 •\n\n . SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.lt.\n\naffidavit is that the question of Shri Singh's mother's illness was discussed and the Chief Justice of India disclosed his inability to agree ... with Shri Singh 1hat there were no other dependable persons . in his' . . family who. could lookafter his mother and it was . pointed out that Shri s, B. N. Singh, the brother of Shri Singh who was a practising advocate in the Patna High Court was quite .capab!e'of looking after the mother. The Chief Justice of India admits that during this discussfon Shri Singh pointed out that it was possible that some baseless . ·:complaints may have been made to him (Chief Justice of India} and ·\n\n'that he (Shri Singh) would like to remove any _wrong impression which those complaints may have created .. On . this reference being made by Shri Singh the Chief Justice of India told him that he did not go by baseless complaints, that he did not believe that his (Shri Singh's) conduct was blameworthy, but that if he wanted to explain .. any matter, which according to him had created.dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court he wa8 free to do so. The Chief Jus- .. : tice of india further states. that during this. conversation Shri Singh\n\ntold him how certain persons connected with the High Court were · influenced by.communal considerations and how he; on his own part, did not permit communal or any other extraneous considerations to influence him administrativeiy or judicially •. The Chief Justice. of . India further states that he (Chief Justice of India} assured Shri\n\nSingh that . he did not hold that he (Shri Singh} hims; lf was to . blame but that certain persons were exploiting their pft'.l'ximity to.him which bad created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction • • Number of grounds have been stated by Shri Singh in this affidavit but these of which notice may be taken are that the transfer. is without consent which according to him is impermissible, and that. the> consultation was not full, effective and meaningful in that the relevant considrations were not taken into a'.ccount, no verification of facts was made and there was no relevant consideration for coming\n\n• ' • c • , to a fair and considered conclusion that such a transfer would be in public interest. One additional ground is that the impugned :order _of transfer is punitive in character. Further, the transfer caused 'injury and the injury is inflicted without . following' the principles of atural justice, and the transfer is not shown to be in public iD.ierl!st.\n\nH_:\n\nChief Justice of India filed his counter-affidavit dated Septem her 29, 1981. Shri Singh filed reply to the counter-affidavit on dcto~ ber 16, 1981. In between there are two affidavits, oneofShri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretry, Department of Justice, Ministry. of Law,\n\n. -\\_ .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. ui-dON (Desai, J.) ni3\n\nJustice and Company Affairs, being counter-affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, and the other by Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of India, specifically claiming privilege against disclosure of certain documents called for by Shri Singh.\n\nBy an order made by this Court, the Union of India was called upon to disclose all relevant documents, notings, etc. bearing on the question of transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh.\n\nPursuant to this order a file was submitted to this Court containing the correspondence between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister, Chief Justice of India and the Prime Minister, and a letter from Shri M. G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu to Law Minister.\n\nThe evidence furnished by the correspondence may have to be evaluated, appreciated, analysed and examined along with the averments made in various affidavits. The correspondence has to be read in juxtaposition with the averments in the affidavits so that the clear picture of fact situation may emerge which may assist in disposing of the contentions raised by Shri Singh.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India-wrote to the Law Minister on December 7, 1980.\n\nThis is a fairly long letter, part of which refers to filling in the vacancies in the Supreme Court which may be ignored as being wholly irrelevant for the present purpose. The next subject discussed is confirmation of Acting Chief Justices one of whom is Shri K. D. Sharma, then Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court and the recommendation is that he should be confirmed. There is a reference to Justice Murti Bahauddin-Farooqi, then Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir. The ecommendation bearing on the question of -::onfirmation of Justice Farooqi as Chief Justice is not relevant but as we are dealing with the transfer and as the proposal has emanated from the Chief Justice of India, what were the relevant considerations present to the mind of the Chief Justice of India on the question of transfer have a vital bearing on the final outcome and, therefore, that part of the letter which recites a recommendation for transfer of Justice Farooqi can be taken into account.\n\nThis is being referred to for a very limited purpose as to the overall view of the letter, the approach of the Chief Justice of India, the permeating flavour in the letter that the transfer is consequent upon some\n\n1024 SUPREME cotJR'i' REPORTS [19S2j 2 s.c.l.\n\ninquiries in respect of complaints against various Chief Justices and this bas .a vital bearing on the topic of transfer. Viewed from this angle, the statement in this letter that several complaints have been received against Mr. Farooqi, some of which, on verification, seem well-founded, bas a direct nexus to the recommendation that Mr.\n\nJustice Farooqi, then Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir should be transferred as a puisne judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. As would be pointed out later, indisputably the transfer was a direct consequence of complaints found well-founded on verification and, therefore, the transfer was directly and irrevocably related to the conduct of Justice Farooqi.\n\nTh t: Chief Justice of India then proceeds to state in unmistakable terms as under which is very very relevant\n\n\"Though I am firmly opposed o a wholesale transfer of the Chief Justices of High Courts, I take the view, which I have expressed from time to time, that such transfers may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons. Personal considerations must, in the matter of such transfers, be wholly kept out. The transfer of some of the Chief Justices has been engag- . ing my attention for the past few months. I have made personal inquiries in this behalf and have met several lawyers and many judges of the concerned High Courts.\n\nOn the basis of the data which I have collected and which I have considered with the greatest objectivity, I am of the opinion that the following transfers may be\n\nmade\". ·\n\nProceeding further in the letter the Chief Justice of India recommends transfer of Sbri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan as Chief Justk:e of Kerala consequent upon the vacancy caused in the office of Chief Justice of Kerala by elevation of tbe then incumbent of office to the Supreme Court of India. In thevacancy caused by the transfer of Shri K. D. Sharma in the Rajasthan High Court, the recommendation was that. Shri K B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna\n\nHigh Court be trasferred and posted as Chief Justice of Rajastban High Court and Shri Syed Sarwar Ali, seniormost puisne judge of the\n\nPatna High Court should be appointed as Acting Chief Justice of\n\nPatna High Court. On the transfer of Shri Farooqi, Acting Chief Justice of J.ammu & Kashmir High Court, Mr. Justice Mobllmmad\n\n' =\\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1125\n\nHamid Hussain of the Allahabad High Court was to be promoted - and posted as Chief Justice of Jammu _& Kashmir High Court. Then follows a paragraph which must be extracted :\n\n\"That leaves for consideration the question of appointment of permanent Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court. I am fairly satisfied that Chief Justice Satish Chandra should be transferred from .the High Court of Allahabad, but I do not want to express any final opinion on this question until! I ascertain for myself the state of affairs in Allahabad. For that purpose I will be going to Allahabad on December 31.\n\nDuring my three days' stay at Allahabad, I will be meeting various members of the Allahabad Bar as also the Judaes of that High Court. In case T advise the transfer of Justice Satish Chandra, he can be appointed as the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court.\n\nThat will create a vacancy in the_ office of the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for which a suitable recommendation can be made later. Justice Satish Chandra's transfer to Patna, in case it is necessary, may be made any time after January 15,\n\n1981 \".\n\nThis letter thus involves the transfer of Acting Chief Justice Mr.\n\nFarooqi, Mr. Justice M.H. Hussain, Acting Chief Justice Mr. K.D.\n\nSharma, Chief Justice Mr. K.B.N. Singh and a near certain transfer of Chief Justice Mr. Satish Chandra.\n\nLeaving aside others, one incontrovertible fact may be noticed here that prior to December 7, 1980, when a firm proposal was made for transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan High Court, there was neither a whisper or discussion between . Chief Justice of India and Shri Singh concerning his transfer. The proposal to transfer Shri Singh is a firm proposal not a tentative one because the tentative suggestion couched in a different language is in repect of Shri Satish Chandra, Chief Justice of Allahabad.\n\nAs far as Shri K.D. Sharma, Acting ChiefJustice of Rajasthan, Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna, Shri Farooqi, Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir, and Shri M.H. Hussain, Judge of Allahabad High Court, are concerned, there was a firm proposal\n\n1126 SUPREME COUil! RllPOllTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R\n\nand it would mean that before making such a firm proposal the Chief Justice of India must have taken all aspects bearing on the question of transfer into consideration b. cause of transfer such high constitutional functionaries as Judge or a Chief Justice of a High\n\nCurt is to be made after collecting relevant material, cool deliberation, mature consideration and as an absolute necessity. If the\n\npropos~I to transfer Shri Singh was thus a firm proposal which if the President had accepted without further question as it was coming from the highest in the judiciary, the Chief Justice of India, and Shri Singh was transferred, ex facie the validity of the transfer would be open to serious question in view of the ratio in Mr. Seth's case. Within 24 hours before the ink was dry on th~ first letter the\n\nChief Justice of India, whose attention was drawn to serious error in proposing transfer of Acting Chief Justice Shri K.D. Sharma from Rajasthan to Kerala High Court by telephonic conversation, immediately went back on the proposal. It transpii-es from the corres pondence that the Law Minister drew the attention of he Chief Justice of India that if Shri K.D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan was transferred as Chief Justice of Kerala High Court, he would become Chief Justice over six judges of Kerala High Court who were senior to him by length. It was pointed out that Shri Sharma was inducted as a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in in 1973 while the seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court Shri P. Stihramania Poli was inducted in the High Court in 1969 and that there were five other judges along with Mr. Poti who were inducted into the High Court prior to 1973: If te proposal of the Chief Justi<:e of India was implemented, a fairly junior judge would become Chief J.ustice over his seniors, a thing which would be seriously resented as the imposition would be utterly unjustified, destroying ruthlessly the natural expectations of judges who had accepted Hi1gh Court judgeship between 1969 and 1973. It appears this very relevant aspect was completely overlooked while making the recommendation for the transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma to Kerala High Court. This faux pas on being brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India was rightly accepted saying that the Chief\n\nJustice of India \"did not realise that as many as six judges of the Kerala High Court are senior to Justice Shri K.D. Sharma and that makes it necessary to think abont the matter d:fresh\"; and, therefore, by letter dated December 8, 1980, the proposai to transfer Shri K.D. Sharma as Chief Justice of Kerala was. cancelled and in supersession of that proposal a fresh proposal was submitted that\n\nShri K.D. Sharma be transferred to Sikkim and Shri M.M.S; Gujral,\n\n... _ ......\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1127\n\nthe then Chief Justice of Sikkim be transferred as Chief Justice Kerala. Even Mr. Gujral was inducted as a High Court judge five months later than Mr. Poti. This fact was not considered important enough in making the proposal. The other proposals contained in the letter dated December 7, 1980, were reaffirmed which would imply that Shri K.B.N. Singh's proposed transfer from Patna to Rajasthan High Court was to be ordered.\n\nThe next letter dated December 18, 1980, by Chief Justice of India to Law Minister reveals one more fact that before the letter dated December 8, 1980, intimating the cancellation of poposal of transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma to Kerala High Court reached appropriate quarters, the proposal was already processed to the Prime Minister who appears to have approved the same and this becomes evident from a recital in the letter dated December 18,\n\n1980, that having communicated one proposal to the Prime Minister in regard tJ the appobtment of Kerala Chief Justice (Shri K.D.\n\nSharma) consequent upon the impending elevation of the then Chief Justice to Supreme Court, it was some what awkward to withdraw that proposal especially sine~ the Prime Minister was inclined to agree to that proposal.\n\nPossibly with a view to apprising the Prime Minister as to the circumstances necessitating withdrawal of the proposal, on the same day a letter was addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Prime Minister in which it was stated that while recommending transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma as Chief Justice of Kerala High Court. he had overlooked that Justic~ Shri KD. Sharma is junior to as many six judges of the Kerala' High Court and, therefore, his trans fer to that High Court was bound to invite a great amount of public criticism and it would also create administrative problems in the way of Justice Sharma himself.\n\nOne other aspect in this letter worth noticing is that the Chief Justice of India informed the Prime\n\nMinister that he was trying to explore the possibility of recommending the appointment of the seniormost puisne judge of the Karnataka High Court, Shri K. Bhimiah, as Chief Justice of Kerala High Court In the penultimate paragraph of the letter the Chief Justice of India reiterates that the other proposals, for example, the proposal of transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court to Sikkim and the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief\n\n1128 sUtREMB COUkT REPORTS (1982J s.C.R.\n\nJustice of Patna High Court to Rajasthan High Court . may await further consideration. The underlined portion of the letter extracted herei111 would show that the proposal to transfer Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh to Rajasthan was likely to be reviewed and reconsidered and, therefore, the proposal itself may become tentative.\n\nBut the next letter to which presently a reference would be made would show that the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh was certain, only the station may be reconsidered.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India wrote to the Law Minister on December 20, 1980, that is, two days after the letter to the Prime Minister that having given the matter his most anxio.us consideration, he :proposed, in supersession of the previous proposals made by him, that Shri M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court should be appointed as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and in the: consequential vacancy caused in the office of the Chief Justice of Madras High Court Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna be transferred as Chief Justice of Madras. A further proposal was that Shri Syed Sarwar Al~, seniormost puisne judge in the Patna High Court should be appointed as Acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. . There ends the correspondence.\n\nThe correspondence bearing on the question of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, commencing from December 7, 1980, and ending with the letter dated December 20, 1980, has been disclosed.\n\nThere is no contemporaneous written evidence bearing on this topic either in the form of memorandum or notings. This becomes explicit from the following paragraph in the statement made on behalf of Union of India by the learned Solicitor-General on November 12, 1981. Relevant paragraph in the statement reads as under:\n\n\"Except the material brought on. record by the vario\\js affidavits filed on behalf of the Government of India in the case, the correspondence already disclosed and the notings submitted to this Hon'ble Court with a claim of privilege, there are no mlnutes recorded as to any conversation between the Chief Justice of India and the Union of India.\n\nNo other data is available except what is in the above records\"\n\n(underlining mine)\n\nJ • -\n\ns.P.'GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) Jl29\n\nAffidavits refer 'to telephonic conversation of Chief Justice of India with Mr. Singh on January 5, 1981, and the meetting between the two on January 8, 1981., File of notings was shown to the Court. Dr. Singhvi submitted that if there is any relevant material bearing on the question of transfer of Shri Singh it must be dis closed and consistent with our order for disclosure we would have been duty bound to disclose it. The fact that after perusing the file we did not direct disclosure permits the irresistible inference that the notings did not contain any relevant material. Therefore a fortiori it follows that, except the correspondence disclosed there is no contemporaneous written record, nor notings or minutes of telephonic communication relevant to transfer of Shri Singh.\n\nAnd it would be imprudent to hold that such serious , issue with forebodings of resignation is left to oral discussion between two high constitutional functionaries to be conjured up by tapping memory as to what transpired.\n\nSuch an approach would expose high constitutional functionary like Chief Justice of a High Court without remedy, reprieve and relief. ~\n\nDisclosed correspondence thus being the only source of what happened during two weeks commencing from December 7, 1980, and ending with the letter dated December 20, 1980, has to be minutely albeit dispassionatley and objectively scanned. During the fateful period five Chief Justices and one puisne judge were proposed to be transferred. They include Chief Justices K.D. Sharma (Rajasthan), K.B.N. Singh (Patna), M .M.S. Gujral (Sikkim), Acting Chief Justice Farooqi (J & K), Chief Justice M.M. Ismail (Madras) and Justice M.H. Hussain, a puisM judge of the Allahabad High Court who was to be promoted, transferred and posted as Chief Justice, Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nAnd notice the rotational movement. Shri Sharma was first proposed to be moved from Jodhpur to Ernakulam, i.e. Rajasthan to Kerala, from the\n\nHindi speaking belt to an area where Hindi is hardly welcome, Shri Gujral moves from Sikkim to Ernakulam, that is, from Sikkimese to Malayalam and from extreme norh to down south.\n\nWithin 24 hours the wheel turned almost 180 degrees when Shri Sharma instead of going to extreme south, i.e. Ernakulam in Kerala, is pu&hed to extreme north, Sikkim in the foothills of Himalayas. Shri Singh is first proposed to be sent from Patna to Jodhpur, Rajasthan, both in Hindi speaking belt and then actually\n\nhifted to Madras, Hiil<li to Tamil, seriously objected to by . ' ' . .\n\nB •\n\n• 8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nMr. M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu.\n\nShri Ismail moved from Madras to Kerala not very far. away though from Tamil to Malayalam language area. Shri Farooqi who was first in Kshmir, then sent to Allahabad, brought back to Kashmir,. is proposed to be demoted and sent. to Chandigarh.\n\nShri Mohammad Hamid .Hussain moves from Allahabad to Jammu and Kashmir. The chequered history of this rotational movement spreading over hardly 13 days would hardly satisfy the rigorous test of a mature, objective, dispassionate consideration of the various factors involved in the transfer. This is an the more so because as it will be pointed out a little while latter that the Government of India pm:sibly out of deference to Chief Justice of Indi~, which ought to be the right attitude, had simply abdicated itself and accepted the proposals not for the reasons for which they were made but for entirely contrary and opposite reasons. '\n\nTransfer of Shri Singh is sought to be sustained on the ground that it is not by way of punishment nor on account of misbehaviour or objectionable conduct on his part nor with a view to casting a stigma on him but in larger public interest, namely, that he being an experienced senior Chief Justice, such a person was required to man a premier High Court like the Madras High Court. Does the correspondence bear out this submision ?\n\nThe letter dated December 7, 1980, read as a whole, piecemeal or linewise hardly indicates that Shri Singh was proposed to be transferred bec:ause he was the senior experienced man and a. premier High Court like the Madras High Court would require a senior experienced person. All High Courts are of eql!al irpportance, save that some High Courts have a span of more than a century and others were formed after the independence. When the submission that transfer of Shri Singh was not in public interest is considered, it would be pointed out that when transfer was first .mooted, there was not even :1 remote possibility of Madras High Court requiring a senior experienced judge.\n\nWith this background, if the letter dated December 7, 1980, is read as a whole, an indelible impression is formed on the mind that the governing consideration for recommending transfers was that one or the other Chief Justice had made himself obnoxious on account of complaints against him.\n\nMr. Justice Farooqi's case is iin instance in point and it is incontrovertible that in his case it wa~\n\nS.P; GUPTA v. UNION fDesni, J.) 1131\n\nproposed that he be demoted and transferred from Jammu & Kashmir to Chandigarh because several complaints had been received against him some of which on verification seem well founded. And this is the undertone of the whole letter because it is with reference to Justice Farooqi that the proposals for transfer commenced in the letter. And this is reinforced when one reads the case of Shri Satish Chandra, Chief Justice of Allahabad because it is suggested by the Chief Justice of India that he is fairly satisfied that Shri Satish Chandra should be transferred but that he will formulate the proposal by reaching a decision after a visit to Allahabad when he proposed to meet various members of the Allahabad Bar as also Judges of the High Court to ascertain the state of affairs in Allahabad. If Shri Sa ti sh Chandra is the senior, exeperienced Chief Justice, that aspect is not to be collected by a visit to Allahabad. If some other public interest requires transfer of Shri Satish Chandra, a visit to Allahabad would hardly be enlighttening. If the state of affairs at Allahabad is required to be ascertained a visit is inevita_ble.\n\nThat such a visit was in contemplation is clearly stated and during this visit what was contemplated to be done was a meeting with various members of the Allahabad ' Bar as also Judges of the Allahabad High Court. And this meetinl was for the avowed object of ascertaining the state of affairs in Allahabad which will have a bearing on the proposal to transfer Shri Satish Chandra. Can it be said in all humility that the sequence of events herein .set out would not unmistakably show that the complaints against Shri Satish Chandra have to be examined, the truth or otherwise of it has to be ascertained, the degree of his unacceptability at Allahabad has to be determined and upon all these considerations flowing invariably from complaints againts Shri Satish Chandra, a transfer proposal would be submitted.\n\nAdd to this the statement in the letter dated December 7, 1980, when the chapter on transfers opens that transfers be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons.\n\nIn this connection Chief Justice of India states that he has made personal enquiries in this behalf and has met several lawyers and many judges of the concerned High Courts and on the basis of the data collected during such visit and enquiry which he has considered with greatest.objectivity, he proposed transfers including that of Shri Singh. Therefore, . the transfer is the outcome of enquiries from lawyers and judges, about local atmosphere qua a judge necessitating his transfer. The transfer in such a case would be clearly relatable to the alleged misl;>eh11viour1 if any!\n\nP.r conduct of the judge.\n\nSUPREMB COORT RBPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.C.1l.\n\nReading the letter as a whole and the permeating flavour emerging from it is that the Chief Justice of India believed, truthfully and honestly, but impermissible according to the ratio in Mr. Sheth's case that the transfer in each case was to remove the judge from a certain :place because he had made himself obnoxious and that this cannot be for any other reason except punishment because it has already been pointed out that transfer is more harmful than even punishment. This conclusion is reinforced by a specific, unambiguous assc:rtion extracted herein above that the Chief Justice of India was opposed to the wholesale transfer of Chief Justices of High Courts and that Qis approach was that : 'transfer may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons. Personal considerations .must be wholly kept out in such cases'. Analysing this sentence it would mean that wholesale transfer of Chief Justices referable to an objective norm that the Chief Justices shall always be from outside is not acceptable to the Chief Justice of India. That is his view and he strictly adheres to it. He is, therefore, certainly not proposing transfers as and by way of policy.\n\nIt would be so because in his leading judgment in Mr. Sbetb's case be bas expressed in no uncertain terms that policy transfers on a wholesale basis which .Jeave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one:sided Governmental considerations are outside the contemplation o(, our Constitution. The Chief Justice of India is thus opposed to policy transfers. Therefore, he .is not proposing these transfers by way of policy transfers. The Chief Justice of India is of the view that the transfer may be made in appropriate case, meaning thereby selective transfers. Then be says that it must be for objective rea:ions. These objective reasons may include complaints against the juclge concerned and the complaints, if found to be of substance, transfer may be ordered pursuant to the complaints. Transfers on such complaints can be made and would not be made punitive is also his view in the leading judgment in Mr.\n\nSheth's case. To recall his observation that the 'factious local atmosphere sometimes demands the drafting of a judge or Chief Justice from another High Court and on the rarest of rare occasions which can be counted on the fingers of a hand, it becomes necessary to withdraw a judge from a circle of favourities and non-favourities'.\n\nTransfer for these reasons would, according to the view expressed by Chandr.achud, J. in Mr. Sheth's case, be in public interest. This itself is a moot point. Transfer in appropriate cases not answerable to any objective norms would be selective transfer. But in view of the majority decisio!l iq Mr. $beth's ase, the more objectionable part\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) . l I 33 . is that personal considerations in the matter of such transfers be wholly kept out. If.by personal considerations it is meant the complaints against judge then it becomes tautologous because objective reasons remain unexplained. If by personal considerations what is meant is personal difficulties, inconvenience~,. and hardships of the judge consequent upon. the transfer and if these are to be kept out of consideration, the transfer order becomes bad in view of the ratio in Mr. Sheth's case. Therefore, summing up the whole approach under- . lying the letter by which transfers were first proposed show that all the relevant aspects were not taken into consideration, to wit, proposal to transfer Sbri K. D. Sbarma:\"'to Kerala, that these were not policy transfers because the Chief Justice of India was wholly opposed to policy transfers ; that these were selective transfers in appropriate cases meaning complaints against Mr. Justice Farooqi and the future investigation of complaints against Chief Justice Satish\n\nChandra, and the data collected in coune of enquiry with lawers and judges in respect of other j.udges whose transfer was proposed, that the personal consideration, i.e. the personal inconveniences, hardships and difficulties were to be kept out of consideration, and that the transfers were to be for objective reasons, namely, complaints against the concerned judges, were the governing considerations of the letter and this was operating on the mind of the . Chief Justice of India while proposing the transfers. It may also be recalled here that while deciding the transfers the station to which the man is sent has a relevant consideration because as has been pointed out that some stations are good and some are not so good. And while deciding the station it is n\"ecessary that the personal considerations of the judge may have an important bearing, to wit, education of his children, environmental considerations, availability of medical facility, health of his parents, if any, etc. and all these have to be kept in view in deciding the station to which the judge is proposed to be transferred.\n\nNow, here this aspect seems to have been taken for granted because on December 7, 1980, Shri Sharma was proposed to be sent to Kerala and on the next day be was shifted to Sikkim.\n\nIs there anything comparable between Ernakulam and Sikkim save and. except that tbey form part of India ? Shri Singh was proposed to be transferred first to Jodhpur and t.hen he was shifted to Madras. Now, nothing transpires from the record as to what relevant considerations about , selecting the station qua a judge have weighed with tp<,: C.::hic; f Justice of India while making proposal for transfer,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.11.\n\nOne additional fact which I only propose to mention and not comment upon is that all the relevant considerations were not thoro\n\nughly examined and analysed befc; ire making the proposal and this\n\nbecomt:s apparent from the fact that a very vital consideration that a junior may not be imposed over a senior was wholly overlooked when Mr. K. D. Sharma was proposed to be sent to Kerala because there were six judges senior to Mr. Sharma who would be puisne judges and over whom he would be the Chief Justice.\n\nAnd this is admitt1ed when it is stated that that aspect while making the propo'sal\n\nwas overlooked. This is such a vital consideration that if the proposal had been carried out, it would have admittedly invited a great amount of public criticism and would have resulted in administrative problems in the way of Mr. Justice Sharma himself.\n\nH may be fairly assumed here that at one stage the Chief Justic<: of India considered it necessary in public interest to transfer Mr. Justice Gujral from Sikkim but that proposal was eventually dropped.\n\nThe most serious contention raised by Dr. Singhvi may now be examined. Urged Dr. Singhvi, that before a transfer of a judge is contemplated it is necessary to keep in view his personal problems and it must bl: weighed in relation to the reasons for his transfer.\n\nWbeu a high constitutional functionary like the Chief Justice of India make11 a proposal it is not conceivable tbat the proposal would be made first and the relevant facts bearing on the subject may be collected afterwards and examined and evaluated later on, on a preposition that if it becomes so necessary the proposal may be withdrawn.\n\nThis is not how high constitutional functionaries discharge their constitutional obligations. Article 222 provides for a minimum safeguard 'of a consultation with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nWhat constitute:;. meaningful, purposive and substantial consultation has been set out earlier. It includes within its fold an inquiry into the personal factors of the judge such as the position of his wife, children, , parents, other inconveniences and difficulties that he might experience on transfer. This can be gathered either from the judge concerned or from other reliable sources. But personal inconveniences at best can be gathered from the person himself. ,\n\nThere is not a tittle of evidence that before proposing the transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh from Bihar to Rajasthan on December 7; !9~0 1 '1~ had p~~Jl given even a glimpse\n\n• S.P .. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1135\n\nof his proposed tratlsfr.\n\nThat ls an admitted position. p, fdthing was whispered to him, neither in February 1980 when the Chief Justice o( India paid an official visit to Patna, nor at any time till December 1, 19801 When a firm proposal emanated from the Chief Justice of India and was handed in to the Government of India for being implemented.\n\nIn tbig connection it is stated in the affidavit of the Chief Justice of India that the mother of Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh is old and is not keeping good health was a fact known to him since February 1980. The age and health of the mother, an objective fact if known would by itself hardly be relevant.\n\nThe real -question would be, what is the positionof the mother qua the son •\n\nand how much is she in her old age dependent on the son, and what would be the result of bringing about an estrangement between the two.\n\nThat is a vital consideration not the fact of her age and present health. Till January 5, 1981. during which period two independent proposals emanated from the Chief Justice of India for transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh first to Rajasthan and neict to Madras, not a whisper was made to Shri Singh about the proposed transfer.\n\nAfterall, when a high con 'titutional functionary like the Chief Justice of India makes a proposal how speedly it is prossed at the highest level becomes discernible from the fact that the proposal dated December 7, 1980, passed though the Law Minister to the Prin; e Minister by December 9, 1980, and was approved by the Prime Minister and embarrassment was felt as disclosed by the letter of the Chief Justice of India. dated December 18, 1980, while withdrawing the proposal. The incontrovertible fact situation that emerges from reading the correspondence is that the Chief Justice of India made the proposal for transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh in the letter dated December 7, 1980, reaffirmed it in the letter dated December 8, 1980, described it as tentative by saying that the proposal concerning Shri .K.B.N. Singh may wait further consideration by the letter dated December 18, 1980, and affirmed it to be a firm pro-posal by letter dated December 20, 1980, without whispering a word to Shri K.B.N. Singh.\n\nThe proposal is unaccompanied by necessary relevant facts videncing the relevant , public interest, and it is inevitable that it must be so.\n\nPublic interest 'which necessitates transfer is not stated.\n\nThere is not the slightest reference to the problem of mother of Shri Singh.\n\nMaybe, Chief Justice of India may consider it irrelevant from his standpoint.\n\nBut President is entitled to know every re1evant fact.\n\nAnd barring making proposal till that day no relevant fact is coll~9t~<.t l\\nd even if Chil,!f Justice of\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nIndia had the facts, none were stated in the proposal, Would the Chief Justice of India accept this proposal emanating in this form from President without further inquiry ? He would send for all relevant material which must be the source and foundation for transfer.\n\nShould the President be denied the same considerations ?\n\nAnd Pr1sident says he had no discussion with the Chief Justice of India. It was for the first time in a telephonic talk in the evening of January S, 1981, the Chief Justice oflndia conveyed the proposal for transfer to Shri K.B.N. Singh, By that time two firm pro- • posals, one a tentative and another final were pending with the Government of India. It would be stretching one's credibility to limit to hold that Chief Justice of India postponed talking to Shri Singh 1to a date later than the proposals. Chief JLstice oflndia is an authority to be consulted but instead of being consulted he initiated the proposal.\n\nThe minimum that is expected of him is that. he collect:; all relevant facts, also collects the relevant personal problems of the judge to be transferred, examines appraises and evaluates them from all objective standards keeping in view the possiole\n\ninconvenience and hardship likely to be caused to' the judge and comparable public interest which necessitates transfer and thereafter puts forward the proposal.\n\nWhile discharging such a high constitutional function of either initiating the proposal for transfer or for being consulted for transfer it would be a failure to perform the constitutional duty if the proposal is made first, processed right up to the Prime Minister in one case and collecting of the data is postponed to a later date.\n\nThis is contrary to what Chandrachud, J. has stated in his judgment in Mr. Sheth's case. To _recall, he said that there can be no purposeful consideration of a matter in the absence of facts and circumstances on the basis of which alone the nature of the problems involved can be appreciated and a right decision taken.\n\nThe deciion to be a right decision must follow the c:ollecti:Jn of material and be based on the material and that collection of evidence is not an empty formality, for the record only_.\n\nIt was, however, said that before the proposal was finally imp-. lementeg by the Presidential notification transferring Shri K.B. N. Singh\n\nthem was a full and effective consultation between the Chief Justice of India and the President and that by that time the Chief Justice of ladia was in possession of all the relevant and material facts.\n\nAttention in this cotMX.t was inviteq to a statement in the affidavit\n\n~- ·.\n\ns.1>. GtJl>tA v. UNION (Desai, i.) i131\n\nof the Chief Justice of India that 'there was a full and effective consultation between me and the President of India on the question of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras as Chief Justice of Madras High Court. Every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer'.\n\nWith reference to the statement in affidavit a question was put to Mr. Parasaran, learned Solicitor General as to whether the discussion involved in consultation was personally with the President of India or the expression 'President o( India' means Government of India and the consultation was through proper channel as laid down in the rules of business.\n\nA statement was read over to the Court by Mr. Parasaran, possibly as instructed by the President of India, that at no time the Chief Justice of India had any personal discussion with the President.\n\nTherefore, one has to fall back on the discussion, if any, the Chief Justice of India may have either with the Law Minister who as Minister of Justice. according to the rules . of business would be the proper person to deal with the problem of transfer. It appears more or less the discussion has been by Correspondence. Even a perfunctory knowledge about official correspondence would convince anyone that if there is a continuous correspondence on the subject, every letter would have a reference to the prior letter bearing on the subject. Turning to tlte first letter dated December 7, 1980, in which a proposal is made for transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh from\n\nPatna to Rajasthan, there is not the slightest reference to any earlier discussion oral or in writing between the, Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India on the question of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh.\n\nIt may be that there was some public de bate about the transfer of ' all Chief Justices of High courts pursuant to a policy which was sought to be evolved that the Chief Justices of all High Courts must be from outside the State. This evolving proposal was not acceptable to the Chief Justice of India when be said in the first letter that he is firmly opposed to a who! esale transfer of Chief Justices of High Courts. Then he proceeded to point out transfers may be effected in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons.\n\nHaving settled what ought to be the governing form for transfer the Chief Justice proposed transfer of Acting Chief Justice K.D. Sharma Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh, Acting Chief Justice M.B. Farooqi and Justice M.H. Hussain Recalling the statement in the affidavit that there was full and effective consultation with the President of India prior to transfer, it has to be evaluated in the light of the contemporaneous written evidence in the form of the Itter of the Chief Justice of India dated\n\n1138 stJPtu!ME cOtJR'r ll.EPOll'rS [1982] 2 s.C.tt\n\nDecember 7, 1980. And in the statement on behalf of Union or India dated November 12,. 1981, it is specifically made clear that except the disclosed correspondence and notings !'or which privilege is claimed there are no minutes or notes of discussion. I have shown abovf: that there is no other contemporaneous written record except the correspondence. The first proposal to t_ransfer Shri K.B.N. Singh finds its place in letter dated December 7, J 980. It is an admitted position that prior to that there was no discussion between the Chief Justic1: of India and the Law Minister.\n\nEqually it is an admitted position that Shri K.B.N. Singh was not even whispered that Jt was proposed to transfer him. It is also an admitted position that it was on January 5, 1981, that the Chief Justice of India talked with Shri K.B.N. Singh for the first time in which he broached the subject of transfor of Shri Singh. The inescapable conclusion is that a firm proponal for transfer was submitted to Government as late as December 20, 1980, and about 15 days thereafter Shri' Singh was told for the first time about his proposed transfer and was invited to inform the Chief Justice of India about his' personal difficulties and im:onveniences. Now, the order of transfer is dated January 19, 1981.\n\nIn between Shri Singh met the Chief Justice of India on January 8, 1981, and till the order of trans!'er was notified there is nothing in the correspondence which shows .that there was any further discussion.\n\nThe firm decision was reached on January 8, 1981 it:ielf because it was stated to the court that the Prime Minister approved the proposal of transfer of Shri Singh on January 9, 1981.\n\nIt is reasonable to believe that Law Minister must have processed the proposal on January 8, 1981.\n\nThe meeting between Chief Justice oflndia and Shri Singh took place in the evening on January 8, 1981. This would establish that a firm proposal for transfer was made, processed and approved before collecting all the relevant material which would considerably detract from the validity and efficacy of the proposal.\n\nEven if subsequently gathered facts were communicated to the President, one could have overlooked this apparent defect but the written record does not bear out that the President was informed of all the relevant facts.\n\nOne would have expected in this connection that while making the proposal for transfer, the very letter would, in respect of each judge proposed to be transferred, set out therein as to what were the personal difficulties, what necessitates the transfer, which public interest was likely to bit served by the transfer and all these should find their releva11.t place in the proposal itself.\n\nOral dr telephonic\n\n...\n\n- ....\n\nSJ'. GtJPTA v. UNION (.besai, J.) 1139\n\nconversation while discharging important constitutional function affecting character and dignity of such high constitutional functionary as Chief Justice of a High Court is entirely out of place. The only\n\nrefrence to the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh in the first letter is as under:\n\n\"The transfer of Justice K.D. Sharma will create a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court. I recommend that Justice K.B.N. Singh; who is the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court, should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court.\"\n\nWe struggled hard to find out from this long letter as to what public interest prompted the Chief Justice of India to propose transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh to Rajasthan.\n\nThe later suggestion that Shri Singh's transfer was proposed to subserve the public interest, namely, that he is a senior, experienced Chief Justice needed to preside over a premier High Court will not help because there was no question of sending a senior, experienced Chief Justice to Rajasthan High Court and at the relevant time there was no proposal for transfer of Shri M M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court.\n\nTherefore, some other public interest must have informed the Chief Justice of India to propose transfer of Shri Singh to Rajasthan. What inevitably transpires is that the transfer of Shrj Singh from Patna is certain, reasons and place and public interest may fill in the gap as situation demands. This is neither consultation nor appreciation of relevant facts to satisfy the rigorous test laid down in Mr. Sheth's case.\n\nThere is a further lacuna in th~ process of consultation and it may be briefly mentioned here.\n\nWhile laying down the parameters of the scope of consultation under Article 222 (1), Chandrachud, J. in his leading judgment of the majority view in Mr. Shth's case approved and affirmed the passage in Chandramouleshwar Prasad extracted earlier.\n\nApproving the statement of law contained in the extracted passage, it was said in Mr. Sheth's case that in order that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact, it is essential that each must have for its consideration full and . identical facts, which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal in his mind which is not\n\ni 140 SUPRliAiE COURT REPORTS [l 982j 2 S.C.R.\n\ncommunicated to the proposer, th~ direction to give effect to the counter proposal without anything more cannot be said to have been issued after consultation (pp. 674-675). The question is, whether this test is satisfied.\n\nChief Justice of India unmistakeably asserts that he is opposed to poliey transfers or wholesale transfers of Chief Justices of the High Courts.\n\nHe is of the view that transfers may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons.\n\nIn other words, selective tran_sfers.\n\nPursuant to this view held by him he proposed amongst others the transfer of Sbri K.B.N. Singh. This proposal was to be proceilsed by the executiv1:. It was incumbent upon the e)(ecutive to have requested the Chief Justice of India to put all the materials and relevant facts collected by him for consi ieration of the President.\n\nObviously, pursuant to a caution voiced by Chandrachud, J in Mr. Sheth's case that as a high constitutional functionary like the Chief Justice of High Court was involved all the necessary relevant facts bearing on the que>.tion of transfer must be collected by the Chief Justice of India as this is founded on the principle that in a matter which concerns the judiciary vitally; no decision ought to be taken by the executive without obtaining the views of the Chief Justice of India who, by training and experience, is in the best position to consider the situation fairly, competently and objectively.\n\nIn order to consider 1:very relevant fact in the discharge of this constitutional obligation the Chief Justice of India would be within his right and indeed it is his duty wherever necessary to elicit and ascertain further facts either directly from the judge concerned or fro~ reliable soumes, but thereafter he has voiced a caution that 'the executive cannot and ought not to establish report with the judges which is the function and privilege .of the Chief Justice'.\n\nConsistently with this weighty judicial pronounement the Chief Justice of India alone will have to gather all material and the executive would be well advised to keep hands off the judiciary. Therefore,· whatever material the Chief Justice of India will have, has to be placed before\n\nPresident. The correspondence manifests a woeful lack of any such material being placed before the President. That apart, the Chief Justice of India proposed selective transfers in appropriate cases strictiy for objective reasons.\n\nNow, look at the performance of the executive.\n\nThe executive appears to have accepted the proposal not on merits but out of reverence for the Chief Justice of India which constitutes a complete abdication of its function.\n\nThis\n\n> •\n\nS.l•. OUt>TA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1141\n\nbecomes discernible when in the course of hearing in response to a query m'ade by the Court, the learned Solicitor-Oeneral made a statement on November 12, 1981, which is material for the decision on this point and, therefore, may be extracted hereunder:\n\n\"Throughout the Government had been of the view that as a policy the Chief Justices of the various High Courts should be from outside their states. It is this policy view that was put across to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India expressed that he was opposed to all the Chief Justices of the High Courts being from outside and was keen on transfers to be made in appropriate .cases strictly for objective reasons. It is in . pursuance of this view propounded by the Chief Justice of India that he suggested the transfers covered by the letters which in his view were desirable.\n\nGovernment acceded to the transfers proposed by the Chief Justice of India as (I) it was felt that not agreeing to these transfrs may be construed as though the Government is departing from the view of .having Chief Justices from outside; (2) the policy aspect could still be pressed i71to service later.\" ·\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n- At a later stage of the hearing to a further query by the Court Mr.\n\nParasaran in terms stated that the Government accepted the proposal for transfer not for the reasons which prompted the Chief Justice of India to propose transfers but for .its own reasons. Recalling the test of consultation at this stage set out just hereinabove that if one party makes a proposal to other who has a counter proposal in his mind which is not communicated to the proposer the direction to give effect to the counter proposal without anything more, cannot be said to have been issued after consultation', the proposal was for a selective transfer definitely not in cons<; mance with any policy Government of India may have in contemplation which was firmly opposed and the counter proposal was for policy transfer and. giving effect to the counter proposal without anything more cannot be said to be after consultation. The test of consultation certainly is no.t satisfied because not only two minds have not been able to confer and produce a mutual effect but each did not have full and identical facts and, therefore, the final decision cannot b~ said to be the product of consultation and deliberation.\n\n1142 SlJPllllME COtnl.t lllll'OR.tS [1982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\nA very emotional and passionate appeal was made by Mr.\n\nParasaran to consider these transfers as policy transfers. In the light of the statements hereinabove quoted, the appeal must fall on deaf ears,, for, the Government of India had a policy in embryonic stage and the Chief Justice of India was firmly opposed to any such policy be1:ause he is firmly committed to the view as laid down in his majo:rity judgment in Mr. Sbeth's case that policy transfers on a wholes.ale basis which leave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our constitution. He re-asserts this in his letter dated December 7, 1981.\n\nApart from this; it is impossible to uphold this transfer as a policy transfer. It is no doubt true that laying down of a policy is the fu:nction of the executive.\n\nIf that policy relates to judiciary, ordinarily the executive would be well advised to have full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the highest co1stitutional functionary in the judiciary. The policy has to be evolved and firmly laid. Views expressed do not constitute policy. Now the question is, was there any policy to which these transfers can be related ? The view of the Government as expressed by the Law Minister is that Chief Justice of every High Court shall be from outside his jurisdiction.\n\nMaybe, the Government may lay down such a policy and as and when laid down its constitutional validity may have to be examined.\n\nBut one cannot accord the status of policy to a view expressed by the Law Minister, may be the official spokesman for the Department of Legal Affairs and Justice of th~ Government of India.\n\nWe were not told how a policy is framed and firmly laid down.\n\nBut a view occassionally expressed does not have the trappings of a firmly laid down policy.\n\nAnd it is not in dispute in this case. In the statement extracted hereinabovc made on behalf of the Government of India, the policy question wais to be examined at a later stage.\n\nA reference to the statement of the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1980, upon a calling attention motion on the resolution of the Bar Council of India disapproving Government proposal to appoint seniormost judge of a High Court as Chief Justice of another High Court in the country, may be made. The Law Minister stated as under:\n\n\"The Government has, however, received representatiom; from various quarters urging that as a matter of\n\n..Jj\n\n( \\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1143\n\npolicy the Chief Justice of a High Court should be appoin-\n\n1 ted from outside the jurisdiction of that High Court.\n\nThis matter is actively engaging the attention of the Govern-· ment. Even though Government's thinking has not taken a final shape in the matter, the Government is prima facie of ·\n\nthe view that the proposal by and large merits favourable consideration in the interest of sound judicial administration\n\nand also the independence of the judiciary\".\n\n(Emphasis supplied~.\n\nThis statement would at once reveal that till July 24, 1980, the matter was under consideration of the Government and that the Government's thinking had till then not taken a final shape in the matter. Then as late as September 3, 1981, the Law Minister informed the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs that he had sought views of the Chief Justice of India on the policy of having Chief Justices from outside as that by itself would considerably. improve the functioning of the High Courts.\n\nThe Law Minister further apprised the members of the the approach of the Chief Justice in the matter of transfers and appointments of outsiders. He proceeded to state that final decision in the matter of a policy of transfers was stili to be taken. (underlining mine).\n\nAt any rate, this unmistakable, unambiguous statement of the Law Minister on September 3, 1981,.m:uch after the commencement of hearing in this case in the Court, would remove\n\n- any vestige of doubt that a decision on policy transfers was yet to,\n\nbe taken. There was a view expressed but no policy in July 1980, there was no such policy in January 1981 when Shri K.B.N. Singh was transferred, there was no policy as late as September 3, 1981, when the case was being heard and the statement made to this Court on November Ii, 1981, that the policy aspect could still be pressed into service later on, leave no room for doubt that the impugned transfer was not a policy transfer. Therefore, the transfer of Shri Singh cannot be upheld as a policy transfer. It is rather in this context surprising that the Chief Justice of India while firmly opposing policy transfers in letter dated December 7, 1980, should tell Shri Singh on January 5, 1981, that it was Government policy to transfer judges. And there is nothing to show that between December 7, 1980, and January 5, !980, Chief Justice of India. has veered round to the view of Law Minister because if he had, he ' .\n\n1144 SUPREMll COUR.T RllPOtltS [I 982J 2 s.C.R.\n\ncould have proposed transfer-of a large number of Chief Justices and not confined himself to two only.\n\nIt may be mentioned in passing that there was-a very lively debate about the power of the executive to lay down policy. It is a well.rec:ognised epithet of constitutional wisdom that in constitutional matters the Courts do not decide what is not brought before it nor would it prefer advice except in a reference unde:r:. Art. 143, on the wisdom or validity of a future action. If there is no policy till\n\ntoday it would be unwise to pronounce upon a future policy without knowing what form and shape it would take.\n\nNo carte blanche can be given in this behalf. How dangerous it would be can be illustrated by observing that if the policy were to be laid down by the executive that a judge -of the High Court who decides the matter against the Government will be transferred it would be an objective norm because it can be easily ascertained whether a judge has decided a matter against the Government. Such a policy, if at all laid down, would be complete 'anti-thesis of the independence of judiciary.\n\nTherefore, I refrain from saying anything on the wisdom or validity of what is being proposed as a policy that every Chief Justice must be from outside the state because there is no such policy and as and when it is laid down, if questioned; its validity will have to be examim:d.\n\n0:11e more infirmity urged an~ likely to invalidate the order of transfer may 'DOW be examined. The power to transfer a High Court judge can be exercised only in public interest. In the proposal '-forwarded to the Government by the letter dated December 7, 1980, and the letter dated December 20,\" 1980, for transferring Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh first to Rajasthan and then to Madras, it is nowhere stated what public interest is sought to be served by this transfer.· This assumes importance because both the constitutional functionaries invcilved in the process of consultation are operatin8 on different wave leJagths, to wit, Chief Justice of India for selective transfers, President to buttress the position to evolve a policy in future. In the affidavit it is stated that consequent upon the transfer of Shri M.M. 11\\mail from Madras to Kerala it was necessary to appoint a senior, uxperienced Chief Justice in the Madras High Court. Permanent and senior, experienced Chief Justice from outside to man a.\n\nHigh Court seems to be a phenomenon of recent origin. Ordinarily . the seniormost puisne ju_dge is appointed as Chief Justice. There\n\n-; -\n\n' t\n\n,.... .\n\n- .\n\n~·-\n\ns.f>. OUf>tA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1145\n\nwere, of coutse, some cases in which the Chief Justice was brought from outside and the cases pointed out were of Mr. Justice Das sent to Karnataka, Mr. Justice Sarjoo Prasad going to Rajasthan, and our esteemed . colleague Mr. Justice R.S. Pathak going to Himachal Pradesh. But these cases are few and for between. The norh1al rule of succession has been the seniormost puisne judge becoming the Chief Justice unless he was otherwise found to be unsuisable.\n\nAnd the Chief Justice of India accepts unreservedly just and rightful expe'ctations of the seniormost puisne judge to be promoted as Chief Justice when he suggests that Mr. Poti, seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court will be deprived of his just and rightful expectation to become Chief Justice on the transfer of Shri K.D.\n\nSharma, and therefore, further suggested that Mr. Poti be appointed in a suitable vacancy as Chief Justice but outside Kerala, thereby, of course, denying rightful expectation of the seniormost puisne judge in that High Court. Now, Mr. P.R. Gokulakrlshnan is the seniorm, ost puisne judge of the Madras High Court. Nothing is pointed out why he would be considered unsuitable for being promoted as Chief Justice if it becomes necessary to transfr Mr. Ismail.\n\nMr, M M. Isrnail who was seniormost puisne judge was promoted as Chief Justice, Madras, on retirement of Mr. Ramaprasada Rao in the year 1979 who had by that time to his credit experience of 12 years of High Court judgeship.\n\nHow it became a compelling necessity not to promote Mr. Gokulakrishnan even if Shri M.M.\n\nIsmail was to be transferred, left us guessing.\n\nMr. Gokulakrishnan was appointed as permanent judge of Madras High Court on July 7, 1969. Mr. Poti was appointed as Additional Judge \"of Kerala High Court on March 20, J 969. {fa judge of a High Court after twelve years of High Court judgeship is not suitable for being promoted as Chief Justice, he would ordinarily never become suitable for that post. But Mr. Poti is good enough to be appointed Chief Justice but unsuitable for Kerala, for which Mr. Sharma an inductee of. 1973 was considered good enough to be permanent Chief. Justice.\n\nAgain, Mr. S. Sarwar Ali inducted as High Cou.rt Judge on July 6, 1970, was recommended to be posted as Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court on the transfer of Mr. Singh. If Madras High Court has a life span over a century, so also Patna High Court has a life span over a century .. But Mr. Ismail, a senior experienced Chief Justice is transferred to Kerala High Court, .a High Court which came into existence as late as 1956 and just celebrated its Silver Jubilee. Delhi High Court has a permanent Chief Justice who is an inductee of January 1969. Every attempt to find an objectivli\n\n. '\n\nit46 SUPREME cOURT itl:i>bR:fs (198.ij 2 S.c; R;\n\nnorm or yardstick related to proclaimed public interest by which\n\nthese transfers can be measured or judged and for which they were ordered has led me to a blind alley. For over 30 years with some few exceptions the seniormost puisne judge was always promoted as the Chief Justice except in the case of Himachal Pradei; h when on setting up the High Court for the first time Mr. M.H. Beg was transferred from Allahabad and promoted as Chief Justice and posted at Simla.\n\nAnd also again when someone had not put in five years of High Court judgeship before his turn to be elevated as Chief Justice arrived. It is quite wellknown that next in line of succession to the Chief Justice is always being trained be being normally associated with administration so that when the elevation as Chie:f Justice becomes due he has already his grip over the administration. In most of the High Courts seniormost puisne judge is alwayi; entrusted with a large chunk of administrative work and, therefore:, he is probably well acquainted and trained to take over the responsibilities of a Chief Justice.\n\nThere is no material on record which would show that Mr.\n\nGokulakrishnan would not compare favourably with Mr. Singh for being appointed as Chief Justice of Madras High Court. Mr. P.S. Poti the senionpost puisne judge of Kerala High Court and who is functioning as Acting Chief Justice since the elevation of the then Chief Justice of Kerala High Court to Supreme Court has been a judge of the High Court since\n\n1969. If 12 years of High Court judgeship does not make the incumbent mature for Chief Justice one would be left guessing when he would bec.ime one.\n\nAnd yet Mr. M.M. Ismail was transferred to Kerala reverting Mr. Poti as Puisne judge. It thus appears that the transfer of Shri Singh oh the ground that he is the seniormost experienc:ed Chief Justice which would. be in public interest, fails to carry coiilViction.\n\nDr. Singhvi, learned counsel for Shri Singh also contended that the transfer of Shri Singh is punitive in character. The Chief Justice of India spc1fically denies this charge.\n\nAnd further it is stated that when Mr. K.B.N. Singh brought up the question of some baseless complaints against him, the Chief Justice of India assured him that he did ncit go by baseless complaints and he did not believe that his (Mr. Singh's) conduct was blameworthy.\n\nAnd the Chief Justice of India further assured him that he. did not hold Mr. Singh was to blame but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had creittec; l needless misunderstandiDJil ancl dissatisfaction,\n\nI I..\n\nI \\\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. uNibN (Desai; J) it47\n\nthus th'e Answer of the Chief iustlce would certainly show that the complaints against Mr. Singh did not. provoke_ the transfer.\n\nShri Singhvi, however, tried to persuade us by. putting in juxtaposition certain events which would permit an inference that the complaints against Shri Singh formed the foundation for the order of transfer.\n\nIt was pointed out that when in February 1980 the Chief Justice of.\n\nIndia visited Patna, he met lawyers and judges which may permit an inference that the complaints against Shri Singh must have been voiced by those lawyers. This feeling was uppermost in the mind of Shri Singh because he himself broad ed the subject af'a meeting with the Chief Justice of India on January 8, 1981, and even though the Chief Jystice of India assured Shri Singh that he did not go by baseless complaints and that he did not believe that his conduct was blameworthy but yet pointed out that certain persons were exploiting their proximity with him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. Drawing sustenance from this statement it was contended that inferentially speaking the situation had reached at Patna to such an impasse that Shri Singh was required to be uprooted from that atmosphere and, therefore, the transfer and this being a selective transfer it would attach stigma or slur While accepting what' the Chief Justice of India says that the CO!, llplaints did not form the foundation for transfer and that the Chief Justice was actuated by the sole desire to subserve _the public interesHn proposing the transfer of Shri Singh, selective transfers always give rise to canards and the transferred judge suffers character assassination. From this limited point of view one cannot -escape the conclusion that such transfer in the background stated would cast a slur and, therefore, is punitive in character and that would also vitiate the order of transfer.\n\nHaving examined all the relevant considerations, regrettable as it may appear, the conclusion is inevitabl_e that the order of transfer ofShri K.B.N. Singh is vitiated for want of effective consultation and the selective transfer would cast a slur or stigma.\n\nAdd to this that the public interest pleaded fails to carry conviction in the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, the transfer .does not appear to be in public.interest.\n\nFor all these reasons the order of transfer is vitiated and rr ust be declared void.\n\nIn the course of hearing petitioners requested the Court that the correspondence that passed between the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court !Ind the Ll!W Minister in re?rd tQ\n\nEl ...) .\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe non-appointment of Shri S.N. Kumar as additional judge be disclosed. The Union of Jndia,.through the affidavit initially of Shri S.M.H. Burney, Secretary, Ministry of Justice and subsequently by the affidavit of Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, holding the same post, claimed privilege on the ground that doctrine of candour demands that the correspondence bearing on the question of appointment or nonappointment of high constitutional functionaries should not be disclosed. There was a similar request for disclosure of correspondence that pasHed between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister witb reference fo the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court to Madras High Court. After hearing both sides at considerable length and first perusing the documents ourstlves to ascertain whether disclosure of it would or would not be. in public interest,\\Je directed disclosure and deferred giving our reasons for the same.\n\nI would, however, briefly say what I feel to be the fairly antiquat1:d notion about the secrecyin administration. Privilege was claimed under section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 123 was enacted in the hey-day of the colonial regime.\n\nAnd more . than a century after when.the Raj has disappeared and a republican form of Government under a liberal constitution is ushered in, we are told that the principle enunciated in section 123 holds good.\n\nWhat is :impermissible under section 123 is giving evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to affairs of the State. It was said that appoint!llent to high offices is such a'~11s.itive subject that the expression 'affairs of the State' would be wide enough to comprehend the same and, therefore, correspondence, notes notings connected therewith forming part of unpublished official record cannot be disclosed to the Court except at the cost of injury to public interest. Add to this the prohibition enacted in Article 74 that the court cannot inquire whether, if any, and if so what, advice was tendered by the Minister to the President. Privilege was claimed and\n\ndisclosur1~ was opposed on the above mentioned ground. It was very . passionately urged that no public interest would be served by washing the linen, dirty if it appears to be, in open and who is going to be benefited by disclosure of such documents. In the State of Punjab\n\nv. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, (1) Gajendragadkar, speaking for Sinha, C.J. and Wanchoo, J., referred to Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd ,(2) wherein Viscount Simones L.C. deduced the principle which has to be applied in such cases in the following words ;\n\n(1) (1961] 2 SCR 371.\n\n(2)~[li942] AC 624.\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.)\n\nJ 149\n\n\"Documents oth.erwise relevao, t and liable to production must not be produced if the public interest requires that they should be withheld. This test may be founCi to be satisfied either (a) by having regard to the contents of the particular document, or (b) by the fact that the document belongs to a class which, on grounds -of public interest must as a class be ' withheld from production.''\n\nThe question was whether the objection to production taken was valid one or not.\n\nThe House of Lords in the aforementioned case held that an objection validly taken to production on the ground that this would be injurious to public interest is conclusive. Having referred to this observation, the majority decision further proceeded to state that the decision in the case before it wherein privilege was claimed against disclosure must ultimately rest on the relevant statutory provisions contained in Indian Evidence Act. The Court then referred to Sections 123 and I 62 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nReferring to the expression \"affairs of the State\" . in section I 23, the majority judgment observed that in.the latter half of the Nineteenth Century affairs of State may have had a comparatively narrow content, but with the State in pursuit of its welfare actiyities which were formerly treated as purely commercial, and documents in relation to such commercial activities undertaken by the State in pursuit of public policies of social welfare are also apt to claim the privilege of being documents relating to the affairs of State. It is in the latter class of documents the Court proceeded to determine the claim for privilege fo such borderline cases.· The Court ultimately upheld the claim for privilege.\n\nDuncan's case appears to be hovering over the entire discussion. Then came Conway v. Rimmer. (1) This decision moved a step further because it was held therein that the Court can inspect the document to find out whether the claim to privilege is well merited. The view in Sodhi's case was to some extent diluted by.reference to Conway. Two subsequent cases, The Science Research Council\n\nv. Nasse, (2) and Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. vc Governor & Company of the Bank of England & Anr., (3) were also referred to. The discussion as to what is laid down by the House of Lords in aforementioned cases was o elaborate in the Court tl1t !\\t Qn~ ti.mi: gspected that these\n\n(1) [1968] AC 910.\n\n(2) [1980] AC 1028.\n\n(3) [1980J AC 1090,\n\n1150 SUPREME COUll'r REPORTS ( 19821 2 s.c.a,\n\ndecision:; will have to be explained away, otherwise they are binding\n\nm us. A specific question was put, should we mould our approach dovetail:ing it to the changes in the view in the United Kingdom because it is an undeniable fact that on the question of privilege and disclosure commencing with Duncan and ending with the last mentioned ca:>e, the view in this country has more or less changed shades with the view expressed by the House of Lords. In my opinion, Section 123 must be construea on its own terins. Undoubtedly, a century old provision enacted to some extent keeping in view the needs of Empire builders must change in the context of the Republican Government and the open society which we. have set up. Undoub~ tedly there must be such affairs of the State involving security of the nation and foreign affairs where public interest requires that the disclosu:re should not be ordered. It is, however, equally well recog\n\nnised that fair administration of justice is itself a matter of vital public internst. Therefore, if the two public interest conflict, the Court will have to decide whether the public interest which formed the foundation for claiming privilege would be jeopardised if disclosure is ordered and on the other hand whether fair administration of justice wou)d suffer by non-disclosure and decide which way the balance tilts. Viewed from this angle, it was stated in Conway that the Court should balance public interest involved where a clash of public interest is brought to its notice.. In the ultimate analysi.s the approach of the Court while deciding the question of privilege would be that it has to balance public interest in just justice and just administration of justice and state affairs at high .level in respect of appofotment to. high constitutional offices and then decide which way the balance tilts. Having formulated this test the answer was that a disclosure in the interest of justfoe far outweighs the possible embarrassment f::Ir by disclosing certain aspects. I do not propose to deal with the matter further.\n\nJustice Bhagwati by a vrry elaborate discussion has given reasons why the disclosure was necessary arid I find myself so entirely in agreement with what has been stated by him that I do not think I can usefully add anything to it.\n\nThe oniy point that now remains is whether the petitioners Iqbal M. Chagla and three others in the petition filed in the Bombay High Court, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, petitioner in the petition filed in tbe Delhi High Court and other advocates who have filed petitions in Patna and Madras High Courts have a locus standi to maintain the petitions. Learned Attorney General did not raise this quesiion but Mr, P.R,. Madu! Iern\\ld oi.p:is\\ll w4Q appeared for the Lw Minister\n\n. -\n\n\"\".\n\n} ' -\n\n- ,-\n\n~·\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, 1.1 Il5I\n\nin the first set of petitions seriously contended that the petitioners have no locus standi. In fact . the matter h.as assumed acdemic importance because in the 1st batch of petitions Shri S.N. Kumar, the learned Judge of the Delhi High Court who was given short term extension and was ultimately not appointed, has questioned the validity and legality both of•the circular issued by the Law Minister and .the power claimed by the executive not to appoint an additional judge after the expiry ; f his initial term.\n\nHis locus standi is beyond question. Similarly, in the other batch of petitions Shri K.B.N. Singh, the Chief Justice transferred is transpos_ed as petitioner No. 3 in the petition filed by Shri D.N. Pandey and another advocate of the Patna High Court and he has challenged the validity and legality of the order. of his transfer.\n\nHis locus slandi is beyond question. There- : fore, the contention about locus standi is now of academic interest and I do not propose to deal with it.\n\nHowever, I am in full agreement with my learned brother Bhagwati, J. who has discussed this aspect in meticulous details.\n\nThat is the end of the journey. To sum up :\n\n(I) An additional judge can only be appointed in the High Court if the President is satisfied that there is a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or there\n\nare arrears and for this purpose it is necessary to E increase the number of judges in the High Court for the time being.\n\n(2) An additional judge appointed initially for a certain tenure has a right to be considered' for fresh appointment on the expiry of the tenure and the consultation F must proceed along the same lines as prescribed under Article 217. -\n\n(3) Consultation under Article 217 must be full, effective and meaningful and in the case of an additional judge, if there is any defect, drawback or deficiency in the consultation the decision arrived at is open to judicial review.\n\n(4) Power to transfer a High Court judge conferred by Article 222 on -the President can be exercised after full, effective and meaninft1l 90~~1Jltl!ti9!1J with the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S, C.'k. ·\n\nChief Justice of India and this necessitates all the facts in possession of one or the other constitutional func- . ..;. tionary being fully exchanged and deliberated upon.\n\n(5) Power to transfer a High Court judge cannot be exercised with a view to punishing a jurlge or for any thing\n\nin his conduct or behaviour which may cast a slur or stigma on him.\n\n(6) The circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, does not suffer from any infirmity and is not constitutionally invalid.\n\nAccordingly, Transferred Case No. 19/81 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri S.P. Gupta in Allahabad High Court, Transferred Case No. 21/81 arising from the petition filed by Shri J.K.\n\nKalra: and others in the Delhi High Court, Transferred Case No. 22/81 arising from the petition filed by Shri Iqbal M. Chagla and three others in the Bombay High Court and Transferred Case No.\n\n20/81 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri V.M. Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in all the matters.\n\nTransferred Case No. 24/81 in 'which Shri K.]l.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court is transposed as petitioner No. 3 is allowed and the order dated January 19, 1981, transferring him as Chief Justi:ce of Madras High Co1Jrt is quashed and set aside and a manda mus is issued to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the said order. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nIn view of this decision no specific order is required to be made in Writ Petition No. 274/81 filled by Miss Lily Thomas, Transferred Case No. 6/81 arising from a writ petition filed by Shri P. Subramaniam in Madras High Court and Transferred Case No. 2/81 arising from a writ petition filed by Shri A. Rajappa ip the Madras High Court and they accordingly stand disposed of. There would be no order as to costs. -\n\nIn view of the order quashing and setting aside f e order direc- . ting transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras High Court, the special leave petition No. 312/81 filed by Shri Ripudaman Prasad Singh has become infructuous and would $tand disp.Qs<; d of\n\nae<:ordinly wi~~ no order s ~Q costs throughot,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) i!.53\n\nPATHAK, J: Transferred Case No. 19 of 1981, filed by Shri S.\n\nP. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad, as a writ petition challenges the validity of a Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 issued by Shri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs in the Union Goverment and addressed to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the north-eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of Additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts. Such consent was also required from persons who had already been proposed or may in the future be proposed, for initial appointment.\n\nHe contends also that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Art. 216 and clause (!) of Art. 224 of the Constitution, and he assails the appointments of some Additional Judges of the High Court for short terms of six months only when, according to him, the Additional Judges should have been appointed as . permanent Judges. In particular; he bas prayed for a declaration that three additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murli Dhar, Mr. Justice A. N.\n\nVerma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges and that the Circular letter of the Law Minister is void.\n\nTransferred Case No. 20 of 1981 filed. by Shri V. M.\n\nTarkunde, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court as a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, also assails the Circular letter and the appointments of three additional Judges, Shri 0. N. Vohra, Shri S.\n\nN. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad for a further period of three months only. The petitioner prays that the Circular letter be declared void and the posts of additional Judges in the Several High Courts be converted into permanent posts. Of the three additional Judges specifically named, Shri S. N. Kumar has entered appearance and has supported the case pleaded by the petitioner.\n\n3. Shri J. L. Katra and a few other advocates filed Transferred Case No. 21 of 1981 as a writ petition. in the High Court of Delhi and, inter alid, they have -prayed for mandamus to the Union -\n\nGovernment to create an adequate number of posts of permanent and additional Judges and to make appointments to those posts.\n\n4. Four advocates•practising in the High Court of Bombay, Shri Iqbal M. Chagla, Shri C. R. Dalvi, Shri M. A. Rana and Shri\n\nil54\n\n\n( 1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\nI • Sorab K. J. Modi filed Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981 as a wnt petition in the High Court of Bombay questioning the validity of the aforesaid Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the Circular letter is ultrµ vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges.\n\nThese four cases constitute a group raising substantially common points for consideration.\n\n6. There is a second group, also consisting of four cases, led by Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nShe challenges the transfer of Shri M. M. fomail, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court.\n\nShri M.\n\nM. famail has filed an affidavit stating that he has decided not to pro- C•eed to Kerala, nor to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to rietirement by resignation of his office.\n\nShri M. M. Ismail has resigned since.\n\nE 7.\n\nAn Advocate, Shri A. Rajappa, practising in the High _ Court of Madras, filed Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981. He prays for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Shri M.\n\nM. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna, to the High Court of Madras is void.\n\n.• ~\n\nF -\n\n 8.\n\nTransferred Case No. 6 of 198( was filed in the High Court of Madras by Shri P. Subramanian, praying for the same reliefs as Shri Rajappa in Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981.\n\nTwo advocates, Shri D. N. Pandey and . Shri Thakur :Ramapati Sinha, filed Transferred Case No. 24 of 1981 in the High\n\nCourt at Patna challenging the order of transfer of Shri M. M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Shri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras. During the pendency of this w1it petition, Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh, who had ben impleaded a~ a respondent, was transposed as\n\n.a petitioner.\n\ni ts.5\n\n10 These cases raise constitutional questions of considerable significance to. the judicial system in India. · They involve grave issues of fundamental importance respecting the High Courts and the Judges constituting them. They deeply. affect the Rule of Law and the administration of justice.\n\nThe Rule of Law and the adminisrration of justice\n\n11. India is a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic governed by a written Constitution designed to sectire to all its citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity in their various facets.\n\nA constitutional democracy;. so portrayed has its institutions and values rooted in the Rule.of Law, and that is plainly demonstrated by the provisions of our constitutional structure and the constitu-. tional philosophy inspiring it: The; vitality of the Rule of Law flows from those roots to the sever'al branches . of the constitutional strUCture, sustaining and nurturing them and -giving them life and their intended significance;\n\n( The Rule of Law is the Primary Principle of our Constitution, and in its universality and omnipotence it postulates that no oiie, neither State nor individual, shall act contrary to the law, and . nobody shall be denied right• and justice.· The principal organs of the State, the Executive, the . Legislature and the Judiciary are. governed by it and operate through it. In its daily task of adjudicating disputes, the Judiciary maintains the Rule of Law and enforces . it. It does sci by interpreting tlie law and applying it and, in appropriate cases, decreeing its observance. And in adjudging the consti~ -tutional validity of degislation and• exutive: acts; it protects the Rule of Law embodied iri the Constitution. ·\n\n12. In securing and promoting tlie ' resolution of disputes in a legal forum. in accordance'' with established -legal • pr9cedure, the administration of justice ensures a 'peaceful and orderly progress by a people through constitutional methods . towards the . realisation of their aspiratioqs. And if it'. is to rule their minds and hearts, the administration of justice must enjoy their confidence: Public col)fidence in the administration of justice is imperative to its effective\" ness, because ultimately, the ready . acceptance 'of: a judicial verdict' alone gives relevance to the judicial system. While the adminisira: tion of justice draws its legal sanction from the Constitution; its credibility rests in the 'faith• of the people. Indispensable to that'\n\n... ·\n\n• D\n\nF }\n\n. .\n\n. I-'\n\n\" .. -\"\n\n-\\-\n\n/ . . ..\n\nSUPREME COUR.T REPORTS\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nfaith is the independence of the judiciary,. An independent and impartial judiciary supplies the reason for the judicial institution, ; t also gives character and content to the constitutional milieu.\n\n13. India; s statesmen, political leaders, eminent jurists and representatives of a broad cross-section of our national life were . engaged for about three years in forging a Constitution _worthy of India's greatness. In the fashioning of the provisions relating to the judiciary, the greatest importance was attached . to securing the independence of the judges, and throughout the Constituent Assembly debates the most vigorous emphasis was laid on that principle. The judiciary in British India had by and large, for. a century of British rule, enjoyed the respect and confidence of the people_ for its high reputation of independence and impartiality. None the less the framers of the Constitution took great pains to ensure that an even better and more effective judicial structure was incorporated in the Constitution, one which would meet the highest expectations of judicial independence. In a land and among a people whose ancient /values stemmed from Truth as a. Reality, culminating in the adoption .\n\nof a national emblem confirming. that creed, they could have done no. less. - . _ , ·\n\n14. It is pertinent to observe that the High Courts under our Constitution have been conferred far wider jurisdiction and powers than the High Courli under the Governm-entof India Act, 1935.\n\nThey enjoy not only the jurisdiction and powers existing before the commencement of the Constitution but by virtue of Article 226 they have been vested with power to issue directions,. orders or writs to any person or authority; including any Government within their territorial jurisdiction, and that power . is not limited, as it is in the case of the Supreme Court of India, to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III but extends to any other purpose .\n\nMoreover, by Article 227 of the Constitution . the High Courts have been granted the superintendence not merely over all courts subject to their appellate jurisdiction , but indeed over all courts and tribunals . throughout their territorial jurisdiction. Further, unlike the Government of India Act the Constitution has not prohibited the High Cour.ts from enjoying original jurisdiction in .matters concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof. The framersof the Constitution evidently intended that the widest amplitude of remedil action should be available to every person throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the. High Courts.\n\n) >\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1157\n\nSo great was the anxiety to ensure that the Rule of 'Law reigned A supreme in each State throughout India.\n\n15. It is in this context that the questions raised before us may be considered.\n\nThe constitutional scheme concerning the High Courts\n\n16. The judiciary in India consists broadly of the Union judiciary, the High Courts in the States and tbe Subordinate Courts in those states. Chapter V of the Constitution deals with the High Courts and its present provisione may be briefly surveyed. Article 214 requires that there shall be a High Court for each State, and , Art. 216 deals with the constitution of every High Court. Art. 217 . lays down the procedure for appointment of a Judge of the High Court, the circumstances in which the office of Judge is vacated, the qualifications for appointment, and how the age of a Judge shall be determined. Art. 218 provides for the removal of a Judge from his office.\n\nArt 219 requires a Judge to make or subscribe an oath or affirmation before he enters upon his office. Art. 220 places a restriction on practice after a person has been appointed permanent Judge. Art. 221 provides for payment to the Judge of his salary and entitles him to certain allowances and rights, and the proviso declares that neither the allowances of a Judge nor his rights in respect of leave of absence or pension shall be varied to his tlisadvantage after his appointment. Art. 222 empowers the Ptesident to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Arts. 223, 224 and 224A enable the appointment of an acting Chief Justices, additional Judges, acting Judges and provide for former Judges to sit and act as Judges.\n\nArt. 225 defines the jurisdiction of existing High Courts and Art. 226 extends the jurisdiction to the issue of directions, orders and writs.\n\nArt. 227 vests in the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction.\n\nArt. 228 empowers the High Court to transfer to itself cases pending in a subordinate court involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the .Constitution. Art. 229 provides for the appointment of officers and servants of the .High Court, and Art. 230 for the extension of jurisdiction of the High Court , to Union territories. Finally, there is provision by Art. 231 for establishing a common High Court for two or more States or for two or more States and a Union Territory.\n\n\n(1982) '.! s,.c.R.\n\n17.\n\nAn important point to note is that Chapter V relating to the High Courts embodies a single organic scheme.\n\nThe provisions of that scheme are inter-related and often inter-dependent, and in ord1er to appreciate the true purpose, scope and content of any pro'lision it is necessary to examine it in the context of the entire con:; titutional scheme. This is so, whether the question relates to the ; appointment of an additional Judge, or to the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.\n\nThe constitution of the High Courts and te appointment of the Judges ·\n\n18.\n\nIn a modern democracy the supreme power of the State is shared between the three priI1cipal organs, the Exective, te Legislature and the Judiciary. Each holds a distinct position in te overall constitutional scheme; and has broadly separate functions and responsibilities from those vested in the other organs. . Consti tutio:11 deems the simultaneous co-existence and effective functioning of all three organs imperative to the proper working of the consti· tutional system. It envisages that all three organs should function contiiauously according to their true nature and responsibilities, so that in the totality the constitutional system is held in constant balance. The constitutional document itself has made full and detailed provision for the constitution of each of these primary organs of the State, so that at all times the constitutional system as a whole is in full operation.\n\n19. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from F time to time deem it necessary to appoint. Plainly, while the President i!: vested with the power 'to appoint Juge~, he is also unde~ a constitutional obligation to ensure that the fligh Court is fµlly constituted. It is fully constituted when it consists of Judges sudicient in number to regularly cope with and dispose of the work falling within its j1;1risdiction.\n\nFrom the terms of .Art. 216 it is a\\so G plain that the constitutional obligation imposed on the President extend:s to ensuring from time to time that the High Court consists of a sufficient number of Judges. The expression \"from time;: to time\" is significant. The responsibility imposed by Art. 21 (j requires the making of a periodic review of the annual institution of cases H and thtl pending strength of arrears resulting in a reasonable assessment of the number of Judges needed in each High Court. It may be observed that serious injury is possible to a constitutional\n\n-- r\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1159\n\ndem9craey where this is not done, and , the judiciary remains insufficiently manned and periahig cases coniinue to accumulate for long periods.\n\nA continuing imbalance in the proper operation of the constitutional system ranging over a long period of time by reason of one of its primary organs remaining ill-equipped to discharge its essential responsibilities cannot but be viewed with grave concern.\n\n20. Article 216 speaks of Judges generally. A study of the constitutional scheme embodied in Chapter V indicates that as a general rule the appointment of permanent Judges is contemplated.\n\nThey are Judges who are entitled to continue in office until they attain th~ age of 62 years, and whose tenure is fixed by the Consti tution itself. They are appointed with reference to the normal workload of the court.\n\nA fixed tenure u'naffected by the discretion of the executive safeguards the principle of judicial independence.\n\nIn spedal circumstances, however;\" and in special circumstances only, the appointment of additi_onal Judges or acting Judges is contemplated under Article 224.\n\nAn additional Judge is appointed under clause (1) of Art. 224 where it appears to the President that by reason of any temporary increase in the business of~ High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein the number of the Judges of that court shouid be for the time being. increased. The number. of Judges is increased only for the time being, and the appointment of an additional Judge is, therefore, envisaged for a limited period which, by clause (I) of Art. 224 must not exceed two years.\n\nA~ acting Judge is appointed under clause_ (2) of Art. 224 by the President when any Judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is by reason of absence or for any . other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, a person so appointed can act as a Judge only until the permanent Judge has resumec:l h.is duties.\n\nBoth additional Judges and acting Judges must be appointed from among duly qualified persons, that is to say, the qualifications prescribed in Artie!~ 217, and they cannot be appointed to hold office after attaining the age of 62 years. It will be seen therefore that Art. 216 contemplates Judges who are permanent Judges, additional Judges or acting Judges,' permanent Judges as a rule and additional Judges or acting Judges in exceptional or special circumstances. A separate and distinct category is that of former Judges of a High Court who under Article 224A may be requested by the Chief Justice of a High Court, with the previous consent of the President, to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court. Such a person does not fall within\n\n1160 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nArt. 216, for he is not a Judge of the High Court when so sitting and acting. The President does not appoint him, but only gives his consent to the Chief Justice to request the former Judge to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court. The process of appointment\n\nembodicd in clause (I) of Art. 217 does not apply to him. It is for that reason that express provision has been made in Art. 224A itself that while sitting and acting as a Judge of the High Court the former. Jludge will be entitled to such allowances as the President may, by order, determine and he shall have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges, but will not otherwise be deemed to be a Judge of that High Court.\n\n21. It may be pointed out that the Constituent Assembly was not in favour of appointing additional or acting Judges, and although in the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee provision was made by Art. 198 for the appointment of temporary Judges a.nd by Art. 199 for the appointment of additional Judges, there wa.s strong opposition to their inclusion and those provisions were omitted when the Constitution was finally enacted.\n\nThe Draft Constitution provided by Art. 200 that the Chief Justice of a High Court could request a former Judge of that court to sit and act as a Judge of the Court. The provision was retained in the en.acted Constitution as Article 224, with this difference that before making such request the Chief Justice had to obtain the previous consent of the President and further his choice extended not only to a former Judge of that High Court but also to that of any other High Court. Apparently, it was felt that by enacting Art. 224 there was no need to provide for the appointment of temporary o:r additional Judges. It was subsequently found that the arrangement was not adequate, and for that reason the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 brought in the presen.t Article 224 providing for additional Judges and acting Judges and simultaneously deleted the original provisions respecting former Judges.\n\nHowever, the need for former Judges continued to be felt, and the provision was reintroduced by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and was numbered as Article 224A.\n\n22. The procedure for appointing a Judge of a High Court is set forth in clause (I) of Art. 217.\n\nA Judge of a High Court is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after\n\n, ' . -\n\nA . \\\n\n' '\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1161\n\nconsultation with the Chier Justice or lndla, the Governor of the .\n\nState, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court. The appointment of a Judge-is an executive act. The power to appoint is vested in the President, who by virtue of clause (1) of Art. 74 is required to ' act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers.. The President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwi'se, but he must act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. The nature of the power exercised by the President under clause (1) of Art. 217 being executive in character, it, cann_ot be identified with the power exercised under clause (3) of Art. 217 in regard to the determination of the age of a Judge of a High Court. The power exercised under clause (3) of Article 217 has been held by this Court in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter ,(1) to involve a judicial function and which therefore does not fall within the scope of clause (I) of Art. 74,\n\n23.\n\nWhile there can be no doubt that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court lies in the executive power of the President, it is not an absolute and U{lfettered power. It is conditioned by the obligation imposed on the President to consult the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and in the case of an appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court 'The consultation is a constitutional imperative and the process of consultation must precede the appointment. Three constitutional functionaries are required to be consulted, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court, who are judicial functionaries, and the Governor of the State who is the executive head of the State in respect of which the High Court has jurisdiction.\n\nIn this, clause (I) of Art. 217 makes a marked departure from s. 220, Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nUnder s. 220, a permanent Judge of a High Court was appointed in the absolute discretion of of the Crown, and the additional Judges appointed in the absolute discretion, of the Governor General.\n\nIn practice; of course, the chief Justice of the High Court was usually consulted, as well as sometimes a few eminent leaders of the Bar who would not .be interested in the appointment. But when the Constitution was being drafted there was general agreement that the appointment of a Judge\n\n(!) [1971) 3 SCR 483.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c.a.\n\nof a High Court should not be left to the unfettered discretion of the Executive Government. The Constitution itself now imposed the obligation to consult. Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935 had been assured by prescribing a fixed tenure under sub-s. (2) of s. 220, and a Judge could not be removed from his office except on the ground of misbehaviour or of infirmity of mind or bcidy and on a report by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the Judge ought to be removed. There was the further stipulation by the proviso to s 221 that neither .the salary of a Judge nor his rights in respect of leave of absence or pension could be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.\n\nNow, the independence of the judiciary can be fully safeguarded not by merely conferring security on the Judges during their term of office but by ensuring in addition that persons who are independent, upright and of the highest character are appointed as Judges.\n\nMoreover, there is always the fear that appointments left to the absolute discretion of the appointing executive could be influenced by party considerations. The framers of the Constitution apparently had this in mind when they decided to incorporate the prescription of consultation in the terrns set forth in clause (I) of Art. 217.\n\nAs Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel explained in the Constituent Assembly on June 21, 1947 wben presenting the Report on the Principles of a Model Provincial Constitution : ·\n\n\"With so many checks and -counter-checks these appointments place the High Court Judges beyond any influence of the parties or any other influences and beyond any suspicion or doubt of such a nature. There is thus enough guarantee provided for the independence of the Judiciary.\"(1)\n\n24. - As has been observed, clause (I) of Art. 217 prescribes that besides the Governor of the State, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court must be consulted in the appointment of a Judge of a High Court. Three distinct constitutional functionaries are involved in the consultative process, and each plays a distinct role, and the nature and scope of the role are indicated by the character and status of their respective offices. The Chief Justic(: of the High Court is the head of the: i.ustltl!ioi; i, IQ. ~Nch\n\n(1} Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IV p. 694 •\n\n......\n\n' /\n\n) -\n\n8. P; GtJi>tA 11. UNION (Pathak, i.)\n\nthe }udge wlll be apoinhid. Ite is, therefore, particularly qualified to know the needs of the court in the context of its present constitution and the work whi6h is pending.\n\nGenerally, an appointment is trtade either ftohi the High Court Bar or from the OistriCt Judiciary. lii both cases, the Chief Justice can be expected to possess an intimate knowledge of the legal ability of the person under consideration and to have a sufficiently accurate estimate, of his character, antecedents and teputation, including his integrity, in the context of the legal profession or the judicial service, as the case may be, as well as his potential capacity as a Judge. It is also conveniently possible for . him to obtain a fair measure of information in respect of a member of a District Bar, should such a member be un'er consideration. In regard to persons practising in other courts or members of judicial tribunals it is not difficult for Mm to secure adequate information.\n\nIt is apparently for this reason that the practice which has prevailed for several years in this country postulates that it is the Chief Justice of the High Court who should initiate the process of appointment by suggesting a person for the office of a Judge.\n\nBut by virtue of his position in the High Court and the State, the Chief Justice is also exposed to local influences, and to prejudice or bias in relation to lawyers appearing before him or judicial officers who meet him. His assessment can be subjectively efiected.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India has been brought in, and it is apparent that, in virtue of the exalted office held by hiin and the circumstance that he is far -removed from the local pull of influences and the temptations of partisanship, he can be trusted to apply a strictly objective approach to the recommendation proceeding from the High Court.\n\nBesides, the Chief Justice of India possesses the advantage of viewing the matter from the superior plane of a national perspecti\\'.e.\n\nHe is seized with knowledge of prevailing standards and trends in the different High Courts, and as the head of the highest Court in India exercising appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts by way of the widest power under Article 136 he would be cognisant of the need to ensure that the highest quality was maintained in the appointment of Judges of the High Courts.\n\nIndeed, he is expected by the Constitution to keep himself adequately informed of the affairs of each High Court.\n\nFor it is not merely for the purpose of appointing a Judge to the High Court under clause (I) of Art. 2f7 that lie is to be consulted.\n\nThe President is also obliged to consult him before he can transfer a Judge Urider clause (I) of Art. 222 fom one High Court to another High Court; a matter in which the Constitution does not expressly stipulate consultatiQ!l c; vt;!l wjtil he <;:hief ustices of the two Hih\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS · IJ 982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nCoutts concerned, the liigh Court f'tolll which the Judge is to be transl' erred and the Jligh Court to which his transfer is contemplated. It must also be remembered that in the determination of the age of a Judge of a High Court under clause (3) of Att. 217 it is the Chief Justice of India alone whom the President is required to consult,\n\n25.\n\nThe part played by the Governor of the State must, it\n\n,~ seems, be limited.\n\nThe State Government possesses the advantage of being able to secure information which may not be within the knowledge of the Chief Justice in regard to the character and integrity oif the p.erson recommended and his local position and affiliations.\n\nBesides, as the High Court is the highest court of the State and the funds for it flow from the State Exchequer, it is only logical that the State Government should be allowed a voice in assessing the suitability of the person recommended for appointment.(1) The State Government, however, can have no role in commenting on his legal ability, knowledge of law and judicial potential.\n\n26.\n\nThe President is obliged to consider the advice tendered_ by the three constitutional functionarie's under clause (!)of Art. 217; and in the evaluation of the advice from each he must bear in mind that the appointment under consideration is the appointment of a Judge of a High Court, that is to say, a judicial appointment.\n\nOnce that is kept in the forefront and it is apparent that the. person recommended is of desirable personal character and reputation, the greatest value should be attached to the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe advice tendered by the two judicial functionaries possesses a quality peculiarly pertinent to the appointment of an able and efficient Judge, It is, in a sense, \"expert\" advice, and where the Chief Justicti of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India agree\n\no~ the recommendation it is within reason to hold that the Pr.:sident will ordinarily accept the recommendation, unless there is strong and cogent reason for not doing so, which must be a reason directly relevant to the purpose of the appointment.\n\nIt may be reiterated that the dc:parture made by clause (I) of Art. 217 of our Constitu tion from s. 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935 clearly establishes that the advice tendered by the judicial functionaries was considered 1:0 be a safeguard against arbitrary appointments and therefore entitled to the greatest weight.\n\nIt may be pointed out\n\n(1) Law Commonweattb of India, Fourteenth Report Vol. 1 p. 74.\n\n,.._ ,.\n\n- .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1165\n\nthat appointments in England to the Court of Appeal, to the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords and to the offices of Lord Chief Justice, and Pre&ident of the Family Division are made on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Lord Chancellor, and the likelihood that . the Prime Minister may depart from the recommendations of the Lord Chancellor can be contemplated \"only B in the most exceptional case\" .(1)\n\n27.\n\nAt the same time I am unable to accept the contention that as the Constitution stands today the President is obliged in all cases to agree with a recommendation in which the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India have concurred.\n\nDuring the Constituent Assembly Debates a proposal was made by a member that the appointment of Judges should require the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India (although that suggestion was made in connection with the appointment of Judges of the Supreme court), but that proposal was not accepte'd.\n\nThe Law Commission of India(2) surveyed the machinery for appointing a Judge of a High Court and considered it desirable that the provision in clause (!) of Art. 217 should be altered to provide for \"not merely consultation with the Chief Justice of India but his concurrence in the proposed appointment\". That recommendation has not borne fruit and we are concerned with the position which prevailed\n\nthen and continues today.\n\nDoes the advice given by the Chief Justice of India have primacy over that rendred by the Chief Justice of the High Court?\n\n28.\n\nA point has been raised whether on a difference of opinion between them the advice of the Chief Justice of India can be said to enjoy primacy over that tendered by the Chief Justice of the' High Court. Nothing is laid down on the matter in express terms in clause (I) of Art. 217. If by \"primacy\" is meant that the opinion of the Chief ustice of India supersedes that or°the Chief Justice of the High Court and can alone be considered, it is elearly against the provisions of clause (I) of Art. 217, for the clause inte'nds that the President should consult both judicial functionaries, besides the Governor. The advice of each, the Chief Justice of lndia and\n\n{I) J.A.G. Griffith: The Politi<;~ of Judiciary,'pp.17, 18 •.\n\n(2) Ibid p. 75, • .. ·. . . . .\n\n\n [ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe Chief Justice of the High Court, has to be considered by the President. The Chief Justice of India does not sit in appellate judgment over the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court, and the fact that the former has given his advice cannot imply that the advice' of the latter must be ignored.\n\nBut it must be remembered that the advice by the Chief Justice of India takes into account not only the primary material before him but also the assessment made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, and terefore when he renders advice the assessment by the Chief Justice of the High Court has also been considered by him. In other words, in forming his opinion and giving his advice, the Chief Justice of India will take all the facts and circumstances into consideration, including the material circumstance that the advice. of the Chief Justice of the High Court is the advice of an authority possessing the advantage of direct and intimate knowledge of the requirements of the Court and generally also of the person recommended, and thereafter he will advic'e whether he endorses. the recommendation.\n\nIn that sense, it can be 8aid that the recommendation qf the Chief Justice of the High Court is screened through the assessment made by the Chief Justice of India. The screening is a logical result of the Chief Justice of India being brought in to express his opinion on the recommendation. In passing, it may be observed that if any material comes into the possession of the Chief Justice of India which was not before: the Chief Justice of the High Court it should be communicated to the Chief Justice of the High Court for his comments.\n\nWhen the advice of the Chief Justice of the High Court and of the Chief Justice of India 'is placed before the President, the President will consider both and assess them in tl; e light of the positions held, and the advantages possessed, by the respective functionaries in relation to the recommendation, and also bear in mind that while the Chief Justice of the High Court bas the advantage of proximity in rela'tion to the High Court and generally in assessing the ability and efficiency of the person recommended, the Chief Justice of India enjoys the advantage.:rns position of. being able to apply a more objective judgment and also of taking into account a national perspective and pr-esent standards and trends in other High Courts. In the ultimate analysis, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the advice rendered by the Chief Justice of India enjoys mere parity with that of the Chief Justice of the High Court. If the Chief Justice of India was intended to enjoy equal status merely with the Chief Justice of the High Court in 'this regard, it is difficult to appreciate why the Chief Just::ce of India was b:rouht in at all, . especially when the\n\n_; .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1167\n\nadvice expected of a judicial functionary for appointing a Judge of a High Court could be obtained from the Chief Justice of'the High Court alone. The constitutional scheme appears to iDdicate that in matters concerning the High Courts there is a close cons.ultative relationship between the President and. the Chief Justice of India.\n\nIn matters so serious as transfer of judges and the determination of the age of judges, the Constitution bas appointed the Chief Justice of India as the sole functionary to be consulted by the President.\n\nIn that capacity, the Chief Justice of India functions under the Constitution as a constitutional check on the. exercise of arbitrary power and protects t\\le independep.ce of the judiciary.\n\nThe position relating to additional judges specifically\n\n29. It has been observed earlier that a High Court is intended under Article 216 to consist of permanent judges as a rule. That would accord with the principle of judicial independence because thereby security of tenure is provided.\n\nThe permanent Judges must be in sufficient nml)ber to cope with the usual work of the High Court. There may, however, be exceptional circumstance, prevailing over a brief period, which may call for a temporary accretion to the number of Judges. Provision is found in Art. 224 for meeting the exil!; ency.\n\nThe President has power to appoint additional Judges and acting Judges depending on the . nature of the exigency. Clause\n\n(1) of Art. 224 deals with the appointment of additional Judges,\n\nand it is thb provision with which we are immediately concerned.\n\nAn additional Judge may be appointed where by reason of the temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of .arrears of work therein it appears to the President that the number of Judges should for the time being be increased. The two condi-. tions contr-01 the exercise of the power, and if neither is satisfied there can be no case for appointing an additional Judge. The increase in the business of the High Court must be temporary and should be capable of being disposed of within a short period. Likewise, the arrears of work should be such that they cannot be expected to endure Jong.\n\nInasmuch as the period of appointment of additional Judges is prescribed as a maximum of two years, it is only where the .disposal of the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the pending arrears of work is expected to take about two years at the most that a case for appointing additional Judges arises. If the increase in the business of the High Court or the volume of arrears of work is of a magnitude which cannot ordinarily be disposed of within. two years! i~ js ae where the busj~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\nness -0r work must be regarded as an accretion to the regular business or work of the High Court, calling for an increase in the strength of permanent Judges. A person appointed as an additional Judge under clause (I) must be a \"duly qualified\" person. He must be duly qualified for appointment as a Judge, '.the qualifications being !hose prescribed in Art. 217. The appointment of an additional Judge, like the appointment of a permanent Judge, must be made in the manner prescribed in clause (1) of Art. 217.' The appointment of an additional Judge, like the appointment of a permanent Judge, must be made in the manner prescribed in clause (I) of Art. 217.\n\nThe process of consultation contemplated by that clause comes into play, and it is only after his suitability has been determined in accordance with that clause that the additional Judge is appointed.\n\nAn additiional Judge discharges functions of the same character as a permanent Judge. There is no difference whatever between the two in status and the other incidents of office, except that an additional Judge can hold office only for the perfod specified in the warrant of his appointment.\n\nThere is nothing in clause (1) of Art 224 to suggest that the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the pending arrears of work can alone be entrusted to additional Judges.\n\nAll that the clause provides is that either or both conditions can constitute a reason for temporarily increasing the number of Judges of the High Court. Which work should be assigned to permanent Judges and which to a, dditional Judges is a matter normally falling within the discretion of the Chief Justice of . the High Court. It was observed by this Court in Krishan Gopal v.\n\nShri Prakash Chandra(1) that \"election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be entrusted for trial to a permanent Judge of the High\n\nCourt\". But that was a mere expression of policy for the court affirmed that they \"are legally competent to hear these matters\".\n\nIt may be that despite the appointment of a reasonable number of additional Judges, the temporary increase in the business of the High Comt or the pending arrears of work may not be disposed of within a period of two years aud may continue for a few more months. There is reason to expect that the person. found fit for appointment as additional Judge and who has already gained proficiency and experience will be appointed as a Judge for a further period in order that the work may be disposed of and not 11llowed to remain pe:nding.\n\n(1) p974J 2 SCR 206,\n\n. -\n\nS.J>. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1169\n\nIn passing, it may be observed that the period prescribed : .~Y clause (I) of Art. 224 for the appointment of'an additional Judge i~ put at a maximum of two years, but that does not mean that in every case the appointment must be for two years. The appointment of an additional Judge may be for a period less than two years, and the period will be determined with reference to the time estimated for disposing of the temporary increase in the business or the pending arrears of work which occasioned the appointment. The period of .appointment cannot be fixed on the basis of any other factor.\n\nWhere, as observed earlier, the work or business is not completed within two years and calls for a further appointment of additional Judges, the duration of the further appointment will be conditioned again by the time assessed for disposing of the remaining business or work. But it is to be distinctly borne in mind that additional Judges can be appointed only where the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the arrears of work can be expected to be disposed of within a period of two years and not very much more If additional Juqges are appointed for successive periods of two years or more it is clearly a case where the increase in the business of the High Court or the volume of the arrears of work does not call for the appointment of additional Judges but for a review of the number of permanent Judges.\n\nAppointments of additional Judges for successive periods of two years or more constitute a violation of the safeguard afforded by the appointment of permanent Judges for the protection of the principle of judicial independence.\n\nIt appears that for several years now a practice has grown, to which both the Executive and the Judiciary have unwittingly subscribed, of maintaining a regular strength of additional\" Judges and generally appointing a person as an additional Judge of the High Court instead of appointing him directly as a permanent Judge of the High Court. The additional Judge so appointed continues as an ad.ditional Judge, until a vacancy in the office of permanent Judge arises, whereupon such person is appointed as a permanent Judge.\n\nIf no vacancy arises before the expiry of the term of the additional Judge, he is appointed an additional Judge for a further term. A regular strength of additional Judges is maintained in almost every High Court which is burdened by a continuing backlog of pending cases. These arrears have assumed enormous proportions and cannot possibly be disposed of for quite some years, let alone a period of two years. A distortion of the constitutional scheme has resulted, and the aberration has persisted by reason of the failure to realise that\n\n1110 SUPlUJME COURt RllPoRtS [1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\naddition.al judges can be appointed only where the temporary increase in the business or the arrears of work can be disposed of ordinarily within two years, and that otherwise it is a case for increasing the number of permanent Judges.\n\nThe omission has Jed to a serious state of affairs, which has affected the careers and future of a large number of persons appointed as additional Judges in the High Courts. Having decided to maintain a regular strength of additional Judges on a permanent basis, the practice also grew of invariably appointing these additional Judges as permanent Judges\n\nas and when vacancies arose.\n\nThat was principally prompted by the disinclination to permit additional Judges on the expiry of their terms as such, to revert to the Bar. It must be remembered .that when the Draft Constitution including Article 199 providing for addition.al Judges was submitted for consideration there was strong opposition to the inclusion of that provision. Several legal lumi naries, including Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru objected to it on the ground that such reversion to legal practice gav!l them an unfair advantage over their colleagues and was embarrassing to the administration of justice. Therefore, the Constitution as originally enacted did not contain any provision for the appointment of additional Judges.\n\nSubseqU1mtly, however, because of persisting rrears of cases in most High Courts, the need was felt for making such provision and it was inserted as lause CO. of Art. 224 by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. It was thought that the evil of additional Judges reverting to the Bar could be prevented by absorbing them as permanent Judges, and in some Hj.gh Courts this was so:ught to be secured by obtaining from persons appointed as additional Judges an undertaking at the time of such appointment that they would not refuse appointment as permanent J_udge if it was offered to them.\n\nIn a few High Courts a further undertaking was secured to the effect that in the event of the additional Judge refusing appointment as permanent Judge or resigning before the offer was made he would not pra1tice in that High Court or in any Court or tribunal subordinate to it. It was intended that this practice should be extended to all High Courts, for a suggestion was made on June 29, 1967 by the then Chief Justice of India, Shri K.N. Wanchoo, \"when a member of the Bar is appoiQted Additional Judge, it must be with a view to making him permanent in due course.\n\nIf that is not possible, additional judgeship should not be offered to a member of\n\nthe Bar. I agree, therefore, that an undertaking should be taken from the: members of the Bar that they will accept a permanent\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1111\n\njudgeship when offered to them in due course ...• \" The practice of additional Judges being appointed permanent Judges, the senior most additional Judge being invariably appointed first, has been followed in India almost without exception.\n\nWhere no present vacancy of permanent Judge was available, the additional Judge was, on the expiry of his term, always appointed for a further term as additional Judge. We are informed that of 400 such appointments of additional Judges as permanent Judges the practice has been breached in the observance on two or three occasions only.\n\nThis practice has been uniformly and consistently followed and has crystallised into a positive rule of conduct. It is a rule of conduct followed by the Government regularly and without interruption, almost entirely without exception, and has operat(\\d consistently for twenty five years on the basis of precisely defined norms in respect of a general class.\n\nAnd it flows from the power of the State. It prescribes a channel of appointing Judges and is not inconsistent with clause (I) of Art. 217 .. So long as it is not varied or supreseded, it will operate as a rule of conduct binding on the President. On that edifice rests the efinite expectation of a large number of additional Judges. It may be added that during this period, direct appointments from the Bar as permanent Judges have numbered 100 only.\n\nIn the circumstances, the question which arises is : Are the additional Judges entitled to claim appointment as permanent Judges? ·\n\n32. It is contended that as the volume of arrears of cases pending in the High Courts is so great that they cannot be disposed of within a period of two years, the position is tht when the additional Judges were appointed the appointment should have been instead to the office of permanent judges. Alternatively, it is urged that a direction should be issued to the President to appoint the additional Judges as permanent Judges. Now the warrant of appointment issued by the President recites that the appointment is of an additional Judge for the limited period specified therein. The intention was to appoint an additional Judge and for the period specified. It is not open to the Court to alter the terms of the warrant.\n\nAlthough it may be generally possible to say that the circumstances require an increase in the number of permanent Judges and not the appointment of additional Judges, it is for the . President under Article 216 to determine what should be the number of permanent Judges. The Court cannot by judicial verdict decide\n\n1172 SUPREME COURT lµJPORTS (1982] 2 s.C.R.\n\nhow many permanent Judges are required for the High Court. And if it is not competent to do so, it can neither regard the appointment of additional Judges as an appointment of permanent Judges nor can it issue a direction to the Government that the additional judges should be appointed now as permanent judges. ·\n\n' 33. But while an additional Judge may not have a right to be deemed to be a permanent Judges or be entitled to a direction that he Ile so appointed, nonetheless he has, in my view, a right to be considered for such appointment. His case must be distinguished from the case of a person considered for direct appointment as a permanent Judge. The latter has no right to be considered for appointment. The adqitional Judge, however, bas accepted office within the framework of a definite and consistent practice practically always followed and leading him to believe that he would be considered for appointment in accordance with that practice. The requirement of an undertaking that he would not refuse an offer of appointment as permanent judge may, it is true, be a feature presently in some High Courts only, but it clearly demonstrates how the appointment of additional judges has been regarded by the President. It cannot be said that because the undertaking was required in some High Courts only, those High Courts are to be consideed to be distinct from the others where no . such undertaking has been required. The µndertaking merely confirms the practice on the basis of which the appointments of additional judges have been made in all the High Courts and which has been followed all along.\n\nThe additional Judges are persons who were found to possess the same high order of character, integrity and legal ability as is required in the case of permanent Judge.\n\nThe standards for making appointment as additional jndge or as permanent judge are not different.\n\nAll the additional Judges accepted judicial office on the assumption that the practice clothed with all the status of constitu tional reality would operate in their cases and that they would in their turn be considered for appointment as permanent judges.. All of them certainly believed that inspired by that trust, they abandoned their positions at the Bar and law practices assiduously bl)ilt up over many years. As observed already, there is nothing in the power of appointment vested in the President under clause (!) of Article 217 to prphibit the appointment of permanent judges from persons holding office as additional judges and in the order of seniority based on the date of such appointment. It has been stated by the learn d Attorney General that the Government places great\n\n> (\n\n, '\n\nS.P. GtJPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1173\n\nvalue on the experience already acquired by the additional judges and would be reluctant to allow them to revert to the Bar if on consideration they were found suitable for appointment as permanent judges. In my view, having regard to all the circumstances the additional judges must be held entitled to consideration for appoint\n\nment as permanent judges, or to consideration for further appoint ment as additional judges in the terms already set forth. That will be so in the case of all additional judges appointed to that office in the framework of the circumstances to which I have adverted.\n\n34. The next question to be considered is whether the consideration of persons serving as additional judges for appointment to the offioe . of permanent judges envisages a fresh application of the process envisaged under clause (I) of Art. 217 in respect of all the matters to which consi deration has already been given at the time of their appointment as as additional Judges. On behalf of the petitioners it is contended that the process of consultation must be confined to the question whether a vacancy in the office of permanent Judge has arisen, or, if no such vacancy has arisen, whether the High Court continues to suffer from a temporary increase in its business of by continuing arrears of work inasmuch \"as suitability for holding the office of judges has already been determined .when they were appointed additional judges. It is pointed out, and that is conceded by the learned Attorney General, that the additional Judges cannot be considered to be J.udges on probation for the purpose of appoint ment as permanent Judges. Alternatively, it is urged that whatever else may be open to consideration it is not competent for the appointing authority to consider the manner and quailty of their work as additional.judges.\n\nTo my mind, there is no doubt whatever that the provisions of clause (I) of Article 217 come into play when an additional Judge is to be considered for appointment as permanent Judge or even for further appoilltment as additional judge. The process involves the consideration of all the concomitant elements and factors which entered into the process of consultation at the time of appointment earlier as an additional Judges, but it may be clearly stated that no account can be taken of the merits of judgments, decrees and orqers rendered by him or administrative orders or directions made in the bonafide exercise of his functions as an additional Judge. In the consideration of matters under clause (I) of Art. 217 there will be a somewhat varied approach. The difference,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nand inevitably there will be a difference because the process has already been applied earlier in the case of that person, will lie in the reduced emphasis with which the consideration will be exercised Ordinarily, the presumption will be that a person foud suitable fo; appointment as an additional Judge continues to be suitable for appointment as a permanent Judge. But circumstances may arise and events may take place meanwhile which bear adversely on the mental and physical capacity, character and .integrity or other matters rendering it unwise to appoint him as a permanent Judge.\n\nThere must, however, be relevant and pertinent material before it can be said that such a person has forfeited the badge of suitability for appointment as a permanent Judge. There must be material which sufficiently convinces the reasonable mind that the person is no longer suitable to fill the high office of a Judge. It is difficult to define precisely the nature and quality of such material. If the reputation of the person is in doubt, the doubt must be rooted in reasonable foundation. It must not be forgotten that it is a case of a person who has a right to be considered for appointment. It is a right to be considered fairly. The exercise of arbitrary judgment is clearly ruled out. While I find it difficult to accept the plea that -\n\nuch a person is entitled as of right to be heard in regard to material discovered against him I have no doubt that for the purpose of discharging responsibilities invo I ved hr the process of consultation the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India will find it desirable in their discretion to ascertain from him whether there is any substance in what has been conveyed to them. In d.oing so, the two judicial functionaries will not be conceding a right of hearing to such a person. For a right to be heard involves on enquiry of certain dimensions well known to the law- In doing so, the two judicial functionaries will be acting within the scope of their legiti~\n\nmate duty of giving advice to the President if for that purpose they acquaint themselves fully and truly, so far as they reasonably conceive it necessary, to collect all available relevant information.\n\nSurely if it is open to them togatlrer information from other sources there is no valid reason why they should exclude the one person who would be in personal possession of material concerning information operating to his detriment. But much will depend on the circumstances of each case.\n\nWhat needs to be considered is that the constitutional duty to tender advice necessarily involves the obligation of ensuring that the advice, in the judgment of 'the functionary ten de ring it, is accurate and proceeds on the basis of reliable material.\n\nWhatever verifica, tion is possible, there is no doubt that recourse\n\n' ..\n\n' .....\n\nf -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1175\n\nshould be had to it. There can be no half measures, and in the discharge of that constitutional duty the response must be equal to . the responsibility.\n\n35. There is the contention that if the consultative process under clause (1) of Art. 217 applied again in all its comprehensiveness in the case of a person who has already been found suitable for appointment as additionai Judge, it must be regarded that while serving as additional Judge he was in fact put on probation. The submission appears to be misconceived. A person.is on probation when he is appointed to an office on the understanding that he will be confirmed in that same office if found suitable. No such question arises here. Then, the service of a person on probation can be terminated at will even before the expiry of the period of probation.\n\nAn additional Judge, however, is entitled to serve for the full period specified in his appointment, and can be removed only under Article 218 read with cl. ( 4) and cl. ( 5) of Article 124.\n\nThe case of Shri S.N. Kumar\n\n36.\n\nI , shall now consider the validity of the decision of the Union Government not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term. It is the admitted position that the volume of work in arrears in the High Court of Delhi continues to be sufficiently large and would have otherwise justified his appoint ment. It has been observed already that when, on the expiry of his term, an additional Judge is considered for a further term in that office his case attracts the provisions of clause '(l) of Article 217, and the President must consult the functionaries mentioned in that clause. In the case of the High Court of Delhi, consultation is called for with the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court only. The consultative process, it may be reiterated, requires that all the material in the possession of the Chief Justice of the High Court must be placed before the Chief Justice of India as well as the President. Likewise, all the material in the possession of the Chief Justice of India must be placed before the President and the Chief Justice of the High Court. So also; all the material in t'1e possession of the President must be placed before the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court. A continuous process of consultation between all three authorities is mandated, resulting ultimately in advice tender\", ed to the President by the Chief Justice of the High Court and\n\n1176 StJPREMll COtJR'r REPORtS i1~82) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe Chief Justice of India. It is not necessary for me to enter into the other questions raised in the challenge directed against the decision of the Union Government not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term.\n\nIt seems to me sufficient to say, on a review of the material before me, that there was no effective and full consul.tation between the President and the Chief Justice of the High Court on the one hand, and the Chief Justice of India on the other. The facts may be recounted briefly.\n\n37. Shri S.N. Kumar was appointed an additional Judge of the High Court of Delhi\n\n0 for a period of two years by a notification dated March 6, 1979, and he assumed charge of his office the next day. Shortly before the expiry of that period, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi addressed a letter dated February 19, 1981 to the Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs stating that while the pendency of cases in the High Court justified the appointment of additional Judges and normally the extension of the tenure of an additional Judge was recommended in the circumstances, he did not recommend the extension of Shri S.N. Kumar because, he said, serious complaints had been received, both oral and in writing, against him directly by the Minister as well as himself, that he had examined those complaints and found that some of them were not without basis, that responsible members of the Bar and some other colleagues had also complained about Sbri S.N. Kumar and that although he had no investigating agency to enquiie conclusively into the genuineness of the complaints the complaints had been persistent.\n\nIt was also pointed out that Shri S.N. Kumar bad also not been helpful in disposing of cases.\n\nFinally, it was said, some responsible members of the Bar as well as some colleagues expressed some doubts in regard to Sbri S.N. Kumar's integrity.\n\nA copy of the letter was sent to the Chief Justice of India, on March 3, 1981, the Chief Justice of India expressed a desire to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar and pointed out that the letter of the Chief Justice of the High Court appeared to be too vague to persuade one that Sbri Kumar lacked integrity. The Chief Justice of India recommended that Sbri Kumar be appointed for a further period to enable him to make an enquiry into the matter meanwhile.\n\nSbri Kumar was reappointed as an additional Judge with effect from March 7, 1981 for a period of three months.\n\nOn March 19, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of the High Court drawing his attention to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the letter dated February 19, 1981 sent by the Chief Justice of\n\n,, -\n\n_, )\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1177\n\nHigh Court appeared to suffer from vagueness and it was therefore difficult to accept that Shri Kumar lacked integrity. It appears that the Chief Justice of the High Court met the .Chief Justice of India and discussed the case of Shri Kumar with him. On March 28, 1981 he wrote to him confirming that \"with regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the matter has already been discussed between us.\" On the same day the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote to the Law Minister enclosing a copy of his letter to the Chief Justice of India and he informed the Law Minister that he had had \"an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India.' He added :\n\n\"Perhaps 'you will co1:1sider this to _be sufficient\n\nomments' on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter.\"\n\nIn reply, the Law Minister wrote back on April 15, 1981 to the Chief Justice of the High Court pointing ut that \"you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you concluded that Justice Kumar's reputation for integrity was not above board and recommended that he may not be continued.\n\nIn view of the observations of the Chief Justice oflndia asking for concrete material, it would be necessary for us to have it with your comments.\" Quite evidently, the Law Minister intended that the material should be available to the Chief Justice of India also, so that all the material should be considered by both of them. Thereafter, the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote a Jetter D.O. No. 269-HCJ /PPS dated May 7, 1981, bearing the caption \"SECRET (For Personal Attention Only)\" and reading as follows :\n\n\"Dear Mr. Minister,\n\nI am in receipt of your D.O. No. 50/2/81-Jus. dated 15th April, 1981.\n\n' Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India had made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and the same were communicated to me by you for my comments in your\n\nD.O. No. 50/2/81-Jus., dated 19th March, 1981. Th((\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nChief Justice had also written to me a letter dated 14th March, 1981; asking for '; details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\" As I wrote to you in my D.0. No. 293HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March,1981, I discussed the matter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my D.O. No. 292-HCJ/PPS, dated March 2'8, 1981 a copy of which was forwarded to you.\n\nAccordingly, it is not only enbarrassing but painful for me to write this letter.\n\nAs you, however, desire to know what material provided the basis for me to conclude that Justice Kumar's integrity was not above board, I give below some facts :\n\nIn the first half of 1980, Justice Kumar was sitting singly and was doing mostly Original Side matters but also some Appellate Side matters. Chance remarks came to my knowledge about his conduct in Court as well as about his integrity.\n\nSomewhere early in May, 1980 one of my colleagues met me and said that he was rather perturbed about information with him to the effect that if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance 'company would be decided in favour of that _party.\n\nI had not paid much attention to the earlier reports but when this _was brought to my notice, and I was at that time not the Chief Justice, I thought to myself that after the summer vacations, to save Justice Kumar from any embarrassment, he should be put on a jurisdiction other than original jurisdiction. Therefore, when as Acting Chief Justice I constituted the Benches for the second half of 1980 I put Justice Kumar in .a Division Bench to sit on the Appellate Side and Writ Jurisdiction. In my view this was a safe way to finish the rumours if the same were incorrect and thus safeguard the reputation of a Judge.\n\nSurprisingly enough, Justice Kumar did not release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his board and continued to deal with these suits even in the second half of 1980. These suits were Suit No. 1409 of 1979, Suit No. 1417 of\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1179\n\n1978 and Suit No. 1408 of 1979 filed by Jain Sudh\n\nVanaspati Ltd. and Jain Export Pvt. Ltd., against the New Iti.dia Assurance Co. Ltd.\n\nIn August, 1980, the same colleague of mine who talked to me earlier and another collague mentioned that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis-avis the aforesaid cases and some others. Since I was only acting as Chief Justice at that time, I did not want to take any precipitate action. I, however, made discreet inquiries from some of the leading counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations.\n\nThis made me IOok into the matter more carefully when to my astonishment I found that it was not only the three suits mentiohed above but that there were other Single Bench matters also which had been retained by Justice Kumar on his board despite being put in the Division Bench. There is fairly a long list of these cases. In some of these the parties involved were rich and influential including some former princes. After I was appointed Chief Justice early in January, 1981; I looked into this matter a little more deeply and made further inquiries. Some of the lawyers were non-committal and understandably so.\n\nOthers, however, asserted with some force that Justice Kumar's reput.ation was not above board. I talked to some of my other colleagues besides the two who had earlier spoken to me.\n\nThey also said that unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were not very complimentary to Justice Kumar. This made me conclude that the reputation for integrity of Justice Kumar was not what should be for a Judge of the High Court. To my mind, reputation of a integrity is just as important as person actually being aboveboard.\"\n\nThen followed reference to a complaint made by one Mr. Sabir Hussain, advocate and some data concerning the disposal of cases by Shri S. N. Kumar as well as allega.tions about some incidents in his Court concerning his conduct towards counsel.\n\n38.\n\nSome days after receiving this letter of May 7, 1981 from the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Law Minister recorded a note on May 19, 1981 mentioning therein that before issuin~Jtbe\n\n'C '\n\n\nletter the Chief Justice had requested him to treat it as a secret document confined to his personal attention, and that he had given certain reasons for wanting it treated so.· The Law Minister sought advice from his Secretariat whether the communication of the Jetter to the Chief Justice of India was unavoidable. This indicates that the Law Minister has not decided, when he received the letter, whether he should withhold it from the Chief Justice of India. It is not apparent what advice he received from his Secretariat, but it seems that he ultimately decided to honour the request of the Chief Justice of the High Court to keep the document secret. It appears that neither the Law Minister nor the Chief Justice of the High Court did ever inform the Chief Justice of India of this Jetter of May 7, 1981 and of its contents. A perusal of the subsequent correspondence confirms that to be so, and indeed that was affirmed by the Law Minister in his letter of May 29, 1981 addressed to the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\n39. On May 27, 1981 the Law Minister recorded a note in which inter alia he said :\n\n\"I presume that when C.J., Delhi and the C.J. of the Supreme Court met, the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned to me in his letter dated 7.5.81. This presumption. is raised on the basis of the letters from the Chief Justice, Delhi.\"\n\nHe went on to observe that on the question of the integrity of Mr.\n\nJustice Kumar, the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court be preferred because he had the advantage of watching the work and conduct of the Judges.\n\n40. The first point to consider here is whether the information contained in the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of the High Court was ev.er made known to the Chief Justice of India. There is no dispute that the Law Minister, in deference to the wishes of the Chief Justice of the High Court, did not communicate that information to the Chief Justice of India. The dispute centres on whether the Chief Justice of the High Court had ever conveyed the particular information to the Chief Justice of India. In my view, he never did so. There were no doubt .meetings between the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1181\n\nChief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court when the question relating to the integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar was discussed.\n\nOriginally, the Chief Justice of the High Court had spoken in the most general terms of complaint against the Judge. It seems that subsequently on March 26, 1981 the Chief Justice of the High Court told the Chief Justice of India that he doubted the integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar because \"even after Justice Kumar's allocation was changed from the original side to the appellate side, he still continued to hear the part-heard cases on the original side.\" This was mentioned in the letter dated May 22, J 981 written by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India understood the allegation in its limited scope, that is to say that Shri S.N. Kumar was committing an irregularity in retaining original jurisdiction part heard cases before him when he was now sitting on the appellate side.\n\nIn the same letter he said :\n\n\"As regards the complaint of the Chief Justice that Justice Kumar's integrity was doubtful since he continued to take old part-heard matters even after the allocation of his work was changed, I have made enquiries ... \"\n\nand observed that it appear to be common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the Judge was moved from the original side to the appellate side he continued to take up part-heard cases on which a substantial amount of time had already been spent. The Chief Justice of India concluded that in the circumstances Shri Kumar could not be said to have done anything out of the way in taking up part-heard cases even after the allocation of work was changed. The affidavit of Shri S.N. Kumar discloses that an enquiry was made of him by the Chief Justice of India on why he continued to deal with original work while sitting on the appellate side, and in this connection he specifically refers to the three suits clearly mentioned in the Jetter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of the High Court. There is nothing to suggest that the Chief Justice of India was ever apprised of the much more serious allegations contained in the letter of May 7, 1981 insinuating that the parties in these suits and in certain other cases, which as part-heard cases were said to have been retained by Shri Kumar for hearing, were rich and influential persons and that the Chief Justice of the High Court had \"made discreet enquiries from some of the leading counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations\" and that this was the material which Jed ~Q <; iout:>t on the interitr of th,~\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nJudge. This material was certainly very grave, much more than the mere allegation that the Judge was continuing to bear part-beard suits which, without anything more, could have been regarded at the worst as a mere irregularity. It took on a different complexion when considered in the light of the more dama- • ging allegations made in the letter of May 7, 1981.\n\nI do not find anything on the record from which it can be presumed that this material was ever conveyed by the Chief Justice of the High Court to the Chief Justice of India. When all the correspondence and the affidavits on the record before us are considered together, that appears to be the only conclusion. It is stregthened by the insistent request of the Chief Justice of the High Court to the Law Minister that the letter of May 7, 1981 should not be disclosed to the Chief Justice oflndia.\n\n4 l. What is the effect of that ommission ? It is clear that the Chief Justice of India had, for the purpose of tendering his advice in the process of consultation, decided to make enquiry from Shri S.N. Kumar concerning, the allegations against him.\n\nHe had enquired, and Shri Kumar bad explained, about the Judge continuing to hear part-heard cases even after he had been moved to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.\n\nHad the allegations contained in the letter of May 7, 1981 been communicated to the Chief Justice of India, he would have been in a position to determine for himself by necessary enquiries, either from Shri Kumar or from other sources, whether there was any substance at all in those allegations.\n\nSuch an enquiry was material to enable the Chief Justice to decide whether there was any substance in the allegations now made against Shri Kumar, and in case on enquiry he was of opinion that the allegations were baseless he would have, while maintaining his recommendation for a further term as additional Judge to be given to Shri Kumar, communicated his views to the Law Minister in respect of this further material. It must be remembered that the Government was deciding against a further term to Shri Kumar solely on the ground of doubtful integrity, and clearlv the allegations contained in the Jetter of May 7, 1981 were strongly influencing that decision.\n\nThat is apparent from the note drawn up by the Law Minister on May 27, 1981 where he says: \"The Chief Justice of India in bis advice proceeds from the premises that taking up partheard cases after the allocation of work is changed does not amount to lackinlin interity. ~If it ,\\were tht imple I would not have\n\n.>· )' .\n\n.. .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1183\n\njoined issue, but the details furnished by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in his letter dated 7-5·81 go farther\".\n\nIt is an open question whether the Law Minister would have continued to prefer the views held by the Chief Justice of the High Court if the Chief Justice of India had been informed of the allegations contained in the letter and on subsequent enqumes had found that there was no substance whatever in them.\n\nSo Jong as the possibility remains, the conclusion must be that the process of consultation with the Chief Justice of India was not full and effective and the withholding of important and relevant material from the Chief Justice of India has vitiated the process.\n\nIn my view, there was a violation of the Constitutional requirement mandated by clause (I) of Art. 217. It follows that the question whether Shri S.N. Kumar should be given a further term as additional Judge has to be reconsidered, and a decision taken only after full and effective consultation as envisaged by the constitutional mandate.\n\nThe power to transfer a High Court Judge under clause (/) of Art. 222.\n\n42, The most strenuous debate before us has been raised over the scope and content of the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another under clause (I) of Art. 222.\n\nThe issues\n\nraised are of great importance to the administration of justice and E undeniably can produce far reaching consequences .\n\n45.\n\nThe matter has already received the attention of this Court in Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Seth and Anr.(1) and the majority opinion expressed therein is that the consent of the Judge is not essential to his transfer.\n\nIt is urged that the view requires reconsideration and that we, as a larger Bench, are competent to do so.\n\n44.\n\nIt is desirable in the first place to trace the history of the\n\n\\.., provision.\n\nAlmost from the inception of the High Courts in India Judges appointed to one High Court were thereafter appointed to G another High Court. The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe Government of India Act did not contain any provJS1on corresponding to Art. 222 of our Constitution. But by section 2 and subs. ( 1) of s. 6 of _....;- the India (Miscellaneous Prqvjsion) ~Act, 1944 statutory recogni- H\n\n(1) [1978J l S.C.R. 423,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\ntion was given to the practice by enacting with retrospective effect clause (c) in the proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 220, which said :\n\n\"( c).\n\nThe office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by His Majesty to be Judge of the Federal Court or of another High Court.\"\n\nThatwas the only provision in the Act which could be said to constitute evidence of the practice of moving a Judge from one High Court to another Court. The clause was included as clause (c) of the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 193 of the Draft Constitution, and there was a suggestion that another clause be added as follows:-\n\n\"(d) Every Judge shall be liable to be transferred to other High Courts.\"(1)\n\nThe peremptory nature of the suggested clause may be noted. The Drafting Committee considered the amendment unnecessary and pointed out that there was no bar under Article 193 to a Judge of one High Court being appointed a Judge of another High Court, and drew attention to the existing clause (c) providing that the office of the Judge would be vacated on the Judge being appointed to any other Court.\n\nIn regard to another suggestion that a convention should be established whereby a proportion of Judges in every High Court could be recruited from outside the Province, the Drafting Committee observed that there was no bar to such recruitment or to the transfer of a Judge of a High Court to another High Court. It seems, however, that subsequently the Drafting Committee changed its mind and on reconsideration decided to incorporate an express provision for the transfer cif High Court Judges. The provision empowered the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court. This provision was amended subsequently by including therein an obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India in the matter. Consequently, clause (c) of the proviso to clause (I) of Art. 217 was altered so that in place of the word \"appointed\" the word \"transferred\" would be read in conjunction .\n\n(I) B. Shive Rao: The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Document~\n\nyo1. IV P 16~.\n\n....\n\n.\\:\n\ns.i>. GuFrA v. UNION (Pathak, J.)\n\n11SS\n\nwith the words \"to any other High Court\". The reasons given by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly for proposing this provision may be mentioned :\n\n\"The Drafting Committee felt that since all the High Courts so far as the appointment of judges is concerned form now a central subject, it was desirable to treat all the judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single cadre like the I.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred from one High Court to another. If such power was not reserved to the Centre the administration of justice might become a very difficult matter. It might be necessary that one judge may be transferred from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not be locally available.\n\nSecondly, it might be desirable to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court because it might be desirable to have a man who is unaffected by local politics and local jealousies. We thought therefore that the power to transfer should be placed in the hands of the Central Government.\n\nWe also took into account the fact that this power of transfer of judges from one High Court to another may be abused.\n\nA Provincial Government might like to transfer a particular judge from its High Court because that judge had become very inconvenient to the Provincial Government by the particular attitude that he had taken with regard to certain judicial matters, or that he had made a nuisance of himself by giving decisions which the Provincial Government did not like.\n\nWe have taken care that in effecting these transfers no such considerations ought to prevail. Transfers ought to take place only on the ground\n\nof convenience of the general administration. Consequently we have introduced a provision that such transfers shall\n\nG take place in consultation with the Chief Justice of India who can be trusted to advise the Government in a manner which is not affected by local or personal prejudices.\n\nThe only question, therefore, that remained was whether such transfer should be made so obligatory as not\n\n1186 si.Ji>RBMil COURT Rili>oilrs [1982} 1 s.c.il.\n\nto involve any provision for compensation for loss incurred. we felt that that would be a severe hardship .... '. . The Drafting Committee felt therefore justified in making provisions that where such transfer is made it would be permissible for Parliament to allow a personal allowance to be given to a judge so transferred.\"\n\nThe statement gave reasons for making the express prov1S1on conferring power to transfer and proceeded on the basis that the transfer could be made obligatory on the Judge concerned, and that he should be relieved to some degree against the hardship occasioned thereby provision was made for payment of compensation. Incidentally, the statement also shows that the Drafting Committee was under the impression that the Judges of the High Courts throughout India should be treated as constituting a single cadre like the Indian Civil , Service. The statement can be regarded as of historical relevance only. In so far as it records the impression that the Judges of the High Courts form a single cadre it proceeds on an impression whicl1, as I shall presently show, is totally erroneous.\n\nBut it does mention the reasons which prompted the Drafting Committee to include the provision for transfer and compensation. The clause providing for the payment of compensatory allowance to a transferred Judge during the period he served as a Judge of the other High Court was omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 but thereafter was reinstated in appropriate language by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963.\n\n45. The present Art. 222 reads :\n\n. \"222(1). The President may, after consultation with\n\nte Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court.\n\n (2) When a Judge bas been or is so transferred, he shall, during the period he serves, after the commencement of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, as a Judge of the other High Court, be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined, by Parliament by law and, until so determined such as compensatory allowance as the President\n\nmay by order fix.\"\n\n............ _\n\n. •\n\n.... >\n\ns.fl. dtJJITA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1181\n\nI think it is necessary to remove the impression that the Judges of the High Courts constitute a single All India cadre. The consti tutional scheme embodied in Chpter-V envisages each High Court as a distinct entity from every other High Court. It is a complete, self-contained and self-sufficient institution, independent of the others and not related to them in any manner. Every High Court draws its own powers and jurisdiction from the provisions of the Constitution, and in no way does it share them with the other High Courts. When a Judge is appointed to a High Court, he is appointed to that High Court only. It is for that reason clause\n\n(c) of the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 217 enacts that the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being transferred to any other High Court. He is the holder of a distinct office, that of a Judge of the High Court to whic.h he is appointed. It will be noticed that the consultative process envisaged in clause (I) of Art. 217 involves in his appointment requires the President to consult the Chief Justice of the High Court to which his appointment is proposed\\and the Governor of the State concerned, besides the Chief Justice of India • The Chief Justtce of High Court is consulted because, as has been observed earlier, he is intimately concerned with the appointment of a competeent Judge to meet the particular requirements of his Courts.\n\nThe Governor of the State likewise is consulted .because he is concerned about the quality of the administration of justice at its highest level in the State.\n\nIn the case of both functionaries, they are involved with the appointment in order to ensure tnat the Judge appointed is most suitable in relation to that High Court. The interests and needs of that High Court alone occupy the mind of these two functionaries.\n\nA person may be found unsuitable, by reason of association or other links, for being a Judge of the particular High Court, while he may be free from that embarrassment in respect of the other High Courts. It may be observed that the Presidential Warrant appointing the Judge specifically mentions that the appointment is as a Judge of the High Court named therein.\n\nMoreover, the prescribed Form itself of the oath, which the Judge must make and subscribe before entering upon his office shows clearly that the appointment is confined to that High Court. We have been referred to Hira Singh v. Jai Singh,(1) wehere a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that an additional Judge of that court who had already _taken oath on such appointment was not obliged to take oath again on his appointment as a permanent\n\n(1) AIR 1937 All., 588,\n\nStJPitBME COtJRt REi>oRTs [198.2] 2 s.c.a.\n\nJudge. The case is clearly distinguishable, for it was one where the Judge continued to be a Judge of that court. He had not been transferred to another High Court under our Constitution, the Form reads:\n\n\"!, A.B., having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of the High Court at (or of) ............ do swear in the name of God solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by Jaw established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or illwill and that I will uphold the Constitution and the Jaws.\" (1)\n\nThere is no All India Service of High Court Judges. Art. 215 speaks of a High Court for each State, and Art. 216 plainly declares that the High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and other Judges.\n\nThe Chief Justice is a Chief Justice of that High Court only and so are the other Judges. The Judges of a High Court owe their responsibilities and discharge their functions in relation to that High Court only. They have no constitutional connection and no legal relationship with the body of Judges of any other High Court.\n\nThis position, in my view, cannot admit of any doubt.\n\n46. That being the position how then can the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court be viewed in law ? A Judge appointed to a High Court is entitled to continue as a Judge of that High Court until he attains the age of 62 years, unless of course he resigns his office or is removed from it.\n\nHis transfer to another High Court involves the vacation of his office in that High Court, that is to say, his appointment as a Judge of that High Court stands terminated. This is confirmed by clause (c) of the proviso to clause (I) of Art. 217.\n\nSimultaneously, without anything more the transfer affects his appointment to the other High Court to which he is being sent. An order of transfer under clause (I) of Art. 222 therefore, is a transaction in two parts, the termination of the appointment as a Judge of the original High Court and the simultaneous appointment as a Judge of the other High Court.\n\nThat view is supported by the circumstance that the power of\n\n(1) Form No. VIII in the Third Schedule of the Constitution.\n\nS.P. GUP'tA v. UNION (Pathak, i.)\n\ntransfer is vested in the President. It is significant in this connection that the President is also the appointing authority in the case of appointments made under clause (1) of Art. 217 and is also vested with the power of removal in cases falling under Art. 218 read with clause ( 4) of Art. 124. Therefore it was necessary that the authority who has been otherwise vested with the power to appoint a Judge and to terminate his appointment should also be the authority to transfer him.\n\nIt may be added that inasmuch as the transfer constitutes an appointment of the Judge to the other High Court, Art. 219 comes into play and, therefore, the transferred Judge must, before he enters upon his office in that High Court, make or subscribe an oath or affirmation according to the prescribed Form.\n\n47. It is necessary to observe that the appointment to the other High Court involved in the order of transfer is an appointment attributable to the power under clause (I) of Art. 222, and cannot be regarded as an appointment under clause (1) of Art. 217.\n\nWhereas in the latter the Constitution requires consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, in the case of an appointment by transfer the Chief Justice of India alone is involved in the consultation. The framers of the Constitution evident!}' considered it unnecessary to include other functionaries. If they had to be included, they would have consisted of the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of\n\nthe High Court to which the Judge was originally appointed as well as the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the Judge was being transferred. It was apparently considered that the consultation with the Chief Justice of India would suffice to take into account the relative interests of the two High Courts and the President would take into account the interests of the two States concerned. In this regard, while there is no constitutional requirement expressly mentioned in clause ( !) of Art. 222, it is always open to the President and the Chief Justice of India to make necessary enquiries of the two States and the two High Courts affected by the transfer.\n\nThe merit of involving the Chief Justice of India alone in the consultative process under clause (!)of Art. 222 lies in this that the process of consultation can be more epeditiousiy completed and is to be preferred to the inevitably protracted process called for by a constitutional requirement involving two States and two High Courts. Whereas the Chief Justice of India can informally ascertain the views of the Chief Justice of the High Courts and\n\n1190 SUPRBMB COllkt kEPOlttS (I 982) 2 s.c.i.\n\nsatisfy himself whether he should advise in favour of the transfer, the President can similarly ascertain the views of the two States.\n\nThe need for a formal presentation before the President of advice from the Chief Justices of the two High Courts, from the Governors of the two States and from the Chief Justice of India is thus eliminated.\n\n48. I shall now examine whether the power to transfer under clause ( 1) of Art. 222 can be exercised only after securing the consent of the Judge concerned or even without his consent. As I have observed, the power to transfer was not expressly conferred by any provision under the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nWhat was done was to clarify that when a Judge appointed to one High Court was thereafter appointed to another High Court, he must be deemed to have vacated his office in the original High Court. In other words, it was made clear that on his subsequent appointment he could not be regarded as a Judge of two High Courts. That, it seems to me, was the intent or the speeches made by the Earl of Munster in the House of Lords and the Secretary of State for India, Mr. L.S. Amery, and Mr. Pethick Lawrence in the House of Commons when the India (tvfiscellaneous Provisions) Bill was intro duced in the two Houses.\n\nAlthough they spoke of \"the transfer\" of High Court Judges, it is apparent that the word was used in the popular sense. It was not used in the particular sense of an obligatory\n\ntransfer. There was no provision then in the Government of India Act for the appointment to another High Court of a sitting Judge without his consent. Indeed, the word used in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-s. (2) of s.220 of the Act was \"appointed\". That was also the word used in the original clause (c) of the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 217 of our Draft Constitution. It was only when Art. 222 was added that the word \"appointed\" was substituted by the word \"transferred\" The difference between the two words \"appointment\" and \"transferred\" in our Constitution is borne out by the different terms used in clause (c) of the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 217, where it is declared that the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being \"appointed\" by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or on his being \"transferred\" by the President to any other High Court. It is true that sub-clause (iii) of clause (b) of paragraph 11 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, which defines \"actual service\", speaks of \"joining time on transfer from a High Court to the Supreme Court or one High Court to another.\" To my mind, that plainly is an error in the drafting of the provision.\n\n) ,.>-.\n\n,.. .\n\nj -\n\n$.1>. GtJP'tA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1191\n\nIt would seem that some of the provisions in the Schedules have not been framed with the care they deserved, because in another part, Form IV in the Third Schedule, the Form of Oath or Affirmation to be taken by the Chief Justice of India before entering upon his office refers to him as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India.\n\nIn clause (1) of Art. 124, and throughout the other provisions in the body of the Constitution, he is described as the Chief Justice of India.\n\n49. It seems to me that clause (I) of Art. 222 was specifically enacted in our Constitution for the purpose of empowering the President to transfer a Judge without necessarily securing his consent.\n\nThe power was intended to be in the widest terms and subject only to the obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India. If transfer was conditioned further by the imperative of securing the consent of the Judge concerned, then having regard to past practice there was in fact no need to enact Art. 222.\n\nA Judge can always be removed from one High Court to another with his consent. That had not infrequently been done during the ninety years of the High Courts in British India, and there was no reason why it could not have continued in tle High Courts under our Constitution. But the framers of the Constitution intended a departure from that position.\n\nBy clause (I) of Art. 222 in the terms enacted, they did not include the condition that the Judge concerned must consent to his transfer.\n\n50. It was contended before us that clause (I) of Art. 222 was incorporated in the Constitution so that the Chief Justice of India could be brought in for the purpose of ensuring that the transfer was effected in the public interest only and not for the personal benefit of a Judge.\n\nThe argument is without substance. Public power of this nature can be employed only in the public interest.\n\nIt may be that incidentally the transfer may advantage the Judge, but in every cae the primary ground for transfer must be public interest. It seems to me clear that unless clause (I) of Art. 222 had been enacted, it was not possible for the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another without his consent. If a transfer only with his consent was contemplated, it would have been sufficient to rely on the power of the President under clause (I) of Art. 217 to appoint the Judge to another High Court, and cl:.iuse (c::) of the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 217 would remove any doubt that\n\n1192 StJPRBME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nby such appointment the Judge vacated his office in the original High Court. There is no need to confer power in express terms to do a specific act which can be done with the consent of the parties under the umbrella of a general power.\n\n51. It is worthy of note that where the element of consent was considered necessary, it was expressly mentioned in the Constitution. The proviso to Art. 224A imposes that condition when a former Judge of a High Court is requested by the Chief Justice of a High Court to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court. So also is the provision in Art. 128 in respect of former Judges of the Supreme Court, the Federal Court or of a High Court requested to sit and act as a Judge of the Supreme Court. In contrast, when under clause (I) of Art. 127 a Judge of a High Court is requested to sit as an ad hoc Judge of the Supreme Court when a quoram of the Judges of the Supreme Court is not available, the Judge of the High Court is bound to accept the request and his consent is not necessary.\n\nReference may also be made to the position in England where under s.4 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 the' High Court is divided into three divisions, the Chancery Division, the King's Bench Division and the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. The puisne Judges of the High Court are attached to the several divisions by a direction of the Lord Chancellor. Sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act provides that any such Judge may with his consent be transferred by a like direction from one of the Divisions to another. It will be noticed that although the three Divisions are part of the same High Court, nonetheless the statute el)pressly insists that on a Judge being attached to one of the Divisions he can be transferred to another Division only with his consent. The provision was reiterated in sub-s. (4) of s. l of the Supreme Ccurt of Judicature (Amendment) Act, 1944.\n\nIt is contended that the element of consent must be imported in cl. (I) of Art. 222 because a fresh oath or affirmation is necessary when a Judge enters upon his office in the other High Court, and whether he will make and subscribe such oath or affirmation rests necessarily within his volition. To my mind that consideration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion sought to be inferred. If a transferred Judge refuses to make and subscribe such oath or affirmation he could be regarded, it seems as guilty of misbehaviour warranting his removal.\n\n<A...·•\n\n\" ..\n\n~ -\n\n.. . >.\n\n,._\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1193\n\nBut the principal ground in support of 'the submission that a transfer of a Judge of a High Court can only be with his consent lies in the argument that such a transfer amounts to a punishment of the Judge without trial and therefore the principle of judicial independence is gravely prejudiced. That submission, to my mind, must be tested by an examination of the grounds on which a transfer is permissible.\n\nClause (1) of Art. 222 does not mention the grounds on which the Judge may be transferred. Plainly, inasmuch as it is in the nature of a public power vested in a functionary of the State, it can be exercised only in the public interest.\n\nPublic interest is the touchstone on which every transfer must be tested.\n\nThat is the _ necessary limitation implicitly circumscribing the exercise of power under clause (1) of Article 222.\n\nAll grounds which can be said to fall within that rubric may be entertained. But no ground which falls within the scope of Art. 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 124 can be brought within that scope. The grounds envisaged by those provisions are \"proved misbehaviour or incapacity\".\n\nIn relation to them express provision has been made by the Constitution, the grounds being so grave that if established they can result in one pen111ty only, that of removal of the Judge.\n\n54. The removal of a Judge is a matter of the greatest seriousness. It affects not only the Judge personally but also, in a larger sense, affects the general reputation of the Judiciary.\n\nConsequently, the Constitution, by clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 124 and by The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has made the removal subject to a constitutional and statutory process consisting of several stages at each of which the action for removal is screened.\n\nThe Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 requiries a notice cf motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of a Judge. The notice must be signed by a hundred members of the House of the People, where notice is given in that House and by fifty members of the Council of State where the notice is given in the Council.\n\nThe Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, may consult such person as he thinks fit and after considering such material, if any, as may be available to him, he may either admit the motion or refuse to admit the same. If the motion is admitted, the Speaker or the Chairman will then constitute a Committee for the purpose of making an investigation into the grounds on which the removal is sought. The Committee consists of three members, one chosen from among the Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme Court, the other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nbeing a Chief Justice of a High Court and the third being a distinguished jurist. The Committee is required to frame definite charges against the Judge, and such charges together with the statement of the grounds must be communicated to the Judge, who will be given a reasonable opportunity of presenting a written statement of defence.\n\nWhere it is alleged that the Judge is unable to discharge the duties of his office efficiently due to any physical or mental incapacity and the allegation is denied, the Committee may arrange for the medical examination of the Judge by a Medical Board appointed by the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman.\n\nThe Medical Board undertakes the medical examination of the Judge and submits a report to the Committee. During the investigation, the Committee is obliged to give reasonable opportunity to the Judge of cross-examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being heard in his defence. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Committee is required to submit its report to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be. If the report of the Committee finds that the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour or does not suffer from any incapacity no further steps can be taken in either House of Parliament and the motion pending in the House cannot be proceeded with. If the report finds that the Judge is guilty, then the motion together with the report of the Committee, is taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses in which it is pending.\n\nJf the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament in accordance with clause (4) of Art. 124 read with Article 218, then the misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge is deemed to have been proved and an address praying for the removal of the Judge must be presented to the President by each House of Parliament in the same session in which the motion has been adopted. It is clear that where an allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity is levelled against a Judge, he has the opportunity to defend himself including the right to lead evidence as well as to cross-examine witnesses produced against him.\n\nAt every stage of the process the statute provides for careful 6consideration whether the motion for removal should be continued. Allegations which are so grave as to attract such detailed procedure and which afford full opportunity to the Judge to defend himself cannot possibly be made a ground for transfer of the Judge.\n\nIn my view, the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity are clearly ruled out from the scope of clause (I) of Art. 222.\n\nI am convinced that the transfer of a Judge under that provision cannot be made for the purpose of punishing him. It was never intended that the power shoµld b\\: exercised to impose a penalty by way of punish-\n\n. \"\n\n...\n\n• )i .\n\n.....\n\n' ...\n\n.... •\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1195\n\nmeat.\n\nTo permit that would be to permit a violation of the principle of judicial independence, for the only grounds envisaged by the Constitution for punishment are grounds constituting misbehaviour and the penalty for which is removal from office.\n\n55. In the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another the principle of judicial independence and the rights of the Judge are protected by two safeguards.\n\nThe first is that incorporated in clause (I) of Art. 222, that is to say, the obligation of the President to consult the Chief Justice of India. The Constitution expects the Chief Justice of fodia to ensure in the process of consultation that the power to transfer is not used arbitrarily against a Judge of a High Court, that it is not employed as a disguise for punishing him, and that, even if the ground for the proposed transfer is made out, it will be in the public interest to effect the transfer. In this regard, the consultation with the Chief Justice of India must, in my opinion, extend to the entire gamut of the grounds on which the transfer is proposed, even where the grounds are incorporated in a policy. The protection afforded to the Judge by the obligation of consultation with the Chief Justice of India is intended to be a complete protection. It must be borne in mind that the Judge concerned is entitled to continue in the High Court to which he has been appointed for the full period of his tenure.\n\nIt has already been observed that the transfer can be effected without the consent of the Judge. It is, therefore, necessary to construe the scope of the safeguard of consultation in its fullest comprehension. To properly discharge his responsibility in the matter, the Chief Justice of India must consider himself obliged to entertain not only the material furnished by the Preside.1t to him but he must also make as full an enquiry as he conveniently can for the purpose of determining whether a transfer should be advised.\n\nIn that process, he must determine not only whether the grounds on 'Vhich the transfer proposed are made out but he must also consider as relevant the personal circumstances of the Judge concerned. It is ultimately in the public interest that the personal circumstances of the Judge should be taken into consideration, for there may be a case where they may hinder the proper discharge of his duties in the High Court to which he is transferred. In that connection it is only right that the Chief Justice of India should satisfy himself by enquiring from the Judge himself about what he has to say in the matter of his transfer,\n\nJ4'\n\nI 196\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R\n\nboth in regard to the grounds for the transfer as well as in regard to any hardship or inconvenience which may be suffered by him by such transfer. As a sitting Judge he is entitled to be informed of the proposed transfer and of the grounds therefore because his right to continue as a Judge of the High Court is placed in jeopardy. It is a very different case from the transfer of an officer who is a member of a service and is ordinarily transferable.\n\nAs has been observed earlier, a Judge of High Court is not a member of any All India Service of Judges. It may be made clear at this stage that the Judge does not have a right of hearing in the sense in which that right is generally understood in law.\n\nThe scope and degree of inquiry by the Chief Justice of India must rest in his discretion.\n\nAll that is necessary is that the ]udge should know why his transfer is proposed and he should be able to acquaint the Chief Justice of India of any reason why he should not be transferred. It my also be added that the process of consultation envisaged under clause {I) of Art. 222 requires that all the material in the possession of the President must be placed before the Chief Justice of India, as well as such other information which he may need and may call for in order to render his advice.\n\n57.\n\nThe advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India should ordinarily be accepted by the President and in this regard the observations made in Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal (supra) will be fully attracted. Chandrachud, J. as he then was, speaking for the majority of the Court, relying on what Bhagwati & Krishna Iyer, JJ. said in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab,(1) observed \"that in all conceivable cases, consultation with the Chief Justice of India should be accepted by the Government of India and that the Court will have an opportunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have entered inro the verdict of the Executive if it departs from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India.\" 'In practice, the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as promoted by oblique considerations vitiating the order.' Krishna Iyer, J. observed\n\n\"Although the opinion of the Chief Justice of India may not be binding on the Government it is entitled to\n\n~5) [1975] 1 SCR,.\n\n...\n\n. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1197\n\ngreat weight and is normally to be accepted by the Government because the power under Article 222 cannot be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily.\"\n\nand further :\n\n\"It must also beborne in mind that if the Government departs from the opinion of the Chief Justice of India it has to justify its action by giving cogent and convincing reasons for the same and, if challenged, to prove to the satisfiction of the Court that a case was made out for not accepting the advice of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nHe added:\n\n\"The danger of arbitrary action or unsavoury exercise has been minimised by straight-jacketing of the power of transfer. Likewise, the high legal risk of invalidation of any Presidential order made in the teeth of the Chief Justice's objection, runs in an added institutional protection.\n\nFor it is reasonable for the court before which a Judge's transfer is challenged, to take a skeptic view and treat it as suspect if the Chief Justice's advice has been ignored.\"\n\nI am fully in agreement with those observations. It is open to a Judge who is ordered to be transferred to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and seek judicial relief against the transfer on the ground _ of violation of clause ( l) of Art. 222 as construed by this Court.\n\nThis constitutes the second of the two safeguard mentioned earlier.\n\n58.\n\nWhile on this point, I think it necessary to emphasis that the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another under clause ( l) of Art. 222 is an extraordinary power. Inasmuch as it can be exercised without the consent of the Judge, it can constitute a threat to the sense of independence and impartiality of the Judge.\n\nIt must, in my opinion, be used most sparingly and only for very strong reason.\n\nIt must be clearly understood that the onus of justifying the transfer lies heavily on the State.\n\n59. In the debates before us pointed reference was made to a policy contemplated by the Gov\\lrQment in reard to the transfer of\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nof the High Court. It seems to me that any policy governing the application of clause (I) of Art. 222 must conform in all respects to the scope and content of clause (I) of Art. 222. The power to transfer is to be found in that clause, and every act of the Government be it the framing and adoption of a policy or the actual order of transfer, must fl!ll completely within the scope of that provision. The entire content of power vested in the President respecting the transfer of Judges of the High Courts must be traced to the confines of the clause. 'Accordingly, any policy framed and adopted in this behalf must be tested on the criterion of public interest, and it must be clearly understood that \"public interest\" means here the interest of the administration of justice.\n\nThat is the sole purpose of the grant of the power under clause (l) of Art. 222.\n\nNow, if the framing and adoption of a .Policy is an act of the President under the power\n\nconferrd by clause (I) of Art. 222, it must be subjected to consultation with the Chief Justice of India. That is an imperative conditiqn grafted on the exercise of all power relating to the transfer of Judges of the High Courts. That the framing and adoptioq of a policy should be governed by that condition is easily explicable if it is appreciated that the policy constitutes the basic consider11tion entering the order of transfer.\n\nAll considerations controlling the transfer of a Judge of a High Court must fall within the scope of the consultative process. The Constitution intends that the Chief Justice of India should be consulted before a transfer is ordered by the President.\n\nThe consultation must travel over the entire ~ea of consideraiion which prompts the transfer. The scope of consultation is not limited to any particular. It must be remembered that the Constitution has insisted on consultation with the Chief Justice of India in order to protect the administration of justice and its central principle, the independence of the judiciary, from arbitrary encroachment by executive power.\n\n60. It is contended that policy making is the exclusive and absolute preserve of Governmental power.\n\nWhile that may be so ordinarily; it cannot be accepted here having regard to the plain terms of clause (l) of Art. 222.\n\nIt is also urged that the policy can always be tested in a court of law for its constitutional validity. and therefore the intervention of the Chief Justice of India in his consultative capacity need not be contemplated.\n\nIt is not possible to agree.\n\nTb_e framing of a policy is an administrative exercise, and calls for mking a choice of one or more considerations for executive action:withi~ the fielq gf several consideration~. When the\n\nx . \"\n\n. ,..\n\n$.!>. GUPtA v. ONION (Pathak, J.) iI99\n\nChief Justice of India is consulted ori the formation of a policy by the President, the consultation involves an administrative choice of operating on an administrative plane. When the President consults the Chief Justice of India under clause (I) of Art. 222, it is consultation in relation to an executive act.\n\nThe transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice, High Court of\n\nPatna.\n\n61.\n\nShri K.B.N. Singh was a Judge of the High Court of Patna from September 15, 1966. He was appointed Chief Justice of that Cout and assumed charge on July 19, 1976.\n\nOn January 19, 1981 the President issued a notification, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transferring Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras with effect from the day be assumed charge of that office. The transfer has been challenged in Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981 and Transferred Cases Nos. 2, 6 and 24 of 1981.\n\nThe principal contentions of the' petitioners are firstly, that there has been no effective consultion as envisaged by clause (1) of Art. 222 inasmuch as all the material considered by the Chief Justice of India.was not placed before the President, and the process of consultation was not marked by fair procedure, and, secondly, that the transfer cannot be said to have been made in the public interest, and if different considerations have prevailed with the President and the Chief Justice of India, neither can be described as related to public interest.\n\n62.\n\nAn examination of the several affidavits and of the correspondence between the Government and the Chief Justice of India discloses the following facts :\n\n63.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India decided on visiting the High Court of Patna in February, 1980 in order to meet the Judges of the High Court and members of the Bar.\n\nAfter informing Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of his proposed visit, he proceeded to Patna and during his stay there on February 24, 25 and 26, 1980 he met the Judges of the High Court individually and interviewed individual members of the Bar, and also met Judges of the District Court and members of the District Court Bar. Of twenty advocates of the High Court whom be met, there were fifteen senior advocates suggested by Sbri K.B.N. Singh. He !!Iso met the members of the Advocats' Association collectively at\n\n1100 SlJt>REMll COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.R.\n\na function arranged by them.\n\nAmong other things he had also come to know that Shri K.B.N. Singh's mother was old and infirm and not in a good state of health. At that time be did not indicate to Shri K.B.N. Singh that there was any proposal to transfer him to another HighCourt because at that time there was no proposal to transfer him. It is clear that he returned from Patna greatly perturbed about the conditions prevailing there, and the matter continued to engage his mind thereafter.\n\nIt was then that he conceived of the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh. There was at that time a proposal by the Government that the Chief Justices of all the High Courts should be transferred as a matter of policy to other High Courts, so that each High Court would be headed by a Chief Justice from outside.\n\nNo final formulation of the scheme had been reached and no modelity or mechanism had been decided on for implementing such a policy.\n\nFrom the correspondence and other material on the record it is apparent that the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister were engaged in continuous discussion over a long period with regard to the appointment of the Chief Justice of High Courts. The discussion was embodied in their letters and also took place in personal meetings and over the telephone.\n\nOn December 7, 1980, the Chief Justice of India wrote to the Law Minister \"in furtherance to the discussion which we had yesterday\", stating that be was \"firmly opposed to a wholesale transfer of the Chief Justices of High Courts'' and that \"such transfers may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons\" and \"personal considerations must, in the matter of such transfers be wholly kept out\". He mentioned that the transfer of some of the Chief Justices bad been engaging his attention for the past few months and in this connection he had made personal enquiries and had met several lawyers and may Judges of the High Courts concerned.\n\nHe recommended that Shri KD. Shara, then acting as Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajastban, should be transferred as Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala, and Shri K.B.N. Singh should be transferred from the High Court of Patna as the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court. It appears that it was then realised that certain difficulties would arise if Shri K.D. Sharma was transferred to the High Court of Kerala. In a letter to the Prime Minister written on December 18, 1980 the Chief Justice of India proposed that the transfer of Sbri K.B.N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan should await further consideration.\n\nAfter a telephonic talk with the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India wrote on December 20,\n\n...,;.._ -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1201\n\n1980 proposing the transfer of Shri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras, as Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala and the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras. On January 5, 1981, the Chief tJustice of India telephoned Shri K.B.N. Singh and informed him of the likelihood of his transfer to Madras.\n\nHe asked him if he had anything to say in the matter. Shri K.B.N. Singh wished to know why he was being transferred and the Chief Justice of India informed him that it was \"Government policy\" and that it was proposed to transfer Shri M.M. Ismail from. Madras and it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place.\n\nShri K.B.N.\n\nSingh informed the Chief Justice of India on the telephone that his mother was bed-ridden and he was not in a position to go with his mother to Madras. No other personal difficulty was disclosed.\n\nShri K.B.N. Singh also observed that if his transfer was insisted on he would prefer to: resign. The Chief Justice of India requested him not to act in haste but to give the matter close thought, and he was also making a note of the difficulty mentioned by him and \"it will have to be taken into consideration before a final decision was taken.\" The Chief Justice of India requested him to come to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer. On January 8, 1981 at 7.30 p.m. Shri K.B.N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India at his residence in Delhi and was with him for some time.\n\nHe discussed the question of his mother's advanced age and illness; that was the only personal difficulty which he mentioned in the matter of his proposed transfer to Madras. The Chief Justice of India told him that be was unable to agree that the mother's circumstances presented any serious difficulty because there were other dependable persons in his family who could look after the mother and that, in any case, his brother Shri S.B.N. Singh, who was practising in the High Court, was quite capable of looking after the mother.\n\nShri K B.N. Singh replied that bis mother was particularly devoted to him and he could not leave her to the care of his brother and other membersof the family.\n\nHe mentioned that some baseless complaints may have been made to I he Chief Justice of India and that he desired to remove any wrong impression created by those complaints. The Chief Justice of India assured him that he was not proceeding on the basis of baseless complaints and that he did not believe that his conduct was blameworthy, but that if he wanted to explain any matter which according to him had created dis-satisfaction about the working of the High Court he was welcome to do so.\n\nUpon\n\n1202 SUPREME COURT REPOkTS [1982] 2 s.c.k.\n\nthat, Shri K.B.N. Singh told the Chief Justice how certain persons conn.ected. with the High Court were influenced by communal\n\ncons1derat10ns and how he, on his own part, did not permit communal or other extraneous considerations to influence him administratively or judicially.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India assured him that he did not hold him to blame, but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him and that had created unnecessary misunderstanding and dis-satisfaction.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India conveyed to Shri K.B.N. Singh that his transfer was proposed in the public interest and that it was not made by way of punishment, and that it was thought of also by the transfer of Shri Ismail from Madras to Kerala.\n\n64.\n\nIt seems clear that Shri K.B. N. Singh was informed by the Chief fostice of India in full detail of the proposal to transfer him from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras, and keeping in mind the telephonic conversation between them on January 5, 1981 and the personal discussion on January 8, 1981 it is\n\napparent that Shri K.B. N. Singh was being transferred not because of any wrong or fault on his part or for any conduct for which blame could be attached to him, but because people were exploiting their proximity to him in matters which had created dissatisfaction ·\n\nand unnecessary misunderstanding in the High Court at Patna. It is also apparent that Shri K.B. N. Singh was aware that such a situation prevailed because he attempted to clear himself of any blame in connection with what was happening. He was invited by the Chief Justice of India to say whatever he wanted to in the matter which\n\n\"according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court\". It is clear that the matter wa~ discussed fully between the Chief Justice of India and Shri K.B.N. Singh and the latter had aniple opportunity to say what he wanted to. And it is also clear that the proposal to transfer him from Patna was not by way of punishment. It is unfortunate that a situation had been allowed to develop'in legal and judicial circles at Patna which could only be remedied by his transfer. That the transfer was intended to Madras was occasioned by the circumstance that Shri M.M. Ismail was being transferred from Madras to Kerala and it was necessary to send a senior and experienced Chief Justice to the High Court of i\\ladras.\n\nThe difficulty expressed by Shri K.B.N. Singh in regard to the condition ofliis mother's health was also considered by the Chief Justice of India, who felt that Shri S.B.N, Singh, his brother practising law in the High Court, and other dependable person in the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1203\n\nfamily at Patna could be relied on to look after the mother. Every relevant circumstance, including the personal difflculty mentioned by Shri K.B.N. Singh was considered carefully and objectively by the Chief Justice of India and on an assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances he came to the conclusion that notwithstanding any difficulty posed by a different language in Madras, as Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh was an experienced and senior High Court Chief Justice, he should be transferred from Patna to Madras. I am satisfied that a fair procedure was adopted and all that could reasonably be done in .,. the circumstances was done in the matter,\n\n;. .\n\n65. It is urged there was no full and effective consultation between the Chief Justice of India and the Government as the second discussion between the Chief Justice oflndia and Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh took place in the evening of January 8, 1981 and the order was signed by the Prime Minister the next day.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India, in his affidavit on oath has emphatically averred that \"there\n\nwas full and effective consultation between me and the President of India on the question of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras as the Chief Justice of Madras High Court.\n\nEvery relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer\". There is no material on the record for doubting the statement. It must be remembered that the matter of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer had been under discussion all along for a considerable time between the Chief Justice of India on the side and the Law Minister and the Prime Minister on the one other, and the discussion had taken place through written correspondence as well as oral conversation by way of discussion in personal meeting and on the telephone.\n\nIt is perfectly within the realm of credibility that what had passed between the Chief Justice of India and Shri K.B. N. Singh on January 8, 1981 had also been communicated to the Law Minister and the Prime Minister before the order of transfer was signed by the Prime Minister.\n\n66.\n\nA point was raised that the Chief Justice of India had averred in his affidavit that the consultation was effected between him and the President of India and not that the consultation took place between him and the Law Minister and the Prime Minister; To my mind, it is .clear that the Chief Justice of India is referring to the President in the sense of the \"Executive Government\". This is amply borne out by the lare volun:ie 9f <; loQumentar~ materi~\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nwhich shows that the Chief Justice of India was in communication with the Law Minister and the Prime Minister only. There i; nothing to suggest that he met the President personally in this matter.\n\n67. It is also contended that the proposal to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh had already been made by 1he Chief Justice of India to the Government as early as December 1980 and this was before any discussion on the point between him and Sbri K.B.N. Singh.\n\nNow it is clear from the record that the proposal so made was in the nature of a suggestion calling for an examination of the matter.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India had visited Patna and from the material in his possession he had formed an opinion that there was a case for considering the transfer of Sbri K.B.N. Singh. The matter was only at the stage of consideration and clearly could not be finalized before Shri K.B.N. Singh had been taken into confidence.\n\nWe must remember that it was the Chief Justice of India (Chandrachud J. as he then was) who had pronounced judgment in Union of India v.\n\nSanko! Chand Himatlal Seth and Anr. (1) where in considerable detail he has dwelt on the imperative need of a full and effective consultation which, as he observed there, could require the Chief Justice of India to elicit the facts directly from the Judge concerned. It was• apparently pursuant to this that he considered it necessary to discuss the matter with Shri K.B.N. Singh otherwise, he would not have found it desirable to telephone from Delhi to Patna on January 5, 1981 and after discussing the matter with him then, to invite him for further discussion at Delhi on January 8, 1981.\n\nThe proposal was pending the consultation with the Government was going on and no final decision had been taken. As the Chief Justice of India has stated in his affidavit, the discussion with the Government continued even after the proposal. The process of consultation could continue right up to the moment the final decision was taken.\n\nThe process of consultation continued actively throughout and there is no reason to doubt the objectivity which marked it.\n\nAs the learned Solicitor General bas pointed out, it must not be forgotten that the Chief Justice was not a personally interested party but was only discharging the duties and responsibilities cast on him by the Constitution. A few facts may be set forth again. On December 18, 1980, the Chief Justice of [ndia requested the Prime Minister that the proposal to transfer Sbri K.B N. Singh to Rajasthan should\n\n<0 [1978] 1 §CR 423.\n\n' ....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1205\n\nawait further consideration. On January 5, 1981, Shri K.B.N. Singh was informed by the Chief Justice of India that the difficulty mentioned by him concerning the infirmity and age of his mother was being noted by him and would be taken into consideration before a final decision was taken. It seems to me beyond dispute that the matter did not stand closed merely because of the proposal made in December 1980 to transfer him.\n\n68. Then it is urged that clause (1) of Art. 222 contemplates that the process of consultation should be initiated by the President by a reference of the matter to the Chief Justice of India for his advice and that instead it is the latter who has initiated the process I do not see any substance in this point having regard to the continuous consultation which was going on between the Chief Justice of India and the Government.\n\n69.\n\nI shall now deal with the task of identifying the considerations which prevailed with the Chief Justice of India and the Government in transfering Shri K.B.N. Singh, and whether it can be said that these considerations fall within the expression \"public interest\".\n\n70. When a Judge permits his jdgment in a case to be influenced by the irrelevant considerations of caste and creed. of relationship or friendship, of hostility or enmity, he commits a breach of his oath. It is a case where justice is not done and is denied. It is a case of misbehaviour, to which the provisions of Art. 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 124 are attracted.\n\nThere is another kind of case where a Judge acts in accordance with his conscience on the basis of the facts and the Jaw as he bona fide understands them, and yet because of surrounding circumstances it may appear that justice has not been done even though in fact it may have been done.\n\nWhere. there is a danger that justice will not appear to be done, and the prevailing environment is linked with the person of the Judge, notwithstanding that he may have done nothing to promote it, the injury to the administration of justice can be as serious as a case where the Judge has consciously deviated from the standards of impartial judgment.\n\nWhere there is a genuine apprehension that justice may not appear to be done, the ordinary rule is that the case pending before the Judge should be transferred to another Judge. But wher~ t4e apprehensio~ \\s rootc; d jn local\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nassociation, no links with members of the Bar or influence present in close proximity to the Judge and the circumstances are such that, notwithstanding that the conduct of the Judge has done nothing to promote it, there is grave and bona fide fear in the minds of honest citizens that the fount of justice may be polluted, its effect is not confined to a single case but spreads widely, endangering the purity of the entire administration of justice. Inasmuch a.s the administration of justice relies for its vitality on the strength of public confidence, it must range supreme and, therefore, if the Judge is transferred in these circumstances it must be regarded as a transfer in the public interest. The desirability of inducting Chief Justices and a proportion of the Judges from outside the State has been emphasised ever since the drafting of the Constitution. During the finalisation of the Draft Constitution a suggestion was received by the Drafting Committee that one third of the Judges appointed to a High Court should be from outside the State.\n\nSuccessively, the idea has been promoted by the Law Commission of India in its Fourteenth Report and thereafter in its Eightieth Report, and also by the States Reorganisation Commission. The need has been affirmed from time to time and programmes to implement it have been constantly mooted.\n\nThe Union Governmf:nt, according to evidence before us, has been actively engaged during the last two years in securing an acceptance of the policy from the Judiciary, and discussions have taken place from time to time between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister.\n\nThe Government, has proposed that the policy should be implemented not only by appointing the Chief Justice and one third of the number of Judges to a High Court from outside the State at the time of their initial appointment to the office, but should also be taken in hand presently by the transfer of sitting Chief Justices and Judges. It has been further proposed by Government that the transfers should be effected simultaneously in all the High Courts.\n\n71.\n\nIt seems from the material on the record that although the Chief Justice of India is in agreement with the need for appoint ment of Chief Justices and a number of Judges to the High Court from outside the State, he has not accepted yet the further suggestion of the Government that the transfer should be effected as a policy implemented enmasse over all the High Courts. It seems that the Chief Justice of India is prepared to go so far only that the matter should be considered from case to case, on the objective Jllerjts of e!l\\:4 case.\n\nThis is i:vi\\iently what he had in\n\n.~-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1207\n\nmind when he considered it desirable to propose the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras.\n\nHe did so plainly on the ground that although Shri K.B.N. Singh himself was not to blame for this, people in the proximity of Shri K.B.N. Singh had created an atmosphere injurious to the administration of justice resulting in great disaffection. It is apparent that the reasons which weighed with the Chief Justice of India form the very basis of the policy promoted by the Government. The basic component of that policy is identifiable in the reasons which prevailed with the Chief Justice of India. When this view is taken, it is immediately clear what the Chief Justice of India meant when during the telephone conversation with Shri K.B.N. Singh on January 5, 1981, he explained that the ttansfer was prompted by Government policy.\n\nThis also readily explains why the Government accepted the proposal to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh. As the learned Solicitor General explained before us, the Government considered this as the first stage in the implementation of its policy, and although there was no finalisation in regard to the time and manner of inducting the Chief Justice and a proportion of the Judges in a High Court from outside the State, the proposal to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh was rooted in the very considerations which found favour with the Government in promoting the policy conceived by it.\n\n72.\n\nI am of opinion that the considerations which prevailed with the Chief Justice of India and the Government in the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh were substantially identical, that for the purposes of this transfer the Government had agreed that having regard to the reasons for the transfer it was prepared to consider the case on its individual merits and not to insist on the making of transfers generally for the time being. I am also of opinion that the considerations on which the transfer was made must, in view of what I have observed, be regarded as falling within the expression \"public interest\". In my judgment, there is no violation of clause (I) of Art. 222.\n\n72A. It is next urged that the provisions of the Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Government of India had not been complied with inasmuch as no enquiry had been made of the Chief Ministers of the States concerned before the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh. The learned Solicitor General has statedJrom the Government records in. pis possessioq thl\\t the 4aw Minister\n\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nconsulted the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu on January 3, 1981, the Chief Minister of Kerala on January 4, 1981 and the Chief Minister of Patna on January 6, 1981 in regard to the proposed transfers of Shri M.M. Ismail and Shri K.B.N. Singh. Learned counsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh points out that there was opposition by the Tamil Nadu Government to the induction of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras on the ground that he was not acquainted with the Tamil language and would find difficulty in coping with his duties in the High Court at Madras. It is said that if the Chief Justice of India had been informed of this objection, Shri K.B.N. Singh would not have been transferred. I have observed earlier that the Chief Justice of India had considered this matter long before, and did not consider it as a substantial difficulty.\n\nValidity of the Circular Letter dated March 18, 1981 issued\n\n,. by the Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India. '. 1 73. The Circular letter was addressed by the: Minister to the Chief Ministers of different States and to the Government of Punjab pointing out that several bodies and forums, including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Association had suggested that one third of the Judges of a High Court should, as far as possible, be from outside the State in which the High Court was situated. It was said that the suggestion was made \"to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations.\" He requested that the additional Judges working in the High Court of the State should be required to give their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court in the country, and they could name three High Courts, in order of preference, where they would prefer such appointment. It was also requested that similarly consent may be taken from persons who have already been, or may in the future be, proposed for initial appointment. He requested further that it may also be made clear to the additional Judges that giving their consent and indicating their preference would not commit th(: Government in the ll)atter of their appointment or in the matter of accommodating them according to their preference. Thereafter it appears, some of the additional Judges, whose terms were expiring, were granted further appointment as additional Judges for short periods of three months,\n\nix iponths or a rear\n\ns.i>. GtJttA v. UNION (Pathak, J.)\n\n120~ J\n\n74. The validity of the Circular Letter has been challenged before us on several grounds including the ground that the contents of the lette.r constitute a threat to the judicial independence of the additional Judges inasmuch as, feeling pressured by the apprehension that unless the)' conveyed their consent to appointment to another High Court they would not be given further terms as additional Judges, some of them have conveyed their consent. It has been urged that the additional Judges have a right to be considered for appointment as permanent Judges in the High Courts where they are serving, and the Circular letter should be construed as an attempt to transfer them to some other High Court without operating through the consultative process which the President is obliged under the Constitution to enter into with the Chief Justice of India.\n\n75. It seems to me unnecessary to enter into all these points of controversy, because to my mind if the Circular letter is regarded as intending to bind the additional Judges it can have no such effect in law. An appointment of a person as a Judge of a High Court must, as observed earlier, be an appointment to a particular High Court. For the purpose of making such appointment, the constitutional process must be initiated with respect to a particular High Court. The Constitution does not contemplate a single process in relation to several High Courts, collecting as many persons as there are vacancies all over India, and then in the discretion of the Government appointing each of them where the Government pleases. To adopt this procedure will be to equate the appointment of Judges with the appointment of members of an All India Service, a position which cannot constitutionally be countenanced. There must be a separate and distinct process in regard to appointment to each High Court. The Governor of the particular State and the Chief Justice of the particular High Court have to be involved in that process, besides the Chief Justice of India. It is in the course of such a process that a proposal for appointment is made to the person intended for appointment.\n\nIn other words, a valid proposal, as part of the constitutional process, is one which offers an appointment to a particular High Court. It is only when consent is given to such a proposal, that is to say consent to appointment in a particular High Court, that it can be said in law to be binding and effective. The Circular letter has invited the consent of the additional Judges in the most general terms, to appointment to any HighCourt other than the High Court in which they are serving as additional Judges. If it is intended to bind the additional Judges,. it has faifod inits\n\n1210 SUPREMll cotJR.'r REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.il.\n\npurpose.\n\nNeither the proposal nor any consent given thereto has any legal status. It may be that the Circular lettt:r was intended only for the purpose of obtaining information informally whether \\he additional Judges would be agreeable to being appointed as permapent Judges of other High Courts.\n\nBut inasmuch as the consent given by the additional Judges cannot bind them, it will be open to them to consider any concre.e proposal now made offering appointment to a particular High Court with a perJ'ectly open and free mind, unhindered by any consent given earlier in pursuance of the Circular letter. It may be added that a concrete proposal can contemplate appointment only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in cl. ( 1) of Art. 217.\n\n76.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it would be sufficient to declare that the Circular letter cannot be acted on and any consent given pursuant to the Circular letter is not binding in law on those who have given it.\n\nThe claim of privilege against the disclosure of certain documents.\n\n 77. The law relating to the plea of privilege raised by the State against the disclosure of documents has advanced considerably in recent times and its evolution has been traced by brother Bhagwati who has discussed the present content of the law abroad, and has given substantial reason for taking the law forward in this country from the position enunciated by this court in State of Punjab v. Sodi Sukhdev Singh.(1) I am in broad agreement with what he has said in regard to what the present state of the law in India should be.\n\n78.\n\nBut I think it desirable to add a note of warning. There is good reason to be circumspect. Traditions and beliefs which governed life until yesterday and held an important place in the polity cannot be rooted out overnight. Change to be valid must find general acceptance, and its pace will be determined by the education of experience. The past is ever with us, and when the present takes hold it must do so conscious of its responsibility to the future. The rules now developed by this Court relating to the disclosure of documents need to be carefully applied. The balance between the conflicting claims of public interest represented by official dom and the public interest flowing from the administration of Justice often\n\n(!) [1961] 2 SCR 371.\n\nS.I>. 01:.Jl>tA v. i.JNIQN (Pathak, J.) 121 i\n\ncalls for a delicate assessment, into which per force must enter consideration vital to the operations of Government on the one hand and the demands of adjudication on the other.\n\nThe responsibility fixed on the Court is a serious one, and there is need to warn that this power which now 'Vests in the Court can have grave consequences if the content of its potential is not truly appreciated and realised by those who wield it.\n\nWhenever a court breaks new ground, the development and recognition of new rights is often accompanied by the birth of problems surfacing also for the first time.\n\nNew doctrines must be cautiously applied, and yet no court can shirk its duty if it finds that its power has been rightly invoked.\n\n79. In regard to the plea raised by the State on the basis of clause (2) of Art. 74 of the Constitution, there is no denying, in my view, the accuracy of what has been observed by brother Bhagwati, that it is the advice and its reasons tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President which are protected from .enquiry by a court, and no such protection extends to the material from which the advice proceeds.\n\n80. On the facts of the case, it was material, to my mind, to ascertain whether indeed a full and effective consultation had taken place with the Chief Justice of India on the question whether Shri S.N. Kumar should be appointed for a further term as additional Judge, and for that purpose it became necessary to consider the contentsof the letter dated May 7, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court to the Law Minister.\n\nGreat emphasis was laid by the parties in their submissions on the question of full and effective consultation in point of fact, and it seemed in the context in which the question was debated that the disclosure of the letter of May 7, 1981 and the connected correspondence was imperative in order that justice be administerc:d.\n\nIt was not an easy decision for the Court to order disclosure, but after carefully balancing the rival interests we came to the conclusion that the balance inclined in favour of a positive order.\n\nLocus Standi\n\n81. What remains now is to consider the objection raised H by the respondents to the maintainability of the petitions before us.\n\nMy brother Bhagwati has .dealt with this objection at some length,\n\n1212 SUPREME COtJRt REPORTS ( 1982) 2 S.C.ll.\n\nand has held that it has no substance. I find myself' in general agreement with him, and need say nothing more.\n\n82. \" Before concluding, I think it only of right to record my appreciation and gratitude for the great and valuabh: assistance offered to the Court by the very able and erudite submissions made during the' hearing of these cases.\n\nEminent _counsel appeared on both sides, who in the discharge of their responsibilities to the Court and to the parties represented by them, did not spare themselves and brought to bear to the hearing their vast learning and enormous industry, notwithstanding that the hearing had to proceed for several weeks.\n\n8'.I. Jn the result, Transferred Cases No. 19, 20, 21 and 22 of 1981 are:_ allowed in so far that a declaration is grant, ed that the Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 cannot be acted on aind that the additional Judges concerned shall not be held bound by their consent given in pursuance of the Circular letter, to their appointment as permanent Judges of High Courts other than those where they presently' serve.\n\nIn the Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981, the respondents are directed to reconsider the case of Shri S.N. Kumar for appointment as n additional Judge of the High Court of Delhi for a further term.\n\nWrit Petition No. 274 of 1981 and Transferred Cases Nos. 2, 6 and 24 of 1981 are dismissed.\n\n84.\n\nIn all these cases, having regard to the circumstances, there is no,'order as to costs.\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This judgment can be conveniently divided in to fourteen parts thus :\n\nI. Jntroduction\n\n' ' II. -Locus standi of the petitioners\n\nIII.\n\nThe doctrine of political question\n\nIV.\n\nThe status of High Courts\n\nH V. Art. 217 (1). Appointment of a Judge of a High Court History.\n\nProcess of consultation under Art. 217 (I) Is the opinion of the Chief Justice of India binding on\n\n--4-\n\n, ..\n\nS.f>, GuPTA v. UNION (J!enkataramiah, J.) 1213\n\nthe President ? Whether the Council of Ministers can tender advice to the President on the question of appointment of a Judge ? Whether such advice interferes with the basic structure of the Constitution ?\n\nWhat is the practice prevailing in some other countries?\n\nVI.\n\nArt. 224 (I). Appointment of additional Judges.\n\nHistory The manner in which Art. 224 (1) is applied from its commencement and its effect on the principle of independence of judiciary. Has an additional Judge whose term prescribed under Art. 224 (I) has expired any right ? Does the manner in which Art. 224 (I) is being used give rise o any enforceable constitutional convention ? Are the principles of natural justice to be followed at the time of consideration of the question of reappointment of an additional Judge ?\n\nVIL Art. 222 Transfer of High Court Judges.\n\nHistory Does a transfer of a Judge of a High Court amount to a fresh appointment in another High Court ? Does the majority judgment of this Court in Sankal Chand Sheth's case holding that the consent of a Judge is not an essential condition of a valid transfer require reconsideration ? Does an order of transfer amount to a punishment ? Can a Judge be transferred on the basis of allegations of misbehaviour or of incapacity ? Does the expression 'Judge' in Art. 222 include a Chief Justice also? Is the policy of having the Chief Justice of every High Court from outside the State valid ?\n\nWhether ignorance on the part of a Jlidge of the regional language of the State in which a High Court is situated is an impediment to transfer the Judge to that High Court ?\n\nVlll. Question of executive privilege in respect of documents relating to appointment of High Court Judges.\n\nIX. Whether there has been any error in the consultation preceding the decision not to appoint Shri S.N . . Kumar?\n\nThe validity of the circular letter dated March_ 18, 1981 written by the Law Minister to the Chief Ministers.\n\nH •\n\n1214 SUPR.BME COUR.1 kBPORTS (19821 2 s.c.a.\n\nXI.\n\nValidity of the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh\n\nXII. Cannot the Union Government be called upon to review the strength of Judges in every High Court and to appoint sufficient number of Judges?\n\nXIII. Relief\n\nXIV. Concluding remarks\n\nPART I\n\nAt the commencement of the judgment it is my duty to thank the learned counsel who have argued in these cases with exceptional ability and skill, without whose assistance it would nave been very difficult to prepare this judgment. I sincerely thank all of them.\n\nThese petitions are disposed of by this common judgment because common questions of law arise for consideration in them.\n\nA brief statement of facts involved in these cases is given b:low.\n\nTransferred Case No. 22 of 1981 had originally be~:n filed in the High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nLater on it was transferred to the file of this Court by an orcler made under Article 139A of the Constitution to be disposed of afongwith other connected cases.\n\nThe petitioners in this cse are Shriyuts Iqbal, M. Chagla, C.R. Dalvi, M.A. Rane and Sorab K..J. Mody.\n\nThey are advocates practising in the High Court of Bombay.\n\nRespondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this case are the Union Law Minister and the Union of India.\n\nRespondents Nos. 3 to 12 are the additional Judges of the High Court of Bombay appointed under Article 224 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe above petition is filed questioning the validity of a circulair letter dated March 18, 1981 addressed by the Union Law Minister to the Governor of Punjab and Chief Minister (by name) (except the North-Eastern States) by which they were requested to obtain the consent of additional Judges working in the High Courts to their appointment as Judges of the High Courts other than those in which they were additional Judges on the lines indicated in the said circular letter. A request was also made in that letter to obtain consent to appointment as Judges from persons who 'had been Oil'\n\nmay in future 'be proposed by you' (that is by the Chief Minis\n\n... \"'\n\n....\n\n• , ..\n\nS.P. GuPTA v. ONION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1215\n\nters); It is alleged that aggrieved by the said letter, which according to them, amounted to a direct attack on the independence of the judiciary, which was a basic feature of Constitution, the members of the Advocates' Association of Western India met at a Special\n\nGeneral Meeting on April 3, 1981 and passed resolutions inter alia condemning the said letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Union Government to withdraw the said letter. The Bombay Bar Association also passed similar resolutions at its Extraordinary General Meeting on April 7, 1981.\n\nOn April 14, 1981 it is alleged that the Managing Committee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society (representing the Solicitors practising in Bombay who were also advocates) passed similar resolutions and also authorised the petitioner No. 4 to join as a petitioner in this petition. The petitioners have inter alia alleged that the impugned letter which affected about one hundred additional Judg.es currently working in the various High Courts and which threatened them with 'transfer' to High Courts other than the one in which they were working was outside the scope of Article 222 of the Constitution which provided for such transfers and amounted to an unwarranted executive interference with the judiciary. They have also alleged that the manner of appointment of additional Judges under Article 224(1) of the Constitution was a clear abuse of that provision which empowered the President to appoint additional Judges to clear off arrears in High Courts but not where the arrears were continuously rising. The petitioners have prayed for, among other reliefs, a declaration that the impugned letter of the Union Law Minister was ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent given by any of the additional Judges.\n\nBy a counter affidavit filed by Shri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi, the Union Government has opposed the petition. The Union Government inter alia has questioned the locus standi of the petitioners to file the petition and has further pleaded that by the impugned letter, the Union Government merely sought the consent of the additional Judges and others who had been or who were to be proposed for appointment as Judges to the effect that they were willing to be initially appointed as Judges in other High Courts. It is stated that the consent of the additional Judges had not been sought for their transfer under Article 222 of the Constitution. It is denied that there was any attempt to interfere with the independence of the judiciary. The pc>licy of appointment of Judges in High Courts from outside is justified on various\n\n1216 SUPREME COtJllT klll>ORtS ( 198.2) 2 s.c.tl.\n\ngrounds set out in the affidavit. Accordingly the Union Government has prayed that the petition may be dismissed.\n\nTransferred Case No. 20 of 1981 was originally filed in the High -Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court Bar after the Law Minister's letter of March 18, 1981 was written and three additional Judges of the Delhi High Court Sarva Shri O.N. Vohra, S.N.\n\nKumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from March 7, 1979 were appointed as additional Judges for a period of three months only from March 7, 1981.\n\nIn addition to the declaration that the impugned letter of the Law Minister was uncom1titutional and void, Shri V.M. Tar_kunde has requested the Cour1t, among other prayers, to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Government (i) to convert the posts of additional Judges into permanent' posts in various High Courts commensurate with the regular business of the High Courts and arrears in consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court and the Chief Justice of India and (ii) to convert 12 posts of additional Judges in the Delhi High Court into permanent posts having regard to the regular business and the arrears of that Court. In the course of the petition the propriety and constitutionality of appointing the three additional Judges referred to above for a period of three months only from March 7, I 98 I have been questioned.\n\nThe other allegations in the petition more or less are simila1r to the allegations made in the petition of Bombay Lawyers. It is not necesrary to go into certain events and proceedings that took place till the counter affidavit was filed in this case on July 22, I 98 I except the fact that Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar had ceased to be Judges with effect effect from June 7, 1981 as they had not been appointed as additional Judges for any further period and that Shri\n\nS.B. Wad had been appointed as an additional Judge from June 7, 1981 for one year more. In the counter affidavit filed by Shri K.C.\n\nKankan, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, th-e petition is opposed. This counter affidavit contains more or less similar pleas contained in the counter affidavit filed in the petitio1~ filed by the Bombay lawyers and in addition to them certain further pleas are raised here in justification of the action taken by the Union Government in not appointing Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N.\n\nKumar as additional Judges for a further period and in appointing\n\n• ...\n\n.J.. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, 1.) 1217\n\nonly Shri S. B. Wad as stated above.\n\nThe specific plea with regard to the non appointment of Shri 0.N. Vohra and Shri $.N. Kumar and the appointment of Shri S.B. Wad runs thus :\n\n\"(w) & (x) Shri Justice Vohra, Shri Justice Kumar and\n\nShri Justice Wad were appointed for a further period of 3 months from 7·3-1981. The short-term appointment was made to enable the Government to take a final view having regard to the complaints that had been received against some of them after consultation with the constitutional authorities. The petitioner's statement that both the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India had recommended the appointment of these 3 Judges for a further period of 2 years is untrue and incorrect. It is strange as to how the petitioner could claim knowledge of the recommendations of the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. After careful consideration of the material available with it and after taking into account the views expressed by the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and after giving full considerations to the views of both, Government decided not to give appointments for a further term to Shri Justice O.N. Vohra and Shri Justice S.N. Kumar on the expiry of their term on 6-6-1981.\n\nShri Justice Wad was, however, appointed for a further period of l year from 7-6-1981.\n\nIt is neither necessary nor advisable to disclose to the additional Judges the reasons for their short term appointments or for their non-appointment since this would bring them within the pale of public controversy and would involve disclosure of material which necessarily has to be kept confidential. There is no breach of the principles of natural justice in this\".\n\nIt may be mentioned here that Shri O.N. Vohra has remained absent in these proceedings but Shri S. N. Kumar has filed a separate affidavit and has presented his case through a counsel. In the course of his affidavit in addition to the pleas supporting the pleas urged by Shri V.M. Tark; unde, he has questioned the validity of th~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe proceedings culminating in not appointing him as an additional Judge after June 7, 1981. The allegations made by Shri S.N. Kumar are controverted by an additional affidavit filed on behalf of the\n\nUnion Government in this case.\n\nTransferred Case No. 21 of 1981 was filed in the High Court of Delhi by Shri J. L. Kalra and others, all advocates, under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners have prayerd for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Govi:rnment to make an assessment of the number of permanent and additional Judges required for the High Court of Delhi having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears, to create suich number of posts of permanent and additional Judges as may be necessary and to make appointments to those posts. The other reliefs asked in this petition are substantially the same as the reliefs prayed in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981 filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde. The allegations in the petition and in the counter affidavit in these two cases are also substantially the same. This petition, however, emphasises the fact that Article 224 (I) of the Constitution is being used for a purpose other than the one for which it is intended.\n\nThe issues arising out of this petition are the same as those arising in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981.\n\nTransferred Case No. 19 of 1981 was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Allahabad by Shri S P.\n\nGupta, Advocate, practising at Allahabad. Aggrieved by the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 which is impugned in Trans ferred Case No. 22 of 1981 filed by the Bombay lawyers the nondetermination of the necessary strength of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad as required by Articles 216 and 224 (I) of the Constitution, the appointment of some additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad for short-terms of six months on the expiry of the period specified in their warrants of appointment under Article 224 (1), the alleged misuse of Article 224 (!) of the Constitution by the Union Government in making appointments of additional Judges where permanent Judges had to be appointed and several other matters urged in the petition, the petitioner filed the above petition requesting the Court to issue appropriate directions having regard to the submissions made in the petition and principally he has prayed for a declaration that the three additional Judges-Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A.N.\n\nYl'rma and Mr. Justice N.N. Mittal must be deemed to have been\n\n>-.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1219\n\nappointed as permanent Judges under the warrants issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister is void.\n\nThe reliefs prayed for by the petitioner more or less are identical with the reliefs in Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981. The allegations made in the petition and in the counter affidavit will be dealt with in the course of the judgment as many of them are common to all\n\nthese cases.\n\nWrit Petition No. 274 of 1981 is filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an advocate practising in the Supreme. Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution. She has sought for a declaration that the transfer of Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court is unconstitutional. She has also stated that the Union Government had acted illegally in not appointing Mr. Justice Subramanian Poti, the seniormost Judge of the Kerala High Court as the Chief Justice of that Court in the vacancy created by the appointment of Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, as a Judge of this Court. She has contended inter alia that Article 222 of the Constitution which provides for transfer of Judges does not apply to Chief Justice and that in any event Article 222 of the Constitution cannot be used to defeat the claim of the seniormost Judge of a High Court to become the Chief Justice of that Court whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of the Chief Justice.\n\nShe has pleaded that the transfer of Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail had not been made in the public interest and when such transfer is made without consent of the Judge concerned would be unconstitutional.\n\nOn behalf of the Union of India it is pleaded that the transfer had been made in consultation with the Chief Justice of India in the public interest after taking into consideration all relevant matters.\n\nIt is pleaded that Article 222 applies to Chief Justices also.\n\nMr. Justice M.M. Ismail who has been impleaded as the respondent No. 2 in this petition has filed an affidavit, the third paragraph of which reads thus :\n\n\"3. As soon as I was informed of the Notification of the President of India under Article 222 (1) of the Constitution of India, transferring me as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala, I decided (I) not to proceed to Kerala to take charge as the Chief Justice of the Hih Court\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nof Kerala, (2) not to challenge the legality or the validity of the order of the President so transferring me in any Court of Law and (3) to proceed on leave preparatory to premature retirement by resigning my office.\n\nIn view of this I. have nothing to submit to this Hon'ble Court in this Writ Peti tion and I do not want anyone to litigate for or against me.\n\nIn these circumstances, I have nothing to represent with_ reference to the questions of law raised in the Petition and I do not want anything about me to be argued or debated\".\n\nI Mr: Justice M.M. Ismail has since resigned from his office.\n\nt i Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981 was originally ftled under Article 22~ of the Constitution in the High Court of Madras by Shri A. Rajappa, an advocate practising in Madras. He has prayed for a declaration that the orders of transfer passed by the Pre:sident on January 19, 1981 transferring Mr. Justice M.M Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and the transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as the Chief Justice of Madras High Court are void. , The principal grounds urged in the petition are that the transfers in question interfere with the independence of the judiciary, a transfer'without consent of a Judge is ultr.a vires under Article 222 of the Constitution and non-consultation with the Governor concerned mounts to violation of Article 217( I) of the Constitution which should precede the appointment of a Chief Justice. The transfer of a Judge who does not know Tamil language to the High Court of Madras would not be in the public interest. There is also a plea that the transfers suffer from malafides.\n\nSome or the pleas urged by Miss Lily Thomas in her petition are urged in this petition also. The Union of India has opposed the petition. It has relied on Article 222 of the Constitution in support of the impugned orders of transfer. It is stated that the transfers had been ordered in the public interest in consultation with the Chief Justice of India who is the only authority to be consulted under Article 22 2 and that the procedure prescribed under Article 217( I) of the Constitution need not be followed when a transfer is ordered under Article 222.\n\nThe plea that the transfers have interfered with the independence of the judiciary is also denied.\n\nThe allegation that the impugned orders hadbeen made malafide is also denied in the count1r affidavit\n\nfiled on \\:>half of th~ Union of India.\n\n}-- ·-'\n\n...\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1221\n\nTransferred Case No. 6 of 1981 was originally filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Madras by Shri P. Subramanian. The allegations and prayers made in this petition and the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India are substantially the same as those in transferred Case No. 2 of 1981 filed by Shri A. Rajappa.\n\nTransferred Case No. 24 of 1981 was originally filed in the High Court of Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution by two advocates Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thakur Ramapati Sinha ques tioning the validity of the order of the transfer of Mr. Justice M.M.\n\nIsmail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and the order of transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. The allegations in this petition are substantially the same as those in Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981, in Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981 and in Transferred Case No. 6 of 1981. But during the pendency of this petition in this Court,\n\nMr. Justice K.B.N. Singh who had been impleaded as a respondent was transposed as a petitioner by an order of this Court. There after Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh has filed an affidavit inter alia stating that his transfer was not in the public interest and that the transfer had been ordered on irrelevant and insufficient grounds. These allegations have been denied by the Union of India. It has stated in the counter affidavit filed in support of its; case that the transfer of Mr, Justice K.B.N. Singh had been made after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India in the public interest keeping in view all relevant considerations. The Chief Justice of India has also filed a counter affidavit to which detailed reference will be made in due course stating inter a/ia that Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh had been transferred keeping in view all relevant matters in the public interest and not on any ground touching his character and conduct as a Judge.\n\nIndia, that is Bharat, is a Union of States. It is not a federation of States like the United States of America. The word 'federa tion' is not used in the Constitution of India. There is no dual citi\n\nzenship in India as we find it in the United States of America. The Constitution of India contemplates only one citizenship, only one loyalty and only one sovereignty. The geographical area covered by the States and the Union.\n\nTnitoric;~ IIlrHiogel; I in the First\n\n1222 SuPREME COuRT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nSchedule to the Constitution and such other areas that may be acquired constitute the territory of India which is an indivisible and indestructible whole though for administrative convenience is divided into.States and Union Territories.\n\nParliament may by Jaw form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State; increase the area of any State; diminish the area of any State; alter the boundaries of any State and alter the name of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State in accordance with Article 3 and Article 4 of the Constitution. The principle of unity contemplated 1 under the Constitution of India is much stronger than the principle underlying the Constitution of the United States of America. It is, therefore, necessary to remember and adopt it as our own rule of conduct what Washington wrote on June 8, 1783 in his message to the Governors of States in the United States of America.\n\nHe wrote :\n\ni I\n\n1: ..\n\n.).\n\nf I'\n\nr 1\n\n\"There are four things which, I humbly conceive, are essential to the well being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States, as an independent power. Firstly, an indissoluble union of the States\n\nunder one Federal head; secondly, a sacrc!d regard to public justice; thirdly, the adoption of a proper peace establishment; and fourthly, the prevalence of the pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions, which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrific:e their individual advantages to the interest of th1! community.\n\nThese are the pillars on which the glorious fabric of our independence and national chara<:ter must be supported.\"\n\n(By courtesy : \"The Constitution of India\" .by N.R. ;.• Raghavachariar (1951) p. 17).\n\n\\,, A constitution of a country is a living document and cannot,\n\nH therefore, be interpreted in a narrow pedantic sense.\n\nA broad and ,_, liberal spirit should inspire those who are called upon to interpret the Constitution. This does not mean that they are free to stretch\n\n...\n\nt -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1223\n\nor pervert the language of the Constitution. The broad purposes and the general scheme of every provision in the Constitution, its history, its objects and the result which it seeks to achieve should always be kept in view. Current usage and a priori reasoning should also be used as the tools of interpretation of the constitutional provisions. The Constitution of India in order to ensure sound administration has entrusted separate powers to different organs of the State, charging all of them with the joint responsibility of securing to all citizens of India, justice, social, economic and political, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity; and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation. The said joint endeavour involves cooperation, mutual sympathy and understanding amongst all the organs. The Constitution demands that there should be mutual trust amongst and there should be no room for suspicion.\n\nDistrust and a feeling of suspicion on the part of any of the organs of the State towards any other organ is bound to result in a great national calamity.\n\nWe have worked the Indian Constitution for more than thirty years.\n\nThe Constitution has undergone many changes.\n\nAt the end of three decades of experience one is bound to feel in the same way in which Thomas Jefferson felt about the Constitution of the United States of America in 1816. He wrote to Samuel Karcheval on July 12, 1816:\n\n\"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment.\n\nI knew that age well; I belonged to it, and laboured with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book reading and this they would say themselves. were they to rise from the\n\ndead\".\n\nWe must while interpreting the Constitution realise that many of the difficulties that we may encounter now had not been foreseen by its makers.\n\nApplication of constitutional provisions to actual facts of life therefore requires judicial states~nship. The following worc!s \" .. .\n\n• ...\n\n•. J\n\nI '\n\nH H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nof Professor Frankfurter at Harvard University (who later became Justice Frankfurter) with reference to the American Constitution are\n\nequally apposite to our own : .,\n\n''Every legal system for a living society, even when embodied in a written constitution must itself be alive.\n\nIt is not merely the imprisonment of the past; it is also the unfolding of the future. Of all the means for ordering the political life of a nation, a federal system is the most complicated and subtle; it demands the most flexible and imaginative adjustments for harmo nising national and local interests. The constitution is not a printed finality but a dynamic process; its application fo the actualities of Government is not a mechanical exercise, but a function of statecraft.\"\n\nLet us now turn to the actual issues involved in these cases.\n\nPART II\n\nAt the outset the question whether the petiltioners who are advocates can file these petitions for the reliefs mentioned therein under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution has got to be considered. The contention is that members of the Har who are not personally affected by. the circular letter of the Law Minister, by the appointment of certain additional Judges for short-terms of three mon'ths, or six monrhs by the non-appointment of any of the additional Judges after the expiry of the tenure fixed under Article 224 (I) or by the non-appointment of sufficient number of Judges of the High Courts or by the transfer of some Judges have no locus standi to file these, petitions.\n\nIt is contend_ed that neither qualitatively nor\n\nquaiitatively these petitioners have sufficient interest to prosecute these petitions the result of which would not affect them either directly or even indirectly.\n\n. ' The attitudes of the courts on the question of locus standi do not appear to be uniform. They vary from country to country, court to court and case to case. Sometimes the tests applied by courts also vary\n\ndepnding upon the nature of the relief sought. In some cases courts liave 1taken a very narrow view on this question holding that unless an applicant has either personal or fiduciary interest in the result of the ' it• - ' '\n\n~ 'f#\"\n\n'.-\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION {Venkataramiah, J.) t22S\n\napplication, no relief can be granted on his application even though it may appear that the impugned action or omission of the administrative authority concerned is not in accordance with law.\n\nThe other extreme view is that the courts may in their discretion issue mandamus to an administrative authority at the instance of any member of the public. A close scrutiny of the authorities and texts cited before us shows that neither of the two extreme views is accepted as correct in majority of the cases. It is also seen that in many of them the courts have found some sort of special interest in the applicant which distinguishes him from the general public before granting the relief prayed for by him.\n\nA person who has a genuine grievance on account of an action which affects him prejudicially is ordinarily considered to be eligible to move the Court.\n\nIn England a member of public who has no personal interest in the performance of a public duty by an administrative authority may as it may be done in India under sections 91 and 92 of the Code-of Civil Procedure, 1908 in a limited _and qualified way instead of himself approaching the Court, move the Attorney-General to initiate action in courts for the benefit of the public. If the Attorney General is satisfied that action is called for in any given case, as the nominal plaintiff in a relator action \"can obtain an injunction to prohibit either some breach of the criminal law or else some ultra vires act by a public authority, such as illegal .local government expenditure\". H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, Fourth Edition, page 493.\n\nThe learned author proceeds to observe :\n\n\"A similar practice seems to be developing in actions brought by private plaintiffs despite the 'fundamental rule that the Court will only grant an injunction at the suit of a private individual to support a legal right'. This, if it continues, may turn the injunction into a more general remedy of public law.\n\nAnother consequence will be that there will be problems of standing, since a plaintiff without a personal legal right may be required to show that he has a sufficient interest to maintain the action.\"\n\nIf the Attorney-General declines to give his consent to a relator action the Court cannot question his exercise of discretion.\n\n\" D\n\n' .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ l 9S2l 2 s.c.tt.\n\nThis was firmly settled by the House of Lords in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers(1) reversing a bold decision rendered by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers and Ors.(2) in which he had observed at page 719 thus:\n\n\" ... When the Attorney-General comes, as he does here and tells us that he has a prerogative by which he alone is the one who can say whether the criminal law should be enforced in these courts or not then I say he has no such prerogative. He has no prerogative to suspend or dispense with the laws of England. If he does not give his consent, then any citizen of the land any one of the public at large who is adversely affected can come to this court and ask that the law be enforced. . Let no one say that in this we are prejudiced. We have but one prejudice. That is to uphold the law.\n\nAnd that we will do, whatever, befall. Nothing shall deter us from doing our duty\".\n\nAfter his decision was reversed by the House of Lords, Lord Denning in bis book entitled 'The Discipline of Law' at Page 144 wrote thus:\n\n\"In administrative law the question of locus standi is the most vexed question of all. I must confess that\n\nhenever an ordinary citizen comes to the Court of Appeal and complains that this or that government department or this or that local authority or this or that trade union is abusing or misusing its power. I always like to hear what he has to say. For I remember what Mr. T.P. Curran of the Middle Temple said in the year 1790 :\n\n\" 'It is ever the fate of the indolent to find their rights become a prey to the active. The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigila11ce'.\n\nThe G ordinary citizen who comes to the Court in this way is usually the vigilant one. Sometimes he is a mere busy body interfering with things which do not concern him. Then let him be turned down. But when he has a point which affects the rights and liberties of all the citizens, then I\n\n_ ....\n\nH . r--~\n\n(I) [1978] AC 435:\n\n(2) ' [1977] 1 All ER 696.\n\n'; \\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Ven/cataramiah, J.)\n\nwould hope that he would be heard : for there is no other Nperson or body to whom he can \"appeal. But I am afraid that not everyone agrees with me.\"\n\nThe House of Lords having ruled in the Gouriet's case\n\n(supra) the Court's jurisdiction in England appears to have been confined to declaring contested legal rights subsisting or future, of the parties and of them only when the Attorney-General does not intervene. Th is is a step which the House of Lords appears to have taken with a view to stalling a new trend in public interest litigation which had been set by Blackburn v. Attorney-General(1)and Attorney- General ex rel. Mc Whirter v. Independent Broadcasting Authority. (2)\n\nAfter the decision of the House of Lords in Gouriet' s case\n\n(supra) it is noteworthy that order 53 was introduced into the Rules of the Supreme Court in England in the year 1977. The relevant part of Order 53 which took effect on January 11, 1978, some six months after the decision in Gouriet's case reads :\n\n\"I. (1) An application for-(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari .. shall be made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with the provisions of this Order.\n\n(2) An application for a declaration or an injunction (not being an injunction mentioned in paragraph (I) (b) may be made by way of an application for judicial review, and on such an application the Court may grant the declaration or injunction claimed if it considers that, having regard to-(a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by way of an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, (b) the nature of th~ persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by way of such an order, and (c) all the circumstances of the case, it would be just and convenient for the de'clarati on or injunction to be granted on an application for judicial review.\n\n(1) [1971] 1 WLR 1037.\n\n(2) [1973] QB 629.\n\nsui>iiii.iil cobb li!PoRTs ( t 98iJ 2 s.c.a.\n\nA 2.\n\nOn an applicatio11 for judicial review any relief mentioned in rule 1 ( 1) or (2) may be claimed as an alternative or in addition to any other relief so mentioned if it arises out of or relates to or is conD1ected with the same matter.\n\n3. (I) No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the Court has b<1en obtained in accordance with this rule.\n\n(2) An application for leave must be made ex parte to a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division.\n\n(3) ................................................................. .\n\n(4) ................................................................. .\n\n(5) The Court shall not grant leave unl, ess it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relaltes ........ ..\n\nIt appears that Order 53 was designed to stop technical procedural arguments of many types which had marred the true administration of justice, and to provide a machinery to determine at the preliminary stage of the granting of leave to prosecute an application. for judicial review, whether the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.\n\nThe phrase 'sufficient interest' whiCh, it is stated, owed its origin to an interlocutory observation made by the Court in R. v. Cotham(1) and to its use by Avory,' J. in his judgment iri Ex parte Stott(2) embraced all kinds of phrases 'a party', 'a person aggrieved',. 'a person with a particular grievance' etc. used in various cases where the locus standi of the applicaut concerned was questioned. After the aforesaid\n\nOrder 53 came into force the application out of which the case Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self- Employed and Smail Businesses Ltd.,(3) decided on April 9, 1981 by the House of Lords arose was instituted before the Queen's Bench.\n\nThe facts of the case were these : There was a long standing\n\n(1) (1898] 1 QB 802 at 804.\n\n(2) [1916] I KB 7 at 9.\n\n(3) [1981] 2 All. ER 93,\n\nf .\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1229\n\npractice in Fleet Street 'for casual employees on national newspapers to receive their wages without deduction of tax and to supply fictitious names and addresses when draw:ng their pay in order to avoid tax. Their true identities were known only to their unions which operated a closed shop and controlled all casual employment on the newspapers. In order to prevent the evasion of tax by the casual employees, the Revenue made a special arrangement with the employers, the employees and the unions whereby the employees were required to register with the Revenue and submit tax returns for the previous two years (1977-78 and 1978-79 in return for an undertaking by the Revenue that they would not invetigate tax evaded prior to 1977. The applicant, a federation of self-employed persons and sm 'b' II businessmen which claimed to represent a body of taxpayers, applied for judicial review under RSC Order 53 seeking (i) a declaration that the Revenue had acted unlawfully in making the arrangement and (ii) an order of mandamus directing the Revenue to assess and collect tax on the newspaper employees\n\nas required by law. The Revenue opposed the application on the ground tbat the applicant did not have 'a sufficient interest in the matter' relating to the application, as required by Order 53, rule 3 (5) for the Court to grant it the necessary leave to apply for judicial review. The Divisional Court upheld that contention and refused the applicant leave. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal which held that, a11 a preliminary issue and on the assumption that the Revenue had acted unlawfully, lhe applicant was not a mere busybody but had a genuine grievance and therefore had a sufficient interest for the purpose of rule 3 (5). The Revenue appealed contending that the duties imposed on them by the tax legislation, including in particular the duty of confidentiality as between the Revenue and each individual taxpayer, precluded the possibility of any other taxpayer or group of taxpayers from having any 'sufficient interest' in the performance by the Revenue of their statutory duties. The House of Lords held inter alia that whether an applicant for mandamus had a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application related, for the purposes of Order 53, rule 3 (5) depended on whether the definition (statutory or otherwise) of the duty alleged to have been breached or not performed expressly or impliedly gave the applicant the right to complain of the breach or non-performance.\n\nSince the tax legislation, far from expressly or impliedly conferring on a taxpayer the right to make proposals about another's tax or to inquire about such tax, in fact\n\n1230 StJPAE.MB COURT AEl.>Oil.i'S (1~821 2 s.c.il..\n\nindicated the reverse by reason of the total confidentiality of assessments and negotiations between individuals and the Revenue, and since on the evidence the Revenue in making the impugned arrangement were genuinely acting in the care and management of taxes under the powers entrusted to them, the application made by the applicant should be .Jismissed beacuse the applicant did not have a sufficient interest for the purposes of rule 3 (5), or (per Lord Diplock) because it had not been shown that the Revenue had acted ultra vires or unlawfully in making the arrangement.\n\nLord Wilberforce added that as a matter of general principle a taxpayer had no sufficient interest in asking the Court to investigate the tax arrears of another taxpayer or to complain that the latter had been underassessed or overassessed; indeed there was a strong public interest that be should not. Accordingly the appeal was allowed and the original application was dismissed.\n\nIn Canada, however, the rule has been that the principle requiring personal standing 'applies to legislation of a rei:ulatory character which affects particular persons or classes but where no particular persons or classes are affected more than others,. where the issue is justiciable and where the nature of the case is suitable the Court may grant declaratory relief to any citizen at its d iscre\n\ntion as can be seen from the decision oi the Supreme Court of Canada in Thorson v. AttorneyGeneral of Canada (No. 2)(1).\n\nDealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act in Canada, Laskin, J. observed in that case thus :\n\n\"It is not the alleged waste of public funds alone that will support standing but rather the right of the citizenry to constitutional be baviour by Parliament, where the issue in such behaviour is justiciable legal question.\"\n\nIn Australia the prevailing view appears to be that in matters affecting public generally in order to maintain a petition for the issue of a direction to an administrative authority to act according to law 'while something less an enforceable right would be sufficient, there nevertheless must be some special right in the prosecutor, over and above those held by the public at large or by all members of a\n\n(1) [1974] 43 DLR (3d) 1.\n\n.. _\n\nS.11. OUl>TA v. UNION (Yenkataramiah, J.) 12~1\n\nparticular class to which he belongs' (vide W. Friedmann: 'Principles of Australian Administrative Law, (Second Edition) page 180).\n\nThe question of locus standi of a petitioner µnder Article 226 of the Constitution was considered by this Court in Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.(1) The facts necessary for appreciating the point decided in that case and the decision of this Court on the locus standi of the petitioner there\n\nin can be seen from the following passage occurring at page 181:\n\n\"Has the appellant a right to file the petition out of which the present appeal has arisen ? The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dharamjigudem. The villagers of Dharamajigudem formed a committee with the appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up the Primary Health Centre. The said committee collected Rs, 10,000/- and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. The appellant represented the village in all its dealings with the Block Development Committee and the Panchayat Samithi in the matter of the location of the Primary Health Centre at Dharamajigudem. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the Committee and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorized to act on behalf of the committee. The appellant was, therefore, a representative of the com mittee which was in law the trustee of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose.\n\nWe have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appellant had the right to maintain the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This Court held in the decision cited supra that \"ordinarily\" the peti\n\ntioner who seeks to file an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the peti tion.\n\nA personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the\n\n(1) [1966) 2 S.C.R.. 172.\n\n1232 ii 982! 2 s.c.a.\n\nexpression \"ordinarily\" indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter hereof. The appellant has certainly been prc:judiced by the said order. The petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution at his instance, therefore, is maintainable.\" (emphasis added)\n\nIn Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay,(1) the expression 'person aggrieved' found in section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961 was considered by this Court.\n\nThe appellant in that case was an advocate of Maharashtra. He was convicted by a Summary Court in London on a charge of pilfering from a Departmental Store and was sentenced to pay a fine.\n\nThe State Bar Council called upon him suo motu to show cause why lie should not be held guilty of misconduct. He submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council was satisfied that there was no reason for holding him guilty of professional misconduct. The Advocate-General of the State who has sent a notice of the proceedings as required by section 35(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961, :and had appeared before the Disciplinary Committee, filed an appeal to the Bar Council of India under section 37 of that Act, under which, any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committet: of the State Bar Council made under section 35 of that Act, could prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India. The appellant objec:ted that the Advocate General had no locus standi to file the appeal. The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct. After examining the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierre, Sarr N'Jie (2) and other decisions cited before it, this Court held that the Advocate-General of Maharashtra could not be treated as a\"person aggrievt:d' who was entitled to file an appeal under section 3 7 of the Advocates Act.\n\nThe entire decision was based on the construction of the provisions (as they stood then) of the statute concerned, as it appeared to the Bench which decided the case. It may be noted that section 37 of\n\n(I) [1971] 1 SCR 863.\n\n(2) [1961JA.C. 617.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1233\n\nthe Advocates Act has since been amended authorising the Advocate General of a State expressly to file an appeal.\n\nIn Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar etc. etc.,(1) the interpretation of the words 'person aggrieved' in the Advocates Act, 1961, again came up for consideration by this Court. In that case the right of the State\n\nBar Council to file an appeal against the decision of the Bar Council of India before this Court was challenged on the ground that it was not an aggrieved party. That contention was negatived by Ray, C.J. by giving a liberal interpretation to the words 'person aggrieved' with the following obsevation at page 315:\n\n\"The words \"person aggrieve~\" are found in several statutes. The meaning of th~ words \"person aggrieved\" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words \"person aggrieved\" correspond to the requirement of locus \"stanrli which arises in relation to judicial remedies.·\n\nWhere a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words \"a person aggrieved\" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one \"a person aggrieved\".\n\nAgain a person is aggrived if a legal burden is imposed on him.\n\nThe meaning of the words \"a person aggrieved\" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights.\n\nThe restricted meaning requires denial or deprevation of legal rights, A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional\n\n(I) [1976] 1 SCR~306.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 982'1 2 s.c.il.\n\nconduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words \"person aggrieved\" in sections 3 7 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words \"person aggrieved\" include \"a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests\" .. It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional co; iduct and etiquette.\n\nThe pre-eminent question is : what are the interests of the Bar Council ? The interests of the Bar Council are the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council has no personal or pecuniary interest. The Bar Council has the statutory duty and interest to see that the rules laid down by the Bar Council of India in relation to professional conduct and etiquette are upheld and not violated. The Bar Council act as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally inti:rested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession.\n\nThe interest of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiqu1tte in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust.\n\nThe Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of pirofessional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India is accor- 'ding to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in profession, the State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the: interests of the profession a11d the i11terests of the :(3ar,''\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1235\n\nThe above two decisions are in cases in which writs in the nature of certiorari were sought. This Court has however in cases in which writs in the nature of habeas corpus or of quo warranto are prayed for relaxed the rule that ordinarily an applicant under Art. 226 should show that some personal right or fiduciary interest is prejudiced by the action or inaction of the authority concerned.\n\nIn Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors.(1) this Court observed that \"while a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave. miscarriage of justice having an ad- C verse impact on public interests\".\n\nIn Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri & Ors. v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors.,(2) the right of workers in a factory owned by Government to question the validity of a disposal of plant and equipment of the factory by the management was disputed.\n\nOn that D question Chaudrachud, C.J. observed :\n\n\"That disposes of the question as regards the maintainability of the writ petition. But, we feel concerned to point out that the maintainability of a writ petition which is correlated to the existence and violalion of a fundamental right is not always to be confused with the locus to bring a proceeding (; under Article 32.\n\nThese two matters often mingle and coalesce with the result that it becomes difficult to consider them in water tight compartments The question whether a person has the locus to file a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the pub!i<; or at least a se<;-\n\n(1) [1976] 3 SCR 58.\n\n(2) [1981] 2 SCR 52 at pp. 65-66,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.li\n\ntion of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations. Public enterprises are owned by the people and those who run them are accountable to the people. The accountability of the public sector to the Parliament is im:ffective because the parliamentary control of public enterprises is \"diffuse and haphazard\".\n\nWe are not too sure if we would have refused relief to the work<!rs if we had found that the sale was unjust, unfair or mala fide.\"\n\nIn the same case Krishana Iyer, J. after an elaborate discussion of the principle of 'locus standi' observed at page 76-77 thus:\n\n\"In the present case a worker, who, clearly, has an interest in the industry, brings this action regarding an alleged wrong-doing by the Board of Management.\n\nArticle 43A of the Constitution confers, in prindple, partnership status to workers in industry and we cannot, therefore, be deterred by technical considerations of corporate personality to keep out thoie wlio seek to remedy wrongs committed in the management of public sector. Locus standi and justiciability are different issues, as I have earlier pointed out ....\n\nI , If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious iptervener without any inter.est or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him.\n\nBut if he belongs to an organisation which has special\n\niterest in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him\n\ni~ justiciable may still remain to be considered.\n\nI, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Article 226.\"\n\nIn Municipal Council, Rat/am v. Shri Vardhichand & Ors.,(1) Krishna Iyer, J. upheld the right of the people who were reside.nts\n\n(1) [1981~ 1 s. <;::.}l. 97 at pp. 99-1()0.\n\n. .. >\n\n. '--.,...__\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1237\n\n'or Ratlam town to institute a case against its Municipal Council\n\nventilating a public grievance thus :\n\n\"It is procedural rules', as this appeal proves, which infuse life into substantive rights, which activate them: to make them effective'. Here before us, is what looks like a pedestrian quasi-criminal litigation under s. 133 Cr. P.C., where the Ratlam Municipality the appeJlant challenges the sense and soundness of the High Court's affirmation of the trial court's order directing the construction of drainage facilities and the like, which has spiralled up to this Court. The truth is that a few profound issues of processual jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our legal system face us and must zero-in on them as they involve problems of access to justice for the people beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of British Indian vintage. If the centre of gravity of justice is to shift, as the Preamble to the Constitution aodates, from the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community orientation of public interest litigation, these issues must be considered. In that sense, the case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the citizens of a ward. is a path-finder in the field of people's involvement in the justicing process, same which as Prof.\n\nSikes points out the system may 'crumble under the . burden of its own insensitivity'. The key question we have to answer is whether by affirinative action a court can compel a statutory body to carry out its duty to the community by constructing sanitation facilities at , great cost and on a time-bound basis. At issue is the coming of age of that branch of public law bearing on community actions and the court's power to force public bodies under public duties to implement specific plans in response to public grievances.\"\n\nAll these Transferred Petitions were filed initially by advocates under Article 226 of the Constitution before one or the other High\n\nCourt. The Writ Petition however is filed by an advocate under R Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court. The petitioners belong to different High Court Bm .\\llha~<\\d 1 !Jombay, Madras\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS !1982) 2 s.c.1\\.\n\nPatna and Delhi-and to the Supreme Court Bar. One ltflportant prayer made by them is that the Government should be directed to appoint sufficient number of permanent Judges in every High Coutt.\n\nThe other points urged by them are that additional Judges should not be . appointed for short terms like three months Ot six months, that Judges should not be transferred from one High Court to another without their consent and that the circular letter of the Law Ministry should be quashed. Their principal submission is that appo\n\nintment of additional Judges for short terms and their transfer without their consent would interfere with the independence of the judiciary and would violate the directive principle of State policy contained inArticle 50 of the Constitution which requires the State to take steps to separate the judiciary . from th@ executive in the public services of the State.\n\nWhatever may be the position with regard to the other prayers made in these petitions, it is difficult to hold that on the first two questions the petitioners can be held to be having no 'standing' to file the petitions. It is no doubt true that the power to fix: the number of permanent Judges to be appointed in each High Court is within the discretion of the President. But that power is coupled with a duty which the President owes to the public in general and to the lawyers and litigants in particular. If at any given point of time it is found that the number of Judges in a High Court is absolutely inadequate to meet its requirements, the members of the Bar who are vitally interested in the administration of justice can file a petition before the High Court to compel the Government to review the strength of the permanent Judges of that Court and to appoint adequate number of Judges.\n\nThe members of the Bar are not called officers of courts only to impose obligations on them.\n\nThey have certain rights too. It is significant that Article 124 (3} (b), Article 217 (2) (b) and Article 233 (2} of the Constitution specifically state that the legal profession is a sourr.e of recruitment of Judges of the Supreme Court, High Courts and District Courts.\n\nEntries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, specifically refer to persons entitled to prac; tice before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961, provides that only one class of persons. can practise the .profession of law, namely, advocates.\n\nMembers of the Bar have a vital stake in the functioning of the judiciary. Members of the .Bar and. even litigants whose cases have remained undisposed for a long number of years on account of the Government not appointing sufficient number of Judges can therefore file a p€:tition demanding\n\nap~intent of uffi9innnumber of perm.anent Judes !Q High\n\n)--\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1239\n\nCourts. The power under Article 216 of the Constitution is an administrative power which can be regulated in an appropriate way by the courts like any other administrative power. It is not a matter of policy simpliciter.\n\nThe question of appointment of sufficient number of additional Judges under Article 224 (I) of the Constitution for the required period having regard to the arrears or the quantum of business in a High Court can also be agitated by lawyers and litigants. It is true that the Court should not ordinarily issue a mandamus in such cases unless it is satisfied that there has been a gross deriliction of duty on the part of the Government. That however is a point to be comidered before granting or refusing to grant the relief.\n\nBut it cannot in any event be said that a petition filed by lawyers for the above sald reliefs is liable to be dismissed at the threshold merely on the ground of locus standi. The petitioners satisfy all the tests which are laid down in the decisions referred to above to maintain the petitions on the two questions referred to above.\n\nDuring the pendency of these petitions, two further circumstances have come into existence.\n\nMr. S.N. Kumar who was an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court when the petition of Shri V.M. Tarkunde was filed in the High Court has ceased to be an additional Judge as his term was not extended beyond June 6, 1981.\n\nHe has, though as a respondent, by filing necessary pleadings questioned the action of the Government in not extending his term and also the validity of the circular letter of the Law Minister. In the case relating to the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of Madras High Court, he has been permitted to be transposed as the petitioner. He has filed an additional affidavit challenging the order of transfer. In view of these new circumstances much of the sting in the objectioP to the locus standi of the original petitioners to file the petitions is lost.\n\nIt must also be stated that the learned Attorney--General also stated at the commencement of the hearing of these cases that he would not press his objection relating to the locus standi of the petitioners having regard to the magnitude and the importance of ths constitutional questions involved m the cases.\n\nBut Shri P.R. Mridul, learned counsel appearing for the Law Minister, however, contends that the lawyers either as a class or individually cannot be permitted to file petitions for the issue of\n\nany direction to the Government concerning the appointment or ff transfer of Judges. He has depended upon the writings of L.A. Stein, S.M. Thio, Joel Grossman all<l ic!iard S. Wells and Louis L. Jalfo\n\n.118\n\n.F\n\n. 1240\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1'982) 2 S.C.k .\n\n. and a number of decisions in support of his submission.\n\nHe has . quoted copiously from 'Judicial Protection Against The~ Executive' \\ published by the Max Planck Institute. Shri Mridui argues that .an applicant must show that he has a legal or some special interest , which is sufficient in law to move the Court and that th1e duty which , is sought to be enforced is owed to him. I have carefully considered . his submission. The conclusion reached by S.M. Thio in his essay\n\n.. entitled' ~Locus Standi in Relation to Mandamus' at page 133 in\n\nPublic Law, edited by J.A.G. Griffith on which Shri Mridul has relied is of significance.\n\nIt runs thus :\n\n' ..\n\n\"It may be seen from the abo\"ve analysis of the cases that the uncertainty surrounding the locus standi of an\n\ni applicant for mandamus is largely attributable to the ·.; variety of formulae employed by the courts to describe the nature of the interest required to support an application for mandamus, some of which are conflicting ·: and others ambiguous. The employment of the tradi- , tional syntax or a \"legal right\" to describe the requisite\n\n.· i interest coupled with the assertion that a mandamus ·, , applicant must show that the duty is owed to him ' personally has established two particular poinlts. On the one hand a strict rule limiting standing to a pe:rson who r has a litigable right within the categories of private law. On the other hand, the courts hav, e, in the absence of such a litigable right, accorded standing to : a person who made out a \"special intere!1t\" in the 'r performance of the duty sought to be enforced.\n\nThe courts, in some of these cases, paid lip-service to the \"legal right\" test, but obviously using the term to • connote any interest judicially recognised as worthy\n\n'\" ! of protection rather than a right the invasion of which gives rise to civil actionability. They have, in the other cases. directly held it sufficient for a mandamus applicant to establish a \"special interest\" in order to have locus standi. As has been seen, the various judicial pronouncements requiring an applicant to show that the duty the performance of which is sou1ght to be . , secured is one owed to him personally may be discounted since they were designed to bring out the point . that where the repository of the duty was a crown , ! ervant1 itJ\\was Jmperative for the applicant to show\n\nt ..\n\ns.P. OUl>TA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) d4i\n\nthat the duty was not one owed to the Crown. but that it was imposed on the Crown servant as persons designate and hence amenable to mandamus.\n\nOn balance, the weight of authorities favour the more liberal \"special interest\" test under which the courts have accorded standing to persons who have a direct and substantial interest at stake. This is necessarily a matter of judicial discretion. However, the preponderance of cases reveal that :\n\n(I) Where the duty sought to be enforced is imposed on a\n\npublic official or a public body for the benefit of a C specific class of persons, persons within the class are competent to apply for mandamus without further ado.\n\nPersons outside the class may have locus standi if they have a special interest in its performance i.e. an interest over and above that of the general public.\n\n(2) Where the duty sought to be secured is a general one and is not specifically imposed for the benefit of a• particular class of persons, the mandamus applicant must satisfy the \"special interest\" test.\n\nWhere the failure to perform the duty has a de facto adverse effect on a class of persons over and beyond that sustained by the general public, any member of that class is competent to apply for mandamus without showing that he is more prejudiced than other members of the class.\n\nHowever, where the non.performance of the duty theoretically affects a class of persons more than the general public, but in actuality has only de facto effect on some members of the class, the mandamus applicant will probably have to show that his interest is more substantial than that of the interest group to which he belongs\".\n\nShri Mridul however fairly concedes that litigations of class character or public interest litigations (which may be called public injury cases) are an essential feature of modern civilised jurisprudence and there is no gainsaying the fact that in these cases of public wrongs and public injury a liberal approach is adopted by the courts to reach all forms of injustice particularly where prisoners, lunatics,\n\n1242 SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS (1982] 2 S.C.ll.\n\nA minors and other eaker sections of people who cannot have access to court owing to their helplessness are involved.\n\nIn support of this statement, he has brought to our notice the decision of' this Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and Ors(1) in which Krishna Iyer, J. has observed thus: B ~\n\n\"Fairness to respondent's counsel constrains us to consider in limine a flawsome plea forcibly urged that the Union figured as the appellant before us but being no party to the dispute (which was between the workers on the one hand and the establishments on the other) had no locus standi. No right of the Union qua Union was involved and the real disputants were the workers.\n\nSurely, there is terminological lapse in the ca.use-title because, in fact, the aggrieved appellants are the workers collectively, not the Union. But a bare reading o.f the petition the description of parties, the grounds urged and grievences aired, leave us in no doubt that the battle is between the workers and employers and the Union represents, as a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though formally invisible on the party array. The substance of the matter is obvious and formal defects, in such circumstances, fade away. We are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code but with an industrial dispute . where the process of conflict resolution is informal, rough-and-ready and invites a liberal approach. Proce ' dural prescriptions are handmaids, not mistresses of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which Courts must view .processual deviances.\n\nOur adjectival branch of jurisprudence, by and large, deals not with\n\n.. sophisticated litigants but the rural poor, the urban lay and the weaker societal segments for whom law will be an added terror if technical misdiscriptions and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the causetitle create a secret weapon to non-suit a party. Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted, latitude , ' is a grace of processual justice.\n\nTest litigations,\n\n(ll (1976] 3 SCR 591, 596-97. '\n\nS.f>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataratnlah, J.) 1243\n\nrepresentative actions, pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral procedural short-comings. Even Art. 226, viewed in wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents,· has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a specious contruction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival Jaw.\n\nTherefore, the decisions cited before us founded on the jurisdiction under Art. 226 are inept and themselves somewhat out of tune with the modern requirements o~ jurisprudence calculated to benefit the community\".\n\nYet the contention of Shri Mridul is that even though the lawyers constitute a special group who can' be said to be concerned with the administration of justice in the sence of having a professional interest in connection therewith, that by itself is not suffi. cient for holding that they can file the petitions in respect of the reliefs prayed for by them which concern only the Judges and not the lawyers.\n\nHe strongly pressed before us the view expressed by this Court in the State of Gujarat & Anr. v, Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad etc.(1) I tl.nd that the said decision has not much relevance on the question before us and it is not necessary to deal with it at length.\n\nIt is also difficult to hold that the recongnition of the 'standing' of the lawyers to file these petitions would in any way interfere with the doctrine of separation of powers since it is not the case of\n\n(I) (1974] 3 SCR 760.\n\n1i44, SUPREME Cot.lilt REPORTS iI982J 2 s.c.t.\n\nShri )ldridul that a person who has indisputably the right to file these petitio11s cannot in law raise the questions urged before us in these cases. If the issues are non-justiciable, the petitions may have to be dismissed on the ground that the impugned administrative action is beyond judicial review but this has no bearing on the question of 'locus standi' of the petitioners, who are lawyers. Lawyers are entitled to approach the Court to direct the Governmcmt to appoint sufficient number of permanent Judges and to appoint sudicient number of additional Judges for the maximum period of two years having regard to the arrears and the business of the Court. They may also legitimately agitate that additional Judges should not be appointed when permanent vacancies have remained unfilled for no good reason.\n\nrt has, however, to be made clear that it cannot be said that lawyers only because they have a right to practice in a court have 'locus standi' to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning judges, courts and administration of justice. There ari~ many such matters in which they have no 'locus standi' to ask for relief. By way of illustration, lawyers cannot question the establishment of a new court on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby. (See V.R. Mudvedkar & Ors. v. The State of Mysore.(1) Even in these cases on the question of non-appointment of Mr. S.N. Kumar and on the question of transfer of Mr. K.B.N.\n\nSingh, the lawyer-petitioners may have no voice. But for the active participation of these two persons, the petitions regarding reliefs concerning them individually would have probably become liable to be dismissed on the ground that the lawyers have no 'locus standi' to make these prayers.\n\nBut, since as already stated, Mr. S.N. Kumar and Mr. K.B.N.\n\nSingh have requested the Court to consider and if thought fit to grant relief in their favour and the learned Attorney-General has fairly stated that he would not raise the objection that the peti: tioners have no locus standi in view of the importance of the ques tions debated in these cases, we hold that the petitions cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the petitioners who are lawyers have no locus standi to file these petitions. Before leaving this topic, it has to be observed that the question of locus standi in the field of administrative law is still in a fluid state and it is not possible\n\n(1) AIR 1971Mysore202 •.\n\nS.i>. GUPTA v. UNION tflenkataramiah, J.) 1245.\n\nto lay down in any one case the principles which can govern all situations.\n\n~ART III\n\nThe Court cannot also decline to go into the questions agitated in these petitions on the ground that they are political questions or questions within the exclusive domain of executive discretion. The doctrine of political question which was holding the field long time back in the United States of America has now been exploded. It had been assumed for sometime that the courts would not adjudi cate claims to power by the legislative and executive branches because they presented 'political' and therefore non-justiciable questions. This claim was based on the principle of separation of powers recognised by the Constitution of the United States of America. Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the earliest writers who challenged in the year 183 5 itself the correctness of the doctrine of political question. He said in his book entitled 'Democracy in America' (published by Oxford University Press in 1961, p. 82) thus:\n\n\"But the American Judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own will.\n\nHe only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a case.\n\nThe political question which he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interest of the suitors, and he cannot refuse to decide it without abdicating the duties of his post\".\n\nIt should, however, be borne in mind that separation of powers does not mean a rigid analytical division.\n\nIt is a general guiding principle. As Woodrow Wilson put it in 1908:\n\n\" ........ government is not a machine but a living thing ...... No living thing can have _its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent upon theit quick co-operation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of purppse ....... Their cooperation is indispensible, their warfare fatal\".\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(Wilson: 'Constitutional Government in the United States' 56 (1908).\n\nEach one of the organs of the State-the legislature, the executive and the judiciary-has to discharge iis legitimate duties having sound administration as the common goal.\n\nThe doctrine of political question was examined in the year 1962 by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Baker v. Carr.(1) That was a civil action in which the complaint was that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated had been denied equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America by virtue of debasement of their votes by reason of unconstitutional . division of their electoral area situated in the State of Tennessee.\n\nThe District Court dismissed their claim on two grounds namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the action was a non-justiciable one. The Supreme Court of the United States of.\n\nAmerica reversed the judgment of the court below and n:maded the case to the District Court to dispose it of in the light of its decision.\n\nThe Supreme Court held that the complaint of the appellants involved a justiciable cause upon which they were entitled to a trial and a decision. Brennan, J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of six of the Judges, in the course of his decision, observed at page 691 thus:\n\n\"We come, finally, to the ultimate inquiry whether our precedents as to what constitutes a non-justiciable \"political question\" bring the case before us under the umbrella of that doctrine. A natural beginning is to note whether any of the common characteristics which we have been able to identify and label de1icriptively are present.\n\nWe find none : The question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided by a political branch of government coequal with this Court.\n\nNor do we risk embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we: take issue with Tennessee as to the constitutionality of' her action here challenged. Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed ;.)n this action, ask)he Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the ------\n\n<o 369 U.S. 186; 7 L. Ed. 2nd 663,\n\n.. >\n\n, f---\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1247\n\nEqual Protection Clauseare well developed and familiar, and it has been open to c:ourts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action\".\n\nIn Powell v. McCormack(1) the label of political question was consiclered a misnomer and all cases in which such a plea was raised were cases in which really the question of jurisdiction of the court to dedde the issue arising in them had been canvassed.\n\nThe plaintiff in that case Adam Clayton Powell Jr. was duly elected from a congressional district of New York as a member of the United States House of Representatives in 1966.\n\nHowever, pursuant to a House resolution he was not permitted to take his seat on the ground that he had earlier wrongfully diverted House funds, had made false reports regarding foreign currency etc. Powell alongwith some others who were voters in the constituency then filed a suit claiming that the House could exclude him only if it found that he failed to meet the standing requirerrents of age, citizenship and residence contained in clause 2 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States of America and thus had excluded him unconstitutionally.\n\nThe District Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court pf Appeal affirmed the dismissal although on somewhat different grounds. One of the points raised before the Supreme Court of the United States of America was that the question involved was a political question and hence was not justiciable. The Suprsme Court held that it was an error to dismiss\n\nthe suit and remaded it for disposal, in accordance with law.\n\nChief Justice Warren who spoke for the Court disposed of the defence based on political question at page 532 thus : .\n\n\"(2) Respondents' alternate contention is that the case presents a political question because judicial resoc\n\nlution of petitoners' claim would produce a \"potenti- G ally embarrassing confrontation between coordinate\n\nbranches\" of the Federal Government. But, as our interpretation of Art. 1, $ 5, discloses, a determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such ff\n\n(1) 395 U.S. 486; 23 L. Ed. 2nd 491.\n\n!248 SlJPRfiME COURT Rill>ORTS ( 1982) s.c.Ji..\n\na determination falls withiq the traditional role accorded to cour.ts to interpret the law, and does not involve a \"lack of the respect due to (a) coordinate branch of government\", nor does it involve an \"initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion\". Baker v. Carr, 1369, US 186 at 217; 7 L. Ed 2d 663 at 686.\n\nOur system of government requires that federal courts on occassion interpret the Constitutio;1 in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged ·onflict . that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the court's avoiding their constitutional responsibility ....\n\nxx xx xx xx\n\nThus, we conclude that petitioners claim is not barred by the political question doctrine, and, having determined that the claim is otherwise generally justiciable, we hold that the case is justiciable\".\n\nIn sum, the political question doctrine, according to R. Berger, interposes no obstacle to judicial determination of the rival legislative executive claims to receive or withhold information. The powerc to decide these claims plainly has not been lodged in eith1r the legislative 011 the executive branch; equally plainly, the jurisdiction to demarcate constitutional boundaries between the rival claimants has been given to courts. The situation is the same when private parties are involved. This rule, of course, is subject to considerations such as national security and diplomatic relations.\n\nThis appears to be: the position in the United States of America.\n\n( I In our country which is governed by a written Constitution also many questions which appear to have a purely political colour are bound to assume the character of judicial questions.\n\nIn the State of.-Rajasthan & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India etc. etc. (1) the Government's claim that the validity of the decision of the President under Article 356(1) of the Constitution being political in character was not justiciable on that sole ground was rejected by this Court.\n\nBhagwati, J. in the course of his judgment observed in that case at pages 80,81 thus :\n\n(1) [1978) 1 SCR lo\n\nS.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataralniah, J.) 12.49\n\n\"1t \\\\iili, thetefote, be seeli that merely because a (iuestloh has a political colour, the Court cannot fold Its hahds in despair and declare \"judicial hands off\".\n\nSo long as a question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits or Its power ot exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed it would be its constitu_tional obligation to do so. It is necessary to assert in the clearest terms, particularly in the context of recent history, that the Constitution Is Supreme lex, the paramount Jaw or the land, and there is no department or branch of government above or beyond it.\n\nEvery organ of government, be it the executive or the legislature or the judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within the limits of its authority. No one howsoever highly placed and no authority howsoever lofty can claim that it shall be the sole judge of the extent of its power under the Constitution or whether its action is within the confines of such power laid down by the Constitution. This Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to this Court is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the power conferred on each branch of government, whether it is limited, and if so, what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is for this Court to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the rule of law.\"\n\nThe objection tliat the questions involved in these petitions are non-justiciable merely on the ground that they are political in character has to be negatived.\n\nBut it is made clear that the courts are not entitled to enquire into every sort of question without any limitation. There is still a certain class of questions such as international relations, national security which cannot be entertained by the Court. It is for the Court to determine in each case whether a particular question should be debated before it or not.\n\nTile questions raised in these petitions will be considered here after,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.Il.\n\nPART IV\n\nWe are concerned in these cases with High Courts. and Judges of High .courts in our country ........ .\n\nSpeaking on the nature of the Draft Constitution, Dr. Ambed- B kar in his speech delivered on November 4, 1948, in the Constituent Assembly saic; I :\n\n\"All federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of federalism. No matter what the circumstances, it cannot change its form and shape.\n\nC It can never be unitary. On the other hand the Draft Constitution can be both unitary as weII a:; federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances ...... .\n\nThere is another special feature of the proposed Indian Federation which distinguishes it from other federations.\n\nA Federation being a dual polity based on divided authority with separate legislative, executive and judicial powers for each of the two polities is bound to produce diversity in laws, in administration and in judicial protection.\n\nUpto a certain point this diversity does not matter. It may be welcomed as being an attempt to accommodate the pJwers of Government to local needs and local circumstances.\n\nBut this very diversity when it goes beyond a certain point is capable of producing chaos and has produced chaos in many federal States. One has only to imagine twenty different laws if we have twenty States in the Union-of marriage, of divorce, of inheritartce of pro perty, family relations, contracts, torts crimes, weights and measures, of bills and cheques, banking and com merce of procedures for obtaining justice and in the standards and methods of administration.\n\nSuch a state of affairs not only weakens the State but becomes intolerant to the citizen who moves from State to State only to find that what is lawful in one State is not lawful in another. The Draft Constitution bas sought to forge means and methods whereby India will have federation and at the same time will have: uniformity\n\nS.I'. GUPTA v. UNION (Yenkataramiah, J.) 1251\n\nin all the basic matters which are essential to maintain the unity of the country.\n\nThe means adopted by the Draft Constitution are three;\n\n(I) a single judiciary,\n\n(2) uniformity in fundamental laws, civil and B criminal, anci\n\n(3) a common All India Civil Service to man\n\nImportant posts.\n\nA dual judiciary, a duality of legal codes and a duality of civil services, as I said, are the logical consequences of a dual polity which is inherent in a federation. In the U.S.A. the Federal Judiciary and the State Judiciary are separate and independent of each other. The Indian Federation though a Dual Polity has no Dual Judiciary at all.\n\nThe High Courts and the Supreme Court form one single integrated Judiciary having jurisdiction and providing remedies in all cases arising under the constitutional law, the civil law or the criminal law.\"\n\n(Constitution Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1948-49) at E pp. 34-36-37)\n\nThe High Courts in India are established by the Constitution.\n\nArticle 3 76 of the Constitution, howevery, provided for the continuance of the Judges of a High Court in any Province holding office immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as Judges of the new High Court in the corresponding State.\n\nArticle 376 of the Constitution reads :\n\n\"376. ( l) Notwithstanding anything in clause (2) 0f article 217, the Judges of a High Court in any\n\nProvince holding office immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, unless they have elected otherwise, become on such commencement the Judges of the High Court in the corresponding State, and shall thereupon be entitled to such salaries and allowances and to such rights in respect of leave of absence auq\n\n' I\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.ll.\n\npension as are provided for under Article 221 in respect of the Judges of such High Court.\n\nAny such Judge shall, notwithstanding that he is not a citizen of India, be eligible for appointment as Chief Justice of such High Court, or as Chief Justice or other Judge of any other High Court.\n\n(2) The Judges of a High Court in any Indian State corresponding to any State specified in Part B of the First Schedule holding office immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, unless they have elected otherwise:, become on such commencement the Judges of the High Court in the State so specified and shall, notwithstanding anything in clauses (I) and (2) of article 217 but subject to the proviso to clause\n\n(1) of that article, continue to hold office until the expiration of such period as the President may by order determine.\n\n(3) In this article, the expression \"Judge\" does not include an acting Judge or an additional Judge.\"\n\nAfter the commencement of the Constitution, the new High Courts were allowed to exercise the jurisdiction of the , existing High Courts, until it was duly altered by appropriate Legislature, by virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution which reads :\n\n\"225.\n\nSubject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the j11risdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts shall be the same as immediately before the\n\n9ommncement of this Constitution,\n\n- \"'\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1253\n\nProvided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction\".\n\nSome of the High Courts came to be constituted or reconstituted after the commencement of the Constitution under different laws made by the Par Ii amen t.\n\nAn analysis of the various provisions of the Constitution and other Jaws having a bearing on the question shows that every High Court in India is an integral part of a single Indian judiciary and Judges who hold the posts of Judges of High Courts belong to a single family even though there may be a slight variation in two of the authorities who are required to be consulted at the time of the appointment. The provisions dealing with the High Courts are found in Chapter V in Part VI of the Constitution containing rrovisions governing the States and the salaries of the Judges of a High Court are paid out of the funds of the State or States over which it exercises jurisdiction.\n\nYet it is difficult to say that each High Court is independent of the other High Courts.\n\nA perusal of the other provisions in .that Chapter shows that the State Legislatures and the State Governments have very little to do so far as the organization of the High Courts is concerned.\n\nArticle 366 (14) of the Constitution states that a 'High Court means any Court which is deemed for the purposes of this Constitution to be a High Court for any State and includes (a) any Court in the territory of India or reconstituted under this Constitution as a High Court and (b) any other Court in the territory of India which may be declared by Parliament by law to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of this Constitution'.\n\nread: Article 214 of the Constitution as it was originally enactrd\n\n\"214. (I) There shall be a High Court for each State.\n\n(2) For the purposes of this Constitution the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to any Province immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall be deemeg tQ Q\\: tl!e High Court for the corresponding State,\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S, C.R.\n\n(3) The provisins of this Chapter shall apply to every High Court referred to in this article\".\n\nClauses (2) and (3) of Article 214 .were omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and Article 214 (l) was renumbered as Article 214. Clause (2) of Article 214 contained the necessary 'deeming' provision under which the High Courts exercising jurisdiction in any Province immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution became High Courts under the Constitution as per definition contained in Article 366(14) of the Constitution Clause (3) of Article 214 stated that Chapter Vin Part VI of the Constitution did not apply to any particular High Court but generally to all the High Courts thereby suggesting that this Chapter could have very well been included in a separate part of the Constitution. The legislative power to constitute a High Court is vested in the Parliament by Entry 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which reads :\n\n\"78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts ; persons entitled to practise before the High Courts\".\n\nIt is today quite possible for the Parliament to pass a common High Courts Act governing all the High Courts in India replacing the existing laws governing them.\n\nThe appointment of a Judge of a High Court is made by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State concerned and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\nA Judge may by writing under his hand addressed to the President resign his office.\n\nHe is removable from office by the order of the President passed after an address by Parliament presented in the manner provided in Article 124 ( 4) of the Constitution for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court. Article 222 of the Constitution states that the President may after consultation with the Chief Justice of India transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court without any kind of consultation with the Governors of the States concerned or the Chief Justices of those High Courts. Article 224A of the Constitution inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V in Part VI of the Constitution, the Chief Jqsti<; e of a High Court for any State\n\nS.P. GUPTA ¥. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1255\n\nmay at any time with the previous consent of the President request any person who has held the office of a Judge of that Court or any other High Court to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court for that State. Under paragraph 11 (b) (i) of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the time spent by a Judge of any High Court on duty as a Judge or in the performance of such other functions (including functions connected with a different State) as he may at the request of the President undertake to discharge is tr::atcd as 'actual service'.\n\nUnder Article 231 of the Constitution, Parliament may by law establish a common High O; iurt for two or more States or for one or more States and a Union Territory.\n\nArticle 139A (2) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to transfer any case, appeal or other proceeding pending before a High Court to any other High Court. By virtue of the proviso to clause (I) of Article 356 of the Constitution the powers vested aod exercisable by a High Court remain unaffected by any proclamation issued under Article 356 (I) by the President in relation to a State over which the High Court is exercising jurisdiction. These provisions indicate that all the High Courts organically form integral parts of a single system although their territorial jurisdictions are defined.\n\nNo High Court can claim any superiority over the other either on the basis of its situation or on the basis that it is a successor to a High Court which was functioning in any Province immediately before the commencement of the Constitution or on the basis of the extent of its territorial jurisdiction. All the High Courts have the same status under the Constitution.\n\nPART V\n\nThe scope of the power of the President to appoint Judges of the High Courts under Article 217 (!) of the Constitution may be considered now.\n\nIt may be appropriate to refer here to the position prevailing under the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nUnder section 220 (2) of that Act every Judge of a High Court was to be appointed by His Majesty and he could hold office until he attained the age of sixty years.\n\nHe was liable .. to be removed from his office by His Majesty on the ground of misbehaviour or of infirmity of mind or body if the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on a reference being made to them by His Majesty reported that be ought on any such ground to be removed.\n\nThe appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935 was thus l\\ Cr9w11 appointTQQJlt. The Governor\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19821 2 s.c.a.\n\nGeneral was, however, given the power under section 222 of thaJ Act to appoint additional or acting Judges on behalf of the Crow~ for a temporary period. There was no requirement of any consulta tion with any specified judicial authority.\n\nWhen section 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935 came up for discussion before the House of Commons in order to ascertain whether the appointments of High Court Judges was subjected to political pressure or not, a question was raised in the following way :\n\n\"The Crown must, of course, have nominations made to it. Will tho.se nominations be made by the Ministers, or will they be put forward by the Governor acting in his discretion ?\n\nThe above question was replied by the Solicitor-Gene.ral of His M!ljesty's Government thus : ·\n\n\"I do not think there is any thing to fetter the Secretary of State in making inquiries from the Governor-General, the Governor or any body he thinks proper. I think it is a perfectly unfettered duty\"\n\nt (See Parliamentary Debates Indian Affairs, Commons, 1934-35, Vol. II Col. 2685).\n\nIn the ordinary course it is legitimate to assume that there must have been always consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned or with some others who were familiar with judicial matters whenever an appointment of a Judge to a High Court was made.\n\nArticle 193 (I) of the Draft Constitution stated that every Judge of a High Court was to be appointed by the President by a warrant tinder his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High court of that State. In the Memorandum containing the views of the Judges of the Federal Court and of the Chief Justices representing all the Provincial High Courts prepared by the Con ference ofthe Judges of the Federal Court and the Chief Justices of the several High Courts held in March, 1948 on the question of appointment of Judges of the High Court, it WM n:presented to the\n\nDrafting Corn mitt~ !l, S fallows :\n\ns.f>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n\"The Chief Justice should send his recommendation in that behalf directly to the' President. After consultation with the Governor the President should make the appointment with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. This procedure would obviate the need for the Chief Justice of the High Court discussing the matter with the Premier and his Home Minister and \"justifying\" his recommendations before them.\n\nIt would also ensure the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court being always.placed before the appointing authority, namely, the President. The necessity for obtaining the \"concurrence\" of the Chief Justice of India would provide a safeguard against political and party pressure at the highest level being brought to bear in the matter.\n\nIt neds hardly to be pointed out, in this connection, that under the system of responsible Government envisaged by the proposed Constitution, the President who is to make the appointment will be the constitutional head of the executive guided by the advice of the Council of Ministers who will of necessity be drawn from the political party for the time being in power, and there may thus be some risk of political and party considerations influencing the appointment of the highest judicial officers in the country which, under the existing Constitution, has so far remained on the whole free from such influences, the Governor-General and the Governors not being elected nor owing their appointment to political parties in this country. It is therefore suggested that Article 193 (I) may be worded in the following or other suitable manner :\n\nEvery Judge of the High Court shall be appointed by the President by a warrant under his hand and seal on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court after consultation with the Governor of the State and with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India ............ (emphasis added)\n\nWe do not think it neeessary to make any provision in tile Constitution for the possibility of the Chief\n\n1258 iUPRBMB toURT RilJ>oR.ts (1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nJustice of India refusing to concur in an appointment proposed by the President.\n\nBoth are officers of the highest responsibility and so far no case of such refusal has arisen although a convention now exists that such appointment should be made after referring the matter to the Chief Justice of India and obtaining his concurrence. If per chance such a situation were ever to arise it could of course be met by the President making a different proposal, and no express provision need, it seems to us, be made in that behalf\".\n\nUltimately Article 217 (!) which provided for the appointment of High Court Judges was enacted in the following form :\n\n\"217. (I) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the Pre'sident by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court and ........ \"\n\nIt may be noted that the three different words 'recommendation', 'consultation' and 'concurrence' used in the proposal of the Conference of the Federal Court Judges and Chief Justices of High Courts were not adopted by the Constituent Assembly but only the word 'consultation' was used in respect of all the three functionaries referred to in Article 217 (I).\n\nIn Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor,(1) the effect of section 256 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provided that no recommendation should be made for the grant of magisterial powers to, or the withdrawal of any magistenal powers from any person save after consultation with the District Magistrate of the District in which he was working or with the Chief Presidency Magistrate, as the case might be, was considered by the Federal Court. The Federal Court held that the procedure of consultation prescribed in that section was directory and not mandatory and noncompliance with that would not render an appointment otherwise regularly and validly made ineffective or inoperative. The Court felt that any other view would lead to general inconvenienc~ and\n\n(I} [1945] FCR 99 1\n\ns.J>. GUPTA v. UNION {Venkataramiah, J.) 1259\n\ninjustice to persons who had no control over those entrusted with the duty of making recommendations for the grant of magisterial powers It is noteworthy that the above view 'was taken by the Federal Court notwithstanding the fact that the words in the section were very emphatic and of a prohibitory character. In State of Uttar\n\nPradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastma(1) the provisions of Article 320\n\n(3) (c) of the Constitution were held by this Court to be directory and that they did not confer any right on a public servant. It was further held that the absence of consultation or any irregularity in consultation with the Public Service Commission by the Government before imposing a penalty on him at the end of a disciplinary enquiry and non-compliance with Article 320 (3) (c) did not vitiate any such punishment, particularly when due enquiry had been held in accordance with Article 311 of the Constitution and no defect in such enquiry had been pointed out. In reaching that conclusion, the Court depended upon the statement in Crawford on 'Statutory Construction' which was to the following effect :\n\nD \"The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed.\n\nThe meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by consider- E ing its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other ............ \"\n\nThe words prescribing the consultation machinery in Article 217 (!) of the Constitution have to be construed in the context of the broad purposes and the general scheme of that provision ; its history, its object and the result which it seeks to achieve. It is equally necessary that the Court while construing a constitutional provision . should bear in mind that it is a part of the organic law of the country and not just an ordinary piece of legislation. A High Court is the highest judicial authority in a State and is the Court of the last resort for the majority of cases.\n\nAlongwith the Supreme Court at the apex, the High Courts have to play the role of protectors of the rights and liberties of the people and should, therefore, be manned by independent and efficient Judges.\n\nRealising the importance of\n\n(1) [1958) SCR 533.\n\nIi60\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [i982J 2 s.c.il.\n\nthe High Court in a democratic country with a federal form of Government, the Constitution states that the Judges should be appointed after following the consultative machinery provided in Article 217 (I). A citizen of India who has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India is eligible to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. A citizen of India who has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more High Courts in succession is also qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court.\n\nArticle 217 is designed to select the best, known for their high character and unquestionable integrity from among the large number of qualified persons .• Consequently the appointment of Judges of High Courts is not made by calling for applications or holding examinations because the really deserving persons would not make applications.\n\nThe range ol selection is, therefore, practically limited by the personal or acquired knowledge of the Chief Justice of the High Court cncerned about the advocates or Judicial Officers. In that process it may be that many deserving advocates escape notice and consideration.\n\nAn advocate who is thus left out of consideration cannot make grievance of it before a court of law and claim that his case should be considered for such appointment. The paramount public importance attached to the post prevents institution of such action by a member of the Bar. From the nature of the provisions contained in Article 217 (I) of the Constitution, it is also clear that any. appointment made without following the procedure of consultation with the authorities mentioned therein, which appears to me to be madatory, would not be a valid one.\n\nIt is, however, contended on behalf of some of the petitioners and also on behalf of Shri S.N. Kumar that on a true construction of Article 217(1), the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India should be treated as final and binding on the President, having regard to the position of primacy assigned to the Chief Justice of India by the Constitution regarding matters connected with Indian judiciary. 'It is also submitted that the Council of Ministers can have no voice in the matters nf appointment of Judges. Both these contentions are repudiated by the Central Government.\n\nThe question is whether Article 217(!) treats the opinion of any of the functionaries who have to be consulted thereunder and in\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1261\n\nparticular of the Chief Justice of India as final .and binding on the\n\nPresident.\n\nThe Constitution has used different words signifying varying degrees of compulsive or binding character of the opinion of one constitutional dignitary or authority on the other wherever there is need for two or more of them participating in any decision making process under the Constitution.\n\nThey are, for example, 'shall act, according to such opinion' (Art. 103 and Art. 192), 'consent' fArt. 127(1), Art. 128, Art. 224A and Art. 348(2) ), 'advice' (Art. 74 and Art. 150), 'concurrence' (Art. 370(1) (b) (ii), approval' (Art. 130, Art. 146(2) and Art. 229(2) ), 'recommended by' (Art. 233(2) ) and 'after consultation with'\"or 'in consultation with' or 'be consulted' (Art. 124(2), Art. 127(1), Art. 146(1), Art. 217(1), Art. 217(3), Art. 222, Art. 229, Art. 233{1), Art. 320(3), Art. 341(1), 342(1) and Art. 370(1) (b) (i) )- It is significant that the words 'after consultation with' in Article 150 were substituted by the words 'on the advice of' by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, since the .Parliament wanted, as can be seen from the Notes on Clauses in the relevant Bill which later on became the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, the President to prescribe the form of the accounts of thej Union and of the States with the concurrence of and not merely in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.\n\nFrom the scheme of the constitutional provisions, it appears that each of the three functionaries mentioned in Article 217(1) of the Constitution who have to be consulted before a Judge of a High Court is appointed has a distinct and separate role to play. The Chief Justice of the High Court is the most competent person to evaluate the merit and efficiency of a person recommended for the judgeship. The Governor is the proper authority who through the executive agency available to him may be able to report about tlie local position of the person proposed, his character and integrity, his affiliations and the like, which have a considerable bearing on the working of the person proposed for appointment as a Judge.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India is brought into the picture to prevent any vagaries on the part of the Cnief Justice of the High Court who may be moved on occasions by petty considerations such as commuualism and favouritism or who may even be capricious in proposing names of persons for judgeship.\n\nThe Chief Justice of iudia will naturally be able to assess the qualities of persons proposed having in vie.v the standard of efficiency of Judges in all tlie High Courts in India\n\nand also to prevent unsati11factory appointments being made on the\n\n1262 SUPRBMB couR.t RBl'oRts [19S2J 2 s.c.a.\n\nbasis of faulty recommendations made by the Chief Justices of High Courts.\n\nThe position of the Chief Justice of India under Article 217(1) however is not that of an appellate authority or that of the highest administrative authority having the power to overrule the opinion of any other authority.\n\nFrom the specific roles attributed to each of them as explained above, which may to some extent be overlapping also, it cannot be said that the Chief Justice of India has been given any position of primacy amongst the three persons who have to be consulted under Article 217( l) of the Constitution. There are no express words conveying that meaning.\n\nThe President has to take into consideration the opinions of all of them and he should not accept the opinion of any of them only on the sole principle of primacy. He has to take a decision on the question of appointment of Judges of the High Courts on the basis of all relevant materials before him.\n\nArticle 217(1) confers the power of appointment on the President, who ordinarily has to act on the advice of the Council of Mihisters under Article 74(1) of the Constitution.\n\nNow we have to examine whether there is any compelling reason to hold that the Council of Ministers would have no voice in the matter of appointment of a High Court Judge and the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would be binding on the President.\n\nIt is necess,1ry to refer here to certain articles of the Constitution. Article 74(1) provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President, who shall in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice. The proviso to that clause provides that the President may require the Council of Minister to reconsider such advice either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.\n\nIt is thus clear that the only means of coun teracting any advice tendered to him by his Council of Ministers available to the President where he feels that the advice should not be straightaway acted upon is to remit it to the Council of Ministers for reconsideration.\n\nIf after such reconsideration the Council of Ministers tenders its advice the President has to act in accordance with such advice.\n\nThe advice thus tendered is binding on the President.\n\nA comparison of Article 74( I) with Article 163(1) which also requires a Governor to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers shJws that the Governor may in certain matters which are within his discretionary power act independently of his Council\n\nS.P. GU1>TA v. UNION {J!enkataramiah, J.) 1263\n\nof Ministers.\n\nThere is no such exception expressly made in Article 74(1) specifically excluding any matter from its scope.\n\nArticle 103 of the Constitution is another provision which has to be noticed here.\n\nIt confers the power on the President to decide the question whether a Member of Parliament has incurred any disqualification mentioned in Article 102(1) of the Constitution. It reads :\n\n\"103. (I) If any question arises as to whether a member of either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of article 102, the question shall be\n\nreferred for the decision of the President and C his decision shall be final.\n\n(2) Before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion''.\n\nClause (2) of Article 103 lays down the only method in accordance with which the President can decide a question arising under clause (l) thereof. lt requires him to refer the said question to the Election Cootmission for its opinion and to decide the question according to its opinion.\n\nArticle 74(1) therefore is excluded from operation by necessary implication.\n\nA question of similar nature arising in respect of a member of the State Legislature has to be decided under Article 192 by the Governor concerned in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission.\n\nArticle 163(1) therefore becomes inapplicable by necesssary intendment to such a case.\n\nIt is thus seen that wherever the opinion of another authority alone is binding on the President or a Governor, as the case may be, the Constitution uses appropriate words conveying such meaning.\n\nUnder Article 217(3) of the Constitution which provides for the determination of the age of a Judge of a High Court, the President\n\nhas to decide the age of a High Court Judge after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and this Court has observed in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter(1) that the President cannot in deciding the case under Article 217(3) act on the advice of his Ministers. Here again Article 74(1) of the Constitution gets excluded\n\n0) (1971] 3 SCR 483,\n\n' H\n\n1264 sut>tlBMB OOU1lt RBPOR'i'S [ 1982] 2 s.c.il.\n\nby necessary implication.\n\nBut that case stands on an entirely different footing.\n\nThe function of the President under Article 217(3) is a judicial function and that makes all the differeace.\n\nThis Court observed in the said case at pages 504-505 thus :\n\n\"It is necessary to observe that the President in whose name all executive functions of the Union are performed is by Art. 217(3) invested with judicial power of great significance which has bearing on the independence of the Judges of the higher Courts.\n\nThe President is by Art. 74 of the Constitution the constitutional heal wbo acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers in the exercise of his functions.\n\nHaving regard to the very grave consequence resulting from even the initiation of an enquiry relating to the age of a Judge, our Constitution makers have thought it necessary to invest the power in the President.\n\nIn the exercise of this power if democratic institutions are to tai<e root in our country, even the slightest suspicion of appearance of misuse of that power should be avoided.\n\nOthrwise independence of the judiciary is likely to be gravely imperilled.\n\nWe recommend that even in the matter of serving notice and askin.g for representation from Judge of the High Court where a question as to his age is raised, the President's Secretariat should ordinarily be the channel, that the President should have consultation with the Chief Jutice\n\nof India as required by the Constitution and that there must be no interposition of any other body or authority, in the consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India. Again we are of the view that normally an opportunity for an oral hearing should be given to the Judge whose' age is in quest10n, and the question should be decided by the President on consideration of such materials as may be placed by the Judge concerned and the evidence against him after the same is disclosed to him.\n\nThe President acting under Art. 217(3) performs a judicial function of grave importance under the scheme of our Constitution.\n\nHe cannot act on the advice of his Ministers.\n\nNotwithstanding the declared finality:_ofthe order of the President the Court' has jurisdiction in appropriate cases to set aside the order, if it appears that it was passed on collateral considerations or the rules of natural justice were not observed,\n\n... ~\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1265\n\nor that the President's judgment was coloured by the advice or representation made by the executive or it was founded on no evidence.\n\nBut this Court will not sit in appeal over the judgment of the President, nor will the Courts determine the weight which should be attached to the evidence.\n\nAppreciation of evidence is entirely left to the President and it is not for the Courts to hold that on the evidence placed before the President on which the conclusion is founded, if they were called upon to decide the case they would have reached some other conclusion.\"\n\nThe power of appointment of a Judge of a High Court is an C executive power and the analogy of Article 217(3) is, therefore, inappropriate.\n\nThe power of the Governor with regard to matters connected with appointment or dismissal of judicial officers was construed by this Court giving the final voice regarding such appointment or dismissal only to the Governor under Article 233 of the Constitution notwithstanding the vesting of control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court under Article 235 in the case of The Stare of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi.(1) In that case Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) reconciled and interpreted Article 233, Article 234, Article 235 and Article 31 l thus :\n\n\"That the Governor appoints District Judges and the Governor alone can dismiss or remove them goes without sayiog. That does not impinge upon the control of the High Court. It only means that the High Court cannot appoint or dismiss or remove District Judges. In the same way the High Court cannot use the special jurisdiction conferred by the two provisos.\n\nThe High Court cannot decide that it is not reasonably practicable to give a District Judge an opportunity of showing cause or that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give such an opportunity. This the Governor alone can decide.\n\nThat certain powers are to be exercised by the Governor and not by the High Court does not necessarily take away other powers from the High Courts.\n\nThe provisos can be given their full effect without giving rise to\n\n(5) [1966] l ~CR 771 at l'I' 789·7?Q:•\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.C.Ji\n\nother implications.\n\nIt is obvious that if a case arose for the exercise of the special powers under the two provisos, the High Court must leave the matter to the Governor.\n\nIn this connection we may incidentally add that we have no doubt that in exercising these special powers in relation to inquiries against District Judges, the Governor will always have regar<l to the opinion of the High Court in the matter.\n\nThis will be so whoever be the inquiring authority in the State.\n\nBut this does not lead to the further conclusion that the High Court must not hold the enquiry any more than that the Governor should , Jersonally hold the enquiry.\n\nThere is, therefore, nothing in Art. 311 which compels the conclusion that the High Court is ousted of the jurisdiction to hold the enquiry if Art. 235 vested such a power in it. In our judgment, the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete conlrol subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges.\n\nWithin the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to the conditions of service, to a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by cl. (2) of Art. 311 unless such opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause.\n\nThe High Court alone could have held the enquiry in this case. To hold otherwise will be to reverse the policy which has moved determinedly in this direction.\"\n\nAgain in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court and Ors.,(i) the power of appointment of District Judges exercisable by the Governor in consultation with the High Court arose !or consideration.\n\nThis Court recognised in that case that the power to appoint District Judges was vested with Governor but that such power could be exercised only after a full and effective consultation with the High Court.\n\nIt held that if the process of consultation was defective the appointment would become invalid, The Court\n\n(2) (! 970] 2 SCR 666.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION Venkataramiah, J.) 1267\n\ndid not, however, go to the extent of saying that any opinion expressed by the High Court was binding on the Governor.\n\nIn Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab(1) which is a judgment of a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court, Chief Justice Ray observed at page 843 thus :\n\n\"For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President as well as the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the Constitution to act personally without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nWhere the Governor has any discrection, the Governor acts on his own judgment.\n\nThe Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with his Council of Ministers.\n\nThe appointment as well as removal of the members of the Subordinate Judicial IService is an executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Appointments and removals of persons are made by the President and the Governor as the constitutional head of the executive on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.\n\nThat is why any action by any servant of the Union or the State in regard to appointment dismissal is brought against the Union or the State and not against the President or the Governor.\"\n\nIn the same case Krishna Iyer, J. with whom Bhagwati, J. agreed in his concurring judgment has summed up the true legal position under Article 74 and Article 163 of the Constitution at page 875 thus :\n\n\"We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and other powers under various Articles, shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well known exceptional situations.\n\nWithout being dogmatic or exhaustive, these situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime Minister (Chief\n\n(I) (1975] 1 S.C.R. 814.\n\n\nMinister), restricted though this choice is by the para. mount consideration that he should command a majority in the House; (b) the dismissal of a Government which has lost its majority in the House but refuses to quit office;\n\n(c) the dissolution of the House where an appeal to the country is necessitous, although in this area the Head of State should avoid getting involved in politics and must be advised by his Prime Minister (Chief Minister) who will eventually take the responsibility for the step.\"\n\nThe above decision was delivered by this Court after a careful consideration of all aspects of constitutional law bearing on the point in the light of Article 234 of the Constitution which entrusts the power of appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service of a State to the Governor. In principle an appointment under Article 217(!) cannot be different from an appointment under Article 224.\n\nThe binding nature of an opm10n expressed by an authority who has to be consulted before making an appointment of a Judge was disposed of by Chandrachud, C.J. in Re. The Special Courts Bill, 1978(1) at page 550 with the following words-\" ........... the process of consultation has its own limitations and they are quite wellknown.\n\nThe obligation to consult may not necessarily act as a check on an executive ......... \". Later on the learned Chief Justice again obse.rved at pages 550-551 :\n\n\"Yet another infirmity from which the procedure prescribed by the Bill suffers is that the only obi igation which clause 7 imposes on the Central Government while nominating a person to preside over the Special Court is to consult the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis is not a proper place and it is to some extent embarrassing to dwell upon the pitfalls of the consultative process though, by hearsay, one may say that as a matter of convention, it is in the rarest of rare cases that the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India is not accepted by the Government. But the right of an accused to life and liberty cannot be made to depend upon pious expressions of hope, howsoever past experience may justify them.\n\nThe assurance that conven-\n\n(1) (1979] 2iS.C.R. 47~.\n\n. ......,-·\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1269\n\ntions arc seldom broken is a poor consolation to an accused whose life and honour are at stake.\n\nIndeed, one must look at the matter not so much from the point of view of the Chief Justice of India, nor indeed from the point of view of the Government, as from the point of view of the accused and the expectations and sensitivities of the society.\"\n\nThe substance of these observations is that the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India who has to be consulted before .hand would not be binding as such on the executive. That was the reason for insisting upon in that case that the Government should appoint a Judge of the Special Court with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India as otherwise there would have been no need for sucli\n\ninsistence.\n\nThe thesis that the Constitution prohibits the participation of the Executive in the appointment of Judges of superior courts and that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India alone should be binding on the President in such matters totally fails when we consider the question of appointment of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nArticle 124(2) of the Constitution provides that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme\n\nCourt and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.\n\nFrom the above clause of Article 124, it is obvious that when the appointment is to the post of the Chief Justice of India, it is not obligatory on the part of the President to consult any specified functionary.\n\nBut he has to consult such of the Judges of the Supreme Court each one of whom may himself be an aspirant to the post and such other Judges of the High Courts he may consider necessary.\n\nIn this situation, it is quite evident that the opinion of any one of the Judges who may be consulted cannot be treated as binding on the President. The power of appointment rests with the President who has no doubt to take the decision on the advice given by the Council of Ministers after making the necessary consultation.\n\nWhen the 'primacy of judicial opinion' doctrine thus fails in the case of the appointment of the Chief Justice of India, it would not be appropriate to hold that it prevails in the case of appointments of other Judes 9f tile Supreme Court and tl:to Judges of the High Courts.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nUnder Article 217( 1) of the Constitution the President should, therefore, while making an appointment of a High Court Judge act on the advice of his Council of Ministers having due regard to the opinions expressed by the functionaries mentioned therein after a full and effective consultation.\n\nThere is no scope for holding that either the Council of Ministers cannot advice the President on this matter or that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is binding on the President although such opinion should be given due respect and regard.\n\nAs a part of this very contention it is urged that the Executive should have no voice at all in the matter of appointment of Judges of the superior courts in India as the independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution would be in serious jeopardy if the executive can interfere with the process of their appointment.\n\nIt is difficult to hold that merely because the power of appointment is with the executive, the independence of the judiciary would become impaired.\n\nThe true principle is that after such appointment the executive should have no scope to interfere with the work of a Judge.\n\nIn this connection out of curiosity I have looked into some of the books dealing with the modes of appointment of Judges in other countries.\n\nThe methods by which Judges are chosen in the different countries of the world may be broadly classified according to Prof.\n\nJ.W. Garner into three types- (I) election by the legislature, (2) election by the people and (3) appointment by the executive either absolutely or from a list of nominees presented by the courts or with the concurrence of an executive council or the upper chamber of the legislature.\n\nChoice by the legislature was a favourite method of selection in the American States for sometime but this system has been abandoned in all the States except Rhode Island, Verment, South Carolina and Virginia.\n\nIn Switzerland the Judges of the federal tribunal are chosen by the legislative assembly of the federation. Election of Judges by the people was first introduced in France in 1790. With the advent of Napolean this system was abolished as it had become discredited by then.\n\nIn thirty eight of the States in the U.S.A., the method of popular election of Judges is the rule.\n\nIn nearly all countries other that the United States of America, the Judges are appointrd by the executive and even in the United States it is the method followed for the appointment of federal Judges and in six State~ for appointment of State Judges.\n\nIn Belgium the Judges\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1271\n\nof the Court of Cassation :ire appointed from two lists of nominees each containing twice as many names as there are vacancies to be filled, one presented by the Court itself and another by the Senate.\n\nIn France it is the custom when a vacancy occurs on the Bench it is for the President of the Court and the State's Attorney to propose the names of several persons to the Minister of Justice for his consideration. Generally he appoints one of the persons so recommended but sometimes for political reasons he prefers to follow the recommendations of a deputy, who may be an influential member of the Minister's party.\n\nIn England the nominations to all vacancies among the superior Judges are made either by the Prime Minister or by the Lord Chancellor. 'The Prime Minister nominates the Law Lords, the Lords Justices of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and the President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division.\n\nIt is commonly assumed that the Prime Minister is guided by the Lord Chancellor. The ordinary Judges of the High Court often called puisne Judges are nominated by the Lord Chancellor.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor is responsible for the lesser judicial appointment.' (See R.M. Jackson, 'The Machinery of Justice in England' 1960 Edition p. 232).\n\nIn his letter written by the end of 1951 to Morse Erskine, a member of the California Bar, Lord Jowitt who was the Lord ,.\n\nChancellor in the Labour Government till October 1951, however, \" stated :\n\n\"I think that I can fairly say that we have established a tradition in which \"politics\" and \"influence\" (in the appointment of judges) are now completely disregarded.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor selects the man whom he believes to be the best able to fill the position.\n\nIn mY own case I had an unusually large number of appointments, and I can only recall appointing two men who were members of my own party.\n\nYou must remember these facts which help in establishing the tradition.\n\nThe Inns of Courts are completely independent of any governmental control.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor has always been a barrister, and must therefore be a member of one of the Inns.\n\nHe is in close touch with all that goes on in his Inn of Court.\n\nHow should I have felt if I had made a, lot of qJlworthy aprointments, when\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\ni I noticed the cold looks that I should have received when next I went to lunch at the Inn.\n\nSecondly, in practice, the Lord Chancellor would always consult with the Head of the Division to which he was called upon to appoint a Judge.\n\nIf I had to appoint a ,.\n\nJudge to the Queen's Bench Division, I should, in practice, always consult with the Chief Justice; if to the Divorce , Division, with the President, if to the Chancery Division, with the senior judge.\n\nIn all my many appointments, I never in fact made one without the approbation of such a person.\n\nWhen it came to t''.e Court of Appeal, I should consult the Master of the Rolls as to who was the most suitable person............ . . \"\n\n(See 'The Life of the Law, Ed. by John Honnold (1964) p. 270)\n\nSir Albert Napier, the permanent secretary of the office of Lord Chancellor in a paper prepared in about the year 1963 said m11ch tht: same thing as Lord Jowitt as tollows ;\n\n\"The Lord Chancellor is the most appropriate Minister to advise on appointments and promotions for the very reason that he is a Judge and is qualified for that position\n\nby actual practice at the Bar. He knows by experience as an ' advocate, the nature and degree of the knowledge and kind of character and temperament which go to make the best judges. When he sits he hears eminent Barristers arguing before him.\n\nHe is in almost daily touch as a Law Lord and a Bencher of his Inn, with the Lords of Appeal and other Judges and members of the Bar. The Bench of an inn is a society where all are equal, and talk is free, and so far as precedence is necessary, it goes by date of election and not by rank.\n\nIn such a society a bad appointment could not escape criticism, and if it were ever suggested to a Lord Chancellor that he should appoint or promote the wrong man for the wrong motive, he would know not only where his duty Jay but that if he were to accede he would lose the respect of the whole profession.\"\n\n(See 'The Life of th\\l Law, Ed. by John Honnold (1964)\n\nP 210)\n\n8.i>. ou.PrA ii. UNiON (Venkaiaramiah, i.j . Ii73\n\nThe foregoing gives a fairly reliable picture of the English system of appointments of Judges.\n\nIt is thus seen that in England the Judges are appointed by the Executive. 'Nevertheless, the judiciary is substantially insulated by virtue of rules of strict law, constitutional conventions, political practice and professional tradition, from political influence'. (Vide Halsbury's Laws of Eagland, Fourth Edition, Vol I para 5).\n\nIn Australia the Justics of the High Court and of the other courts created by the Parliament are appointed by the Governor- General in Council. (See Section 72(1) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900).\n\nThe appointment of federal Judges is a cabinet matter which is formally ratified by the Executive Council. It is stated that the practice is that the Attorney-General would recommend to Cabinet persons for appointment though it is the Cabinet which will make the final decision.\n\nIn Canada Judges of superior courts are appointed by the Governor-General. (Vide section 96 of the British North America Act, 1867).\n\nIn Japan, the Emperor appoints the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet and Judges other than the Chief Judge are appointed by the Cabinett\n\nIn India we have adopted the procedure contained in Article 217(1) of the Constitution for the appointment of Judges of the High Courts.\n\nWe do not find anything intrinsically wrong in this method.\n\nThe process of consultation prescribed b; Article 217(1) acts as a sufficient safeguard against the appointment of undesirable persons as Judges of the High Courts.\n\nOur experience has been that the independence of the judiciary has not in any way been impaired by reason of the President appointing Judges on the advice of his Coucil of Ministers after following the process of consultation prescribed in Article 2 I 7(1). This method appears to have been adopted so that the appointments of Judges may have ultimately the sanction of the people whom the Council of Ministers represent in a parliamentary form of Government.\n\nIn that way only the Judges may be \"called people's Judges. If the appointments of Judges are to be made on the basis of the recommendations of Judges only then they will be Judges' Judges and such appointments may not fit into the sc'1eme of popular democracy.\n\n1274 SUPi:UlMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.C.ll.\n\nAs a corrolary to the above contention, it is urged that an advocate or a member of the subordinate judiciary who is recommended by the Chief Justice of a High Court acquires a right to be appointed if his name is approved by the Chief Justice of India also and one of the learned counsel appearing in these cases said that such a person would be entitled to request the Court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the President to appoint him as a Judge of the High Court. The soundness of this argument depends upon the process of appointment itself.\n\nArticle 217 of the Constitution does not say in terms that the proposal for appointment of a person as a Judge should be initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court.\n\nLet us assume for purposes of argument that he may initiate the proposat:'recommending the name of a person who according to him is qualified for the post.\n\nThe Governor may or may not agree with the proposal. The Chief Justice of India may or may not agree with the proposal.\n\nUltimately the appointing authority has to take a decision on the question.\n\nUnder the scheme of Article 217 the power to :. 'appoint a Judge of a High Court is vested in the President. While he is bound to consult the authorities mentioned therein and take into consideration their opinions, he is not bound by their opinions.\n\nOrdinarily one does not expect the President to make an appointment by ignoring all the adverse opinions expressed by the functionaries mentioned in Article 217. If there are conflicting opinions the President has to weigh them after giving due consideration to each of them and take a decision on the question.\n\nIn any event it is difficult to hold that an advocate or a member of the Subordinate Judiciary whose name is approved by the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India gets a vested right to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. In fact he has no' justiciable right at all. If for any reason he is not appointed he cannot move the Court to appoint him as a ~Judge of the High Court. The position of an additional Judge who is currently holding office and who is not reappointed stands on a slightly different footing and his case will be considered at the appropriate place.\n\nPART VI\n\nThe evolution of the system of appointing additional Judges in the High Courts for such period not exceeding two years as the President may specify needs to be examined now.\n\nAppointment of a Judge who is a member of the superior judiciary for such short\n\nS.1•. OtJP'tA v. UNION (llenkataramiah, J.) 1215\n\nperiod appears to be peculiar to our country.\n\nSuch practice not prevailing in the United Kingdom. Even in India we do not have Judges either in the Subordinate Judiciary or in the Supreme Court whose tenure is so short.\n\nWe may have additional courts in the Subordinate Judiciary but they are manned by Judges belonging to regular judicial cadre, whose tenure is the same as the tenure of others in the cadre.\n\nUnder section 4 of the High Courts Actjor the Charter Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Viet.; c. 104) it was provided that all the i'.Judges of the High Courts established under that Act held their offices during Her Majesty's pleasure provided that it was lawful for any Judge of a High Court to resign such office of Judge. Section 7 of that Act, however, provided that upon the happening of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice and during any vacancy in the office of Chief Justice and during any absence of a Chief Justice, the Governor-General in Council or Governor in Council as the case might be could appoint one of the Judges of the High Court concerned to perform the duties of Chief Justice of that Court until some person was appointed to the office of the Chief Justice (this provision corresponds to Article 223 of the Constitution).\n\nIt also provided that upon the happening of a vacancy in the office of any other Judge of a High Court and during any absence of any such Judge or on the appointment of any such Judge to act as Chief Justice it was lawful to the Governor-\n\nGeneral in Council or Governor in Council as the case might be to appoint a person with such qualifications as were required in persons to be appointed to the High Court to act as Judge of that Court and the person so appointed was authorized to sit and to perform the duties of a Judge of that Court until some person was appointed to the office of the Judge of that Court and had entered on the discharge of the duties of such. office or until the absent Judge had returned from such absence or until the Governor-General in Council or Governor in Council as aforesaid saw cause to cancel the appointment of such acting Judge. (This provision corresponds to Article 224(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIt may be noted that the President cannot cancel the appointment of an acting Judge under Article 224(2) ).\n\nlo the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861, there was no provision for appointment of an additional Judge of a High Court with a restricted tenure as it is in Article 224(1) of the Constitution.\n\ni276\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19S1j Z S.C.1'.\n\nSection 105 of the Government of India Act, 1915 contained almost the same provisions which were found in section 7 of the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861 providing for the appoint-' ment of acting Chief Justice and acting Judges.\n\nBut section 101 of the 1915 Act however made provision for the appointment of addi-. tional Judges. Sub-section (2) of section 101 stated that each High Court should consist of a Chief Justice and as many other Judges as His Majesty might think to appoint.\n\nClause (I) of the proviso to that sub-section authorised the Governor-General-in- Council _to appoint persons to act as additional Judges for such period not exceeding two years.\n\nSuch provision for the appointment of additional Judges of High Courts appears to have been made by this Act for the first time.\n\nSection 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as it was originally enacted provided that every High Court was to consi&t of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as His Majesty might from time to time consider it necessary to appoint.\n\nIt further provided that the Judges so appointed together with any additional Judges appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with law could at no time exceed in number such maximum number as His Majesty in Council, might fix in relation to the High Court concerned. Under the Government of India Act, .1935, every Judge of a High Court held his office until he attained the age of sixty years provided that he would cease to be a Judge of the High Court if any of the events mentioned in the proviso to section 220(2) happened earlier. Section 220 of the.Government of India Act, 1935 underwent subsequently slight modifications which are of no materiality for the present purpose. Section 222 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provided for the appointment of temporary and additional Judges of a High .Court read immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution as follows :\n\n\"222. ( 1) If the office of Chief Justice of a High Court becomes vacant, or if any such Chief Justice is\n\nby reason of absence, or for any other reason, unable to perform the duties of his office, those duties shall, until some person appointed by His Majesty to the vacant office has entered on the duties thereof, or until the Chief Justice has resumed his duties, as the case may be, be per• formed by such one of the other Judges of the\n\nS.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1271\n\ncourt as the Governor-General may in his A discretion think fit to appoint for the purpose.\n\n(2) If the office of any other judge of a High Court becomes vacant, or if any such judge is appointed to Act temporarily as a Chief. Justice, or is by reason of absence, or for any other reason, unable to perform the duties of his office, the Governor-General may in his discretion appoint a person duly qualified for appointment a judge to act as a judge of that Court, and the person so appointed shall, unless the Governor-General in his discretion thinks fit to revoke his appointment, be deemed to be a judge of that Court until some person appointed by His Majesty to the vacant office has entered on the dujes thereof or until the permanent judge has resumed his duties.\n\n(3) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of any High Court or by '.reason of arrears of work in any such Court it appears to the Governor-General that the number of the judges of the Court should be for the time being increased, the Governor-General in his discretion may, subject to the foregoing provisions of this chapter with respect to the maximum number of judges appoint persons duly qualified for appointment as judges to be additional judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\"\n\nArticle 166 of the Draft prepared by the Constitutional adviser more or less adopted the language of section 222 of the Government of India Act, 1935 with some modifications.\n\nThe Drafting Committee, however, redrafted Article 166 of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Adviser by splitting it into two articles i.e. Articles 198 and 199. The redrafted Articles 198 and 199 of the Draft Constitution read as follows:\n\n\"198. ( 1) When the office of Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when any such Chief Justice is, by reason of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his office, the duties of the\n\n1278 StJl'itEME COtJllT llEl'OlttS [1982) 2 s.c.a.\n\noffice shall be performed by such one of the other Judges of the court as the President may appoint for the purpose.~\n\n(2) (a) When the office of any other judge of a High Court is vacant or when any such judge is appointed to act temporarily as a Chief Justice or is unable to perform the duties of his office by reason of absence or otherwise, the President may appoint a person duly qualified for appointment as a judge to act as a judge of that court.\n\n(b) The person appointed shall, while so acting, be deemed to be a judge of the Court.\n\n( c) Nothing contained in this clause shall prevent the President from revoking any appointment made under this clause.\n\n\"199. If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of any High Court or by reason of arrears of work in any such court, it appears to the President that the number of the j1; dges of the court should be for the time being increased, the President may, subject to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter with respect to the maximum number of judges, appoint persons duly qualified for appointment as judges to be additional judges of the court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\"\n\nThe Drafting Committee also introduced one more Article i .. e.\n\nArticle 200 providing for the attendance of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts which conformed to the practice in the United Kingdom and in the United States of America. That Article read :\n\n\"200. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, the Chief Justice of a High Court may at any time, .subject to the provisions of this article request any person who has held the office of a judge of that court to sit and act as a judge of the court, and every such person so requested shall, while so sitting and acting, have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges of, but shall not other\n\nwise be deemed to be, a judge of that court :\n\nS.J>. GUJ>'l'A V. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1279\n\nProvided that nothing in this article shall be deemed to require any such person as aforesaid to sit and act as a judge of that court unless he consents so to do.\"\n\nAt the conference of the Federal Court Judges and Chief Justices of the Hight Courts which met in March, 1948, it was recommended that Article 198(2) ( c) of the Draft Constitution which empowered the President to revoke the appointment of an acting judge appointed under Article 192(2) (a) should be omitted.\n\nThe Drafting Committee received at this juncture a number of representations to delete the Article providing for the appointment of additional Judges and acting Judges.\n\nThe comments of Tej Bahadur Sapru on the practice of additional Judges or acting Judges resuming practice after a short stay on the Bench were telling. He said:\n\n\"Additional judges, under the old Constitution, were appointed by the Governor-General for a period not exceeding two years.\n\nI do not know whether that condition has been reproduced in the proposed Constitution.\n\nThis prohibition, however, does not apply to acting judges or temporary judges. I think the rule in future should be that any barrister or advocate, who accepts a seat on the Bench, shall be prohibited from resuming practice anywhere on retirement. I would not, however, apply this to temporary judges taken from the Services, who hold a seat on the Bench for a few months, but I would add that the practice of appointing additional and temporary judges should be definitely given up.\n\nWhen I said at the Round Table Conference that there were acting, ad 'itional and temporary judges in India, some of the English lawyers not accustomed to Indian law felt rather surprised. I am also of the opinion that temporary or acting judges do greater harm than permanent judges, when after their seat on the Bench for a short period they revert to the Bar. A seat on the Bench gives them a pre-eminence over their colleagues and. embarrasses the subordinate judges who were at one time under their control and thus instead of their helping justice they act as a hindrance to free justice. I have a very strong feeling in this matter and have during my long\n\n1280 SuPRllMil COURT Rili>Otti's [19821 2 s.c.R..\n\nexperience seen the evil effects of unchecked resumption of, practice by barristers and advocates\".\n\n(B.\n\nShiva Rao ; 'The Framing of India's Constitution' Vol. IV pp. 172-173).\n\nIn October, 1948, the Drafting Committee decided to dr<ip both Article 198 (2) and Article 199 providing for the appointment of acting and additional Judges. It was of the view that it was 'possible to discontinue the system of appointment of temporary and additional Judges in High Courts altogether by increasing, if necessary, the total number of permanent Judges of such courts'.\n\nOn June' 7, 1949 after hearing the plea of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 'that all Judges of the High Court shall have to be permanent', the Constituent Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Drafting Committee to delete Articles 198 (2) and 199 of the Draft Constitu tion providing for the appointment of acting and additional Judges in High Courts. Accordingly the Drafting Committee deleted reference.to appointment of acting and additional Judges altogether in the revised Draft Constitution submitted to the Constituent Assembly on November 3, 1949 but retained only those provisions relating to appointment of acting Chief Justice and attendance of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts.\n\nIn the Constitution as it was enacted finally by the Constituent Assembly these were provisions for appointment of Chief Justice, acting Chief Justices and attendance of retired Judges at the sittings of the High Court. (Vide Article 217, Article 223 and Article 224).\n\nThere was no provision for the appointment of acting or additional Judges.\n\nSince it was felt 'that the working of Article 224 as it was originally enacted which proided for the attendance of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts was not satisfactory and that Lere was need to intro duce provisions for appointment of acting and additional Judges as it obtained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 222 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, I 956, .Article 224 was substituted by the new Article 224 which reads 1hus .:\n\n\"224. (I) If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be additional\n\n'f.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1281\n\njudges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.\n\n(2) When any Judge of a High Court other than the Chief Justice is by reason of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office or is appointed to act temporarily as Chief Justice, the President may appoint a duly qualified person to act as a Judge of that Court until the permanent Judge has resumed his duties.\n\n(3) No person appointed as an additional or acting C judge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty years\".\n\nArticle 217 (I) was simultaneously amended in order to make the procedure of the appointment of permanent Judges applicable to additional and acting Judges too.\n\nAfter amendment, t\\rti<; le 217 (I) reaq~ ;\n\n\"217. (I) Every Judge of High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court and shall hold office in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in Article 224 and in any other case until he attains the age of sixty years ................... \" ..\n\nThe original Article 224 which was replaced by the new Article 224 was again reintroduced as Article 224A by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 again providing for the attendance of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts. Simultaneously Article 217 (I) was amended substituting \"sixty two years\" in the place of \"sixty years\" in it.\n\nClause (3) of Article 224 was also amended by substituting \"sixty two years\" in the place of \"sixty years\". Tb.is completes the history of Article 224 of the Cons-\n\n~.itµtioi; i,\n\n1282 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nWhat is the true meaning of Article 224 (I) ? It empowers the President to appoint duly qualified persons to be additional Judges, if it appears to him by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein that the number of Judges of that Court should for the time being be increased. The two occasions when an additional Judge can be appointed are those mentioned in Article 224 (I) of the Constitution, namely, (i) a temporary increase in its business or\n\n(ii) accumulatation of arrears of work in the High Court concerned. Article 224 (I) is not, therefore, intended for meeting a situation where the work of the High Court is gradually on the inerease requiring the appointment of more number of permanent Judges. The reasons for the increase in the work of the High Courts according to the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission were:\n\n\"The problem of arrears in the High Courts must in our opinion be viewed against the very large, increase in the work of these courts in recent years, particularly during the period following the Constitution. Two main causes of this increase need mention.\n\nFirstly, the growing volume of ordinary litigation following the economic and industrial development of the country, has considerably added to the normal work of all the Courts. We append a Table (Table I) showing the extent of the increase under various heads.\n\nSecondly, there has been an expansion of the High Courts' special jurisdiction under a variety of fiscal enactments like the Income tax and Sales Tax Act and other special laws. The fact of such expansion was noticed by the High Courts Arrears Committee \"as far back as 19il9. A very recent example of the conferment of the special jurisdiction on the High Courts will be found in the Representation of the People Act b\\· which the High Court is empowered to hear appeals from the decisions of Election Tribunal.\n\nThe fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution and resort to the remedies provided for their enforcement have contributed largely to the increase in the volume of work in the High Courts. Applications for the enforcement of fundamental rights, applications\n\n... _ -\n\nS.P. otJPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, 1.) 1283\n\nseeking to restrain the usurpation of jurisdiction by administrative bodies and applications or suits challenging the constitutionality of laws have made large additions to the pending files of the High Courts.\n\nIt has to be observed that many laws have come in for challenge in the Courts on the ground of their inconsistency with the Constitution. The complexity of recent legislation has resulted in a large number of novel and difficult questions having been brought before the High Couts. Their decisions have not only taken longer time, but have led not infrequently to references to Full Benches which necessarily divert the available judge-power from what may be called normal judicial work. As a result of this large addition to their work, the disposal of ordinary civil and criminal work in the High Courts has suffered very considerably. This increase of work and its specially difficult and novel character can well be regarded as an important cause of the accumulation of old cases\".\n\n(Vide paragraphs 2 and 3 in Chapter 6 of Vol. I of the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission).\n\nThese observations were made in 1958. There are more rea- E sons now for the increase in the work of the High Courts.\n\nThe Law Commission in paragraphs 54 and 57 of Chapter 6 in Volume I of its Fourteenth Report recommended thus :\n\n\"54. The large increase in the volume of annual institutions which has been referred to earlier must now, we think, be taken as a permanent feature.\n\nThis position accordingly necessitates a thorough revision of existing ideas regarding the number of judges required for each High Court. The strength of some of the High Courts has been increased from time to time. In doing this, however, the post-Constitutional developments which have thrown a much heavier burden on the High Courts have, in our view, not been' adequately taken into account. To expect the existing pt1mber of judges in the various High Courts to deal ' ,. . . ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.a..\n\nefficiently with the vastly increased volume of work is, in our opinion, to ask them to attempt the impossible. As pointed out to us by a senior counsel, if there is a congestion on the roads due to an increase in traffic, the remedy is not to blame the traffic but to widen the roads.\n\nThe first essential therefore, is to see that the strength of every High Court is maintained at a level so as to be adequate to dispose of what may be called its normal institutions. The normal strength of a High Court must be fixed on the basis of the average annual institutions of all types of proceedings in a particular High Court during the last three years.\n\nThis is essential in order to prevent what may be termed the current file of the Court falling into arrears . and adding to the pile of old cases.\n\nThe problem of clearing the arrears can be satisfactorily dealt with only after the normal strength of each Court has been brought up to the level required to cope with its normal institutions. We suggest that the required strength of the High Court of each State should be ifixed in consultation with the Chief Justice of that\n\nState and the Chief Justice of India and the strength\n\n1 so fixed should be reviewed at an interval of two or three years. Such a review will be necessary not only by reason of changing conditions but because the implementation of our recommendations made else where will lea:d to a quicker disposal of work in the subordinate courts which, in its turn, will result in an increase in the work of the High Courts.\n\n57.\n\nWe are of the view that the provfaions of article 224 of the Constitution should be availed of and additional judges be appointed for the specific purpose of dealing with these arrears. The number of such additional judges required for each High Court for the purpose of dealing with the arrears will have to be fixed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the State High Court after . taking into consideration the arrears in the particular\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1285\n\ncourt, their nature and the av.erage disposal of that court. The number of additional judges to be fixed for this purpose should be such as to enable the arrears to be cleared within a period of two years. The additional judges so appointed should, in our view, be utilised as far as possible exclusively for the purpose of disposing of arrears and not be diverted to the disposal of current work.\n\nPari passu with the disposal of the arrears, the permanent strength of the High Court will have to be brought up to and maintained at the required level, care being taken to see that their normal disposal keeps pace with the new institutions and that they are not allowed to develop into arrears. The appointment of additional Judges for the exclusive purpose of dealing with the arrears is, in our view, called for in a larg~ number of High Courts\".\n\nThe practice that grew in High Courts was, however, different.\n\nArticle 224 (1) was treated as the gateway through which almost every Judge had to pass before being made permanent. It is indeed disturbing to notice that some Judges before they were made permanent had functioned as additional Judges for nearly five years.\n\nArticle 217 (1) of the Constitution lays down the procedure to be followed in making the appointment of a Judge of a High Court. The President can appoint a High Court Judge after con sultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court. Article 217 (I) as it was originally enacted referred to the appointment of permanent Judges only as there was no provision in the Constitution then to the appointment of additional or acting Judges.\n\nWhen the new Article 224 of the Constitution was subsituted in the place of the original Article 224 by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 providing for the appointment of additional and acting Judges, Article 217 (1) also was amended requiring the appointment of additional and acting Judges also in the same manner, the only distinction maintained between the permanent Judges and the additional and acting Judges being the one relating to their tenure.\n\nA permanent Judge is entitled to be in office till he attains the age of sixty two years wherea,~ te tenure of an additional orJ!actin~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nJudge is as specified by the President under Article 224 (I) or Article 224 (2) of the Costitution as the case may be. It is, however, to be noted that the Constitution does not prescribe any difference in the mode of appointment of a permanent Judge or of an additional or an acting Judge. All of them should satisfy the same tests as to their fitness to be appointed as Judges irrespective of the fact whether they are appointed as permanent Judges or as additional or acting Judges. We shall hereafter confine our attention to the appointment of permanent Judges and additional Judges only.\n\nArticle 216 of the Constitution reads :\n\n\"216. Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.\"\n\nIt is well known that with the increase of the population and the number of laws and with the changes brought about in the economic, social and political life of the people, litigation in all courts has been continuously increasing.\n\nNaturally the number of cases filed in the High Courts which happen to be the highest courts in the case of a large number of matters have gone on growing.\n\nFrom the statements filed on behalf of the Central Government alongwith the affidavit dated August 29, 1981 of Shri T.N.\n\nChaturvedi, Secretary (Justice), Government of India, the following facts emerge :\n\n(a) The total number of main cases pending\n\n(b) Average disposal of main cases per Judge per year during the 'years 1978, 1979\n\nilDd 19?0~\n\nAs on As on 31-12-1978 31-12-1979\n\n6,13,799 6,17,239\n\nAs on 31-12-1980\n\n6,78,951\n\n~60\n\n.....\n\n...\n\ni..\n\n....\n\ns. P.GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n(c) The sanctioned strength of permanent Judges in all the High Courts as on 18-3-1981.\n\n( d) The actual strength of permanent Judges in all the High Courts as on 18-3-1981.\n\n(e) The sanctioned strength of additional Judges in all the High Courts as on 18-3-1981.\n\n(f) The actual steength of additional Judges in all the High Courts as on 18-3-1981.\n\nSanctioned strength\n\nActual strength\n\nHence on March 18, 1981 in all there were 320 Judges (permanent and additiona1) in all the High Courts.\n\nAt the average rate of 860 main cases per year per Judge, 320 Judges can dispose of about 2,75,200 cases per year. To dispose of the arrears of cases as on 31-12-1980 they need approximately four years since many of them are bound to be heavy Division Bench matters which consume a lot of time. Of them, it may be noted that 2,59,827 cases were more than two years old as on 31.12.1980. The fresh institutions in all the High Courts are also on the increase.\n\nFresh cases instituted in all the High Courts were 4,85,880, 5,30,614 and 5,55,719 respectively in the years 1978, 1979 and 1980. If the total average disposal of all the existing Judges per year is only 2,75,200 cases then twice the number of existing Judges would be needed even to dispose of the new cases institute)Q every yea~ l\\l\\vin~ re~rc! tQ,\n\nSUPREME COUR1 REPORTS\n\n[1982] 2 S.C, R.\n\nthe institutions in the year 1980, let alone the backlog of nearly 7,00,009 of cases. It is thus clear that the number of Judges in the High Courts, both permanent and additional, is wholly inadequate to cope up with the situation which has arisen more on account of delay in filling'up existing vacancies and on account of not increasing the strength of Judges of the High Courts to the requisite number from time to time. There appear to be some discrepancies in the statistics furnished in these cases.\n\nBut it is admitted by the Government that they need at least I 50 more additional Judges in addition to the sanctioned strength of 308 permanent Judges and 97 addi tional Judges to clear off the arrears in two years.\n\nArticle 216 of the Constitution requires the President to appoint necessary number of Judges in each High Court. The word 'necessary' in Article 216 is a crucial one. It imposes a duty on the President to review the strength of Judges in each High Court from time to time and to increase the number of Judges as and when it is\n\nnecessary. No steps appear to have been taken to do so pr;:iperly and that is the reason why we have reached these staggering arrears.\n\nIn the present situation, it appears, there should be at least 600 permanent Judges to fight the problem of arrears. If in any given High Court the arrears come down, then fresh appointments in that High Court may not be made. But steps have to be taken to appoint immediately at least 200 more Judges after making all the existing additional Judges permanent. In this state of affairs, it is difficult to understand as to why Judges are being appointed even now as additional Judges only for a period of two years or for lesser periods.\n\nWhen it is not disputed that a Judge appointed under Article 224 •(1) of the Constitution, is not a Judge on probation, what is the\\ advantage of appointing additional Judges when there is need to appoint more permanent Judges?\n\nSurely there is no' financial gain to the Government as the expenditure involved is almost the same whether a Judge is an additional Judge or a permanent Judge.\n\nOn the other hand, the appointment of additional Judges even where permanent Judges are needed leads to two important disadvantage:;. First, the periodic processing of the papers relating to the renewal of the term of an additional Judge consumes a lot of time of the high functionaries who have to be consulted under Article 217 (I). Secondly, an additional Judge concerned will not be able to deal with matters as independently as a permanent Judge can. Because the conduct of an additional Judge\n\n}VOuld become subject to scrutiny by the Chief Justice of the High.\n\n'y---\n\ns.i>. OIJt>TA v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1289\n\nCourt, the Governor, the Chief Justice of India and the President in connection with the his reappointment just when his tenure specified under Article 224 {l) is about to come to a close, it is natural that he would not be able to deal with the matters placed before him without fear of incurring to displeasure of any one of them.\n\nWe have to bear in mind that the State and the Central Government are the biggest litigants in every High Court and order passed by an additional Judge are sure to displease them in one way or the other. It is no doubt true that an additional Judge takes the oath of office to deal with the matters without fear or favour, and affection or illwill, but we should remember that he is after all a human being. If an advocate who is at the age of about 45 years, is appointed as an additional Judge for two years, what should he do if at the end of two years he is dropped on the ground that he is not fit for being continued as a Judge ? Having burnt his boats at the Bar, should he make fresh efforts to re-establish himself in the Bar? Will not his position be made more difficult if he is sent back with a label that he was not found fit to be continued as a Judge ? Similarly in the case of a District Judge who is promoted as a High Court Judge, should he go back as a District Judge at the end of the tenure fixed under Article 224 (I) ? Probably having in view all these difficulties at the time when the Constitution was enacted, no provision was made for appointing additional Judges.\n\nIt was no doubt introduced in 1956 to meet emergencies arising out of sudden increase in arrears of cases. Article 224 (1) was never intended for appointing almost every Judge first as an additional Judge and then as a permanent Judge. A perusal of the list of Judges of the High Courts maintained by the Government shows that not less than 4/5th of the Judges have been initially appointed as additional Judges and then as permanent Judges.\n\nOnly I/5th of them are appointed as permanent Judges initially. This may be due to the existence of vacancies in the permanent strength when they were appointed as Judges. The sanctioned strength of permanent Judges, however, at no time represented the true position as it is found that always the permanent strength fell short of the requisite number.\n\nThis is not a happy position at all but this is not all.\n\nJudges whose tenure is not assured as in the case of permanent Judges but whose continuance in office after the specified period is subject to the will of any other authority generally do not inspire confidence in the\n\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R..\n\nlitigant public also.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Krishan Gopal\n\nv. Shri Prakash Chandra & Ors.(1) supports this statement. That was a case where the appellant had questioned the jurisdiction of a retired Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court who had been requested to function as a Judge under Article 224A of the Constitution to try an election petition. This Court negatived that contention of the appellant holding that a retired Judge functioning under Article 224A had all the powers and jurisdiction of a sitting Judge.\n\nThis Court also negatived another contention of the appellant which had been urged in support of the appeal. The appeal should have, therefore, been dismissed. The operative part of the judgment, however, was entirely different. It reads at page 215 thus :\n\n\"The two legal contentions which have been advanced on behalf of the appellant in our opinion, are not well founded, and we have no hesitation to repel them. All the same, looking to the special facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it is fit and proper and in the interest of justice that the election petition filed by the appellant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice of that Court. It seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be entrusted for trial to a permanent judge of the High Court, even though we find that • additional or acting judges or those requested under Article 224A of the Constitution to sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters.\n\nWe, therefore, set aside the order dated August lO, 1973. The election petition filed by the appellant shall now be heard by a permanent judge who may be assigned for the purpose by the learned Chief Justice.\n\nThe case may, therefore, be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders.\n\nThe appeal is accepted accordingly. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs of this Court and in the High Court\". (Emphasis added)\n\n(1) (1974] 2 SCR,206,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1291\n\nWhat does this decision mean ? Additional or acting Judges appointed under Article 224 (I) and (2) or retired Judges requested under Article 224A of the Constitution are looked at with suspicion even by this Court. Why ? The reason is obvious. This Court felt that cases like election petitions which had political overtones should not be entrusted to additional Judges or acting Judges whose tenure was dependent upon the pleasure of the Government which had the power to withhold its consent to the fresh appointments of the Judges concerned to be made at the end of the period specified under Article 224.\n\nIs this not sufficient to hold that by constantly resorting to Article 224 (I) where it could not be done, the Government has created a second class of Judges in the High Courts even though as we are aware their integrity, character and erudition are beyond question ? The answer has to be in the affirmative.\n\nThe appointment of a retired Judge whose tenure was at the pleasure of the Government to try criminal cases was found to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution by Chandrachud, C. J.\n\nIn re. The Special Courts Bill, 1978's case (supra). In that connection the learned Chief Justice observed at page 549-550 thus :\n\n\"The second infirmity from which the procedural part of the Bill suffers is that by clause 7, Special Courts are to be presided over either by a sitting Judge of a High Court or by a person who has held office as Judge of a High Court to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The provision for the appointment of a sitting High Court Judge as a Judge of the Special Court is open to no exception. In so far as the alternate source is concerned, we entertain the highest respect for retired Judges of High Courts and we are anxious that nothing said by us in our judgment should be construed as casting any aspersion on them as a class.\n\nSome of them have distinguished themselves as lawyers once again, some as members of administrative tribunal and many of them are in demand in important walks of life. Unquestionably they occupy a position of honour and respect in society. But one cannot shut one's eyes to the constitutional position that whereas by article 217, a sitting Judge of a High Court enjoys security of tenure until he attains a particular age, the retired\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\nJudge will hold his office as a Judge of the Special\n\n1 .j Court during the pleasure of the Government. The pleasure doctrine is subversive of judicial independence . .\n\nA retired Judge presiding over a Special Court, who displays strength and independence may be frowned upon by the Government and there is nothing to\n\n.1 prevent it from terminating his appointment as and when it likes. It is said on behalf of the Govern ' rnent that if the appointment has to be made in consul- , ; tation with the Chief Justice of India, the termination -I of the appointment will also require similar consultation.\n\nWe are not impressed by that submission.\n\nBut, granting that the argument is valid, the process of consultation has its own limitations and they are quite 'l , f well-known. The obligation to consult may not neces\n\nsarily act as a check on an executive which is determined to remove an inconvenient incumbent.\n\nWe are therefore, of the opinion that clause 7 of the Bill violates article 21 of the Constitution to the extent that a person who has held office as a Judge of the High Court, can be appointed to preside over a Special Court merely in consultation with the Chief Justice of\n\nI I India\". l .\n\nThis again supports the view that the present practice of appointing almost all the High Court Judges initially under Article 224 'cO and later on as permanent Judges is not conducive to the\n\nindepndence of judiciary.\n\n··,\n\n, It is important to bear in mind that the independence of the judiciary is one of the central values on which our Constitution is based. No other constitutional agency is shielded as are the superior courts in our country with so many built-in safeguards. The Judges can, if they choose to, be guided by the doctrine of conscience only while discharging their duties.\n\nThey are not expected to be under any, kind of external pressure.\n\nThey are circumscribed by 'expectations of neutrality and impartiality' and by the traditions of the legal profession which is always keeping a watchful eye on every action of a Judge. In all conntries where the rule of law prevails and the po'wer to adjudicate upon disputes between a man and a man, a man\n\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. tJNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1293\n\nand the State, a State and a State and a State and the centre is entrus ted to a judicial body it is natural that such body should be assigned a status free from capricious or whimsical interference from outside and the judges who constitute it should be granted a security of tenure that lifts them above the fear of acting against their conscience.\n\nLord Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke is remembered with gratitude by all who cherish the independence of the judiciary as an inviolable part of a democratic Government. 'That when all the other judges basely succumbed to the mandate of a sovereign who wished to introduce despotism under the forms of juridical procedure Chief Justice Coke did his duty at the sacrifice of his office'. The extract from 11 Coke 63 which is found at pages 271 and 272 of the 'The Lives of The Chief Justices of England' by J.L. Campbell, Vol.\n\nI (1849) shows the courage with which Coke, C.J. resisted the attempts of Kings James I to interfere with the judicial proceedings.\n\nArchbishop Bancroft suggested that in order to curb the indepen dence of Lord Coke the King himself should commence to decide whatever cause he pleased in his own person.\n\nAccordingly the King summoned all the Judges before him and his Council to know what they had to say against the said proposal. Coke, C.J. said :\n\n\"By the law of England, King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as treason, felony, or betwixt party and party concerning his inheritance or goods ; but these matters ought to be determined in some court of justice . -\"\n\nHearing this, King James asked ;\n\n\"My Lords, I always thought, and by my soul I have often heard the boast, that your English law was founded upon reason. If that be so, why have not I and others reason as well as you the Judges ?\"\n\nCoke, C.J. replied :\n\n\"True it is, pleae your Majesty, that God has endowed your Majesty with excellent science as well as great\n\ngifts of nature ; but your Majesty will allow me to say, H with all reverence, that you are not learned in the laws of this your realm of England, and I crave leave to\n\n1294 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.C.R\n\nremind your Majesty that causes which concern the life or inheritance, or goods or fortunes, of your subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it. The law is the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of your Majesty's subjects, and it is by the law that your Majesty is protected in safety and peace.\"\n\nThe foregoing demonstrates the true role of a Judge in a country where rule of law prevails.\n\nSpeaking on the Judge's Remuneration Bill in the House of Commons in March, 1954 Sir Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of, England observed in the course of his speech thus :\n\n\"The principle of the complete independence of the Judiciary from the Executive is the foundation of many things in our island life. It has been widely imitated in varying degrees throughout the free world. It is perhaps one of the deepest gulfs between us and all forms of totalitarian rule. The only subordination which a judge knows in his judicial capacity is that which he owes to the existing body of legal doctrine enunciated in years past by his brethren on the bench, past and present, and upon the laws passed by Parliament which have received the Royal Assent. The judge has not only to do justice between man and man. He alsoand this is one of his most important functions considered incomprehensible in some large parts of the world-has to do justice between the citizens and the State.\n\nHe has to ensure that the administration conforms with the law, and to adjudicate upon the legality of the exercise by the Executive of its powers. The relations between the Judiciary and the Legislature are also exceptional and privileged. Parliament has deliberately maintained the judges in a special position, not only by charging their salaries to the Consolidated Fund so that they do not fall within the annual scrutiny of Parliament, but also by eschewing any claim to criticise a judge's conduct in his judicial capa-\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1295\n\ncity except on a specific Motion for an Address to the Crown for the judge's removal. That has worked, as far as one can see, without any adverse comment as long as any of us can remember.\n\nParliament has a vital interest in the efficiency and the integrity of the bench because Parliament and the Judiciary are interdependent and, from different angles, they exercise and enforce their control upon the Executive. Parliament decides what the law shall be and the judges decide what, in fact, Parliament has made it. The labours of Parliament in enacting the law depend for their effectiveness very largely on the fact that there is behind Parliament an independent judiciary applying and enforcing the law with high integrity and a great measure of common sense and knowledge of daily life, and with high professional skill, an applying it in conformity with the intention of Parliament.\n\nPerhaps only those who have led the life of a judge can know the lonely responsibility which rests upon him.\n\nIn criminal cases, and in some civil cases, be may have the assistance of a jury, but it is on bis shoulders that even in these cases the heaviest burden lies.\n\nIn other cases in which the honour and fortune of citizens are at stake, be has the sole responsibility of decision, and a heavy one it must be.\n\nThe service rendered by judges demands the highest qualities of learning, training and character. These qualities are not to be 'assured in terms of pounds, shillings and pence according to the quantity of work done. A form of life and conduct far more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people is required from judges and, though unwritten, has been most strictly observed.\n\nThey are at once privileged and restricted.\n\nThey have to present a continuous aspect of dignity and conduct.\"\n\n(Parliamentary Debates-Commons (1953-54) Vol. 525 at p. 1062)\n\n1296 SlJPRBMB COlJRT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nMoving the very same Bill in the House of Lords the Marquess of Salisbury described the high esteem in which Parliament regarded the judiciary thus :\n\n\"But even Parliament has put Judges in a very special position. It has taken the precaution, as we all know, of charging their salaries on the Consolidated Fund, so that they are not subject to the annual scurtiny of Parliament ; it has also eschewed the right to criticise Judges in their judicial capacity.\n\nParliament, which represents the British people, the whole electorate of the , country, has throughout history been at special pains to protect the independence of the Judiciary.\n\nThis, I should have thought, was both natural and right. After all, the legislation that rules our lives is, in fact, the , joint creation of Parliament and the Bench ; Parliament decides what the law ought to be, and the Bench decides what in fact it is.\n\nAs I see it, the work of , . Parliament largely depends for its effectiveness on the fact that both Parliament itself and the individual . citizens of the country know there is behind it the • 'Judiciary, which not only applies and enforces the law, !but interprets it, where necessary, with high integrity and vast professional skill.\n\nI imagine that there can , . be no profession where professional skill based on I ong experience is more necessary than in the case of the Judiciary.\"\n\n(Parliamentary Debates-Lords (1953-54) Vol. 186 at\n\n'P 1019)\n\nThe foregoing shows the importance of the independence of the Judiciary in our body-politic. r\n\nThe next point which requires to be examined is whether an additional Judge who is appointed for a specified term and who is not reappointed after the expiry of the said term can complain before a court of law about his non-appointment. In other words whether such an additional Judge has any judicial remedy at all if he is aggrieved by the Government not appointing him as additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge is the question which has !o be considered here.\n\nOrdinaril~ wherever there is a\n\ns.P. GtJPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1297\n\n.right there should be a remedy, otherwise the right would be without meaning. On a fair construction of Article 224(1) of the Constitution which enables the President to appoint an additional Judge for a period not exceeding two years and of Article 217(1) of the Constitution which limits the tenure of an additional Judge appointed to the period specified under Article 224(1), it is not possible to make a declaration that an additional Judge should be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent Judge on the ground that Y.hen his appointment was made under Article 224 (l) it was necessary for the President to appoint a permanent Judge in view of the quantum of work pending in the High Court concerned and not an additional Judge. The warrant of appointment has to be construed in accordance with the unequivocal language in which it is couched and nothing more can be read into it. The Constitution does not confer any right upon an additional Judge to claim, as of right, that he should be appointed again either as a permanent Judge or as an additional Judge.\n\nThere is no such enforceable right. A court of law has no power to give effect to any right not recognised by law.\n\nIt is also not the function of a court of justice to enforce or give effect to moral obligations which do not carry with them legal or equitable rights. It seems to be a very formidable proposition indeed to say that any court has a right to enforce what may seem to it to be just, apart from the Constitution and the laws.\n\nAs an aid to the construction of the relevant Articles of the Constitution and in particular Article 217, and Article 224 of the Constitution, it is urged, that the British constitutional convention regarding the tenure of Judges should be adopted. Elaborating this contention, it is urged that in England there are no Judges who may be equated with additional or acting Judges. \"All the superior Judges other than the Lord Chancellor hold office during good behaviour subject to a power of removal by His Majesty on an address presented to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament\".\n\nThis bas been the accepted legal position since the Act of Settlement 1700 and it is so formulated with the object of securing the independence of the judiciary. By a constitutional convention the procedure for removal of a Judge by the presentation of an address has been evolved.\n\nSince the independence of the judiciary is an integral part of the scheme 'of the Indian Constitution it is argued that whatever constitutional conventions are prevalent in England whose system we have adopted in creating an independent judiciary free from executive interference should be followed while interpret-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\ning the words of Article 217 and Article 224 of the Constitution. It is argued that when once a Judge is appointed to the High Court under Article 224(1) of the Constitution as an additional Judge by following the procedure of consultation prescribed in Article 217, he should either be appointed as a permanent Judge if a vacancy arises before the end of his tenure fixed pursuant to Article 224(1) which cannot exceed a period of two years or reappointed as an additional Judge before the end of that period if the arrears of work in the Court to which he is appointed are such that there is a need to have an additional Judge for a further period.\n\nIt is urged that when the occasion to appoint such additional Judge as a permanent Judge or as an additional Judge, as the case may be, arises even though consultation with the functionaries specified in Article 217 of the Constitution should again be followed, the consultation on that occasion should be limited to the existence of a vacancy of a permanent Judge or the existence of arrears, as the case may be, and not to any other question which may be relevant at the time of the initial appointment. In other words, the argument is that the consultation on the second occasion cannot relate to the capacity, integrity, behaviour etc. of the additional Judge and any other view, according to the petitio.ners, would be opposed to the spirit of the constitutional convention which should be followed in such a case as otherwise the whole process would be vitiated on account of the scope it gives for executive interference.\n\nAlternatively, it is urged that since almost all the additional Judges appointed after 1956 have been later on absorbed as permanent Judges, it should be held that a constitutional convention to appoint every additional Judge as a permanent Judge has come into exis tence and that such convention should be enforced by courts.\n\nAbout the applicability of the principle of judicial independence embodied in the provisions relating to the tenure of Judge in the Act of Settlement, 1700, reference may be made here to Terrell v. Secretary of State for the Colonies & Anr.(1) In which a similar contention was urged in support of the case of the claimant therein. In 1930, the claimant, then in his 49th year was offered an appointment as a puisne Judge of the Supreme Court in Malaya.\n\nBy a letter written on behalf of the Secretary of State, the claimant was informed that the qualifying term for a pension was seven years and that the com-\n\n(1) [1953] 2 Q.B. 482,\n\n.,.... -\n\n~.1>. GUPTA v. \\:JNiON (Venkataramiah, J.) 1299\n\npulsoty retltlng age In the case of a Judge was 62, and the claimant accepted the appointment on those terms. In 1942, while the claimant was on leave in Australia, Malaya was occupied by the enemy and the Letters Patent appointing the claimant, of which there was no copy and those relating to other Judges, were lost or destroyed.\n\nOn April 7, 1942, the claimant was informed that the Secretary of State could not justify retaining him now that his post was necessarily In abeyance and there was no alternative but to award him pension on abolition of his office and the claimant's appointment, accordingly, ended on July 7, 1942, 17 months before h:s 62nd birthda)'. On the question whether the claimant was liable in law to be required to retire before the age of 62, it was contended that the principle of judicial independence embodied in the Act of Settlement, 1700, was to be regarded as part of the law of the Straits Settlements, and that therefore the claimant held office duri11g good behaviour and could not be removed; alternatively, that if he had been appointed during pleasure, the correspondence between the claimant and the Secretary of State constituted a contract enforceable against the Crown that the Crown would employ him until he attained the age of 62. It was held by Lord Goddard, C.J. that the provisions of the Act of Settlement relating to the tenure of office of Judges of the Supreme Court in England did not apply to the Straits Settlements or to any other colony; it was for the Crown by exercise of the prerogative or Parliament by statute to set up courts in an acquired territory, and the conditions under which Judges of those courts held office depended upon the terms on which the Crown or Parliament established them. Secondly, that it was clear from a consideration of the Straits Settlements Act, 1866, Royal Letters Patent of 1911 which instructed the Governor that he might appoint Judges to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure, and the Royal Warrants relating to the courts in the Straits Settlements that Judges held office during the Royal pleasure; accordingly, the claimant having been appointed by Letters Patent issued pursuant to a Royal Warrant which following the terms of the Letters Patent of 1911, held office during the Royal pleasure. Thirdly, that it was a rule of law that once it was established that the Crown had the right to dismiss at pleasure, that right could not be taken away by any contractual arrangement made by an executive officer or department of State; a Judge appointed during pleasure was in no way in a different position from the point of view of dismissal from that of any other person in the Service of the Crown; having been appointed to hold office during pleasur<; !10 9orrespondence whi9h took place bfor~ or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS f 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nafter the claimant's appointment could affect the terms of appointment; accordingly, the termination of the appointment by the Crown was justifiable in law. It is thus seen that the English court did not extend the benefit of the Act of Settlement, 1700, to a Judge appointed in a British colony. It is more difficult to extend the benefit of that Act to Judges functioning in an independent country, like India governed by its own Constitution, even though the same pattern of administration of justice is continued even now as it was in the British India.\n\nThe nature of constitutional conventions, understandings and practices, according to A.V. Dicey \"Make of a body, not of laws, but of constitutional or political ethics\". They are not enforced or recognised by the courts. Freeman writes in his 'Growth of the English Constitution (1872)' that when an Englishman speaks of the. conduct of a public man being constitutional or unconstitutional, he means something wholly different from what he means by conduct being legal or illegal'. Constitutional conventions in England are those which mainly govern the exercise of the royal prerogative. 'The right to dissolve or to convoke Parliament, to make peace or war, to make new peers, to dismiss a minister or to appoint his successor, even though vested in the Crown is always regulated in accordance with the wishes of the ministry. A ministry which is out voted on any vital question in the House of Commons is bound to retire from office is an important constitutional understanding which is invariably obeyed. The aim of these precepts is to secure that Parliament or the Cabinet shall in the long run give effect to the will of that power which in modern England is the true political sovereign of the State-the majority of the electors or (to use popular though not quite accurate language) the nation'. A convention is a rule of constitutional practice which is neither enacted by Parliament as a formal legislation nor enforced by courts, yet its violation is considered to be a serious breach of constitutional morality leading to grave political consequences to those who have indulged in such violations. They are, according to 0. Hood Phillips, 'rules of political practice which are regarded as binding by those to whom they apply, but which ......... are not enforced by the courts or by the Houses of Parliament'. Constitutional conventions, understandings, or practices therefore constitute a source of constitutional law or. binding rule of conduct though not enforced by courts. The true position'.may be summarised thus_:-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramia, h, J.) 1301\n\n\"The people as a whole, and Parliament itself, recognise that under the unwritten Constitution there are certain established principles which limit the scope of Parliament. It is true that the courts cannot enforce these principles as they can under the Federal system in the United States, but this does not mean that these Principles are any the less binding and effective.\" -Prof. A:L. Goodhart.\n\nThe conventions are evolved over a long period of political experience and are capable of regulating the operation of political power and are largely relied on particularly in those countries where there are no written Constitutions. They, however, vary from country to country in the Commonwealth. In India we have incorporated some of the conventions in the Constitution itself which has established a Parliamentary form of Government. Articles 74, 75, 77, 85 and 117 contain some of the British constitutional conventions in a modified form.\n\nBut apart from those conventions which are incorporated in the Constitution, there may be some conventions which are followed by those in office out of political necessity.\n\nThe latter however are not capable of enforcement in courts. The courts are . not concerned with the 'Constitutional practices' which are outside the Constitution. It is, therefore, difficult t_o make a declaration on the basis of any constitutional convention not found in the Constitution that an additional Judge who was appointed after following the same procedure prescribed for appointment of a permanent Judge should be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent Judge because the circumstances warranted the appointment of a permanent Judge at the time of his appointment, contrary to the express and unequivocal language of the warrant of his appointm.ent.\n\nI must confess before proceeding further that the above argument appeared to be very attractive at one stage but on closer scrutiny it has to be rejected. In doing so I am influenced in no small measure by the following observations made in.the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Northern Securities Co. v. United States.(1) Justice Holmes said :-\n\n{I) 193 U.S. 197 400·401 : 48 L El:\\-. ~79,~ 7t6.,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\n\"Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of future; but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful and before .which even well settled principles of law bend.\"\n\nBut the question is whether an additional Judge can apply to the Court to direct the Government to consider his case for such reappointment having regard to the situation in which he is placed • and the circumstances surrounding his case. This has presented some unusual difficulty in answering it. A rule of practice should, according to some legal philosophers who are principally concerned with what the law ought to be, be treated as binding if it is fair and operates in a fair society and if it involves mutual benefits to the participants, so hat the party who receives or expects to receive benefits, must in his turn be willing to render benefits according to the practice, because such practice gives rise to expectations, which when violated would result in harm to .one or the other. These philosophical reasons may appeal to the sense of morality but while interpreting the Constitution, it has to be seen whether there is any room for concluding that an enforceable right has come into existence as a consequence of such practice.\n\nProf. P.S. Atiyah, who has tried to analyse the nature of promissory obligations in the light of the theories of 'promising' associated with the natural lawyers, the utilitarians and a number of other legal philosophers in his book entitled 'Promise, Morals and Law, (1981), Oxford, observes at pages 141-142 thus:\n\n\"Some philosophers have recognised that the binding force of promises may vary in a similar sort of way, but the implica.tions of this have not (I think) been properly grasped.\n\nAt the lowest, recognition of these differing degrees of bindingness must involve acceptance that pure expectations are not generally thought deserving of a high degree of protection and in some cases are not thought worthy of protection at all\". ' '\n\n• -'!l.\n\nS.P, GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1303\n\nIf this is the position in the case of laws relating to promises of private individuals, the position in the case of an appointment under the Constitution would be weaker still unless there is any provision in the Constitution which expressly or by necessary intendment binds the authority concerned to act in a particular way.\n\nWhen the Chief Justice of a High Court feels that a member of the Bar should be invited to accept the post of a Judge of the High Court, after obtaining the consent of such advocate, he recommends that his case may be considered for appointment as a permanent or as an additional Judge depending on the vacancy which has to be filled up by such appointment.\n\nIt is stated that in some High Courts including the Delhi High Court an undertaking would be taken from the advocate concerned when his name is recommended for th~ post of an additional Judge that he would accept the post of a permanent Judge if offered before the expiry of the term of appointment as additional Judge.\n\nEven though such practice of taking an undertaking is not shown to be prevailing in all the High. Courts, it is seen that a suggestion had been made by K.N. Waochoo, Chief Justice of India, in 1967 that such an undertaking should be taken. K.N. Wanchoo, C.J. recorded a note on June 29, 1967 as follows :-\n\n\"When a member of the Bar is appointed Additional Judge, it must be with a view to making him permanent in the course. If that is not possible, additional judgeship should not be offered to a member of the Bar. I agree therefore that an undertaking should be taken from the members of the Bar that they will accept a permanent judgeship when offered to them in due course ... \"\n\nAs stated elsewhere the prov1S1on for appointment of additional Judges was included in the Constitution by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. From that time onwards nearly 500 persons have been appointed as Judges of High Courts.\n\nAbout one-fifth of them were initially appointed as permanent Judges and the rest were appointed initialy as additional Judges for a certain term and thereafter appointed as permanent Judges.\n\nSome of them were appointed as additional Judges twice or thrice before they were made permanent.\n\nOnly a few of the!ll]were inc; t\" •' ·~ . • • •\" •• ... . ' ' •' I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS {1982] 2.s.c.R.\n\nmade permanent, either because they had attained the age of retirement or they had resigned or for some other reason.\n\nThe number of persons who were not made permanent on the ground\n\nthat they were found unfit when their cases for reappointment were considered appears to be almost insignificant as it may not be more than five.\n\nBut at no time the action of the Goverqment in not reappointing an additional Judge as a permanent Judge was questioned before any Court as it is now done in these cases.\n\nWhat is to be noticed is that in almost every High Court a few posts have been kept as sanctioned posts of additional Judges as if they were part of the total strength.\n\nThe result has been that unless all the sanctioned posts of additional Judges and at least one post of a permanent Judge have fallen vacant at a given point of time any new Judge appointed on that occasion being the junior most has to be appointed as an additional Judge and the later no appointed as a permannt Judge when a vacancy arises in the per\n\nmanent strength after all other additional Judges senior to him have been absorbed as permanent Judges.\n\nSuch a thing could not have happened before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 came into force.\n\nAt that time every Judge of a High Court had to appointed only as a permanent Judge without any need for scrutinising his case again for purposes of reappointment as additional Judge or permanent Judge.\n\nFrom the information made available to the Court, it appears that subject to just exceptions in almost all the High Courts if a realistic review of the present strength is made the total number of permanent Judges needed '¥ill be much' more than the existing number of permanent Judges and additional Judges.\n\nThis must have been the position for some years past. But still instead of increasing the number of posts of permanent Judges and making appointments to them the practice of. inducting a new member as an additional Judge first and making him permanent later on has been continued quite contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 216 and Article 224(1) of the Constitution. .Since - invariably an additional Judge has been appobted as a permanent Judge in due course except in some rare cases, every member who is appointed as an additional Judge and who has not completed the age of retirement ex~\n\npects that he will be made permanent as and when a vacancy arises\n\njn the permanent strength and will be continued as an additional.\n\n~ ' . . .\n\n~.!.>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramlaii, J.)\n\nH0.5\n\nJudge by fresh appointments until such vacancy arises provided the arrears in the High Court requiring his 'continuance as an additional Judge persist. It cannot be said that such epectation on the part . of an additional Judge is not well founded.\n\nIn addition to such settled expectation on the part of the additional Judge, as the learned Attorney-General has submitted, even on. the part of the Government there has always been reluctance to send back an additional Judge to the Bar after the completion of his term specified under Article 224(1) and to lose the services of a Judge with experience, These twin factors namely the expectation on the part of the additional Judge and the reluctance on the part of tbe Government distinguish the case of an additional Judge from the case of a new member who may be a competitor for the same post at the termination of the tenure of the additional Judge. Ordinarily the additional Judge is continued in service as a Judge or as an additional Judge unless there are any relevant circumstances which would outweigh the above mentioned factors. In the absence of any such cogent reasons for not appointing him again, the appointment of somebody else in his place would be an unreasonable or perverse act which entitles an additional Judge to move the Court for appropriate relief in the peculiar circumstances in which Article 224(1) is being operated tillnow.\n\nAt this stage an allied contention urged in this connection may be disposed of. That contention is that an additional Judge cannot be dropped without 'giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice.\n\nWe do not find any merit'in this contention since the wide 'discretionary power of appointment exercisable by the President in the public interest under Article 217(1) is indicative of the absence of a11 obligation to act judicially. (Vide Para 65 Vol. I of Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) ). It is seen from the language of that Article that the Constitution has evinced an intention to exclude the operation of the rule of audi alteram partem by conferring on the President unfettered discretionary power subject only to the prescribed procedure of consultation mentioned therein. (Vide Para 74, Vol. I of 'Halsbury's Laws of Eugland' (4th Edn.) ). Having regard to the high office to which appointment has to be made under Article 217( I) of the Constitution and to the association of the high dignitaries who have to be consulted before any such appointment is made the application of principles of natural justice as of right is ruled out and non-compliance with such principles\n\n1306 SUPREME COURT REPORfS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.A.\n\nwould not vitiate the decision.\n\nBut it may still be shown on the available material that there was no cogent reason for the decision.\n\nIt is argued on behalf of the Government that there is no precedent in administrative law to such a conclusion being reached.\n\nThere cannot be a precedent in England, in the United States of America and in Australia as there are no additional Judges in those countries of the type we are having in India and in India too we do not have a precedent because no such case has come up before the Court so far.\n\nThis case is indeed an extra-ordinary one. This Court however, is under a duty to do complete justice when a matter comes before it.\n\nWhat kind of relief should be granted in such a case is governed by the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal provisions governing it. If the problem is a new one a new solution has to be evolved.\n\nA Judge who has cultivated assiduously a sense of right and wrong sometimes may even depend upon his hunch while moulding the relief to be granted in a given case. It is a part of the judging process. The following words of Judge Hutcheson are illuminating indeed.\n\nHe tells us :\n\n\"I must premise that I speak now of the judgment or decision, the solution itself, as opposed to the apologia for that decision; the decree, as opposed to the logomachy, the effusion of the judge by which that decree is explained or excused ..... The judge really decides by feeling and not by judgment, by hunching and not by ratiocination, such ratiocination appearing only in the opinion. The vital motivating impulse for the decision is an intuitive. sense of what is right or wrong in the particular cases; and the astute judge, having so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors his laggard mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with his critics.\n\nAccordingly, he passes in review all of the rules, principles, legal categories, and concepts \"whi9h he may find useful, directly or by an analogy, so as to select from them those which in his opinion .will justify his disired result.\"\n\n(See Jerome Frank : 'Law and the Modern Mind\n\n(1963) p. 112).\n\n_,, -\n\n...\n\nIi.fl. otJMA v. bi; iOJ.; {Venkatarainiah, J, j i3o1\n\nThe following observations of Denning, L.J. (as he then was) in.Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., (1) though in the minority are also relevant here.\n\nHe observed :\n\n\"This argument about the novelty of the action does not appeal to me in the least. It has been put forward in all the great cases which have been milestones of progress in our.law, and it lias always, or nearly always, been rejected. If you read the great cases of Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym, 938, Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 3 Term Rep. 51 and Donogue\n\nv. Stevenson (1932) A.C. 562, you will find that in each of them the judges were divided in opinion. On the one side there were the\" timorous souls who were fear ful of allowing a new cause of action. On the other side, there were the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so required.\n\nIt was fortunate for the common law that the progressive view prevailed.\"\n\nIf a progressive view was possible in the English Common Law it should not be difficult to evolve solution in India under th'e Constitution to do justice within the bounds of law provided the case calls for legal redrss.\n\nOn the facts and in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the only thing which the Court can do here is to examine the material before it in order to ascertain whether the refusal to reappoint the additional Judge concerned is based on any relevant grounds or not and to mould the relief on the basis if the finding on the above question by applying the relevant principles of administrative law.\n\nAny relief beyond this would be impermissible in view of the language of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It is however made clear that even this limited enquiry is made possible only on account of the wrong application of Article 224(1) of the Constitutional all these years.\n\nA similar enquiry may not be possible in the case of additional Judges to be appointed hereafter.\n\n(l) [1951] 2 K.B. 164 @ 178.\n\n i3o8 SUPREME couk't REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.C.ll\n\nPART VII\n\nIt is interesting to trace the history of the provision relating to the transfer of Judges from one High Court to another. The Draft Constitution of India did not contain any provision providing for such transfer.\n\nClause (c) of the proviso to Article 193 (1) of the Draft Constitution merely stated that the office of the judge shall, be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of any other High Court. When two members of the Draft Constituent Assembly Shri R.R. Diwakar and Shri S.V.\n\nKrishnamurthy Rao moved an amendment to clause (1) of Article 193 of the Constitution for adding clause (d) which read as \"(d) every judge shall be liable to be transferred to other High Courts\" it was recorded that there was no need for the amendment as clause le) of Article 193 (I) of the Constitution provided that the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed to be a judge of another High Court. Perhaps the present Article 222 of the Consti tution was not in view at that stage. (See B. Shiva Ra,0 : 'The Framing of India's Constitution', Vol. IV p. 165). The note made by the Drafting Committee on the proposal of the Home Ministry that a convention should be established whereby a proportion of judges in every High Court could be recruited. from outside the Province stated that there was no bar to the recruitment of Judges of High Court in any Province from outside the Province or to the transfer of a judge of a High Court to another High Court and a convention might be established where by a proportion of judges of a High Court could be recruited from outside the Province.\n\n(B.\n\nShiva Rao: 'The Framing of India's Constitution', Volume IV, p. 166). In view of the suggestions made in the course of the discussion on the Draft Constitution, the Drafting Committee incorporated in the Revised .Draft, Article 222 which read as follows :\n\n\"222. (I) The President may transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court within the territory of India.\n\n(2) When a Judge is so transferred, he shall, during the period he serves as a Judge of the other Court, be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such compensatory allowances as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined, such\n\n.. .,..\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramialt, J.) 1309\n\ncompensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.\"\n\nIn the letter dated November 3, 1949, forwarding the Revised Draft to the President of the Constitutent Assembly referring to\n\nthe newly added Article 222, the Dra.fting Committee observed B thus:\n\n\"Article 222 (new) : We have proposed the insertion of this new article to enable the President to transfer a judge of a High Court from one High Court to another. The present provision in the Constitution would not permit of any compensatory allowance being given to judges on such transfer. Power has accordingly been reserved to Parliament to determine by law the compensatory allowance to be paid in case they are so transferred, and, until Parliament so determines, to the President to fix by order the quantum of such allowance.\"\n\nIt may be seen that Article 222 (1) which was incorporated in . the Revised Draft gave the power to the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another without any obligation to consult any other functionary before doing so.\n\nBat on. the 16th November, 1949 an amendment to that Article was adopted by the Constituent Assembly which required. the President to consult the chief Justice of India before exercising the power of transfer.\n\nArticle 222 (I) was finally enacted as follows :\n\n\"222. (l) The President may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court within the territory of India\".\n\nClause (2) of Article 222 was adopted in the form in which it had been proposed in the Revised Draft as set out above.\n\nConsequently Article 217 was also suitably amended by introducing the word 'transferred' in proviso (c) to clause (I) thereof.\n\nIn defence of Article 222 and in particular of clause (2) of that Article providing for payment of compensatory allowance to a Judge who is transferred from one High Court to another High Court, Dr. D.R.\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nAmbedkar spoke in the Constituent Assembly before Article 222 was passed thus :\n\n\"The only question that we are called upon to consider is when a person is appointed as a Judge of a High Court of a particular State, should it be permissible for the Government to transfer him from that Court to a High Court in any other State ? If so, should this transfer be accompanied by some kind of pecuinary allowance which would compensate him for the monetary loss that he might have to sustain by reason of the transfer ? The Drafting Committee felt that since 'all the High Courts so far as the appointment of judges . is concerned form now a central subject, it was desirable to treat all the judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single cadre like the l.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred .from one High Court to another. If such power was not reserved to the Centre the administration of justice might become a very difficult matter. It might be necessary that one judge may be transferred from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High Court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not be locally available. Secondaly it might be desirable to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court because it might be desirable to have a Il!an who is unaffected by local politics and local jealousies. We thought therefore that the power to transfer should be placed in the hands of the Central Government.\n\nWe also took into account the fact that this power of transfer of judges from one High Court to another may be abused.\n\nA Provincial Government might like to transfer a particular judge from its High Court because that judge had become very inconvenient to the Provincial Government by the particular attitude that he had taken with regard to certain judicial matters or that he had made a nuisance of himself by giving decisions which the Provincial Government did not like.\n\nWe have .taken care that in affecting these transfers no such considerations ought to prevail.\n\nTransfers ought to take place only on the ground of\n\n--.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1311\n\nconvenience of the general administration. Consequently, we have introduced a provision that such transfers shall take place in consultation with the Chief Justice of India who can be trusted to advise the Government in a matter which is not affected by local or personal prejudices.\n\nThe only question, therefore, that remained was whether such transfer should be made so obligatory as not to involve any provision for compensation for loss incurred. We felt that that would be a severe hardship. A judge is generally appointed to the High court from the local bar.\n\nHe may have a household there. He may have a house and other things in which he will be personally interested and which form his belongings. If he is transferred from one High Court to another obviously he cannot transfer all his household.\n\nHe will have to maintain a household in the original Province in which he worked and he will have to establish a new household in the new Province to which he is transferred. The Drafting Committee felt therefore justified in making provision that where such transfer is made it would be pt rmissible for parliament to allow a personal allowance to be given to a judge so transferred.\n\nI contend that there is nothing wrong in the amendment . proposed by the Drafting Committee.\"\n\n(The Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 (1949) pages 580-581)\n\nBut by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the words \"within the territory of India\" in clause (I) of Article 222 and the whole of clause (2) which provided for payment of compensatory allowance to a transferred judge were omitted.\n\nBy the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, a new clause (2) was introduced into Article 222.\n\nAfter this amendment, Article 222 of the Constitution reads thus ;\n\n\"222. (l) The President may, after consultation with H the Chief Justice of India, trans(er a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court . •\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.C.R.\n\n(2) When a Judge has been or is so transferred he shall, during the period he serves, after the commence~ ment of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, as a Judge .of the other High Court, be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and, until so determined, such compensatory allowance as the President may by order fix.\"\n\nThis leads to the question whether under Article 222 of the Constitution, the consent of a Judge of a High Court is necessary to transfer him from one High Court to another High Court. The majority judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Sakal Chand Himatlal Sheth and Anr.(1) holds that the consent of a Judge for his transfer from one High Court to another High Court is necessary.\n\nIt is, however, contended before us that the said interpretation of Article 222. is erroneous as it would affect adversely the independence of the judiciary. It is significant that Article 222 does not state in express terms that the consent of the Judge concerned is a pre-requisite for his transfer.\n\nIn places where consent of a Judge is needed the Constitution has stated that such consent should be obtained from the Judge concerned (vide proviso to Article 128 and proviso to Article i224A of the Constitution).\n\nUnder Article 127 (I) of the Constitution if at any time there is no quorum of the Judges of the Supreme Court available to hold or to continue any session of the Court, the Chief Justice of India may with the previous consent of the President and after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned request in writing the attendance at the sittings of the Supreme Court as an ad hoc Judge for such period as may be necessary of a Judge of a High Court duly qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice of India.\n\nClause\n\n(2) of Article 127 makes it obligatory on the part of the High Court Judge who is so designated to attend the sittings of the Supreme Court in priority to other duties of his office at the time and for the period for which his attendance is required and while so attending he shall have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges and shall discharge the duties of a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is significant that Article 217 does not require the consent of the Judge to to be. designated under Article 127(1) to be obtained before asking\n\nu> [197BJ 1 s.c.R. 423.\n\n!i.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) J 3i3\n\nhim to function as an ad hoc Judge of the Supreme Court even though it may involve the shifting of his residence during the period specified in the Jetter of request sent to him under Article 127(1).\n\nA Judge of a High Court Itlay have to be shifted from one place to another when the reorganisation of the State in which the High Court is situated takes place even though such shifting may not strictly amount to transfer under Article 222 (See V.B. Raju v. State of Gujarat & Anr.) (1) and such shifting may not depend upon the willingness of the Judge concerned. It cannot be said that any transfer or shifting of a ~Judge without his consent would amount to a punishment and would interfere with the independence of the Judge concerned or of the judiciary. If the requirement of the consent of the Judge in question is read into Article 222 then the power conferred on the President ceases to be a power in the jurisprudential sense. A power is defined by Salmond as ability conferred on a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that end the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations either of himself or of other persons.\n\nPowers are either public or private The former are those which are vested in a person as an agent or instrument of the functions of the State. We are not here conc.erned with the latter class. If Article 222 is construed as requiring the consent of a Judge to be transferred then the power of the President can be neutralised by the Judge withholding consent.\n\nSuch a construction would virtually confer on an unwilling Judge an immunity against the exercise of the power by the President under Article 222 even though public interest demands the transfer of the Judge.\n\nArticle 222 would in that case become almost ineffective. 'That being so, such a construction has to be avoided.\n\nOne other reason which prompts me to say so is as follows : By way of comparison we may refer here to some of the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 51. c-49) of England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 and of the Consiitution.\n\nSection 3 of that Act corresponds to Article 224A of the Constitution. Section 7 of that Act corresponds to Article 127 and section 8 of that Act corresponds to Article 128.\n\nSection 4 (I) of that Act provides for the establishment of three Divisions of the Hih Court and they are\n\nP> [1981] 1 SCR 613.\n\nSUPREME COURT REi>ollts {19821 2 s.t.tt\n\nnow called the Chancery Division, the King's Bench Division (now called the Queen's Bench Division) and the Family Division (formerly known as the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division).\n\nSection 4 (2) of that Act which provides for the attachment of a puisne Judge to one of the above said three Divisions and his transfer from one Division to another reads :\n\n\"4. (2) The puisne 1udges of the High Court shall be attached to the several Divisions thereof by direction\n\nof the Lord Chancellor and any such Judge may with his consent be transferred by a like direction from\n\n- one of the said Divisions to another :\n\nProvided that no direction shall be given for the transfer of a puisne judge from the King's Bench Division or from the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division without the concurrence of the President of that Division.\" [Emphasis added]\n\nThe pattern of the above section shows that if the Constitution makers intended that the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another under Article 222 should be with his consent, they would have included necessary words in .Article 222.\n\nThe words corresponding to the words \"with his consent\" in the above said section 4 (2) are significantly absent in Article 222 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is argued by Shri H.M. Seervai, learned counsel for the petitioners in Transfer Case No. 22 of 1981 that the majority decision of this Court in Sakal Chand Sheth' s case (supra) holding that the consent of the Judge concerned is not necessary for transferring him from one High Court to another High Court under Article 222 of the Constitution requires to be reconsidered for the reason that the assumption of Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) and Krishna Iyer, J. that there was no provision for transfer of Judges of High Courts in the Government of India Act, 1935 is erroneous and that every such transfer should be considered as a fresh appoint ment of the Judge concerned in the court to which he is transferred.\n\nIt is contended that if the effect of a transfer under Article 222 is a fresh appointment, the consent of the Judge so transferred should be considered as an essential pre-requisite of every suc!J transfer. I should sa)' !It t)le o-qtset that the aqumerit is really an ingenious\n\nS.P. GUPTA ... UNION Venkafaramiah, J.) 1315 .\n\nI - i one, but it does not appear to have been presented in Sakal Chand Sheth's case (supra) in the form in which it is argued before us.\n\nWe shall examine the above contention . now urged before us in two parts-(!) whether there was a provision for a transfer of a Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935? and (2}, If, there was such a provision, whether the decision of, the majority in Saka!\n\nChand Shfth's case (supra) requires to pe rl'<; onsi<ll'el'd 7\n\nIt is true that Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) arid Kriha Iyer, J. have both stated in the course of their opinions that there was no provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 providing for the transfer of a Judge from one. High Court to . another High Court and both the. learned Judges proceeded on the assumption that under that Act the_ induction . of a . Judge of one .High Court in another was possible only by a fresh appointment: Even Bhagwati and Untwalia, JJ. who constituted the - minority in Sakal Chand Sheth's case (supra) proceeded on the same basis. :Bhagwati.-J. , observed, fo that case at page473; \"Neither in proviso (c) nor in any other provision of the _Government of India Act, 1935 was the word 'transfer' used and there was also no specific prvision in that Act conferring power to transfer a' High Court Judge.\" Untwalia, J. observed in that case at page 510: \"Neither in proviso (c) nor in any other section of the Government of India Act was the word \"transfer\" used or such a power conferred in terms on the Governor-\n\nGeneral.\" It is, however, asserted before us that there was a'. pro vision for transfer in the Government of• India Act, 1935 : for the following reason. Section 220 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 as itwas originlly enacted read :___; .\n\n\"220 .. (2). Every judge of a iligh Court shall be appointed by His Majesty by. warrant under .. the Royal Sign Manual and shall hold office until he attains . the age of sixty. years : · -\n\nProvided that-\n\n(a) a judge may by resignation under his hand addressed to the Governor resign his office;\n\n(b) a judge may . be : removed from his office by Ji His Majesty by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual on th\\'. ¥round of. misb\\'haviour or \\lf\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ninfirmity of mind or body, if the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on reference being made to them by His Majesty, report that the judge ought on any such ground to be removed.\"\n\nOn October 26, 1944, the British Parliament enacted the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 by which clause (c) was added at the end of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 2 of the said amending Act of 1946 read ;\n\n\"Judges to vacate office on trransfer.\n\n\"2. At the end of the proviso to sub-section (2) of\n\n- section two hundred and twenty of the principal Act (which-relates to the term of offices of judges of High Courts) there shall be added the following paragraph:-\n\n\"(c) the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by His Majesty to be a judge of the\n\nFedral Court or of another High Court.\"\n\nSection 6 of the said amending Act of 1944 provided that the above amendment made by Section 2 thereof in the Principal Act should be deemed to have been made therein immediately before the passing thereof and thus.the newly added clause (c). of the proviso to Section 220 (2) was given retrospective effect Then reliance is placed on the speech of Earl of Munster made on July 4, 1944 in the House of Lords in support of the Bill which latter became the said amending Act, the relevant part of which read thus :-\n\n\"Clause 2 of the Bill makes it clear that if a Judge of the High Court is transferred to another High Court or to the Federal Court, he shall not retain his office of a judge of the High Court from which he was transferred. This is the only Clause which will be retrospective. I might mention that there is a similar provision in Section 10 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925 applicable to High Court Judges in this country : (unqerlining supplied).\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1317\n\nSee Hansard. (Lords) Vol. 132, Col. 632 of July 4, 1944.\n\nReliance is also placed on two other. speeches made in the Hou'se of Commons ort September 27, 1944 on the same Bill, the relevant , parts. of which are given below :\n\nThe Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery) stated :\n\n\"The second clause clears up a doubt which had been expressed as to whether under the provisions of the Act a Judge transferred in India from one High Court to another or to the Supreme Court\n\n(sic) might not be considered as still holding his position in his original Court. In our own Judicature Act, 1925, that point is made clear in Sec. 10. This I .\n\nClause simply adopts the Indian c<, indition to the wording of our own Judicature Act.\" (underlining supplied)\n\n(See Hansard, (Commons) Vol. 49.3, Col. 345 of 27-9-1944).\n\nMr. Pethick Lawrerice also observed :\n\n\"With respect to the Judges, I understand the proposal is merely intended to put beyond question what was certainly the intention in regard to them. That is, I understand the only part of the Bill which is retrospective. It is simply to clear up doubts ...... \"\n\n(ibid _Col. 347)\n\nThe argument constructed on the basis of the above material is that clause (c) of the proviso to section 220 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1.935 provided for the transfer of Judge, of one High Court to another High Court although it used the word 'appoint' and that is made clear by the use of the word 'transfer' in the marginal note of section 2 of the amending Act of 1944 which introduced the amendment. I have carefully considered the above submission but I have to state that it requires Jot of credulity to accept it in the circumstances of the case. The source of inspiration for this argument is easily traceable to the marginal note to section 2 of the India (Miscellane01.~~ Provisions) Act, 1944, whih\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nreads : 'Judge to vacate office on transfer'. The importance of a . marginal note in statutory construction so far as English' statutes are concerned appears to be very little as can be gathered from the following words in Craies_ on 'Statute Law' (sixth Edn.) page 197 :-\n\n\"The side notes are not part of the Act and I believe are not considered or amended by the legislature.\" Lord MacNaughten in the Privy Council considered it well settled that the marginal notes cannot be referred to for purposes of construction, Thakurain Ba/raj Kunwar v. Rae Jagatpal Singh (1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 132, 142 and Lord Hanworth M.R. referring to the Superannuation Act of 1859, said : \"It was contended that these catchwords could be used to explain the meaning of sections upon which they appear. As explt1ined:by Baggallay L. J. in Att.-Gen. v. G.E. Ry.\n\n(supra) marginal notes are not part of an Act of Parliament. The Houses of Parliament have nothing to do with them, and I agree with the learned Lords Justices in that case that case the courts cannot look at them Nixon v. Att.-Genl. (1930) I Ch. 566, 593\".\n\nE In Maxwell on 'The Tnterpretation of -Statutes' (12th\n\nEdition) it is stated at pages 9-10 thus :\n\n\"The notes often found printed at the side of sections in an Act, which purport to summarise the effect of the sections, have sometimes been used as an aid to construction. But the weight of the authorities is to the effect that they are noi parts of the 'statute and so should not be considered, for they are inserted not by Parliament nor under the authority of Parliament, but by irresponsible persons\".\n\nIn 'Statutory Interpretation' by Sir Rupert Cross (1976 Edition), we have a very instructive passage explaining the rl!lative importance of certain parts of a statute, including side notes (or marginal notes). The learned author is of the view that although H the long title, preamble (if any) and short title of a statute may be described as aids to the ascertainment of the intention of Parlia Jllept, cross-headings, side notes (or marginal notes) and punctua-\n\n...\n\n-~-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1319\n\ntion merely indicate the intention of the dr.aftsman.\n\nHe proceeds to observe at pages 107-108, 113-114 thus:\n\n\"There is a bewildering mass of conflicting dicta on the question whether some of the above items can be treated as aids to construction at all and, when it is conceded that they may be so treated, upon their weight.\n\nThis is due to a failure to distinguish between two stages in the pr0cess of interpretation at which the aids may be relevant. The first stage is that at which the judge has to decide whether he has any real doubt about the meaning of the word, phrase or passage which he is called upon to interpret. At this point it is hard to believe that he can or should have any inhibitions concerning the parts of the statute which he will read. No doubt he will begin with the section containing the wod, phrase or passage in dispute. He can hardly help taking account of the punctuation and side note. If he is to fulfill his duty of reading the whole Act; when it is necessary to do so in order to determine whether there is an ambiguity, he must look at the long title, preamble (if any), short title and cross-headings.\n\nIf, after this performance, the judge is satisfied that the word, phrase or passage the meaning of which is in . dispute really only has one meaning in the context, he must apply that meaning; but if he has doubts on the subject he will think again. It is at this point that the distinction between the enacting parts of a statute and the other parts becomes crucial. If the sole cause of doubt is a disparity between the . otherwise clear and unambiguous words and a title, preamble, heading or side note, the judge must disregard his doubts and apply the otherwise clear and unambiguous words. This is because there is a rule of Jaw according to which, although the parts of the statute which do not enact anything may be consulted as a guide to Parliamentary intent and hence to the meaning of the enacted word, effect must not be given to any doubts which they may raise about the meaning of that word. If, howevc::r, the Jude has do4bts abqu~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c, R.\n\nthe meaning of the statutory provision he is considering for some such other reason as-its lack of clarity or apparent pointlessness, he may take the title, preamble, heading or side note into consideration in determining how those doubts should be resolved.\n\nAs we shall see, reservations have been expressed about the propriety of taking any of the above items into consideration, and it is necessary to be especially cautious when endeavouring to -state the law with regard to the extent to which the short title and side - notes, not to mention punctuation, may be taken into consideration, but it is submitted that the following remarks of Lord Upjohn in Director of Public Prosecution v. Schildkamp (1971) A.C. 1 at p. 28 amply justify the above general account of the relevance of the items mentioned at the beginning of this section to the judicial process of interpretation. The remarks were maae with special reference to cross head in gs :\n\n\"When the Court construing the Act is reading it through to understand it, it must read the crossheadings as well as the body of the Act and that will always be a useful pointer to the intention of Parliament in enacting the immediately following sections.\n\nWhether the cross-heading is no more than a pointer or label, or is helpful in assisting to construe, or even in some cases to control, the meaning or ambit of those sections must necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case and I do not think it is iJOSsible to ly down any rules.\" - '\n\nThe matter must now be considered in slightly greater detail.\n\nSide notes\n\nChandler v. Director of Public Proseculions(1) may be-cited as conclusive authority for the proposition\n\np) p964J A.C. 763.\n\n...\n\nS.~. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1321\n\nthat side notes (frequently spoken of as \"marginal notes\") cannot be used as aids to construction in any circumstances. The defendants, members of the Committee of One Hundred, the aim of which was to further nuclear disarmament, participated in a demonstration at an airfield with the object of grounding all aircraft. They were charged with and convicted of an offence against s. 1 (I) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 which punishes those 'who approach prohibited places for a purpose prejudicial to the safety of the State. The side note reads \"penalties for spying\" and it was conceded that the defendants wete not spying, but their appeal to the . House of Lords was dismissed on the ground that they were acting for a purpose prejudicial to the safety of . the State within the meaning of s. 1 (1 ). Lord Reid said : ,\n\n\"In my view side notes cannot be used as an aid to construction. They are mere catch words and I have never heard of it being supposed in recent times that an amendment to alter a sidenote could be proposed in either House of Parliament. Side notes in the original Bill are inserted by the draftsmen. During the passage of the Bill through its various stages amendments to it or other reasons may make it desirable to alter a side note. In that even I have reason to believe that alteration is made by the appropriate officer of the House-no doubt in consultation'with the draftsma~.\n\nSo side note cannot be enacted in the same sense as the long title 6r any part of the body of the Act.\"\n\nIn spite of its great weight, three remarks may be made with regard to this passage. In the first place what Lord Reid said would seem to be equally applicable to crossheadings, yet we have just seen that this has not prevented them from being treated in much the same way as the long title and preamble.\n\nSecondly, even iflt is the: case that side notes cannot be called in aid in order to resolve•doubts, it can hardly be the law that they are to be disregarded by the judge when he is perusing the Act with a view to ascertaining whether\n\n1322 SUPREME couk'i' REroRTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.a.\n\nbe has any doubts. No judge can be expected to treat something which is before his eyes as though it was not there. In the words of Upjohn, L.J. : \"While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at. least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind.\n\nFinally, Lord Reid's remarks in Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions must be read in the light of his subsequent remarks in Director of Public Prosecutions\n\nv. Schildkamp [1971] A.C. 1 at p. 10 :\n\n\"But it may be more realistic to accept the Act as printed as being the product of the whole legislative process, and to give due weight to everything found in the printed Act.\n\nI say more realistic because in very many cases the provision before the court was never even mentioned in debate in either House, and it may be that its wording was never closely scrutinised by any member of either House. In such a case it is not very meaningful to say that the words of the Act represent the intention of Parliament but the punctuation, crossheadings and side notes do not.\"\n\nIn Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh, (1) Subba Rao, J. (as ke then was) observed thus :\n\n\" \"Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes\", 10th Edn., gives the scope of the user of such a heading in the interpretation of a section thus, at p. 50 :\n\n\"The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may explain ambiguous words,\"\n\n(1) [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 798@ 809.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNiON (Venkataramiah, J,) t323\n\nIf there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that doubt.\"\n\nIn Indian Aluminium Company etc. v. Kerala State Elearicity Board, (1) Bhagwati, J. Said :\n\n\"It is true the marginal note cannot afford any legiti- . mate aid to a construction of a section, but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the sec- . tion, or, to use the. word of Collins M.R. in Bushell\n\nv. Hammond (1904) 2 K.B. 563 \"to show what the section was dealing with\".\"\n\nA reading of the passages and decisions referred to above leads to the view that the Court while construing a statute has to read boththe marginal.notes and the body of its provisions. Whether the marginal notes would. be useful to interpret the provisions and if so to what extent depends upon the circumstances of each case. No settled principles applicable to all cases can be laid down in this fluctuating state of the law as to the degree of importance to be attached to a marginal note in a statute. If the relevant provisions in the body of the statute firmly point towards a construc- , tion which would conflict with the marginal note, the marginal note has to yield. If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal note may be looked into as an aid to construction.\n\nThe marginal note in question was not incorporated in the Government of India. Act, 1935.\n\nMoreover, the marginal note differed in material respects from clause (c)\"which was added to the proviso to section 220(2) of the Government of India Act 1935 as clause (c) referred to appointments to the Federal Court and to another High Court. There could be no transfer of a High Court Judge to the Federal Court. He could become a Judge of the Federal Court only on being appointed as such under section 200(2) under a separate warrant of appointment.\n\nEven in the case of High Courts, a Judge of a High Court could become a Judge of another High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935 only by an appointment under section 220(2) by a warrant of appointment.\n\nc1> [1976] 1 s.c.R. 10@86-81.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll.\n\nThere was no independent provision corresponding to Article 222 of the Constitution providing for transfer in the Government of India Act, 1935. The Bari of Munster and Mr. Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act and if I may say so got into an error of proximity when they relied on section 10 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, which established the\n\nupreme Court of Judicature in England consisting of His Majesty's High Court of Justice and His fajesty's Court of Appeal both of which were in iJhe same building at the Royal Courts of Justice.\n\nEven there section 10(2) of that Act provided that the office of any Judge of the High Court would be vacated by his being appointed as a Judge of the Court of Appeal and the same Act used. 'transferred' in section 4(2) thereof where it was dealing with the transfer of a Judge of the High Court from one Division to another Division The Marginal note and the speeches relied on are, therefore, of-not much use. On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935. I am of the view that there is no error committed by the learned Judges in stating so in Sakal Chand Seth's case (supra) and the decision in that case is not liable to be reconsidered on the ground now urged before us.\n\nE It is alternatively urged that as the Constitution has used the words 'transfer' aQd 'appointment' interchapgeably in Article 222 and in paragraph l l(b) (iii) of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the word 'transfer' in Article 222 should be read as equivalent to 'appointment' and a transfer of a Judge therefore results in a fresh appointment which requires his consent.\n\nParagraph 11 (b)(iii) F of the Second Schedule to the Constitution reads thus :\n\n\"11 (b) \"actual service\" i1Viludes\n\n(i) ........... .\n\n(ii) .......... ..\n\n(iii) joining time on transfer from a High Court to the Supreme Court or from one High Court to another.\"\n\nThe contention is that since a High Court Judge can become a Judge of the Supreme Court only by a fresh appointment and that\n\n...... \\,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkatarami'ah, J.) • 1325\n\nfo paragraph 11 (b) (iii) of the Second Schedule to the Constitution the word 'transfer' i~ used to 'denote such appointment,' it should be held that even when a High Court Judge is transferred to another High Court he must be deemed to have been appointed afresh in the Court to which he is transferred and because it is a fresh appointment his consent is necessary. as it is needed under Article 217(1).\n\nIn support of this submission reliance is placed on another part of Maxwell on 'The Interpretation of Statutes' (12th Edition) at page 286 where it is stated thus :\n\n\"Just as the presumption that the same meaning is intended for the same expression in every part of an Act is not of much weight, so the presumption of a change of intention from a change of language:__which is of no great weight in the construction of documentsseems entitled to less weight in the construction of a statute than in any other case : for the variation is sometimes to be accounted for by the draftsman's concern for \"the graces of the style\" and his wish to avoid the repeated use of the same words, sometimes by the circumstance that the Act has been compiled from different sources, and sometimes by the alterations and additions from various hands which Acts undergo in their progress 'through Parliament\".\n\nThe decision in State of Bombay v.\n\nHeman Santlal Alreja(1) is also cited before us for our consideration in support of this contention. In that case, the High Court of Bombay has observed at pages 23-24 thus :\n\n\"The argument is very attractive and receives considerable support from two different expressions used in the Constitution. It is perfectly true that the ordinary and normal canon of construction requires that when we find in a statute or in a constitution two different expressions used, as far as possible two different meanings must be given to these expressions, because it must be assumed that the Legislature or the Constituent Assembly did not use two different expressions H\n\n(1) AIR 1952 Bom. 16.\n\n!326 • SUPRBMll COURT R~PORtS (1982] s.c.R..\n\nwiihout intending to convey two different meanings.\n\nBut instances are not unknown where two different expressions have been used to convey the same meaning\".\n\nIn the aforesaid Bombay case the learned Judges were concerned with the apparent difference between two expressions 'law in force' and 'the existing law' of which the latter expression was more compendious than the former and could include within its scope both the former expression 'law in force' which meant Jaw actually in force and any law potentially in operation such as law which had 'been suspended or which had not been extended to certain territories.\n\nThe two expressions found place in Article 13 and Article 372 respectively of the Constitution. On a consideration of the relevant circumstances, the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that 'existing law'_ and 'la\"'. in force' had been used in the Constitution without any distinction or difference.\n\nWe are not faced with any difficulty in this case of the sort with which the Bombay High Court had to deal in the above decision.\n\nThe Constitution has used the word 'appojntment' and 'transfer' to convey two different senses, the first meaning the initial induction of a person into a post and the latter meaning the shifting of a person from one post to another equivalent post. The members of the Constituent Assembly were quite familiar with this distinction which was well known to the bureaucracy at the time when the Constitution was enacted. The following history of the legislation supports the view that the two expressions are not used in the same sense as meaning 'appointment' only but they mean two different concepts as stated earlier.\n\nClause\n\n(c) of proviso to section 220 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is the earliest of the relevant clauses read as :\n\n\"(c) The office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by His Majesty to be a Judge of the Federal Court or of another High Court\"\n\nClause (c) of the proviso to Article 193 (1) of the Draft Constitution which did not contain a provision for the transfer of High Court Judges read asfollows:\n\n\"(c) The office of the Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of any other High Court\"\n\n.....\n\n....\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) . 1327\n\nIn the Revised Draft Constitution which was submitted to the Constituent Assembly on November 3, 1949, in which a provision for transfer had been included in Article 222, Clause (c} of the proviso to Article 217 (!) which almost remained unaffected read as:\n\n\"(c) The office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of any other High Court in any State specified in the First Schedule\".\n\nBut on November 16, 1949 the above clause was amended at C the stage of the third reading of the Constitution emphasizing the difference between 'appointed' and 'transferred' and in order to bring it in accord with Article 222 which provided for transfer of High Court Judges. After the amendment it read as under :\n\n\"(c) The office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to any other High Court within the territory of of India\" (emphasis added)\n\n(See Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 p. 596) .\n\nIf the Constituent Assembly had thought that . 'appoited' and 'transferred' were interchangeable, there would have been no need for the amendment as the provision in the Revised Draft Constitution was sufficient. But it deliberately amended the provision as\n\n F stated above by distinguishing a 'transfer' from an 'appointment'.\n\nJf in spite of this amendment, the Constituent Assembly has allowed paragraph 11 (b} (iii) in the Second Schedule to the Constitution to remain as it is, it only means that it thought that the word 'transfer' bad been used therein in a broad sense meaning a physical 'transfer' of the Judge concerned which included both appointment to the Supreme Court and transfr to another High Court and that is clear by the use of a common expression 'transfer' in respect of both the events which follow it in that clause.\n\nMoreover, this argument now pressed before us runs• counter to Article 222 of the Constitution which appears to be a complete code on the topic of transfer of a High Court Judge. If transfer is a fresh appointment, Article 217\n\n1328 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS [l 982) 2 s.c.k.\n\nA (!) of the Constitution would immediately be attracted and that provision contains an entirely different procedure of consultation from what is contained in Article 222.\n\nI, therefore, do not find any merit in this contention.\n\nThe next contention urged against the correctness of the majority decision in Sakal Chand Sheth' s case (supra) is the one that appealed to Untwalia, J. in that case, namely, that a transferred Judge cannot become a Judge of the High High Court to which he is transferred without taking a fresh oath in accordance with Article 219 of the Constitution in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule to the Cqnstitution. The gist of the argument may be summarised thus : Article 219 provides that every person appointed to he a Judge of a High Court shall before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the Governor of the State, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule to the Constitution. The form of the oath in the case of Judges of High Court reads :\n\n\"I, A.B . having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of the High Court at (or of) ....... do swear in the name of God that solemnly affirm I will bear true faith and allegience to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my. office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.\"\n\nIt may be noted that the place where the High Court is situated or the State to which it pertains should be inserted in the blank space shown in the form of oath set out above. Clause (c) of proviso to Article 217 (1) of the Constitution states that the office of a Judge of a. High Court shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to any . otlier High Court within the territory of India. The argument is that since a Judge of a High Court has to take a fresh oath when he is appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court he should also take a fresh oath when he is transferred to another High Court before he enters upon his duties\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nJ329\n\nthere for the reason that he ceases to be Judge of a High Court to which he is originally appointed on beiqg transferred and the oath taken earlier would come to an end on such transfer as the oath is with reference to the High Court concerned, (which is inserted in the blank space in the form of oath). It is argued that it is not possible for a person to function as a Judge unless the oath is operative. If a transferred Judge has therefore to take a fresh oath then it is urged that the order of transfer would become a a fresh appointment for which his consent would be required by necessary implication as it is necessary in the case of a first appoint- . ment under Article 217 (I). It is difficult to agree with this contention. What is the object of an oath ? An oath is taken by a Judge in order to show his allegience to the Constitution and to affirm that he will duly and faithfully discharge his duties as a Judge without fear or favour, affe<!tion or ill-will and that he will uphold the Constitution. The essential part of it is what he swears or affirms to do. The words \"having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of the High Court at (or of)\" in the form of oath are only descriptive of the person who takes the oath. The oath is not confined to the High Court where he enters bis office. It will operate as\n\nlog as he discharges judicial duties either In that High Court or in any other High Court to which he may be transferred under Article 222 of the Constitution or even when be discharges any other duty which he may be requested to do by the President as provided in paragraph 11 (b) (i) of the Second Schedule to the Constitution. The oath binds him even after his retirement. A persual of some of the provisions of the Constitution would establish this. Under Article 127 of the Constitution a High Court Judge can be asked to discharge the duties of a Judge of a Supreme Court. Under Art.224A a retired High Court Judge can be asked to sit in the High Court where he had worked as a Judge before his retirement or in any other High Court and decide \"Cases. In neither of these two cases he has to take a fresh oath, even though he discharges judicial duties. It is contended that since in the first of these two cases he is not treated as a regular Supreme Court Judge but continues to be a High Court Judge and in the second case be is entitled to have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges of, but shall not otherwise be deemed to be a Judge of the High Court where he functions under Article 224A no fresh oath would be necessary.\n\nThis contention overlooks the necessity . for taking the oath. The necessity for the oath is that the person who discharges judicial duties in a superior court should perform those duties without fear or fav.our1 affection or ill-will. If that is\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.a.\n\nso, can we say that the effect of the oath come~ to an end when he leaves the High Court which is mentioned in the form of oath taken by him or is confined to that High Court ? Then it would mean that a High Court Judge who is requested under Article 127 under Article 224A would not be bound by the oath when he discharges judicial duties pursuant to those Articles. Such a construction cannot be permitted. The oath he has taken would be operating as long as he discharges any duty arising out of or traceable to his status of being a Judge of a High Court. A Judge functioning under Article 127 and Article 224A cannot be freed from the obligations flowing from the oath even 'though a particular High Court is meniioned in the form of oath taken by him. The position cannot be different when a Judge of a High Court is transferred under Article 222.\n\nOn such transfer he may cease to be a Judge of the High Court where he was working before such transfer bui he continues to be a Judge nontheless and goes to the Court to which he is transferred as a Judge and not as a newly appointed person who is still to blossom into a Judge by taking the oath as prescribed by Article 219 of the Constitution.\n\nIncidently we may refer to the decision of the High Court of Allahabad iii Hira Singh & Ors. v. Jai Singh & Ors. (1) in which the question of a Judge not taking o.ath had arisen for considaration in a slightly different situation. In that case a preliminary objection was taken to the Constitution of the B.ench before which the case came up for hearing as the Bench consisted of Justice Uma Shankar Bajpai, who had been originally appointed as an additional Judge of that Court under the Government of India Act, 1915 and who after some extensions had been appointed as a permanent Judge on March 17, 1937 with effect from April l, 1937.\n\nPart 3 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which came into force on April l, 1937 provided that any Judge appointed before the com'mencement of that Part to any High Court would continue in office and should be deemed to have been appointed under that Part. One of the contentions, which appears to have been urged in this case, was that without taking a fresh oath as required by section 220(4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, Bajpai, J. could not function as a Judge. That contention was negatived by the Full Bench in the following way at page 590 :\n\n\\!l AlR 1937 All. 588 (F.B)\n\n• -\n\n. ...,_\n\nS.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1331\n\n\"All that s. 220(4) requires that every person appointed to be a Judge of a High Court shall,' before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the Governor or some other person appointed by him an oath according to the form prescribed. The oath is necessary before entering upon his office as a Judge.\n\nAs already pointed out, Bajpai, J. entered upon his office as a Judge of this Court long ago and took the oath which has then prescribed under Cl. 3 of our Letters Patent. The mere fact that he has now been made a permanent Judge does not mean that he \"enters upon his office\" as a Judge of this Court a fresh, necessitating a fresh oath which is required for a person who enters upon his office for the first time.\n\nIf. this were not the correct interpretation, then the result would be that every time that an additional Judge's term if extended, he would have to take a fresh oath. This is contrary to the established practice of this Court. It may also be pointed out that under s. 223 of the Act the powers of the Judges of a High Court in relation to the administration of Justice in this Court are the same as immediately before the commencement of Part 3 of this Act.\"\n\nThis decision proceeded on the basis that an additional Judge once appointed does not change his status as a Judge even when his -tenure is extended or is made permanent. We need not go to that extent in this case since we are concerned with a Judge who is trans- 'ferred from one post to another equivalent post.\n\ni am of the view that no fresh oath need be taken by a Judge who is transferred before entering upon duties as a Judge in the High Court to which he is transferred since the oath already taken continues to bind him and the transfer is only traceable to the status which he had acquired after taking the oath earlier in the Court to which he was initially appointed. It is not correct to state that the effect of that oath'comes to an end because he vacates his seat in the Court where he was functioning before his transfer. Since there is no necessity for a fresh oath after his transfer; even though as a matter of abundant cautioQ the practice of t11king fresh 011th is pre-\n\n SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nA vailing now a days, it cannot be said that he is appointed afresh as a Judge in the Court to which he is transferred.\n\nThere is one other ground to hold that the transfer does not result in a fresh appointment. . If it is a fresh appointment in a new High Court with his consent, payment of an additional compensation under Article 222(2) of the Coustitution to the Judge who becomes a Judge of that High Court nuder. an order of transfer under Article 222(1) would become anamolous as the other Judges of that Court who are initially appointed to that Court would be getting the usual salary, allowances and other perquisites allowable in the case of a High Court Judge. It is only when a Judge is transferred in the public interest without his volition it can be said that payment under Article 222(2) would not be discriminatory as then he would1be belonging to a different class.\n\nThe payment under Article 222(2) can be justified only by holding that the transfer under Article 222(1) does not result in a fresh appointment in another High Court to which a Judge is transferred. '\n\nIf a Judge who is transferred under Article 222 of the Constitution is to be treated as haying been appointed a fresh in the High Court to which he is transferred then he will have to be assigned a rank below all the other judges who were working in that Court before he was transferred. It is only if it is held that he goes there as a person already appointed as a Judge though in another High_ Court then he can reasonably be assigned seniority over others who were appointed after he was appointed initially as a High Court Judge.\n\nAny other view would be irrational.\n\nThe argument that a transfer can be made only with the consent of a Judge on personal grounds also does not appeal to me.\n\nWhile explaining this ground, an illustration of a Judge who on grounds of health is seeking transfer from one High Court to anoother was given. The illogicality of this submission becomes obvious when we consider whether there can be any justification for paying such a Judge the Compensation under Article 222(2) after he is so transferred. There is no merit in this submission.\n\nRelying upon clause (2) of Article 222 of the Constitution H which provides for payment of compensatory allowance in addition to his salary to a Judge who is transferred to another High Court\n\nI ...\n\ns. P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1333\n\nfrom the Court to which he was originally appointed it is argued that A transfer Is a punishment or an injury for which compensation is provided under Article 222(2) of the Constitution. It is difficult to accede_ to this submission.\n\nA transfer under clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution could not ever have been considered to be a punishment in disguise, the transfer being in the public interest.\n\nThe transfers may not be on account of any conduct of a Judge which is not relished by the transferring authority. It may be on account of the public interest such as providing another High Court with a competent Judge who is able to discharge his duties effectively in that Court.\n\nPayment of such compensatory allowance does not imply that a transfer involves an element of punishment. It is difficult to imagine that Article 222 was enacted by the Cons.tituent Assembly as a measure of punishment to an erring Judge. It may be that when a Judge is transferred in the public interest, he suffers some inconvenience but such inconvenience cap.not be termed as a punishjllent. I am sure that the Chief Just ice of India and the President will duly consider all aspects before ordering such a transfer.\n\nThe following observations of Chandracbud, J. (as he then was) in Sakal Chand Seth's , case (supra) fully explain the true legal position at pages 444-445 thus :\n\n\"Unquestionably, the fundamental principle on which these constitutional provisions and decisions rest cannot oe allowed to be violated or diluted, directly or indirectly. But then the question .. is : Is there any need or justification, in order to uphold and protect the independence of the judiciary, for construing article 222(1) to mean that a judge cannot be transferred from one Higu Court to another without his consent ?\n\nI think not.\n\nThe power to transfer a High Court Judge is conferred by the Constitution in public interest and not for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon to punish a .Judge who does toe its line or who, for some reason or the other, has fallen from its grace. The executive possesses no such power under our Constitution and if it can be shown though we see the difficulties in such showing that a transfer of. a High Court Judge is made in a given case for Jan extraneous reason, th!( e, i; e, y\\e,. of the PC!We.r CllD,\n\nSUPREME .COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 S.C.lt.\n\nappropriately be struck down as being vitiated by legal mala fides.\n\nThe extraordinary power which\\ the Constitution has conferred on the President by article 222(1) cannot be exercised in a manner which is calculated to defeat or destroy in one stroke the object and purpose of the various provisions conceived with such care to insulate the 'judiciary from the influence andpressures of the executive.\n\nThe power to punish a High Court Judge, if one may so describe it, is to be found only in article 218 read with article 124(4) and\n\n(5) of the Constitution, under which a Judge of the High Court can be removed from his office by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament, supported by a majority of the totai membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting, has been presented to the President\n\nin the same session for such removal; on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Thus, if the power of the President, who has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers to transfer a High Court Judge under article 222( I) is strictly limited to cases in which the transfer becomes necessary in order to subserve public interest, in other words, if it be true that the President has no power to transfer a High Court Judge for reasons not bearing ox; i public interest but arising out of whim, caprice or fancy of the executive or its desire to bend a Judge to its own way of thinking, there is no possibility of any interference with the independence of the judiciary if a Judge is transferred without his consent.\"\n\nThe. last sentence of the above passage is of great significance.\n\nIt is clear from the ab, ive passage with which I respectfully agree, that an order of transfer made under Article 222 is liable to be struck down by the Court if it is shown that it has been made for an extraneous reason, that is, on a ground falling outside the scope of that. Article under that Article a Judge cim be transferred when such transfer subserves public ir.terest and the President \"has no power to transfer a High Court Judge for reasons not bearing on public interest but arising out of whim, •aprice, or fancy of the executivr or its\n\n.. - -....;,..\n\n. S.P. GUPTA v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1335\n\ndesin: to bend a Judge to its own way of thinking\". It is also clear from the above decision that \"the power to punish a High Court Judge, if one may so describe it, is to be found only in Article 218 read with Articles 124(4) and (5) of the Constitution under which a Judge: of a High Court can be removed from his. office by an order of the President after an address by each House of Parliament\" is presented in accordance with those clauses on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The question debated before us is . whether under Article 222, it is open to the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another High Court on the ground of 'misbehaviour or incapacity' and whether the said ground falls within the scope of 'public interest' which is the only relevant consideration on the basis of which a transfer can be made under that Article. It is argued that even though the observations made in the majority judgment which are extracted above point out that no valid transfer can tacke place under Article 222 on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge, the followmg passage at page 446 in the same judgment suggests to the contrary :\n\n\"Experience shows that there are cases, though fortunately they are few and far between; in which the exigencies of administration necessitate the transfer of\n\na Judge from one High Court to another. The factious local atmosphere sometimes demands the drafting of a Judge or Chief Justice from another High Court and on the rarest of rare occasions which can be counted on the fingers of a hand, it becomes necessary to withdraw a Judge from a circle of favourities and non-favourities.\n\nThe voice of compassion is heard depending upon who articulates it. Though transfers in such cases are pre-eminently in public interest, it will be impossible to achieve that purpose if a Judge caqnot be transferred without his consent. His personal iuterest may lie in continuing in a Court where his private interest will be served best, whereas, public interest may require that his moorings ought to be served to act as a reminder that \"the place of justice is a hallowed place.\"\n\nIn Sakal Chand Seth's case (supra) the main question for ff determination was whether a Judge could be transferred at all without consent. The majority reaCQ\"tq tle <:onclusiq.q that Ile could;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Il98i] 2 S.C.R.\n\nbe transferred in public interest without his consent. The Court was not specifically concerned with the question whether such transfer could take place on a ground which could be the basis for Parliament proceedings for the removal of a Judge under Article 218 read with Atticle 124( 4) and (5) of tlie Constitution. Since this question has been directly raised in this case it requires to be examined more closely having regard to the scheme of the constitutional provisions.\n\nClause (b) of the proviso to Article 217 (I) of the Constitution states that a Judge of a High Court may be removed from bis office by the President in the manner provided in Clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court. Article 218 of the Constitution provides that the provisions of Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 shall apply_ in relation to a High Court as they apply in relation to the Supreme Court with the substitution of references to the. High Court for references to the Supreme Court.\n\nClauses (4) and\n\n(5) of Article 124 read as follows-:\n\n\"124. (4)' A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session sor such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.\n\n(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4).\"\n\nClause (5) of Article 124 authorities the Parliament by law to regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for investigation and proof 'Of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause ( 4) thereof. In exercise of the said power Parliament has enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act .51 of\n\n1968) whic~ is applicable to Judges of both the Supreme Court and High Courts. The procedqre prescribed by that Act i6 an elaborate\n\npner\n\ns.i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1337\n\nSection 3 to 6 of the above said Act lay down inter alia that the proceedings for removal of a Judge can be commenced with a notice of motion for. presentation of an address to the President praying for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the case of a notice given in the Lok Sabha, signed by not less than one hundred members of that House and in the case of a notice given in the Rajya Sabha, . by not less than fifty members of that House. The next step is the consideration of the said notice by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. as the case may be who may on the basis of the material before: him either admit the motion or refuse to admit it. If the Notice is admitted, the Speaker or the Chairman should keep the motion pending and constitute a committee of three members of whom one should be chosen from among the Chief Justice and other Judgc:s of the Supreme Court, one from among the Chief Justices of the High Courts and one person who in the opinion of the Speaker or the Chairman, as the '?ase may be, is a distinguished jurist. If notices of motion are given on the sam~ day in both the Houses, no committee can be constituted unless the motion has\n\nbeen admitted in both the Houses and if it is so admitted by both the Houses then the committee should be Constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman. The committee so constituted has to frame charges and hold an enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor.\n\nAt the conclusion of the enquirr if the committee reports that the Judge is not guilty of the charges, the motion pending in the House. cannot be proceeded with. If the committee finds that the Judge against whom the enquiry is instituted is guilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity then the motion should be taken up for consideration by the House concerned. If thereafter the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the me:mbers of that House present and voting and an address is presented to the President in the prescribed manner by each House of\n\nParliament in the same session, a Judge of the Supreme Codrt or of a High Court can be removed from office.\n\nWe are concerned here with the transfer of a Judge whose stock-in-trade if we may use this' expression, is liis reputation. People accept the decision of a Judge not because his decision is always\n\ncorreCt but because it is rendered by a person known for his wisdom H integrity, character and impartiality. It is only on account of these\n\n1338 SUi>RBMB COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nqualities of a Judge, people have faith in the judiciary .. The litigants naturally exfject the presiding officer of a Court to be a virtuous person. If there is a slight rumour which would adversely affect his reputation, he ceases to command the respect of the people.\n\nEven a correct judgment given by a Judge who is transferred would be viewed with suspicion;· if it is known that a Judge, . whose character and conduct are not above reproach is liable to be transferred from one High Court to another High Court, even when his transfer is effected in the public interest and not on the ground of his character or conduct. Then, how can a Judge who is transfersed command. the respect of the Bar and the people in the State to which he is transferred when his moral personality stands destroyed by the very act of transfer unless the order of transfer carries a postscript . that he is not being transferred on any ground of misbehaviour or incapacity ? _\n\nThe following words of the Bhagavad Gita are quite relevant here:\n\n11-34,\n\n(To the honourd, infamy is surely worse than death)\n\nIf a Judge with a bad reputation is transferred, then it would not subserve any public interest at all since the people in the State _ to which be is transferred will not have faith in him.\n\nMore than all, in the absence of any procedure for any enquiry in which a Judge can clear his conduct, is it fair to expose him to public ridicule ? · Can payment of compensation under Article 222 (2) of the Constitution be of any avail to an honest Judge ? Looking at .the problem from another angle, can we say that the Constitution has provided for payment of a reward under Article 222 (2) to a ...\n\nJudge who is transferred on the allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity which is not established at an inquiry? Alltliese questions may be set at rest by reading down Article 222 as not conferring on the President the power to transfer a Judge on the basis of untested allegations or rumours about acts of misbehaviour or incapacity of Judge and it appears that such a construction would not merely be in conformity with Articles 218 and 124 (4) and (5) but also would be consistent with the independence of' the judiciary. As the law now staµds it is not open to any single individual, whether it is the\n\n•. I\n\ns.t>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1339\n\nPresidi:nt or the Chief Justice of India or anybody else to take cognizance of any allegatios of misbehaviour or of incapacity of a Jud, ge and to take any legal action on their basisunder the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Obe hundred Members of the Lok Sabha or fifty Members of the Rajya Sabha alone can initiateany action on such allegations.\n\nNaturally, all others . are excluded from taking cognizance of them and acting on them_.\n\nIn the absence of any categorisation of acts ol misbehaviour or incapacity into different classes-like those on the basis of which Parliamentary procet:dings for the removal of a Judge may be initiated and those on thi: basis of which an order of transfer under Article 222 of the Constitution can be passed, it would be incorrect to hold that a transfer of a Judge can be made under Art. 222 on more allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge.\n\nArticle 218 and Article 124 (4) and (5) of the Constitution make it clear that Article 222 cannot be resorted to in any such case, and if it is utilised by the President in that way, the transfer would have to be set aside on the ground of excess of jurisdiction.\n\nWhen once it is declared that a transfer of a Judge cannot be made at all on the ground of allegations of misbehaviour or of incapacity and can only be made in the public interest, the reputation of a transferred Judge would remain unsullied. and no evil consequences such as those indica.ted above would follow.\n\nIt should be stated here that the learnced Attorney-General has fairly conceded that no transfer of a Judge under Article 222 is possible on any of the grounds which may form the basis of a charge in a parliamentary proceeding under clauses ( 4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Article 218 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is, therefore, declared that a transfer based on any such ground being out- ·\n\nside the scope of Article 222 is liable to be set aside.\n\nBut a transfer made in the public interest in accordance wit!} Article 222 but with- . out the consent of the Judge who is transferred is unassailable.\n\nIt was faintly suggested by one of the petitioners that Article 222 of the Constitution does not in terms apply to a Chief Justice ofa High Court and hence the transfer of a Chief Justice was bad.\n\nThis contention is based on, the assumption that the word 'Judge' in Article 222 does not include within its scope a 'Chief Jm; tice'.\n\nIt is submitted that a Chief Justice is different from other Judges of a High Court for the following reasons .: {a) Article 216 of the .\n\n1340 SIJPRllMll COlJR'i' RllPORTs [19S2J 2 s.c.a.\n\n Constitution states that a High Court should always have a Chief Justice. It may riot have any other Judges ; (b) a Chief Justice's post has to be filled up by making a separate appointment under Article 21 7 ( l) even when it is filled up by a person who is already holding the post of a Judge and the method of consultation is different in his case, a Chief Justice has to take a fresh oath ; (c) when a Judge is appointed, the Chief Justice qas to be consulted ;\n\n(d) when the Chief Justice's post is vacant or when the Chief Justice is absent, any other Judge may be appointed to perform the duties of the Chief Justice under Article 223 and the Judge so appointed functions only as an acting Chief Justice ; ( e) under Article 229; the Chief Justice alone is entrusted with the duty of appointing servants of the High Court and has control over them ;\n\n(f) under the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the salary of a Chief Justice is fixed at Rs. 4,000/ - per mensem whereas other Judges get Rs. 3,500/- only; (g) under Article 159, a Governor has to make and subscribe the oath before the Chief Justice and only in his absence before the se_niormost Judge available and (h) even in the official ranking assigned for ceremonial purposes, the Chief Justice is placed higher than the other Judges of a High Court.\n\nThese points of distinction between a Chief Justice and a Judge of a High Court no doubt are there but they do not appear to be conclusive for decid_ing the question before us.\n\nThe expression 'Judge' is not defined in the Constitution. We have, therefore, to go through. all the relevant provisions of the Constitution to ascertain its true meaning. If we proceed on the basis that the expression 'Judge' does not include a 'Chief Justice',\n\neveral anamolous results follow.\n\nIn Article 217 (I) the procedure for appointment of a Judge is provided. It says that every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the Pi:esiden t after consulta tion which the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court. This clause makes it clear that the expression 'Judge' includes a 'Chief Justice' also. If a Chief Justice is not a Judge, there would be. no separate age of retirement for him. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 217 (I) would also become inapplicable to Chief Justice as the word 'Chief Justice' is not used in them. Similarly, Article 217 (2) which prescribes qualifications of a Judge, Article 217 (3) which provides _the procedure for determination of the age of a Judge, Article 219 which requires a Judge to make and subscribe an oath, Article 220\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Jlenkataramiah, J.) 1341\n\nwhich imposes restrictions on the right of persons who have held office as permanent Judges to practice in certain courts, Article 221 which prescribes and protects the salaries of Judges and Article 224A which provides for appointment of retired Judges to sit and act as Judges of a High Court would become inapplicable to a Chief Justice.\n\nArticle 225 which has preserved the powers of Judges of High Courts which they were exercising before the commencement of the Constitution becomes inapplicable to a Chief Justice. If the term .'Judge' did not also include a 'Chief Justice' all Chief Justices of High Courts who were holding office immediately before the commencement of the Constitution had to vacate their offices on January 26, 1950 because Article 376 (1) and (2) referred to 'Judges' only. If the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is accepted, the foregoing absurd results would ensue.\n\nSome othertonsequences of accepting this contention will be that the expression 'one Judge' occurring fli Article i33 (3J of the Constitution will not include a 'Chief Justice' of a High Court and by analogy, the word 'Judges' in Article 145 (2) and (3) will not include the 'Chief Justice of India'.\n\nIn these circumstances, the reasonable way to construe the above Articles of the Constitution is to interpret the word 'Judge' whenever it appears in the Constitution as including the 'Chief Justice' also except where a particular provision expressly or by necessary implication distinguishes a Cheif Justice from a Judge .. In all other places, the word 'Judge' should be considered as having been used i11 a generic sense. The conclusion is so self-evident that it is not necessary to support it by authorities.\n\nArticle 222 of tl:ie Constitution, therefore, applies to all Judges of High Courts including a Chief Justice.. Of course, a Chief Justice can only be transferred as a Chief Justice of another High Court and not as a Judge.\n\nI may say a few words here on the policy of appointing the Chief Justice in. every High Court from outside the State. In our country we are used to the British Chief Justices presiding over the High Courts for more than a century.\n\nMany of them turned out to be distinguished Judges and the fact that they were functioning in a country which they had not known before drd not act as any hindrance to their work. Even the ignorance of any of the local languages did not act as a serious obstacle to their functioning efficiently.\n\n1342 StJPllEMB cotnit 1lEP01lts [ 1982) 2 s.C.R.\n\nThe Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission having considered the question of appointment of Chief Justices of High Courts from outside the State observed in Chapter VI thus :\n\n\"26. A large body of evidence before us has suggested that it should be made in invariable practice to filla vacancy in the office of Chief Justice by appointing a Judge from outside the State. Such course, it is said, will have the advantage of giving the Chief Justice of India a wide choice in recommending a person suitable for that office. It has also been pressed upon us that bringing a Chief Justice from outside the State will have a very healthy influence, that, it will promote a sense of unity in the country and prevent the Chief Jus!!ce being swayed by local connections and local influences. It may he mentioned that that Chief Justices f.rom outside the State have been appointed in some of the States and these appointments have proved a success.\n\nThough the nalogy may not be very pertinent, we. may refer to the practi, ce of appointing Governors who do not belong to the State, which has been in vogue since the advent of the Constitution.\n\n27.\n\nOn the other hand it has been urged with considerable force, that it would not be fair, that competent persons on the Bench of the State High Court should be shut out from the chance of occupying the office of the Chief Justice in their own States.\n\nIt has also been pointed out that the proposed practice may prevent members of the Bar from accepting appointments as judges, the opportunity of serving as Chief justices in their own States being denied to them.\n\n28.\n\nOn the whole we are of the view that it would be difficult to lay down such an inflexible practice. It should, we think, be clearly understood, that the senior-most. puisne judge of a Court, should not merely by reason of his seniority have an expectation of succeeding to the office of the Chief Justice.\n\nIn every case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) -1343\n\nJustiee, the senior puisne judge should be appointed to the office, only if he bas the necessary qualifications.\n\nIndeed the Chief Justice of India may well bear in mind the desirability of appointing a Chief Justice from outside the State by reason of the consideration we have mentioned. Even in cases where the seniormost puisne judge is fit to occupy the office, it would be doing no injustice to him to leave him out and appoint him to a similar office in another State.\" •\n\nThe 80th Report of the Law Commission observed in Chapter\n\nVI thus: C\n\n\"6.19. It would not be a healthy practice in case the seniormost judge is considered not suitable for the office of Chief Justice to appoint a junior judge from the same court as Chief Justice. In such an event, the proper course, _in our opinion, would be to appoint some judge from outside the State. It should also be ensured that the judge so appointed as Chief Justice should have been on the High Court Bench for a sufficiently iong time and should have that much seniority as a judge as not to cause resentment in the senior judges of the High Court that someone junior in service has been appointed in super-session of their claim.\n\nWhile appointing 6omeone from outside the State as Chief JustiCe of the High Court, care must also be taken to see that his tenure as Chief Justice is not so long as to black the chances of not only the seniormost judges but also of other judges in the High\n\nCmrt. By the words \"blocking the chances\", we mean not only preventing the appointment of a person.as Chief Justice but also substantially reducing the length of his term as Chief Justice.\n\nOf course, arthmetical exactitude and precision in these matters cannot be insisted upon\".\n\nNeither of the above two Reports of the Law Commission, however, notices any impropriety in appointing Chief Justice from\n\noutside. Such practice has its own distinct advantages particularly H in these days. Since the Chief Justice of Indiahas got to be consul- 'ted before appointing a Chief Justice of a High Court one may feel '\n\n...\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.C.ll\n\nassured that there will be very little room for anything prejudicial to the community of High Court Judges happening by the implementation of the policy of appointing Chief Justices of the High Courts from' outside the State. The advantages of having some Judges in every High Court from outside have been considered by some high-power bodies earlier.\n\nThe States Reorganisation Commission presided over by Justice S,' Fazal Ali, former Judge of the , Supreme Court of India • in its Report prepared in the year 1955 observed at paragraph 861 thus:\n\n\"861. Guided by the consideration that the principal organs of. State should be so constituted as to inspire confidence and to help in arresting parochial trends, we would also recommend that at least one-third of the number of Judges in a High Court should consist of persons who are recruited from outside that State.\n\nIn makin~ appointments to a High Court Bench, pro-\n\n. fessional standing and ability must obviously be the overriding consideration. But the suggestion we have made will extend the field of choice and will have the advantage of regulilting the staffing of the higher judi ciary as far as possible on the same principles as in the case of the Civil Service\". •\n\nIn para 58 of the Summary of Conclusion and Recommendations given at the end of its Report, the States Reorganisation Commission recommended:\n\n\"58. , At least one-third of the number of Judges in the High Court of a State should consist of persons who are recruited from outside that State, (paragraph 861)\".\n\nThe Study Team on Centre-State Relationships (Shri M.C, Setalvad, former Attorney-General was the Chairman of the Team) appointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission also considered the question of appointment of High Court Judges in its Report submitted in the year 1968.\n\nDealing with the rcommen dations of the States Reorganisation Commission on the above questions, the Study Team observed ; ·\n\n).\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1345\n\n\"We would neverthless .suggest that, without necessarily preparing panels, the recommendation of the State Reorganisation Commission should be given effect to as far as possible. Some \"outside\" appointments are made even now but these are few and far between. A serious effort to increase their number will make its own contribution to efficiency, independence and national integration.\n\nUnlike the suggestion for the panel, this proposal does not affront any canons of delicacy and discretion. And yet a couple of objections might be raised and need to be dealt with :\n\n(a) obviously, when appointing an, 'outsider\", it will be necessary to consult the Chief Justice and the_ government of the State from which he hails.\n\nAs the Chief Justice of the High Court in which the vacancy occurs will not have any personal knowledge of the suitability of the candidate, he will be unable to give his opinion although constitutionally required to do so.\n\nThe objection is of a technical nature. The spirit behind the present procedure is that the opinion of the Chief Justice who knows the candidate's reputation and ability should be given due weight.\n\nWe notice that \"outside\" appointments have been mde in the past without any constitutional difficulties arising.\n\nThe same could continue to happen in the future.\n\nDifficulties might arise if Chief Justices of High Courts to which \"outsiders\" are allocated object frequently to candidates -so allocated: But the whole approach recommended here postulates an enlightened national policy on the problem to which Chief Justices can be expected to subscribe.\n\nNormally, therefore, a Chief Justice should not object to the allocation of a carefully selected man. There is in any case no virtue in making any Bench the monopoly of the local Bar irrespective of available merit there or not ;\n\n(b) it may be thought that the authority .and prestige H of a High Court would be affected in case members of an o\\ltsi9e lllll' life appointed to it. This is aIJ\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R..\n\n insubstantial objection, because a High Court must command respect for the quality of justice that it dispenses and not for its ability to promote members of its Bar to the Bench.\n\nLeaving this aside, the proposar in any case does not envisage that more than one-third of the number of judges of a High Court will come from outside. This cannot seriously affect the prestige and authority of the High Courts and the Chief Justices. Besides any fancied diminution h the position of the Chief Justice on account of this one-third component from outside will be offset by the fact that candidates from his State may be going to other High Courts through a selection procedure in which he is associated.\"\n\n(Vide Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations, Vol. I pages 188-190). +\n\nAccordingly the Study Team recommended at page 195 of 'i\n\nVlume I of its Report that as far as practicable, one-third of the r number of Judges of a High Court should be from outside,\n\nIt appears from paragraph 13.21 of Volume I of the Report of the Study Team that the Chief Justices themselves handpressed for the transferability and the formation of an all-India cadre of Judges. The relevant part of tht paragraph reads :\n\n\"13.21.... . ..... Transferability and the formation of an all-India cadre of Judges was urged by the Chief Justices on the following grounds : ~\n\n(i} that such a cadre would have the advantages of extending the field of choice of High Court Judges and of regulating the staffing of the higher judiciary on the same lines as that of the civil service ;\n\n(ii) that a judiciary so recruited would be more independent having less local connections ;\n\n- \"'-'\n\n1 -\n\nS.I>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1347\n\n(iii) That the difficulty experienced in constituting\n\ndivision benches in hearing cases as one or.more of the judges recruited from the State had been engaged in the case at an early stage either as counsel or as party or happened to be related to one or more of the litigants would be avoided ;\n\n(iv) that a unified cadre of High Court Judges with . free transfers all over the country would help to break down the barriers of regionalism which held sway in many parts of the country\"\n\nThe foregoing shows that the Chief Justices did not find anything objectionable in th transfers of Judges provided they were made in accordance with Article 222 of the Constitution. The Study Team, however, followed the recommendation made in the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission but added :\n\n\"We consider that it is important to make \"outside\" appointments a reality, and that once that is done it is not necessary to insist on a regular system of transfers\".\n\nThe 80th Report of the Law Commission has also approved the above idea of having some Judges ia every High Court from outside.\n\nThe principle underlying this policy is not something new to oriental countries. In the letter half of the eighteenth century in China, there was in vogue a rule called the 'Law of Avoidance'. \"The 'Law of Avoidance' required that no one be appointed to high positions in his native province and 'no two members of the same family be allowed to work in the same locality or service, so as to prevent nepotism and the forming of cliques\". (Immanual CY.\n\nHsu : 'The Rise of Modern China', Second Edition, p. 62).\n\nOne of the arguments in favour of appointing one-third of the Judges in every High Court from outside the State is that such a step would assist in bringing about national integration. It is my\n\nview that there is a good deal of substance in this argument al- H though some dismiss the idea very lightly.\n\nClauses (a) to (e) of , Article 51 A of the Constitution need t<;> be quoted here :\n\n1348 .\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nA .SIA. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India-\n\n(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem;\n\n(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals whicli inspired our national struggle for freedom;\n\n(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty; unity and integrity of India;\n\n(d) to defend the country and render national. service when called upon to do so;\n\n(e) . to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; ...... \"\n\nArticle 51A of the Constitution which lays down the funda mental duties of the citizens of India was introduced into the Con•- titution with effect from January 3, 1977 probably to remind Indians of certain values which they were slowly neglecting during the period of thirty years following the independence of the country.\n\nEven in the year 1963 itself by the Constitution (Sixteenth Amend ment) Act, 1963, the form of oath to be taken by a Judge which is set out in the Third Schedule to the Constitution was amended by adding the words \"that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India\". The preamble of the Constitution was amended with effect from January 3, 1977 by substituting the words \"unity and integrity of the Nation\" in the place of the words \"unity of the.\n\nNation\" whic)l. were there earlier. These amendments had .to be made to fight the divisive forces which were raising their ugly heads in different corners of India. The nation should be grateful to the makers of the Constitution for enacting the provisions relating to the Indian judiciary which have brought into existence an unitary judicial system in a federal Constitution. Law (dharma) has always been an unifying force in India. The entire country from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari possesses this great inner bond of unity. Judges and lawyers who are the votaries of Indian law should feel' proud of their heritage.\n\nJust as the Jndian soldier feels proud of defending\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1349\n\nthe borders of the country treating the whole country as a single unit, Judges and lawyers should feel that they are a part. of a single judicial system operating throughout India and that they are not just members of one St11:te or another. They should be prepared to work in any part of India irrespective of the State in which they arc born or brought up: Today no High Court can afford to remain .isolated from other High Courts as a judicial island. Lawyers and Judge of one High Court should be prepared to receive with open arms lawyers and Judges of other High Courts. They should also be prepared to spare the services of their Judges to be utilised in other High Courts. It _is only then thedream of an integrated Bar and of an integrated judiciary will be fully realised. The Indian judicial system i; i one way is a great forging instrument of unity which, if properly used, can assist the country in bringing about national integration which is no longer a mere slogan. National integration is an absolute necessity now. If national integration is not a matter of public interest, what else can be in the public interest ? •\n\nIt is difficult to believe that Judges who_ day in and day out are applying decisions of English, American and Australian courts while administering justice will not be able to pick up 'the local laws in force in the State in which the High Court to which they are transferred is situated. Are not the Judges of the Supreme -Court who come from different State deciding cases from all the States in which very often they have to construe one local law or the other ? The argument that the efficiency of Judges will suffer if they are transferred is merely an argument of despair which has got to'be rejected.\n\nThe plea that a Judge of a High Court should always know the language of the rogion is again unsustainable. The Constitution makers knew that in India there were a number of regional languages: Yet they enacted Article 222 of the Constitution without any limitation.\n\nA Judge of one High Court who does not know the regional language of another State may be transferred to the High Court of that State. It is well known that many Britishers who did not know any Indian language discharged their functions very efficiently as High Court Judges in India before the commencement of the Constitution. The language of the High Courts has always been English.\n\nEven after the commencement of the Constitution, many Judges who did not undert!!Ild the; local limuage have fun(,':tionec.I\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.it.\n\nas High Court Judges to the satisfaction of all concerned. When the reorganisation of States took place in 1956, the States Reorganisation. Commission consisting of Shri Justice Fazal Ali, Shri H.N.\n\nKunzru and Shri K.M. Panikkar strongly pleaded as stated earlier for appointment of at least one-third of Judges of a High Court from outside the State.\n\nEnglish is now the language of the Supreme Court and all the High Courts~ Article 348 of the Cons titution reads :\n\n\"348. (I) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament by law\n\notherwise provides-\n\n(a) al proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,\n\n(b) the authoritative t.ext~-\n\n(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State;\n\n(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and\n\n(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State,\n\nshall be in English language.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of clause (I), the Governor of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purposes of the State, in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seat in that State ;\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1351\n\nProvided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such High Court.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulga'.ted by the Governor of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that subclause, a translation of the same in English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authorita\n\ntive text thereof in the English language under this article\" .\n\nJudges of one High Court trained in English language should not, therefore, find any difficulty in carrying on their duties in other High Courts which are situated in other States. All the high-power bodies which have expressed their opinion in favour of transfers of\n\nI Judges have felt that the advantages flowing from the transfers of High Court Judges would outweigh the disadvantages, if any, including those flowing from the various regional languages of India. It is not possible to hold that the transfers of Judges would be opposed to the public interest on this ground also.\n\nIt is pertiment to deal with a statement made in Sakal Chand Sheth' s case (supra) at page 454 which reads as follows :\n\n\"Policy transfers on a wholesale basis which leaves no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our Constitution\".\n\nOn the basis of this it is argued that policy transfers as such are not 'permissible under Article 222 of the Constitution.\n\nI do not understand the above said observations as conveying that meaning and if they so convey th&t meaning; thn it has to be J \" ,, •••.•.\n\n.J• ••\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nobserved that they are too broadly made. Wb1t the above state ment means is that even where a transfer is made pursuant to a valid policy, each transfer should recieve adequate consideration at the bands of the authorities concerned.\n\nAll other relevant matters in relation to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred pursuant to the policy should be considered before ordering his transfer. If on such consideation it is found that he should not be transferred, the proposal should be given. up and the question of transferring another Judge in furtherance of the policy may be taken up for consideration. By doing so the policy remains unaffected and the public interest to be served by the policy also would not suffer.\n\nBut if it is argued that the above statement bars every tranfer made pursuant to a policy which is in the public interest then it bas to be held that to the extent it bars such transfers is opposed to the provisions of Article 222 which empowers the President to transfer a Judge after due consultation with the Chief Justice of India, of course, in the public interest and is thus not binding as such a construction would curtail the width of the power under Article 222.\n\nI am of the view that in view of the foregoing reasons and opinions expressed by several expert bodies any transfer of a Judge of a High Court under Article 222 of the Constitution in order to implement the policy of appointing the Chief Justice of every High Court from outside the State concerned and of having at least one third of the Judges of every High Court from outside the State, of course, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India would not be unconstitutional. ·\n\nPART VIII\n\nIn order to establish their case, learned counsel appearing for Shri V.M. Tarkunde and Shri S.N. Kumar, called upon the Union Government to produce the records pertaining to the consultations made by the President under Article 217 (1) of the Constitution in so far as the case of Shri S.N. Kumar was con cerned. The demand made by them was opposed by the Union\n\nGovernent on the ground of privilege. It was contended by the Union Government that the documents whose discovery was sought\n\n1'ein¥ those containin? communications mc!~ by high constitutional\n\n+ r\n\ns.i>. GUl>TA v. UNION {Venkataramiah, ).) 1353\n\nfunctionaries regarding a high level appointment it would not be proper to compel the Union Government to produce them.\n\nThe question which relates to the circumstances in which the Government can claim that the documents, the production of which is demanqed before a court of .law, should not be compelled to be produced on the ground of privilege is ot great constitutional importance. In Duncan & Anr. v. Cammell, Laird & Company Ltd.(1) decided during the Second World War by the House of Lords such a question arose for consideration. On June 1, 1939, the submarine, Thetis, which had been built by the respondents in that case under contract with the Admiralty was undergoing her submergence test in Liverpool Bay, and while engaged in the operation of a trial dive sank to the bottom owing to the flooding '/ of her two foremost compartments and failed to return to the surface with the result that all who were in her, except four sur vivors were overwhelmed.\n\nNinty-riirie men lost their lives. A large number of actions were instituted by those representing, or dependent on, some of the dei:eased against respondents and three other persons claiming damages for' negligence.\n\nAll of these actions, except two, were stayed until after the trial of two test actions, which were consolidated, the plaintiffs in those two test . actions being the appellants in the above case. The respondents,\n\nin their affidavit of documents objected to produce certain documents called for by the appellants on the ground that they (the respondent) had been asked by the Treasury Solicitor on behalf of the First Lord of the Admirality not to produce the said documents which had come into their possession under a contract with the Gornment and to claim crown privilege in respect of them. The First Lord of the Admiralty also filed ari affidavit stating that the documents in question had been considered by him and he had formed the opinion that it would be injurious to the public interest that any of the said documents, should be disclosed to any person. The documents to the production of which objection was thus taken included (either in original or in copy) the contract for the hull and machinery of the Thetis, letters written before the disaster relating to the vessel's trim, reports as to the condition of the Thetis when raised, a large number of plans and specifications relating to the various parts of the vessel etc.. The trial Judge declined to allow inspection of the documents and the\n\n(I) (1942] A.C. 624.\n\nSUPREME cbukt REPoRtS [ 1 ~82] 2 s.c.t.\n\nCourt of Appeal affirmed his decision. The House of Lords also upheld the claim of privilege by an unanimous decision, holding that a Court of law should uphold an objection taken by a public department called on to produce documents in a suit between private citizens if on grounds of public policy they ought not to be produced and that documents otherwise relevant and liable for production must not be produced if the public interest required that they should be withheld. The House of Lords in that case laid down two tests on which documents may be withheld one based on the contents of the documents and the other namely the class to which the documents belonged, which on grounds of public interest must be withheld from production. It proceeded to lay down that an objection validly taken on the ground that it would be injurious to the public interest was conclusive. But it was held that the mere fact that the minister of the department did not wish the documents to be produced was not an adequate justification for objecting to their production.\n\nProduction could also be withheld when the public interest would otherwise be damnified 'as where disclosure would be injurious to national defence or to good diplomatic relations or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret was necessary for the proper functioning of the public service. In such a case, it was held that the court should not require to see the document for the purpose of ascertaining whether disclosure would be injurious to the public interest. It was further held that it was essential that the decision to object should. be taken by the minister who was the political head of the department concerned and that he should have seen and considered the contents. of the documents and himself formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced and such objection should ordi narily be taken in an affidavit of the minister.\n\nThis decision, it may be seen, laid down that privilege could be claimed in respect.of a document on two alternative grounds viz. (a) that the disclosure of the contents of the document would be injurious to the public interest by endangering national security or diplomatic relations and (b) that the document belonged to a class which should not be disclosed to ensure the proper functioning of public service. Viscount Simon who spoke for the House of Lords in this case expressed his disagreement with the decision of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia (No.2) (1)\n\n(1) [1931] AC 704.\n\n..,\n\n• -\n\ns. i>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1~55\n\nin which it had been held that it was proper for a court to inspect the documents in respect of which . privilege had been claimed to determine. whether their production would be prejudicial to the public welfare. In the course of his speech, the noble Lord observed at page 641 thus:\n\n\"As.Lord Parker said in another connection : \"Those\n\nwho are responsible for\" the national security must be the sole judges of what the \"national security requires\": The Zamora [1916] 2 A.C. 77,107- In Robinson v. State of South Australia (No. 2) (1931) A.C. 704, the Judicial Committee reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had refused to order the inspection of documents which the minister in charge of the department objected to produce on grounds of public policy, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court with the direction that it was one proper for the exercise of the court's power of inspecting documents to determine whether their production would be prejudicial to the public welfare. I cannot agree with this view.\n\nTheir Lordships' conclusion was partly based on their interpretation of a rule of court which was in the same ter'ms as O.XXXI, r. 19A, sub-r.2, of the Rules of the English Supreme Court. This sub-rule provides : \"Where on an application for an order for inspection privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful for the court or a judge to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege.\" In my opinion, the Privy Council was mistaken in regarding such a rule as having any application to the subject matter. The doubt expressed on the point by du Parcq L.J. in the present case is fully justified. The withholding of d0cuments, on the ground that their publication would be contrary to the public interest, is not properly to be regarded as a branch of the law of privilege connected with discovery. \"Crown privilege\" is for this reason not a happy expression privilege, in relation to discovery, is for the protection\" of the litigant and could be waived by him, but the rule that the interest of the state must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure\n\n\n[1982J 2 S.C.R.\n\nit is a principle. to be observed in administering justice, quite unconnected with the interests or claims of the particular parties in litigation, and, indeed, is a rule on which the judge should, if necessary, insist, even though no objection is taken at all.\"\n\nNearly five years after the judgment in Duncan's case (supra) the Crown froceedings Act, 1947 was passed by the British Parliament and the Crown privilege recognised under the common law was regulated by section 28 of the said Act. But that section was, however, subject to the proviso that it could not override any rule of law which authorised or required the withholding of any document or the refusal to. answer any question on the ground that the disclosure of the document or the refusal to answering of the question would be injurious to the public interest.\n\nRobinson's case (supra) which was dissented from by the House of Lords as stated above arose out of an action in South Australia.\n\nThe Judicial Committee had held in that case that a South Australia Rule which provided that where on an application for an order for inspection, privilege was claimed for any document it was lawful for the Court or a Judge to inspect it for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the s:laim applied where privilege was claimed for an official document on the ground that its disclosure would be contrary to the interests of the public even though the claim was supported by a statement to that effect by the Minister responsible.\n\nIt was further held that the Court had always in reserve, the power to inquire into the nature of the document for which protection was so sought and to require some indication of the injury which would result from its production. The Judicial Committee added that the claim to protection in the case of documents relating to trading, commercial or contractual activities of a State could rarely be sustained especially in time of peace and that documents would prejudice the case of the State in the litigation or assist the other party was a compelling reaso.nfor their production only to be overborne by the gravest reasons of State policy or security. ·\n\nIn three cases which came before the Court of Appeal after Duncan's case (supra) was decided by the House of Lords, while it was held hat on matters touching national security and foreign affairs, the application of the principle enunciated in the Duncan's case (supra) in an unqualified manner was not open to question,\n\n• -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1357\n\ndoubts were entertained about its application without modification to a class of documents (See Merricks v. Nott-Bower,(1) Re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2)(2) and Wednesbury Corporation v, Ministry of Housing and Local Government) (3) When it was asserted by the Attorney General that so long as the objection was taken in proper form, the Judge must treat the claim of privilege as conclusive, in Re Grosvenor Hotel's case (supra) Lord Denning, M.R. after referring to the practice prevailing in Scotland and Commonwealth countries, observed .at pages 361-362 thus :\n\n\"In view of these developments, I think that it is open to the House and I believe to us, to reconsider that matter : and I must say that, in my. judgment, the law of England should be brought into line in this matter with that of Scotland and of the rest of the Commonwealth. The objection of a Minister, even though taken in proper form, should not be conclusive.\n\nIf the court should be of opinion that the objection is not taken in good faith, or that there are no reasonable grounds for thinking that the production of the documents would be injurious to the public interest, the . court can override the objection and order production.\n\nIt can, if it thinks fit, call for the documents and inspect them itself so as to see whether there are reasonable grounds for withholding them : ensuring, of course, that they are not disclosed to anyone else. It is rare indeed for the court to override the Minister's objection, but it has the ultimate power, in the interests of justice, to do so. After all, it is the judges who are the guardians of justice in this land; and if they are to fulfil their trust, they must be able to call on the Min.ister to put forward his reasons so as to see if they outweigh the interest of justice.\"\n\nThe privilege based not on their contents but on the class G to which the documents belonged was held to be not acceptable.\n\nOn balance however the Court of Appeal upheld the privilege in the light of the above observations.\n\n(1) [1964) l All. E.R. 717.\n\n(2) [1964] 3 All. E.R. 354.\n\n(3) [1965] l All. E.R .. 186 .\n\n1358 SUPREMB COURt REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.C.R.\n\nIt is interesting to notice here the recommendation made by the General Council of the Bar in England in a memorandum issued by it in February, 1956 after a critical examination of the decision in Duncan's case (supra). In para 15 of that memorandum the Council recommended thus :\n\n\"We therefore recommend-\n\n(I) A departmental head seeking the exclusion of any evidence should be required to state in his affidavit whether tpe adduction of such evidence would be pre-judicial to the national security, including diplomatic relations, or some other head of public interest, which he should specify.\n\n(2) In either case the departmental head should be required to state whether the evidence would be so prejudicial when adduced in open or in closed court.\n\n(3) Where his claim to privilege is based on ground of national security it should be conclusive.\n\n(4) Where his claim is based on grounds of public interest other than national security it should be examinable by the court.\n\n(5) The court should be given power to order a hearing or partial hearing in closed court on the ground that publication of . any evidence to be given in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the national safety or the national interest. •\n\n(Vide Appendix 4 to 'Law and Orders, by C.K. Allen, 2nd Edn.)\n\nLord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir also made 'a statement on June 6, 195_6 in the House of Lords on the question of Crown privilege arising out of the decision in Duncan's case (supra). In the course of that statement after referring to the two grounds on which\n\n• -\n\nS.P. CiUP!A v. UNION (J!enkataramiah, J.) 1359 • privilege could be claimed according to Duncan viz. (a) that the disclosure of the particulardocument would injure public interest e.g. by endangering public security or prejudicing diplomatic relations and (b) that the document fell within a class which the public interest required to be withheld from production, Lord Kilmuir stated thus:\n\n\"The claiming of Crown privilege on the first ground that I have mentioned has always been acceptable to the courts and public opinion. Where, however, the claim has been made on the ground that the document belongs to a class, especially, in proceedings where the Crown's position seems very like that of an ordinarily litigant, it has been criticised on the ground that the administration of justice is itself a matter of public interest and should be weighed against the other head of public interest, that is, 'the proper functioning of the public service.'\n\nThe reason why the law sanctions the claiming of Crown privilege on the 'class' ground is the need to secure freedom and candour of communication with and within the\" public service, so that Government decisions can be taken on the best advice and with the fullest information. In order to secure this it is necessary that the class of documents to which privilege applies should be clearly settled, so that the person giving advice or information should know that he is\n\ndoing so in confidence. Any system whereby a document falling within the class might, as a result of a later decision, be required to be produced in evidence, would destroy that confidence and undermine the whole basis of class privilege, because there would be no certainty at the time of writing that the document would not be disclosed.\n\nIt is sometimes suggested that a claim for privilege on the class basis should be referred to and decided by a judge. This suggestion goes much further than the position in Scotland, where the power of the judge is only exercisable 'in very special circumssances' and does not permit any examination of the ground of the\n\nSUPREME COURT RllPORTS [1982] s.c.k.\n\nclaim. This ground namely, 'the proper functioning of the public service', must in our view be a matter for a Minister to decide, with his knowledge of govern ment and responsibility to Parliament, rather than for a Judge.\n\nA Judge assesses the importance of a particular document in the case that he is hearing, and his incli nation would be to allow or to disallow a claim for privilege according to the contents and the relevance of the document, rather than to consider the effect on the public service of the disclosure of the class of documents to which it belongs. The result would be that the same kind of document would sometimes be protected and sometimes disclosed, which would, as I have said, be destructive of the whole basis of the class privilege.\n\nI would emphasise that claims of Crown privilege are made in respect <Jf all documents falling within the class, irrespective of whether 0heir production would be favourable or unfavourable to the Crown's interests.\n\nAll Crown lawyers are familiar with cases in which the Crown's interests have in fact been prejudiced by the application of the rule.\n\nThe proper way to strike a balance between the needs of litigants and those of Government administration is, in our opinion, to narrow the class as much as possible by excluding from it those categories of documents which appear to be particularly relevant to litigation and for which the highest degree of confidentiality is not required in the public interest.\"\n\n(Vide Appendix 4 to 'Law and Orders' by C.K. Allen, 2nd Edition pp. 467-468)\n\nThe three decisions of the Court of Appeal nferred to above which had been decided by Lord Denoning M.R., Harman and Salmon, L.JJ. came up for consideration again before the Court of Appeal in\n\n.. I\n\n• -\n\nU•. GtJl>t'A v. tJ1'llON (Venkataramlah, J.) 1361\n\nConvay v. Rimmer (1) consisting of Lord Denning, M.R. Davies and Russell, L. JJ.. The relevant facts of this case were these. The plaintiff, a probationer police constable was prosecuted by a Superin tendent in the constabu.la.ry on a. charge of stealing an electric torch belonging to another probationer constable. The prosecution failed and the plaintiff was acquitted but soon afterwards he was dismissed from the police force as unlikely to become an efficient police officer. The piaintiff sued the Superintendent for malicious prosecution. On discovery in the action the Home Secretarv claimed Crown privilege for a class of documents which included the probationary reports relating to the plaintiff and the report leading to his prosecution; the privilege was claimed on the ground that discovery, of documents of that class would be contrary or injurious to the public interest. The claim of privilege was in proper form. It was not suggested that the claim was not taken in good faith or . that the Home Secretary was mistaken in thinking the documents to be of the class stated. The Registrar of the Court directed the defendant to produce the documents. But Browne, J. allowed the appeal by the defendant and the Attorney General and disallowed the claim for discovery. It is\n\n0 this order which was questic; med before the Court of Appeal. In this case, Lord Denning who was in the minority directed the production of the documents. The other two learned Judges, however, felt that Duncan's case (supra) could not be departed from by the Court of Appeal and that the observations in the three cases referred to above questioning the validity of the privilege based on the class to which the particular document belonged were not binding Davies L.J. with whom Russell L.J. agreed observed at pp. 1271;.72 thus :\n\n\"I turn now to the 1964 trilogy of cases, namely, Merricks v. Nott-Bower [1964] I All B.R. 717; Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2) [1964] 3 All B.R. 354; and Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry of Housing and Local Goyernrnent [1965] I All E. R. 186, men tioned earlier in this judgment and decided in this Court by the same trinity of judges, viz. LORD DEN-\n\nNING, M.R., HARMON and SALMON, L.JJ.. The judgments in those cases are, of course, most weighty and most interesting; but, within the greatest respect, .\n\nI cannot accept them as decisions that English Law is other than I have suggested that it is.\n\nSome general\n\n(I) [1967] 2 All, E.R. l~O.\n\n\n[ 1982J 2 S.C.R\n\nobservations may be made about those cases. In the first place, in not one of them did the court order production of the documents in question or itself inspect them; so that, whethr or not the observations made in those cases were obiter, as in that state of affairs I am inclined to think that they were, the Crown had no opportunity of challenging in the House of Lords the validity of the views expressed in this Court. Secondly, in each case the court was much exercised about the form and sufficiern:y of the Minister's certificate or affidavit.\n\nIn the present case no such question arises.\n\nThird, all those decidons proceeded on the basis that then: was a difference or dichotomy, as HARMAN, L.J: called it in Re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2) [1964] 3 All E.R at pp. 364, 365 between contents cases and class cases; though it would appear that SALMON, L.J. would make a sub-division between high \"class\" cases ar.d low \"class\" cases (See [1964) 3 All E.R. at pp. 370 2, nd 371). I am bound to say that I can see no logical distinction, though there obviously may be a practical one, between high. class cases and low class cases, any more than there is between class cases and contents cases. Fourth, all of the judgments proceeded on the basis that the observations of VISCOUNT SIMON in Duncan's case [1942] 1 All E.R. 587 as to class cases were obiter and wrong.\n\nFifth, very little weight was attached in any of those cases to the decision in Auten v. Rayner [1958] 3 All E.R. 566. Finally all the judges were ei•ercised in their minds as to desirability of the law of England in this respect being the same as that of Scotland and of Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.\n\nWhether the Jaw in those Commonwealth countries, whose courts are, of course, in'fluenced by Robinson\n\nv. State of South Australia (No. 2) [1931] All E.R.\n\nRep. 333; is precisely the same as the Jaw of Scotland, as laid down in Glasgow Corpn. v. Central Land Board 1956 S.C. (H.L.) l is, perhaps, open to doubt.\n\nThat it is desirable that the law on this important constitutional matter should be the same every where is beyond question: but, in my judgment, the only tribunal in this country which can achieve that object is the House\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1363\n\nof Lords, who now have the power to alter or vary the decision at which, as I have said,, in my opinion they arrived in Duncan's case [1942] 1 All E. R . 587'' .\n\nThe appeal was dismissed in accordance with the opinion of the majority.\n\nThe clock was thus again put back by the Court of Appeal.\n\nConwa}\"s case (supra) was taken up in appeal before the House of Lords in Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (1) After a review of a number of decisions which had been rendered before Duncan's case including Robinson's case decided by the. Privy Council and the decisions of the Court of Appeal subsequent to the decision in Duncan's case, the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.\n\nIt directed that-the documents in question should be produced before the Court which had called them for its inspection and if it was found that disclosure would not be prejudicial to the public interest or that such possible prejudice would be insufficient to justify nondisclosure, an order for disclosure of the reports should .be made.\n\nIt is important to note that in this case one Lord after another rejected the contention that the possibility of future disclosure would affect'candour. Lord Reid observed at page 881: \"So far as I know, however, no one has ever suggested that public safety has been endangered by the candour or completeness of such reports having been inhibited by the fact that they may have to be produced if the interest of the due administration of justice should ever require production at any time.\" Lord 'Morris observd at page 891 : \"In many decided c!J.ses, however, there have been references to a suggestion that if there were knowledge that certain documents (e g. reports) might in some circumstances be seen by eyes for which they were never intended the result would be that in the making of similar documents in the future, candour would be lacking. Here is a suggestion of doutful validity. Would the knowledge that there was a remote chance of possible enforced production really affect candour ? If there was knowledge that it was conceivably possible that some person might himself see a report which was written about him, it might well be that candour on the part of the writer of the report would be encouraged rather than frustrated.\n\nThe law is ample in its protection of thoy wlw r~ hoqst in reordin~\n\n(1) [1968] l All. ER ~74 ftL 0\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.tt.\n\nopinions which they are under a duty to express.\n\nWhatever may 1 be the strength or the weakness of the suggestion to which I have referred it seems to me that a court is as well and probably better qualified than any other body to give such significance to it as the circumstances of a particular case may warrant.\" Lord Hodson observed at page 904 : \"It is strange if civil servoots alone are supposed to be unable to be candid in their statements made in the course of duty without the protection of an absolute privilege denied other fellow subjects\". Lord Pearce said at page 912: \"There are countless teachers at schools and universities, countle>s emplo . yers of labour who write . candid reports unworried by the outside chance of disclosure ... \" Lord Upjohn obsered at pages 914-915 : \"The reason for this privilege .js that it would be quite wrong and entirely inimical to the proper functioning of the publlc service if the public were to learn of these high level communications, however, innocent of the prejudice to the State the actual Contents of any particular document might be, that is obvious. It has nothing whatever to do, however, with candour or uninhibited/ freedom of expression, I cannot believe that any Minister or any high level military or civil servant would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views in the course of his duty on some subject such as even the personal qualifications and delinquencies of some colleague, by the thought that his obserations might ne day see the light of the day.\" Commenting on this decision, H.W.R. Wade wrote : \"Their Lordships heaped withering criticism upon this class \"principle\" which is that complete cll!sses of official reports and documents ought tci be kept secret, at whatever cost to the interests of litigants, merely because otherwise there would not be \"freedom and candour of communication with and within the public service\" (Vide 'Crown Privilege Controlled at Last' by H.W.R. Wade [1968] 84 The Law Quarterly Reviewp. 171 at 172).\n\nDuncan's case (supra) stood accordingly modified.\n\n- In Rogers v. Home Sercetary(1), the appellant required the production of a certain Jetter written about him to the Gaming Board for Great Britain which had the duty to make unusually extensive inquiries not only into the capacity and diligence of all applicants for licences to maintain gaming establishments but. also into their character, reputation and financial standing and any other circumstances appearing to the Board to be relevant before issuing\n\n(1)1t1973~ A.(:. 386.\n\n• -\n\ns.P, GUPTA v. U_NION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1365\n\nlicences under the Gaming Act, I 968.\n\nApplications made by a Company of which the appellant was a director.had been refused by the Board. It was the custom of the Board to obtain confidential information about applicants from the police. The appellant said that there came into bis possession from an anonoymous source a copy of a letter written about him to the Board by Mr. Ross, Assistant Chief Constable of Sussex.\n\nObviously this letter had been . abstracted by improper means from the files of the Board or of the\n\nPolice~ The appellant said that this letter contained highly damaging libellous statements about. him and that he wished to take proceedings to clear his reputation.\n\nThe means he chose for doing that was to seek to prosecute Mr. Ross for criminal libel.\n\nTo succeed he had to prove the letter. So he applied for its produc tion. The Attorney-General opposed the summons and he succeeded. The House of Lqrds in appeal in the above case upheld the privilege. Lord Reid observed in the course of his speech at pages 400-401 thus :-\n\n\"The ground but forward has been said to be Crown privilege.\n\nI think that that expression is wrong and may be misleading.\n\nThere is no question of any pri vilege in the ordinary sense of the word. The real question is whether the public interest requires that letter shall not be produced and whether that public interest is so strong as to override the ordinary right and interest of a litigant that he shall be able 'to lay before a court of. justice all relevant evidence.\n\nA Minister of the Crown is always an appropriate and often the most appropriate person to ass'ert this public interest, and the evidence or advice which to he gives the court is always valuable and may some times be indispensable. But, in my view, it must always be open to any person interested to rai<e the question and there may be cases where the trial judge should himself raise the question if no one else has done so.\n\nIn the present case the question of public . interest, was raised by both the Attorney- General and the Gaming Board. In my judgment both . were entitled to raise the. matter. Indeed I think that in the circumstances it Wl;\\S the duty of the board\n\nto do as they hav~ gon~., . · \" · · · \" ,\n\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R,\n\nThe claim in the present case is not based on . the nature of the contents of this particular letter. It is based on the fact that the board cannot adequately perform their statutory duty unless they can preserve the confidentiality of all communications to them regarding the character, reputation or antecedents of applicants for their consent.\n\nClaims for \"class privilege\" were fully considered by this House in Conway v, Rimmer (1968) A.C. 910. It was made clear that there is a heavy burden of proof on any authority which makes such a •claim.\n\nBut the possibility of establishing such a claim was not ruled out. I venture to quote what.I said in that\n\ncase at p. 952 :\n\n\"There may be special reasons for withholding some kinds of routine documents, but I think\n\nthat the proper test to be applied is to ask, in the language of Lord Simon in Duncan v. Cam mell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) A.C. 624, 642, whe ther the withholding of a document because it belongs to a particular class is really 'necessary' for the proper functioning of the public .service.\"\n\nI do not think that \"the public service\" should be construed narrowly. Here the question is whether the 'Yithholding of this class of documents is really neces sary to enable the board adequately to perform its statutory duties. If it is, then we 11re enabling the will of Parliament to be-carried out.\"\n\nIn a latter case before the House of Lords i.e. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England,(1 ) it was again laid down that there was no rule of law that a claim by the Crown the grounds of public interest for immunity from production of a class of docu ments of a high level of public importance was conclusive and that the. Court had the power to inspect the documents before deciding. whether they should be disclosed after balancing the competing interests of preventin, g harm to the State or ; the public ervice by\n\n(I) (1979] 3 All. E.R. 790.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkatarami(lh, J.) 't'f67\n\ndisclosure and preventing frustration of the administration of justice by withholding disclosure.\n\nIn the last decision of the House of Lords to which our attention is drawn i e. Science Research Council v. Nasse,(2) the question as to how for confidentiality could be a ground for claiming privilege in respect of any document arose for consideration. That case arose out of disputes between two employees and their employers which wer~ raised before the Industrial Tribunal. The emplo yees' complaint was that they had been discriminated against by their'. employers in the course of their employment.\n\nBfore the Tribunal they were called upon for production of some documents. The Court of Appeal had allowed appeal of the employers holding that if the documents were disclosed it would be in gross breach of faith and could lead to .industrial trouble. Dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords held that while no principle of public interest immunity protected such confidential documents and that they were. not immune from discovering by reason of confidentiality alone, the Tribunal in the free exercise of its discretion to order discovery should have regard to the fact that they were confidential and that discovery would be a breach of confidence, so that accordingly, relevance alone though a necessary ingredient did not provide an automatic test for discovery, the uJimate test being whether discovery was necessary for disposing fairly of the proceedings and in order to decide whether it was n.ecessary, the tribunal should inspect the documents considering whether special measures such as \"covering.up\" or bearing in camera should be adopted. Dealing with the rule of 'public interest immunity' claimed by a1person who is called upon to produce any document,. Lord Scarman observed in the above case thus:\n\n\"Whatever may be true generaliy of the categories of 'public interest, the \"public interest immunity,\" which prevents documents from being produced or evidence from being given is restricted, and is not, in my judgment, to be extended either by demanding ministers or by the courts.\n\nAnd, though I agree with my noble and learned friend, Lord Edmund- Davies, in believing t411t l\\ court may ref11e t<? wdc;:r .\n\n(1) [1980J A.C. 1028.\n\n\nI 1982) 2 S.C.R\n\nproduction of a confidential document if it takes the view that justice does not require its production, I do not see the process of decision as a balancing act. If the document is necessary for fairly disposing of the case, it must be produced notwithstanding its confidentiality. Only if the document should be protected by public interest immunity, will there be a a balancing act. And then the balance will not be \"between \"ethical or social\" values of a confidential relationship involving the public interest and the document's relevance in the litigation, but between the public interest represented by the State and its public service, i.e., the executive government, and the public interest in the administration of justice : see Lord Reid. Thus my emphasis would be different from that of my noble and learned friends.. \"Public interest immunity\" is, in my judgment restricted .to what must be kept secret for the protection of government at the highest levels and in the truly sensitive areas of executive responsibility.\"\n\nIn England, accoding to Prof. S.A. De Smith, as matters now stand \"a government department can seldom expect to succeed in a claim based solely on prospective deteriment. to that facet of the public interest which requires candid expressions of opinion within the public service. In any event the court will prefer to rest a decision to exclude evidence on a more general ground than \"Crown privilege\" -e.g. that it is contrary to the public interest to require the disclosure in legal proceedings of information obtained in con fidence for a limited purpose. Courts are likely to accept without question a Minister's certificate that disclosure would be injurious to national security or diplomatic relations, or that the document relates to Cabinet proceedings; but in any marginal case they can be expected to insist on privately inspecting the documents or classes of documents and then rejecting claims to exclude evidence of \"'routine\" matters but ac<;:epting claims to exclude documents referring to matters of high policy. It is doubtful whether any material distinction is now to be drawn between \"contents\" claims and \"class\" claims.\"\n\nThe scope of the powers of courts in England where a claim to privilege is made is also explained at para 90 in Volume 13 of\n\n...\n\n...\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1369\n\nHalsbury's. Laws of England, (Fourth Edition) thus :\n\n\"90. Powers of court-The decision whethr to allow or reject the claim to Crown privilege, and if so to what extent, is and remains the decision of the court, an.d the view of the political minister that the production or disclosure of documents or information, whether because of their actual contents or because of the class of documents to which they belong is not conclusive. The court will give full weight to the .view . of the minister in every case, but it has and is. entitled to exercise a residual power, and indeed a duty, to examine the objection and the grounds raised by the minister to support his view that production would be injurious to the public interest. If, in spite of the certificate or affidavit ofthe minister, the court is satis fied that the objection is not taken bona fide or that the grounds relied on by the minister are insufficient or misconceived or not clearly expressed or that there .are no reasonable grounds for apprehending danger to the public interest, the court has a residual power to override the objection. For this purpose, the court is entitled to see the documents before ordering production, and the court can see the documents without their being shown to the parties, but the minister should have a right to appeal before the documents are in fact produced. '\n\nThe court will more readily uphold an objection on the ground of the contents of a .document, and for this purpose the minister need not go into any detail.\n\nBut where the minister raises the objection to production on the ground that the documents belong to a class the production of which would be injurious to to the public interest, he must describe with .some particularity the nature of the class and the reasons why they should not be disclosed.. For this purpose the proper test to be applied . is whether the withholding of a document because it belongs to a particular class is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service, and the term \"public\n\nservice\" in this context should not be construed\n\nSUPREME coufl'i' REPORfS It 98~} 2 s.c.ii..\n\nnarrowly. In considering a claim to Crown privilege in relation to a class of documents, the fact that the documents were communicated in confidence to the Crown is a very material consideration, but neverthe less the court may conclude that the public interest in such confidentiality is outweighed by the public interest than they should be disclosed in the adm!nistration of justice.\"\n\nIn Australia too the very same pos1t1on prevails. It is sufficient to refer to the observaions of Gibbs, A.C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Sankey v. Whit/an & Ors.(1} decided in November, 1978 at page 542 which are as follows :\n\n\"What are now equally well es'tablished are the respective roles of the court and of those usually the Crown\n\nwho assert Crown privilege.\n\nA claim to Crown privilege has no automatic operation; it always remains the function of the Court to determine upon. thai claim. The claim, supported by whatever material may be thought approprfate to the occasion does no more than draw 'to the court's attention what is said to be the entitlement to the privilege and provide the court with material which may assist it in determining whether .or not Crown privilege should be accorded.\n\nA claim to the privilege is not essential to the invoking of Crown privilege. In cases of defence secrets, matters of diplomacy or affairs of government at the highest level, it will often appear readily enough that the balance of public interest is against disclosure. It is in these areas that even in the absence of any claim to Crown privilege (perhaps because the Crown is not a party and may be unaware of what is afoot) a court, readily recognizing the proffered evidence for what it is, can as many authorities establish of its own motion enjoin its disclosure in court. Just as a claim is not essential neither is it ever con'clusive although, in the areas which I have instanced the court's acceptance of the claim may often be no more than a matter of\n\n(I) 21 A.L.R. SOS.\n\nS; P. GUPTA v. tJNioN (Venkataramiah, ).) 1371\n\nform. It is not conclusive because the function of the court once it beeomes aware of the existence of material to which Crown privilege may apply is always to determine what shall be done in the light of how best the public interest may be served, how least it will be injured.\"\n\nIn Canada the prevailing view of law appears to be the same as stated above . as can be seen from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Snider(1) in which Rand, J. has stated thus :\n\n\"Once the nature,.general or specific as the case may be, of documents or the reasons against its disclosure, are shown, the question for the Court is whether they might, on any ratio.oat view, either as to their contents or the fact of their existence be such that the public interest . requires that they should not be revealed ; if they are capable of austaining such an interest, and a Minister of the Crown avers its existence, than the Courts must accept his decision.\n\nOn the other hand, . if the facts, as in the example before us, show that, in the ordinary case, no such interest can exist, then such a declaration of the Minister must be taken to have been made under a misapprehension and be !· disregarded. To eliminate the Courts in a function with which the tradition of the common law has invested them and to hold them subjct to any opinion formed, rational or irrational by a member of the Executive to the prejudice, it might be, of the lives of private individuals, is not in harmony with the basic conceptions of our polity. But I should add that the consequences of the exclusion of a document for reasons of pub.Jic interest as it may affect the interest of an accused person are not in question here and no implication is intended as to what they may be ..\n\nWhat is secured by attributing to the Courts this preliminary detetermination of possible prejudice is protection against Executive encroachments upon the\n\nadministration of justice ; and in the present trend of ~\n\n. (1) [1954] 40.L.R. 489,\n\n1372 SUPREME COURT llEPORtS\n\n(1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\ngovernment little can be ;-more essential to the maintenance of individual security.\n\nIn this important matter, to relegate the Courts to such a subserviency as is suggested would be to withdraw from them the confidence of fodependence and judicial appraisal that so far appear to have served well the organization of which we are the heirs. These are considerations which appear to me to follow from the reasoning of the Judicial Committee in Robinson v. South Australia,\n\n(1931) A.C, 703.\"\n\nIn the United States of America, the question relating to the limits of executive privilege came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison(1) probably for the first time.\n\nIn that case William Marbury and three others severally moved the U.S. Supreme Court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State for the United States, to show cause as to why a manda_mus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as Justices of the Peace in the District of Columbia. In the affidavit fi, led in support of the petition they pleaded that Ar1ams the former President had nominated the applicants to tbe Senate for their advice and consent to be appointed J_ustices of the Peace ; that the Senate advised and consented to the appointments, that commissions in due form were signed by the said President appointing them Justices, that the seal of the urated States was in turn affixed to the said commissions and that Madison had declined to cause them to be delivered even though they had acquired the right to the offices. In the course of the proceedings certain questions were put to the Attorney-General Levi Lincoln relating to the Commissions and where they had been kept and on objection being raised to the questions the court said that 'if Mr. Lincoln wished time to consider what answers he should make, they would give him time, but they had no doubt he ought to answer. There was nothing confidential to be disclosed.\n\nIf there had been he was not obliged to answer it ; and if he thought that anything was communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was he obliged to state anything. which would criminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions had been in the office or not, could not be\" a confidential fact; it is a fact\n\n(1) 5 U.S. 137.\n\n·~\n\n•.'l. !i.P. OtJPTA v. tJNto!'I (Venkataramtah, i.) 1373\n\nwhich all the world have a right to know. If h~ thought any of the questions improper, he might state his.objections'.\n\nIn United States v. Burr(4) Chief Justice Marshall ruled:\n\n\"thBt the President of the United States may be subpoenaed and examined as a witness and required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted. The President, although subject to the general rules. which apply to others, i; nay have sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its production.\n\nI can readily conceive that the President might receive a letter which would be improper to exhibit in public, because of the manifest inconvenience of its exposure. The occasion for demanding it ought,· in such a case, be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court before its production could be insisted on.\"\n\nAccording to Wigmore the scope of the privilege in America, beyond secrets in the military or international sense is by no means clearly defind. Paragraph 2379 in Volume. VIII of Wigmore on 'Evidence' reads : ·\n\n\"Same : Who determines the Necessity for Secrecy.\n\nSo far as the privilege has legitimate scope, it raises the question how the existence of the facts which make it applicable is to be determined. If it extends only (as its just limits prescribe) to matters involving international negotiati6ns or military precautions against a foreign enemy, the presence of such matters in the documents . or com, nmnications sought to be disclosed must by some authority be predetermined, before the privilege can be deemed applicable. If it extends to the larger scope indicated by the English rulings, still the existense of a necessity for secrecy must be in each instance declared.\n\nWho shall make this deter- . minations ? ------------\n\n(1) 25 Feb. Cas, 187 (No. 14694) (Cir. ct. Va )807)\n\n1314 st.Jt>llEME COURT REPORTS (19821 2 s.c.il.\n\nObviously, and by aQalogy with other privileges, the Court (ante, 2193 2271, 2322; post, 2550). But the judg1.: (urges the learned in cum bent of that office, in Beatson v. Skene (1).\"woulQi be unable to determine it without ascertaining what the document was,\"- surely an unavoidable process; which inquiry,\" however' it is added, \"cannot take place in private,\" -a singular assumption. It would rather seem that the siinple and natural process of determination was precisely such a private perusal by the judge. Is it to l?e said that even this much of disclosure 9annot be trusted ? Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the secret, and not the presiding officer of Justice ? Can- . not the constitutionally coordinate body of government share the confidence ? It is ludicrous to observe a Chief Magistrate, as in Beatson v. Skene, solmenly protesting his incompetence to share the knowledge of a fact which had never been secret at all and had for months been spread abroad by the hundred tongues of scandal.\n\nThe truth cannot be escaped that a Court which abdicates its inherent function of determining the facts upon which the admissibilty of evidence depends'\n\nwill furnish to bureaucratic officials too ample . opportunities for abusing the privilege. The lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond any control, if its applicability. is left to the determination of the very official whose interest it may be to shield a wrongdoing under the privilege.\n\nBoth principle and policy demand that the determination of the privilege shall be for the Court; and this has been . insisted upon by the highest judicial personages both in England and the United States :\n\nConclusion : The privilege, when recognised, should therefore be subjected to the following limitations :\n\n(1) 5 H & N. 838.\n\nS.P. dtiP.TA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1315 ;\n\n(1) Any executive or administration regulation pur-\n\n, porting in general terms to authorise refusal to disclose official records in a particular department when duly requested as evidence in a court ' of justice should be deemed void (on the logic of 1355; 2195; ante). 8\n\n(2) Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential (ante 2378, n. 7) should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in court of justice.\n\n(3) The procedure in such cases should be : A letter of request (like a letter rogatory, ante,. 2195a) from the head of th_e Court to the head of the Department (accompa'lying the S!Jbpoena to the actual custodian), stating the circumstances of the litigation creating the need for the document ; followed (in case of refusal) by a reply from the Departmental head stating the circumstances deemed to justify the refusal ; and then a ruling by the Court, this ruling to be appealable and determinative of the privilege.\"\n\nWriting about the immunity claimed by President Nixon against the demand for disclosure of certain types of documents, Raoul Berger writes in his book entitled 'Executive Privilege : A Constitutional Myth' (1974) at page 264 thus:\n\n\"Candid interchange\" is yet another pretext fordoubtful secrecy. It will not explain Mr. Nixon's claim of blan-·\n\nket immunity for members of his White House staff on the basis of mere membership without more; it-will not justify Kleindienst's ass'ertion.of immunity from congressional inquiry for two and one-half million federal employees. It is merely another testimonial to the greedy expensivenes.s o.f power, the costs of which patently outweigh its benefits. As t!Je latest branch in a line of ille gitimate succession, it illustrates the .excesses bred by the claim of executive privilege. And in practice it has\n\n-··\n\nE •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (198.2] .2 s.C:.k.\n\nrealised Lord Pearce's pregnant observation ; ''What a complete lack of common sense a general blanket protection of wide class may yield\". Conway v.\n\nRimmer (1968] 1 All E.R. 874, 910. The problem will not be met by pruning a branch here and there; . the axe must be put to the root of a claim that is altogetbe r without constitutional warrant, leaving . it to the good sense of Congress and the people-and, if need be, the courts:-to work out an accommodation for such matters as confidential communications between .the President and his immediate advisers, excluding any communications with respect to illegal acts. To leave it with the executive branch to decide is to court more of the \"horrors\" revealed by recent history\".\n\nProfessor Arthur Schles'inger Jr. States : \"The secrecy system has become much less a means by which Government protects national security than a means by which the Government safeguards its reputation, dissembles its purposes, buried its mistakes, mani pulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself\" (Quoted by Curt Mathews, St. Lewis Post-Despatch Feb. 26, 1973, sec. l-12B p. I).\n\nNow a few words about the legitimacy of the rule of 'official secrecy' may be mentioned. The tendency in all the dornocratic countries in recent times is to liberalise the restrictions placed on the right of the citizens to know what is happening in the various public offices. The emphasis now is more on the right of a citizen to know than on his 'need to know' the contents of official docum::nts. It is pertinent to refer to the practice prevailing in Sweden. In his article entitled 'Laws on Acces to Official Documents', Donald C. Rowat writes :-\n\n\"When I visited Sweden in 1973 to study its unique system of openness, I was lucky enough to accompany a reporter who worked for the Swedish national press agency, as he made his daily rounds of three government departments. To my amazement, all incoming and outgoing documents and mail were laid out in a special press room in each department for an hour every morning for reporters to examine. If any\n\n~--\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1377\n\nreporter wanted further information on a case, he simply walked down th.e hall to. look at the department's flies.\n\nNo special permission was needed.\n\nSuch a system of open access is so alien to the tradition of secrecy else where as to be almost unbelievble.\n\nSweden's long experience with the principle of openness indicates that it changes the whole spirit in which public business is conducted. It causes a decline in public suspicion and distrust of officials, and this in turn gives them a greater feeling of confidence.\n\nMore important, it provides a much more solid foundation for public debate, and gives citizens in a democracy a much firmer control over their government.\".\n\n(Vide Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.\n\nXXV, No . .4; OctoberDecQmber, 1979 lit pages\n\n. C)90·991)\n\nThe position In Sweden l!Ppe11rs tQ represent an extreme i:3se of openqess of !ldministr; ltive proges~,\n\nMax Weber (1864-1920) who was very critical of the rule of official secrecy observed :\n\n\"Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.\n\nBureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of \"secret sessions\": in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and actions from criticism. The treasury officials of the Persian Shah have made a secret doctrine of their budgetary art and even use secret script. The official statistics of Prussia, in general, make public only what cannot do any harm to the intentions of the powerwielding bureaucracy.\n\nThe tendency towards secrecy in certain administrative fields follows their material nature : everywhere that the power interests of the domination structure towards the outside are at stake, whether it is an economic competitor of a private enterprise or a foreign potentially hostile polity, we find secrecy. The pure interes~ of the\n\n1378.\n\n\n(19S2] 2 S.C.R.\n\nbureaucracy in power, however, is efficacious far beyond those areas where purely functional interests make for secrecy. The concept of the \"Official Secret\"\n\nis the specific iti vention of the bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude, which cannot be substantially justified ' beyond these specifically qualified areas. In facing a parliament the bureaucracy, out of a sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or from interest groups. The socalled rights of parliamentary investi gation is one of the means by which parliament seeks such knowledge. Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament at least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with !he bureaucracy's interests.\"\n\n(H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans.), from Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948, pp. 233-4) (By courtesy of Dr. S.R.\n\nMaheshwari).\n\nIn India many intellectuals have always thought that as far as possible there should be openness in administration. Opposing the Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill which came up for discqssion in the Imperial Legislative Assembly in March, 1903, Gopal Krishna Gokhale pleaded : .\n\n\"The proper and only remedy worthy of the British Government is not to gag newspapers as proposed in this Bill but to discourage the issue of confidential circulars which seek to take away in the dark what has been promised again and again in Acts of Parliament, the Proclamations of Sovereigns and the responsible utterances of successive viceroys. From the standpoint of the rulers; no less than of the ruled, it will be most unfortunate if Indian papers were thus debarred from writing about matters which agitate the Indian community most.\n\nWhat happened, for instance, last year when those circulars .were published ? For sometime before their publication, the air was thick with the\n\nrµmour that Government had issued orc; lers to shut out\n\n~-.\n\n•, S.P. OUP'rA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, _J.) 1379 . ,,\n\n''Indians. from 'all •posts in the Railways Department, carrying a salary of 'Rs. 30 and upwar!ls a month. It was impossible to ; believe a statement of this kind, but it was not possible to contradict it effectively when It was practically on every tongue. The damage done to the prestige -of the Government was considerable and it was only when the circulars were published that the exact position came to be understood. The circulars as they stood, were bad enough in all conscience but they were not so bad as the public had believed them to '.be. What was laid down in them was not that Indians were to be shut out from all appointments higher than Rs. 30 a month but that Eurasians and Europeans were to have, so far as practicable, a preference in making appointments to such posts. The fear.that such lamentable departures from the avowed . policy of Government might be dragged into the light of day, acts at present as an effective check on the adoption of unjust measures, and I think it will have a disastrous effect on the course of administration ; if this check were to be done away with and nothing better_ substituted in its place.\"\n\n(Abstract of the. Proceedings of the Council of the E Governor General of India Assembled for the purpose of Making Laws and Regulations, Vol. XLII, 1903, pages 280-281) .\n\n. Saiyad Muhammad and Asutosh Mukherjee also opposed the Bill. '.Those speeches gave ample .support to the movement which stood for the' freedom of the press in India.\n\nFew persons have the vision of these great leaders. The need for making access to information about the activities of Government more liberal has been explained .by Dr. S.R Maheshwari in the book entitled ''.Open\n\nGovernment in India\" (1981) at pp. 95~96 thus:\n\n\"Administrative India puts the greatest weight on keepinghappenings within its corridors secret, thereby denying the citizens access to information about them.\n\nSuch orientations produce deep contradictions in larger sociospolitical system of t4e land which itself js\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS (1982j 2 S.C.R.\n\nin a state requiring nourishment and care. As the latter is still relatively new and in its infancy, its growth processes inevitably get retarded for want of information about the Government,· which means from the Government. Over-concealment of governmental information creates a communi\".ation gap between the governors and the governed, and its persistence beyond a point is apt to create an alienated citizenry. This makes democracy itself weak and insecure.\n\nBesides, secrecy renders administrative accountability unenforceable in an effective way and thus induces administrative behaviour which is apt to degenerate into arbitrariness and absolutism. This is not all.\n\nThe Government, today,· is called upon to make policies on an ever increasing range of subjects, and many of these policies must necessarily impinge on the lives of the citizens. - It may sometimes happen that the data made available to the policy. makers is of a selective nature, and even the policy-makers and their advisers may deliberately suppress certain viewpoints and favour others. Such bureaucratic habits get encouragement in an environment of secrecy and openness in governmental work is possibly the only effective corrective to it, also raising, in the process, the quality of decision-making. Besides, openness has an educational role in as much citizens are enabled to acquire a fuller view. of the pros and cons of matters of major importance, which naturally helps in building informed public opinion, no less than goodwill for the Government.\"\n\nIt may be necessary to deal_ with the question f official secrecy in greater detail in a case where the constitutionality of the claim for official secrecy, independently of the power of the Court to order discovery of official documents in judicial proceedings, arises for consideration. We are concerned in this case \"'.ith the power of the Court to direct thQ disclosure of official documents in judicial\n\nproceedins.\n\nS.P. GUPTA:V. lJ.NlON (Venkataramiah, n 1381\n\nWe shall now turn to the Indian law. In the State of Punjab v . . Sodhi Sukhdev Singh,(1) a Constitution Bench of this C'mrt had occasion to examine the limits of the privilege of the Government in the light of sections 123 and 162 of the Indian Evidence 'At, 1872.\n\nSection 123 reads :\n\n\"l 23.\n\nNo one shalL be permitted .to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.\"\n\nSection l 6i-reads : ..\n\n\"162. A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to\n\nCourt, notwithstanding any objection which there may D. be to its production or to its .admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided\\ on by the Court.\n\nThe Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take E other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility ..\n\nIf for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret, unless the document is to be given in evidence ; and, if the interpreter disobeys such direction, be hall be held to have committed an offence under section l 6) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ·( 45 of I 860).\"\n\nThe decision in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) was rendered in the light of the development of the law on the above question in England upto the year 1960. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority <:>bserved iQ that case at pages 393.395 thus t\n\n(1) (1961) 2 SCR 371,\n\n.1382\n\n\n[ 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\n\"Thus our conclusion is that reading ss. 123 and 162 together the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question. That is a matter for the authority concerned to decide ; but the Court is competent, and indeed is bound, to hold a preliminary enquiry arid determine the validity of the objections to its production, and that necessarily involves an enquiry into the quetion as to whether the evidence relates to an affair of State under s. 123 or not.\n\nIn this enquiry the Court has to determine the character or class of the document. If it comes to the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State then it should reject the claim for privilege and direct its production. If it comes to the conclusion that the document relates to the affairs of State it should leave it to the head of the department to decide whether he should permit its production or not. We are not impressed by Mr. Seervani's argument that the Act could not have intended that the head of the department would permit the production of a document which belongs to the noxious class. In our opinion, it is quite conceivable that even in regard to a document falling within the class of documents relating to affairs of State the head of the department may legitimately take the view that its disclosure would not cause injury to public interest. Take for instance the case of a document which came into existence quite sometime before its production ia called for in litigation; it is .not unlikely that the head of the department may feel that though the character of the document may theoretically justify his refusing to permit its production, at the time when its production is climed no public injury is likely to be caused. It is also possi- . hie that the head of the department may feel that the injury to public interest which the disclosure of the document may cause is minor or insignificant, indirect or remote ; and having regard to the wider extent of the direct injury to the cause of justice which may\n\nresult from its non-production he may decide to permit its production.\n\nJn exercising his discretion under s.\n\n• -\n\n.•\n\nS.P. GUPTA ... UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1383\n\n123 in many case the head of the department may have to weigh the pros.and cons of the problem and objectively determine the nature and extent of the injury to public interest as against the ijury to the adlI)inistration of justice. That is why we think it is not unreasonable to hold that section 123 gives discretion to the head of the department to permit the production , of a document even though its production may theoretically lead to some kind of injury to public interest.\n\nWhile construing ss. I 23 and I 62, it would be irrele-. vant t<t\"consider why the enquiry as to injury to public interest should no.t be within the jurisdiction of the Court, for that clearly is a matter of policy on which the Court does not and should not generally express any opinion.\n\nIn this connection it is necessary to add that the ·\n\nnatur~ and scope of the enquiry which, in our opinion, it is competent to the Court to hold under s. 162 would remain substantially the same whether we accept the wider or the narrower interpretatio 1 of the expression \"affairs of State\". In the former case the Court will decide whether the document falls in the class of innocuous or noxious documents ; if it finds that the document belongs to the innocuous class it will direct its production ; if it finds that the document belongs to the noxious class it will leave it to the discretion of the head of the department whether to permit its production or not. Even on the narrow construction of the expression \"affairs of State\" the Court will determine its character in the first instance ; if it holds that it does not fall within the noxious class which alone is included in the relevant expression on this view an order for its production will follow ; if the finding is\n\nthat it belongs to th.e noxious class the question about its production witr b\\: left to the 'discretion of the head of the department.\n\nWe have already stated how three views ate possible on th.is point. In our opinion Mr. Seervai's contention which adopts .one extreme position ignores the effect of s. 162, whereas the contrary p9itio~ w4i9~ js also xtrm\\: in char~~\\er\n\n~ . . ~\n\n1384 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nignores the provisions of s. 123. The view, which we are disposed to take about the 'authority and jurisdiction of the Court in such matters is based on a harmo~ ·\n\nnious construction of s. 123 and s. 162 read together ; it recognises the power conferred on the Court by cl . . (I) of s. 162, and also gives due effect to the discretion vested in the head of the department by s. 123.\"\n\nA similar question arose again before this Court in State of U.P. v. Raj Narain and Ors.(1) Ray, C.J. speaking for himself and Alagiris.wamy, Sarkaria and Untwalia, JLobserve.i&at pages 348-349 thus: ·\n\n\"The several decisions to which reference has already been made establish that the foundation of the law behind sections 123 and 163 of the Evidence Act is the same as in English law. It is that injury to public interest is the reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents w.hose contents if disclosed would injure public and national interest. Public interest which _ demands that evidence be withheld is to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should have the fullest possible access to all relevant materials.\n\nWhen public interest outweigh's the latter, the evidence cannot be admitted.\n\nThe court will proprio motu exclude evidenc:e the production of which is contrary to public interest. It is in public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded. The reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents.\n\nConfidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the contents contain material which it would be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the documents would be of class which demand protection. (See Rogers v. Home Secretary [1973] A.C, 388 at p. 405). To illustrate the class of documents would embrace Cabinet papers, Foreign Office despatches, papers regarding the security to the State and high level interdepartmental minutes. In the ultimate analysis the\n\n(I) [19?SJ 3 S.C.R. 333,\n\n9.P. GUPTA v. UNION. (Yenkatafamiah, J.) 1385\n\ncontents of the document are so 'described that it could be seen at once that in the public interest the documents 'are to be withheld. (See Merricks and Anr. v.\n\nNott Bower & Anr. [1964] All B.R. 717.\n\nIt is' now the well settled practice in our country that an o.bjection is raised by an affidavit affirmed by the head of the department. The Court .may also re- . quire a Minister to affirm an affidavit. That will arise in the course of the enquiry by the Court as to whether the document should be withheld from disclosure. If the Court is satisfied with the affidavit evidence that the document should be protected in public interest from production the matter ends there. If the- Court would yet like to satisfy itself the Court may see the document.\n\n\nIn his concurring judgment, Mathew, J: said at pages 359 and 361 thus: ·\n\n\"When a question of national secrity is involved, the\n\ncout may not be the proper forum to weigh the matter and that is the reason why a Minister's certificate is ., ' ,_ taken as conclusive. \"Those who .are responsible for •\n\n. I I , ) the nat10nal security must be the sole judges of what national security requires\".\n\nAs the executive is solely responsibly for national security including foreign relations, no other organ could judge so well of such matters. Therefore, documents in relation to these matters might fall into a class which per se might require protection. But the executive is not the organ solely responsible for public interest. It represents only an important element in it; but there are other elements.\n\nOne such element is the administration of justice. The claim of . the executive\n\nSUPlllMI! COURT R~PORTS [19821 2 s.c.k.\n\nto have exclusive and conclusive power to determine what is in public interest is a claim based on theassump tion that the executive alone knows what is best for the citizen. The Claim of the executive to exclude evidence is more likely to operate to subserve a partial interest, viewed exclusively from a narrow departmental angle.\n\nIi is impossible for it to see or gi'Ve equal weight to another matter, namely that justice should be done and seen to be done. When there are more aspects of public interest to be considered, the court will, with reference to the pending litigation, be in a better position to decide where the weight of public interest predominates.\n\nThe power reserved to the court is a power to order production even though public interest is to some extent prejudicially affected.\n\nThis amounts to a recognisation that more than one aspects of public interest will have to be surveyed. The interests of government for which the Minister speaks to not exhaust the whole public interest. Another aspect of that interest is seen in the need for impartial administration of justice. It seems reasonable to assume that a court is better qualified than the Minister to measure the importance of the public interest fn the case before it. The court has tp make an assessment of the relative claims of these different aspects of public interest.\n\nWhile there are overwhelming arguments for giving to the executive the power to determine what matters may prejudice public security, those arguments give no sanction to giving the executive an exclusive an power to determine what matters may affect public interest.\n\nOnce considerations of national security are left out, there are few matters public interest which cannot safely be discussed in public.\n\nThe administration itself knows of many classes of security documents ranging from those merely reserved for official use to those which can be seen only by a handful of Ministers of officials bound by oath of secrecy.\n\n,. • ' • \"' \"'.· ' 1 .. .\n\nS.P. GuPTA v. UNION .(Yenkatara,171iall, J.) 1387\n\nThere was some controversy as to whether -the Court can inspect the document for the purpose of coming to conclusion whether the docume.nt relates to affairs of state.\n\n\nIn England, it is now settled by the decision in Conway v. Rimmer [196~] 1 All B.R. 874 that there is resid_ual power in court to decide \"'.het4er the disclo sure of a document is in the interi)st of public and for that purpose, if necessary, to inspect the document, and that the statement of , the head of the department that the disclosure would injure public interest is not .final.\"\n\n' It seems that by this decision the law in India was brought.in line with the deciion of the House of Lords in Conway's case (supra).\n\nAfter hearing the arguments on the question of privilege, this Court directed the Government to submit .the documents i~ respect which privilege was claimed for its inspction. Those documents ii; icluded the .correspondence between the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi, the Chief Justice of India and the Minister of Law and Justice and some official notings relating to th~ question of reappointment of Shri S.N. Kumar as a Judge of the High Court of Delhi.\n\nThe above order was made as the documents in question had no concern with either the security of the State or with the diplomal.?S8 . - StJPllEME COURt REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.C.ll.\n\ntic relations between om country and any foreign country. They no doubt related to a 'high level' appointment, but it was felt by us that that fact by itself was not sufficient in the circumstances of the case to prevent the Court from directing the Government to produce the documents for its inspection before deciding the question of discovery.\n\nThe question whether these documents should be allowed. to be disclosed as prayed for by the parties concerned, depend upon our view.on the question whether such disclosure would subserve the publice interest. Iris accepted on all hands that the documents in question were 'high level' documents relating to the appointment of a Judge of a High Court and any order to be made on the question of disclosure had to be made after considering the pros and cons of all relevant matters. Having inspected the documents the Court had to consider whether their disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious, public or political criticism or whether the business of the Government would be exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of background or perhaps some axe to grind, as observed by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer (supra). The wise words of Lord Keith in Burmah Oil Co.' s case (supra) that the public interest might 'demand' though no doubt only in a very limited number of cases, that the inner working of government -should be exposed to public gaze, and there may be some, whowould regard this as likely to lead, not to captious or ill-informed criticism, but to criticism calculated to improve the nature of that working as affecting the individual citizen also had to be kept in view by the Court while dealing with this case. The Court had to strike a balance between the public interest in the proper functioning of the public service and the public interest in the administration of justice. The Court also considered whether the disclosure would lead to any other futher consequence of any body taking any further action on the basis of these documents.\n\nThe rµling in Riddick v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.(1) was also examined. In that case, Lord Denning has observed at page 75 thus :\n\n\"In order to encourage o.penness and fairness, the public interest requires that documents disclosed on discovery are not to be made use of except for the\n\n(I) [1977] W.L.R,63.\n\n. >- /\n\n.-.·,\n\nS.P: GUptA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) l3M\n\npurposesofthe •action in which they are disclosed . . They are not to be made a ground -for comments in'\n\nthe newspapers, nor for bringing a libel action, or for any other alien purpose. The principle was stated in a work of the highest authority 93 years ago by Bray J., Bray on Discovery, 1st ed. (1885), p. 238:\n\n\"A party who has obtained access to his adversary's documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents public or communicate them to any stranger. to the suit .. . . nor to use them or copies of them for any collateral object ...... If necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order ... \"\n\nSinqe that. time such an undertaking has always been D implied, as Jenkins J. said in Alterskye v. Scott (1948) 1 All E.R. 469, 471.\n\nA party who seeks discovery of documents gets it on condition that he will make use of them only for the purposes of that action, and no other purpose.\n\nThe modern authorities are well discussed by Talbot J. in Distillers Co. (Bichoimicals) Ltd. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1975) Q.B. 613, 621 and I would accept all he says, particularly as to the weighing of the public interest involved : see p. 625.\"\n\nOurs is an open society which has a government of the people, which has to be run according to the Constitution and the laws. The expression 'affairs of State' should, therefore, receive a very narro.w meanning.\n\nAny claim for interpreting .it with a wider connotation may expose section 123 of the Evidence Act to be challenged as being unconstitutional.\n\nIn this case the questions involved are (I) : Whether there was divergence or opinion between the opinion of the Chief' Justice of the Delhi High Court and the opinion of the Chief Justice of India ?\n\n(2) Whether the opinions expressed by them were relevant (or deciding the question of fitness of Shri S.N. Kumar for appointment as additional Judge or permanent Judge of the High Court of Delhi ? (3) Whether the consultations made under Article 217, (1)\n\n1390 SUPREME COURT RBPOilTS\n\n' ; .~ ' ,- 1. ,.._ (19821 2 s.c.R.\n\nwere proper ? (4) Whether the decision of the President not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge or permanent Judge could be characterised as perverse ? The pleadings in the , case naturally could not give us a complete picture in view of the secrecy involved in the process of recommendation and the claim of privilege made on behalf of the Government. The standing of the parties concerned to question the decision of the President was also raised apart from the question of non-justiciability of the issue itself.\n\nSince Shri S N. Kumar himself took active interesf in the litigation and asked for relief, the absence of locus stand! of Shri V.M. Tarkunde (the petitioner) did not matter much.\n\nOn the question of justiciability, we felt that an additional Judge who was not reappointed could move the Court for a direction to the Government to consider the question of his reappointment in a fair way for the reasons recorded else where in this judgment.\n\nWe felt that the issue involved the performance of a duty which was judicially identified and its breach was capable of judicial determination and that it was possible to grant relief; though in a limited way, if circumstances warranted_ it.\n\nWhen we considered the contentions of the parties against the background of the facts and . the important questions of constitutional law and their application involved in this case, we felt that a decision not to direct disclosure of the documents would result in graver public prejudice than the decision to direct such disclosure and that the public interest involved in the administration of justice should prevail over the public interest of the public service in the peculiar circumstances of the case. We also felt that in the circumstances of this case if disclosure was not ordered, there would be room for many undesirable conjectures and surmises about the entire process of consultation under Article 217 (I).\n\nAccordingly by our order made earlier in the course of these proceedings we directed the disclosure of the documents after careftilly consid_ering all11spects of the case including the weighty reasons of our learned brother Fazal Ali, J. to the contrary.\n\nPART IX\n\nThe next important and delicate question for consideration is whether the non-appointment of Shri S.N. Kumar .as an additional H Judge even though the arrears of work in the High Court of Delhi justified the _appointment of more number of Judges is legal and proper.\n\nArticle 217(1) of the Constitution which empowers the\n\n• -\n\ns. P. GUPTA V.· UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1391\n\nPresident to appoint Judges of High Courts does not make any distinction between the tests that should be applied in the ·· case of appointment of a permanent Judge and the tests to be applied in the case of the appointment of an additional Judge, as to the fitness of the person to be appointed.\n\nThe same tests have to be applied even when a person who has already been appointed as an additional Judge is to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge or for appointment as a'n additional Judge for another period although as already mentio11ed an additional Judge has two factors in his favour which have to be taken into consideratio_n by the appointing authority in the context of the manner in which Article 224 of the Constitution has been operated all these days. . Since the appointment in question is to the post of a Judge, questions of integrity and of character of the person proposed for the post do assume large importance in taking a decision. The appointing authority cannot merely act on mere absence of evidence of lack of integrity or character of the person concerned. The appointing authority should on the other hand feel positively assured about the integrity and good character . of such pers.on.\n\nHaving regard to the importance of the office of a Judge fa High Court, the constitutional and legal immunities that a Judge enjoys and the need for infusing confidence in the mind of the people who approach courts seeking impartia-1 justice, the. appointing authority has to take sometimes hard decisions and it is likely that in that process some person who is realy honest may not be.· appointed on account of some doubt expressed by one or the other amongst .the functionaries who have to be consulted under Article 217(1) of the Constitution or on ·. account of some other relevant material that may be available to the appointing authority.\n\nHence if a person is not appointed as a Judge after the usual process of consultation is over it does not necessarily mean that in fact he lacks integrity or character. If the matter badbeen placed in the above light in this case perhaps the task of the Court would have been less onerous .. But in the course of the arguments, serious allegations of political vndetta, consplracy, malice, fraud etc, were made against the Prime Minister, Law Minister an_d the -Chief Justice of the Delhi, High Court.\n\nA deeper probe into the case has, therefore become necessary.\n\nThe lirst submission was that as there was an uncntradicted news\n\nitem appearing in a newspaper according to which the Prime Minister H \"' had expressed dissatisfaction with the Judges appointed by the Government which was in office' prior to her becoming the Prime Minister .\n\n1392 SUPitl!ME COURt REPOllT~ . [1982} 2 s.c.ll.\n\nin January, 1980, the action taken in respect of Shri S.N. Kumar who had been appointed by the previous Government was traceable to the said reaction of the Prime Minister.\n\nIt iS difficult to accept this submission because there were about sixty such additional Judges appointed by the previous Government and out of them it is seen that only four-one of the Allahabad High Court, one of the Rajas. than High Court and two of the Delhi High Court including the petitioner have not been reappointed as additional Judges. If the policy was not to appoint such Judges, as a matter of policy, in the case of others also a similar decision would have been taken. But that has not been the case. As can be seen from the List of Judges of the High Courts as on January I, 1980, there were 12 additional Judges in the Delhi High Court. Of them one died in 1980 and nine (including Mr. Jutice Wad) had been either made permanent . or continued as additional Judges by the present Government.. Only\n\ntwo i.e. Shti S.N. Kumar and Shri O.N. Vohra hav.e not been continued. Hence it is difficult to draw an inference that it is on account of any political ground that Shri S.N. Kumar has not been continued.\n\nThis argument that the Prime Minister took a hostile attitude towards Shri S.N. Kumar on account of political ground is inconsistent with another argument 11rged before us, namely that the Law Minister had tried to mislead the Prime Minister when he wrote on March 3, 1981 that \"the Jetter of the Chief Jlistice of Delhi High Court makes a serious complaint against the integrity of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar and I deliberately avoid going into the merits or the details at this stage as I am proposing a short extension in his tenure presently'\\ The argument is that even though the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had not made any serious complaint, the Minister for Law had stated so in order to mislead the Prime Minister.\n\nWhether factually he had tried to mislead her or not will be dealt with later. But the statement that he was misleading the Prime Minister who, according to the learned counsel for Shri S.N. Kumar had made up her mind to take some action prejudicial to Shri S.N.\n\nKumar appears to be incongruous. Perhaps• it would have been acceptable if the case was that the Prime Minister was favourably disposed towards Shri S.N. Kumar but the Law Minister had tried . to mislead her.\n\n.., The next allegation is that the Chief Justice Qf the Delhi High Court and the Minister for Law had entered into a conspiracy to do harm to Shri S.N. Kumar. This aspect of the mater also will\n\n!I.I'. GUPTA v. UNION (Penkataramiah, J.) 1393\n\nbe discussed later on, But this contention is, however, inconsistent with another argument that the Law Minister had tried fo put ndue pressure on the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to furnish some particulars which .were against Sbri S.N. Kumar and secured the letter of May 7, 1981.\n\nConspiracy presupposes the existence of a voluntary combination of two or more persons to ac_hieve some unlawful object or to bring about some res ult injurious to some other person or persons. If there were only two in a given case and one of them had exerted. pressure on the other to secure some information it would not be a case of conspiracy but a case of extortion of some information by one from the other.\n\nThe preceding discussion shows that there is inhereut inconsistency in some of the contentions. which are urged° before us,\n\nIn the instant case, we are concerned with the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of .the Delhi High Court and the Law Minister each of whom is holding a very high office and each of whoin is entrusted with high responsibilities.\n\nEach one of them has to express his candid opinion on the matter in issue. It is not unknown that on the same matter any two honest persons may have two different opinions. There is no allegation in the-case that either the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court or the Law Minister had any personal ill will against Shri S. N. Kumar. There is no allegation also to the effect that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had anything to gain by colluding with the Law Minister. He had been appointed as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court before Febrnary 19, 1961 on which date he wrote the first letter expressing his opinion against the reappointment of Shri S.N. Kumar. Further the Chief Justice of the Delhi High .Court is not impleaded as a respondent in the case.\n\nIt is wholly improper and opposed to all canons of judicial process to make any comment against him without giving him an opportunity to defend himself.\n\nUnder the Constitution, he is under a duty to express his opinion on the question of appointment of a Judge in the High Court of Delhi. Suchopinion should be about all relevant aspects including the reputation and integrity of the person concerned. In discharge of his constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Law Minister on Fi:brnary 19, 1981 as follows:\n\n\\. ••• , • i l\n\n\n[1982) 2 S.C, R.\n\nSECRET & CONFIDENTIAL\n\nCHIEF JUSTICE\n\nHIGH COURT OF DELHI\n\nD.O. No~ 275-HCJ/PPS\n\nNew Delhi, the 19th February, 1981\n\nMy dear Shiv Shankerji,\n\nMr. Justice S.N. Kumar was appointed an Additionai Judge of this Court for a period of two years vide Notificatfon No. 50/8/78-Jus., dated 6.3.1979 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice).\n\nHe assumed the charge of his office in the afternoon of March 7, 1979.\n\nNormally extension of the tenure of an Additional Judge is recommended keeping in view the pendency in Court. The pendency in this Court still justifies the appointment of Additional. Judges. There have, however, been serious complaints against Mr. Justice S.N.\n\nKumar, botJi oral and in writing. These complaints have been received by me direct as well as through you.\n\nI have examined these complaints and find that some of the complaints are not without basis.\n\nResponsible members of the Bar and some of my colleagues, whom\n\nI. would ratlier not name, have also complained about Mr. Justice Kumar. I have no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not.\n\nAll the the same the complaints have been persistent.\n\nThere is one other factor , which has been brought to my notice. It is rather unfortunate that Mr. Justice Kumar has also not been very helpful in disposing of cases. Some responsible members of the Bar and some of my colleagues have also expressed doubts about Justice. Kumar's integrity.\n\nIn the above circumstances, it is my very painful duty not to recommend an extension for Justice\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Yenkataramiah, J.) 1395\n\nKumar. You may, however, examine the matter at your end and take such steps as you think proper.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice And Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi\".\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/-\n\n(PRAKASH NARAIN)\n\nA reading of the aforesaid ietter shows that it was being written in anguish and with a feeling of sincerity. It is not shown that the Chief Justice of the Deihl High Court had made any statement which was false to his knowledge, or which he did not believe to be true or which he believed to be untrue. A Chief Justice of a High Court has no machinery to investigate into complaints but be has got to state about the fitness of the person to be appointed as a Judge.\n\nIt is seen that be has relied on the statements of some of .his colleagues and some Of the members of the Bar.\n\nHe has no doubt not given their names. It is not also possible to expect .him to give out their names having regard to the constraints of law which applies to persons who make uch statements. It is significant that even the Chief Justice of India has not given the names of Judges and of lawyers who were consulted by him as stated in his Jetter dated May 22, I 981.\n\nThere is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court that he bad heard some statements which suggested that the integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar was in doubt.\n\nThe said statement may be in fact not true.\n\nWe cannot go into the correctness or otherwise of those statements in proceedings of this character. It is enough to state that it is not shown that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had not heard such statements at all.\n\nIn this situation if the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had conveyed whatever he had heard and had not recommended .continuance of Shrl S.N. Kumar, he cannot be considered as having committed any act of impropriety even though Shri Kumar had not in fact done anything which. was improper as a Judge. If Shri Kumar is a victim of false rumour he deserves sympathy but jt js not open to '?on<Jem!l the 11ction of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nChief Justice of he Delhi High Court which he had to discharge in the public interest and true to his oath of office.\n\nThe next aspect of this part of the case relates to the question whether there was full and proper consultation With the function-, aries mentioned in Article 217( I) of tli'e Constitution. In the case of the High Court of Dell1i which is situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, consultation with the Governor does not arise (vide section 4 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966).\n\nThe only two authorities who have to be consulted by the President are the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The process of consultation referred to in Article 217(1) requires that the authorities concerned should be given sufficient information and also suffi\" cient opportunity to furnish their opinion .. The .... question whether such information was furnished and whether such opportunity was given depends upon the facts of each case; In the instant case the letter dated February 19, 1981 written by_ the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court was made available to the Chief Justice of India.\n\nOn that the Chief Justice of India observed on March 3, 1981 : \"I would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N.\n\nKumar. The Jetter of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seems to me too vague.to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity\". The Chief Justice of India, however, recommended that Shri S.N. Kumar may be appointed for a period of six months so that he could enquire into the matter in the meanwhile. On the same date i.e. March 3, 1981, the Law Minister put up a note for the consideration of the Prime Minister suggesting that Shri S.N. Kumar may be appointed as an additional Judge for three months so that a final decision could be taken within that period. It is true that the Law Minister has stated in this note that the Ch'ief Justice of the Delhi High Court had made 'serious complaint' against the integrity of Shri S.N. Kumar. The word 'serious' according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary means 'requiring earnest thought, consideration or application'. Any remark against the reputation.or integrity of a person to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court is a matter which requires earnest consideration. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the Law Minister had made any misrepresentation to the Prime Minister in recording the aforesaid note.\n\nAfter Shri S.N. Kumar was reappointed as an additional Judge with effect from March 7, 1981, the Law Ministc:r wrote on March\n\n;;= I\n\n...\n\ns P. GUPTA v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1397\n\nI 9, 1981 to the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court bringing to bis notice the note of the Chief Justice of India made on March 3, 1981 that the letter of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seemed to him too vague to accept that Sbri Kumar lacked integrity and added :\n\n\"2. In the light of these observations of the Chief Justice of India, I shall be grateful for your further comments on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.\n\nHis term expires on 6.6.198 I and I would be grateful. if your comments\n\nreach me by '15.4.1981.'.'\n\n. C\n\nIt is seen from the letter dated March 28, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India that the Chief Justice of India had also written a letter dated March 14, 198 I (which is not placed before us) to the Delhi Chief Justice about . the same subject and that the Chief Justice , of the Delhi High Court had met the Chief Justice of India on March 26, 1981 (this date is mentioned in the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated May 22, 1981 which will be referred to later on). After that meeting the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Chief Justice of idia the Jetter dated March 28, I 981 referred to above.\n\nIt reads :\n\n\"Secret\n\nMy dear Chief Justice, .\n\nChief Justice High Court of Delhi New Delhi D.O. No. 292-HCJ/PPS\n\nMarch 28, 1981\n\nI am in receipt of your letter dated ~4th March, 1981 G with regard to Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar. Since then I have also had an opportunity to discuss this delicate matter with you.\n\nThere were three points mentioned in my D.O. No. 275-HCJ/PPS dated 19th February~ 1981 addressed to the Law Minister, a copy 'QfWhi~~ \\V!lS f<_>fW!lrcled to you. ~\n\n1398 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nhad also mentioned in that letter that I have no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not. Unl!erstandably there will be some who would support the allegations and there will be some who would refute them. Therefore, it is natural that there may be variance between the views that may be expressed by different people. Indeed, my experience is that people are hesitant in speaking out frankly.\n\nWith regard to the complain ts about Justice Kumar's integrity and gen era) conduct, the matter has already been discussed between us.\n\nAbout Justice Kumar not being very helpful in disposing of cases. I enclose a statement of disposal by. Justice Kumar in 1980. Just by way of comparison I have also included the figure of disposal in the same period of my other two colleagues whose case> for re-appointment are under consideration.\n\n\\ With warm regards,\n\nEncl: Hon'ble Mt. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, 5, Krishna Menon Marg, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Prakash Narain)\n\nAlongwith this letter, a statement of cases was sent as stated in its last paragraph.\n\nOn the same date i.e. March 28, 19s1 the Delhi Chief Justice wrote to the Law Minister enclosing a copy of the letter written by him to the Chief Justice of India. That letter runs as under :\n\n\"Secret\n\nChief Justice High Court of Delhi\n\nNew Delhi\n\nD.O. NO. 293-HCJ/PPS March 28, 198l\n\n•' -\n\nI S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1399\n\nMy dear Shiv Shankerji,\n\nI am in receipt of your D.O. No. 50/2/81-Jus. dated 19th March, 1981.\n\nI have received a letter from the Chief Justice of India with regard to my observations and recom{aendations made in my D.O. No. 275-HCJ/PPS dated 19th February, 1981, addressed to you, a copy of which was sent to the Chief Justice of India, asking me to furnish him with \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\" I have since had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India.\n\nAfter the discussion I have addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, a copy of which is enclosed. Perhaps you will consider this to be sufficient 'comments' on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter.\n\nWith regards,\n\nEncl : 1\n\nShri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice And Company Affairs, Government of India.\n\nShastri Bhavan, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerly,\n\nSd/- (Prakash Narain)\n\nOn April 15, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court asking for any material which provided the: basis for his recommendati<?i; i, t reads i .\n\nT llllt!I\n\nE /\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nA \"Confidential\n\nMy dear Chief Justice,\n\nD.O. No. 50/2/81-Jus\n\nApril 15, 1981 ·\n\nI am to band your d.o. letter No. 293HCJ/PPS dated 28th M\n\n0 arcb, 1981 and a copy of your letter to the Chief Justice of India bearing the same date, regarding Shri Justice S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge, Delhi High Court.\n\nThe Chief Justice of India bad felt that the reasons giv1m\n\nin your earlier letter were vague and wanted more concrete particulars. It is true that you have no investigating agency to conclusively establish the truth of complaints. Neverthe less, you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you concluded that Justice Kumar's reputa tion for integrity was not above board and recommended that he may not be continued. In view of the observations of the Chief Justice of India asking for concrete material, it would be necessary for us to have it with your comments I would, therefore, be grateful; if it be furnished to me at the earliest.\n\n2. I would also request you to send me your comments promised in your letter No. 268-HCJ/PPS dated 12th November, 1980 on the complaints of Shri Sabir Hussain.\n\nFrom the statement of disposal of cases sent by you, it is observed that it is really in the second half of 1980 that there has been a sharp drop in the disposals of Justice Kumar. Could there be any specia.1 reason for this?\n\nI may please be informed whether the nature of cases assig ned to Justice Kumar, in the terms of time normally required for their disposal, was roughly similar to the nature of cases disposed of by Justice Vobra and Justice Wad.\n\n4. I shall be grateful for an early reply.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShd Justice Prakash Narain, Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, filew Pelbi,\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/· (P. Shiv S:h; ukar)\n\n• -\n\nf I\n\ns.f>. GtJi>tA v. UNION {Ven/cataramiah, i.) 1401\n\nIn reply to this letter the Chief Justice of .the Delhi Hgh Court wrote on May 7, 1981 a Jetter by way of reply which bas given rise to some serious controversy in this case. That letter reads :\n\n\"Secret\n\n(For Personal Attention Only)\n\nDear Mr. Minister,\n\nChief Justice High Court of Delhi New Delhi\n\nD.O. No. 296-HCJ/PPS New Delhi, the 7th May, 1981\n\nI am in receipt of your D.O. 50/2/81-Jus., dated i5th April, 198 !.\n\n. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India bad made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and the same were communicated to me by you for my comments in your D.O. No. 50/2/81 Jus. dated 19th March, 1981. The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated 14th March, 1981, asking for \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\" As. I wrote to you in. my D.O.\n\nNo. 293HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March; 1981, I discussed the\n\nmatter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by F him, in reply to his letter, wrote my D.O. No. 292-HCJ/PPS dated March 28, 1981, a copy of which was forwarded to you. Accordingly, it is not only embarrasing but painful for me to write this letter.· As you; bow ever,. desire to know what material provided the basis for me to conclude that Justice Kumar's integrity was not above board, G I give beii:>\"Y. some facts.-\n\nIn the.first half of 1980, Justice Kumar. was sitting singly and was doing mostly Original Side matters but also some Appellate Side matters: Chance remarks came to my knowledge about bis conduct in Court as well as about his' integrity. Somewhere early in\n\n-' _,,,...,.\n\n1402 SuPREMil Cotiitt REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.A..\n\nMay, 1980, one of my colleagues met me and said that he was rather perturbed about information with him to the effect that'if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance company would be decided in favour of that party. I had not paid much attention to the earlier reports but when this was brought to my notice, and I was at that time not the Chief Justice, I thought to myself that after the summer vacations, to save Justice Kumar from any embarrassment, he should be put on a jurisdiction other than original jurisdiction. Therefore, when as Acting Chief Justice I constituted the Benches for the second half of 1980.\n\nI put Justice Kumar in a Division Bench to sit on the Appellate Side and Writ Jurisdiction. In my view this was a safe way to finish the rumours if the same were incorrect and thus safeguard the reputation of a Judge.\n\nSurprisingly enough, Justice Kumar did not release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his board and continued to deal with these suits even in the second half of 1980. 'fhese suits were Suit No. 1489 of 1979, Suit No. 1417 of 1978 and Suit No. 1401 of 1979 filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd., and Jain Export Pvt. Ltd. against the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. In August, 1980, th~ same colleague of mine who talked to me earlier and another coileague mentioned that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis-a-vis the aforesaid cases and some others. Since I was only acting as Chief Justice at that time, I did not want to take any precipitate action. I, however, made dis-· creet inquiries from some of the lea ding counsel and they in strict confidence supported the allegations.\n\nThis made me look into the matter more carefully when to my astonishment I found that it was not only the three suits mentioned above but that there were other Single Bench matters also which had been retained by Justice Kumar on his board despite being\n\nput)ll the Division Bench.\n\nThere is fairly a long list of these cases. In some of these the parties involved were rich and influential including some former princes. ·After I was appointed Chie~ Justice early in January,\n\n·\".\n\nS.P. otrl>'i'A v. UNION (Venkataramiah, i.) 1403\n\n1981, I looked into this matter a little more deeply and made further inquiries. Some of the lawyers were noncommit ta! and understandably so. Others, however, asserted with some force that Justice Kumar's . reputation was not above board. I talked to some of my other colleagues besides the two who bad earlier spoken to me. They also said that unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were not very complimentary to Justice Kumar. This made me conclude that the reputation for integrity of Justice Kumar was not what should be -for a Judge of the High Court.\n\nTo my mind, reputation of integrity is just as important as a person actually being above-board.\n\nWith regard to the . complaint of Mr. Sabir Hussain, Advocate, I had looked into he relevant files besides showing the complaint to Justice Kumar. My colleague liad, of course, no comments to make nor could I ask him for the same. The litigation referred to in Mr. Sabir Hussain's complaint ended by the suit being decided in his favour as is apparent from the judgment and decree in Suit No. 550 of 1975. The learned Judge did not, however, give his decision on all the prayers or with regard to all the parties to the suit.\n\nFrom the record I could not find any evidence of alleged partiality.\n\nIt is correct that the learned Judge took over six months in pronouncing judgment , after the case was closed. I would not like to comment further on the merits of the decision because that is a judicial matter.\n\nBut it is correct that the judgment does not deal with all the matters raised in the suit or regarding which evidence was adduced. It is also correct that all the evidence adduced has not been discussed in the judgment. - The inferences made by Mr. Sabir Hussain from such a judgment are possible but it is a matter which should only be commented upon judicially.\n\nWith regard to the disposal sttement for the second half of 1980, I may mention that no special type of work was allocated to the Bench of which Mr Justice Kumar was\n\nSUPRBMB d ouR.t REPORTS (198~1 s.\".ft\n\na member. The Bench disposed of eleven main cases and 7 Misc. petitions.\n\nNormally when matters are heard by a Division Bench alternate judgments are written by the two members of the Bench.\n\nCredit, however, is given to both the Judges for the total disposal by the Bench. To clarify, if 18 matters were disposed of by the Bench, 9 judgments would normally be written by each Judge in regular matters but each Judge will get credit of 18.\n\nSo far as motion matters are concerned, short orders admitting or dismissing a case are dictated in open Court by the senior of the two Judges.\n\nNo credit is given for disposal of motion matters.\n\nExcept for the Division Bench doing Tax matters or Criminal Appeals, other Division Benches have writ matters L.P. As. and other types of civil matters listed before them.\n\nThere is no special type of work assigned to any particular ·\n\nJudge or Bench in our High Court. Normally the distribution of work is in the broad categories of criminal work, tax work and civil matters. Sometimes, depending upon the special aptitude of a Judge, one particular type of cases are listed before that ~Judge in greater number.\n\nThere was no special distinction between the work that was being done by the Bench of which Justice Kumar was a member and the Benches of which Just ice V ohra and Justice Wad were the members. This would be evident . from a reading of the. classification of cases disposed of by the various Benches which are all broadly mentioned as Main Cases in the statement of disposal sent by me to , Hon'ble the Chief Justice.\n\nI enclose for your ready reference the break up of the Main Cases.\n\nYou will notice that the Division Bench of which Justice Wad was a member heard and disposed of 11 Writ Petitions, 79 Letters . Patent Appeals, 11 Sales Tax References, I Civil Misc:\n\n(Main), 2 Criminal Contempt Petitions and 5 Income Tax References besides 7 Misc. Petitions. The Bench of which Justice Vohra was a member disposed of 8 Regular First . Appeals, 55 First Appeals from O.rders, 3 Company\n\nAppeals, 10 Civil Writ Petitions, 7 Criminal Appeals, 18.\n\nLetters Patent Appeals, 3 Civil Revisions etc. etc. The Bench of which Justice Kumar was a member disposed of\n\n- \\\n\n~.f>. dttPtA ' UNION (Penkataramiah, J.) 1405\n\nI Letters Patent Appeal, 9 Civil Writ Petitions and 1 First Appeal from Order besides 7 Misc. Petitions.\n\nIn my original letter to you I had•mentioned about other complaints regarding Justice Kumar besides the complaints about integrity. These pertain to his conduct with counsel in Court. . Generally speaking an incident in Court is nothing more than exchange of, at the worst, hot words. Unfortunately incidents in Justice Kumar's Court have been occurring more frequently than ir others. In some cases I am told, and in one I have venlied, a senior counsel had to go to the extent of recording the incident and making his comments about unfair conduct of the Judge on affidavit which was placed on the record of the case. It created an unhappy situation.\n\nfo view of what I have written a!>ove and my talks with you, it is now for the Government to see whether it would like Justice Kumar to continue as a Judge of the Delhi High Court. As far as I am concerned, my view have already been expressed in my letter dated 19th February, 1981. ·\n\nWith regards,\n\nBriel: 3 Shri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Prakash Narain)\n\nThree statements are enclosed with this letter showing the\n\nnumber of cases disposed of by Sbri S.B. Wad, Shri 0. N. Vohra G and Shri S.N. Kumar. After the above letter of May 7, 1981 was received, the Law Minister recorded a note on May 19, 1981 asking for the opinion of the Secretary (Justice) which read as follows:\n\n\"Last evening I spoke to. the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court for an early reply to my letter dt ........ .. in view of the fact that the time left for. the decision\n\n. .H\n\n140()\n\nSUi>IU!MB COURT REPORTS (19821 2 s.c.k.\n\nof cases of S/Shri Justice Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad was very short. He assured me that he would send his reply within a day or two and said that t)le matter necessarily involved a little time as he had to wade through the proceedings of the \"Kissa Kursi Ka\" case and make a few enquiries.\n\nHe requested me that his reply may be kept secret for personal attention only, as he desired in his earlier letter dated 7th May,\n\n1981. In fact, I recall that before issuance of the letter dated 7th May, I 981, he informed me to treat it secret though at that moment .I did not try to probe the implications and details of his request. When he made the request now, for keeping the letter secret, I asked him as to what exactly he meant by 'secret for personal attention only' as indicated in the 7th May, 1981 letter. In the context during the 'discussions he requested that his letter may be avoided from being brought to the notice of CJI for the following reasons :\n\nI. For reasons stated in the opening portion of his letter dated 7th May, 1981.\n\nHe felt highly embarassed and perplexed after he addressed the original letter dtd. 19.2.1981 about Shri S.N. Kumar as the contents of that Jetter came clearly to be known to Shri S.N. Kumar and certain of his colleagues on the bench as a result of which it embarassed him in discharge of his duties and functions.\n\nHe felt that the contents of his Jetter dated 7th May, 1981 would also get into the hands of Shri S.N. Kumar and certain of his other colleagues and he would thereby be put to greater embarassment which might create problems for him in future in the discharge of his .duties as Chief Justice ..\n\n. 3.\n\nHe felt that the Chief Justice of India had already started wrongfully denigrating him for his letter of February '81 as some of his friends conveyed to him the feelings of the CJ.I.\n\n• -\n\nS.i>. OUP'tA v. UNION (i'enkataramiah, J.) 1407\n\nHe categorically informed me that he. could not afford to spoil his relations with the CJI on the one ' hand and on the other could not desist from expressing without fear or favour what he felt cif crtain matters and if be is going to be suspect for discharging his functions fairly and conscientiously, than his functioning as the Chief Justice would never be smooth visa-vis CJI. ·\n\nIn view of the above, Secretary (J) may examine immediately as to whether it is inevitable to fttrnisb the letters of the Chief Justice of Delhi to the 'CJI for his comments or would it be sufficient if on the basis of his previous endorsements, we address a letter to the CJI for .his ad\\lice, making him available, if need be the material available with us including the purport of the IR report. In the latter case drafts may be put up.\n\nSecretary (Justice)\"\n\nSd/· (P. Shiv Shankar)\n\n19-5-81.\n\nThereaften on May 21, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of India requesting him to give his opinion on the con-· tinuance. of Shri S.N. Kumar. It. has to be mentioned here that by then an interim order had been passed by, this Court asking the Union Government to take a decision on the continuance of Sbri S.N. Kumar ten days before the expiry of bis tenure as additional Judge which was to come to an end on June 6, 1981 i.e. on or before May 27, 1981. It is admitted that the letter of' May 7, 1981 written by the Dell; ti Chief Justice to the Law Minister was not sent to the Chief Justice of India alongwith the letter of May 21, 1981. The letter of February 19, 1981 referred to above was, however, sent ..\n\nBut the letter of May 21, 1981 contained a reference to the meeting which had taken place between the Delhi Chief Justice and the Chief Justice of India ill para;, thereof.\n\nThe letter of May 21, 1981 reads:\n\nSUPREME c6tJRt REi>Okts\n\n\"D.O. No. 50/2/81-Jus\n\ni J 98~J 2 S.C.R.\n\nMay 21;1981\n\nIn his letter dated 19th Februay, 1981 the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court (copy enclosed} had recommended that Justice Kumar may not be given any extension.\n\nBy another letter of t!ie same date he had recommended an extension of two years for Justice Wad.\n\nYou had advised on 3i:d March, 1981 as below:\n\n\"I have recommended, for reasons mentioned in the concerned file, that Shri O.N. Vohra's term should be extended by ix months.\n\nShri Vohra is senior to Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad. In the interests of propriety, the term of these two Judges should also be extended by six months.\n\nI would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar. The letters of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seem to be too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity.\n\nTrue, that there are no complaints against Shri Wad. But, since he is junior to the other two Judges, his term ought not to be extended, longer than that of the other two.: That is to say, Sliri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad should all be extended by six months.\"\n\n3. In regard to complaints regarding Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the Chief Justice of the High Court discussed the matter with you as mentioned in his D.O. letter No. 292-Hd dated 28th March, 1981, to you, a copy of which he had sent to me.\n\nIn that letter he had also mentioned the: dis- posals of Justice Kumar.\n\nWhen you had tendered your advice dated 3rd March,· 1981 the following I.B. report regarding Shri\n\nS.N; Kumar had been brought to your notice :- . ,\n\n(Extract from J.B. report omitted)\n\nt .\n\n9.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1409\n\nAn extract of a further report received is enclosed.\n\nYou will please see that in ryour advice dated 3rd March, 1981 you desired to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar. In terms t!iereof if you were pleased to make any inquiries, I shall be grateful to have the details.\n\nI would be grateful for your urgent advice in regard to the continuance or otherwise of the terms of Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri Y.V~ Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court, New Delhi.\n\nBncls : As above.\"\n\nYours\n\nSd/- (P. Shiv-Shanker)\n\nThe Chief Justice of India was camping at Simla then. The Government of India had to take a decision as per the interim order of this Court on or before May 27, 198i. In view of the urgency involved; the Chief Justice of India sent his reply as per letter of May 22, 1981 through a special messenger from Simla to the Law Minister which reads as follows :-\n\n\"Chief Justice of India\n\nConfidential By Special Messenger\n\nMy dear Shiv Shanker,\n\nSupreme Court of India New Delhi\n\nCamp: Simla May 22, 1981\n\nI am in receipt of your letter (D.O. No. 50/2/81- Jus) dated May 21! 1981 seeki~~ m~ aqvi<; e in rearct\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] i S.C.R.\n\nto the con ti nuance or otherwise of the terms of Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad who are at present functioning as additiona_I Judges of the Delhi High Court aud whose terms were extended by a period of three months with effect from March 6, 1981.\n\nShri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, had written a letter dated February 19, 1981 to you, a copy of which was sent to me.\n\nThe Chief Justice had recommened in that letter that Justice Kumar's appointment should not be extended furter for three reasons : (I) that serious complaints were received against Justice Kumar orally as well as in writing; (2) that Justice Kumar was not very helpful in disposing of cases; and (3) that some responsible members of the Bar and Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumar's integrity.\n\nBy my letter dated March 14, 1981 to the Delhi ChiefJustice I requested him to furnish further details and concrete facts in re-· . regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar since the result of the enquiries made by me was quite at variance with what the Chief Justice had stated in his letter of March 19.\n\nThe Chief Justice met me on March 26, 1981 when he told me that Justice Kumar was very slow in. his disposals and that he doubted his integrity bec:ause even after-Justice Kumar's allocation was changed from the original side to the appellate side, he still continued to heat the part-heard cases on the original side.\n\nThe Chief Justice did not mention anything adverse in regard to Justice Kumar's political leanings or affiiiations By my request the Chief Justice prµmised to send a statement showing the disposals .of Justice Kumar.\n\nI have made the most careful . and extensive enquiries in regard .to both of these matters and I am satisfied that there is no substance in any one of them. I have with me a detailed statement of the disposals of Justice Kumar from which it would appear that no charge can be made against him that he is slow in his\n\nI '\n\nll.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1411\n\ndisposals. Justice Kumar was sitting with Justice T.P.S. Chawla for quite some time during the period under consideration and it is a matter of wide knowlege that Justice Chawla takes an enormously long time over the cases which come before him.\n\nSitting with Justice Chawla as a junior Judge. Justice Kumar could have done precious little to hasten the disposal of cases which came before the Bench.\n\nAs regards the complaint of the Chief Justice that Justice Kumar's integrity was doubtful since he conti nued to fake old part-heard matters even after the allocation of his work was changed, I have made en quiries not only from members of the Bar but from the sitting Judges of the Delhi High Court which show that it is a common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a Judge is changed from\n\nthe original side to the appellate side and vice-versa, he continues to take up part-heard cases on which a substantial amount of time has been already spent.\n\nJustice Kumar therefore did nothing out of the way or unusual in taking up part-heard cases after the alloca tion of his work was changed,\n\nI find it therefore diffiult to agree that Justice Kumar's term should not be extended for the reasons mentioned by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. I : disagree with the learned Chief Justice, on enquiries made by me, that Justice Kumar is either\n\nlow in his disposals or that his integrjty is doubtful.\n\nI must mention that I also made independent en- quiries in .regard to Justice Kumar's integrity generally and apart from the reason for which the learned Chief Justice thought that Justice Kumar lacked integrity.\n\nNot one member of the Bar or of the Bench doubted the integrity of Justice Kumar. On the other hand several of them tated that he is a ma, n of unquestioned interity.\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [ 1982) :! s.c.a.\n\nYou have annexed to your letter an extract of a further report from the r. B. which says that :\n\n(Portion relating to l.B. report omitted)\n\nOn my return on May 26, 1981 I will get into touch with Justice Kumar and make enquiries from him as also from other persons who are likely :o be in the know of the matter.\n\nUntil then it is impossible for me to tender any opinion one way or the other.\n\nI would therefore propose that Justice Kumar's term, a11d consequently Justice Wad's term, should be extended by a further period of three months.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Y. V. Chandrachud)\n\nThis letter recommends a further extension by three months to Shri S.N. Kumar pending further enquiry by the Chief Justice of India on the contents of some l.B. report.\n\nBut the Chi-tf Justice cf .India is categorical . that the three reasons viz. \"(I) that serious complaints were received against Justice S.N. Kumar orally as well as in writing;\n\n(2) that Justice Ku.mar was not very helpful in disposing of cases; and (3) that some responsible members of the Bar and the Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumar's integrity\" given by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court were unsustainable. The letter refers to tb.e meeti!1g of March 26, 1981 between tb.e (; b.ief Justice of India and tb.e Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.\n\nThe rest of the contents are self-explanatory.. This\n\nleter is followed by the letter of May 29, 1981 by the Chief Justice of lndia to tile Law Mipister whi1; h rµns as under ; ~\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah; J.) 1413\n\n\"CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA\n\nConfidential\n\nMy Dear Shiv Shanker,\n\nSUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\nNEW DELHI May 29, 1981\n\nWhile in Simla, I received your letter dated May 21, 1981 in connection with the extension of the term of Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad whose term as Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court is due to expire on June 6, 1981.\n\nImmediately on receipt of your letter I sent a reply to you dated May 22, 1981, recommending, for the time being, that the term of the two Judges be extended by a furiher period of three months.\n\nIn so far as Jtistice Wad is concerned, there was no difficulty in recommending the extension of bis term for the normal period of two years pr until the occurrence of a permanent vacancy. but that could .not be done since he is junior in appointment to Justice\n\nS.N. Kumar and a further report from the I.B. was enclosed along with your aforesaid letter in regard to Justice Kumar.\n\nI had stated in my reply that after my return to Delhi I will make enquiries into the allegations contained in the l.B. repoct against Justice Kumar and shall thereafter tender my advice on the question regarding the f, urther extension of his term.\n\nThe report of the l.B. contains the following\n\n F information in regard to Justice Kumar :\n\n(Portion relating to I.B. report omitted)\n\nI have already stated in my reply of the 22nd that G I do not agree that Justice Kumar's term should not be extended as an additional Judge for.· the reason either that he is slow in bis disposals or that he Jacks integrity .\n\n• I, t berefore, recommend that the term of Justice S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge should be extended by a further prjog of two rear~. '\n\n1414 SUYRliME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nAs a consequence, the term of Justice S.B. Wad should also be extended by a further period of-two\n\nyears.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice And Company Affatrs, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Y.V. Chandrachud)\n\nThis letter recommends an extension of two years of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar instead of three months' extension recommended in the letter of May 22, 1981.\n\nBut by .the time the letter of May 29, 1981 was received, the Law Minister had recorded his note on May 27, 1981, the relevant part of which reads : ·\n\n\"In my letter to the C. J. I. dated 21.5 .1981, I categorically N'quested to have the details of inquiries that he might have made in terms of his advice dated 3.3.1981. I desired the details consciously as I did so with the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court since the C.J.I. termed the letter of C.J. Delhi dated 19.2.81. addressed to me as too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity.\n\nI regret that notwithstanding my specific request as to details, the CJ.I. did not furnish me the same and on the contrary reading his letter dated 22. 5. 81 would reveal that he became a victim of hi-s own charge of vagueness made by him against the Chief Justice of Delhi. C.J.I. cloes mention that C.J. Delhi met him on 26.3.1981.\n\nHe also refers about the common practice in the Delhi High Court that even after the allocation of a Judge is changed from the original side to the appellat(: side and vice-versa, he continues to take up partheard cases on which a substantial an11ount of time has been already spent.\n\nI presume that when C.J. Delhi and the C.J. of the Supreme Court met, the former myst have informed the latter about the d<:tails\n\n( f.\n\n.,. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNJON,(Venkataramiah, J.) 1415\n\nthat he had mentionP.d to me in his lettr dated ,7.5.81.\n\nA This presumption. is raised on the basis of.the letters from the Chief Justice, Delhi.\n\nEven cassuming that there is a prevaient practice as referred to by the C.J .I., the C.J.I; Iiimself says that such cases .should be those on _which substantial amount of. time has been already spent.\n\nThe CJ.I. surprisingly has left the matter there, without further probing as to whether the part-heard matters which Justice Kumar chose to handle as a single.Judge notwithstanding his having been allocated to the Division Bench were such on which substantial amount\"°of time had already been spent by him.\n\nThe C.J.I. in his advice proceeds from the premises that taking up part-heard cases after the allocation of work is' changed does not amount to lacking in integrity. If it were that simple I would not have joined issue, but the details furnished by the C.J. Dellii in his letter dated 7-5-81 go further.\n\nThe C.J.I. also observes that he made inquiries in regard to Justice Kumar's integrity generally.\n\nThe C.J.I. states that in bis general inquiries no member of the Bar or the Bench doubted the integrity of Justice Kumar.\n\nI regret that the letter of C.J.I. is not only Jacking in details as desired by me but too vague. The premises on which he does not doubt the integrity of Shri Justice Kumar is wholly different. ' ·\n\nIn the matter of assessment of integrity', I prefer . that the veiws of C.J. Drlhi_ be given credence as it is in his association that the Judge concerned discharges his duties and that .he has a better occasion and opportunity to watch his working and conduct.\n\nThe correspondence from the C.J.' of Delhi addressed to me furnishes clear details which cannot easily by brushed aside.\n\nI therfore agree with the observations contained in the note of the Secretary (Justice) and opine that Shri Justice S.N. Kumar may not be continued any further as additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure Oil 7.6.1981 anq thus recommenq !IC'?ordingly\" '.\n\nSUPR~MB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nIn the earlier part of the aforesaid note, the Law Minister has stated that he \"would avoid going to the I.B. Reports of Shri\n\nKumar's disposals or even the behaviour in the Court and prefer to confine to the question of reputation and 'integrity\" of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar. The consultation process thus came to an end.\n\nThe two questions to be considered here are whether the Union Government committed an error amounting to an unfair act in not sending the letter of May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to the Chief Justice of India and w)lether on account of not sending that letter, the consultation process is vitiated. The note of May 19, 1981 of the Law Minister containing the reasons given by the Delhi Chief Justice for requesting th~ Law Minister not to send the letter of May 7, 1981 to anybody else is confirmed by the following letter da:ted May 29, 1981 written by the Law Minister\n\nto the Delhi Chief Justice :\n\n\"D.O. No~ 50/2W/81-Jus. Part\n\nMay 29, 1981\n\nMy dear Chief Justice,\n\nWhen you spoke to me on 18th May, 1981, you had requested me that the letter that you were proposing to send to me regarding Justice O.N. Vohra should be kept secret for personal attention only.\n\nYou had made a similar request about letter dated 7th May, 1981 regarding Justice S.N. Kumar.\n\nOn my request you elucidated that when you marked your letter dated 7th May, 198 I, \"secret for Personal Attention only\" what you were particular about was that the letter may not be brought to the notice of Chief Justice of India for the following reasons :-\n\nI. For the reasons stated in the opening portion of your letter dated 7th May, 1981.\n\nYou felt highly embarassed as the c:ontents of your letter dated .19th February, 1981 about\n\nShri Kumar came clearly to be known to Shri S.N. Kumar and some of his colleagues on the Bench.\n\nYou felt that the contents of your letter dated 7th May, 1981 might .also\n\ns. i>. oui>TA v. tn.lioN lvenkataramiah, J.) 1417\n\nget known to them and cause you further embarassment.\n\nYou felt that the Chief Justice of India bad already started wrongfully denigrating you for your letter of February 19, 1981.\n\nYou mentioned that you could not desist from expressing without fear or favour what you felt about certain matter but at the same time you were particular that your relations with the Chief Justice of India should not .be spoiled.\n\nFor similar reasons you were particular that your letter regarding Shri O.N.\n\nVohra should not be sent to him as also for the additional reason that a senior counsel whose name figured .therein had enjoined secrecy.\n\nYour letter regarding Shri O.N.\n\nVohra dated 22nd May, 1981 has since been received by us.\n\nIn view of. the emphasis laid by you on keeping these letters confidential from the Chief Justice of India we have not shown these to him.\n\nThis is for favour of your information.\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, New Delhi.\"\n\nYours sincerely,\n\nSd1-. (P. Shiv Shanker)\n\nThe note of the Law Minister dated May 19, 1981 and the letter of May 29; 1981 written by the Law Minister to the Delhi Chief Justice which refer to the request of the Delhi Chief Justice clearly establish that the letter of May 7, 1981 was not sent to the Chief Justice of India not as part of any conspiracy o.r pact between the Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice but at the reque; t of the Delhi Chief Justice.\n\nIt is not also shown as to what advantage the\n\ni418\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.C.lt\n\nLaw Minister was deriving by withholding the said letter from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India unless we.start with the assumption that for some undisclosed reason the Law Minister was bent upon treating Shri S.N. Kumar with an 'evil eye and an uneven hand' and for that reason:he kept back the letter froni the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice has given three reasons for requesting the Law Minister not to send the letter outside his office. The first reason is, according to the Chief Justice, contained in' the first paragraph of the letter of May 7, 198l. That paragraph refer to the meeting which had taken place between the Chief Justice of India and himself on March 26, 1981 on all relevant point relating to the proposal of reappointment of Shri S.N. Kumar and the fact that he had written the letter of March 28, 1981 to the Law Minister 'as desired' by the Chief Justice of India. That there was full and frank discussion between the Chief Justice of India and the Delhi\n\nChief Justice with reference to the very particulars referred to in the letter of May 7, 1981 is Clear by the following facts : (i) The statement \"with regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the matter has already been discussed between\n\nus\" which is found in the letter of March 28. 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India,\n\n(ii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the same date addressed by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Law Minister enclosing a copy of the above said letter dated March 28. 1981, (iii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Law Minister t~ the Chief Justice of India dated May 21, 1981 and (iv) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Chief Jlistice of India dated May 22, 1981 written from Simla.\n\nThis is further supported by the affidavit dated July 17, 1981 of Shri\n\nS.N. Kumar himself which had been filed long before the date on which .documents in question were directed to be disclosed by the Court i.e. in October, 1981.\n\nThe relevant part of the aforesaid affidavit of Shri S.N. Kumar reads:\n\n\"Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, on the other hand discussed the matter with me at length about my work and other general matters.\n\nI gave him full and true information and supplied him relevant papers for his consideration.\n\nSince thr Government has n9t disclosed the reasons for its action I have no other course open but to apprise this Court briefly of what is in my knowledge.\n\nIt was alleged that I was slow and that it was improper for me to continue to deal with original\n\n-··\n\nS.1'. GtJPTA v. UNiON (Venkataramiah, J.) 1419\n\n work while sitting on the appeltate side, A comparative assessment of work disposed of by eight Judges who sat on the original side with me showed that the work disposed of by me was nearly maximum. I disposed of 8i'7 matters' during 256 sittings out of which 385 were civil suits and 442 miscellaneous matters.\n\nRegardiPg the second allegation, I say that on the contrary it would be improper for a judge not to finish a part heard matter.\n\nI acted in accordanc~ with well established practice of Court I know that two judges of this Court threatened issuing of contempt notice to the officer concerned who removed a part heard matter 'from . their lists.\n\nThe practice is so well understood that the Registry of the Court its'elf fixes cases accordingly in routine. Furthermore a perusal of the proceedings in the part heard' matters would reveal the ridiculous nature of the allegations'' .\n\n. Then Shri S.N. Kumar refers to the proceedings .in Suit No. 5/1980, Suit No. 87/1975, Suit Nos. 1408, 1409 and 1417/1979, Suit\n\nNo. 304/1974, Suit No. 327/1979, Ex. No. 11/1978, C.C.P. No.\n\nE 13/1979 and Suit No. 73/1979.\n\nThereafter he says:\n\n\"20.\n\nAs stated above, !informed the Chief Justice of India that the old established practice in Delhi High , Court is that.a part heard matter goes with the Judges and is heard by him whether he goes over from the appellate side to the original side or vice versa. A bunch of over 30 part heard Regular Division Bench matters were heard during January and February, 1981 on Friday by me sitting .with Chawla, J. while I was holding court singly on the Original Side w.e.f.\n\n5.1.1981.\n\nL.P.A. 32 of 1980 was heard during February, 81 by me while sitting with Mr. Chawla, J.\n\nEven on 24th April, 1981 (Friday) when the aforesaied material was sent to the Chief Justice of India by me the foliowing part-heard matters were posted in the Division Bench of which I was a member :\n\ni42Ci tiPRBME CoURT RBPOts [ 19821 2 s.c.a,\n\n(1) Civil Writ No. 557/79 and Civil Wrft No. 1231 of 1979.\n\n(2) Civil Writ No. 61/80 with C.Ms.\n\nPractically every week once from January, 81 till the end of May, 81, I was sitting in Division Bench with Chawla, J. to finish part-heard matters.\"\n\nWhen a question was put by the Court as to who gave the particulars of the cases referred to above, the learned counsel mentioned that they were given by the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThat means that the Chief Justice of India had been furnished all the particulars by the Delhi Chief Justice earlier at the meeting which took place on March 26, 1981.and the Chief Justice of}ndia had also the explanation of Shri S.N. Kumar.\n\nIt i& not necessary for us here to assess correctness or otherwise of the conflicting versions of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar bearing on the matters referred to above but tlie aforesaid particulars are sufficient to hold that sufficient information was available with the Chief Justice of India to record his opinion on the question of appointment of Shri S. N. Kumar and no material of any substantial importance had been kept back from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThe letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High. Court to the Law Minister which is quoted above more or less contained the same particulars.\n\nThere would have been some reason to complain if the material contained in the letter of May 7, 1981 was favourable to Shri S.N.\n\nKumar and the Chief Justice of India had recommended that Shri\n\nS.N. Kumar should not be appointed in ignorance of the contents of the letter of May 7, 1981.\n\nOn the other hand, on the basis of the material which had been made' available to him, the Chief Justice of India had made a report favourable to Shri S.N. Kumar.\n\nThere appears to be not much substance in the submission that Shri S.N.\n\nKumar was denied the benefit of a further refutation by the Chief Justice of India of the allegations in the letter of May 7, 1981 and that he had suffered thereby.\n\nSuch reiteration whould not have added any further strength to hi~ case. It cannot, therefore, he said that the process of consultation , had become de[ecti ve or that Shri S.N. Kumar had been prejudiced by reason of the Government keeping back the Jetter dated May 7, 1981 from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India out of respect to the wishes of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.\n\nS.Jl. OUM'A v. UNION (Yenkataramialt, J.) 1421\n\nOne of the arguments urged on the basis of the Law Minister's not dated May 19, 198.J may be disposed of here.\n\nThat argument is that since the Chief Justice.of the Delhi High.Court had stated that he was looking int<,> the file of the 'Kissa Kursi Ka' case in which Shri 0.N. Vohra had convicted late Shri Sanjay Gandhi (son of the Pi:ime Minister) who was later on acquitted by the Supreme\n\nCourt, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court was looking into irrelevant papers at the instance of the Law Minister or the Prime Minister to find out some material against Shri O.N. Vohra who was also not continued as additional Judge and hence his opinion given against Shri S.N. Kumar also was a motivated one.\n\nApart from the above reference to his looking into the file of 'Kissa Kursi Ka' case, we do not have any other material to draw the above conclusjon except the fact that Shri Vohra also had not been continued.\n\nIt is not known what opinion was expressed by the Delhi Chief Justice on that material. Sbri Vohra himself has not questioned the decision taken in his behelf.\n\nThe Court cannot go outside the record.\n\nPrejudice and passion cannot be allowed to overtake reason.\n\nIt is not open to the Court to draw an adverse inference against the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court who is. not before the Court. Any attempt. to do. so would be an unjudicial act. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention.\n\nIt is, however, contended that the Law Minister had tried to 'preempt' the decisio:u on the issue by making up his mind on May 27, 1981 not to reappoint Shti S.N. Kumar even. before the Chief Justice of India w.rote his final letter dated May 29, 1981 recommending reappointment of Shri Kumar for a period of two years instead of three months as stated in the letter dated May 22, 1981.\n\nThere does not appear to be any undue haste or impropriety on the part of the Law Minister in making his recommendation not to appoint Shri Kumar on May 27, 1981 for two reasons : (I) that the Government had to take a decision on that question on. or before May 27, 1981 as directed by the interim order referred to above and\n\n(2) that tqe Law Minister had expressly kept out of consideration the I.B. reports while taking his decision, as can be seen from the note of -\n\nMay 27, 1981 on which alone the Chief Justice of India had reserved his opinion in his letter dated May 22, 1981 which showed that on the other questions he had finally expressed his opinion. Another point which may be noticed here is that the granting of extension to a Judge pending enquiry into a material aspect of the case may\n\nnot strictly be . in consonance with the Constitution.\n\nIt may be irregular to issue a warrant of appointment pending inquiry into the\n\n1422 stJJ>RllME cot.JRT RllPbil.ts [1982J i s.c.a.\n\nA fitness of the person to be nppointed as a Judge.\n\nHence it . cannot be sad that the.re was any transgression of ordinary rule of official conduct on the part of the Government in finaily processing the file by May 27, 1981..\n\nThe Predent has taken his decision on a consideration of the material before him and in doing so he isnot shown to have relied on any irrelevant ground. The President, as observed earlier, is entitled to arrive at his own decision on the question of appointment of a Judge after consultation with the dignitaries mentioned in Article 217(1) of the Constitution. He is not, however, bound by the opinion of any of them although he is expected to give due regard to the opinions expressed by them The President in the instant case has, as stated by the learned Attorney General, out of prudence deeided not to reappoint Shri S.N. Kumar as the opinions of the two constitutional dignitaries were conflicting on the question of integrity, a question vital to the appointment ofa Judge. There appears to be no constitutional impropriety in the decision of the President.\n\nThe reason for not reappointing Shri Kumar is not an irrelevant one.\n\nMoreover there is a distinction between the appointment of a Judge without proper and effective consultation as required by Article 217(1) and a nonappointment of a person as a Judge preceded by defective consultation.\n\nIn the former case the validity of the appointment may be open 'to question but in the latter case ordinarily no petition will lie except under an extra ordinary case like the one here where the scope of Article 224 of the Constitution was not correctly understood by the authorities.\n\nEvery one of the authorities viz. the Law Minister, the Chi<if Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court has discharged his duties in this case with a sense of responsibility. But it is unfortunate that they could not arrive at an unanimous opinion.\n\nIf the reasons had been irrelevant, probably the Court could have asked the Government to reconsider the matter. , But that is not the case here.\n\nG Shri R.K. Garg, learned counsel for Shri Kumar strenuously urged before us that Shri S.N. Kumar was ready to establish his innocence and an opportunity should be given to him to do so.\n\nHis anxiety in making that submission is quite understandable.\n\nBut unfortunately the Court cannot undertake this function in view of H the restricted scope of the jurisdictiOn of this Court in this case. In spite of the limitations which appeared to exist at the earlier stages of this case, this case has turned out to be r1:markable\n\n_,.\n\ns.t>. OUl>tA v. UNION (Yenkataramiah, J.) .1423\n\nfor two reasons.\n\nFiist, the Court directed for the purpose of deciding this case the disclosure of the documents relating .to , the ' appointment to a high constitutional office which may not have been possible in any other Commonwealth country even now and secondly the Court has come to the conclusion that it is open to the Court to determine whether the decision not to reappoint Shri S.N. K'umar was due to cogent reasons or not in the peculiar circumstances of this case even when the relevant constitutional provisions are silent about it. In these two respects, this case should be considered as an important milestone in the development . of administrative law in our country.\n\nThe Court, however, cannot proceed further in this case and try to find out the truth or .otherwise of the complaints said to . have been made against Shri S.N.\n\nKumar. It is true that lf the complaints are really untrue, then Shri Kumar has paid the penalty for no fault committed by him.\n\nBut it should be a matter of some consolation that the Chief Justice of lndi~ has 'exonerated him fully.\n\nIt is also made clear that the Court has dedined to grant the prayer of Shri S.N. Kumar without expressing any opinion one way or the other on his integrity or efficiency.\n\nThe result of this case should demonstrate to all those who are today holding the\" posts of fodges and to those who aspire after judgeships how difficult it is to maintain the fair image of a Judge. The decision of the President not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the High Court df Delhi cannot, therefore, be interfered with. .\n\nPART X\n\nThe validity of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 sent by the Law Minister to all the Chief Ministers is seriously assailed before us by the petitioners; It is contended by them that the letter amounts to a threat to all the' additional Judges whose. consent for being appointed as permanent Judges in High Courts other than the one in whjch they were working is sought.\n\nThe Government contends that the letter does not contain any such threat and that it had been sent in o_rder to implement the policy of the Government to have some Judges. in every High Court who belong to other States.\n\nBy the letter in question, the Law Minister has requested the Chief Ministers of States (except North-Eastern States) and the Governor of Punjab to ascertain the wishes of all additional Judges working in their High.Courts and persons whose names have been recommended fo~ ap.pointment as Judges of High Courts whether\n\n1424 $lJPRllME COtJltt llllPOllTS (19821 2 s.c.R., ·\n\nA they are willing to work in High Courts outside teir States.. The circular letter reads :\n\n\"D.0. No. 66/10/81-Jus.\n\nMy dear,\n\nMinister of Law Justice and Company Affairs, India New Delhi-11000 I.\n\nMarch 18, 1981\n\nIt has repeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar· Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. Some how, no start could be made in the past in this direction. The feeling is strong, growing and justified that some effec, tive steps should be taken very early in this direction.\n\nIn this context, I would request you to- ·\n\n(a) obtain from all the Additional Judges working in the High Court of 'your State their consent to be. appointed as Permannt Judges in any other High Court in the country. They could, in addition, be requested to name three High Courts, in order of perference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as Permanent Judges; and\n\n(b) Obtain from persons who have already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in th.e country alongwith a similar preference for three High Courts.\n\n....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1425\n\nWhile obtaining the consent and the preferenceof the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it may be\n\nmade clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of Government either in regard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the preferences given.\n\nI would be grateful if action is initiated very early by you and the written consent. and preferences of all Additional Judges as well as of persons recom.mended by you for initial appointment are sent to me within a fortnight of the receipt of this letter.\n\nI am also sending a copy of this letter to the Chief Justice of your Hih, Court.\n\nWith regards, .\n\nGovernor of Punjab\n\nYours sincerely, . Sd/- (P. Shiv Shanker)\n\nChief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States)\n\nIn its Fourteenth Report, the Law Commission suggested that\n\nF . the whole country should be treated as a single unit for the purpose of selection of Judges of the High Court.\n\nThe relevant part of the report reads :\n\n\"59. Further, the whole country must be treated as a single unit for the purpose of selection as it is vitally important that the best available talent which the country is capable of providing be mobilized for the task of meeting a situation which has undoubtedly assumed the proportions of an emergency. If suitable persons of the necessary merit and character are in the opiriion of the appointing authority not available in thi: St; j.te, the authority $h911ld not hesitate to draw\n\n• E\n\n1426 SUPRBMll COURT RBPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a.\n\nupon persons available in other States.\n\nSelections from the Bar must necessarily be of persons of outstanding merit commanding a large practice who may Well be willing to make a pecuniary sacrifice and render public service by accepting these judgeships. An effort should be made to persuade suitable senior practitioners to accept these judgeships at least for a short period as a public duty.\n\nTheir position at the Bar must be of such eminence that it could not be suggested that acceptance by them of judgeships . was likely to increase their earnings on their reverting to the Bar.\"\n\n(Vide Para 59 in Chapter 6 of the 14th Report of the Law Commission of India, V:ol. I)\n\nThe advantages gained by having persons from other States as Judges of High Court were'stated by theLaw Commission presided over by Justice H.R. Khanna, in its 80th Report thus :\n\n\"6.21. We may next deal with the question of having in each High Court about one-third of judges from outside the State.\n\nRecommendation for this purpose was made by the States Reorganisation Commission.\n\nThe Law Commission presided over by Mr.\n\nSetalvad in its fourteenth Report observed in this connection :\n\n\"The recent creation of various zones in the country and the efforts to treat the States forming part of these zones as one unit for various purposes would we hope, lead to the States forming part of each zone tv be recruiting ground for appointments to the High Courts from the members of the Bar in these States. It is hoped that in this manner the expectation of the States.\n\nReorganisation commission that at least one third of the High Court judges would be persons drawn from outside the State will be realised\".\n\nLikewise, the Study Team on Centre-State Relations appointed by _the Adminisirative Reforms Commission also suggested that so far as practicable one-third of the number of judges of a High Court\n\nhould be from. outsid~.\n\n...\n\n._.,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkatilramiah, J.). 1427\\\n\nWe have given the matter our earnest consideration and are in substantial agreement with the recommendations mentioned above., In our opinion, there should be a convention,. according to which one-third of judges in each High Court should be from another\n\nState.\n\nThis would normally have to be done through the process of initial appointments and not by transfer.\n\nIt would also in the very nature of things be a slow and . gradual process and take some .. years before we realc!h\n\nth!\\ proportion,\n\n6.~2. Evolving such a. convention would, in our . opinion, not only help in the process of national integration but would also improve the functioning of various High Courts. It would secure on the Bench .of.each High Court the presence of a number of judges who would not . be swayed by local considerations or affected by issues which may rouse local passions and emotions.\n\nAs observed by us in one of our earlier Reports, one of the essential fhings for the de administration of justice is not only the capacity of th~ judges to bring a dispassionate approach to cases handled by them, but also to inspire a feeling in all concerned that a dispassionate approach would underlie their decision.\n\nQuite . often, cases which arouse strong emotional sentiments and regional feelings come up before courts of law. To handle such cases, we need judges who not only remain unaffected by .local sentiments and regional feelings, but also appear to be so.\n\nNone would be better suited for this purpose than judges hailing from other States. It is a common feeling amongst old lawyers that apart from cases with political overtones, the English judges showed a sense of great fairness and brought a dispassionate approach in the disposal of judicial cases handled by them.\n\nWe in India are in the fortunate position of having a vast country. There can, therefore, be no difficulty in having a certain percentage of judges who - hail from othe'r States.\n\nThe advantages gained by having persons from other States as judgs would be much greater compared with any disadvantage whicq\n\nmight result therefrom\", · ·\n\nD - E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 s.c.i.\n\nWhile rejecting the contention that the transfers of High Court Judges during the emergency in the year 1976 had been made in the interests of national integration, ~Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed in Sakal Chand Seth's case (supra) at page 450 thus :\n\n\"As regard the first, no one can deny that whatever measures are required to be taken in order to achieve national integration would be in public interest.\n\nWhether it is necessary to transfer Judges from one High Court to another in the interest of national integration is a moot point.\n\nBut that is a p; licy matter with which courts are not concerned directly.\n\nOne may, however, venture, the observation that there are numerous other ways of achieving natio11al integration more effectively than by transferring High Court judges from one High Court to another.\n\nConsidering the great inconvenience, hardship and possibly a slur, which a transfer from one High Court to another involves, the better view would be to 'leave the Judges untouched and take other measures to achieve that purpose.\n\nIf at all, on mature and objective appraisal of the situation it is still felt that there should be a fair sprinkling in the High Court judiciary of persons belonging to other States, that object can be more easily and. effectively attained by making appointments of outsiders initially.\n\nI would only like to add that the record of this case does not bear out the claim that any one of the 16 High Court' Judges was transferred in order to further the cause of national integration\". (emphasis added)\n\nUntwalia, J. observed in that very case at page 507 thus :\n\n\"The purpose of national integration, if othenvise it is a good thing to be achieved, or the need of particular High Court for a Judge possessing a particular type of proficiency or some such grounds of public interest can well be achieved at the time of the initial appointments; as for example, a member of th.e Bar practising in a particular High Court may be appointed at the very threshold, if he so agrees to be appointed, a Judge of another High Court so that after retirement\n\n\\'. t ,. ' . • ! .... .T ..... ' : , .' • .... ~;.\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1429\n\nf '\" ! . f. ' • • \" '' • • . : • •\n\nI ;, .he may come back and resume his practice in the High Court where he wa\"s so doillg. . '1 shll. perhaps, be crossing my permissibfo 'limits if I embark to write an essay or a the'sis o'n the various 'aspects of the 'needs of such public interest high-ligh\"ti0g\n\n0 the minus points also in them, nor. will it serve any useful purpose.\n\nThese are ma'tters of policy decision entirely within the realm of the governmental power\". (emphasis added)\n\nThese \"two 'exfracts from the decision in Sakal Chand Sheth's case (supra) cfoarly state that if as a matter o!f policy the Govern~ ment proposes to 'appoint some Judges in every High Court from outside the State, it is a matter within the realm of the Government.\n\nThey havenot siated that it is constitutionally impermissi~Ie to do so.\n\nThe objections raised by the petitioners to the opinions of the Law Commiesion referred to above are that they could not be relied on as the said opinions had not been tested by the 'purifying process' of an argument at the Bar and secondly the recruitment of members of the Bar or of the subordinate judiciary functioning outside the State would be unconstitutional as there would be no possibility of an effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the concerned State as they would have no opportunity of personally assessing the quaiities of members of the Bar and. the subordinate judiciary working outside their jurisdiction.\n\nThe Report of the Committees of the Law Commission are entitled to great respect as they are prepared by experienced persons after taking into consideration all relevant aspects and sometimes the evidence collected by them from several sources.\n\nIf they are to be excluded many opinions expressed in many of the books relied on by the pethioners themselves have to be excluded.\n\nReports of the Law Commission can be looked into to understand the history of the legislation; the object with whch certain legal provisions are enacted and 'what advantages may be drived by adopting a particular policy.\n\nReports of the Law Commission have been made use of by this Court earlier to understand the history of the legislation which was under consideration and the object with which if was passed. (Vide Balchand. /airi v, State of Madh)'a Pradesh.(1) The\n\n(1) - [1977] 2 SCR 52,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R:\n\nsecond limb of this argument over\\O)kS the fact that the Constitution dues not state that the Chief Justice of the High Court and the _ Governor of the State should personally know the persJns recommended under Article 217 of the Constitution and that they cannot collect information about them by any other source such as the\n\nChief Justice of .the -High Court having jurisdiction over the area where they are working or the Governor of the other State.\n\nIn the true nature of things such personal knowledge cannot be insisted upon. If that is insisted upon, the cons.ultation with the Chief\n\nJustice of Irtdia itself may turn out to be ineffective for the very same reason for he cannot be expected to have personal knowlege about many persons whose names are recommended by the Chief Justices of the various High Courts and Governors. In the context of Article 217, it has to be held that the functionaries who have to express opinion under that Article can ascertain aff relevant information about a person proposed for the appointment by any other reasonable means and they need not know them personally. Any other view would result in the exclusion of a large body of lawyers who are not practising before the High Courts from consideration for appointment as High Court Judges, which certainly could not have been the intention of the Constitution makers.\n\n. The next contention urged in this connection is that this is an indirect attempt to transfer some additional Judges from one High Court to another.\n\nIt cannot be so for the reason that the transfer of an additional Judge (appointed under Article 224(1) ) unless the arrears\"have been cleared off and the transfer of an acting Judge (appointed under Article 224(2)) in any-event would not be possible at all. An additional Judge is appointed for a term not exceeding two yeJ!.rS only with a view to clearing off the arrears in a High Court. If that is the sole object of appointing him, how can he be transferred as an additional Judge in the public interest from that Court to another Court unless the purpose for which -he is appointed is achieved namely, clearing off the arrears? Moreover when his stay as an additional Judge is very short it would not subserve the interest of efficiency of public service if he is mact'e to work in more than one High Court during that short period unless there is not sufficient work to be assigned to him in the High Court in which he is initially appointed as an additional Judge.\n\nThe case of an acting Judge appointed under Article 224(2) of thu Constitution is a self-evident one.\n\nAn acting Judge is appointed to act as. a\n\nJude until the permanent Judge in whose place he is appointed ha~\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1431\n\nresumed his office.\n\nHe cannot, therefore, be transferred under Article 222 contrary to the express terms of Article 224(2). In view of this declaration the petitioners cannot entertain any suspicion that the circular letter has been issued to achieve the object of transferring additional Judges, during their tenure fixed under Article 224(1).\n\nThis, however, does not come in the way of an additional Judge or an acting JuJge being appointed as a permanent Judge either in his own High Court or in any other High Court before the tenure specified under Article 224( l) or Article 224(2), as the case may be, comes to an end. .\n\nI also do not find .any substance in the submission made on behalf of some of the petitioners that the circular letter of the Law Minister suggests that the additional Judges who have not given their consent would be under a disadvantage in the -1ilatter of their continuance as additional Judges or of their appointment as perma nent Judges in their own Court. The learned Attorney-General has stated before the Court that 'beyond any inherent or incidental advantage that the implemeptation of the policy of appointing out side Judges may confer, no other advantage or disadvantage is to be visited on any person by reason of his having given consent or his refusal in response to the inquiry stated in the impugned letter of 18th March, 1981'.\n\nIn view of the above statement, I take it that the portion in paragraph 3 of the letter, namely, 'it may be made clear to them that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a preference does not imply any commitment on the part of Government either \" in regard. to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance with the preference given' does not carry with it any sinister design.\n\nIt is submitted on behalf of the Government that such a statement had to be made because the necessary censultations under Article 217(1) of the Constitution had yet 'to be made. This explanation is accepted reserving liberty to any additional Judge, who is prejudiced by his not givfng consent, to approach the Court for appropriate relief if an occasion arises to do so.\n\nThere is also no merit in the contention. that since thecircular letter. has been addressed without the previous consultation of the Chief Justice of India, Article 217(1) and Article 222 of the Constitution had been violated. The letter as can be seen from its tenure . is intended to find out whether any additional Judge is willing to be appointed as a Judge in any othe( Hit?h Cou_rt. uch apointen~ -\n\n\nI 1982) 2 S; C.R\n\nhas to be made only in accordance with Article 217(1) of the <; onstitution. Before making such appointment, the President had to consult all the functionaries mentioned in Article 217(1) inciuding the Chief Justice of India.\n\nArticle 222 .of the Constitution does not come into picture at all as no transfer is contemplated under' the letter. The letter relates to initial appointments only.\n\nIn the circumstances there is no error committed by the Law Minister in writing the inpugned letter to the Chief Ministers.\n\n• All the cotentions of the petitioners regarding the circular letter of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, therefore fail.\n\nPART XI\n\nWe are concerned in the case of Shri KB.N. Singh with the question Whther the order of his transfer as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras is valid or not. Earlier it has been held that the consent of the Judge to be transferred is not necessary under Article 222 of the Constitution and that such transfer can be made in the public interest as laid down by the majority in Sakal Chand Sheth's case (supra). The order in question is an administr.ative order which is passed by the President in .accordance with the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India, who is the sole authority to be consulted under Article 222. In this case also as per. directions of this Court, the relevant papers have been produced by the Union Goverment. It is urged that the manner in which consultation is made in this case is not in accordance with law as the President had not initially asked the Chief Justice of India to gi-ve his opinion on the question of transfer of Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh but the Chief Justice of India had on bis own accord ' advised the Union Government to. transfer him first to the High Court of Rajasthan and later on to the High Court of Madras.\n\nArticle 222 does not lay down the procedure to be followed for effecting a transfer. Even granting that the proceedings for transfer of a Judge are initiated by the Chief Justice of India the order of transfer would not be bad as under Article 217 (I) of the Constitution which is couched in almost the same language, an appointment of a Judge would not be bad only because the Chief Justice of a High Court who is one of the autlJ.orities to be consulted initiates the proposal. In fact the practice has been that the Chief\n\nJutice of the l-lii:h Court invariably initiates it. This conten-\n\nS.P. OuptA. v. UNION (Jlenkataramiah, J.) 14l3\n\n. , I tion is'not therefbre' one'of sut1stiince!. The' crux of me question is wlietlier'the authority exercising' the power of.transfer has brought to the knowledge of the authority to be consulted all' the relevant material with .it and has given sufficient opportunity .to tender his opinion. Thete is no allegation that'tlle', Govrnment had kept back . any relevant information from the Chief Justice of lhdia: The' Chief Justice of India himself says in his counter affidavit that there was full and effective consultation witli hiin. A fair reading of the letter of the Chief Justice of fodia dated December 7, 1980 shows that there was prior discussion about the question of transfers of Chief Justices of High Courts and that there was a suggestion by the Government that.there should be atransfer of all Chief Justices of High Courts so that in every High .. C.ourt there was a Chief Justice who hailed from outside the State. This suggestion stems from the proposed policy of the Government which is clear from the state~ ment of the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1980, the relevant part of which reads : \" Policy is whether we . should have the\".:hief JustiCe from outside. This is the policy. How we should have.isa matter of mechanism.\" .There are similar references ; to it•in some other. speeches' ofthe'Law Minister both in the Lok Sabha and in the Rajya1Sabha:. Even 1though it' appears from someof the speeches of the Law Ministert.that such a policy had not taken a fi'nal shape, the ChierJustice:ofllndia had been told that the Government had'an'ideato bring1int0forcesuch a policy before the middle1ofl980.. From certain notings\" on the file• relating to the appointment of ChieHustice of the Delhi High Curt which weredisclosed by'the Union Governmnt as per ordersof the Court dated November.18, 1981 it. is evident that there was discussion between the Central Government and,- thei Chief Justice of India about the policy of appointing the Chief Justice of every High Court from outside, the, State. The first.note.of the Law Minister dated\n\nMay 15, 1980, where he specifically refers to the said policy refers to the discussion he had with the Chief Justice of India on it. The next' note inthat•fi!e is' ofthe Chief.Justice of India. It is dated June 5; 1980 an'd the relevant part of it reads :\n\n--·\n\n\"lt would become.necessary:in the very near future to evolve an All India policy for. appointments of Chief Justices in the various High Courts. The difficulties in taking any, ad hoc decision on that question are of such grave magnM:ude that it would be impossible at this\n\nF .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 S.C.l\n\nstage to appoint an outsider as a Chief Justice either of the Delhi High Court or of the Andhra Pradesh High Court \"\n\n• This note is followed by the note of th! Law Minister dated July 21, 1980. In that it is stated :\n\n\"The Chief Justice of India and I had a detailed discussion yesterday morning on the question of appointment and transfer of Chief Justices of the High Courts so that .the position of the Chief Justice of a High Court is held by an outsider as a matter of policy.\n\nThis would avoid discriminatory treatment which would have otherwise invited undue criticism ..\n\nIn view of the discussion with the C.J.I., it appears desirable to appoint Shri Justice Prakash Na.rain as the Permanent Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and Shri Justice Kuppuswami as Permanent Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, subject to the general policy decition oil having the Chief Justice: from outsid.e that High Court. It is clearly understo_od that subject to the genera.I policy decision and the mechanism that would be evolved to give effect to that policy, Shri Justice Prakash Narain and\n\nShri Justice Kuppuswami would be transferred to different High Courts~ . . . . . ..... \"\n\nThen there is a long note dated July 31, 1.980 of the Chief Justice of India in which he bas observed thus :\n\n\" ... The heart of the matter however is whether as, a general All India policy, a Judge of a High Couirt ought never to be appointed as the Chief Justice of that High Court. I am prepared to keep an open mind on this question because the pros and cons of the issue has still to be thrashed out. But the better view may be that transfers of sitting Chief Justices may be made. only in appropriate cases, that is to say, when a strong case for the transfer has been made out.\n\nSimilarly, appointments of Chief 'Justices may be\n\ns.P. GU1>°i'A v. UNION (Venkatarainiah, J.) i43.5\n\nmade from outside, whenever the circumstances warrant. This involves the assessment of each individual situation as and when its asises ...\n\nAt this stage it is unnecessary to say anything more on the subject except to clarify that though I recognise the need to evolve an All India policy for appointments of Chief Justices in the various High Courts, I do not think that it will be either feasible or proper to transfer each and every sitting Chief Justice of the High Court to another High Court, or io appoint an outside Judge as the Chief Justice whenever a vacancy of a Chief Justice arises.\n\nSuch a course will introduce numerous complications the general nature of which I have discussed with the Law Minister.\n\nThe question is so replete with practical difficulties and involves a question of such high principle that a very careful thought shall have to be given to it before a final decision is taken.\n\n I, therefore, reiterate my earlier recommendation that Mr. Justice Prakash Narain should be appointed as the permanent Chief Justice of. the Delhi High Court and Shri Justice Kuppuswami as the permanent Chief Justice:. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nI consider it unnecessary to add that these appointments should be \"subject to the general policy\" .of. appointing Cbief Justices from outside, because if, eventually, a decision is taken that every Chief Justice must come from outside, it will naturally become necessary to consider the transfer of Mr. Justice Prakash Narain and Mr. Justice Kuppuswami.\"\n\nThe above notings show that the Chief Justice of India who had been apprised of the proposed policy of . the Government had not opposed the fransfe~ of Chief Justices of High Courts as a matter of policy but only had expressed certain points which needed to be considered before taking a final decision on the question.\n\n1436 stJl>ltllMll cotillT li.El>ottts ( t 982) 2 s.c.tl.\n\nIn this letter dated December 7, 1980 however the Chief Justice . of India says \"though I am firmly opposed to a wholesale transfers of the Chief Justice of tbe High Courts, I take the view, which I have expressed from time to time that such transfers may be made in appropriate cases for stricitly objective reasons.\" It.is true the Chief Justice of India stated that he was oppost:d to 'wholesale transfers' but he does not appear to have opposed the policy of having the Chief Justice of every High Court from outside the State. This statement 'niay men that at the same. time the transfers or appointments of all the Chief Justices of all the eighteen High Courts in accordance with the p'alicy may not be advisable Thee may be a Chief Justice, who has only three or four months of service before his superannuation~ There may he a Chief.Jµstice who is ailing and who cannot threfore .. be m'aved to another High Court immediately. Moreover the Chief Justice f India has to get into touch with each one of the Chief Justices before an order of transfer is made in his case to ascertain from him his prolems. There may be some. difficulty in finding out a suitable High Court for a Chief Justice because the question of adjustment of seniority between him and the other Jdg es of that Court may pose a problem.\n\nIt is probably on account of these difficulties the Chief Justice of India stated that he was . opposed to a 'wholesale transfer' of the Chief Justices. This statement cannot be read as conveying the meaning that the hief Justice of India wanted that only some particular Chief Justice should be transferred or that the policy should be implemented in the case of particular High Courts.\n\nThere is no doubt that a policy decision should ultimately be applicable to all High Courts. But it can be applied by stages.\n\nA policy or for that matter a law may have to be applied by stages in differe_nt areas and in the case of different institutions or bodies by reason of administrative compulsion and such application cannot be considered as either arbitrary or capricious or unconstitutional.\n\nSometimes the application of a policy or a law in all areas or in respect of all institutions to which it is ultimately intended to apply simuitaneously may defeat , the very policy or law, even though it may be otherwise beneficial. The difficulties involved in such 'wholesale' application might have given rise to the difficulty expressed by the Chief Justice. This appears to be a reasonable construction to be placed on the sitid statement of the .Chief Justice of India.\n\nOne should remember. that the said statement is in a letter and not in a statute and is one made in the context of previous correspondence and discussions which have gone on for some\n\nS.P. GtJPt~, v. VNION.{Penkataramialr, J.) 1437\n\ntie in an inforryial W~Y: Moreoye, r: a, p.J?ljcy is, not somethiJ)gv wbih should take the form of a formal statute or a written code. It can be gathered from a course''or' action~;. COl}duct and can take' its birth whe~-the flst step is taken'id its direction. . ..... .\n\nThe question of policy is a matter, entirely for the President to decide. Even though the Chief Justice of- India .is consulted in that behalf by. the President since th~. policy relates to the. High Cour.ts, his opinion is not binding.on the President. lt is open to the President to adopt any policy, which is sµbject only. to the judicial review by the Court.\n\nUnder Article 222 ofthe Constitution the. Chief .Justice of India has to be consulted on the question whether a particular Judge should be transferred and where he should be transferred1 w)lile implementing the, said policy.\n\nIf the Government requests, the Chief~ °Justice of; lndia to give his opinion on. a transfer. to implement.the.said policy.w.hich is really in the public interest he cannot decline to do. so.\n\nEven though the Chief Justice.was opposed, to the.'wholesaleJransfers'.· ofrJµdges there is no bar for.the.Government treating the., recommendation for transfers made by the. ChieUustice, ofrlndia.as a., part of,.the.implementation of its. policy.\n\nThat, the., transfer, of:Sbri. ~.B.N. Singh was on account ofthe .policy.of1the., Governmeqt, caJI. be gathered: from the following statemenfs, in th.et affidavits1 led, before this Court : In paragraph 8.of, tlw., a!fid!lvlt date4.~Rtm.ger, l6, l9811 o(hri K.B.N.\n\nSingh. It.is stated,: \"When the dep_qnent; wapte, d, tp kp, ow why he might be transferred t(l M; lras, the_, Hon,'ble, sChjef. Jµstice of India merely said, tt; it was the,, Qovern1m; nt p9ljcy, but.gave. no clue as to what necessit_ated1hi$, tran&fer frpm, PatQa 'to.· Madras.'.\" In para 2(g) of the .adyit.o(ihe CifJustj(ie, , f.'Ip4~~ h~ 1hs; ~ated : \"I deny that w.hen, Shrj.K.ltN. Si.nghswated:: to, kn, ow, qv% the telephone on, Janu!!rY; S.: 19~!, I~ s!atl?fi m11r~IYith1L~' it 1was.tpe 'Government policy' .. .'; In paragraph 8 of the Rejoinai; r, ajfidavit dated October 16, 1981 of Shri K.B.N. Singh, it is stated \"at one point he also said1that, it. v.:a~ Gove, rnenj 1 pqliy.,. to., effe<?tftr!Lµ, sfer .in, batches of two or, thr~'l\"\n\nIt is seen that the two Chief. Justices-Shri M, M, Ismail and Shri K.-B.N. Singh were transferredat thC'first instance. Some other transfers probably would-have followed•but for the filing ofthese\n\npetitions. It is already held that the policy ofhaving the Chief Justice in every High Court from outside tlie State is not unconstitutional and that it.couldbe achieved\" by resorting to Article:222<;>f\n\nH -\n\n1438 SUPREME COURT lllll>OltTS ! 1982] 2 s.c.ll.\n\nA . the Constitution. The transfer ordered pursuant to that policy cannot therefore be considered as either discriminaiory or not being in the public interest. Io fact such transfers are in the public interest for reasons already stated.\n\nIn is seen from the Counter Affidavit of the Chief Justice of India that the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh had not been recommended by him on the basis of any allegation of misbehaviour or of incapacity can form a basis for action under Article 218 read with Article 124(4) and (5) of the Constitution. The relevant part of that Counter Affidavit reads : ·\n\n\"It is true that he (Shri K.B.N. Singh) said that it was possible that some baseless complaints may have been made to me and that he would like to remove any wrong impression which those complaints may have .created.\n\nI told him that I do not go by baseless complaints, that I did not believe that his conduct was blameworthy but that if he wanted to explain any matter, which according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court, he was free to to do so.\n\nThereupon Shri K.B.N. Singh told me how certain persons connected with the High. Court were influenced by communal considerations and how he, on his own part, did not permit communai or any other extraneous considerations to influence him administratively or judicially. I assured him that I did not hold that he himself was to blame but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had created needless misunderstanding andl dissatisfaction.'\"\n\nThe foregoing clearly shows that the Chief Justice of India had never formed .an opinion that there -was any error committed by Shri K.B.N. Singh. Hence there can be no basis for the apprehension in the mind of Shri K.B.N. Singh that the transfer was being used as a measure of punishment in his case. If it had been a selec-. tive transfer ordered without regard to the public interest it would have been unconstitutional.· But this is noi such a transfer .• The order does not attach any stigma to. Shri K.B.N. Singh.\n\nIt is a bonafide one made in implementation of a perfectly valid policy which may be implemented in instalments. ·\n\nS.P. (lUP1A v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 143\\)\n\n,,. It is true that earlier the ChiefJusiice .if India had recom mended that Shri K.B N. Singli should be transferred to the R.ajasthan High Court. That was .a part of the chairi. of transfers then proposed;' It had not taken a final shape since s'hri J(B.N. Singh had not yet been informed about it and his views liad not yet been ascertained.\n\nBut when 'it was decided to transfer Shri M.M. !Smail to the Kerala High Court, tlie Chief Justice of India felt that the services of Shri K. B. N. Singh being a senior Chief\n\nJUstice were reqU'ired by the High Court of Madras. There is nothing unusual about this alteration but on the other hand shows that the ChiefJustice of India had an op'l:n mind on the question of transfer until he dlade his final recommendation.\n\nThe next submission made in this case is that the procedure followed in connection . with the. impugned orC:er of transfer is not fair.\n\nChandrachud, J. (as he then was) has dealt with the question of procedure to be followed before ordering the transfer ofa Judge under Article 222 of the Constitution in Sakal Chand Sheth's case\n\n(supra) at page 456 th us :\n\n\"Article 222 (l) postulates fair play and contains builtin safeguards in. the interests of reasonableness. In the first place, the power to transfer a High Court Judge can be exercised lh public interest only. Secondly, the President is under an obligation to consult the Chief Justice of India which means and requires that all the relevant facts must be placea before the Chief Justice.\n\nThirdly, the Chief Justice owes a corresponding duty, both.to the President and to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred, that he shall consider every rele- vant fact before he tenders his opinion to the President: In' the discharge of' this constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice woultl be within his rights, and indeed it is his duty whenever necessary, to elicit and\n\n. ascertain further facts either directly from the Judge concerned or from other reliable sources.\n\nThe execuc tive cannot and ought not to establish rapport with . ; tlie Judges which is the function and privilege of the\n\nChief Justice.\n\nIn substance and effect, therefore, the Judge concerned cannot have reason to complain of arbitrariness or unfair play, if the due procedure is followed.\"\n\n1440 SUJ>ltEMil COUR.t R.lll'Oltts, [1982) 2 s.c.lt.\n\nIt is evident from the above passage that the duty of consider ing every relevant fact pertaining to a Judge is of the Chief Justice of India .on the question of his transfer under Article 222 of tho Constitution.\n\nIn his counter affidavit the Chief Justice of India bas given the P, articuiars of the enquiry he. had made. before recommen· ding that Shri K.B.N. Singh should be transferred to Madras.\n\nHe. first talked to Shri K.B.N. Singh over the telephope onJanuary; S.·.\n\n1981 and informed him about the proppsal to transfer. him. to• Madras. Again on January 8,. 1981 Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met thei Chief Justice of.India at New Delhi and, tbe question of transfer, was. again discussed. The relevant part of the counter affidavit, of. the• Chief Justice of India.reads : •\n\n\"2(f) It is true, as stated by Slfri'K'.B~N. SingH in paragraph 8 of bis affidavit, that I conveyed 'to him onthe evening of January 5, 19811 over thetelepb'one that it was proposed to transfer Shri Justice M:M.\n\nIsmail to Kerala and that he, Shri K.B; N: Singh mayhave to go to Madras.\n\nI telephoned'Shri K.B!N; Singli on January 5, 1981 in order to zpprise him of the likeli\n\nhQQd , of. his transfer· to Madras. and.; to ask him if he had. auYthing, to say 1 on theuestion, of; his .• proposed transfer,\n\n(g) I deny.that when Shri K.B.N. Singh wanted to know over t.he telephone on J<1nuary,5 why_ he may be transferred to Madras, I stated mcrely, that it was the \"government policy\" an, d gaveno .clue1a.s-to what necessitated his transfer. from ' Patna. to .. Madras. I conveyed to him spifically -that. it was .piopPSed to transfer Shri Justice MiM. Ismail . from Madras and it was necessary to apppint an .. experienced and:.senior Chief Justice in his place.\n\n(h) It is true that Shri K.B.N. Singh .told me over the telephone that his mother.was bed, ridden and was not in a position to go with him to Madras.. I deny that he told ml( of any other prso.nal circum\n\nstance by. reason of which it would be difficult for him to go on transfer to M a<lras. . The only difficulty which he mentioned then or at any other time was that his mother was old and bed-ridden and .would\n\nS.P. ClUPTA 11. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1441\n\nnot <t, herefore be able to go to Madras. He told me that if his transfer was insisted upon, he would prefer to 1'esign. I requested him not to act in haste and to give the matter a close thought.\n\nI added that I was making a no.te of the diffiquity mentioned by him and that it will have to be taken foto consideration before a final decision was taken. I requested him to come to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer.\n\n(3) Sbri K.B.N. Singh has stated in patagraph 9 of his affidavit that be tnet me in Delhi three or four day!i later, told IIle or his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties in the event of his transfer to Madras, that he was with me for about 10-15 minutes and that t was nott-committal in the matter of his transfer. Shri K.B N. Singh saw me at my residence on January 8, 1981 at 7.30 p.m.\n\nHe was with me for quite some time much longer than 10 or IS millutes. I discussed with him the question of bis mother's\n\nadvanced age and illness, which was the only personal difficulty which lie mentioµed in the matter of his ·\n\nproposed transfer to Madras. l told him that I was unable to agree with him since there were other dependable persons in his family who could look after his mother and that, in any case, .his brother Shri S.B.N, Singh who was practising the in High Court was quite capable of looking after the mother. He replied that his mother had a special attachment to him and he could not leave her to the care of his brother or other members of the family.\n\nIt is true that he said that it was possible that some baseless complaints may hl!ve been made to me and that he would like to remove any wrong imprrssion which those complaints , may have created.\n\nI told him that I do not go by baseless complaints, that I did not believe that his conduct was blameworthy; but that if he wanted to explain any matter, which according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court, he was free to do so. Thereupon Shri K.B.N. Singh told me how certain persons connected with the High Court were influenced by commu- , nal considerations and how he on his own part did not\n\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R\n\npermit communal or any other extraneous considerations to influence him administratively or judicially. I assured him that I did not hold that he himself was to blame but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to' him which had created, needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. There are many more matters which he mentioned on the evening of January 8, 1981 but they do not directly bear upon the matters i!l issue her :in and I will, therefore, not refer to them.\n\n(4) The statement contained in paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Shri K. B. N Singh that he had not conveyed to me his consent to the proposed transfer is true.\n\nI however deny that be was not consulted regarding his transfer_ to Madras. I had discussed the. matter with him threadbare on more than two or three occasions. I deny that no reason, ground etc. necessitating. or justifying his transfer was disclosed to him or discussed with him by me.\n\nOn my part, I conveyed to him that his transfer was made in public interest, that it was not made by way of punishment and that it was also necessitated by the trans fer of Shri Justice Ismail from Madras to Keral_a.''\n\nAlthough Shri K.B.N. Singh has not fully accepted the facts narrated in the passage extracted above, there is no reason for not accepting in its entirety the statement made by the Chief Justice of India The above passage clearly shows thiit the Chief Justice of India had acted strictly in accordance with the procedure Indicated by him in Sakal Chand Sheth's case (supra).\n\nThere is, therefore, no ground to hold that the case of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer was not considered by the Chief Justice of India in a fair and reasonable way.\n\nThe next submission made on behalf of Shri K.B.N. Singh is that all aspects of the case were not placed before the President by the Chief Justice of India. This again is met by the statement of the Chief Justice of India in his. counter affidavit that \"there was full and effective consultation between me and the President\n\n9f India on the question of $bri K.:a.N, Singh's transfer from\n\n-.,,,,,,.\n\nS.P. GUPTA Y. UNION (Venkatciramiah, J.) 1443\n\nPatna to Madras as the Chief Justice of the Madras High ; Court.\n\nEvery relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer.\" At the hearing the Court. was informed that the President had not discused the matter personally with the Chief Justice of India. The expression \"President\" should be under stood here in the constitutional sense.\n\nThe discussion must have taken. place with the Minister concerned. It is not possible fo accept the submission that _no such discu)lsion could have taken place at all after Shri K B.N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India on the evening of January 8, 198 I because the Prime Minister had taken the decision on January 9, I 981 and there was no written record in support of it.\n\nFrom the records produced before us it is seen that discussion has gone a between the authorities concerned sometimes over telephone and sometimes at a meeting.\n\nNo minutes are kept of many 'such discussions It cannot, therefore, be said that either there was no time to discuss or nJ such discussion had taken place at all. It has to be borne in mind that the Chief Justice of India asked Shri K.B.N. Singh to met him at New Delhi to discuss the matter further and accordingly S!lri K.B.N. Singh met him on January 8, 1981. If the Chief Justice of India had felt that any representation to be made by Shri K.B.N. Singh was irrelevant he would not have called him for discussion at New Delhi.\n\nAfter discussing the matter with him he must have discussed the matter before the decision was taken on January 9, 1981 with the other authority concerned.\n\nIn the course of the discussion referred to above all matters which had come to the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India must have been placed before the person with whom the discussion had taken place.\n\nAll,. official acts must be deemed to have been done in accordance with law.\n\nThere is, therefore, no merit in this contention also,\n\nThe last submission on the above question was that whereas the Chief Justice of India had recommended that Shri K.B.N.' Singh should be transferred as a part of selective transfers, the President had treated them as part of the policy of haviiJg a Chief Justice in every High Court from outside the State which had not taken a final shape and therefore there was no consensus on the object to be achieved by the transfer. As already observed, the question of policy\n\n;~ within tl1e r~!l)W of the Governm.ent T4erefore, even if tqe Chief.\n\nSUPRBMB. COURT RB1>6RTS (1982] 2 s.c.tt.\n\nJustice of India considered that the recom'inendation made by him was one of six or i!even transfers suggested by him, which would mean for the time'being a partial implementation of the policy, it cannot be said that the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh is bad, for, all aspects relating to Shri K.B.N. Singh were considered by the appropriate authority before ordering the transfer. The tradsfer in question . .is not a stray case of transfer. A few , other transfers were in ·\n\ncontemplation at the relevant time and they necessitated consideration of individual cases separately. The transfers of Shri M.M Ismail and Shri K.B.N. Slngh were ord.ered. In all probability but for these petitions some more transfers would have materialised by now. We have to note that Artie)~ 222 of the Constitution is not confined only to policy transfers involving all Judges. Even individual Judges may be transferred for administratfve 'reasons in the public interest. In the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the transfer was an act of victimisation. One other contention raised in this case is that the Chief Ministers of Tamil Nadu and Bihar had not been consulted in accordance with a memorandum issued by the Government. The question whether there can be any memorandum supplementing the provisions of Article 222 is a matter of doubt. But since the c'aurt is informed that both the Chief Ministers had been consulted about the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Sin'gh, there is no need to probe into this point any further,,\n\nThe decision to transfer a Judge under Article 222 of the Constitution, as already stated, is an administrative one. It is not• alleged that any of the functionaries participating in that decision had any_ ill will against Shri K.B.N. Singh. The existence of malafides niay have been a ground to set aside the impugned order of transfer provided it had been alleged and established. In E.P.\n\nRoyappa v. Stat.: of Tamil Nadu and Anr.( 1) while rejecting a contention against an order of transfer which had been impugned\n\nin that case, Bhagwati, J. has observed thus :\n\n\"Secondly, we must not al.so overlook that the burden of establishing malafides is very heavy on the person\n\nwho alleges it. The allegations of. malafides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof a high order or credibility.\"\n\n(1) [1974] 2 SCR 34$ at ts. 390.\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nI 445\n\nIn this case, no such allegation of malafides is made against any authority. On the other hand the material available in the case clearly establishes that due procedure had been followed and all facts that justify the transfer have been affirmatively proved. It is shown that the authorities concerned felt satisfied about the need for the transfer.\n\nIn view of the above finding, Shri K.B.N. Singh cannot derive much assistance from the observations made in the Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. The Company Law Board & Ors.(1) and in Rohtas Tndustries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal & Anr.(2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is not possible to hold that the order of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras is illegal and void.\n\nPART XII\n\nNow the question is what relief can be granted in these cases.\n\nIn the earlier part of this judgment there is a detailed discussion about the continued neglect on the part of the Government in not making a proper review from time to time of the number of permanent Judges necessary for each High Court and the irregular exercise of power under Article 224 (I) of the Constitution in appointing additional Judges even though it was necessary to appoint permanent Judges. Even according to the Government there is need to appoint at least 150 Judges to clear off the arrears within two years. Article 216 of the Constittion, as observed earlier, confers power on the President to appoint adequate number of Judges in every High Court. In the United States of America the conditions in which a writ of mandamus may be issued to a Governor or the President are set out in paragraphs 140, 141 and 153 in Vol. 52 of the American Jurisprudence 2d. under the title 'Mandamus' thus :\n\n\"140. Governor.\n\nThe question of how far the governor of a state is subject to the supervisory control of court through the writ of mandamus is one of gravity and importance which the courts regard as extremely delicate, and the solution of which they undertake with great reluctance.\n\nIn some jurisdictions the courts refuse to issue the writ against a governor under any circumstances, whether\n\n(1) [1966] Suppl. SCR 311.\n\n(]) (1969] 3 SCR 108.\n\nD ,.\n\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe act sought to be enforced is regarded as ministerial or otherwie, on the theory that interference with his action constitutes a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, or upon the ground that issuance of a writ is inexpedient because of possible difficulty in enforcing it.\n\nUnder this view, a writ is not issuable against an executive for_ the purpose of compelling him to perform a duty, even though it is imposed upon him by statute. This reasoning has been rejected in many jurisdictions, which allow the maintenance of\n\nandamus proceedings against a governor under certain circumstances. All courts agree that the remedy is nof available to control the performance by a governor of political functions or functions requiring the exercise of discretion, but some will issue the writ to require the performance of ministerial duties, or to resfrain 'an act in violation of law.\n\nNeedless to say, mandamus will not issue to compel the'' performance by a governor of an act which does not fail within his prescribed duties, ' or which hs already been performed.\n\n141.\n\nPolitical and discretionary functions.\n\n1 State governors are invested by law with important governmental or political powers and duties belonging to the executive branch of the government, and the due performance thereof is intrusted to their official honesty judgment and discretion.\n\nAs to these purely executive or political functions devolving upon the chief executive officer of the. state, and as to any other duties necessarily involving the exercise of official judgment arid discretion, the doctrine is uncontroverted that mandamus will not lie to control or compel his action.\n\nApplying the foregoing rule, the courts have denied the writ when sought to compel the governor to call an election; count or reject votes cast at an election; issue a commission or certificate of election to office ; make an appointment to office: rescind an order removing or suspending an officer; recommend the passage of a particular Jaw ; sign or veto bills ; institute a proceeding for the transfer of a\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1447\n\nfederal prisoner to the state court; grant a pardon ; approve a parole ; borrow funds; sign or approve a warrant ; issue bonds ; subscribe to stock as required by statute ; appoint a commission to appraise property which1is sought to be condemned; allot 'or pay over money received from the Federal Government; approve a contract ; or perform other like duties.\n\nIf it is the constitutional or statutory duty of a governor to exercise his discretion with respect to a . certain matter, he may be required by mandamus to do so, but, of course,· the writ does not lie to direct the manner in which his discretion shall be exercised . . ' •.\n\n153. .President of United States\n\nAs is also true in the case of a state governor, which' in most respects is' a similar office' mandamus does not lie to control the administrative or executive discretion of the President of the United States, and if the President delegates one of his functions to another officer, an order by the latter is an administrative order of the President, which .cannot be vacated by mandamus.\n\nThe celebrated case of Marbury v.\n\nMadison is generally considered as authority for the view that.the corts have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against .the President to compel him to perform any act incidental to his office, whether purely ministerial in its character or not although the writ may is1me against the heads of departments of the Federal Government when the act to be performed is purely ministerial, not involving judgment or discretion.\n\nOn the other hand, in a later case in the Federal Supreme Court, although the case did not involve the President, the Attorney-General of the United States in his argument, although appearing in behalf of the officer to whom the writ of mandamus was prayed, conceded that such a writ might be issued against the President\n\nD ..\n\nE .,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nof the United States to compel him to perform a merely ministerial duty ............... \"\n\nPara 28 of Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol. I, page 32 reads : ·\n\n\"28. Duty and discretion.\n\nThe repository of a statutory power may be endowed with a discretion whether to act, and, if so, how to act.\n\nA discretionary power is typically conferred by words and phra$es such as \"may\", \"it shall be lawful\", \"if it thinks fit\" or \"as it thinks fit\".\n\nA statutory discretion is not, however, necessarily or indeed, usually absolute : it may be qualified by express and implied legal duties to comply with substantive and procedural requirements before a decision is taken whether to act and bow to act.\n\nMoreover, there may be a discretion whether to exercise a power, but no discretion as to the mode of its exercise ; or a duty to act when certain conditions are present, but a discretion how to act.\n\nDiscretion may thus be coupled with duties. On the other band, duty unaccompanied by any discretion requires action in a prescribed manner and form to be taken when the conditions precedent exists ; performance of such a duty is a mere ministerial act.\"\n\nIt is true that the words in Article 216 of the Constitution are undoubtedly empowering 'but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in public statutes words only directory, permissory or enabling . may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice.' (Vide R. Tithe Commissioners).(~) Earl Cairns said in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford,(') construing the words\n\n(it) shall be lawful' thus :\n\n\"But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under\n\n(1) [1849] 14 Q.B. 459 at 474\n\n(2) [1880] 5 A.C. 214@ 222-23.\n\n< \"\n\n8.P. GUPTA v, UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1449\n\nwhich it is to be done, something in the title of person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the dty of the person in wom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do _so\",\n\nIn Padfield & Ors. v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food & Ors.,(1) the House of Lords .had to construe the provisions - of the Agriculture Marketing Act, 1958 which provided for a com~ mittee of investigation to be cons.tituted, which was to consider and report on certain kinds of complaint \"if the Minister in any case .. so directs\". The complaint of the appellants who were members of the sou'th east regional committee of the Miik Marketing Board was that the board's terms and prices for the sale of milk to the board did not take fully into account the variations between the producers and the cost of bringing milk to a liquid market.\n\nIn effect the complaint was that _the prie .differential worked unfairly against the producers in the popular south east region where milk was more valuable, the cost of transport was less and the price_of land was higher. 'There had been many previous requests to the board but these had failed to get the board in which the . south east producers were _in a minority to do anything about the matter. tlie Minister declined to refer..the matter to the committee.\n\nThereafter the appellants applied to the Court for an order of mandamus commanding the Minister to refer the complaint to the Committee for investigation. The Divisional Court made an order against the Minister. But the Court of Appeal by a majority (Diplock and Russel L. JJ. Lord Denning M.R. disseritirig) set aside the order of-the Divisional Court. On further appeal to. the-House of Lords, the appeal was allowed and the case was remitted. The House of Lords held that the coin plaint was a substantial and a genuine complaint, neither frivolous, repetitive nor vexatious, the reasons of the Minister for not referring the matter to the Committee of iiives!lgation namely that the complaint raised wide issues, that his reasdns were 1iiifettered so that in effect it was sufficient that he should bonafide have considered the matter, 'were not good reasons in law, and indeed left out of account the merits of the complaint ; nd showed that he was not exercising bis discretion in accordance with the intentiou of sectio!l 19 of the Act of l 95 8.\n\n(1) [1968] All B.R. 694.\n\n-~--· ------\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe matter was remitted to the Queen's Bench' Division to require the Minister to consider the application of the appellants in accordance with law. Lord Upjon in his concurring judgment observed that even if the words in a statute conferred an unfetterep discretion on the Minister, it ought not to make any difference in this case. He said at pages 718-719 thus:\n\n\"My Lords, I believe that the introduction of the adjective \"unfettered\" and its reliance thereon as an answer to the appellants' claim is one of the fundamental matters confounding the Minister's attitude, bonafide though it be.\n\nFirst, the adjective nowhere appears in s. 19, it is an unauthorised gloss by the '- Minister. Secondly, even if the section did contain that adjective, I doubt if it would make any difference in faw to his powers, save to emphasise what he has. already, namely that acting lawfully he has a power of decision which cannot be controlled by the courts ; it is unfettered.\n\nBut the use of that adjective; even in an Act of Parliament. can do nothing to unfetter the control which the judiciary have over the executive; namely that in exercising their pewers the latter must act lawfully; and that is a matter to be determined by looking at the Act and its scope and object in conferring a discretion on the Minister rather than by the use of adjeclive.\"\n\nThe importance of he decision in Padfield's case (supra) was underscored by Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v.\n\nAma/¥amatq Engineering Union(1) thus :\n\n\"The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered.\n\nIt is a dicretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this : the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations, which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have actetl in good faith neverthelss the decision will be set aside, That is\n\n(1)\n\n~1971] 2 Q.B. 175 <$ 1901\n\nSJ>. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, :f.) i4S1\n\nestablished by Padfield\n\nv. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997 which is a landmark in modern administrative law\".\n\nNotwithstanding the principle of separation of powers found entrenched in the Constitµtion of the United States of Ameri<; a, as can be seen from_ the last part of para 141 of VoJ. 52 of the American Jurisprudence 2d. under the title 'Mandamus', if it is the constitutional or statutory duty of a governor or the President to exercise his discretion ,.with respect to a certain matter he may be required by mandamus to do so but the manner in which he has to dischage that duty cannot be directed by the courts. As observed jn the English decisions referred to above it is manifest that a statutory discretion is not necessarily or .\n\nindeed usually absolute, it may be qualified by express and implied legal duties to comply with substantive and procedural requirements before a decision is taken, whether to act and how to act.\n\nI am of the view that the power conferred on the President by Article 216 of the Constitution to appoint sufficient number of Judges is a power coupled with a duty and is not merely a political function.\n\nIn the instant case ordinarily the court would have been reluctant to issue any mandamus to the Government to comply with the duty of determination of the strength of Judges of High Courts. But having regard to the undisputed total inadequacy of the strength of Judges in many High Courts, it appears to be inevitable that the Union Government should be directed to determine within a reasonable time the strength of permanent Judges r\\)quired for the disposal of cases instituted in them and to take steps to fill up the vacancies after making such determination.\n\nAt this stage it should be mentioned that Shri P.R. Mridul , made a statement on behalf of the Minister of Law, Union of India in the course of his arguments as follows :\n\n\"The Union Government has decided to inc1 ease the\n\n. G number of posts of permanent Judges,.. in the various High Courts keeping in v!ew the load of work, the guidelines prescribed and other relevant considerations.\n\nIn fact in 1980 itself, on the basis of institution; dis- posal and arrears of cases and the guidelines prescibed, H the Governments of seven States where the problem was more acute, had been addressed to consider\n\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.1l.\n\naugmentattion of the Judge strengths of their High Courts. It has been decided that where necessary the guidelines prescribed will be suitably relaxed by taking into account local circumstances, the trend of litigation and any other special or relevant factors that may need consideration. The Union Government will take up the matter with the various State Government so that after consulting the Chief Justices. of the High Courts, they expeditiously send proposals for the conversion of a substantial number of posts of <j\\dditional Judges into those of permanent Judges.\n\nThe Union Government has also decided that ordinarily further appointments of Additional Judges will not be made for periods of Jess than one year,\"\n\nPART XIII\n\nFor the reasons given above, I am of the view that the Union Government, which has the responsibility of appointing sufficient number of Judges in every High Coutt should be directed to review the strength of permanent Judges in every High Court, to fix the mu:nber of permanent Judges that should be appo!nted in that High Court on the basis of the workload and to fill up the vacancies by appointing permanent Judges, While making. these appointments the Union Goverqment should first consider the cases of he additional Judges who are now in office fQr appointment as permanent J.udges in those vacancies. A writ in the a.Bove terms sJ; iall be iss.ued to the Union Government. All the other reliefs prayed for in these petitions are refused. There shall be no order as to costs.\n\nPART XIV\n\nIn the course of the hearing of these. cases several other questions of great importance touching the administration of justice such as the conditions of service of judicial officers, particularly of the members of the •subordinate judiciary, their salaries am! allowances, housing conditions etc. which needed to be looked into very urgently .came up. for discussion, Similarly many facets of the conduct of Judges and of lawyers were also discussed.\n\nDuring the hearing many useful remarks came to be made both on the side of\n\n< '\n\n...\n\n!l.P. GtJPtA v. t.INION {Yenkataramiah, J.) i453 --·· '.,,_ ._ ,,_ .. ..\n\nthe Bar and on t.he side of the Bench. All this exercise was done w.ith a vle~·t~.ej,11~.ising the. iprtance ofthe indc; p~.nence of\n\nth~ judi, c\\a, t:.Y. a.\\lA te; ii?, depnqence.' qf the B.a.r which are, fun.9.11~ mental o Republican Constitution whose main ch1;1racteristic ought to. b, e yirte: An Qbservation' of David Hume is.orty 9.f\n\nnote here. He said :\n\n• .- t\n\n\"To bala, n, ce a large Stte of society whethe, r Moar chical or Republican, on general laws, is a work of so\n\nr~t difi:iculty 'tha\\ n9 human geni~_s ho'wev~~ ompre\n\nhensive, is abl.e by the mere dint of reason and reflec~\n\n,.-, .• , I '• • '•·< ' • , , ', •• • .. , • • • ti on, to effect it.• The judgments of many should\n\nnite in this work ; experience. mst guide their lbou~\n\ntill).~- must.· blgg it. to perfction:; and .tl).e' f;, elh:ig. o( inconvenience must correct the mistakes which they\n\n{neyitaiy (; n i,9tQ in thir fi'rst. tril.s 11:1:1.\"il epi; i,- ments.\" ,,,., ... , .. ,.\n\nWe have come across in these cases many such mistakes, though committed honestly without realising the import or importance of• some of the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nPerhaps ther.e was no occasion to think about theni so far. It is hoped that at least hereafter in any step that is taken in the matter of appoint-. ment of Judges, the clear implications of the Constitution are kept in view by all concerned.\n\nThese cases . have made us think about ourselves and our learned brothers in t1'e p.er.ur . j11dici~:Y Qf' the QQ.untry. _ We are made to realise that we a_re all mortal; with. all t, he human frailties and that only a few know in this world tlie truth behind the follow• ing statement of ~c~~ J?; Mo~,~~~~,: \"\\\\'e. I. n_<?t to follow the straight road for its straightness, I should follow it for having found by experience that in the end it is commonly the happiest and the most use, fu, I ta~~·· .. It i, s, tu, c; tha~ the; Jl/dge~ oft_~.c; i¥, h. Co:1ms and the_ Supreme Court hold their tenure not at the pleasure of the Presi dent but ti.Ii they attai'n the prescibed ag~ of retiferpent ; that thelr removal is possible only after following an elaborate procedure ; that their salaries and :; il; lowances an4: pensio11 a.lie 9harged on h~\n\nconsolidted funds of the States or of the Union ; that no discus-\n\n, ··~--- -\n\ni454 SUPREME cotJkt REPORts ! 1982) 2 S.C.k.\n\nsion can take place in the legislatures with respect to their conduct in the discharge of their duties except on a motion for their removal that they have the power to punish a' person for contempt of court . and they are protected by a host of other provisions of law which are intended to make them feel and to remain independent of any external agency such as the executive.\n\nThese, as far as they go, are necessary for ensuring the independence of the judiciary.\n\nBut if the judiciary should be really independent something more is necessary and that we have to seek in the Judge himself and not outside.\n\nA 'Judge should be independent of himself.\n\nA Judge is a human being who .is a bundle of passions and prejudices, likes and dislikes, affection and ill-will, hatred and contempt and fear and recklessness. In order to be successful Judge these elements should be curbed and kept under restraint and that is possible only by education, training, continued practice and cultivation of a seme of humanity and dedication to duty. These curbs can neither be boug.ht in the market nor injected into1human system .by the written or unwritten laws.\n\nIf these things are there even if any of the protective measures provided by the Constitution and the .Jaws go the independence of 'the judiciary will not suffer. But with all these measures being there still a Judge may not be independent.\n\nJt is the inner strength of Judges alone that can save the judiciary. The 'life of a Judge does not really call for great acts of self sacrifice ; but it does insist upon small acts of self-denial almost every day.\n\nThe following sloka . explains the true traits of men with discretion which all Jud gcs should possess :\n\nf.p~ ; ftffif~ im '\" ~~\n\nl : tmr(J 'fl q.{~ I\n\nftlil' lil'l ~~ '!'l'mt~ '\" q-q:\n\nSlf~~ l'f \"1ro: II\n\n• • (Let men trained in ethics or morality, insult or praise ; let\n\nIakshmi (wealth) accumulate or vanish a.s she likes ; let death come\n\nt?day itself or at the end of a yuga (millennium), men with discretion will not deflect from the path of rectitude).\n\nI . r\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiqh, J.) 1455\n\nThis is only an ideal. It is difficult to attain it but every Judge should at least ende_avour to set bis eyes on that goal.\n\nORDER '\n\nIn view of the majority decision, all the Transferred Cases and B Writ Petitions are dismissed With no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\n. '\n\nTransferred Cases and Petitions dismis.ed c", "total_entities": 4377, "entities": [{"text": "SP. GUPTA & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.P. GUPTA & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "December 28, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 78, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December 28, 1981\n\n[ P.N. BHAGWATI, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au\n\nV.D. TULZAPURKAR, D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND\n\nE.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ. ]"}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C V.D. Tulzapurkar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 124, 216, 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 792, "end_char": 813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 965, "end_char": 979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Public law-Protection against disclosure of documents claiming privilege-Evidence Act, sections 123 and 162, difference in-Whether the Union of India could claim privilege in respect of the correspondence between the high dignitaries which formed the opinion regarding transfer of Judges/gram of extension to the additional Judges-Constitution of India, Articles 19(1) (a), 14, 217 and 224."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1184, "end_char": 1198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1498, "end_char": 1519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 19( /)(a) and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1785, "end_char": 1806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 217 and 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1837, "end_char": 1858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 216, 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2125, "end_char": 2140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of\n\nIndia", "statute": "Constitution of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another-Constitution of\n\nIndia, 1950, Articles 222-Notification dated January 19, 1981 issued by the President of India transferring Mr. K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna to Madras, validity of.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Constilution of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2319, "end_char": 2340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constilution of India, Article 222(1)-Legal effect of an order of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.", "canonical_name": "Constilution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2342, "end_char": 2356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of\n\nIndia", "statute": "Constitution of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "High Courts", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Courts-Inter se-status-All High Courts have same status- Constitution of India, Articles 224 ( 4), 139A (2), 214 (2) & ( 3) before deletion in 1956, 222, 366(14) 376, Schedule VII List I Entry 78, discussed."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2503, "end_char": 2524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526, "end_char": 2538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2659, "end_char": 2680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2682, "end_char": 2693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2909, "end_char": 2920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2967, "end_char": 2978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the\n.,-\n\n\"\"·\n\n$.P. GUPtA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 523\n\nState or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of Jaw and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty."}}, {"text": "Article 222( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3174, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 215, 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3527, "end_char": 3538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3866, "end_char": 3887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4115, "end_char": 4126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.P. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court, cannot, having regard to this constitutional prov1s10n, embark upon an inquiry as to whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to tne President and since the reasons which have prevailed with the Council of Ministers in taking a particular decision not to continue an additional Judge for a further term would form part of the advice tendered to the President,\nI\n\nS.P. GUPTA •• UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 591\n\nthey would be beyond the ken of judicial inquiry.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5034, "end_char": 5045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5600, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5741, "end_char": 5762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5854, "end_char": 5875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of High Courts", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5895, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution of High Courts-Strength of Judges-Whether a writ af mandamus can be issued against Union of India for fixing the strength of Judges in each High Court-Constitution of India, Articles 216, 32, 74 and 226, scope a/- Advice under Article 74 in the matter of appointment of Judges is binding."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution of High Courts-Strength of Judges-Whether a writ af mandamus can be issued against Union of India for fixing the strength of Judges in each High Court-Constitution of India, Articles 216, 32, 74 and 226, scope a/- Advice under Article 74 in the matter of appointment of Judges is binding.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 216, 32, 74 and 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6135, "end_char": 6145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6225, "end_char": 6237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appointment of Judges-Appointment must be made by the Central Government only after effective consultation as required by Articles 124 and 227 read with 74-Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has a primacy."}}, {"text": "Articles 124 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appointment of Judges-Appointment must be made by the Central Government only after effective consultation as required by Articles 124 and 227 read with 74-Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has a primacy."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6866, "end_char": 6887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6889, "end_char": 6908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Non-extension of the term of office of Mr.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Non-extension of the term of office of Mr. S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, validity of\n\n36."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7458, "end_char": 7468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Non-extension of the term of office of Mr. S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, validity of\n\n36.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7534, "end_char": 7555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8145, "end_char": 8158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Additional JudJ; e of a High Court-Non-extension of the term of the D Judge as additional Judge of the High Court-Integrity of the Judge doubted by the Chief Justice of High Court as disclosed before the Court--Judge ready to establish his innocence :and seeking opportunity from Supreme Court to do so-Supreme\n\nCourt cannot grant such opportunity in view of its restricted jurisdiction in such cases-Constitution of India, Articles 32, 226 and I 39A jurisdiction of the Supreme\n\nCourt, explained."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 32, 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8336, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Additional JudJ; e of a High Court-Non-extension of the term of the D Judge as additional Judge of the High Court-Integrity of the Judge doubted by the Chief Justice of High Court as disclosed before the Court--Judge ready to establish his innocence :and seeking opportunity from Supreme Court to do so-Supreme\n\nCourt cannot grant such opportunity in view of its restricted jurisdiction in such cases-Constitution of India, Articles 32, 226 and I 39A jurisdiction of the Supreme\n\nCourt, explained."}}, {"text": "CollStitution of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CollStitution of India, Articles 226 and 32-Courts have no powers to decide questions of pure academic interest."}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8671, "end_char": 8692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution o( India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9012, "end_char": 9033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution o( India, Article 226-Writ proceedings-Pleadings in the form of affidavits, counter-affidavits, rejoinder-affidavits, etc.", "canonical_name": "Constilution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9035, "end_char": 9046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. Shivshankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 18, 1981, Honourable Sri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed a circular letter to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the\n\n,, •\n\nS.P. GuPlA v. UNioN 169\n\nNorth-Eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "March 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10401, "end_char": 10415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to, as well as after the issuance of the aforesaid circular letter by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981, in several High Courts, including High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi, the President of India acting under C Article 224 granted short-term extensions for three months, six months or a year to sitting additional Judges whose initial terms were about to expire."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10451, "end_char": 10493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to, as well as after the issuance of the aforesaid circular letter by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981, in several High Courts, including High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi, the President of India acting under C Article 224 granted short-term extensions for three months, six months or a year to sitting additional Judges whose initial terms were about to expire."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10533, "end_char": 10544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10714, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying on the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was finally not given further appointment."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10750, "end_char": 10766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying on the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was finally not given further appointment."}}, {"text": "O.N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10899, "end_char": 10909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11111, "end_char": 11129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices.", "canonical_name": "President of India, Union of India"}}, {"text": "January 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11149, "end_char": 11165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices."}}, {"text": "M.M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11190, "end_char": 11201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11233, "end_char": 11250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11275, "end_char": 11292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices."}}, {"text": "Madras High E Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11386, "end_char": 11405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High E Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12813, "end_char": 12853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the transfer order dated January 19, 1981 in respect of the two Chief Justices was also challenged, Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail refused to take part\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "S.P. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981 was filed by Sri S.P. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "High Court at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13172, "end_char": 13195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981 was filed by Sri S.P. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13437, "end_char": 13448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13467, "end_char": 13478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Murali Dhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges.", "canonical_name": "Murali Dhar"}}, {"text": "A.N. Verma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges.", "canonical_name": "A. N.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "N. N. Mittal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13816, "end_char": 13828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Mittal"}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13938, "end_char": 13951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981 was filed by Sri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi assailing the circular and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Sri O.N. Vohra, Sri S.N. Kumar and Sri S.B. Wad for a further period of three months only, It was prayed that the posts of additional Judges in the several High Courts be converted into permanent posts.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14019, "end_char": 14038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981 was filed by Sri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi assailing the circular and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Sri O.N. Vohra, Sri S.N. Kumar and Sri S.B. Wad for a further period of three months only, It was prayed that the posts of additional Judges in the several High Courts be converted into permanent posts."}}, {"text": "S.B. Wad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981 was filed by Sri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi assailing the circular and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Sri O.N. Vohra, Sri S.N. Kumar and Sri S.B. Wad for a further period of three months only, It was prayed that the posts of additional Judges in the several High Courts be converted into permanent posts.", "canonical_name": "S. B. Wad"}}, {"text": "J. L. Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 of 1981, Shri J. L. Kalra and a few other advocates filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi, it was prayed that a mandamus be issued to the Union Government to create an adequate number of posts of permanent and additional Judges and to make appointments to those posts.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14703, "end_char": 14723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges."}}, {"text": "Iqbal M. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "C.R. Dalvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14768, "end_char": 14778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges.", "canonical_name": "C. R. Dalvi"}}, {"text": "M.A. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14784, "end_char": 14793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges.", "canonical_name": "M. A. Rana"}}, {"text": "Sarab K.G. Modi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14802, "end_char": 14817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges."}}, {"text": "Articles 124, 216, 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15363, "end_char": 15374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Article 32 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Lily Thomµs~Peti"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15405, "end_char": 15427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Article 32 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15435, "end_char": 15445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15675, "end_char": 15681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She challenged the transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, to Kerala High Court as Chief Justice, Sri M.M. Ismail filed an affidavit stating that he has decided not to proceed to Kerala, nor to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement."}}, {"text": "M.M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15816, "end_char": 15827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M.M. Ismail has resigned since.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "High A Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15943, "end_char": 15965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of 1981 was filed as a Writ Petition in the High A Court of Madras by one Mr. A Rajappa, an Advocate, praying for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras and Sri K.B.N. 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Pandey and Sri Thakur Ramapathi Sinha, filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16493, "end_char": 16512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court at Patna to the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "M.M. Ismail", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16553, "end_char": 16564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court at Patna to the High Court of Madras.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16634, "end_char": 16646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court at Patna to the High Court of Madras.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16683, "end_char": 16703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. 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Singh, on the ground that he had not been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17330, "end_char": 17346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_,}..\n\nSeveral contentions raised in these Writ Petitions are :\n\n(i) The actions of the Union Government forming part of a scheme constitute a direct attack on the independence of judiciary, which is a basic feature ..... of a constitution .", "canonical_name": "Union Governmf:nt"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17770, "end_char": 17784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankal Chand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) The circular dated March 18, 1981, seeks to effect, in substance and reality, a mass transfer of sitting Additional Judges as also the proposed appointees based on a policy decision unilaterally taken by the Law 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Venkataramiah, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "S.P. GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28298, "end_char": 28308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA V, UNION 375\n\n(ii) Among the opinions of the three constitutional consultancies, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not enjoy primacy over the other two opinions in the matter of appointment of Judges. (", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Vide P.N. Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28524, "end_char": 28542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M.\n\nFazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S.M.\n\nFazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28544, "end_char": 28559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M.\n\nFazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. 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Venkataramiah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28872, "end_char": 28881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\n(iv) \"Consent\" is not necessary for the transfer of a Judge under Article 222, (Vide A.C. Gupta, Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "V.D. Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28883, "end_char": 28899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\n(iv) \"Consent\" is not necessary for the transfer of a Judge under Article 222, (Vide A.C. Gupta, Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "C V.D. Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "R.S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28913, "end_char": 28924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\n(iv) \"Consent\" is not necessary for the transfer of a Judge under Article 222, (Vide A.C. Gupta, Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK"}}, {"text": "C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29098, "end_char": 29106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide /,, C. Gupta, C V.D. Tulzapurkar, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C V.D. Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29108, "end_char": 29126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide /,, C. Gupta, C V.D. Tulzapurkar, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "C V.D. Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "A.C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29365, "end_char": 29375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29453, "end_char": 29461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Bhagwati, J.\n\nI : I. The principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract con ception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitu- .4.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31564, "end_char": 31581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35056, "end_char": 35060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1976 3 SCR 58", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36815, "end_char": 36828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36920, "end_char": 36925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37067, "end_char": 37073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37894, "end_char": 37905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38021, "end_char": 38031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme c", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38596, "end_char": 38605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that there are rµles made by Supreme c:; ourt prescri\\Jin(l the pr<;>C\\l\\11, lre for movin!I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38661, "end_char": 38698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the Chief Justice of Delhi proceeded to state that there were three points\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38731, "end_char": 38741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45067, "end_char": 45073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45211, "end_char": 45217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45242, "end_char": 45248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 344", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47808, "end_char": 47823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48500, "end_char": 48505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this reason, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to non-appointment of O.N. Vohra was not relevant to the issues arising for determim1tion in the writ petition and the Union of India could not be required to disclose it. ["}}, {"text": "O.N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48569, "end_char": 48579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this reason, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to non-appointment of O.N. Vohra was not relevant to the issues arising for determim1tion in the writ petition and the Union of India could not be required to disclose it. [", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48805, "end_char": 48815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, since the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term was assailed, firstly, that there has been no full and effective consultation bet ween the Central Government and the constitutional authorities required to be consulted under that Article\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNloN 381\n\nand, secondly, that the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India would be relevant qua both these grounds. [", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49504, "end_char": 49515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49526, "end_char": 49537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49874, "end_char": 49884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50459, "end_char": 50469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51302, "end_char": 51312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51907, "end_char": 51917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51979, "end_char": 51995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 333", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 54391, "end_char": 54407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54609, "end_char": 54619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56267, "end_char": 56278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56323, "end_char": 56334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63041, "end_char": 63052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public interest by their disclo sure and hence these documents were liable to be disclosed. (", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63109, "end_char": 63128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public interest by their disclo sure and hence these documents were liable to be disclosed. ("}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63213, "end_char": 63218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public interest by their disclo sure and hence these documents were liable to be disclosed. ("}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63660, "end_char": 63671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63686, "end_char": 63697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67899, "end_char": 67910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70248, "end_char": 70259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72441, "end_char": 72452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73453, "end_char": 73464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74114, "end_char": 74125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankalchand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74527, "end_char": 74544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 S.C.tl\n\nadvance, the Law Minister would not be circumventing the majority decision in Sankalchand Sheth's case. [", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Articles 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75338, "end_char": 75350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76091, "end_char": 76103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cenetral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76342, "end_char": 76361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "541 B-D]\n\n6: I. Each of the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under Articles 124 (2) and 217 (1) must ha•e for his consideration full and identical facts bearing upon appointment or non-appointment of the person concerned as a Judge and the opinion of each of them taken on identical material must be considered by the Cenetral Government before it takes a decision whether or not to appoint the person concerned as a Judge."}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76689, "end_char": 76700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76719, "end_char": 76730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77729, "end_char": 77732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78160, "end_char": 78171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78483, "end_char": 78494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79676, "end_char": 79687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81807, "end_char": 81818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85300, "end_char": 85311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85499, "end_char": 85510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86329, "end_char": 86340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 86660, "end_char": 86679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this requirement is not complied with in making appointments on the Supreme Court Bench presumably under a misconception that it is not a mandatory but only an optional provision."}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88577, "end_char": 88588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89722, "end_char": 89733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90429, "end_char": 90440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91080, "end_char": 91091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91341, "end_char": 91352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91500, "end_char": 91510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[554 G-11, 555 B-E, 557 D-E]\n\n7:2: It is obvious that if additional Judges were appointed according to the true intendment of clause (I) of Article 224, they would be temporary Judges appointed for a short duration to dear off the arrears and once the arrears are cleared off, which was expected by Parliament to be achieved within not more than two years they would, on the expiration their term, go back to the Bar or to the District Judicial service."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92126, "end_char": 92137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92347, "end_char": 92358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92835, "end_char": 92846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93578, "end_char": 93589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94144, "end_char": 94155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94893, "end_char": 94904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95049, "end_char": 95060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95525, "end_char": 95536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95793, "end_char": 95804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95958, "end_char": 95968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96356, "end_char": 96367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96932, "end_char": 96943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97096, "end_char": 97107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97245, "end_char": 97256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97344, "end_char": 97355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97478, "end_char": 97489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 102170, "end_char": 102187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103008, "end_char": 103019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103311, "end_char": 103322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103749, "end_char": 103760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104540, "end_char": 104551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105312, "end_char": 105323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "0. N. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 106938, "end_char": 106949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tarkunde, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court as a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, also assails the Circular letter and the appointments of three additional Judges, Shri 0.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106967, "end_char": 106976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad for a period of six months and the Central Government was also in error in appointing them only for a period of three months. [", "canonical_name": "S. B. Wad"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107356, "end_char": 107367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107399, "end_char": 107417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fixation of the strength of judges in each High Court is a purely executive function which is entrusted by Article 216 to the President, that is, the Government oflndia and it is entirely for the Government of India to decide in the exercise of its judgment as to what shall be the strength of judges in each High Court."}}, {"text": "Government of Indi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108409, "end_char": 108427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There would be many policy considerations which would influence the Government of Indi; i in taking a decision as to what number of judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court, like difficulty in getting competent judges, finding court rooms."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109402, "end_char": 109413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111615, "end_char": 111626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112124, "end_char": 112135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112155, "end_char": 112166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112585, "end_char": 112596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113075, "end_char": 113086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113698, "end_char": 113709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114190, "end_char": 114201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".Central Bureau of Investigation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 115313, "end_char": 115345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, as pointed by the Chief Justice of Delhi himself, he had no investigative achinery at his disposal and if be wanted the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar to be investigated, be would have bad to ask the Central Government to carry out such investigation through the .Central Bureau of Investigation or the Intelligence Bureau or some such investigating agency and that ."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 116384, "end_char": 116420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would indeed be impossible for any one unfamiliar with the legal profession and the functioning of the courts\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.a:\n\nto judge the genuineness or veracity of the sources from which information might be obtained in regard to a sitting Judge."}}, {"text": "s. N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122289, "end_char": 122300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his opinion, it is a confidential communication which would not ordinarily be known to the public and in the case of S. N. Kumar too, but for the disclosure of documents vehemently pressed and passionately sought not only by the counsel for the petitioners but also by the counsel for s. N. Kumar, the world would never have known that the Chief Justice of Delhi has given an adverse opinion against the continuance of S. N. Kumar on the ground that his integrity was doubtful.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123110, "end_char": 123121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B.N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123690, "end_char": 123703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at the instance of the Chief Justice of India as in the case of Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 SCR 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 124044, "end_char": 124060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124322, "end_char": 124333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124358, "end_char": 124369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124570, "end_char": 124581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126611, "end_char": 126622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126922, "end_char": 126933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 133137, "end_char": 133146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajasthan.", "canonical_name": "Rajasthan"}}, {"text": "Central' Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 133516, "end_char": 133535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[683;684 C-D, G-H, 685 A]\n\n/ Apart from that, this is not the reason_ which weighied with' the Central' Government in making thC order of transfer against Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh."}}, {"text": "Chfef", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134920, "end_char": 134925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Government did not apply its wind to the question ' whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedient to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, but accepted the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, because it thought that if the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India was accepted and the transfers of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chfef Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh were made, it would be easier for the .Central Government thereafter to press for acceptance of the government policy by the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": ".Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 134986, "end_char": 135005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Government did not apply its wind to the question ' whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedient to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, but accepted the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, because it thought that if the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India was accepted and the transfers of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chfef Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh were made, it would be easier for the .Central Government thereafter to press for acceptance of the government policy by the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135247, "end_char": 135258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135268, "end_char": 135279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139026, "end_char": 139032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PER GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139057, "end_char": 139066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PER GUPTA, J.\n\n1:1."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140061, "end_char": 140066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision not to extend Shri Kumar's term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was invalid and unconstitutional in as much as it was not based on a full and effective consultation, as contemplated in Article 217(1) of the Constitution. [", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140252, "end_char": 140266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140802, "end_char": 140816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141348, "end_char": 141362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141469, "end_char": 141483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141760, "end_char": 141771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142371, "end_char": 142385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142922, "end_char": 142933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142944, "end_char": 142955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 143983, "end_char": 144018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "691 B-D J ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 211(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144078, "end_char": 144092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144339, "end_char": 144353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145240, "end_char": 145254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 SCR 814", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 146855, "end_char": 146871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1978) 1 SCR 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 147610, "end_char": 147626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147792, "end_char": 147806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PER FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148792, "end_char": 148805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "707 E]\n\nPER FAZAL ALI, J."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Judges", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 149652, "end_char": 149672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again, this executive power is not absolute and has to be exercised in consultation with the CJI in the case of appointment of Supreme Court Judges, as also in consultation with the CJI and the Governor of the States concerned in case of the appointment of Chief Justice of the High Courts and in the case .of appointment of High <:; oµrt Judes, the Chief Jt1stic; e qf the concerned Hi!1b\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982} 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "B. N. Rau", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151294, "end_char": 151303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambedkar wanted to give la1ger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President."}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151312, "end_char": 151320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambedkar wanted to give la1ger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President.", "canonical_name": "Ambed- B kar"}}, {"text": "Article 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152980, "end_char": 152994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154320, "end_char": 154330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154511, "end_char": 154521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154550, "end_char": 154582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Articles 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154733, "end_char": 154745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Shamsher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 155073, "end_char": 155087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as interpreted by this Court in Shamsher Singh's case [1975) 1 SCR 814, the High Court exercises absolute and unstinted control over.", "canonical_name": "Shamsher Singh'.s"}}, {"text": "[1975) 1 SCR 814", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 155095, "end_char": 155111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 155752, "end_char": 155767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156089, "end_char": 156094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~:l : Re : Disclo1ure of Document and plea of Privilege claimed by the Government-\n\nIf the documents are not disclosed, the petition would not suffer serious prejudice because the undisputed facts show that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had fot reasons given by him opined that the term of Justice Kumar ought not be extended.", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 156360, "end_char": 156365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, disclosure of details would have undoubtedly caused serious damage to public interest by exposing not only the petitioner Kumar but also the CJ, Delhi High Court and the CJI to public gaze and criticism which would be highly derogatory to the high position that these high constitutional functionaries hold and would in future deter them from expressing any opinion on the merit of future appointments which might .", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "Article 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156798, "end_char": 156811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156836, "end_char": 156856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 157549, "end_char": 157565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1964 SC 1658", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 157603, "end_char": 157619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157664, "end_char": 157671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conway", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157800, "end_char": 157806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, however, unable to agree with this argument because Conway's case has not only not overruled Duncan's case but has held that it was rightly decided."}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159062, "end_char": 159082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159173, "end_char": 159193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159231, "end_char": 159244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 159539, "end_char": 159553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the rule or protection against self discrimination as prevalent in the United Kingdom or U.S.A. has never been accepted in India~\n\n[836H, 837A]\n\nBefore importing the doctrines or the liberal trend of modern cases acro's the seven seas, the Court cannot overlook the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 159557, "end_char": 159563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the rule or protection against self discrimination as prevalent in the United Kingdom or U.S.A. has never been accepted in India~\n\n[836H, 837A]\n\nBefore importing the doctrines or the liberal trend of modern cases acro's the seven seas, the Court cannot overlook the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159783, "end_char": 159809, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 159833, "end_char": 159840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, while in England and A.merica the democratic system of Government had been existing for m.ore than\n\nS.P. GUPTA V. UNION 413\n\ntwo or three centuries, Indian democracy is only three decades old, which is very small period in the life of a nation and India had yet to develop its law by a process of adaptation and accommodation, rejection or modification or by a trialand error method."}}, {"text": "sections 123 & 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160243, "end_char": 160261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 123 & 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160643, "end_char": 160661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the country", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 160841, "end_char": 160866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any revolutionary decisions so as to expose high confidential matters tc) public gaze by following a policy of liberal disclosure of documents ignoring the provisions of sections 123 & 124 of the Act would not only be detrimental to our progress but may cause serious obstruction In the practical running of day to day affairs of the Government or for that matter the Government of the country itself."}}, {"text": "Thui", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 161853, "end_char": 161857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thui, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned it has chosen to follow the principle of English Law with suitable adjustments and modifications in determining the plea of privilege under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 123 & 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162040, "end_char": 162053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 & 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162367, "end_char": 162379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 & 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162820, "end_char": 162833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act", "statute": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 163205, "end_char": 163240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8500-G]\n\n2:6; Another important circumstance that has to be taken into consideration is that even after more than three decades of our independence, the Prliament .despite so many socio-economic chan$e~ a, p 9vr tile; world has not thought it\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "ss. 123 & 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163390, "end_char": 163403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act", "statute": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167811, "end_char": 167822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Icdia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 167900, "end_char": 167905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no question of presenting a fail accompli to the Chief Justice of Icdia, because he has to consider all the shades~ aspects and problems of the matt.er in its entirety clD.d would also have to consult the Judge concerned and if he feels\n\ntat proper case for transfering the."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172695, "end_char": 172697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173219, "end_char": 173223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174451, "end_char": 174462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176172, "end_char": 176183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176791, "end_char": 176802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177380, "end_char": 177390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179851, "end_char": 179862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 179889, "end_char": 179891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President before formulating the Policy should consult theCJI and have his views because the laying down of the Policy would be under Article 222 and consultation with the CH being a necessary concomitant of the said power, even while laying down the Policy, the consultative process is essential. ["}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180403, "end_char": 180414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180482, "end_char": 180493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181210, "end_char": 181221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181914, "end_char": 181925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181967, "end_char": 181978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182167, "end_char": 182178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Singh-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183349, "end_char": 183362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re: Case of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh-\n\nWhere two high constitutional functionaries are involved and have given affidavits and counter-affidavits it is obviously a most difficult and delicate situation.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183761, "end_char": 183765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Analysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandran.(JU/eshwar Prasad's case the following necessary concomitants of an effective consultation may be stated : (i) that the consultation contemplated by Article 222 must be full and effective and is an essential ingredient of the exercise of power under Article 222; (ii) that once when the President decides to transfer a judge, he must consult the CJI before transfer, the consultation before transferring a judge is, as it were; a condition precedent to the actual transfer of the judge;\n\n(iii) if the consultation with the CJI has not been dcine before trans• ferring a judge, the transfer becomes unconstitutional; (iv) the President must make the relevant data and the necessary facts available to the CJI o that he (CJI) may arrive at a proper conclusion.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "eshwar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183790, "end_char": 183803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Analysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandran.(JU/eshwar Prasad's case the following necessary concomitants of an effective consultation may be stated : (i) that the consultation contemplated by Article 222 must be full and effective and is an essential ingredient of the exercise of power under Article 222; (ii) that once when the President decides to transfer a judge, he must consult the CJI before transfer, the consultation before transferring a judge is, as it were; a condition precedent to the actual transfer of the judge;\n\n(iii) if the consultation with the CJI has not been dcine before trans• ferring a judge, the transfer becomes unconstitutional; (iv) the President must make the relevant data and the necessary facts available to the CJI o that he (CJI) may arrive at a proper conclusion."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183935, "end_char": 183946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184036, "end_char": 184047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 186731, "end_char": 186740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION 421\n\nThe .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case ."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 186753, "end_char": 186759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION 421\n\nThe .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case ."}}, {"text": "7-12-80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 186857, "end_char": 186864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION 421\n\nThe .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case ."}}, {"text": "20-12-80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 186868, "end_char": 186876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION 421\n\nThe .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case ."}}, {"text": "Chandramouleshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 187354, "end_char": 187371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "squarely falls within the.ratio laid down in Chandramouleshwar' s case.", "canonical_name": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187489, "end_char": 187500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187626, "end_char": 187640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "whereJajudge", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 188251, "end_char": 188263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is not a case whereJajudge or a~CJ having been transferred had joined his new assignment and started w<;>rking and still no order of compensatory allowance was made by the President. ["}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188461, "end_char": 188472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1962] 1 SCR 896", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 189089, "end_char": 189105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189328, "end_char": 189336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189741, "end_char": 189752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRBME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 189755, "end_char": 189791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It.cannot be said that on a parity of reasoning that 'consent' also should be read as a part and parcel of the exercise of the power under Article 222,\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190254, "end_char": 190265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191192, "end_char": 191203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192058, "end_char": 192069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192337, "end_char": 192348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192598, "end_char": 192609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192660, "end_char": 192671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193158, "end_char": 193169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193256, "end_char": 193270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193275, "end_char": 193286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jiidge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 193781, "end_char": 193787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12:5 The coastitution has used the word \"appointed' in the case of a Judge of the Supreme Court and 'transfer' in the case of Jiidge of a High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193834, "end_char": 193845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194866, "end_char": 194881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 196441, "end_char": 196479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis ours)\n\n(I) [1964] I SCR 371,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196572, "end_char": 196583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196981, "end_char": 196992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197191, "end_char": 197202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197350, "end_char": 197361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197643, "end_char": 197654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198282, "end_char": 198293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199848, "end_char": 199859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202072, "end_char": 202086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202097, "end_char": 202108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202422, "end_char": 202430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203126, "end_char": 203130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204452, "end_char": 204460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205649, "end_char": 205651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 SCR 986", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 208493, "end_char": 208509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 253", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 208606, "end_char": 208622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208701, "end_char": 208708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 208783, "end_char": 208799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208840, "end_char": 208846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209023, "end_char": 209030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1973] 1 SCR 1058", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 209158, "end_char": 209175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209217, "end_char": 209224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 862", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209356, "end_char": 209363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1965] 2 SCR 457", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 210299, "end_char": 210315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Per Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 210330, "end_char": 210345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Tulzapurkar J\n\n1."}}, {"text": "[1982] 2 SCR 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 211649, "end_char": 211664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 1 SCR 863", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 211777, "end_char": 211793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211954, "end_char": 211964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212575, "end_char": 212583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212768, "end_char": 212776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213824, "end_char": 213832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214227, "end_char": 214235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214792, "end_char": 214803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 216 and 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215091, "end_char": 215111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Money Lenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215743, "end_char": 215760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216071, "end_char": 216079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216213, "end_char": 216224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216276, "end_char": 216290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216359, "end_char": 216370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218674, "end_char": 218685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218851, "end_char": 218856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218864, "end_char": 218883, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 219629, "end_char": 219640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220074, "end_char": 220082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220955, "end_char": 220966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222224, "end_char": 222235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1979) 2 SCR 476", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 222370, "end_char": 222386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 222871, "end_char": 222897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224348, "end_char": 224358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224377, "end_char": 224385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224394, "end_char": 224420, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224987, "end_char": 224998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225017, "end_char": 225025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225030, "end_char": 225056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226009, "end_char": 226020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226254, "end_char": 226265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226386, "end_char": 226397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226708, "end_char": 226719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227274, "end_char": 227292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227542, "end_char": 227553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227712, "end_char": 227726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228712, "end_char": 228723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228928, "end_char": 228939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229033, "end_char": 229047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229528, "end_char": 229539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229878, "end_char": 229886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970) 1 SCR. 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 230896, "end_char": 230913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975) 1 SCR 714", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 230951, "end_char": 230967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231436, "end_char": 231447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231806, "end_char": 231817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234026, "end_char": 234037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234165, "end_char": 234175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234818, "end_char": 234829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235050, "end_char": 235064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235907, "end_char": 235918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236291, "end_char": 236302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238573, "end_char": 238587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239523, "end_char": 239531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239984, "end_char": 239995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240394, "end_char": 240402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240414, "end_char": 240425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242213, "end_char": 242221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242912, "end_char": 242924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243336, "end_char": 243344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243355, "end_char": 243366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1) and\n\n438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243578, "end_char": 243598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRflME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 243599, "end_char": 243637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222(1) and\n\n438 SUPRflME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.lt\n\nA similarly, any transfer with an oblique motive or for an oblique purpose, such as for not toeing the line of the Executive or for rendering decision unpalatable to the Executive or for having for some reason or the other fallen from the grace of the Executive, would also be outside its purview and liable to be struck down, if oblique motive or purpose is established. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244043, "end_char": 244054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244873, "end_char": 244884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245126, "end_char": 245137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245311, "end_char": 245322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246737, "end_char": 246749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246802, "end_char": 246813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247051, "end_char": 247062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247573, "end_char": 247583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247703, "end_char": 247714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248684, "end_char": 248695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251120, "end_char": 251134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251802, "end_char": 251813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253064, "end_char": 253075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253859, "end_char": 253870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253983, "end_char": 253994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254503, "end_char": 254514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Iqbal Cbagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 254725, "end_char": 254737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217(1) would be gone into but was and is intended to be acted upon forthwith by conferring.an advantage on those who would be furnishing their consent is clearly borne out by the stand taken by the Government in Shri Iqbal Cbagla's petition.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255029, "end_char": 255039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256264, "end_char": 256271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 256871, "end_char": 256895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the decisions of this Court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad's case and Sankalchand Sheth' s case it is clear that consultation implies a confe rence of two or more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or at least a satisfactory solution and that in order that the two minds may be able to confer and produce a mutual impact it is essential that ea<; li must liave for its c; onsiqeration_ full an!f\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982j 2 S.C.R.\n\nA identical facts, which can at once constitute both the sources and foundation of the final decision.", "canonical_name": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257930, "end_char": 257941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259400, "end_char": 259411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259897, "end_char": 259908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260577, "end_char": 260588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260921, "end_char": 260924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 262313, "end_char": 262325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short, in Shri S.N. Kumar's case it is quite clear that both these high constitutional functionaries namely, the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice abdicated their constitutional responsibility or to use Justice Krishna lyer's language they utterly failed to discharge their \"accountability to the Justice constituency.\"", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "January 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 263524, "end_char": 263539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh the transfer must be regarded as a selective transfer and not based on the policy in the contemplation of the Union Government, notwithstanding the reference to \"Government Policy\" made by the Chief Justice of India during his telephonic talk with Shri K.B.N. Singh on January 5, 1981. ["}}, {"text": "19th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 265799, "end_char": 265817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that a mere recital in the impugned Notification dated 19th January, 1981 about such consultation will not be of much avail especially when the factum of such full and effective consultation has been put in issue but sufficient materials have been produced on record to show that there was full and effective consultation as contemplated by Article 222(1) before the transfer order E was made. ["}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266085, "end_char": 266099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266858, "end_char": 266868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266990, "end_char": 267001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268218, "end_char": 268229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 270324, "end_char": 270329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "995 A-El\n\nPer Desai J.\n\n1 :1.", "canonical_name": ".Desai"}}, {"text": "Sec. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274264, "end_char": 274272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 SCR 589", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 276852, "end_char": 276868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "President", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 277028, "end_char": 277037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President is a constitutional or formal bead and he must exercise his powers and functions conferred on him by 6r under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his council of Ministers.", "canonical_name": "President of India, Union of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 217(1) and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277275, "end_char": 277298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277610, "end_char": 277620, "source": 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 323832, "end_char": 323840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 323845, "end_char": 323871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 324045, "end_char": 324056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 324064, "end_char": 324083, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 325047, "end_char": 325063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325512, "end_char": 325520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Per Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 326145, "end_char": 326155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1144 B-D]\n\nPer Pathak J:\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329844, "end_char": 329855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330013, "end_char": 330024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 330192, "end_char": 330216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provisions of the Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Government of India have been complied with."}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330939, "end_char": 330950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330984, "end_char": 330995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333131, "end_char": 333142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333515, "end_char": 333526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333598, "end_char": 333609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338236, "end_char": 338247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 338399, "end_char": 338436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1193 1)-EJ\n\n• H\n\"--~----------------\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338466, "end_char": 338477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338757, "end_char": 338768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355744, "end_char": 355755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1974) 2 SCR 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 356299, "end_char": 356315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356416, "end_char": 356427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358455, "end_char": 358466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360396, "end_char": 360407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361175, "end_char": 361186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361782, "end_char": 361793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365254, "end_char": 365265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365305, "end_char": 365316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 365333, "end_char": 365346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1175 CD]\n\nPer Venkataramiah; J.\n\nl. A constitution of a country is a living document and cannot, therefore, be interpreted in a narrow pedantic sense.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 366868, "end_char": 366879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 366889, "end_char": 366900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 366913, "end_char": 366924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme ourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 367040, "end_char": 367052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 124 (3) (b), Article 217 (2) (b) and Article 233 (2) of the Constitution F specifieally state that the legal profession is a source of recruiiment of Judges of the Supreme ourt, High Courts and District Courts."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367122, "end_char": 367138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367254, "end_char": 367264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 367272, "end_char": 367291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 367768, "end_char": 367806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion both of them did not disclose the names because the Judges or the lawyers concerned must have given the information in confidence and they would have been seriously einbarrassed if their names were disclosed: ·\n\n(2) These views were put before the Central Government and it was open to the President to accept one view or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367829, "end_char": 367840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368105, "end_char": 368116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "(1971] 1 S.C.R. 863", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 369295, "end_char": 369314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976) 1 S.C.R. 306", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 369445, "end_char": 369464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 370198, "end_char": 370208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in these cases on the question of nonappointment of Mr. S.N. Kumar and on the question of transfer of Mr. K.B.N.\n\nSingh, the lawyer-petitioners may have no voice.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "S. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371814, "end_char": 371820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371867, "end_char": 371873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372604, "end_char": 372613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 373566, "end_char": 373577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 373642, "end_char": 373658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386745, "end_char": 386756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387578, "end_char": 387589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387751, "end_char": 387762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388201, "end_char": 388212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 389489, "end_char": 389500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 389744, "end_char": 389755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390042, "end_char": 390053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390117, "end_char": 390128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 SCR 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 390286, "end_char": 390302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1981] 1 SCR 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 390343, "end_char": 390359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391738, "end_char": 391749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391941, "end_char": 391956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392411, "end_char": 392422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392552, "end_char": 392563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392722, "end_char": 392733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393540, "end_char": 393551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393706, "end_char": 393721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393839, "end_char": 393848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hari Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 394668, "end_char": 394678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1331 F-H, 1332 A]\n\nHari Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394912, "end_char": 394923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395034, "end_char": 395045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395385, "end_char": 395393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395496, "end_char": 395507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395569, "end_char": 395580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395733, "end_char": 395744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396283, "end_char": 396294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396816, "end_char": 396827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397155, "end_char": 397166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 SCR 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 397714, "end_char": 397730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398978, "end_char": 398989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 399200, "end_char": 399219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400121, "end_char": 400132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400243, "end_char": 400254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400317, "end_char": 400328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400333, "end_char": 400344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400396, "end_char": 400407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400930, "end_char": 400941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401609, "end_char": 401620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 404132, "end_char": 404148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 333", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 404186, "end_char": 404202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 406198, "end_char": 406209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 407189, "end_char": 407200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 407932, "end_char": 407943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 408991, "end_char": 409002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sbri S N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 409896, "end_char": 409912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no allegation in the case that either the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court or the Law Minister had any personal ill-will against Sbri S N.\n\nKumar.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "February 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 410136, "end_char": 410153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been appointed as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court before February 19, 1981 on which date he wrote the first letter expre.ssing his opinion against the reappointment of Shri S.N .. Kumar."}}, {"text": "S.N .. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 410252, "end_char": 410264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been appointed as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court before February 19, 1981 on which date he wrote the first letter expre.ssing his opinion against the reappointment of Shri S.N .. Kumar.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "May 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 411793, "end_char": 411805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that even the Chief Justice of India has not given the names of Judges and of lawyers who were consulted by him as stated in his letter dated May 22, 1981."}}, {"text": "Delhi High", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 412208, "end_char": 412218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not shown that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High <;:ourt bad not heard such statements at all."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413009, "end_char": 413018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 413026, "end_char": 413052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413243, "end_char": 413254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi High Court Act, 1966", "statute": "the Delhi High Court Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 414469, "end_char": 414474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That there was full and frank discussion between the Chief Justice of India and the Delhi Chief Justice with reference to the very particulars referred to in the letter of May 7, 1981 is clear by the following facts : (i) Tho statement \"with regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general con- duct, the matter has already been discussed between us\" which is found in the letter of March 28, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India, (ii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the same date addressed by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Law Minister enclosing a copy of the above said letter dated March 28, 1981, (iii) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India dated May 21, 1981 and (iv) the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated May 22, 1981 written from Simla."}}, {"text": "July 17, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 414525, "end_char": 414538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is further supported by the affidavit dated July 17, 1981 of Shri S.N. Kumar himself which had been filed long before the date on which documents in question were directed to be disclosed by the Court i.e. in October\n\n1981."}}, {"text": "March 26, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 414857, "end_char": 414871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That means that the Chief Justice of India had been furnished all the particulars by the Delhi Chief Justice earlier at the meeting which took place on March 26, 1981 and the Chief Justice of India had also the explanation of Shri S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "May 27, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 415704, "end_char": 415716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There does not appear to be any undue haste or impropriety on the part of the Law Minister in making his recommendation not to appoint Shri Kumar on May 27, 1981 for two reasons : (1) that the Government had to take a decision on that'.question on or before May 27, 1981 as directed by the interim orderLof the1Suprem~; eourt and (2) tht1t th~ Law Ministr IJad_ expressly kept out\n\nI . ,,, \\ ., !"}}, {"text": "S.N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 417114, "end_char": 417125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President in the instant case has, out of prudence decided not to reappoint Shri S.N.\n\nKumar as the opinions of the two constitutional dignitaries were conflicting on the question of integrity, a question vital to the appointment of a Judge.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Sbri Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 417377, "end_char": 417387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for reappointing Sbri Kumar is not an irrelevant one.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417538, "end_char": 417549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417836, "end_char": 417847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 SCR 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 419919, "end_char": 419934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419971, "end_char": 419982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420672, "end_char": 420683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420784, "end_char": 420795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421598, "end_char": 421609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421828, "end_char": 421839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421874, "end_char": 421885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422099, "end_char": 422110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422326, "end_char": 422337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422345, "end_char": 422356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423162, "end_char": 423173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21T(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423515, "end_char": 423529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423647, "end_char": 423658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423702, "end_char": 423713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424260, "end_char": 424271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424292, "end_char": 424303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424528, "end_char": 424539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "24, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 425437, "end_char": 425445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This.suggestion sterns from the proposed policy of the Government\n\nwhiCh is clear from the statement of the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1980. ["}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426766, "end_char": 426777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427584, "end_char": 427595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 428697, "end_char": 428712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A discussion in fact did take place after Shri K.B.N. Singh met the Chief Justiee -of India on the evening of-January 8, 1981."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 429127, "end_char": 429136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be borne in mind that the Chief Justice of India asked Shri K.B.N. Singh to meet hini at New Delhi\n\n...\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION\n\n496-A\n\nto discuss the matter further and accordingly Shri K.B.N. Singh met him oti January 8, 1981."}}, {"text": "K.B.N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 430274, "end_char": 430287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "policy, it cannot be said that the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh is bad for all aspects relating to Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh were considered by the appropriate authority before ordering the transfer.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430391, "end_char": 430402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430749, "end_char": 430760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432252, "end_char": 432263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 435137, "end_char": 435158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435210, "end_char": 435220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.P: Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 435462, "end_char": 435472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19, 20, 21 & 22/81-\n\nS.P: Gupta-Petitioner in person - and H.K. Puri in T.C.\n\nD No.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435500, "end_char": 435509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19, 20, 21 & 22/81-\n\nS.P: Gupta-Petitioner in person - and H.K. Puri in T.C.\n\nD No."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435533, "end_char": 435549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, P. H. Parekh and Miss M'anik Tarkunde for-\n\n'JI, the Petitioner in T.C. No.", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435551, "end_char": 435563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, P. H. Parekh and Miss M'anik Tarkunde for-\n\n'JI, the Petitioner in T.C. No."}}, {"text": "M'anik Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435573, "end_char": 435588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, P. H. Parekh and Miss M'anik Tarkunde for-\n\n'JI, the Petitioner in T.C. No."}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435635, "end_char": 435643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Rao, G.C. Kumar, R. Venkatar, amani, Mahesh R'."}}, {"text": "G.C. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435645, "end_char": 435655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Rao, G.C. Kumar, R. Venkatar, amani, Mahesh R'."}}, {"text": "R. Venkatar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435657, "end_char": 435668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Rao, G.C. Kumar, R. Venkatar, amani, Mahesh R'."}}, {"text": "Mahesh R'. Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435677, "end_char": 435697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Rao, G.C. Kumar, R. Venkatar, amani, Mahesh R'."}}, {"text": "G.D. Gpta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435702, "end_char": 435711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choudhary and G.D. Gpta for the Petitioner in T.C. No."}}, {"text": "H.M. Seer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435753, "end_char": 435762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", H.M. Seer, vai, K.C. Cooper, A.J. Rana, J:.R. Gagrat, B.R'.", "canonical_name": "H.M.\n\nSeervai"}}, {"text": "K.C. Cooper", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435769, "end_char": 435780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", H.M. Seer, vai, K.C. Cooper, A.J. Rana, J:.R. Gagrat, B.R'."}}, {"text": "A.J. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435782, "end_char": 435791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", H.M. Seer, vai, K.C. Cooper, A.J. Rana, J:.R. Gagrat, B.R'."}}, {"text": "B.R'. Agurwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435807, "end_char": 435820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", H.M. Seer, vai, K.C. Cooper, A.J. Rana, J:.R. Gagrat, B.R'."}}, {"text": "P.G. Gokha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435822, "end_char": 435832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agurwal, P.G. Gokha/e for the petitioner in T.C. 22/81."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435870, "end_char": 435886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-."}}, {"text": "K. Prasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435906, "end_char": 435917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-.", "canonical_name": "K. Parasaran"}}, {"text": "Vepa P. S'arthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435941, "end_char": 435956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mriduf", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435958, "end_char": 435969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-.", "canonical_name": "P.R. Mriduf"}}, {"text": ". Sarthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435976, "end_char": 435984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General, K. Prasaran, Solic; itc>r General, Vepa P. S'arthi, P.R. Mriduf, f(.R-."}}, {"text": "G.S. Narayana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 435986, "end_char": 435999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarthy, G.S. Narayana, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini for th((· Respondents in t.c."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436001, "end_char": 436012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarthy, G.S. Narayana, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini for th((· Respondents in t.c.", "canonical_name": "R.N .. Poddarfor"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436022, "end_char": 436035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarthy, G.S. Narayana, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini for th((· Respondents in t.c."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436081, "end_char": 436090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, B. V. l)esai and S.[(.. .Jain (or Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R.K.\n\nGarg"}}, {"text": "B. V. l)esai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436092, "end_char": 436104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, B. V. l)esai and S.[(.. .Jain (or Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomµs~Peti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436192, "end_char": 436208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274/81-\n\nMiss. Lily Thomµs~Peti, tioner in person a, nd: Mr. H.M.\n\nSeervai.", "canonical_name": "Lily Thomµs~Peti"}}, {"text": "H.M.\n\nSeervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436238, "end_char": 436251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274/81-\n\nMiss. Lily Thomµs~Peti, tioner in person a, nd: Mr. H.M.\n\nSeervai.", "canonical_name": "H.M.\n\nSeervai"}}, {"text": "L.N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436254, "end_char": 436264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K; Parasaran, Solicitor General H K.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss A. Subhashini and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "H K.S. Gurumoorthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436316, "end_char": 436334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K; Parasaran, Solicitor General H K.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss A. Subhashini and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "H K.S. Gurumoorthy"}}, {"text": "A s. Markadeyafor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436422, "end_char": 436439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "498 SUPREME douR'f REPORTS\n\nA s. Markadeyafor Respondent No."}}, {"text": "L.M. inghyi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436464, "end_char": 436475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. inghyi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha .", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "S.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436477, "end_char": 436487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. inghyi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha ."}}, {"text": "S.K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436489, "end_char": 436499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. inghyi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha ."}}, {"text": "A.M. S!nghvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436506, "end_char": 436518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and A.M. S!nghvi for Responderif'No.", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "L; M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436565, "end_char": 436578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L; M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma , and N. 'Sudhakaran for the ,) •• s . . •", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "N. 'Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436597, "end_char": 436611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L; M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma , and N. 'Sudhakaran for the ,) •• s . . •"}}, {"text": "E.C. Aggar'wala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436693, "end_char": 436708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E.C. Aggar'wala fot\"the intervenor."}}, {"text": "B.C. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436730, "end_char": 436740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,.", "canonical_name": "B.C. Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Sushanta Kumar Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436742, "end_char": 436761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,.", "canonical_name": "Sushanta Kumar Dass"}}, {"text": "G.S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436763, "end_char": 436778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,.", "canonical_name": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "D.P.\n\nMukherjee.and", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436781, "end_char": 436800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,."}}, {"text": "A.K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436801, "end_char": 436813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.C. Ghosh, Sushanta Kumar Dass, G.S. Chatterjee,\n\nD.P.\n\nMukherjee.and A.K. Ganguli for the Intervenor-\n\n• ,."}}, {"text": "K.R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436887, "end_char": 436900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.R. Nagaraja for the."}}, {"text": "N.S. Das Bhal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436923, "end_char": 436936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. Das Bhal for the' iri.terverior."}}, {"text": "D A.K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 436962, "end_char": 436979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A.K. Srivastava, for the intervenor.", "canonical_name": "D A.K. Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Vaidyanathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437039, "end_char": 437051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidyanathan for the Petitioer\n\n' . ·., '"}}, {"text": "E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437081, "end_char": 437111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,'\n\nK.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss.A. Subhashini and R.N .. Poddarfor Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437113, "end_char": 437125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,'\n\nK.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss.A. Subhashini and R.N .. Poddarfor Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "K. Parasaran"}}, {"text": "K.S. Gurumoorthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437148, "end_char": 437164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,'\n\nK.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss.A. Subhashini and R.N .. Poddarfor Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "H K.S. Gurumoorthy"}}, {"text": "R.N .. Poddarfor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437189, "end_char": 437205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E' L.N. Sinha,\"AttorneyGeneral, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General,'\n\nK.S. Gurumoorthy, Miss.A. Subhashini and R.N .. Poddarfor Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R.N .. Poddarfor"}}, {"text": "S. Markedeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437235, "end_char": 437247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. ·' ·- \" ·\n\nS. Markedeya for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "L.M.Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437275, "end_char": 437286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L.M.Singhvi and S.K. Verma for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "Basudeva Pd", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437325, "end_char": 437336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudeva Pd."}}, {"text": "Ashok Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437342, "end_char": 437354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ashok Grover for the intervenor-'-(Patna High Court Bar Association)\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Susanta Kumar Dass, D.P; Mukherjee and G.S.\n\nChatterjee for the intervenor."}}, {"text": "Susanta Kumar Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437424, "end_char": 437442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ashok Grover for the intervenor-'-(Patna High Court Bar Association)\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Susanta Kumar Dass, D.P; Mukherjee and G.S.\n\nChatterjee for the intervenor.", "canonical_name": "Sushanta Kumar Dass"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437449, "end_char": 437458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ashok Grover for the intervenor-'-(Patna High Court Bar Association)\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Susanta Kumar Dass, D.P; Mukherjee and G.S.\n\nChatterjee for the intervenor.", "canonical_name": "Muukherjea"}}, {"text": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437463, "end_char": 437479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ashok Grover for the intervenor-'-(Patna High Court Bar Association)\n\nB.C. Ghosh, Susanta Kumar Dass, D.P; Mukherjee and G.S.\n\nChatterjee for the intervenor.", "canonical_name": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437769, "end_char": 437781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/81-\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha, L.K. Pandey and A.M. Singhvi, for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "L.K. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437807, "end_char": 437818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/81-\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha, L.K. Pandey and A.M. Singhvi, for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "A.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 437823, "end_char": 437835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/81-\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Verma, S.K. Sinha, L.K. Pandey and A.M. Singhvi, for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "A.K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 438038, "end_char": 438053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1509/81-\n\nA.K. Srivastava for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "D A.K. Srivastava"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 438117, "end_char": 438125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nBHAGWATI J.\n\nThese writ petitions filed in different High C Courts and transferred to this Court under Article l 39A of the Constitution raise issues of great constitutional importance affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length before us.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Arobindo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 439859, "end_char": 439867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will recall the brilliant fling of Shri Arobindo in his poem \"Savitri\"."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 440968, "end_char": 440974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must consstantly bear in mind the famous words of Holmes J. in Northern Security Company v. United States(1) where that great illustrious Judge said :\n\n\"Great cases like hard cases make bad law."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 441768, "end_char": 441780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first writ petition is that filed by Iqbal Chagla and others in the High Court of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "18th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 441966, "end_char": 441982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the the High Court of Bombay and they have challenged a circular letter dated 18th March, 1981, addressed by Shri Shiv Shankar, the Law Minister of the Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of the other States."}}, {"text": "Shiv Shankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 442002, "end_char": 442014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the the High Court of Bombay and they have challenged a circular letter dated 18th March, 1981, addressed by Shri Shiv Shankar, the Law Minister of the Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of the other States.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 442080, "end_char": 442086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the the High Court of Bombay and they have challenged a circular letter dated 18th March, 1981, addressed by Shri Shiv Shankar, the Law Minister of the Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of the other States."}}, {"text": "States Reotganisation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 442699, "end_char": 442731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 18, 1981\n\nIt has repeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Reotganisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochil tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 445389, "end_char": 445406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in any event addressed such a communication to each of the additional Judges in his Court."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 445563, "end_char": 445569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know what was the response of the additional Judges in Bombay to the circular letter but the record shows that out of a total number of Additional Judges in the Country quite a few Additional Judges gave their consent to be appointed outside their High Court."}}, {"text": "Advocates Association of Western India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 446094, "end_char": 446132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5o3\n\nConstitution and hence the Advocates Association of Western India which represents advocates practising on the appellate side, the Bombay Bar Association which represents advocJtes practising on the original side and the Managing Commitee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society which represents So!icifors practising in the High Court of Bombay, passed resolutions condemning the circular letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Government of India to withdraw the circular letter."}}, {"text": "Bombay Bar Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 446198, "end_char": 446220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5o3\n\nConstitution and hence the Advocates Association of Western India which represents advocates practising on the appellate side, the Bombay Bar Association which represents advocJtes practising on the original side and the Managing Commitee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society which represents So!icifors practising in the High Court of Bombay, passed resolutions condemning the circular letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Government of India to withdraw the circular letter."}}, {"text": "Bombay Incorporated Law Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 446313, "end_char": 446344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5o3\n\nConstitution and hence the Advocates Association of Western India which represents advocates practising on the appellate side, the Bombay Bar Association which represents advocJtes practising on the original side and the Managing Commitee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society which represents So!icifors practising in the High Court of Bombay, passed resolutions condemning the circular letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Government of India to withdraw the circular letter."}}, {"text": "25th June 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 448597, "end_char": 448611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench fixed the hearing of the writ petition before the learned single Judge hearing writ petitions on 25th June 1981 and also gave directions for filing of affidavits by the parties."}}, {"text": "9th June 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 449365, "end_char": 449378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 for transfer of the writ petition from the Bombay High Court to this Court under Article\n\nI 39A of the Constitution and ultimately by an order dated 9th June 1981, the vacation Judge directed that the writ petition be withdrawn from the Bombay High Court to this Court and he also gave directions for filing of affidavits and written briefs."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Chagla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 449606, "end_char": 449618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is how the present writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others has come up for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "V.M Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 449786, "end_char": 449798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second writ petition is that filed by V.M Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "7th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 450761, "end_char": 450776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from 7th March, 1979, and whose term was expiring on the mid-night of 6th March 1981 were further appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from 7th March 1981 and these short-term appointments were, according to the petitioner, unjustified by the terms of Article 224 and were in any event subversive of the independence of the judicary."}}, {"text": "6th March 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 450826, "end_char": 450840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from 7th March, 1979, and whose term was expiring on the mid-night of 6th March 1981 were further appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from 7th March 1981 and these short-term appointments were, according to the petitioner, unjustified by the terms of Article 224 and were in any event subversive of the independence of the judicary."}}, {"text": "7th March 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 450924, "end_char": 450938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from 7th March, 1979, and whose term was expiring on the mid-night of 6th March 1981 were further appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from 7th March 1981 and these short-term appointments were, according to the petitioner, unjustified by the terms of Article 224 and were in any event subversive of the independence of the judicary."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 451036, "end_char": 451047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 451610, "end_char": 451613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd April 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 452416, "end_char": 452431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Delhi by its order dated 23rd April 1981 admitted the writ petition and issued rule upon it."}}, {"text": "1st May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 452951, "end_char": 452963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, since the questions arising in the writ petition were questions of great constitutional importance and the first writ petition had already been filed in the Bombay High Court and other writ petition to which we shall presently refer had also been presented in the High Court of Allahabad raising substantially the same questions, an application was made to this Court on 24th April 1981 for transfer of the writ petition to this Court and by an order dated 1st May 1981 this Court transferred the writ petition to itself from the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "6th June 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 453132, "end_char": 453145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the further term of O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad was about to expire on 6th June 1981 and no decision appeared to have been taken till then for continuing these three Additional Judges for a further term and the petitioner apprehended that if these three Additional Judges were not continued as Additional Judges on the expiration of their term on 6th June 1981, the writ petition might become infructuous."}}, {"text": "4th May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 453535, "end_char": 453547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner therefore, presented an application to this Court on 4th May 1981 for an order directing that the writ petition be heard and disposed of before 6th June 1981 and that in any event, the respondents should maintain status quo by extending the period of appointment of Additional Judges in the various High Courts till the the disposal of the writ petition."}}, {"text": "6th June, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 454310, "end_char": 454324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner thereupon prayed for an interim order that on the expiration of their term on 6th June, 1981, the Additional Judges should be continued and their term extended until the final disposal of the writ petition."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] i S.C.R.\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 454508, "end_char": 454552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, obvi0usly this was not a prayer which could be granted by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] i S.C.R.\n\nCourt because it is for the President and not for the Court to appoint Additional Judges and once tire term of an Additional Judge has come to an end by efflux of time, it is not competent for the court to reappoint him for a further term."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 454977, "end_char": 455004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since, however, an allegation was made in the application that the appointments of Additional Judges for a further term were being made at the last minute and three Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur were not informed about the extension of their term until the evening of the last day on which their original term was due to expire, this Court made an order dated 8th May 1981 directing that, since the hearing of the writ petition would not be taking place until the reopening of the court after the summer vacation, the Union of India should \"decide not less than ten days before 6th June, 1981 whether any of the three Additional Judges should be reappointed for a further term as Additional Judges or they should be appointed as permanent Judges or otherwise.\""}}, {"text": "8th May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 455170, "end_char": 455182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since, however, an allegation was made in the application that the appointments of Additional Judges for a further term were being made at the last minute and three Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur were not informed about the extension of their term until the evening of the last day on which their original term was due to expire, this Court made an order dated 8th May 1981 directing that, since the hearing of the writ petition would not be taking place until the reopening of the court after the summer vacation, the Union of India should \"decide not less than ten days before 6th June, 1981 whether any of the three Additional Judges should be reappointed for a further term as Additional Judges or they should be appointed as permanent Judges or otherwise.\""}}, {"text": "1st June, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 456548, "end_char": 456562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, according to this order, the Central Government was bound to take its decision in regard to the continuance or otherwise of O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad on orbef'ore 27th May,1981 but since no such decision was communicated to the three Additional Judges, the petitioner, presuming that such decision must not have been reached by the Central Goverment, preferred an application to this Court on 1st June, 1981 for directing the Central Govern rnent, to communicate its decision regarding the continuance or otherwise of the three Additional Judges."}}, {"text": "\\\\bile S. B. Wad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 456885, "end_char": 456901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this application came up for hearing, the petitioner came to know that a decision had been taken by the Central Government in regard to O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad and \\\\bile S. B. Wad continued as and Additional Judge for a period of one year from 7th June, 1981, O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar were not continued for a further term."}}, {"text": "4th. June, .1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 457119, "end_char": 457135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner thereupon preferred another application to this Court on 4th."}}, {"text": "O.N. V.:ihra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 457582, "end_char": 457594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June, .1981 and in this application the petitioner pointed out that there were still large arrears of work in the Delhi High Court and therefore there was no lawful and bona fide reason for the non-\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 501\n\ncontinuance of O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar and not grauting fresh appointments to them was mala fide and unconstitutional and prayed that in the circumstances, an interim order should be made by the Court directing that O.N. V.:ihra and S.N. Kumar shall continue to function as Judges of the Delhi High Court.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458768, "end_char": 458779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458790, "end_char": 458801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Iqbal Chagla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 459230, "end_char": 459242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was thereafter placed for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges along with the writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "J.L. Katra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 459297, "end_char": 459307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third writ petition is that filed by J.L. Katra and others in the High Court of Delhi.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "Cenral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 459520, "end_char": 459537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the Delhi High Court and they have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Cenral Government to make an assessment of the number of permanent and additional Judges required by the Delhi High Court having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears to create such number of posts of permanent and additional Judge; as may be necessary and to make appointments to these posts."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 460486, "end_char": 460506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in that writ petition is an advocate practising in the Allahabad High Court and he has filed this writ petition for substantially the same reliefs as the writ petitions of Iqbal Cbagla and V.M. Tarkunde, with only this difference that the reliefs claimed by him relate to the appointments of additional Judges in the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 460910, "end_char": 460919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has inter alia prayed for a declaration that the three additional Judges of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma and Mr. Justice N.N. Mittal must be deemed to have been appointed permanent Judges under the warrants already issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister must be held to be void.", "canonical_name": "Murali Dhar"}}, {"text": "N.N. Mittal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 460960, "end_char": 460971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has inter alia prayed for a declaration that the three additional Judges of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma and Mr. Justice N.N. Mittal must be deemed to have been appointed permanent Judges under the warrants already issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister must be held to be void.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Mittal"}}, {"text": "19th January 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 462004, "end_char": 462021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What occasioned the filing of this writ petition was an Order dated 19th January 1981 made by the President trasferring Mr. Justice M, M, Ismail, Chife Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office."}}, {"text": "M, M, Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 462068, "end_char": 462080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What occasioned the filing of this writ petition was an Order dated 19th January 1981 made by the President trasferring Mr. Justice M, M, Ismail, Chife Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462331, "end_char": 462342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462579, "end_char": 462590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K .B.N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 462657, "end_char": 462671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously with the making of this Order, another order of the same date was issued by the President whereby the President in exercise of the powers conferred by clame (i} of Article 222 after consultation with the Chief Justice transferred Mr. Justice K .B.N.\n\nSingh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna as Chief Justice of\n\nS.1'.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 462694, "end_char": 462713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously with the making of this Order, another order of the same date was issued by the President whereby the President in exercise of the powers conferred by clame (i} of Article 222 after consultation with the Chief Justice transferred Mr. Justice K .B.N.\n\nSingh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna as Chief Justice of\n\nS.1'."}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462735, "end_char": 462738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463173, "end_char": 463184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463421, "end_char": 463432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464023, "end_char": 464033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464196, "end_char": 464206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464307, "end_char": 464317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464616, "end_char": 464626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464697, "end_char": 464708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464784, "end_char": 464796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464826, "end_char": 464837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. Rajappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 466375, "end_char": 466385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sixth writ petition is that filed by A. Rajappa, an advocate practising in the High Court of Madras.", "canonical_name": "A. Rajappa"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 466514, "end_char": 466525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 466828, "end_char": 466838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This writ petition was originally filed in the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution and in this writ petition the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Orders of transfer passed by the President on 19th January 1981 transferring Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court as the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Mr. Justice K.B. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as the Chief Jstice of Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 467340, "end_char": 467351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 467769, "end_char": 467783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India opposed this writ petition by filing a counter-affidavit where it contended that the transfers of both the Chief Justices were effected in public interest and after consultation with the Chief Justice of India who is the only authority required to be consulted whilst exercising the power of transfer under Article 222, clause (1) and the procedure prescribed by Article 217 clause (I) had no application in the case of transfer of a Judge or Chief Justice from one High Court to another.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 468091, "end_char": 468102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 468147, "end_char": 468158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 468541, "end_char": 468555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The seventh writ petition is tha_t filed by P. Subramanian, an advocate practising in the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "P. Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 468677, "end_char": 468688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D.N. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 469160, "end_char": 469171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eighth writ petition is that filed by D.N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, two advocates practising in the High Court of Patna.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Pandey"}}, {"text": "Thakur Ramapati Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 469176, "end_char": 469197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eighth writ petition is that filed by D.N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, two advocates practising in the High Court of Patna.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 469325, "end_char": 469336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 469900, "end_char": 469912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "17th September, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 470244, "end_char": 470264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and since the original petitioners had no objection to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh joining them as co-petitioner, this Court made an Order on 17th September, 1981 transposing Chief Justice K.B.N. \"Singh as petitioner No."}}, {"text": "K.B.N. \"Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 470291, "end_char": 470304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and since the original petitioners had no objection to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh joining them as co-petitioner, this Court made an Order on 17th September, 1981 transposing Chief Justice K.B.N. \"Singh as petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 470971, "end_char": 471008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh contended inter alia that the order transferring him as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was passed by the President by way of punishment and it was based on irrelevant and insufficient grounds a11d was not in public interest and in any event, it wa, s not precedeq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll\n\nby full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "K.C.\n\nKankan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 471206, "end_char": 471218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The avcrments made by Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh in his affidavit were disputed by the Union of India in an affidavit sworn by K.C.\n\nKankan, Deputy Secretary, Depatment of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and the Chief Justice of India also filed a counter-affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh.", "canonical_name": "K.C.\n\nKankan"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 471537, "end_char": 471549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India prompted two affidavits in rejoinder, one by Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and the other by petitioners Nos.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "K.B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 472382, "end_char": 472395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition for special leave is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Patna rejecting the writ petition of the petitioner challenging the constitutional validity of the Order of transfer of Chief Justice K.B. N. Singh, on the ground that the petitioner had not been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 473094, "end_char": 473100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Locus Standi\n\nWhen these writ petitions reached hearing before us, a preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mridul, appearing on.", "canonical_name": "Mridul"}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 474296, "end_char": 474307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same preliminary objection was urged by Mr. Mridul against the writ petition of S. P. Gupta and the contention was that the petitioner in that writ petition not having suffered any legal injury had no locus standi to maintion the writ petition.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Central Goverment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 474823, "end_char": 474840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde is concerned Mr. Mridul said that he would have had the same preliminary objection against the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain that writ petition because the petitioner had suffered no legal injury, but since S.N. Kumar had appeared, albeit as a respondent, and claimed relief against the decision of the Central Goverment not to appoint him for a further term and sought redress of the legal injury said to have been caused to him as a result of such decision, the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioner was made good and the writ petition was maintainable."}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 478137, "end_char": 478142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition was approved by Lord Esher M. R. in In Re Reed Baveri and Comp.111y(2) and the learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that when James L. J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which bas wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been refused something which he had a right to demand."}}, {"text": "Reed Baveri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 478158, "end_char": 478169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition was approved by Lord Esher M. R. in In Re Reed Baveri and Comp.111y(2) and the learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that when James L. J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which bas wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been refused something which he had a right to demand."}}, {"text": "Court noticed that the Bombay Cinematograph Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 481177, "end_char": 481224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay Cinema Rules, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 481241, "end_char": 481266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1974 SC 2177", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 481532, "end_char": 481548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976) 3 SCR 58", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 481602, "end_char": 481617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482505, "end_char": 482516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 482524, "end_char": 482550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482906, "end_char": 482917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 482925, "end_char": 482951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 483483, "end_char": 483494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 483502, "end_char": 483528, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 484064, "end_char": 484098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is on this principle that the Supreme Court of the United States held in United States v. Raines(2) that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities and save in exceptional cases, no person\n\n(l) AIR 1980 SC 1622. ("}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1622", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 484256, "end_char": 484272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order XXXII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 485395, "end_char": 485418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jaffna Municipal Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 487537, "end_char": 487561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There what happened was that the Jaffna Municipal Council was dissolved by the Minister of Local Government without giving it an opportunity to be heard."}}, {"text": "Upjohn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 487927, "end_char": 487933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Upjohn speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee denied standing to the appellant in the following words :\n\n\"The appellant was no doubt mayor at the time of its dissolution but that does not give him any right to complain independently of the council.", "canonical_name": "Upjohn"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 489052, "end_char": 489076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find that in the United States of America also this exception has been recognised and the strict rule of standing has been liberalised in the interest of justice."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 491623, "end_char": 491627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P.(2) when it was found that the inmates of the Protective Home at Agra were living in inhuman and degrading conditions in blatant violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and by reason of their socially and economically disadvantaged position, they were not in a position to move the court for judicial redress, two law professors of the Delhi University addressed a letter to this Court seeking enforcement of the constitutional right of the inmates under Article 21 by improvement of the living conditions in the Protective Horne, so that the inmates can live with human dignity in the Protective Home."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 491700, "end_char": 491710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 491898, "end_char": 491914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P.(2) when it was found that the inmates of the Protective Home at Agra were living in inhuman and degrading conditions in blatant violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and by reason of their socially and economically disadvantaged position, they were not in a position to move the court for judicial redress, two law professors of the Delhi University addressed a letter to this Court seeking enforcement of the constitutional right of the inmates under Article 21 by improvement of the living conditions in the Protective Horne, so that the inmates can live with human dignity in the Protective Home."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 492017, "end_char": 492027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 1579", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 492338, "end_char": 492354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 492654, "end_char": 492685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court has also entertained a letter addressed by a journalist claiming relief against demolition of hutments of pavement dwellers by the Municipal Corporation of Bombay and this letter has been treated as a writ petition by a Bench presided over by thr Chief Justice of India and interim relief has been granted to the pavement dwellers."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493561, "end_char": 493572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493688, "end_char": 493698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ajmer district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 494030, "end_char": 494044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, such as under-trial prisoners languishing in jails without a trial, inmates of the Protective Home in Agra or Harijan workers engaged in road construction in the Ajmer district, who are !"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 494630, "end_char": 494640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "StJPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 498021, "end_char": 498059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But there may be cases where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury\n\nStJPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.il."}}, {"text": "Thio", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 498617, "end_char": 498621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is what Prof. Thio states in his book on \"Locus Standi and Judicial Review\";\n\n'Is the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining tbe legislative and executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the public (Jurisdiction de droit objectif) or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by preventing iliegal encroachments on their individual rights (jurisdiction de droit subjectif) ?"}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 502305, "end_char": 502312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Diplock rightly said in Rex v. Inland Revenue Commissioners.(1)\n\n\"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by out-dated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of Jaw and get the unlawful conduct stopped It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their unctions.", "canonical_name": "Diplock"}}, {"text": "central government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 502821, "end_char": 502839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Diplock rightly said in Rex v. Inland Revenue Commissioners.(1)\n\n\"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by out-dated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of Jaw and get the unlawful conduct stopped It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their unctions."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 503104, "end_char": 503139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the\n\n(1) [1981] 2 WLR 722 at 740:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Schwartz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 503768, "end_char": 503776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade in their book on \"legal Control of Government\" at page 354 :\n\n\"Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system of administrative law."}}, {"text": "H.W.R. Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 503781, "end_char": 503792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade in their book on \"legal Control of Government\" at page 354 :\n\n\"Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system of administrative law."}}, {"text": "Cappelletti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 508944, "end_char": 508955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, as pointed out by Cappelletti in Vol III of his classic work on \"Access to Justice\" at page 520, \"The traditional doctrine of standing (legitimatio ad causam) attributes the right to sue either to the private individual who 'holds' the right which is in need of judicial protection or in case of public rights, to the State itself, which sues in courts through its organs.\""}}, {"text": "S.A. de Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 509848, "end_char": 509861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General represents the public interest in its entirety and as pointed out by S.A. de Smith in \"Judicial Review of Administrative Action\" (Third edition) at page 403: \"the general public has an interest in seeing that the law is obeyed and for this purpose, the Attorney-General represents the public.\"", "canonical_name": "S.A. de Smith"}}, {"text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 509866, "end_char": 509903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510471, "end_char": 510489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "statute": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 513221, "end_char": 513234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to note that the concept of public interest litigation had its origin in the United States and over the years, it has passed through various vicissitudes in the country of its origin."}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 513679, "end_char": 513686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Douglas said i11 D:lla Processing Service v. Camp(') that. \""}}, {"text": "Brannan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 513843, "end_char": 513850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Justice Brannan, citing Flast observed that \"the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular\n\n(!)", "canonical_name": "Brannan"}}, {"text": "Flast", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 513859, "end_char": 513864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Justice Brannan, citing Flast observed that \"the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514017, "end_char": 514023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.Y. Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 514715, "end_char": 514731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Models For Decision-Making\" by D.Y. Chandrachud.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 514875, "end_char": 514905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See United States v. Richardson.(2) Warth v. Seldin,(3) where the Supreme Court of United States seems to have recoiled a little against expansion of its judicial power."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 515136, "end_char": 515143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, there have been remarkable developments in this area in recent times largely due to the dynamic activism of Lord Denning.", "canonical_name": "Denoning M.R."}}, {"text": "Mc Whirler", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 515534, "end_char": 515544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mc Whirler case is reported in Attorney Genernl v. Independent Broadrasting Authority.(4) This was an action by Mc W'hirter for injuction against the Broadcasting Authority which wasthreatening to show a film which did not comply with the statutory requirements and the showing of which would therefore be illegal.", "canonical_name": "Mc W'hirter"}}, {"text": "Mc W'hirter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 515646, "end_char": 515657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mc Whirler case is reported in Attorney Genernl v. Independent Broadrasting Authority.(4) This was an action by Mc W'hirter for injuction against the Broadcasting Authority which wasthreatening to show a film which did not comply with the statutory requirements and the showing of which would therefore be illegal.", "canonical_name": "Mc W'hirter"}}, {"text": "McWhirter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 515897, "end_char": 515906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning considered the qu :st ion whether McWhirter had locus standi to bring the action when leave to bring a relator action was refused by the Attorney General, and answering this question in the affirmative, he said :\n\n\"We live in an age when Parliament has placed statutory duties on government departments and public authorities for the benefit of the public-but has provided no remedy for the breach of them.", "canonical_name": "Mc W'hirter"}}, {"text": "S. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 516386, "end_char": 516392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 516404, "end_char": 516410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Greater London Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 517505, "end_char": 517527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle was applied by Lord Denning in Rex v. Greater London Council,(1) to accord standing to Blackburn to maintain an action for an order of prohibition preventing the Greater London Council from allowing, contrary to law, the exhibition of pornographic films."}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 517554, "end_char": 517563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle was applied by Lord Denning in Rex v. Greater London Council,(1) to accord standing to Blackburn to maintain an action for an order of prohibition preventing the Greater London Council from allowing, contrary to law, the exhibition of pornographic films."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 517763, "end_char": 517769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again the duty owed by the Greater London Council was to the general public and not to any specific or determinate class or group of persons and there was no one who could claim that a specific legal injury was caused to him by the exhibition of pornographic films But even so Lord Denning held that Blackburn was entitled to maintain an action because he had sufficient interest; he was a citizen of London, his wife was a rate payer and he had children who might be harmed by the exhibition of pornographic films."}}, {"text": "Krishana Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 520585, "end_char": 520598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law\", as pointed out by Justice Krishana Iyer in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.\n\nUnion of Jndia(2) \"is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action when someone with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "Australian Law Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 521116, "end_char": 521149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fear is sometime expressed that if we 1<eep the door wide open for any memb :r of the public to enter the portals of the Court to enforce public duty or to vindicate public interest, the Court will be flooded with litigation But this fear is totally unfounded and the argument based upon it is answered completely by the Australian Law Reforms Commission in the following words:\n\n(ll [ t 978] Appeal Cases 482."}}, {"text": "AIR 1981 SC 344", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 521211, "end_char": 521226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K.E. Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 521420, "end_char": 521430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof: K.E. Scott ; \"Standing in the Supreme Court : A Functional Analysis\" (I 973) 86)\n\nA major expressed reason for limiting standing rights is fear of a spate of actions brought by busy bodies which will unduly extend the resources of the courts."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Cour", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 521994, "end_char": 522020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Over recent years successive decisions of the United States Supreme Cour."}}, {"text": "Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 522181, "end_char": 522186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surveying the result in 197 3 D Professor Scott commented : (Op Cit."}}, {"text": "Krishan Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 522747, "end_char": 522759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may add, with Justice Krishan Iyer; \"In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy, and activisim is essen\n\ntial for participative public justice, some risks hav: to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locus standi.\"", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "S.N. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 523557, "end_char": 523566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The time, money and other inconveniences involved in litigating a case act as sufficient deterrrnts for most of us to take recourse to legal action, vide article of Dr. S.N. Jain on \"Standing and Public Interest Litigation.\""}}, {"text": "Andre Rabie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 523994, "end_char": 524005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Andre Rabie has warned that \"political pressure groups who could not ltchieve their aims through the administrative process\" and we might add, through the political process, \"may try to use the courts to further their aims.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay Bar Association", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 526668, "end_char": 526690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first petitioner is a member of the Bombay Bar Association, petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "Incorporated Law Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 526820, "end_char": 526844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 is the President of the Incorporated Law Society."}}, {"text": "lqbal Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 527987, "end_char": 527999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lqbal Chagla and others cannot be regarded as mere bystanders or meddlesome interlopers in filing the writ petition."}}, {"text": "Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 529241, "end_char": 529276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that this was precisely the principle applied by this Conrt to uphold the standing of the Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union to challege the sale <fa part of the undertaking by the Fertilser Corporation of India in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.\n\nUni01i-of India (supra)."}}, {"text": "Fertilser Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 529333, "end_char": 529363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that this was precisely the principle applied by this Conrt to uphold the standing of the Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union to challege the sale <fa part of the undertaking by the Fertilser Corporation of India in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.\n\nUni01i-of India (supra)."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 529440, "end_char": 529452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Krishna Iyer pointed out f at if a citizen \"belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the .", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 531542, "end_char": 531545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Glanville Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 532259, "end_char": 532275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bas, to use the words of Glanville Austin; to become an arm of the socio-economic revolution and perform an active role calculated to bring social justice within the reach of the common man.", "canonical_name": "Glanville Austin"}}, {"text": "Gordon Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 532913, "end_char": 532924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the Bench\" is that \"the business or a Judge is to hold his tongue until the last\n\npssibtd moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to look\" and in the same strain are the words quoted by professor Gordon Reid from a memorandum to the Victorian Government by Irvin, C.J. in 1923 ."}}, {"text": "Irvin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 532974, "end_char": 532979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the Bench\" is that \"the business or a Judge is to hold his tongue until the last\n\npssibtd moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to look\" and in the same strain are the words quoted by professor Gordon Reid from a memorandum to the Victorian Government by Irvin, C.J. in 1923 ."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982J 2 s.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 534169, "end_char": 534206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this cannot be\n\n536 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1982J 2 s.C.R.\n\nachieved unless we have judicial cadres who share the fighting faith of the Constitution and who are imbued with the constitutional values."}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 535120, "end_char": 535127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Krishna Iyer goes on to say in his inimitable style :\n\n\"Justice Cardozo approvingly quoted President Theodore Roosevelt's stress on the social philosophy of the Judges which shapes the course of a nation and, therefore, the choice of Judges for the higher Courts which makes and declares the law of the land, must be in tune with the social philosophy of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Theodore Roosevelt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 535157, "end_char": 535175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Krishna Iyer goes on to say in his inimitable style :\n\n\"Justice Cardozo approvingly quoted President Theodore Roosevelt's stress on the social philosophy of the Judges which shapes the course of a nation and, therefore, the choice of Judges for the higher Courts which makes and declares the law of the land, must be in tune with the social philosophy of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 538612, "end_char": 538624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If we may again quote the eloquent Words of Justice Krishna Iyer:\n\n\"Independence of the Judiciary is not genufiexion; nor is it opposition to every proposition of Government.", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539816, "end_char": 539827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539882, "end_char": 539893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 540080, "end_char": 540090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "st November, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 540169, "end_char": 540186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956 when the Amending Act came into force, this Article consists of only one clause which reads as under :\n\n\"Every High Court shaII consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.\""}}, {"text": "18th March, l 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 540622, "end_char": 540639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India has placed before us figures showing that as on 18th March, l 981, the aggregate sanctioned strength of permanent and additional Judges was 308 and 97 respectively while the aggregate actual strength was only 277 and 43 respectively."}}, {"text": "31st December 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 541034, "end_char": 541052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The figures given by the Union of India also show the large arrears pending in the different High Courts and it is clear from these figures that the total number of pending main cases has been steadly rising from 6,13,799 on 31st December 1978 to 6,78,951 on 31st December, 1980."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 541068, "end_char": 541087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The figures given by the Union of India also show the large arrears pending in the different High Courts and it is clear from these figures that the total number of pending main cases has been steadly rising from 6,13,799 on 31st December 1978 to 6,78,951 on 31st December, 1980."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542049, "end_char": 542060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543150, "end_char": 543161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nIndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 543471, "end_char": 543491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How many judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court is left to the discretion of the Government of\n\nIndia and there are no judicially manageable standards for the purpose of controlling or guiding the discretion of the Union of India in that respect."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 546512, "end_char": 546523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 546851, "end_char": 546862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 547342, "end_char": 547353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 547527, "end_char": 547538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 548571, "end_char": 548582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 548601, "end_char": 548612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankalchand Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 548723, "end_char": 548739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fortunately, this question is no longer res integra and it stands concluded by the decision of this Court in Sankalchand Seth's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Sanka/chand Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 548789, "end_char": 548805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the question in Sanka/chand Seth's rase (supra) related to the scope and meaning of 'consultation' in clause (I) of Article 222, but it was common ground between the parties that 'consultation' for the purpose of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217 has the same meaning and content as 'consultation' in clause (I) of Article 222.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 548889, "end_char": 548900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 549000, "end_char": 549011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 549030, "end_char": 549041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 549110, "end_char": 549121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandracbud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 549124, "end_char": 549135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandracbud, J., as he then was in his judgment in Sanka/chand Seth's case (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment given by Justice Subba Rao, when he was a Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Pushpam v. State of Modras( 1) \"the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more person or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution\" and added. \"", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Sanka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 549175, "end_char": 549180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandracbud, J., as he then was in his judgment in Sanka/chand Seth's case (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment given by Justice Subba Rao, when he was a Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Pushpam v. State of Modras( 1) \"the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more person or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution\" and added. \"", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "chand Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 549181, "end_char": 549191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandracbud, J., as he then was in his judgment in Sanka/chand Seth's case (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment given by Justice Subba Rao, when he was a Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Pushpam v. State of Modras( 1) \"the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more person or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution\" and added. \"", "canonical_name": "Chand Shfth"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 549285, "end_char": 549294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandracbud, J., as he then was in his judgment in Sanka/chand Seth's case (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment given by Justice Subba Rao, when he was a Judge of the Madras High Court in R. Pushpam v. State of Modras( 1) \"the word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more person or an impact of two or more minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or atleast a satisfactory solution\" and added. \""}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 551058, "end_char": 551069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 551087, "end_char": 551098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 552878, "end_char": 552883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s.~. GUPTA V. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 543\n\nan appointment is made by the Central Government contrary tc the unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553347, "end_char": 553358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553377, "end_char": 553388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 554545, "end_char": 554556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 554869, "end_char": 554880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 555631, "end_char": 555634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cqief Jqstii,:i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 555854, "end_char": 555869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only the power of hearing appeals a ; ainst the decision :or the Chief Justice of a Hih Court that is possessed by the Cqief Jqstii,:i;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 556081, "end_char": 556092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 558183, "end_char": 558194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B.R. Ambedkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 558419, "end_char": 558432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, in the course of debates in the Constituent Assembly, an amendment was moved that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court should be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar made the following comment which is very significant :\n\n\"With regard to the question of the concurrence of the chief Justi9e, it eem$ to me th11t those advocate that pro-\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, .i.)", "canonical_name": "B. R. Ambedkar"}}, {"text": "Central D Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 559610, "end_char": 559630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore, clear that where there is difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries in regard to appointment of a Judge in a High Court, the opinion of none of the c, mstitutional functionaries is entitled to primacy but after considering the opinion of each of\n\nthe constitutional functionaries and giving it due weight, the Central D Government is entitled to come to its own decision as to which opinion it should accept in deciding whether or not to appoint the\n\n• I particular person as a Judge."}}, {"text": "New Zealand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 561086, "end_char": 561097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also in the common-wealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the appointment of High Court and Supreme Court Judges is made by the Executive."}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 563646, "end_char": 563657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 563985, "end_char": 563996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central GovernP.Jent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 564615, "end_char": 564635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contended that the Central GovernP.Jent may, if it thinks fit, consult one or more of the Judges of the Supreme and of the High Courts or it may not consult any and where it does not, the Chief Justice of India will be the only constitutional functionary required to be consulted and in such a case the Central Government must accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of India as binding upon it."}}, {"text": "Supreme and", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 564700, "end_char": 564711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contended that the Central GovernP.Jent may, if it thinks fit, consult one or more of the Judges of the Supreme and of the High Courts or it may not consult any and where it does not, the Chief Justice of India will be the only constitutional functionary required to be consulted and in such a case the Central Government must accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of India as binding upon it."}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 565117, "end_char": 565128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 565960, "end_char": 565971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568417, "end_char": 568428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 569619, "end_char": 569628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that even countries like Australia and New Zealand have veered\n\nro!ln~ to the view that tere soµld be a Judicial Commission for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 549\n\nappointment of the higher judiciary."}}, {"text": "Beattle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 570029, "end_char": 570036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also in New Zealand, the Royal Commission on the Courts chaired by Mr. Justice Beattle, who has dow become the Governor General of New Zealand, recommended that a Judicial Commission should consider all judicial appointments including appointments of High Court Judges."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 570345, "end_char": 570356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 571067, "end_char": 571078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 571494, "end_char": 571505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 572300, "end_char": 572311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 572681, "end_char": 572692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "was no provison in the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 573317, "end_char": 573380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 574085, "end_char": 574113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 574134, "end_char": 574163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 574168, "end_char": 574179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 574618, "end_char": 574629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 574758, "end_char": 574769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575451, "end_char": 575462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575526, "end_char": 575535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575539, "end_char": 575549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government oflndia Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 575558, "end_char": 575586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575604, "end_char": 575615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575839, "end_char": 575850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 576232, "end_char": 576243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Tej Bahadu r Sapru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 576640, "end_char": 576658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was felt by many that the practice of appointing acting or additional Judges was pernicious and it should be done away with Tej Bahadu r Sapru expressed his firm opposition to this practice of appointing acting or additional Judges in the course of his speech in the Constituent Assembly.", "canonical_name": "Tej Bahadu r Sapru"}}, {"text": "Articles 198(2) and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 579063, "end_char": 579086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 198(2) and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580090, "end_char": 580113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580224, "end_char": 580236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580869, "end_char": 580881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 581370, "end_char": 581381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 582200, "end_char": 582211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 582221, "end_char": 582232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583218, "end_char": 583229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583247, "end_char": 583259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583274, "end_char": 583285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583302, "end_char": 583313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583472, "end_char": 583483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583634, "end_char": 583645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585173, "end_char": 585184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585561, "end_char": 585572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585899, "end_char": 585910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 590175, "end_char": 590186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.N. Sapru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 590360, "end_char": 590370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same note was struck by P.N. Sapru when he said in the course of the Debates in Rajya Sabha during the discussion of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Bill: It is necessary to have additional Judges for the disposal of arrears."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 590871, "end_char": 590882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 591099, "end_char": 591110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 591854, "end_char": 591865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 592082, "end_char": 592093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 593460, "end_char": 593471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 595218, "end_char": 595229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596360, "end_char": 596371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596926, "end_char": 596937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S.C.1", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 597633, "end_char": 597669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S.C.1t.\n\nIt is clear on a plain reading of Article 217 clause (1) that when an additional Judge is to be appointed, the procedure set out in that article is to be followed."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597707, "end_char": 597718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597852, "end_char": 597863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598351, "end_char": 598362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598405, "end_char": 598416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598548, "end_char": 598559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598657, "end_char": 598668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598937, "end_char": 598948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599067, "end_char": 599078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599207, "end_char": 599218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599770, "end_char": 599779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599937, "end_char": 599948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 600338, "end_char": 600349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601979, "end_char": 601990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602143, "end_char": 602154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602896, "end_char": 602907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 2H", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602995, "end_char": 603005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 603902, "end_char": 603913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 603973, "end_char": 603984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 605315, "end_char": 605326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 605330, "end_char": 605341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 609951, "end_char": 609962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611011, "end_char": 611022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611269, "end_char": 611280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611922, "end_char": 611934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611983, "end_char": 611994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 612403, "end_char": 612414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 612931, "end_char": 612942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n1980", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 614051, "end_char": 614071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615146, "end_char": 615157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615287, "end_char": 615298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ofO.N. Vohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 615521, "end_char": 615533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointments ofO.N. Vohra, S.\\/. Kumar and S.B. Wad for three months and the appointments of some other additional Judges for six months were thus defended by the learned Attorney General as being within the scope and ambit of clause (!)"}}, {"text": "S.\\/. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 615535, "end_char": 615546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointments ofO.N. Vohra, S.\\/. Kumar and S.B. Wad for three months and the appointments of some other additional Judges for six months were thus defended by the learned Attorney General as being within the scope and ambit of clause (!)", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615749, "end_char": 615760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615831, "end_char": 615842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 616904, "end_char": 616915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Govenment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 617901, "end_char": 617918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also point out that an additional Judge cannot be appointed for a period of three months or six months in order to enable the Chief Justice of India or the Central Govenment to consider whether the additional Judge should be appointed for a further term or ns a permanent Judge."}}, {"text": "O.N.\n\nVohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 618880, "end_char": 618891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the view that the Chief Justice of India acted under a mi.sconception of the true constitutional position when he recommended the appointment of O.N.\n\nVohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad for a period of six months and the Central Government was also in error in appointing them only for a period of three months.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 619715, "end_char": 619726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 619745, "end_char": 619756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gordhandas Bhanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 622948, "end_char": 622965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would therefore seem that the principle of interpretation enunciated by this Court in Gordhandas Bhanji's case (supra) cannot apply in the construction of the circular letter."}}, {"text": "States Re-organisation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 623551, "end_char": 623584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first paragraph of the circular letter begins by saying that it has repeatedly been suggested to the Government over the years \"by several bodies and forums including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one-third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated.\""}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 624738, "end_char": 624770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest point of time when this view was expressed by a high powered body was in the year 195.5, when the States Reorganisation Commission in its report recommended that \"at least one-third of the number of Judges in the High Court of a State should consist of persons who are recruited from outside that State\" and this recommendation was guided by the consideration that \"the principal organs of State should be so constituted as to inspire confidence and to help in arresting parochial trends\"."}}, {"text": "S65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 625946, "end_char": 625949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th October, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 626289, "end_char": 626306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice Subba Rao also in his letter dated 6th October, 1966, expressed the view that it would be better to bring Judges from outside at the time of initial appointment."}}, {"text": "Admini&trative Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 626462, "end_char": 626495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came the Report of the Study Team of the Admini&trative Reforms Commission submitted in 1967 and this Report also examined the question of appointment of Judges in High Courts and came to the view that the recommendation of the States Reorganisation Commission should be implemented so that as far as possible one-third of the number of Judges in a High Court are from outside."}}, {"text": "S.V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 627403, "end_char": 627413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S.V. Gupte, who was then Attorney General of India and who is known for bold and courageous expression of his views, stated in answer to the questionnaire that he was wholly in favour of having one-third the number of Judges in each High Court from outside the State \"as that alone may perh1ps secure some kind of freedom from bias on grounds of caste and class consideration or any close association with local people.\""}}, {"text": "Bar Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 627828, "end_char": 627848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bar Council of India also in its reply to the questionnaire supported the proposal of one-third Judges in a High Court being from outside the State."}}, {"text": "26th February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 628126, "end_char": 628145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to note-and this completely establishes the bona fides of the Law Minister in issuing the circular letter-that even as far back as 26th February, 1979, when the political party to which the Law Minister belongs was not in power, the Law Minister stated clearly and unequivocally that he agreed with the view expressed by the Law Commission that one third of the Judges in each High Court must be from outside the State because this would achieve better national integration in the field of judidary."}}, {"text": "H.R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 628776, "end_char": 628787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then followed the Eightieth Report of the Law Commission presided over by Mr. Justice H.R. Khanna.", "canonical_name": "H. R. Khanna"}}, {"text": "7th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 631031, "end_char": 631045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was also discussed at the Meelings of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Law Ministry held on 7th June, 1980, 24th July 1980 and 17th December, 1980 and the unanimous view taken by the members of the Consultative Committee belonging to different political parties was that at least one third of the Judges in a High Court should be from outside the State."}}, {"text": ", 24th July 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 631045, "end_char": 631061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was also discussed at the Meelings of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Law Ministry held on 7th June, 1980, 24th July 1980 and 17th December, 1980 and the unanimous view taken by the members of the Consultative Committee belonging to different political parties was that at least one third of the Judges in a High Court should be from outside the State."}}, {"text": "17th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 631066, "end_char": 631085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was also discussed at the Meelings of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Law Ministry held on 7th June, 1980, 24th July 1980 and 17th December, 1980 and the unanimous view taken by the members of the Consultative Committee belonging to different political parties was that at least one third of the Judges in a High Court should be from outside the State."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 631997, "end_char": 632006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The National Seminar on Judicial Appointments and Transfers convened by the Bar Council of India in Ahmedabad from 17th to 19th October 1980 also yielded the same consensus view, namely :\n\n\"The ideal of having one third of High Court Judges from outside the State helps promotion of national integration and the preservation of a unified judicial system."}}, {"text": "17th to 19th October 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 632012, "end_char": 632037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The National Seminar on Judicial Appointments and Transfers convened by the Bar Council of India in Ahmedabad from 17th to 19th October 1980 also yielded the same consensus view, namely :\n\n\"The ideal of having one third of High Court Judges from outside the State helps promotion of national integration and the preservation of a unified judicial system."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 635729, "end_char": 635740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrachud, J., as he then was, observed in his judgment in that case : \"I would only like to add that the record of this case does not bear out the claim that any one of the 16 High Court Judges was transferred in order to further the cause of national integration Far from it.\"", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 637173, "end_char": 637184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 637587, "end_char": 637598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Bar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 644665, "end_char": 644682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There have been cases where the Chief Justice of India has recommended members of the Supreme Court Bar for appointment as Judges in different High Cou• ts and equally there have been cases where members of the Income-tax Tribunal as also persons working in the legal department of the Government of India have been recommended by the Chief Justice of India for appointment as High Court Judges."}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 648758, "end_char": 648767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRBME COURT REPORTS f[l 982] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 651586, "end_char": 651625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners also sought to bolster up their case that circular letter held out a veiled threat to the additional Judges by relying on\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS f[l 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe statement contained in the circular letter that the giving of consent by additional Judges would not necessarily involve any commitment on the part of the Central Government to appoint them as permanent Judges."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 652639, "end_char": 652650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 653781, "end_char": 653792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 655349, "end_char": 655360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sa11kalchand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 659018, "end_char": 659036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the circular letter was really an attempt on the part of the Government to transfer Judges from one High Court to another by circumventing the decision of this Court in Sa11kalchand Sheth's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 659745, "end_char": 659752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the first category of persons is concerned, it is impossible to contend and with all his ingenuity even Mr. Seervai appearing on behalf of the petitioners could not argue, that when a person who is recommends.", "canonical_name": "Seervai E"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 660285, "end_char": 660296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 661357, "end_char": 661368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 661571, "end_char": 661582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 661875, "end_char": 661887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 662026, "end_char": 662037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 662429, "end_char": 662440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 662634, "end_char": 662645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 663864, "end_char": 663875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 664142, "end_char": 664153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 665656, "end_char": 665667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 668338, "end_char": 668349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 668367, "end_char": 668378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 670489, "end_char": 670501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra was concerned his case stood on an entirely different footing from that of S.N. Kumar since, unlike\n\nS. N.\n\nKumar who allied himself with the petitioners and actively participated in the arguments almost as if he was petitioner, O.N. Vohra though made a party respondent to the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde did not appear and participate\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 587\n\nin the proceedings or seek any relief from the Court in regard to his continuance as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "O.N. Vohra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 670617, "end_char": 670627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra was concerned his case stood on an entirely different footing from that of S.N. Kumar since, unlike\n\nS. N.\n\nKumar who allied himself with the petitioners and actively participated in the arguments almost as if he was petitioner, O.N. Vohra though made a party respondent to the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde did not appear and participate\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 587\n\nin the proceedings or seek any relief from the Court in regard to his continuance as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 670683, "end_char": 670696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra was concerned his case stood on an entirely different footing from that of S.N. Kumar since, unlike\n\nS. N.\n\nKumar who allied himself with the petitioners and actively participated in the arguments almost as if he was petitioner, O.N. Vohra though made a party respondent to the writ petition of V.M. Tarkunde did not appear and participate\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 587\n\nin the proceedings or seek any relief from the Court in regard to his continuance as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 671652, "end_char": 671662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 671839, "end_char": 671850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 671858, "end_char": 671877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 673454, "end_char": 673489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was presumably for this reason that O.N. Vohra did not appear in the writ petition or seek any relief from\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "0.N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 673579, "end_char": 673589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, we are told, 0.N. Vohra has already started practice in the Delhi High Court.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 677908, "end_char": 677918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on both these grounds that the petitioners and\n\nS.N. Kumar impugned the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term and there can be no doubt that the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India would be relevant qua both these grounds.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 678569, "end_char": 678579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 678619, "end_char": 678630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 678638, "end_char": 678657, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679497, "end_char": 679507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679917, "end_char": 679927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680218, "end_char": 680228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680391, "end_char": 680402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680413, "end_char": 680424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680731, "end_char": 680741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682262, "end_char": 682273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 682599, "end_char": 682618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "full and identical facts\" on which the decision of the Central\n\nGovernment is based must be placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "Central G Jvern", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 683846, "end_char": 683861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bt ordinarily the correspondence exchanged between the Central G Jvern moot, the\n\nChief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the C.1ief Justice cf India would throw light on the question as to what are the reasons which have impelled the Central Government to take any particular decision regarding the continu1C1ce of an additi()odl Judge."}}, {"text": "Article\n\n217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 685309, "end_char": 685321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 686183, "end_char": 686194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 686204, "end_char": 686215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KB N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 687863, "end_char": 687874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we find that fortunately in the present case, unlike KB N. Singh's case which falls for determination in the second batch of writ petitions, there was correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the continuance of S.N. Kumar and the question is whether this correspondence forms part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President so as to be protected against disclosure by reason of clause (2) of Article 74.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 688308, "end_char": 688318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 688571, "end_char": 688573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iadia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 688784, "end_char": 688789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H: s1id that the Council of Ministers cannot advise the President to appoint or not to ap , mint an additional Judge for a further term without consulting the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of Iadia, it is only after consulting them that appropriate advice cao be tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President."}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 689046, "end_char": 689056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 691378, "end_char": 691388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 692128, "end_char": 692144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 692299, "end_char": 692309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 692584, "end_char": 692587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide the observations of Beg, C.J. at page 46, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) at page 91, Fazal Ali J. at pages\n\n120 and 121, where all the three learned Judges took the view that by reason clause (2) of Article 74 the Court would be barred from inquiring into the grounds which might weigh with the Council of Ministers in advising the President to issue a proclamation under Article 356, because the grounds would form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers."}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 692764, "end_char": 692774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 692937, "end_char": 692948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 694102, "end_char": 694112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 694364, "end_char": 694374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1978] 1 SCR 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 694630, "end_char": 694644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "28th September, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 694908, "end_char": 694928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\na respresentation against the Order of removal which was considered by the Council of Ministers of the State as in the meantime the\n\nPresident's rule had come to an end and the Council of Ministers expressed its views in a Resolution passed on 28th September, 1955."}}, {"text": "11th August, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 695146, "end_char": 695163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of the Report of the Public Service Commission, the Council of Ministers considered the matter again and ultimately on 11th August, 1956 it reached the final conclusion ."}}, {"text": "28th September 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 695656, "end_char": 695675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereµpon instituted a suit against the successor St11-te of Punjab for a declaration that his removal from service was i!Jegal and in that suit he filed an application for the production of certain documents which included inter alia the proceedings of the Council of Ministers deted 28th September 1955 and 1 lth August 1956 and the Report of the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "1 lth August 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 695680, "end_char": 695697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereµpon instituted a suit against the successor St11-te of Punjab for a declaration that his removal from service was i!Jegal and in that suit he filed an application for the production of certain documents which included inter alia the proceedings of the Council of Ministers deted 28th September 1955 and 1 lth August 1956 and the Report of the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 695720, "end_char": 695745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereµpon instituted a suit against the successor St11-te of Punjab for a declaration that his removal from service was i!Jegal and in that suit he filed an application for the production of certain documents which included inter alia the proceedings of the Council of Ministers deted 28th September 1955 and 1 lth August 1956 and the Report of the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 695855, "end_char": 695869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the majority of the Court upheld the claim of privilege put forward on behalf of the State and so far as the Report of the Public Service Commission was concerned, the learned Judge held that it was protected against disclosure both under clause (3) of Article 163 and Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696166, "end_char": 696177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696182, "end_char": 696193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 696201, "end_char": 696220, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696306, "end_char": 696317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696380, "end_char": 696390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696610, "end_char": 696621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 696714, "end_char": 696724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge speaking on behalf of the majority, accorded protection to the report of the Public Service Commission under clause (3) of Article 163 on the ground that it formed part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 697469, "end_char": 697480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 698543, "end_char": 698553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 699031, "end_char": 699042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 699050, "end_char": 699069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 701069, "end_char": 701080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "James Madison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 702355, "end_char": 702368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Knowledge\" said James Madison, \"will for ever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982) 2 s.c.1", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 705539, "end_char": 705576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Franks Committee of the United Kingdom also observed\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 982) 2 s.c.1..\n\nto the same effect while pleading for an open government."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 706980, "end_char": 706986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also ~(f fuitobservations in the same strain by Mathew, J. in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain :(1)\n\n\"In a government of responsibility like ours, where , all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct."}}, {"text": "1975] 3 SCR 333", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 707735, "end_char": 707750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. R.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 708374, "end_char": 708391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The need for an open government where there is access to information in regard to the functioning of government has been emphasized and the arguments in support of it have been ably and succinctly summarised in the following passage from the book of Dr. S. R.\n\nMaheshwari on \"Open Government in India\" at pages 95 and 96 :\n\n\"Administrative India puts the greatest weight on keeping happening within its corridors secret, thereby denying the citizens access to information about them.", "canonical_name": "S. R.\n\nMaheshwari"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711155, "end_char": 711166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711227, "end_char": 711238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711270, "end_char": 711278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711648, "end_char": 711659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711672, "end_char": 711683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 711701, "end_char": 711709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 712546, "end_char": 712554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 712562, "end_char": 712585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 712805, "end_char": 712810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of himself, Sinha, C.J. and Wanchoo, J. pointed out that the principle behind the exclusionary rule enacted in section 123 is that a document should not be allowed to be produced in court if such production would cause injury to public interest and where a conflict arises between public interest in non-disclosure and private interest in disclosure, the latter must yield to the former.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 712821, "end_char": 712828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of himself, Sinha, C.J. and Wanchoo, J. pointed out that the principle behind the exclusionary rule enacted in section 123 is that a document should not be allowed to be produced in court if such production would cause injury to public interest and where a conflict arises between public interest in non-disclosure and private interest in disclosure, the latter must yield to the former."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 712904, "end_char": 712915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 713222, "end_char": 713233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 713837, "end_char": 713848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 714592, "end_char": 714605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall have to discuss this problem of balancing different aspects of public interest a little later, but in the meanwhile let us continue with the examination of the decision in Sukhdev Singh' s case (supra)."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 714759, "end_char": 714770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716480, "end_char": 716491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716894, "end_char": 716905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 717184, "end_char": 717199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sodhi Sukhdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 720605, "end_char": 720624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by Gajendragadkar, J. and the other learned Judges in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh' s case (supra) thus runs into an inconsistency and creates an illogical situation.", "canonical_name": "Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's"}}, {"text": "Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 720771, "end_char": 720792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also another infirmity from which the view taken in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) suffers.", "canonical_name": "Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720979, "end_char": 720990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragakar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 721264, "end_char": 721277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now even according to Gajendragakar, J. and the other learned Judges, a document can be said to relate to affairs of State only if it is a document of such a character that its disclosure will injure public interest and therefore the court would have to reach the conclusion that the disclosure of the document will be injurious to public interest before it can find that the document relates to affairs of State.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Sodhi Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 723358, "end_char": 723369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are therefore unable to accept the decision ip Sodhi Singh' s case (supra) as laying down the correct law on this point."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724601, "end_char": 724612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724657, "end_char": 724668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Scarrnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 726308, "end_char": 726316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide observations of Lord Scarrnan in Burma 0:1 v. Bank of England(1)."}}, {"text": "Raj Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 727092, "end_char": 727102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is settled law, and it was so clearly recognised in Raj Narain' s case (supra) that there may be classes of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed, no matter what the individual documents in those classes may contain or in other words, the law recognises that there may be classes of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure.", "canonical_name": "Raj Naraian"}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 730328, "end_char": 730332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Conway v. Rimmer (supra) Lord Reid dismissed the \"candour argument\" summarily at page 952 and Lord Upjohn pointed out at page 993 that immunity of this class of documents against discloure \"has nothing whatever to do with candour or uninhibited freedom of expression\", for it is not possible to believe \"that any minister or any high level military or civil servant would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views in the course of his duty on some subject, such as even the personal qualifications and delinquencies, of some colleague, by the thought that his observation might one day see the light of day.\""}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 730936, "end_char": 730942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest also said in the same case at page 957:\n\n\"in many decided cases there have been references to a suggestion that, if there were knowledge that certain documents (for example reports) might in some circumstances be seen by eyes for which they were never intended, the result would be that in the making of similar documents in the future candour would be lacking."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 731770, "end_char": 731779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Radcliffe also remarked in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board(1) that he would have supposed Crown servants to be \"made of sterner stuff\", a view shared by Harmen L. J. in the Grosvenor Hotel case at page 1255."}}, {"text": "Harmen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 731933, "end_char": 731939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Radcliffe also remarked in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board(1) that he would have supposed Crown servants to be \"made of sterner stuff\", a view shared by Harmen L. J. in the Grosvenor Hotel case at page 1255.", "canonical_name": "Harmen"}}, {"text": "Salmon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 731993, "end_char": 731999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Salmon too rejected the \"candour theory\" in Reg v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Secretary of State for Home Deptt. (", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "Raoul Berger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 732489, "end_char": 732501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The candour argument has also not prevailed with Judges and jurists in the United States and it is interesting to note what Raoul Berger while speaking about the immunity claimed by President Nixon against the demand for disclosure of the Watergate Tapes, says in his ."}}, {"text": "Nixon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 732557, "end_char": 732562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The candour argument has also not prevailed with Judges and jurists in the United States and it is interesting to note what Raoul Berger while speaking about the immunity claimed by President Nixon against the demand for disclosure of the Watergate Tapes, says in his ."}}, {"text": "Kleindienst", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 732929, "end_char": 732940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will not explain Mr. Nixon's claim of blanket immunity for members of his White House staff on the basis of mere membership without more; it will not justify Kleindienst's assertion of immunity from congressional inquiry for two and one-half million federal employees."}}, {"text": "Gibbs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 733481, "end_char": 733486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs A.C, J. in Sankey Whit/am (supra), it would not be altogether unreal to suppose \"that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and can did of these concerned believe that they are protected from dis-\n\n(1) f!956] SC (HL) al page 20.", "canonical_name": "Gibbs"}}, {"text": "Sankey Whit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 733498, "end_char": 733509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs A.C, J. in Sankey Whit/am (supra), it would not be altogether unreal to suppose \"that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and can did of these concerned believe that they are protected from dis-\n\n(1) f!956] SC (HL) al page 20.", "canonical_name": "Sankey Whit"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 733781, "end_char": 733784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 736257, "end_char": 736268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 737983, "end_char": 737988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to such cases it would be proper to say, as Lord Simon did, that to order production of the document in question, would put the interest of the State in jeopardy."}}, {"text": "Menzeies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 740215, "end_char": 740223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in Conway v. Rimmer at page 952, Lord Reid recognised an exception that cabinet minutes and the like can be disclosed when they have become only of historical interest, and in Lanyon Private Limited v. Commonwealth (supra), Menzeies J. agreed that there might be \"very special circumstances\" in which such documents might be examined."}}, {"text": "Scarman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 740331, "end_char": 740338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Scarman also pointed out in the course of his speech in Burma Oil v. Bank of England (supra) that he did not accept \"that there are any classes of documents which, however harmless their content and however strong the requirement of justice, may never be disclosed until they are only of historical interest\"."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c, R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 746609, "end_char": 746647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest also observed to the same effect at page 405 of the Report :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c, R.\n\n\"However honourable and public spirited a person might be, he would undoubtedly feel somewhat inhibited in the future if he found that as a result oi his last response to a request for information he had himself become a defendant or an accused."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747963, "end_char": 747974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sodhi Sukhdeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 749262, "end_char": 749281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has therefore been held since long before Conway v. Rimmer\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 617\n\n(supra) was decided in England and since the decision in Sodhi Sukhdeo Singh's case (supra) in India that a claim for immunity against disclosure should be made by the minister who is the political head of the department concerned or failing him, by the secretary of the department and the claim should always be made in the form of an affidavit.", "canonical_name": "Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 750191, "end_char": 750202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simon of Glaisdale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 751149, "end_char": 751167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Simon of Glaisdale also pointed out in the same case; \"Crown privilege is a misnomer and apt to be misleading."}}, {"text": "Glaisdale", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 752318, "end_char": 752327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "parte Home Secretary (supra) Lord Simon of Glaisdale pointed out that even a litigant or a witness may draw the attention of the Court to the nature of the document with a view to its being excluded."}}, {"text": "Burney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 753183, "end_char": 753189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney General sought to tender on an affidavit sworn by Burney, the then Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming immunity against disclosure in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-appointment of S. N. Kumar but since the affidavit was sworn on 7-9-1981 and yet not tendered until 16-9-1981 even though the arguments had begun long back, we expressed our displeasure at the delay in filing the affidavit whereupon the learned Attorney General stated that he would not rely upon the affidavit."}}, {"text": "7-9-1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 753507, "end_char": 753515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney General sought to tender on an affidavit sworn by Burney, the then Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming immunity against disclosure in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-appointment of S. N. Kumar but since the affidavit was sworn on 7-9-1981 and yet not tendered until 16-9-1981 even though the arguments had begun long back, we expressed our displeasure at the delay in filing the affidavit whereupon the learned Attorney General stated that he would not rely upon the affidavit."}}, {"text": "16-9-1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 753543, "end_char": 753552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney General sought to tender on an affidavit sworn by Burney, the then Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming immunity against disclosure in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the non-appointment of S. N. Kumar but since the affidavit was sworn on 7-9-1981 and yet not tendered until 16-9-1981 even though the arguments had begun long back, we expressed our displeasure at the delay in filing the affidavit whereupon the learned Attorney General stated that he would not rely upon the affidavit."}}, {"text": "T.N. Chaturvedy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 753934, "end_char": 753949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter when the learned counsel for S. N.\n\nKumar sought answers to certain queries in regard to this correspondence, the learned Attorney General filed an affidavit sworn by T.N. Chaturvedy, Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming protection against disclosure of this correspondence, strong objection was taken to the filing of this affidavit by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar on the ground that the learned Attorney General having made a statement that he would not rely upon previous affidavit, it was not competent and in any event not proper for the Union of India to file the affidavit of T.N. Chaturvedi which was almost in the same terms as the previous affidavit.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "T.N. Chaturvedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 754404, "end_char": 754419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter when the learned counsel for S. N.\n\nKumar sought answers to certain queries in regard to this correspondence, the learned Attorney General filed an affidavit sworn by T.N. Chaturvedy, Secretary to the Home and Judiciary Department claiming protection against disclosure of this correspondence, strong objection was taken to the filing of this affidavit by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and S.N. Kumar on the ground that the learned Attorney General having made a statement that he would not rely upon previous affidavit, it was not competent and in any event not proper for the Union of India to file the affidavit of T.N. Chaturvedi which was almost in the same terms as the previous affidavit.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 755912, "end_char": 755923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 755978, "end_char": 755989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 756798, "end_char": 756821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This residual power of the court to inspect the document has also been recognised in Australian Law by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Sankey v.\n\nWhitlam(1)."}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 756990, "end_char": 757001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757589, "end_char": 757600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757777, "end_char": 757788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 757928, "end_char": 757931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C.J. observed at two places while dealing with the objection against the diselosure of ti1e Blue Book under section 123 that \"If the Court would yet like to satisfy itself, the Court may see the document.", "canonical_name": "Bray"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 758041, "end_char": 758052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 758589, "end_char": 758600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. N. Chaturvedy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 759155, "end_char": 759171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since, in the present case, the affidavit of T. N. Chaturvedy claiming immunity against disclosure was made at a late stage of the proceedings and the claim for immunity was in respect of a new class of documents which has so far not come up for judicial consideration and we were in doubt, even after considering the affid1vit, whether the correspondence whose disclosure was sought on behalf of the petitioners and S. N.\n\nKumar was of such a character that its disclosure would, on an overall view after weighing the two a'pects of public interest referred to above, be injurious to public interest, we inspected the correspondence for ourselves for the purpose of deciding whether or not it should be ordered to be disclosed.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 759965, "end_char": 759976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1964 SC 1658", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 760247, "end_char": 760263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raj Naraian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 763263, "end_char": 763274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Mathew, J. also observed to the same effect in his concurring B opinion in Raj Naraian's case (supra):\n\n\"The claim of the executive to exclude evidence is more likely to operate to subserve a partial interest, viewed exclusively from a narrow depa1tmental angle.", "canonical_name": "Raj Naraian"}}, {"text": "Keith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 765488, "end_char": 765493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Keith also emphasized the necessity of taking the particular nature of the proceeding into account in the balancing process, when he said in Glasgow Co-poration v. Central L'lnd Board (supra) that \"everything must depend on the particular circumstances of the case."}}, {"text": "Whitlam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 766241, "end_char": 766248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also a Sankey\n\nv. Whit/am (supra) the High Court of Australia pointed out that the character of the proceeding in which the claim for immunity against disclosure is raised and the importance of the document in the determination of the issues arising in the proceeding are of extreme relevance in deciding which way the balance of public interest lies There, the question was whether in a proceeding alleging offences against Mr. Whitlam, a former Prime Minister and others, certain papers and documents which were relevant to the issues arising in the proceeding were entitled to public interest immunity so as to be protected against disclosure."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 766557, "end_char": 766564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Australia nega tived the claim for immunity and in the course of his judgment, Stephen, J. laid the greatest stress on the character of the proceeding and pointed out its triple significance in the determination of the claim:\n\n\"First, it makes it very likely that, for the prosecution to be successful, its evidence must include documents of a class hitherto regarded as undoubtedly the subject of Crown privilege."}}, {"text": "Pearce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 776692, "end_char": 776698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, to quote the words of Lord Pearce in Convey v. Rimmer {supra) \"there are countless teachers at schools and universities, countless employers of labour, who write candid reports, unworried by the outside chance of disclosure,\" there is no reason to suspect that high level constitutional functionaries like the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India would flinch and falter in expressing their frank and sincere views when performing their constitutional duty."}}, {"text": "Manasollasa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 777889, "end_char": 777900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are, to quote the words from the famous verse from Manasollasa <::~~1!1' fcr<:rf;; rn: I and f~TllT lf'ff'Gr<'f: and we find it difficult to believe that they would not act as Judges but as weak kneed and effete individuals afraid to express their views Jest they might come to be known to others and provoke criticism."}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 781686, "end_char": 781689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Unioo of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 782158, "end_char": 782172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would have the effect of placing the Unioo of India, whose decision is challenged, in an unassailable-almost invincible-position \"t where it can, by claiming class immunity in respect of these documents, ensure the rejection of the writ petition.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "S. N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 784389, "end_char": 784400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant to note that had there not been disclosure of these documents, a certain doubt or misgiving would have continued to prevail in the public mind that the decision to discontinue S. N. Kumar as an additional Judge was taken by the Central Government without full and effective consul-\n\n630 SUPREME COlJRt Ril!>OR.tS (19S2) 2 s.c.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 784870, "end_char": 784882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, as we shall presently point out these documents when disclosed helped to clear this doubt an :I remove this misgiving by explaining to the people what were the true facts behind the decision to discontinue S. N.\n\nKumar as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "16th October, 81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 801451, "end_char": 801467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These were the reasons for which we directed by our order dated 16th October, 81 that these documents be disclosed to the petitioners and S. N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 801818, "end_char": 801829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 802717, "end_char": 802728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 803285, "end_char": 803296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 803331, "end_char": 803342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, in the present case, Shri S.N.\n\nKumar was an additional Judge whose term expired on 6th June, 1981 and he was entitled to be considered for appointment as an additionnl Judge for a further term and the Central Government certainly could, after considering his name, decide in the bona fide exercise of its power, not to appoin him, but that could be done only after consultation with the three constitutional functionaries specified in Article 217 which included the Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 803741, "end_char": 803752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 804145, "end_char": 804156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 804699, "end_char": 804710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 805132, "end_char": 805143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 805574, "end_char": 805585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SN.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 806393, "end_char": 806403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unfortunate drama leading to the non-appointment of SN.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 806708, "end_char": 806718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was written by the Chief H Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister, becaU§e the term for which\n\n638 SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nS.N. Kumar was originally appointed as an additional Judge was due to expire on 6th March, 1n1.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "6th March, 1n1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 806788, "end_char": 806802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was written by the Chief H Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister, becaU§e the term for which\n\n638 SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nS.N. Kumar was originally appointed as an additional Judge was due to expire on 6th March, 1n1."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 808085, "end_char": 808094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now a suggestion was made by Mr. R.K. Garg, learned advocate appearing on behalf of S.N. Kumar that this letter was addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi .to the Law Minister pursuant to a conspiracy between the two to discontinue S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "R.K.\n\nGarg"}}, {"text": "27th June, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 809126, "end_char": 809141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi was appointed acting Chief Justice on 27th June, 1980 and he was confirmed as permanent Chief Justice with effect from 8th January, 1981 and therefore on the date of the letter, his position as Chief Justice was not at all in jeopardy and be was not dependent on the H Central Government or the Law Minister for his office."}}, {"text": "8th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 809207, "end_char": 809224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi was appointed acting Chief Justice on 27th June, 1980 and he was confirmed as permanent Chief Justice with effect from 8th January, 1981 and therefore on the date of the letter, his position as Chief Justice was not at all in jeopardy and be was not dependent on the H Central Government or the Law Minister for his office."}}, {"text": "S.N. l(umar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 809495, "end_char": 809506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were also no disputes or differences between the Chief Justice of Delhi and S.N. l(umar prior to the <Jat(j) pf the letter and no suggestion\n\n'f -\n\ns.i>.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "19th February, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 810637, "end_char": 810656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 19th February, 1981 in fact, contains inherent evidence to show that the Chief Justice of Delhi was acting bona fide in addressing that letter to the Law Minister."}}, {"text": "S.N.Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 812569, "end_char": 812578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R..\n\nJustice of Delhi could not be said to be unjustified in taking the view that S.N.Kumar should not be recommended for continuance as an additional Judge.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 818176, "end_char": 818214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unfortunately, it is the easiest thing to make false, reckless and irresponsible allegations against Judges in regard to their honesty and integrity\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.il."}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820909, "end_char": 820912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th February 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 830355, "end_char": 830373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a copy of this letter dated 19th February 1981 was received by the Chief Justice ofJndia, he took the view that what was stated in the letter was \"too vague to accept that Shri Kumar Jacks integrity\" and he therefore stated in a note dated 3rd March, 1981 submitted by him to the Central Government that he \"would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar\" and recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar by six months."}}, {"text": "ofJndia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 830408, "end_char": 830415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a copy of this letter dated 19th February 1981 was received by the Chief Justice ofJndia, he took the view that what was stated in the letter was \"too vague to accept that Shri Kumar Jacks integrity\" and he therefore stated in a note dated 3rd March, 1981 submitted by him to the Central Government that he \"would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar\" and recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar by six months.", "canonical_name": "ofllndia"}}, {"text": "Kumar Jacks", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 830504, "end_char": 830515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a copy of this letter dated 19th February 1981 was received by the Chief Justice ofJndia, he took the view that what was stated in the letter was \"too vague to accept that Shri Kumar Jacks integrity\" and he therefore stated in a note dated 3rd March, 1981 submitted by him to the Central Government that he \"would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar\" and recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar by six months."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 830567, "end_char": 830582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a copy of this letter dated 19th February 1981 was received by the Chief Justice ofJndia, he took the view that what was stated in the letter was \"too vague to accept that Shri Kumar Jacks integrity\" and he therefore stated in a note dated 3rd March, 1981 submitted by him to the Central Government that he \"would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar\" and recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar by six months."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 831359, "end_char": 831370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 831742, "end_char": 831753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 832329, "end_char": 832340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "7th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 834034, "end_char": 834049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe result was that S.N. Kumar was appointed as an additional Judge for a period of three months from 7th March, 1981."}}, {"text": "14th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 835376, "end_char": 835392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Chief Justice India also addressed a letter dated 14th March, 1981 to the Chief Justice of Delhi asking him, with reference to the observations made hy him in his letter dated 19th February, 1981, to furnish \"details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar.\""}}, {"text": "26th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 835714, "end_char": 835730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi thereupon met the Chief Justice of India and had discussion with him on 26th March, 1981."}}, {"text": "28th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 838020, "end_char": 838036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi also addressed a letter dated 28th March 1981 to the Law Minister pointing out that since receipt of the letter of the Chief Justice of India, he had had an opportunity \"to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\"\n\nand that after this discussion he had addressed a letter dated 28th March, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India a copy of which was being enclosed by him."}}, {"text": "26th March 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 838762, "end_char": 838777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is clear from this letter addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister that the Chief Justice of India asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to furnish him \"Details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar\" and in response to this request, the Chief Justice of Delhi met the Chief Justice of India on 26th March 1981 and discussed \"the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\"."}}, {"text": "Del", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 843012, "end_char": 843015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Chief Justice of Del hi refused to disclose these facts to the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 843525, "end_char": 843539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt in our mind that the Chief Justice of Delhi must have disclosed all the facts relating to the complaints and doubts expressed against the integrity of S.N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India but, as is evident from a subsequent letter dated 22nd May, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India had already, prior to the date of the meeting, made his own inquiries in the matter and as a result of such inquiries he was not inclined to agree with the opinion given by the Chief Justice of Delhi and t is obvious therefore that he must have told the Chief Justice of Delhi that in the course of the inquiries made by him he had been told by persons that there was nothing against integrity of S.N. Kumar and he was consequently unable to agree with the view expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi."}}, {"text": "9th March, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 846076, "end_char": 846091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi expressed the hope that what he had stated in his letter to the Chief Justice of India would be considered sufficiet comments on his part in regard to the observations of the Chief Justice of India quoted in the letter of the Law Minister dated J 9th March, 1981."}}, {"text": "15th April, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 848160, "end_char": 848176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was obvious from the reply given by the Chief Justice of Delhi that despite the discussion with the Chief Justice of India he stuck to his original recommendation not to continue S.N. Kumar for a further term and the Law Minister therefore naturally enquired from him by his Jetter dated 15th April, 1981 as to what was the material which provided the basis on which he concluded that S.N. Kumar's reputation for integrity was not above board and recommended that he may not be continued."}}, {"text": "7th May, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 850606, "end_char": 850619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was a letter dated 7th May, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister in response to the request contained in the letter of the Law Minister dated 15th April, 1981."}}, {"text": "oflndia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 851315, "end_char": 851322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This prefatory statement is extremely important and it may be set out in extenso in the following words :\n\n\"Hon'ble the Chief Justice oflndia had made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and the same were communicated to me by you for my comments in your D.O. No.", "canonical_name": "ofllndia"}}, {"text": "28th March, i 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 851748, "end_char": 851765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "293-HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March, i 981, I discussed the matter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his Jetter, wrote my D.O. No."}}, {"text": "ofindia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 853030, "end_char": 853037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from this prefatory statement that it was as per the desire of the Chief Justice ofindia that the letter dated 28th March, 1981 was addressed by Chief Justice of Delhi in the terms in which he did."}}, {"text": "Kuma7", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 853988, "end_char": 853993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary for us to refer to these facts in any detail but suffice it to state that several facts were set out by the Chief Justice of Delhi which made him conclude \"that the reputation for integrity of Justice Kuma7 was not as should be for a Judge of the High Court.\"", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "Jain Sudh Vanaspati Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 854453, "end_char": 854480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 which were filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Limited and Jain Export Private Limited against the New Indian Insurance Company Limited."}}, {"text": "Jain Export Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 854485, "end_char": 854512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 which were filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Limited and Jain Export Private Limited against the New Indian Insurance Company Limited."}}, {"text": "S .N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 856357, "end_char": 856368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out that th; se were the facts on the basis of which he had come to the opinion that S .N. Kumar did not enjoy good reputation for integrity.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "7th May, 198 I", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 861647, "end_char": 861661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also inherent evidence in the letter dated 7th May, 198 I, to show that the Chief Justice of Delhi acted bona fide in giving his opinion to the Law Minister in regard to the integrity of S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "Sabir Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 861948, "end_char": 861961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister had by his letter dated 15th April, 1981 requested the Chief Justice of Delhi to send his comments on the complaint made by one Sabir Hussain, an advocate.", "canonical_name": "Sabir Hussains"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kuml!.r", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 862831, "end_char": 862843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that the Chief Justice of Delhi was perfectly right in not sitting in judgment over the decision given by S.N. Kuml!.r in Sabir Hussains suit, for it is not open to the Chief Justice of a High Court to examine the judgments given by an additional Judge and pass upon the quality of those judgments for the purpose of deciding whether the additional Judge should be reappointed or not.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Sabir Hussains", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 862847, "end_char": 862861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that the Chief Justice of Delhi was perfectly right in not sitting in judgment over the decision given by S.N. Kuml!.r in Sabir Hussains suit, for it is not open to the Chief Justice of a High Court to examine the judgments given by an additional Judge and pass upon the quality of those judgments for the purpose of deciding whether the additional Judge should be reappointed or not.", "canonical_name": "Sabir Hussains"}}, {"text": "Kissa Kursi Ka Case", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 863473, "end_char": 863492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This exercise is not open to the Chief Justice of the High Court or to the Chief Justice of India because the additional Judge is not on probation and that is why we are constrained to observe though the case of O.N. Vohra not being before us, it is not necessary for us to do so, that the Chief Justice of Delhi was not justified in wading through the papers of Kissa Kursi Ka Case for the purpose of deciding whether O.N. Vohra should be reappointed as an additional Judge, If O.N. Vohra was in error in not disposing of any application in the case or in making a wrong order on such application, it was for this Court in appeal, in the exercise of its judicial power, to comment on the judicial performance of O.N. Vohra and it was not for the Chief Justice of Delhi to sit in judgment over it for the purpose of condemning O.N. Vohra.", "canonical_name": "Kissa Kursi Ka Case"}}, {"text": "3rd March 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 868061, "end_char": 868075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the time fixed by this Court for the Union of India to decide whether S.N. Kumar should be reappointed for a further term as an additional Judge or should be appointed as a permanent Judge or otherwise, was expiring on 27th May 1981 and the Law Minister was therefore constrained to address a letter dated 21st May 1981 reminding the Chief Justice of India that he had stated in his note dated 3rd March 1981 thathe desired to look carefully into the charges against SN."}}, {"text": "SN. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 868134, "end_char": 868143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the time fixed by this Court for the Union of India to decide whether S.N. Kumar should be reappointed for a further term as an additional Judge or should be appointed as a permanent Judge or otherwise, was expiring on 27th May 1981 and the Law Minister was therefore constrained to address a letter dated 21st May 1981 reminding the Chief Justice of India that he had stated in his note dated 3rd March 1981 thathe desired to look carefully into the charges against SN.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "22nd May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 868595, "end_char": 868608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that this letter W\" received by the Chief Justice of India when he was camping at Sb.. , during the summer vacation and on receipt of this letter, the Chief Justice of India addressed a communication dated 22nd May 1981 to the Law Minister stating that he had made the most care ful and extensive inquiries in regard to the allegations against the integrity of S.N. Kumar as also his rate of disposals and he was satisfied that there was no substance in any of these allegations."}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 869759, "end_char": 869762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "/Jhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 869781, "end_char": 869790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA v. UNION (/Jhagwati."}}, {"text": "26th May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 870351, "end_char": 870364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that some Intelligence Bureau report regarding S.N. Kumar was also sent by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion along with his letter dated 22nd May, 1981, but the Chief Justice of India could not give his opinion with reference to the report since he bad no time to examine it and he therefore stated that he would give his opinion after his return to New Delhi on 26th May 1981 and in the circumstances he recommended extension of the term of S.N. Kumar for another short term of three months."}}, {"text": "27th May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 871048, "end_char": 871061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister put up a note before the Prime Minister on 27th May 1981 summarising the effect of the correspondence which had taken place between him."}}, {"text": "7th May 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 871806, "end_char": 871818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister stated in the note that he presumed that when the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India met, \"the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned ...... in his Jetter dated 7th May 1981\" and this inference was obvious from the letters addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874359, "end_char": 874370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874851, "end_char": 874862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 875521, "end_char": 875532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd may, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 876115, "end_char": 876129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now there can be no doubt that the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar for a futurther term was based on the '( facts provided by the Chief Justice of Delhi in his letter dated 7th May, 1981 and if these facts were not placed before the Chief Justice of India before he gave his opinion in regard to the continuance of S.N. Kumar in his letter dated 22nd may, 1981, the decision of the Central Government would be clearly vitiated for want of full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "7th May t98", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 882144, "end_char": 882155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of Delhi might have been right or might have been wrong in entertaining the apprehension that if his letter dated 7th May t98 l was sent to the Chief Justice of India, its contents might in the process leak out and S.N. Kumar and others might come to know about them, but there is no reason to doubt that he bona fide felt this apprehension and that weighed with him by asking the Law Minister not to bring his letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India particularly since he had already discusssed the \"details and concrete facts\" set out in that letter with the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C.k\n\nDelhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 883925, "end_char": 883969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What we have to determine is only a very limited issue, namely, whether the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 were disclosed by the Chief Justice of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C.k\n\nDelhi to the Chief Justice of India and so far as that is concerned there is no doubt in our minds that these facts were discussed by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981 and no contrary inference can be drawn merely because, for the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice B of Delhi asked the Law Minister not to bring his letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "B of Delhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 884305, "end_char": 884315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What we have to determine is only a very limited issue, namely, whether the facts set out in the letter dated 7th May, 1981 were disclosed by the Chief Justice of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982] 2 s.C.k\n\nDelhi to the Chief Justice of India and so far as that is concerned there is no doubt in our minds that these facts were discussed by the Chief Justice of Delhi with the Chief Justice of India at the meeting held on 26th March 1981 and no contrary inference can be drawn merely because, for the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice B of Delhi asked the Law Minister not to bring his letter dated 7th May 1981 to the attention of the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "7th July 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 885568, "end_char": 885580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, additionally, we may point out that this contention is also belied by the counter-affidavit dated 7th July 198 l filed by S.N. Kumar himself."}}, {"text": "Mansfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 889755, "end_char": 889764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long years ago that great common Law Judge, Lord Mansfield spoke of the judicial office in majestic tones and said :\n\n\"I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon his occassion; to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press; I will not avoid doing what I think is right; though it should draw on me the whole artillery of Habels; all that falsehood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a deluded popular can swallow ...... Once for all, let it be understood, 'that no endeavours of this kind will influence any man who atpresent sits here.\""}}, {"text": "27th May, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 892554, "end_char": 892568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government preferred the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi for the reasons mentioned in the note of the Law Minister dated 27th May, 1981 and decided not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an acditional Judge for a further t;:rm."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 893882, "end_char": 893893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 894118, "end_char": 894129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "0.N. Vohra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 895008, "end_char": 895018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No reliief can be granted in respect of 0.N. Vohra because, though added as a party respondent, he has not appeared and claimed any relief against the decision of the Central Goverment to discontinue him as an additional Judge and has accepted such decision without protest or complaint.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "M. M.\n\nIsmail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 897386, "end_char": 897399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second group of writ petition> raises the question of con>- titutional validity of the orders transferring Chief Justice M. M.\n\nIsmail to the Kerala High Court and Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Madras High C0urt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 897874, "end_char": 897891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, so far as Chief Justice M.M. Ismail is concerned, the question bas become academic because he has stated in the counter-affidavit filed by him in reply to the writ petition of Miss Lily Thomas that he does not want any-one to litigate for or against him nor does he want anything about him to be argued or debated and he has subsequently resigned his office as Chief Justice of the Madras High C0urt."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 898216, "end_char": 898227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 898263, "end_char": 898274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 898805, "end_char": 898816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cbandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 899186, "end_char": 899197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority Judges comprising Cbandrachud, J., (as he then was) Krishna Iyer, J. and Fazal Ali J. rejected this contention of Mr. Seervai and held that there was no need or justification, in order to uphold and protect the independence of the judiciary, to construe Article 222 clause (I) as meaning that a Jud:e can be trans-\n\n[ 19~2] 2 S.C.R.\n\nferred from.one High Court to another only with his consent.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 899422, "end_char": 899433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 899572, "end_char": 899580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Untwalia and myself, however, took a different view.", "canonical_name": "Untwalia"}}, {"text": "Article 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 900031, "end_char": 900042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 900077, "end_char": 900091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 900339, "end_char": 900350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankalchand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 901556, "end_char": 901567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by Justice Untwalia and myself was thus a minority view, but since the present writ petitions were being heard by a larger Bench than that which decided Sankalchand 8heth's case, Mr. Seervai canvassed the minority view for acceptance by the Bench of seven Judges.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Sanka!chand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 901759, "end_char": 901776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney General, on the other hand, contended that the majority view taken in Sanka!chand Sheth's case represented the correct law on the point and the Bench of seven Judges should affirm that view.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902807, "end_char": 902818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 904034, "end_char": 904045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 904469, "end_char": 904480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 904506, "end_char": 904517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 904719, "end_char": 904730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "mkalchand Sheth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 904773, "end_char": 904788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, it was so held into &mkalchand Sheth' s case by all the Judges."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 907026, "end_char": 907037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 907385, "end_char": 907396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Zamihr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 911013, "end_char": 911019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court has consistently taken the view in such cases, unlike the House of Lords in Zamihr's case, that the burden of sustainining the validity of the detention must lie on the detaining authority."}}, {"text": "D.A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 914494, "end_char": 914504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on facts, I do not wish to say much, because I agree with the judgment prepared by my learned brother D.A. Desai on this point.", "canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 915458, "end_char": 915469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.H.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 916649, "end_char": 916661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now here, in the present case, the ini1iative for transferring Cb.ief Justice K.H.N. Singh was taken by the Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 916813, "end_char": 916836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He proposed by his letter dated 7th December, 1980 that Cb.ief Justice K.B.N. Singh may be transferred to the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "K .B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 916937, "end_char": 916950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This means that on his part he had made up his mind prior to 7th December, 1980 that Chief Justice K .B.N. Singh should be moved out of Patna.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "7th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 917141, "end_char": 917159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now admittedly, the Chief Justice of India had not mentioned anything about the proposed transfer to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh prior to making his proposal of 7th December, 1980."}}, {"text": "7th Dec.:mber, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 917962, "end_char": 917981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of India should have therefore, before making bis proposal for transfer by his letter dated 7th Dec.:mber, 1980, informed Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh about his proposed transfer to Rajasthan High Court and enquired from him whether he would have any particular problems or difficultiea, if he was transferred to the Rajasthan High Court."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 918050, "end_char": 918070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of India should have therefore, before making bis proposal for transfer by his letter dated 7th Dec.:mber, 1980, informed Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh about his proposed transfer to Rajasthan High Court and enquired from him whether he would have any particular problems or difficultiea, if he was transferred to the Rajasthan High Court."}}, {"text": "K.D. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 918685, "end_char": 918696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But unfortunately, no such enquiry was made by the Chief Justice of India before he made his proposal for transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh to the Rajasthan High Court, which proposal might well have been accepted by the Central Government immediately, but for the fact that there was some difficulty in regard to another proposal simultaneously put forward by the Chief Justice of\n.-\n\n....\n\ns.P. GUPTA 11, UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 679\n\nIndia for transfer of Chief Justice K.D. Sharma from the Rajasthan High Court to the Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Jutice K.B.N. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 919097, "end_char": 919116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was thus a change in the proposal for transfer of Chief Jutice K.B.N. Singh within a period of less than 14 days."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 919486, "end_char": 919505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is significant to note that neither of the two letters dated 7th December, 1980 and 20th December, 1980 sets out any facts showing why the Chief Justice of India desired that Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh should be transferred from the Patna High Coun."}}, {"text": "Patna High Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 919635, "end_char": 919650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is significant to note that neither of the two letters dated 7th December, 1980 and 20th December, 1980 sets out any facts showing why the Chief Justice of India desired that Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh should be transferred from the Patna High Coun."}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Singh 011", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 920161, "end_char": 920177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 7th December, 1980 merely states that he was recommending the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh 011 the basis of the data which he had collected as a result of personal inquiries made from several lawyers and many other Judges of the High Court and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "5th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 921571, "end_char": 921588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was quite sometime after the revised proposal for\n\ntransfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was made in the letter dated 20th December, 1980 that on 5th January, 1981, the Chief Justice of India telephoned [to Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh and informed him that Chief Justice M.M. Ismail was proposed to be transferred to the Kerala High Court and that he may therefore have to go to the Madras High Court and enquired him ''if he had anything to say on the (question of his proposed transfer\"."}}, {"text": "M .M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 922229, "end_char": 922241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh thereupon enquired from the Chief Justice of India as to why \"he may be transferred to Madras\" on which, according to the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India, he gave two reasons, one that it was Government policy and the other that it was proposed to transfer Chief Justice M .M. Ismail from Madras and \"it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place.\"", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "SBN Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 923158, "end_char": 923167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh mentioned his difficulty in regard to his mother's advanced age and illness, the Chief Justice of India told him that he was unable to agree with him \"since there were available persons in his family who could look after his mother and in any case, his brother SBN Singh who was practising in the High Court was quite capable of looking after the mother. \"", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "KBN Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 923267, "end_char": 923276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice KBN Singh, however, informed the Chief Justice of India that his mother has a special attachment to him and be could not leave her to the care of his brother or other members of his family.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "9th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 924135, "end_char": 924152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice KBN Singh thereafter left and on the next day that is, 9th January, 1981, the Prime Minister endorsed her decision\n\n.,._"}}, {"text": "9th January, I 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 930167, "end_char": 930185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing to show that this particular difficulty of Chief Justice KBN Singh was brought to the notice of the Central Government by the Chief Justice of India before the decision was taken by the Prime Minister on 9th January, I 981 to transfer Chief Justice KBN Singh."}}, {"text": "8th January, I 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 930325, "end_char": 930343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meeting between Chief Justice KBN Singh and the Chief Justice of India took place at 7.00 p.m. on 8th January, I 981 and on the next day, the Prime Minister made her endorsement on the file and there is absolutely nothing to show, nothing even in the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India, that after his talk with Chief Justice KBN Singh, he telephoned either to the Law Minister or to the Prime Minister pointing out this particular difficulty of Chief Justice KBN Singh to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "8th January 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 930926, "end_char": 930942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing even in any notings on the file showing that any such information was conveyed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister or to the Prime Minister in the evening of 8th January 1981 or on 9th January I 9S I.\n\nI his omission to communicate the difficulty which would be experienced by Chief Justice KBN Singh as a result of transfer is sufficient to vitiate the process of consultation and it must be held that there was no full and effective consultatton as required under Article 222 clause (I)."}}, {"text": "9th January I 9S I.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 930949, "end_char": 930968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing even in any notings on the file showing that any such information was conveyed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister or to the Prime Minister in the evening of 8th January 1981 or on 9th January I 9S I.\n\nI his omission to communicate the difficulty which would be experienced by Chief Justice KBN Singh as a result of transfer is sufficient to vitiate the process of consultation and it must be held that there was no full and effective consultatton as required under Article 222 clause (I)."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 931234, "end_char": 931245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "7th\n\nDecmber, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 932038, "end_char": 932056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The government policy which the Law Minister put forward was that there should be Chief Justice from outside in every High Court, but the Chief Justice of India in his letter dated 7th\n\nDecmber, 1980 expressed his firm opposition to this Government policy and stated that transfers of Chief Justices \"may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reas0ns\" and it was in pursuance of this view taken by him that he recommended the transfer\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\nof Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh."}}, {"text": "Central GJvernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 934519, "end_char": 934537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But even if it be assumed that this was the real reason why Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh was sought to be transferred from the Patna High Court, I cannot say whether this reason was communicated by the Chief Justice of India to the Central Government because there is nothing in the correspondence or in the notings showing that any such communication was made by the Chief Justice of India to the Central GJvernment, nor does the counter-affidavit of the Chief Justice of India throw any light on this point beyond making a vague and indefinite statement which I have already discussed."}}, {"text": "K.E .N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 935688, "end_char": 935701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But quite apart from that, I find that this is not the reason which weighed with the Central Government in making the order of transfer against Chief Justice K.E .N. Singh.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Central Governmeflt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 936633, "end_char": 936652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Governmeflt did not apply its mind to the question whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedieflt to transfer Chief Justice K B.N. Singh."}}, {"text": "K B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 936771, "end_char": 936783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Governmeflt did not apply its mind to the question whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedieflt to transfer Chief Justice K B.N. Singh.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 937821, "end_char": 937834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nGUPTA, J.\n\nThis batch of writ petitions raises broadly two is mes :\n\n(i) whether on the expiry of the term of office of an additional Judge of a High Court it is permissible to drop him by not giving him another term though the volume of work pending in the High Cotirt requires the services of another Judge; and\n\n(ii) in what circumstances a Judge of a High Court can be transferred to another High Court."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 939690, "end_char": 939703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He assumed the charge of his office on March 7, 1979."}}, {"text": "February 19, l 931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 939708, "end_char": 939726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 19, l 931, a few days before Shri Kumar's term of office was to expire, the~Chief fo>tice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Gupta, J.) 687\n\nUnion Law \\.1inister saving th1t it was his \"very painful duty not A to recommend an extension for Justice Kumar\" as he had been receiving \"persistent\" and \"serious complaints\" against Shri Kumar."}}, {"text": "C.J. Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 941069, "end_char": 941079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, in a note recorded on the relevant file on May 27, 1981 the Law Minister said 'In the matter of assessment of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J. Delhi be given -credence\" and recommended that \"Shri Justice S.N. Kumar may not be continued any further as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure on 7-6-1981 \"."}}, {"text": "7-6-1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 941265, "end_char": 941273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, in a note recorded on the relevant file on May 27, 1981 the Law Minister said 'In the matter of assessment of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J. Delhi be given -credence\" and recommended that \"Shri Justice S.N. Kumar may not be continued any further as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure on 7-6-1981 \"."}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942251, "end_char": 942262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942740, "end_char": 942755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942780, "end_char": 942791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 942794, "end_char": 942808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 943599, "end_char": 943610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944403, "end_char": 944414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944442, "end_char": 944453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944472, "end_char": 944487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944650, "end_char": 944661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944752, "end_char": 944763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 945141, "end_char": 945152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.C. Kankan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 945735, "end_char": 945746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted in the affidavit sworn on July 22, 1981 by Shri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary in the Department of Justice, Ministy of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, and filed on behalf of the Union of India that an Additional Judge is not a Judge on probation.", "canonical_name": "K.C.\n\nKankan"}}, {"text": "Kankan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 946511, "end_char": 946517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kankan's affidavit however adds: It is denied that the appointments of Additional Judges should always be for a period of 2 years unless the amount of business or arrears of work do not warrant the appointment for that period.", "canonical_name": "Kankan"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 946805, "end_char": 946816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 947035, "end_char": 947046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 947355, "end_char": 947366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 947703, "end_char": 947714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 948464, "end_char": 948475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 949059, "end_char": 949070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Feburary 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 949687, "end_char": 949704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter written to the Law Minister on Feburary 19, 1981 the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court while stating that it was his \"very painful duty not to recommend an extension for Justice Kumar\", added that he had \"no investigating agency to conclusively find out whether the complaints are genuine or not.\""}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 950366, "end_char": 950377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 950388, "end_char": 950399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 950433, "end_char": 950444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 952314, "end_char": 952325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 952564, "end_char": 952575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 952905, "end_char": 952916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 953152, "end_char": 953163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 953187, "end_char": 953192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is observed in Sheth' s case : \" .. there can be no purposeful consideration of a matter, in the absence of facts and circumstances on the basis of which alone the nature of the problem involved can be appreciated and the right decision taken.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 954528, "end_char": 954539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "19.2.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 955289, "end_char": 955298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will b~ convenient for a proper appreciation of the matter to set out chronologically the gist on the letters that passed between the constitutional functionaries in Shri Kumar's case and certain other facts :\n\n19.2.1981 The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court w:rote to the Union Law Minister that it was his \"very painful duty not Ito reommend an extension for Justice\n\nKumar\" because there had been \"serious complaints against Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, both oral and in writing."}}, {"text": "3.3.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 956687, "end_char": 956695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point to note in this letter is that it does not mention the facts constituting the basis of the complaints against Shri Kumar\n\n3.3.1981 A copy of this ktter was sent to the Chief Justice of India and on March 3, 198 J the Chief Justice of\n\nIndia recorded this note on the relevant file: \"I would D like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "March 3, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 956763, "end_char": 956775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point to note in this letter is that it does not mention the facts constituting the basis of the complaints against Shri Kumar\n\n3.3.1981 A copy of this ktter was sent to the Chief Justice of India and on March 3, 198 J the Chief Justice of\n\nIndia recorded this note on the relevant file: \"I would D like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "March 7,\n\nI 98 I.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 957200, "end_char": 957217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case."}}, {"text": "19.3.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 957219, "end_char": 957228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case."}}, {"text": "F Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 957388, "end_char": 957395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case.", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kumar.~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 957558, "end_char": 957570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "26.3.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 957573, "end_char": 957582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of E office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7,\n\nI 98 I.\n\n19.3.1981 The Law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri F Kumar appeared to be \"too vague\" and asked for •further comments\" from the Chief Justice of the High Court \"on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S.N. Kumar.~'\n\n26.3.1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumar's case."}}, {"text": "28.3.J", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 957692, "end_char": 957698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28.3.J 98 I The Chief Justice of the High 'Court wrote to the Law Minister saying that he had had \"an opportunity to discuss entire matter in detail with the Chief\n\nIJ982) 2 S.C.R\n\nJustice of India\" and that after the discussion he had also addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "15.4.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 958855, "end_char": 958864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15.4.1981 The Law Minister wrote to the Chie Justice of the High Court in reply to the letter dated March 28,\n\n1981."}}, {"text": "7.5.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 959440, "end_char": 959448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7.5.1981 In answer to the Law Minister's letter of 15.4.1981 the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote back saying that in regard tJ the allegations against Shri\n\nKumar, he had discussed the matter with the Chief Justice of India and had also written to him. \""}}, {"text": "Shti Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 961174, "end_char": 961184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) In August 1980 the same colleague of his who had talked to him earlier regarding Shti Kumar's integrity and another colleague mentione'1 that \"doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis-a-vis the aforesaid cases and some others.\"", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "May 29, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 963017, "end_char": 963029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Chief Jusctice of the Delhi High Court to the Law Minister was marked \"SECRET (For Personal Attention Only):' It appears from a subsequent letter addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of the High Court on May 29, 1981 that a few days after the letter of May 7, was written, the Chief Justice of the High Court had requested the Law Minister to keep that letter a secret from the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 965774, "end_char": 965788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued on behalf of the Union of India and the Law Minister that it must be presumed that all the details were placed before the • Chief Justice of India because the Chief Justice of the High Court in his letter dated March 28, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister had stated that he \"had an opportunity to discuss tbr\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT\n\n(1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nentire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India\" and that in another letter written on the same day to the Chief Justice of India he had said:\n\n\"With regard to the complaints about Justice Kumar's integrity and general conduct, the matter has already been discussed between us.\""}}, {"text": "May 21, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 966278, "end_char": 966290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 21, 1981 the Law Minister had written a letter to the Chief Justice of India when he was in Simla."}}, {"text": "May, 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 967304, "end_char": 967317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of India replied to this letter next day, May, 22, 1981 from Simla."}}, {"text": "Prakash Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 967392, "end_char": 967406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portions of the; letter are as follows :-\n\n\"Shri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, had written a letter dated February 19, 1981 to you,\n\nacopy of which was sent to me.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Na.rain"}}, {"text": "March I 4, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 968009, "end_char": 968024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By my letter dated March I 4, 1981 to the Delhi Chief Justice I requsted him to furnish further details and concrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar since the result of the enquiries made by me was quice at variance with what the Chief Justice had stated in his Jetter of March 19."}}, {"text": "C.J.I", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 971066, "end_char": 971071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The portion of the note relevant for the present purpose reads :\n\n\"C.J.I does mention that C.J. Delhi met him on 26.3.J 981."}}, {"text": "26.3.J 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 971112, "end_char": 971122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The portion of the note relevant for the present purpose reads :\n\n\"C.J.I does mention that C.J. Delhi met him on 26.3.J 981."}}, {"text": "7-5-198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 971584, "end_char": 971591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I presume that when C.J. Delhi and the C.J. of the Supreme Court met, the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned to me in his letter dated 7-5-198 I. This presumption is raised on the basis of the letters from the Chief Justice, Delhi... The C.J. I. in his advice proceeds from the premises that taking up part-heard cases after the allocation of work is changed does not amount to lacking in integrity."}}, {"text": "C.J. Dell1i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 972106, "end_char": 972117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "x x x\n\nJn the matter 0f assessrnen t of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J. Dell1i be given credence as it is in his association that the Judge concerned discharges his duties and that he has a better occasion and opportunity to watch his working and conduct.", "canonical_name": "C.J. Dell1i"}}, {"text": "Jndia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 973632, "end_char": 973637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the earlier portion of the note quoted above, the presumption the Chief Justice of the High Court must have informed the Chief Justice of Jndia about the details that the former had mentioned in his letter dated May, 7, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister does not appear to have any basis.", "canonical_name": "ofllndia"}}, {"text": "May, 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 973706, "end_char": 973718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the earlier portion of the note quoted above, the presumption the Chief Justice of the High Court must have informed the Chief Justice of Jndia about the details that the former had mentioned in his letter dated May, 7, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister does not appear to have any basis."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 973996, "end_char": 974001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true the Chief Justice of the High Court in his two letters dated March 28, 1981 written respectively to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India had said that the \"entire matter\" concerning Justice Kumar's integrity had been discussed between him and the Chief Justice of India but it would be wrong to assume, though the Chief Justice of the High Court spoke of the \"entire matter\", that the particulars of the suits and the allegations\n\naainst Justice Kumar concerning them were placed before the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 976392, "end_char": 976403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 978306, "end_char": 978317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 978868, "end_char": 978879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S N.\n\nKumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 980799, "end_char": 980810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons indicated above, the decision in Shri S N.\n\nKumar's case must be held invalid and the case should go back to the President for a fresh decision after a full and effective consulta-..\n\nti on as contemplated in article 217 ( 1) of the constitution.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 980970, "end_char": 980981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 18, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 981219, "end_char": 981233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of transfer arises upon a letter addressed by the Law Minister on March 18, 1931 to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of different States, except the North-eastern States, stating that the Law Commission, States Re-organisation Commis~ sion and various Bar Associations had expressed the view that to further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one; third of the Judges of a High Court should be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated."}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 983305, "end_char": 983319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 983623, "end_char": 983638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 984007, "end_char": 984018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect has been dealt with in detail in the Judgments of Tulzapurkar J , and Pathak J., which I have bad the advantage of reading.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 984027, "end_char": 984033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect has been dealt with in detail in the Judgments of Tulzapurkar J , and Pathak J., which I have bad the advantage of reading.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Swkil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 984553, "end_char": 984558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been held by a majority in Swkil C!1q•1d's case that transfer of a Judge of a High Court to another High Court is permissible only in public intere>t and not by way of punishment."}}, {"text": "-0fMarch 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 984776, "end_char": 984793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One reason stated in support of the policy of transfer in the letter -0fMarch 18, 1981 is that it would Ci>mb1t narro.v p1ro:'1ia.l te1d-\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ndencies."}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 985536, "end_char": 985550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 985639, "end_char": 985653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 986479, "end_char": 986493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "390 of 1981 in the Madras High Court, the validity of the Notification transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court is challenged.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "K. B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 986647, "end_char": 986661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification is challenged mainly on the ground that the order of transfer was bad as Shri K. B. N. Singh had not consented to it, that there was no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and the Chief Justice of India before the order was made, and that the transfer was not in public irJ:erest but was really by way of punishment.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 987143, "end_char": 987157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 987923, "end_char": 987936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I would ask the Government to consider if it is possible to transfer Shri K.B. N. Singh to some High Court, consistent with his position as a senior Chief Justice, where the language difficulty will not be so actute.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Bb.agwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 989241, "end_char": 989250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons in support of these orders will appear from the Judgment of Bb.agwati, J. with which I agree.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "S.C.R\n\nFnAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 989430, "end_char": 989444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ J 982] 2 S.C.R\n\nFnAL Au, J.\n\nTransfi rred Case No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bcrr, bay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 989532, "end_char": 989555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981 :\n\n1 he petitioners, Advocates practising in the High Court of Bcrr, bay, filed a writ petition No."}}, {"text": "18.3.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 990183, "end_char": 990192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in the original writ petition had issued a Circular letter dated 18.3.1981 (hereafter referred to as the 'Circular') to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of States requesting them to obtain the consent of Additional Judges of the High Courts concerned to their transfer as permanent Judges of High Courts other than those in which they were appointed as Addititional Judges."}}, {"text": "29 3. 81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 990643, "end_char": 990651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Circular was received by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court on 29 3."}}, {"text": "30.3.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 990659, "end_char": 990666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 and on 30.3.81 he addressed a letter to the Addittonal Judges (respondents 3 to 12) and asked them to do the needful."}}, {"text": "Bombay Bar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 990868, "end_char": 990878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Circular seems to have created a serious upheaval in the rank and file of the lawyers of Bombay Bar resulting in a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of Western India on 3.4.81."}}, {"text": "3.4.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 990967, "end_char": 990973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Circular seems to have created a serious upheaval in the rank and file of the lawyers of Bombay Bar resulting in a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of Western India on 3.4.81."}}, {"text": "14.4. 81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 991393, "end_char": 991401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14.4."}}, {"text": "15.4.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 992015, "end_char": 992022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a mark of serious protest against the Circular and the discourteous language in which H the said document (circular) is alleged to have been expressed, the legal practitioners practising in the High Court, city civil courts,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 709\n\nSmall Causes Courts and the police courts resolved not to attend those collrn on 15.4.81."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 992834, "end_char": 992845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Dlhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 993657, "end_char": 993675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another writ petition was filed by Shri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court in the High Court of Dlhi making Union of India, Justice O.N. Vohra, Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad as respondents and alleging that the indepndence of judiciary which was essential for the preservation of civil librty was\n\n710 SUPREME COURT REPORlS\n\n[!"}}, {"text": "S.B. Wad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 993750, "end_char": 993758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another writ petition was filed by Shri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court in the High Court of Dlhi making Union of India, Justice O.N. Vohra, Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad as respondents and alleging that the indepndence of judiciary which was essential for the preservation of civil librty was\n\n710 SUPREME COURT REPORlS\n\n[!", "canonical_name": "S. B. Wad"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994444, "end_char": 994452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 994940, "end_char": 994947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to SJme concrete cases it was alleged that although permanent vacancies in the High Court of Delhi were available yet Justice Goswami and Justice Sultan Singh in stead of being made permanent Judges were appointed as Additional Judge for a period of two years in July and August, 1980 respectively whereas Justice Vohra as an Addi."}}, {"text": "Sultan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 994960, "end_char": 994972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to SJme concrete cases it was alleged that although permanent vacancies in the High Court of Delhi were available yet Justice Goswami and Justice Sultan Singh in stead of being made permanent Judges were appointed as Additional Judge for a period of two years in July and August, 1980 respectively whereas Justice Vohra as an Addi.", "canonical_name": "Sultan Singh"}}, {"text": "Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 995128, "end_char": 995133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to SJme concrete cases it was alleged that although permanent vacancies in the High Court of Delhi were available yet Justice Goswami and Justice Sultan Singh in stead of being made permanent Judges were appointed as Additional Judge for a period of two years in July and August, 1980 respectively whereas Justice Vohra as an Addi.", "canonical_name": "Vohra"}}, {"text": "Wad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 995263, "end_char": 995266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Kumar and Justice Wad were appointed for three months.", "canonical_name": "Wad"}}, {"text": "6.6.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 995441, "end_char": 995447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the allegations made by the petitioner, the terms of the aforesaid three Judges, Justice Vohra, Kumar and Wad was to expire on 6.6.81."}}, {"text": "6th of June 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 995531, "end_char": 995547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the term of Justice Vohra and Justice Kumar expired on the 6th of June 1981, the Central Government did not reappoint them as a result of which they were sent back to the Bar."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 995757, "end_char": 995765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition filed by Mr. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi was also transferred to this Court and was numbered as Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "Tark.unde"}}, {"text": "A.N.\n\nVerma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 996984, "end_char": 996995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this petition, the following reliefs were prayed :\n\n\"(a) issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of a declaratory writ that Justice Murlidhar, Justice A.N.\n\nVerma, Jmtice N.N. Mitthal have already been appointed as permanent Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by virtue of the warrants of appointment dated 12.12.1980, 12.3.1981 and 12.3.1981 respectively.", "canonical_name": "A. N.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Jmtice N.N. Mitthal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 996997, "end_char": 997016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this petition, the following reliefs were prayed :\n\n\"(a) issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of a declaratory writ that Justice Murlidhar, Justice A.N.\n\nVerma, Jmtice N.N. Mitthal have already been appointed as permanent Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by virtue of the warrants of appointment dated 12.12.1980, 12.3.1981 and 12.3.1981 respectively."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 997072, "end_char": 997109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this petition, the following reliefs were prayed :\n\n\"(a) issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of a declaratory writ that Justice Murlidhar, Justice A.N.\n\nVerma, Jmtice N.N. Mitthal have already been appointed as permanent Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by virtue of the warrants of appointment dated 12.12.1980, 12.3.1981 and 12.3.1981 respectively."}}, {"text": "J.L. Kalra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 998044, "end_char": 998054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition exactly similar to the one filed by Mr. S.P. Gupta was also filed bv Mr. J.L. Kalra, Advocate and others in the Delhi\n\nHigh Court which was also transferred to this Court by an Order H dated 1.5.1981 alongwith the case of Mr. S.P. Gupta.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "Delhi\n\nHigh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 998083, "end_char": 998100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition exactly similar to the one filed by Mr. S.P. Gupta was also filed bv Mr. J.L. Kalra, Advocate and others in the Delhi\n\nHigh Court which was also transferred to this Court by an Order H dated 1.5.1981 alongwith the case of Mr. S.P. Gupta."}}, {"text": "N.N. Goswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 998781, "end_char": 998793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the following reliefs were sought :\n\n( 1982] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(a) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent to assess the number of permanent and additional judges required for this Hon'ble Court having regard to its current business and the accu'llulated arrears of work and create such number of permanent and additional posts of judges as may he required, within such reasonablr time as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in accordance with law;\n\n(b) direct the respondent to appoint Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.N. Goswamy, Hon'hle Mr Justice Sultan Singh and Hon'ble Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra as permanent judges of this Hon'ble Court against the three vacant permanent posts forthwith;\n\n(c) direct the respondent to extend the term of the additional judges namely Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Wad by a period of two years within two weeks from the date of the order.", "canonical_name": "N.N.\n\nGoswami"}}, {"text": "High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 999264, "end_char": 999327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) direct the respondent likewise to confirm/extend the terms of the additional judges of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan, whose names are mentioned in paragraph No."}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 999737, "end_char": 999743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from these petitions which have been transferred to this Court other petitions were also filed against the Order of the President transferring Justice Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to be the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to be the Chief Justice of Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "Ismail"}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1000008, "end_char": 1000019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1981\n\nThis writ petition was filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate of the Supreme Court challenging the order of transfer of Justice\n\n,_ ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 713\n\nIsmail from Madras High Court to Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "Lily Thomµs~Peti"}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1000148, "end_char": 1000154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1981\n\nThis writ petition was filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate of the Supreme Court challenging the order of transfer of Justice\n\n,_ ..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 713\n\nIsmail from Madras High Court to Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "Ismail"}}, {"text": "Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1000364, "end_char": 1000370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Thomas, however, pressed the petition only on one ground, viz.,"}}, {"text": "K.B. ~. Sing 1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1000602, "end_char": 1000616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that even if the grievance against the transfer of Justice Ismail no longer survived yet she was entitled to contest the Order of the President of India transferring Justice K.B. ~. Sing 1 from\nPatna High Court to Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Rajappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1000791, "end_char": 1000798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another petition was filed by Mr. Rajappa, Advocate in the Madras High Court being writ petition No.", "canonical_name": "Rajappa"}}, {"text": "Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Ass'.lciation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1001500, "end_char": 1001543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the case of Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is concerned, Mr. D.N. Pandey, Secretary of the Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Ass'.lciation alongwith Thakur Rampati Sinha filed a writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Thakur Rampati Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1001554, "end_char": 1001574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the case of Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is concerned, Mr. D.N. Pandey, Secretary of the Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Ass'.lciation alongwith Thakur Rampati Sinha filed a writ petition No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "Patna High Cour", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1001623, "end_char": 1001638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CMJC 2224/1981 in the Patna High Court against the Union of India, the Chief Justice of India Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Cour; and the Registrar, Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "K.B.'N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1001804, "end_char": 1001817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice K.B.'N. Singh, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "16.9.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1002012, "end_char": 1002019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was directed to file a detailed affidavit which wa~ filed on 16.9.81 and he w1s transposed as petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Ripudarnan Prasad Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1002870, "end_char": 1002893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition has been filed by Ripudarnan Prasad Sinha praying for a writ of quo warranto against Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice Patna High Court for not proceeding to join his new posting at Madras and in continuing as Chief Justice of Patna High Court without any sanction of law in view of the Order of the President transferring him to Madras.", "canonical_name": "Ripudarnan Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "K BN. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1003309, "end_char": 1003320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave has not yet been granted in this petition but it has been tagged on with the cases relating to Justice K BN.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Singhv i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1003702, "end_char": 1003710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having heard Dr. Singhv i, counsel for the petitioners, on the point of law regarding the interpretation of Art.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1003793, "end_char": 1003801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1003931, "end_char": 1003937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222 of the Constitution, we proceeded to deal with the questions of law and the constitutional points raised in the petitions of Mr. Chagla, Mr. Tarkunde, Mr. S.P. Gupta and others as also the constitutional points involved in Justice K.B.N. Singh's case.", "canonical_name": "Chagla"}}, {"text": "S.P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1003957, "end_char": 1003967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222 of the Constitution, we proceeded to deal with the questions of law and the constitutional points raised in the petitions of Mr. Chagla, Mr. Tarkunde, Mr. S.P. Gupta and others as also the constitutional points involved in Justice K.B.N. Singh's case.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1004704, "end_char": 1004712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1004836, "end_char": 1004844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 715\n\ned before us by Messrs Seervai, Sorabjee, Dr. Singhvi, and others during their respective turns.", "canonical_name": "Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1004850, "end_char": 1004857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 715\n\ned before us by Messrs Seervai, Sorabjee, Dr. Singhvi, and others during their respective turns.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1004976, "end_char": 1004984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1005086, "end_char": 1005097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1005255, "end_char": 1005263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1005525, "end_char": 1005533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1005860, "end_char": 1005868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1006175, "end_char": 1006183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1007165, "end_char": 1007173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1008062, "end_char": 1008070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 S C.R. 42", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1008623, "end_char": 1008641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1008875, "end_char": 1008883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1009031, "end_char": 1009042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1009099, "end_char": 1009103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", Messrs Sorabjee, Garg and S.P. Gupta who followed Mr.\n\nSeervai adopted his arguments in toto so far as the interpretation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1009207, "end_char": 1009215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1010057, "end_char": 1010065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1011050, "end_char": 1011061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1012622, "end_char": 1012633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1012841, "end_char": 1012852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1013179, "end_char": 1013190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1013608, "end_char": 1013624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1014024, "end_char": 1014035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015030, "end_char": 1015038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015118, "end_char": 1015126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015277, "end_char": 1015285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015386, "end_char": 1015394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015623, "end_char": 1015631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bbagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1015828, "end_char": 1015836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Bbagwati J. and Untwa!ia J. dissented from the majority decision and took the view that no transfer of one High Court Judge to another High Court can be made without his consent.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Untwa!ia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1015844, "end_char": 1015852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Bbagwati J. and Untwa!ia J. dissented from the majority decision and took the view that no transfer of one High Court Judge to another High Court can be made without his consent.", "canonical_name": "Untwalia"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1016094, "end_char": 1016102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1017235, "end_char": 1017243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1017684, "end_char": 1017692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1017738, "end_char": 1017749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1018446, "end_char": 1018457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1019961, "end_char": 1019969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1020198, "end_char": 1020206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1020643, "end_char": 1020651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1021122, "end_char": 1021133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1021777, "end_char": 1021785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1023044, "end_char": 1023052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1024910, "end_char": 1024918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1025391, "end_char": 1025402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1025541, "end_char": 1025549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026089, "end_char": 1026097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026253, "end_char": 1026265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027538, "end_char": 1027547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027667, "end_char": 1027675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027678, "end_char": 1027686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1027803, "end_char": 1027814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029439, "end_char": 1029447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029611, "end_char": 1029619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029979, "end_char": 1029987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029990, "end_char": 1030001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Govunment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1030467, "end_char": 1030485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here also, the Governor of a State has to exercise a particular power only with the consent of the Govunment of India and not otherwise."}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1030632, "end_char": 1030643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1030722, "end_char": 1030730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1031699, "end_char": 1031707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1031895, "end_char": 1031903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1031935, "end_char": 1031950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370 can be applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir only with the concurrence of the Govermenr of the State."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1032489, "end_char": 1032500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1033032, "end_char": 1033040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1033664, "end_char": 1033675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1034019, "end_char": 1034027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1034939, "end_char": 1034947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035239, "end_char": 1035247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035497, "end_char": 1035505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035683, "end_char": 1035691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035732, "end_char": 1035740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035927, "end_char": 1035935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1036182, "end_char": 1036190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1037686, "end_char": 1037694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1037937, "end_char": 1037945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R. Das, Chief Justice in the case of The Bengal lmmuuity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar &\n\nOrs.(1) expressly referred to this aspect of the matter and observed as follows:-\n\n\"An erroneous interpretation of the Constitution may quite conceivably be perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified for a considerable time to the great detriment to public weJI being.\"", "canonical_name": "S.R. Dasgupta"}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1038492, "end_char": 1038498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered that as Lord Wright pointed out in James v. Commonwealth(') that a Constitution is a federal component and the constituents must hold a balance between all its parts."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1039325, "end_char": 1039341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Crawford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1042033, "end_char": 1042041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crawford in his book captioned 'Statutory Construction' B (1940 Edition) in para 158 'Purpose of Interpretation and Construction' (p.p."}}, {"text": "V.P. Sarathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1045128, "end_char": 1045140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.P. Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes' (1975 Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1047023, "end_char": 1047029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The literal interpretation has a prima facie preference, but to get at the real meaning it is necessary to apply the rule in Heydon's case."}}, {"text": "Craies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1047378, "end_char": 1047384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Craies on 'Statute Law' (6th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Jervis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1047427, "end_char": 1047433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while quoting Jervis CJ.,"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1047465, "end_char": 1047501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at p. 86 observes thus :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS { 1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1048714, "end_char": 1048720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the following observations have made at p. 70 :\n\n\"A second consequence of this rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made ..... Although in construing an Act of Parliament the Court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there,\"\n\nand quoting Lord Parker, the author says thus :\n\n\"Where the literal reading of a statute... produces an intelligible result ...... there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of Parliament.\""}}, {"text": "Bacon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1049653, "end_char": 1049658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Bacon says that \"the function of a Judge is jus decere and not jus dare, i.e., to interpret the law and not to make it."}}, {"text": "Marshal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1049785, "end_char": 1049792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Marshal, CJ observed that we must remember that \"it is the constitution that we are expounding.\"", "canonical_name": "Marshall"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1049990, "end_char": 1049998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1050128, "end_char": 1050135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Maxwell, the golden rule of interpretation is to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used unless it is in direct conflict with the intention of the Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1050812, "end_char": 1050820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1050870, "end_char": 1050878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRI-ME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1051518, "end_char": 1051553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRI-ME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1053879, "end_char": 1053884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Category (A)\n\nThe earliest case on the subject is A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1) where Kania CJ pointed out that external aid wa~ not permissible unless a statute was ambiguous and observed thus :\n\n\"Our attention was drawn to the debates and report of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the working of this clause."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1054354, "end_char": 1054362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1054601, "end_char": 1054611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1054800, "end_char": 1054809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis ours)\n\nAnd Mukherjea, J. observed thus :\n\n\"It is well settled that the Constitution must be interc\n\nIi'\n\npreted in a broad and liberal manner giving effect to all its H\n\n(I) [1950] SCR, 88,\n\n[1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nparts, and the presumption should be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by its framers.", "canonical_name": "Muukherjea"}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1055365, "end_char": 1055375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Resort can be iiad to them\" , says Willoughby, \"With great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be solved .. \"\n\nThe same view was expressed by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhuknan(1) where the learned Judge observed as follows :\n\n\"If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1056197, "end_char": 1056203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors.(2) Sarkar, J. observed thus :\n\n\"Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 294", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1056783, "end_char": 1056799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1057248, "end_char": 1057257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co!ledtor of B Central Excise and Customs, Surat and two Ors .,(1) Ramaswami, J, speaking for the court observed thus :\n\n\"It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1058201, "end_char": 1058206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. shri G. Hyatt,(2) Hegde, J. speaking for the Court made the follow- F ing observations :\n\n\"In our opinion the meaning of Section 17(3)(ii) is plain and unambiguous."}}, {"text": "Section 17(3)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1058304, "end_char": 1058321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1058547, "end_char": 1058553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v K. V. Gopi Nath, Sorter,(3) Mitter, J. reiterated this well settled principle thus:\n\n(lJ [1969] 2 SCR 253."}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 253", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1058608, "end_char": 1058624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1058640, "end_char": 1058647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 53", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1058654, "end_char": 1058669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1060522, "end_char": 1060528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reports of the Committees of the Legistature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act", "statute": "Reports of the Committees of the Legistature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act"}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 542", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1060535, "end_char": 1060551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1060566, "end_char": 1060573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reports of the Committees of the Legistature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act", "statute": "Reports of the Committees of the Legistature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061395, "end_char": 1061403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061521, "end_char": 1061528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061835, "end_char": 1061843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061912, "end_char": 1061920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1063043, "end_char": 1063056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. K. Gopalan' s case (supra), Sastri, J. (as he then , was) observed as follows :\n\n\"It is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that the Drafting Committee appointed by Constituent Assembly of India recommended the substitution of the expression \"except according to procedure established by law\" taken from the Japanese Constitution, 1946, for the words \"without due process of law\" which occurred in the original draft, \"as the former is more specific.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopalan"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1063074, "end_char": 1063080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. K. Gopalan' s case (supra), Sastri, J. (as he then , was) observed as follows :\n\n\"It is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that the Drafting Committee appointed by Constituent Assembly of India recommended the substitution of the expression \"except according to procedure established by law\" taken from the Japanese Constitution, 1946, for the words \"without due process of law\" which occurred in the original draft, \"as the former is more specific.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1063662, "end_char": 1063669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1064877, "end_char": 1064880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1065100, "end_char": 1065110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1065353, "end_char": 1065358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Julius Stone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1066476, "end_char": 1066488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recently, an eminent Indian jurit has reviewed the legal position and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone and Justice Frankfurter."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1066501, "end_char": 1066512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recently, an eminent Indian jurit has reviewed the legal position and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone and Justice Frankfurter.", "canonical_name": "Frank Purter"}}, {"text": "sec 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1067027, "end_char": 1067034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1068735, "end_char": 1068743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Anandji Haridas & Co. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh and Anr.(2), Sarkaria, J. speaking for the: Court observed as follows ;-\n\n\"It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, unc:ertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led\n\nO> [1974) 4 sec 152.", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "sec 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069097, "end_char": 1069104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 862", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069120, "end_char": 1069127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070870, "end_char": 1070877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 834", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070893, "end_char": 1070900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070916, "end_char": 1070923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1071530, "end_char": 1071549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1071575, "end_char": 1071594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1071640, "end_char": 1071657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072018, "end_char": 1072027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1972", "statute": "Finance Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Jn Mangalore Electric Supply Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1072123, "end_char": 1072155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement of objects and reasons admitted in clear and explicit terms that: -\n\nJn Mangalore Electric Supply Co. (supra) Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) relied on the legislative history of the provision of the statute concerned in order to construe the intention of the legislature and pointed out thus ::\n\n\"The legislative history of the Section 12B(I) furnishes an important clue to the question raised by the appellant's counsel.\""}}, {"text": "Section 12B(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072384, "end_char": 1072398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1972", "statute": "Finance Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "sec 638", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072833, "end_char": 1072840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 621", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072856, "end_char": 1072863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.K. Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1073164, "end_char": 1073176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A.K. Gopalan's case (supra) S.R. Das J. very poignantly pointed out thus :\n\n\"The Constitution has by article 21 required a procedure and has precribed certain minimum requirements of procedure in article 22, To add to them is not to interpret the Constitution but to recast it according to our intellectual yardstick and our unconscious predilections as to what an ideal Constitution should be.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopalan"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1073265, "end_char": 1073275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1073360, "end_char": 1073370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1073610, "end_char": 1073613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied)\n\nA similar view was taken by Das J. in Nalinakhya Bysack v.\n\nSham Sunder Haldar & Ors.(1) where he very pithily observed thus :\n\n'It must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Hulsbury in Commissioner for Special Purpose of lnrome Tax v. Pemsel (L.R. (1891) A.C. 531 at p. 549) that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake."}}, {"text": "Hulsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1073760, "end_char": 1073768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied)\n\nA similar view was taken by Das J. in Nalinakhya Bysack v.\n\nSham Sunder Haldar & Ors.(1) where he very pithily observed thus :\n\n'It must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Hulsbury in Commissioner for Special Purpose of lnrome Tax v. Pemsel (L.R. (1891) A.C. 531 at p. 549) that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake.", "canonical_name": "Hulsbury"}}, {"text": "Russel of Killowen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1074398, "end_char": 1074416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even where there is a casus omissus, it is as said by Lord Russel of Killowen in Hansraj Gupta v.\n\nOfficial Liquidator of Dehra Dun Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [(1933) L. R. 60 I.A. 13)] for others than the courts to remedy the defect.\""}}, {"text": "(1933) L. R. 60 I.A. 13", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1074507, "end_char": 1074530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1075096, "end_char": 1075104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N.H. Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1075368, "end_char": 1075381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. Srate of Bombay(1) the law on the subject was very succinctly and clearly laid down by this Court and N.H. Bhagwati J. observed thus :\n\n\"Acceptance of the interpretation which is sought to be put upon these words by the petitioners would involve the addition of words \"in the process of the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein'' or \"in the process of such acquisition\" which according to the well known canons of construction cannot be done."}}, {"text": "Art 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1076082, "end_char": 1076089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seervai E", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1076154, "end_char": 1076163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find ourselves in complete agreement with these observations which aptly apply to the present case so far as Art 222 is concerned and are sufficient to demolish the argument of Mr. Seervai E that the word 'consent' should be added to or read into Art.", "canonical_name": "Seervai E"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1076220, "end_char": 1076228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec 310", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1077051, "end_char": 1077058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1077643, "end_char": 1077651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1078347, "end_char": 1078355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec 565", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1078911, "end_char": 1078918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1080354, "end_char": 1080358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Arabinda Bose and Anr.(2) where Sastri CJ speaking for himself, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1080418, "end_char": 1080430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Arabinda Bose and Anr.(2) where Sastri CJ speaking for himself, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ."}}, {"text": "Muukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1080669, "end_char": 1080679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muukherjea J. also spoke in a similar strain and observed as follows:\n\n(I) 169 us 290.", "canonical_name": "Muukherjea"}}, {"text": "and Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1081155, "end_char": 1081162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Das J. observed thus:\n\n\"that the debates and speeches in the Legislature which reflect the individual opinion of the speaker cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act as it finally emerged from the Legislature and so the debates must be left out of consideration.\""}}, {"text": "Jafer Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1082199, "end_char": 1082209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for himself, Jafer Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar\n...\\ JJ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1082211, "end_char": 1082215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for himself, Jafer Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar\n...\\ JJ."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1082217, "end_char": 1082225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for himself, Jafer Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar\n...\\ JJ."}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1082230, "end_char": 1082239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for himself, Jafer Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar\n...\\ JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1083131, "end_char": 1083136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anandji Haridas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1083591, "end_char": 1083606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision, therefore, make a clear departure, on the point of admissiblity of historical setting, from the minority dissenting judgment of Das J. as indicated above,\n\nIn Anandji Haridas's case (supra), this Court observed thus:\n\n''We are afraid what the Finance Minister said in his speech cannot be imported into this case and 'Used for the construction of clause (c) of section 7."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1083793, "end_char": 1083802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lok Shikshana Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1083999, "end_char": 1084018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lok Shikshana Trust's case (supra), this Court made the following observations:\n\n\"It is true that it is dangerous and may be misleading to gather the meaning of the words used in an enactment merely from what was said by any speaker in the course of a debate in Parliament on the subject."}}, {"text": "[1965) 2 SCR 457", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1084650, "end_char": 1084666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088296, "end_char": 1088304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088392, "end_char": 1088400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089017, "end_char": 1089025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089118, "end_char": 1089126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 101 to 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089665, "end_char": 1089684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089875, "end_char": 1089886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090042, "end_char": 1090050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090483, "end_char": 1090489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090994, "end_char": 1091005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1091038, "end_char": 1091058, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1091148, "end_char": 1091159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092003, "end_char": 1092011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1092166, "end_char": 1092242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092464, "end_char": 1092471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092489, "end_char": 1092500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092757, "end_char": 1092771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1093183, "end_char": 1093194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1093205, "end_char": 1093213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The next statute which merits consideration is the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1093659, "end_char": 1093665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1094162, "end_char": 1094170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1094349, "end_char": 1094357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1094495, "end_char": 1094503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1094682, "end_char": 1094690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1095338, "end_char": 1095344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1095970, "end_char": 1095998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] i s.c.ii\n\nA We have mentioned these circumstances in order to highlight the second argument of Mr. Seervai regarding interpretation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1096134, "end_char": 1096142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1096239, "end_char": 1096247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "rvai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1096522, "end_char": 1096526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was suggested by Mr. See:rvai that under proviso (c) to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1096553, "end_char": 1096561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097548, "end_char": 1097555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097629, "end_char": 1097640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097692, "end_char": 1097700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097795, "end_char": 1097803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097828, "end_char": 1097836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098020, "end_char": 1098029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098978, "end_char": 1098984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1099730, "end_char": 1099738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1099800, "end_char": 1099808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1101266, "end_char": 1101281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1103154, "end_char": 1103156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 217(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104264, "end_char": 1104275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104280, "end_char": 1104288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104708, "end_char": 1104716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 220(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104820, "end_char": 1104832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1105259, "end_char": 1105267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 16, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1105293, "end_char": 1105311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 16, 1949 one of the architects of our constitution, Dr. Ambedkar while proposing the insertion of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1105401, "end_char": 1105409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1105436, "end_char": 1105444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Provincia I Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1107514, "end_char": 1107536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he had taken with regard to certain judicial matters, or that he had made a nuisance of himself by giving decisions which the Provincia I Government did not like."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1108059, "end_char": 1108067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1109176, "end_char": 1109184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1109292, "end_char": 1109300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Santhanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1110084, "end_char": 1110093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, it would appear from the Note appended by Mr. Santhanam in his book 'Constitution of India' as to now and under what circumstances the present Art."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1110107, "end_char": 1110128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1110181, "end_char": 1110189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Shiva Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1110243, "end_char": 1110255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222 came to\n\n(I) The Framing of India's Constitution, by B. Shiva Rao, Vol.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nShiva Rao"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1111016, "end_char": 1111024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1111518, "end_char": 1111526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1112102, "end_char": 1112110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1112140, "end_char": 1112148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ainbedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1112212, "end_char": 1112221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "128) was incorporated according to the guidelines indicated by Dr. Ainbedkar.", "canonical_name": "A:rnbedkar"}}, {"text": "Shiva Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1112808, "end_char": 1112817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiva Rao in 'The Framing of India's Constitution' (Vol."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1113643, "end_char": 1113650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is that the Constitutions of America, Canada, South Africa and Australia are much smaller than ours."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1113652, "end_char": 1113658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is that the Constitutions of America, Canada, South Africa and Australia are much smaller than ours."}}, {"text": "South Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1113660, "end_char": 1113672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is that the Constitutions of America, Canada, South Africa and Australia are much smaller than ours."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1114461, "end_char": 1114476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was President of the\n\n."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1114992, "end_char": 1115005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 982) 2 S.C.R\n\nwith an elected Legislature and, in doing so, we have adopted more or less the position of the British monarch for the President ."}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1115832, "end_char": 1115838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Prasad expressed a wish that by working the Constitution, the people of the country will evolve a convention by which the advice of Council of Ministers would be binding on the President and his historical words have proved to be true and have now taken a constitutional shape becau ; e by virtue of the Constitutional 42od Amendment, the advice of the Council of Ministers has been made binding on the President and he has to act on such advice."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1119146, "end_char": 1119164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed in support of this argument on a large number of transfers that were made during the emergency resulting in writ petitions filed in the Gujarat High Court in Seth's case where this very point was argued on behalf one of the Judges who had moved the petition before the Gujarat High Court."}}, {"text": "Untwalio", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1119430, "end_char": 1119438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dissented from the majority view and particularly Untwalio J. mentioned the fact that the large number of transfers had created a panic.", "canonical_name": "Untwalia"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1119635, "end_char": 1119643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1120028, "end_char": 1120036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1120701, "end_char": 1120709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121198, "end_char": 1121206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121304, "end_char": 1121312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121829, "end_char": 1121837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1122037, "end_char": 1122045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1122193, "end_char": 1122201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1123022, "end_char": 1123030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1123650, "end_char": 1123656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1123769, "end_char": 1123777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1125196, "end_char": 1125204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1125880, "end_char": 1125888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1127692, "end_char": 1127709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Sinha of the Patna High Court was transferred and appointed as CJ in Nagpur High Court."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1127757, "end_char": 1127770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nJustice Sarjoo Prasad of the Patna High Court was appointed as CJ of Assam and later of Rajasthan High Courts."}}, {"text": "C.P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1127869, "end_char": 1127879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice C.P. Sinha of Patna High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court\n\nJustice Malhotra of Allahabad High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court."}}, {"text": "Malhotra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1127938, "end_char": 1127946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice C.P. Sinha of Patna High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court\n\nJustice Malhotra of Allahabad High Court to be CJ of Assam High Court."}}, {"text": "Narasimham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128010, "end_char": 1128020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Narasimham from Orissa to Patna as CJ."}}, {"text": "Khalil Ahmed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128058, "end_char": 1128070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Khalil Ahmed from Patna to Orissa as CJ."}}, {"text": "A.T. Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128108, "end_char": 1128120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice A.T. Harries from Punjab to Calcutta as CJ."}}, {"text": "S.R. Dasgupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128161, "end_char": 1128174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice S.R. Dasgupta from Calcutta to Karnataka High Court\n\nJustice Ansari from Andhra Pradesh to Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "S.R. Dasgupta"}}, {"text": "Ansari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128222, "end_char": 1128228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice S.R. Dasgupta from Calcutta to Karnataka High Court\n\nJustice Ansari from Andhra Pradesh to Kerala High Court."}}, {"text": "A.D. Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1128285, "end_char": 1128296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice A.D. Koshal from Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court to Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court to Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1128302, "end_char": 1128349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice A.D. Koshal from Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court to Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1129930, "end_char": 1129938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1132315, "end_char": 1132326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1132337, "end_char": 1132345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Consti-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] i S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1134655, "end_char": 1134701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In achieving this object, our Consti-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] i S.C.R.\n\ntution has particularly relied on the American Constitution while rejecting the British pattern of conventions."}}, {"text": "Kesavanada Bharti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1135480, "end_char": 1135497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In contradistinction to this, our Constitution confers absolute powers on the High Courts and the Supreme Court to strike down not only legislations brought about by the legislature but also Acts passed by the Parliament and the peak of the judicial power reached when in Kesavanada Bharti' s case (supra) this Court held that the amending power enshrined in Art.", "canonical_name": "Keshavananda Bharti"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1135567, "end_char": 1135575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1138191, "end_char": 1138200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1138432, "end_char": 1138441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United. States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1138531, "end_char": 1138556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( Page 613)\n\nAnd section 1 of Article II reads thus :\n\n\"The executive power shall be vested in a President of E the United."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1138739, "end_char": 1138743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1139260, "end_char": 1139267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rocco J. Tresolini", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1139328, "end_char": 1139346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "74 may be extracted thus :\n\n(I) American Constitutional Law by Rocco J. Tresolini (1959 Edition)."}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1139944, "end_char": 1139951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1140374, "end_char": 1140383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1140983, "end_char": 1140992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 224, 222 and 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1142154, "end_char": 1142175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambcdkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1142774, "end_char": 1142782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambcdkar wanted to give larger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President.", "canonical_name": "Ambed- B kar"}}, {"text": "G. Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1143247, "end_char": 1143256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV), and on pages 128-132 of The Indian Constitution-Cornerstone of a Nation by G. Austin."}}, {"text": "Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1143282, "end_char": 1143288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even an attempt of Dr. Austin and others to introduce instrument of instructions to provide guidelines for the action to be taken by the President was rejected."}}, {"text": "France", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143808, "end_char": 1143814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "West Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143815, "end_char": 1143827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143829, "end_char": 1143834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Malawi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143836, "end_char": 1143842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Sri Lanka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143847, "end_char": 1143856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in France West Germany, Japan, Malawi and Sri Lanka the power of appointment of Judges vests in the executive (vide Garner : Political Science\n\n7so SUPREME cotikt REPo&ts [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Harold Laski", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1144023, "end_char": 1144035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "726-727; Harold Laski : Grammer of Politics, pp."}}, {"text": "Law Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1144092, "end_char": 1144106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "545-548; 80th Report of tht> Law Commission, pp."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1144146, "end_char": 1144167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1145638, "end_char": 1145649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1147335, "end_char": 1147342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 5U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1147522, "end_char": 1147529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1147558, "end_char": 1147590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1150482, "end_char": 1150497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1152406, "end_char": 1152413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1152661, "end_char": 1152669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1152834, "end_char": 1152842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1154211, "end_char": 1154219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1155097, "end_char": 1155105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1155297, "end_char": 1155305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1155645, "end_char": 1155653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1155839, "end_char": 1155847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1156560, "end_char": 1156568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1156699, "end_char": 1156707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1156794, "end_char": 1156802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1156948, "end_char": 1156956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1157429, "end_char": 1157437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1158287, "end_char": 1158295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1158484, "end_char": 1158492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SRC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1160131, "end_char": 1160134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Perhaps this was one of the A main reasons why the SRC being fully alive to these dangers tried its best to see that the reorganisation of States did not lead to disintegration and accordingly suggested a number of measures including a strong and independent judiciary free from parochial and fissiparous tendencies."}}, {"text": "Central and State Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1162745, "end_char": 1162774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "856 ......... The Central and State Governments have to work in very close cooperation!in executing important development projects, which necessitates that technical personnel should be recruited and trained on a common basis and that they should have uniform standards of efficiency and the feeling of belonging to common and important cadres.\""}}, {"text": "K.M. Panikkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1165920, "end_char": 1165933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The SRC consisted of a very eminent Judge of the Supreme Court and two persons of very great public and political eminence like Shri K.M. Panikkar and Shri H N.\n\nKunzru."}}, {"text": "H N.\n\nKunzru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1165943, "end_char": 1165955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The SRC consisted of a very eminent Judge of the Supreme Court and two persons of very great public and political eminence like Shri K.M. Panikkar and Shri H N.\n\nKunzru.", "canonical_name": "H N.\n\nKunzru"}}, {"text": "Saiyid Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1165996, "end_char": 1166012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt.", "canonical_name": "Saiyid Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1166029, "end_char": 1166035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt."}}, {"text": "H.N. K", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1166042, "end_char": 1166048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt."}}, {"text": "unzru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1166049, "end_char": 1166054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt."}}, {"text": "Panikkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1166101, "end_char": 1166109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt."}}, {"text": "Egypt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1166137, "end_char": 1166142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Commission was appointed Shri Saiyid Fazal Ali was Governor of Orissa, Shri H.N. K:unzru was a Member of the Council of States and Sri Panikkar was Ambassador of India in Egypt."}}, {"text": "M.C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1167214, "end_char": 1167227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the need to , achieve unity in all spheres of activities, judiciary not excluded, is not only in public interest but also in national interest, we fail to see\n\nw4at else co1M be in public interet,\n\n$UPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Perhaps it was due to the terse observations, recommendations\n\nand suggestions of the SRC that a high-powered Law Commission was set up by the Government in 1958 which was headed by Mr.\n\nM.C. Setalvad, ex-Attorney General of India, and this high-powered Commission fully endorsed the SRC Report and even suggested a mechanism to implement the recommendations.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1167607, "end_char": 1167615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1167695, "end_char": 1167703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This now brings us to tl:\\e 14th Report of the Law Commission, headed by Mr. Setalvad, where for the first time the policy of having a CJ in every High Court from outside was not only suggested but supported by a large body of independent persons."}}, {"text": "Administrative Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1170128, "end_char": 1170161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(page 100)\n\nIn September 1963 a Study Team was a-ppointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'ARC Study Team') to give its report on Centre-State relations."}}, {"text": "31st August 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1170670, "end_char": 1170686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately following the ARC Study Team Report, a meeting \"\" of the Committee of Zonal Council for National Integration was held on 31st August 1964 and in its Report of item l(viii) (b) the said Committee made the follo\\\\fog recommendation :\n\n\"The Committee also commended the idea that as a F convention, the Chief Justice of tlie High Court of a State\n\nshould be a person from outside the State.\""}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1171592, "end_char": 1171606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A In 1967 the ARC Study Team headed by Mr. M. C. Setalvad, passed a clear Resolution that as far as practicable, one-third of the number of judges should be from outside.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "8.9.79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1171821, "end_char": 1171827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another Law Commission was set up some time in 1978 and the Bar Council of India in its reply dated 8.9.79 to questions Nos."}}, {"text": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1172302, "end_char": 1172318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D In his speech on 26.2.1979 in the Lok Sabha Debates, Mr. P.\n\nShiv Shanker, who was then a Member of Parliament only and not even in the then Ruling Party, expressed his opinion thus :\n\n\"Various reports of the Law Commission with reference to recruitment policy and the policy on transfer of Judges from one High Court to the other, have been only gathering dust.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1172935, "end_char": 1172945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Palkhivala was also a member was salutary which opined that one-third of the Judges of a High Court must be from outside."}}, {"text": "7.6.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1173386, "end_char": 1173392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,\n\nSixth Series-seventh session )\n\nIn a meeting of the Consultative Committee for the Law Ministry, held on 7.6.80, where Members of Parliament belonging ti> opposition parties were also present, the unanimous views was :\n\n. -·"}}, {"text": "24.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1173805, "end_char": 1173812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another meeting of the Consultative Committee for the 8 Ministry of Law held on 24.7.80 fully reiterated and affirmed the view taken by the earlier Committee mentioned above."}}, {"text": "17.12.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1173955, "end_char": 1173963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another meeting of the Consultative Committee held on 17.12.80 which consisted of Members of Parliament of the opposition parties including Bapusaheb Parulekar, also favoured outside appointments."}}, {"text": "Bapusaheb Parulekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1174041, "end_char": 1174060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another meeting of the Consultative Committee held on 17.12.80 which consisted of Members of Parliament of the opposition parties including Bapusaheb Parulekar, also favoured outside appointments."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1174192, "end_char": 1174204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In its 80th Report, the Law Commission headed by an eminent Judge of this Court, Mr. Justice H. R. Khanna, in paras 6 21 and 6.22 made the following observations :\n\n\"6.21...Likewise, the Study Team on Centre State Relations appointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission also suggested that so far as practicable one-third of the number of judges of a High Court should be from outside.", "canonical_name": "H. R. Khanna"}}, {"text": "17-19 October 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1175782, "end_char": 1175800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A national Seminar was held on judicial appointment between 17-19 October 1980 at Ahmedabad, in which various eminent speakers participated and freely expressed their views The Seminar was organised by the Bar Council of India Trust and its deliberations may be extracted thus :\n\n\"The Seminar was of the view that the principle of transfer of Judges in all circumstances _is not to be considered as violative of independence of judiciary."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of India Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1175928, "end_char": 1175954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A national Seminar was held on judicial appointment between 17-19 October 1980 at Ahmedabad, in which various eminent speakers participated and freely expressed their views The Seminar was organised by the Bar Council of India Trust and its deliberations may be extracted thus :\n\n\"The Seminar was of the view that the principle of transfer of Judges in all circumstances _is not to be considered as violative of independence of judiciary."}}, {"text": "3.9.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1177119, "end_char": 1177125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another meeting of the Consultative Committee of Members of Parliament for the Law Ministry was held on 3.9.81, in which Members belonging to the opposition parties were also present, and there also the preponderance which emerged was in favour of having CJs from outside the State and one-third of judges to be recruited ia each High Court from outside."}}, {"text": "Nanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1177485, "end_char": 1177490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nanda (Congress (S)) observed thus :\n\n'Participating in the discussion, Shri Nanda Congress\n\n(s) made particular reference to the Seminar organised by\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. duPtA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 195\n\nthe Bar Council of India at Ahmedabad and the discussions held there on the issue of transfer of Judges and appointments from outside."}}, {"text": "Nanda Congress", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1177562, "end_char": 1177576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nanda (Congress (S)) observed thus :\n\n'Participating in the discussion, Shri Nanda Congress\n\n(s) made particular reference to the Seminar organised by\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. duPtA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 195\n\nthe Bar Council of India at Ahmedabad and the discussions held there on the issue of transfer of Judges and appointments from outside."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of India at Ahmedabad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1177688, "end_char": 1177721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nanda (Congress (S)) observed thus :\n\n'Participating in the discussion, Shri Nanda Congress\n\n(s) made particular reference to the Seminar organised by\n\n' ..\n\nS.P. duPtA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 195\n\nthe Bar Council of India at Ahmedabad and the discussions held there on the issue of transfer of Judges and appointments from outside."}}, {"text": "S.C. Mohanta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1178144, "end_char": 1178156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He emphasized that on the question of appointments of outsiders and transfers, the Consultative Committee had made definite and positive recommendations and Government should implement them ... \"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nShri S.C. Mohanta (LD) expressed his views thus :\n\n\"Shri S.C. (Mohanta (LD)) said that initially he had C reservation about supporting the policy of transfers but ever since the Law Minister had said that he would leave the mechanism and modalities to the Supreme Court, he was convinced that wch a policy should be followed and pressed that those who were newly appointed, should be transferred to outside courts.", "canonical_name": "S.C. (Mohanta"}}, {"text": "S.C. (Mohanta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1178196, "end_char": 1178209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He emphasized that on the question of appointments of outsiders and transfers, the Consultative Committee had made definite and positive recommendations and Government should implement them ... \"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nShri S.C. Mohanta (LD) expressed his views thus :\n\n\"Shri S.C. (Mohanta (LD)) said that initially he had C reservation about supporting the policy of transfers but ever since the Law Minister had said that he would leave the mechanism and modalities to the Supreme Court, he was convinced that wch a policy should be followed and pressed that those who were newly appointed, should be transferred to outside courts.", "canonical_name": "S.C. (Mohanta"}}, {"text": "Jamil-ur-Rahman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1178726, "end_char": 1178741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis supplied)\n\nShri Jamil-ur-Rahman (Congress) observed thus :\n\n\"It would be in the national interest to transfer judges from one High Court to other, and there should be no hesitation in doing this.·\""}}, {"text": "Dandapani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1178920, "end_char": 1178929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thus: Shri Dandapani (DMK) supported the view and observed\n\n\"Shri Dandapani (DMK) supported the view that judges should be transferred from the High Courts in their own interest to other High Courts.", "canonical_name": "Dandapani"}}, {"text": "Hari Nath Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1179400, "end_char": 1179416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hari Nath Mishra (Congress) was of the following view :\n\n79fi\n\nSUPREME Coi.", "canonical_name": "Hari Nath Mishra"}}, {"text": "Bari Nath Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1179511, "end_char": 1179527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Shri Bari Nath Mishra (Congress) mentioned that it had been agreed at earlier meetings that one-third of the judges and tbe Chief Justice should be from outside the State.", "canonical_name": "Hari Nath Mishra"}}, {"text": "Bhogendra Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1179909, "end_char": 1179922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Bhogendra Jha {CPI) observed thus :\n\n\"Shri Bhogendra Jha (CPI) supported the idea of transferring judges of High Courts outside their own State ••.\n\nHe also observed that while members of the Committee belonging to the different parties had agreed that transfer and appointments of outsiders should be made, the idea should be propagated amongst the respective parties\"\n\n{Emphasis supplied)\n\nD The Law Minister presiding over the deliberations of the\n\nConsultative Committee pointed out that the delay in."}}, {"text": "18.3.198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1181271, "end_char": 1181279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18.3.198], the CJI observed that at least a few of the new appointments to every High Court were in fact made from outside the State."}}, {"text": "30.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1182459, "end_char": 1182466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister participating in the discussions in the Rajya Sabha on 30.7.80 on the question of transfer of CJs from one High Court o another spoke thus :\n\n\"Mr. Chagla and Mr. Palkhivala-they supported the approach that one-third of the judges should be from outside so that it would be in the interest of national integra- D tion; regionalism will not come in, and also it would be in the interest of a caste ridden society."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1182919, "end_char": 1182933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even my predecessor, Mr. Shanti Bhushan felt that a Chief Justice should be from outside on the same grounds which were urged by the Law Commission in its 14th Report. ...", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS Ii 982! 2 s.c.il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1183929, "end_char": 1183967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "219-221)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Ii 982!"}}, {"text": "24. 7. l980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1184130, "end_char": 1184141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a later speech on 24."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1184423, "end_char": 1184437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "House that even my predecessor Shri Shanti Bhushan j i seems to be of the view that a Chief Justice should be from outside because of the various factors.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1184584, "end_char": 1184591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Member, Shri Agarwal, did support this approach."}}, {"text": "15.5.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1185598, "end_char": 1185605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To begin with, in a Note dated 15.5.80 (which is contained in one of the Jiles disclosed under the majority Order of this Court), the Law Minister once more wanted to ascertain the final view of the CJI thus :\n\n\"While this file may be referred to the CJI for his advice, I feel that we should also examine about evolving the poiicy to appoint the Chief Justice of a High Court from the High C0urt other than the High Court to which\n\n....._."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1186750, "end_char": 1186775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difficulties in taking any ad hoc decision on that question are of such grave magnitude that it would be impossible at this stage to appoint an outsider as a Chief Justice either of the Delhi High Court or of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\""}}, {"text": "31.7.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1187075, "end_char": 1187082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his Minute dated 31.7.80 while expressing his opposition to the Uniform policy the CJI clearly stated that he had an open mind, the relevant portion may be extracted thus :\n\n.\"The heart of the matter however is whether, as a general All India policy, a Judge of a High Court ought never to be appointed as the Chief Justice of that High Court."}}, {"text": "7.12.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1188572, "end_char": 1188579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would be clear from his letter dated 7.12.80 addressed to the Law Minister where he had expressed his opinion fairly, frankly and without any reservation thus :\n\n·_ .. Though I am firmly opposed to a wholesale transfer of the Chief Justices of High Courts, I take the view, which I have expressed froni time to time, that such transfers may be made in appropriate cases for strictly objective reasons."}}, {"text": "K.D, N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1190079, "end_char": 1190092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A clear instance of this is to be found in the case of Justice K.D, N. Singh which has been fully clarified by the CJI in his counteraffidavit in Transferred Ca>e No.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1193432, "end_char": 1193470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a scheme would be a continuous implementation of the Policy,\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [I 982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1194092, "end_char": 1194099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1196106, "end_char": 1196119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brother Venkataramiah has taken the view that although the CJI was opposed to the wholesale transfers of all CJs, his opposition was only with respect to all these transfers being made at a particular time.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Venkatarmiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1197381, "end_char": 1197393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brother Venkatarmiah has also expressed his view that the transfers proposed by the en.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Venkatararniah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1199721, "end_char": 1199735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, Venkatararniah J, is of the view that the transfers recommended in the CJl's letters dated 7-12-80 and 20-12-80 were merely in implementation of the general policy of transfer of CJs so that every High Court has a CJ from outside.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "SRC", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1201548, "end_char": 1201551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eversince the linguistic provinces came into existence as a result of the SRC Report, attempts have been made to see that the linguistic division of the State does not create disintegration of our big country which is the largest democracy in the world."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1204772, "end_char": 1204780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Paza/ Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1206632, "end_char": 1206641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Paza/ Ali, J.) 807\n\nWe have already observed that whenever a general policy or radical change of this kind is made it has to be subject to just exceptions and the formulation of such a policy would also have to take within its fold exceptional circumstances applicable to a particular CJ or CJs-a matter which we shall discuss hereafter.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1212035, "end_char": 1212043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1212593, "end_char": 1212601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1213170, "end_char": 1213177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since the implied power lies with the President it is not at all necessary that this power should be regulated by a legislation or an Act or a Rule", "statute": "Since the implied power lies with the President it is not at all necessary that this power should be regulated by a legislation or an Act or a Rule"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1216364, "end_char": 1216372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1218354, "end_char": 1218362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Saiyid Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1223682, "end_char": 1223697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, eminent jurists like Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali, Justice R.R. Khanna, Mr. M.C. Setalvad and lot of others must be given the credit of possessing great knowledge of law and if they thought that this was an idea which was most impracticable, they would never have suggested it.", "canonical_name": "Saiyid Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "R.R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1223707, "end_char": 1223718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, eminent jurists like Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali, Justice R.R. Khanna, Mr. M.C. Setalvad and lot of others must be given the credit of possessing great knowledge of law and if they thought that this was an idea which was most impracticable, they would never have suggested it.", "canonical_name": "H. R. Khanna"}}, {"text": "M.C. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1223724, "end_char": 1223737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, eminent jurists like Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali, Justice R.R. Khanna, Mr. M.C. Setalvad and lot of others must be given the credit of possessing great knowledge of law and if they thought that this was an idea which was most impracticable, they would never have suggested it.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Fnrthermore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1225974, "end_char": 1225985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fnrthermore, the en would come into the picture only after the proposal has passed through the High Court and the State Government concerned and it would be open to the CJI at this stage either to agree with this proposal or to drop it."}}, {"text": "Ser.rvai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1226969, "end_char": 1226977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ser.rvai submitted that Judges are not used to indulge in litigation and if they chose to remain silent, the lawyers can take up\n\n816 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ntheir cause and prove that duress and coercion has been practised on them."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1227103, "end_char": 1227142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ser.rvai submitted that Judges are not used to indulge in litigation and if they chose to remain silent, the lawyers can take up\n\n816 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ntheir cause and prove that duress and coercion has been practised on them."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1228968, "end_char": 1228976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1230053, "end_char": 1230061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1232137, "end_char": 1232145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1232169, "end_char": 1232177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1234736, "end_char": 1234751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1234773, "end_char": 1234779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1234787, "end_char": 1234813, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1234818, "end_char": 1234828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1234837, "end_char": 1234858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1235767, "end_char": 1235777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1236057, "end_char": 1236076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 162(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1236638, "end_char": 1236652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2.s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1236698, "end_char": 1236733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 162(1) of the Code of Criminal Pr99gµr~ runs thus:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2.s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1238184, "end_char": 1238190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1238198, "end_char": 1238224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1238229, "end_char": 1238235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 S.C.R. 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1238648, "end_char": 1238667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1238770, "end_char": 1238776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1240065, "end_char": 1240071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1240247, "end_char": 1240253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1240262, "end_char": 1240268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1242523, "end_char": 1242538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1243015, "end_char": 1243021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1243343, "end_char": 1243349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1243357, "end_char": 1243383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1243476, "end_char": 1243487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1244100, "end_char": 1244108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kapoor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1244760, "end_char": 1244766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapoor J, in a concurrent judgment in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), however, clarified the positio'n thus :\n\n\"Thus the documents, which are protected from production, are those the production of which would be prejudicial to the public interests or ."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1245622, "end_char": 1245628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1245699, "end_char": 1245705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1247936, "end_char": 1247943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1248137, "end_char": 1248143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1248148, "end_char": 1248154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1248298, "end_char": 1248304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1249797, "end_char": 1249803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1250076, "end_char": 1250082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1251760, "end_char": 1251780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1252188, "end_char": 1252194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ray CJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1252953, "end_char": 1252959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis mine)\n\nThe aroresaid observations of Ray CJ appear to be on all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case because the documents consisting of the secret correspondence, amply answer the description of the docun:ients which were being dealt with in that case."}}, {"text": "Blanesburgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1255105, "end_char": 1255116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "laid down by Mathew J.\n\nThe Privy Council in Henry Greer Robinson v. State of South Australia(1) held that the foundation upon which the protection against disclosure of official record is based is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest, and Lord Blanesburgh observed as follows :\n\n\"As the protection is claimed on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience, the papers protected, as might have beeh expected, have usually been public official documents of_ a political or administrative character."}}, {"text": "Duncan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1255916, "end_char": 1255922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Duncan's case (supra) the following observations were made:\n\n\" ...... but the rule that the interest of the State must not be put in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administering."}}, {"text": "Pearson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1259903, "end_char": 1259910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also placed by Mr. Sorabjee in the case of Rogers v. Home Secretary(1) and particularly on the observations of Lord Pearson which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"The court bas to balance the detriment to the public interest on the administrative or executive side, which would result from the disclosure of the document or information, 11gainst the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side, which would result from non-disclosure of a document or information which is relevant to an issue in legal proceedings."}}, {"text": "Rogers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1263655, "end_char": 1263661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Strong reliance was placed by Mt. Sorabjee in Sankey v.\n\nWhit/am & Ors.(1) where Stephen J. relying on Rogers' case (Supra) and other cases d\"'.elt on the doctrine of balancing process and B observed as follows :\n\n\"If in the balancing process the circumstances of a particular case can affect the relative weight to be given to each of the respective public interests when piaced in the scales, the outcome in the present case seems to me to be clear.\""}}, {"text": "Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1265552, "end_char": 1265561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pazal Ali, J.) 833\n\ncaused the most colossal damage not only to thi:i Government but A also to the judicial institution itself.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1265684, "end_char": 1265690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sankey' s case the following observations were made :\n\n\"An explanatory memorandum and schedule relating to a meeting of the Executive Council held on 7 January\n\n1975.", "canonical_name": "Sankey Whit"}}, {"text": "7 January\n\n1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1265834, "end_char": 1265849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sankey' s case the following observations were made :\n\n\"An explanatory memorandum and schedule relating to a meeting of the Executive Council held on 7 January\n\n1975."}}, {"text": "Carmody", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1266745, "end_char": 1266752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "claim of privilege observed as follows:\n\n\"Privilege was claimed for the documents in category I by the affidavit of Mr. Carmody, which stated that all members of the Executive Council are required to make on oath or affirmation of secrecy."}}, {"text": "Commonwealth of Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1267128, "end_char": 1267153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit contained the following : \"The documents referred to .. relate to advice given and recommendations made to the Federal Executive Council and the deliberations and decisions of that Council as to the inner Workings of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth of Australia."}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1267549, "end_char": 1267555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Murconi's Wireless Telegraph Co, Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commonwealth(1), Isaacs J. observed as follows :\n\n(I) 16 Commonwealth L.R. 178."}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270459, "end_char": 1270469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270494, "end_char": 1270509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1270975, "end_char": 1270988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the United States decision referred to above must be\n\nunderstood in the light of its own facts and the special provisions E of the American Constitutional law under which there is a complete separation of powers unlike our Constitution where to some extent there is separation of power but by and large all the powers of the appointment of the higher judiciary and their transfer vest in the executive, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1271742, "end_char": 1271750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1271783, "end_char": 1271801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The extreme limit to which the U.S. Supreme Court appears to i have gone is directly opposed to thescope of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1271860, "end_char": 1271875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyamla/ Mohanla/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1271980, "end_char": 1271997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Shyamla/ Mohanla/'s case (supra) has clearly held that the plea of privilege cannot be determined on the principles\n\n(1) 41 L Ed 2nd 1309."}}, {"text": "Section\n\n132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1273465, "end_char": 1273477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1274135, "end_char": 1274150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.P. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1274191, "end_char": 1274201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. '\n\nS.P. GUPTA ~·.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1274242, "end_char": 1274252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1276709, "end_char": 1276717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1277025, "end_char": 1277040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "David Foulkes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1277596, "end_char": 1277609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "David Foulkes in his book 'Introduction to Adminimative law' has observed thus :\n\n\"It laid it down that Crown privilege Ca'> be claimed for a document on two alternative grounds : (a) that the disclosure of the contents of a particular document would injure the public interest, for example, by endangering national security or prejudicing good diplomatic relations;\n\n(b) that the document falls within a class which must be withheld from production to ensure the proper functioning of the public service.\" ("}}, {"text": "C.B.I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1279592, "end_char": 1279597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the correct legal position seems to be that whereas mere expediency may not be a ground to claim privilege so as to avoid production of a document which, if produced, may defeat the defence, where the documents consist of highly confidential matters in respect of constitutional functionaries like Chief Justices or High Court Judges, the Law Minister, the President of India, C.B.I, I.B. and such other Departments 'are concerned, the question of public injury, which may be caused, becomes a decisive factor in upholding the plea of privilege."}}, {"text": "I.B.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1279599, "end_char": 1279603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the correct legal position seems to be that whereas mere expediency may not be a ground to claim privilege so as to avoid production of a document which, if produced, may defeat the defence, where the documents consist of highly confidential matters in respect of constitutional functionaries like Chief Justices or High Court Judges, the Law Minister, the President of India, C.B.I, I.B. and such other Departments 'are concerned, the question of public injury, which may be caused, becomes a decisive factor in upholding the plea of privilege."}}, {"text": "Swinfen Eady", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1280972, "end_char": 1280984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection in Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anzlo- Persian Oil Co. Ltd. (') Lord Swinfen Eady observed as follows :\n\n(I] 345 us!."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1281847, "end_char": 1281855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In taking this view the court had relied on an earlier decision in Hennessy v. Wright.(1)\n\nIn the Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. The Central Land Board(2) Lord Radcliffe observed thus :\n\n\"I do not understand that the existence of the power involves that in Scotland, any more than in England, it is open to the Court dispute with the Minister whether his view that production would be contrary to the public interest is well founded, or to arrive at a view, contradictory of his, that production would not in fact be at all injurious to that interest.\""}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1283465, "end_char": 1283471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edmund-Davies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1285664, "end_char": 1285677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Lord Edmund-Davies observed as follows :\n\n\"Whether a tribunal or court should decide that they themselves should inspect must always depend on the particular facts and issues, though it is difficult to see how they can ever properly conclude that discovery is \"necessary\" without such inspection.", "canonical_name": "Edmund- Davies"}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1286385, "end_char": 1286391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Fraser spoke in the same strain and held that confidentiality was not a separate head of privilege but may be a very material consideration to bear in mind when the question of privilege is raised."}}, {"text": "Wilberforce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1287742, "end_char": 1287753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Bank of England(1) the following observations were made by Lord Wilberforce :\n\n(l) [1980] A.C. 1090."}}, {"text": "Edmund Davies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1291233, "end_char": 1291246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the aforesaid case, Lord Edmund Davies classed the docu- E ments into three categories, which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Category A\n\nThese consist of communications between, to and from ministers (including ministers' personal secretaries acting on behalf of ministers) and minutes and briefs for ministers and memoranda of meetings attended by ministers.", "canonical_name": "Edmund- Davies"}}, {"text": "Burmah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1291764, "end_char": 1291770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All such documents relate to the formulation of the policy of the government ..... \" The minister thereafter sets out various aspects of government policy in relation to the financial difficulties of Burmah."}}, {"text": "Davies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1292864, "end_char": 1292870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After mentioning the categories, Lord Davies observed as follows:-\n\n\"There can be no doubt that the 'court has power to inspect the documents privately.", "canonical_name": "Davies"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1294212, "end_char": 1294219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1294271, "end_char": 1294286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oliver", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1295672, "end_char": 1295678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection Lord Oliver observed thus :\n\n\"Taking all these considerations into account, I think that there is a very real danger that the prospect of disclosure on discovery of material gathered in the course of such an inquiry will inhibit the proper conduct of the inquiry and thus frustrate the purpose of the legislature in making statutory provision for it."}}, {"text": "Denning M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1296180, "end_char": 1296192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my ijudgment, therefore, the public interest requires that these documents should be protected as a class, and I accordingly concur in the conclusion of Lord Denning M.R. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.\"", "canonical_name": "Denoning M.R."}}, {"text": "I.G. Eagles", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1296676, "end_char": 1296687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also placed by Mr. Sorabjee on a book 'Public Law ( 1980)' by I.G. Eagles where at page 275 the author makes the following observations regarding Cabinet papers :\n\n\"If the reason for excluding cabinet or related documents is to safeguard the proper functioning of the higher organs of the state, then that reason is wholly inappropriate where what is charged is the grossly improper functioning of these very org ms."}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1297816, "end_char": 1297826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Swkey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1298494, "end_char": 1298499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was held, as we have pointed out, in Swkey's case (supra) as also in Conway's case (supra) where Lord Reid has clearly 1stated that it is the duty of the court to prevent disclosure of documents even H without the intervention of a Minister, where serious injuries to the national interest is apparent."}}, {"text": "Eagland", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1298791, "end_char": 1298798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus both the leading cases of Eagland\n\n( 1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nand Australia have not accepted the liberal doctrine of candour expounded by the American authors."}}, {"text": "Union oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1298965, "end_char": 1298978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, it is 1 manifest that the Union oflndia bas not taken the plea of privilege merely to hide the truth or to prevent the court frorr knowing the truth."}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301263, "end_char": 1301278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301445, "end_char": 1301451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1301459, "end_char": 1301485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301532, "end_char": 1301547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301663, "end_char": 1301673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SS. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1302405, "end_char": 1302420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1302526, "end_char": 1302536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1303176, "end_char": 1303191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1303599, "end_char": 1303614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1304279, "end_char": 1304286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1304829, "end_char": 1304844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1305275, "end_char": 1305290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1306158, "end_char": 1306165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1306741, "end_char": 1306756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Caesor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1313997, "end_char": 1314003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1982] 2 S.C.R\n\nMy personal conception of a Judge is that he should be above all criticism and controversy; be should be blameless and spotless, full of virtues and free from vices like a 'diamond in the sky', like Caesor's wife above reproach."}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1315839, "end_char": 1315842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Curt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1316673, "end_char": 1316688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear that the CJ, Delhi High Curt was castigated as being dishonest and prejudiced against Justice Kumar for having refused to recommend his extension or reappointment."}}, {"text": "Mufti Bahauddin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1316924, "end_char": 1316939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same is being openly said in the Press regarding the CJI in respect of his adverse comments on Mufti Bahauddin, Acting Chief Justice_ of J & K High Court."}}, {"text": "oelhi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1317216, "end_char": 1317221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "between CJ, oelhi and CJI, there is nothing to show that the materials or the data on which the CJI formed his opinion against Justice Mufti Bahauddin and as he says in his proposal found some substance in the complaints yet all this was done when Justice Bahauddin was neither a party to the present proceedings, nor was he ever heard in his defence and yet he has b.een publicly condemned thanks to the disclosure."}}, {"text": "Bahauddin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1317345, "end_char": 1317354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "between CJ, oelhi and CJI, there is nothing to show that the materials or the data on which the CJI formed his opinion against Justice Mufti Bahauddin and as he says in his proposal found some substance in the complaints yet all this was done when Justice Bahauddin was neither a party to the present proceedings, nor was he ever heard in his defence and yet he has b.een publicly condemned thanks to the disclosure."}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1319360, "end_char": 1319368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KBN Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1319943, "end_char": 1319952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are my reasons for upholding the plea of privilege taken by the Union in the cases of Mr. Kumar and Mr.\n\nKBN Singh.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "s57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1320524, "end_char": 1320527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bh.agwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1323990, "end_char": 1323999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While agreeing with Brothers Bh.agwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324062, "end_char": 1324070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324590, "end_char": 1324598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1325692, "end_char": 1325700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1326420, "end_char": 1326428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327163, "end_char": 1327171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327226, "end_char": 1327229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327608, "end_char": 1327616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327658, "end_char": 1327666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327774, "end_char": 1327782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327852, "end_char": 1327860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1329665, "end_char": 1329667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7.5.31", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1330602, "end_char": 1330608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7.5.31. .."}}, {"text": "CBI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1330919, "end_char": 1330922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister also took care to ignore the CBI reports against Mr. Kumar because he wanted to proceed purely on legal and relevant materials before him."}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1332462, "end_char": 1332470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Deihl", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1335323, "end_char": 1335328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, if we put ourselves in the place of CJ, Deihl we would have done the same in the circumstances."}}, {"text": "Hete", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1335380, "end_char": 1335384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hete was a Chief Justice who was only recently made permanent and was to continue as CJ for quite some time and so Was 'the Ci!."}}, {"text": "7.5.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1336786, "end_char": 1336792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 I feel that in view of the conspectus of the circumstances mentioned above and those detailed by Brother Bhagwati J., CJ, Delhi was fully justified in requesting the Law Minister not to reveal the contents of his letter dated 7.5.81 and to let the matter rest where it was."}}, {"text": "Bhawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1337188, "end_char": 1337195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, therefore, I am unable to agree with the observations made by Brother Bhawati J. on, this as\\'ect of the matter only.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "D. N. Pandey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1337525, "end_char": 1337537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We now propose to deal with the case of D. N. Pandey and others in which Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court has now been transposed as petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Pandey"}}, {"text": "September 15, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1337940, "end_char": 1337958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The:;,'petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh was a practising Advocate of the Patna High Court and was appointed a Judge of the said High Court on September 15, 1966 and was made permanent Judge from March 21,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "March 21,\n\n1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1337993, "end_char": 1338008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The:;,'petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh was a practising Advocate of the Patna High Court and was appointed a Judge of the said High Court on September 15, 1966 and was made permanent Judge from March 21,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "July 6, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1338136, "end_char": 1338148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, he was appointed Acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court for a short while and as permanent Chief Justice on July 6, 1976."}}, {"text": "July 19,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1338194, "end_char": 1338208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July 19,\n\n1976."}}, {"text": "M.M,'.K. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1338603, "end_char": 1338618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar notification was issued by which Justice M.M,'.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "M.G. Ramachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1339104, "end_char": 1339121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the notification, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu took great exception to the appointment of the petitioner as CJ, Madras High Court mainly on the ground that he was not conversant with Tamil language and, therefore, he would not be able to function properly in the jMadras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M. G. Ramachandran"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1339141, "end_char": 1339151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the notification, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu took great exception to the appointment of the petitioner as CJ, Madras High Court mainly on the ground that he was not conversant with Tamil language and, therefore, he would not be able to function properly in the jMadras High Court."}}, {"text": "jMadras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1339368, "end_char": 1339386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the notification, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu took great exception to the appointment of the petitioner as CJ, Madras High Court mainly on the ground that he was not conversant with Tamil language and, therefore, he would not be able to function properly in the jMadras High Court."}}, {"text": "Nalanda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1339967, "end_char": 1339974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner met the CJI in Patna and accompanied him to Nalanda and Rajgir."}}, {"text": "Rajgir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1339979, "end_char": 1339985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner met the CJI in Patna and accompanied him to Nalanda and Rajgir."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1340045, "end_char": 1340050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the petitioner that during his visit to Bihar, the Hon'ble CJI did not give him any inkling of his transfer to Madras or for that matter to any other place."}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1343120, "end_char": 1343126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, he laid great stress .on the statement made by en at Jaipur on January 19, 1981 that the judges who were recruited with the understanding that they would not be transferred to other, States should not be asked after their appointment to go to other States and according to the petitioner the CJI said that in su.:h transfers the problem of language, education of their children could not be brushed aside."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1343896, "end_char": 1343904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1344630, "end_char": 1344645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1344914, "end_char": 1344924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "29.9.8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1345024, "end_char": 1345030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, filed in his counter-affidavit on 29.9.8 l, as directed by us, where he oenied\n\nor rebutted most of the allegations of fact made by the petitioner\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 867\n\nin his affidavit."}}, {"text": "16.10.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1345239, "end_char": 1345247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner filed another rejoinder on 16.10.81 to the counter-affidavit of the CJI."}}, {"text": "on-23.2.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1345689, "end_char": 1345701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He averred that he visited Patna in the exercise of his official duties particularly in order to meet the Judges and the members of the Bar and had informed the petitioner regarding his visit to Patna on-23.2.1980."}}, {"text": "24.2.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1346160, "end_char": 1346167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reaching Patna, the CJI met the members of the Bar individually on 24.2.80 and on the next day in the evening he met the members of the Advocates Association in the High Court premises."}}, {"text": "Nalanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1346311, "end_char": 1346318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also admitted his visits to Nalanda and Rajgir."}}, {"text": "5.1.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1346685, "end_char": 1346691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The CJI further states that be did have a talk over the telephone with the petitioner on 5.1.81 and apprised him of the likelihood of his being transferred to Madras and asked him if he had anything to say."}}, {"text": "8.1.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1347983, "end_char": 1347991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The CJI further admitted that the petitioner was at his residence on 8.1.1981 at 7.30 p.m. and during their discussion the question of his mother's advanced age and illness also c.-i.me up which was the only personal difficulty stressed by him (petitioner)."}}, {"text": "S.B.N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1348307, "end_char": 1348320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The CJI told him that he was unable to agree with him because there were other dependable persons in the family, including his brother S.B.N.\n\nSingh, who could look after his mother.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1351343, "end_char": 1351351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1352173, "end_char": 1352181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1352575, "end_char": 1352583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "20.12.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1353208, "end_char": 1353216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time the recommendation of the CJ[ was to transfer the petitioner to Rajasthan which was later changed and by a subsequent letter dated 20.12.80 the CJI proposed that t)le petitioner be transferred to Madras and Justice Ismail from M adra5 to Kerala."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1353787, "end_char": 1353795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1354383, "end_char": 1354397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1356633, "end_char": 1356647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1357537, "end_char": 1357548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1358581, "end_char": 1358591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Bhagwati J. (One of us) agreed entirely with the observations extracted above.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1358824, "end_char": 1358832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1358894, "end_char": 1358902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1358971, "end_char": 1358979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Krishna A Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1359802, "end_char": 1359816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 873\n\nThis case was followed both by Chandrachud J. and Krishna A Iyer J, and one of us (Fazal Ali J) in Seth's case where it was held that the observations made in this case constitute the true meaning and content of consultation as envisaged by Art.", "canonical_name": "Krishna A Iyer"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1359993, "end_char": 1360004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandra Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1360030, "end_char": 1360043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chandra Mohan's case (supra) this Court made the following B observations regarding the process and purport of consultation :\n\n\"That this constitutional mandate has both a negative and positive significance is made clear by the other provisions of the Constitution wherever the Constitution intended to provide more than one consultant, it has said so : see Arts.", "canonical_name": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "Arts. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1360388, "end_char": 1360397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1360514, "end_char": 1360522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1360525, "end_char": 1360536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandramouleshwer Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1360903, "end_char": 1360927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Analysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandramouleshwer Prasad's case (supra) the following necessary concomic\n\ntants of an effective consultation may be stated : E\n\n(I) that the conclutation contemplated by Art.", "canonical_name": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1361073, "end_char": 1361081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1361173, "end_char": 1361181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1364815, "end_char": 1364823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was trans ferred nearly one year later.:•\n\nThus, the first fact on which there is no controversy or divergence is that during his visit to Patna in February 1980 the CJI did\n\nnot give any indication to the petitioner regarding his transfer to D Madras as there was no such proposal."}}, {"text": "5.1.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1365203, "end_char": 1365211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must, therefore, be taken to be established that after his visit in E February 1980 the first time CJI had a talk with the petitioner was only on 5.1.1981."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1368537, "end_char": 1368545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8.1.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1370373, "end_char": 1370379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also admits that he was with the CJI at his residence on 8.1.81 for 10-15 minutes."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.a.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1371380, "end_char": 1371418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1375370, "end_char": 1375379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already pointed out that between February 1980 and January 5, 1981 there is no evidence at alL nor any allegation or avcrment either in the affidavits of the petitioner or of the CJI to indicate that he had either orally or in writing ascertained the views of the petitioners when he (CJJ) by his aforesaid proposal recommended the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh to Rajasthan as Chief Justice.", "canonical_name": "Rajasthan"}}, {"text": "7th and 20th December\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1376150, "end_char": 1376177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that even between 7th and 20th December\n\n1980, there was no talk or consultation between the petitioner and H the CJI."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1377411, "end_char": 1377419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B.e. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1378279, "end_char": 1378289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this point, Dr. Singhvi as also Mr. B.e.", "canonical_name": "B.C. Ghosh"}}, {"text": "9-1-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1380396, "end_char": 1380402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as things stood, we find that the Pri .ne Minister had already signed the file relating to transfer on 9-1-81 and it can safely be presumed that the file must have been sent by the Law Minister to the Prime."}}, {"text": "S1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1381262, "end_char": 1381265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7·12-80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1382839, "end_char": 1382846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) that there is no mention at all in any of the proposals\n\ndated 7·12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner. \\"}}, {"text": "Clumdramouleshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1383220, "end_char": 1383237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) that there is nothing to show that the President or the concerned constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over the pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner,\n\n(4) the case squarely falls within the ratio laid down in\n\nClumdramouleshwar' s case\n\n(supra) discussed above which had been approved by the en himself and\n\n,~,\n\nS.P. OUPTA v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, J.) 883\n\nKrishna Iyer J. and one of us (Fazal Ali J.) in Seth's A case."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1383517, "end_char": 1383525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1384458, "end_char": 1384466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1384534, "end_char": 1384545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1385191, "end_char": 1385199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1962] 1 SCR 896", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1387605, "end_char": 1387621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1943 FC 75", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1387733, "end_char": 1387747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1387870, "end_char": 1387878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 114(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1387941, "end_char": 1387950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1388107, "end_char": 1388112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given above we hold that the Order of the President transferring the petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh from Panta to Madras is constitutionally invalid and we hereby quash the notification dated 19-8-81 passed by the President."}}, {"text": "19-8-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1388194, "end_char": 1388201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given above we hold that the Order of the President transferring the petitioner, Justice K.B.N. Singh from Panta to Madras is constitutionally invalid and we hereby quash the notification dated 19-8-81 passed by the President."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1388728, "end_char": 1388736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkataramia'1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1388998, "end_char": 1389012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/81 and have made some observations on other questions also but subject to the observations made I would entirely agree with Brother Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramia'1 JJ.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Arts. 217\n\nand 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1389031, "end_char": 1389049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1389610, "end_char": 1389621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nOn March 18, 1981 Hon'ble Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed the following Circular letter to the (I) Governor of Punjab and (2) Chief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States) :\n\n\"D.O. No.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "P. Shiv Shankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1389658, "end_char": 1389673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J.\n\nOn March 18, 1981 Hon'ble Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed the following Circular letter to the (I) Governor of Punjab and (2) Chief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States) :\n\n\"D.O. No.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1392318, "end_char": 1392326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March IS, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1392775, "end_char": 1392789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two actions of the Union 'Government, namely, the issuance of the Circular letter dated March IS, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions led to legal action being taken challenging the same which is the subject matter of the instant adjudication."}}, {"text": "Shree Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1394083, "end_char": 1394094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981\n\nShree Gupta's Writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1394191, "end_char": 1394199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981 (Shri Tarkunde's Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Tark.unde"}}, {"text": "Kalra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1394287, "end_char": 1394292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 of 1981 (Shri Kalra's Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1394383, "end_char": 1394395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981 (Shri Iqbal Chagla's Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1396133, "end_char": 1396136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1396326, "end_char": 1396334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shankal Chand Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1396389, "end_char": 1396407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222 (1) of the Constitution as laid down by this Court in Shankal Chand Seth' s(1) case inasmuch as such mass transfers on alleged grounds of policy are outside its scope and further it reduces the efficacy of the consultation with the Chief Justice of India contemplated therein to a meaningless formality by presenting a transfer proposal to him as a fait accompli, the same being backed by the consent of the concerned Judge or the proposed appointee to his transfer."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1398412, "end_char": 1398420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1398873, "end_char": 1398881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399555, "end_char": 1399563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399821, "end_char": 1399829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1400194, "end_char": 1400202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1400371, "end_char": 1400378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "16th April, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1401158, "end_char": 1401174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 inasmuch as it makes invidious discrimination against those who would be refusing to furnish their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent will be at an advantage and even within the class of those who would be furnishing their consent it gives to the Government unfettered and unguided power or discretion to pick and choose i. e. select some for being shifted to High Courts other than their home State\n\nHigh Courts and to retain and appoint others in their home- State High Courts-which power can be exercised either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism; and in this behalf reliance is placed on the Law Minister's statement made in Parliament in response to a Calling Attention Motion by some Hon'ble Members on 16th April, 1981 to the effect \"it is not the intention of the Government _to appoint all Additional Judges to outside Courts\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1401939, "end_char": 1401947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1402787, "end_char": 1402798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1403366, "end_char": 1403377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1404443, "end_char": 1404454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1405489, "end_char": 1405500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1406314, "end_char": 1406323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that the petitioners have cited specific instances of Additional Judges having been granted shortterm extensions for three months, six months or a year in Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi High Courts and have also cited instances of Additional Judges being dropped in the purported exercise of such absolute power claimed under Art."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1406336, "end_char": 1406353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that the petitioners have cited specific instances of Additional Judges having been granted shortterm extensions for three months, six months or a year in Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi High Courts and have also cited instances of Additional Judges being dropped in the purported exercise of such absolute power claimed under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 224( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1406482, "end_char": 1406494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jmtice 0.N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1406618, "end_char": 1406635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grievance has specifically been made in respect of the individual cases of three Judges of the Delhi High Court, (a) Mr. Jmtice 0.N. Vohra (as he then was), (b) Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar (as he then was) and (c) Mr. Justice S.B. Wad."}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1407924, "end_char": 1407932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1408344, "end_char": 1408356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1408409, "end_char": 1408449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 224( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1409315, "end_char": 1409327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "statute": "the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1409410, "end_char": 1409418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "statute": "the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1413141, "end_char": 1413149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1413374, "end_char": 1413382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1413688, "end_char": 1413699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1413944, "end_char": 1413955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1414955, "end_char": 1414963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1416474, "end_char": 1416482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1417911, "end_char": 1417919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1418528, "end_char": 1418536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 216, 211 and 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1418836, "end_char": 1418861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 217(1) and 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1419007, "end_char": 1419030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1419739, "end_char": 1419750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1421420, "end_char": 1421429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "7.6.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1422236, "end_char": 1422244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the individual cases of the three Judges of the Delhi High Court it is pointed out that so far as Justice Wad is concerned he has now been granted a long term of one year with effect from 7.6.1981 and he can have no grievance and as regards the out-right dropping of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar it is denied that the same is illegal\n\nor unconstitutional or mala fide either in law or in fa ct; and it is pointr.d out that since Shri Vohra is not seeking any relief before the Court the action of dropping him need not be pronounced upon by this Court and so far as Shri S.N. Kumar is concerned, action being proper no relief can be granted to him."}}, {"text": "Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1422325, "end_char": 1422330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the individual cases of the three Judges of the Delhi High Court it is pointed out that so far as Justice Wad is concerned he has now been granted a long term of one year with effect from 7.6.1981 and he can have no grievance and as regards the out-right dropping of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar it is denied that the same is illegal\n\nor unconstitutional or mala fide either in law or in fa ct; and it is pointr.d out that since Shri Vohra is not seeking any relief before the Court the action of dropping him need not be pronounced upon by this Court and so far as Shri S.N. Kumar is concerned, action being proper no relief can be granted to him.", "canonical_name": "Vohra"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1423039, "end_char": 1423047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1423128, "end_char": 1423144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution the legality or constitutionality of the two actions of the Union Government, namely, the issuance of the Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions to sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, is being challenged and the first question raised by the contesting respondents relates to the locus standi of the petitioners, who are legal practitioners in Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi High Courts, to maintain their petitions seeking relief against these two impugned actions."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Srinivas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1424455, "end_char": 1424473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 899\n\nplaced it, whereunder the management of the Mills was taken over and run by the Directors appointed by the Central Government, was challenged by Shri Dwarkadas Srinivas (plaintiff), a preference share-holder of the Company and he also sought relief by quashing the demand made for calls in respect of unpaid share capital by the nominated Directors; a contention was raised about the locus standi of the plaintiff to maintain the suit on the ground that it was the Company who ought to have filed the suit as it was affected by the impugned Ordinance and the Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1425203, "end_char": 1425213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1425269, "end_char": 1425276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 714 of the report Justice Mahajan (as he then was), who delivered the main judgment of the Court, observed thus :\n\n\"I am further of the opinion that the question of the locus standi of the plaintiff to raise the plea that the Ordinance being void against the Company the Directors had no authority to make the call, is really of academic interest in this case because here the company has been impleaded as a defendant."}}, {"text": "Article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1425853, "end_char": 1425866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1426679, "end_char": 1426687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the said contention has been fully and elaborately discussed and dealt with by my brother Bhagwati in his judgment, I purpose to deal with it very briefly.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Adi P Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1428786, "end_char": 1428798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that in two decisions, namely Adi P Gandhi'(') case and Dabholkar' s(') case the question of locas standi was considered in the context of the interpretation of the expression \"persons aggrieved\" occurring in ss."}}, {"text": "Dabholkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1428812, "end_char": 1428821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that in two decisions, namely Adi P Gandhi'(') case and Dabholkar' s(') case the question of locas standi was considered in the context of the interpretation of the expression \"persons aggrieved\" occurring in ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 37 and 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1428965, "end_char": 1428978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1428986, "end_char": 1428999, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1429258, "end_char": 1429263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 37 and 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1429565, "end_char": 1429578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1429993, "end_char": 1430010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the latter case, the errant advocate having succeeded before th~ Bar Council of India, the State Bar Council preferred an appeal to this Court under s. 3 8 and the question arose whether the State Bar Council was a 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of s. 38 and a Bench of 7-Judges of this Court held upon a survey of the provision:; of the Act and its scheme and purpose that the State Bar Council was a 'person aggrieved'."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1430051, "end_char": 1430055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1430158, "end_char": 1430163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ratlam town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1432141, "end_char": 1432152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Municipal Council Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand and Ors.(1) this Court upheld the right of the residents of a certain locality in Ratlam town to adopt proceedings under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the Municipal Council compelling it to provide certain basic amenities like sanitary facilities on the roads, public conveniences for slum dwellers who were using the road for that purpose and to abate nuisance by constructing drain pipes with flow of water to wash the filth and stop the stench."}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1432180, "end_char": 1432186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ratlam Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1433196, "end_char": 1433215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that sense, the case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the citizens of a ward, is a path-finder in the field of people's involvement in the justicing process, sans which as Prof. Sikes points out (Melvyn P. Sikes, Administration of Justice), the system may 'crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity'."}}, {"text": "Sikes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1433344, "end_char": 1433349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that sense, the case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the citizens of a ward, is a path-finder in the field of people's involvement in the justicing process, sans which as Prof. Sikes points out (Melvyn P. Sikes, Administration of Justice), the system may 'crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity'."}}, {"text": "Melvyn P. Sikes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1433362, "end_char": 1433377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that sense, the case before us between the Ratlam Municipality and the citizens of a ward, is a path-finder in the field of people's involvement in the justicing process, sans which as Prof. Sikes points out (Melvyn P. Sikes, Administration of Justice), the system may 'crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity'."}}, {"text": "Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Unions(1)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1433993, "end_char": 1434032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..,..\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 903\n\nIn the Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Unions(1) case the question for consideration was whether the workers in a factory owned b' Government could question the legality and or validity of the sale of certain plants and equipment of the factory by the management and though the Court ultimately did not interfere because it did not find the sale to be unjust and unfair or mala fide on the maintainability of the challenge the Court has made certain observations having a bearing on the aspect of the workers' locus standi."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1434806, "end_char": 1434816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435309, "end_char": 1435317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435327, "end_char": 1435334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1436112, "end_char": 1436120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1437555, "end_char": 1437563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Del.hi Hlgh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1439940, "end_char": 1439957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention is that Shri Kumar's term having come to an end by efflux of period for which he was appointed he is no longer concerned with the impugned Circular-letter nor with the short-term extension that had been granted to him and after he has ceased to be a Judge of the Del.hi Hlgh Court he does not have any vested or enforceable right against the President or the Union Government in the matter of either continuation as an Additional Judge or appointment as a permanent Judue and, therefore, his challenge to the governmental action is not maintainable."}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1440465, "end_char": 1440476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1440770, "end_char": 1440782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOTTS [ 1982] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1441337, "end_char": 1441373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217( I) confers power upon the President to appoint High Court Judges subject to the consultations mentioned therein but the President has a discretion in the matter which cannot be controlled by judicial review by issuance of a mandamus; in any event, non-appointment of a proposed candidate for initial recruitment or non-continuance of an Additional Judge on the expiry of his term does not give rise to any enforceable obligation against the President/Union Government and in favour of the person who is not appointed or not continued and, therefore,\n\n.906\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOTTS [ 1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Articles 217(1) and 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1442586, "end_char": 1442612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1442641, "end_char": 1442652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1443044, "end_char": 1443055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1443127, "end_char": 1443138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1443968, "end_char": 1443976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1444133, "end_char": 1444144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1444335, "end_char": 1444346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1445677, "end_char": 1445688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446101, "end_char": 1446112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446633, "end_char": 1446644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446813, "end_char": 1446821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1447022, "end_char": 1447033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1447476, "end_char": 1447487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1447529, "end_char": 1447548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1447729, "end_char": 1447758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1447912, "end_char": 1447920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1447938, "end_char": 1447967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 222(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448001, "end_char": 1448012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448210, "end_char": 1448221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Tej Bahadur Sapru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1448377, "end_char": 1448394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Constitution was framed the provision Draft Article 199 was deleted because of the strong plea made against it by several Members of the Constituent Assembly including eminent authorities in this field like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Shri K.M. Munshi and others, mainly on the ground that Members of the Bar recruited as Additional Judges will revert to the Bar on the expiry of their term and such reversion to the Bar was manifestly dangerous to the fair administration of justice and opposed to public interest.", "canonical_name": "Tej Bahadu r Sapru"}}, {"text": "K.M. Munshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1448401, "end_char": 1448412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Constitution was framed the provision Draft Article 199 was deleted because of the strong plea made against it by several Members of the Constituent Assembly including eminent authorities in this field like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Shri K.M. Munshi and others, mainly on the ground that Members of the Bar recruited as Additional Judges will revert to the Bar on the expiry of their term and such reversion to the Bar was manifestly dangerous to the fair administration of justice and opposed to public interest."}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448903, "end_char": 1448911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1449069, "end_char": 1449080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1449576, "end_char": 1449605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1449657, "end_char": 1449663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1449675, "end_char": 1449704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1450357, "end_char": 1450368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Arts. 216 and 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1450687, "end_char": 1450707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Money Lenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1451360, "end_char": 1451377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1451703, "end_char": 1451711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1451769, "end_char": 1451781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1451898, "end_char": 1451909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1452065, "end_char": 1452073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1452131, "end_char": 1452142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1453333, "end_char": 1453344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1453892, "end_char": 1453904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1455621, "end_char": 1455632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1455818, "end_char": 1455830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1456083, "end_char": 1456094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1456609, "end_char": 1456618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact in Lok Sabha, Shri Tek Chand, M.P. from Ambala-Simla had opposed the recruitment of any Member of the Bar as an Additional Judge and suggested that such recuritment should be confined to District Judges, whik in the Rajya Sabha Shri P.N. Sapru from Uttar Pradesh strollgly pleaded that in appointing Additional Judges care should be taken to appoint Members of the Bar who were not likely to revert to the profession on the expiry of their term, that is to say \"appoint a man whom you are going to appoint as a Permanent man\"."}}, {"text": "Ambala-Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1456630, "end_char": 1456642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact in Lok Sabha, Shri Tek Chand, M.P. from Ambala-Simla had opposed the recruitment of any Member of the Bar as an Additional Judge and suggested that such recuritment should be confined to District Judges, whik in the Rajya Sabha Shri P.N. Sapru from Uttar Pradesh strollgly pleaded that in appointing Additional Judges care should be taken to appoint Members of the Bar who were not likely to revert to the profession on the expiry of their term, that is to say \"appoint a man whom you are going to appoint as a Permanent man\"."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1456839, "end_char": 1456852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact in Lok Sabha, Shri Tek Chand, M.P. from Ambala-Simla had opposed the recruitment of any Member of the Bar as an Additional Judge and suggested that such recuritment should be confined to District Judges, whik in the Rajya Sabha Shri P.N. Sapru from Uttar Pradesh strollgly pleaded that in appointing Additional Judges care should be taken to appoint Members of the Bar who were not likely to revert to the profession on the expiry of their term, that is to say \"appoint a man whom you are going to appoint as a Permanent man\"."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1457365, "end_char": 1457378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even as late as on June 29, 1967 in a Note prepared by him Justice K.N. Wanchoo had also stated thus :\n\n\"When a Member of the Bar is appointed an Additional Judge, it must be with a view to make him permanent in due course."}}, {"text": "K.N. Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1457413, "end_char": 1457425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even as late as on June 29, 1967 in a Note prepared by him Justice K.N. Wanchoo had also stated thus :\n\n\"When a Member of the Bar is appointed an Additional Judge, it must be with a view to make him permanent in due course.", "canonical_name": "K.N. Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Shah Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1457846, "end_char": 1457861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree that an undertaking should be taken from Members of the Bar that they will accept a permanent Judgeship when offered to them in due course ............ \"\n\n(Note quoted in the Shah Commission's Interim Report-I Para 7.23 at page 52)\n\nIf the genesis of the aforesaid convention or practice as well as the undertaking is nothing but public interest in the sense that public interest is served : (al by not permitting them to revert to the Bar on the expiry of their term, and (b) by not losing or frittering away the experience or expertise gained by them in administering justice during their initial term, then it is these very aspects of public interest which form the compelling reasons to consider their cases for their continuance either by extending their term or making them permanent in preference to outsiders or freshers."}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1460797, "end_char": 1460808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1462056, "end_char": 1462061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Gandhi(1) Chief Justice Sikri observed thus : \"It was said that we must interpret Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 75(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1462114, "end_char": 1462124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1462348, "end_char": 1462421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1978] 1 SCR 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1462769, "end_char": 1462783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463529, "end_char": 1463540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463702, "end_char": 1463707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1463715, "end_char": 1463734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1464549, "end_char": 1464560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1464950, "end_char": 1464961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1465447, "end_char": 1465455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshavanand Bharti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1465577, "end_char": 1465595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J. ) 915\n\nfor consideration before this Court in Keshavanand Bharti' s(1) case A where this Court held that the basic or essential features of the Constitution do act as fetters or limitations on the otherwise wide amending power contained in that Article.", "canonical_name": "Keshavananda Bharti"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1467457, "end_char": 1467468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468078, "end_char": 1468089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468486, "end_char": 1468497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468657, "end_char": 1468668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1469015, "end_char": 1469026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1470964, "end_char": 1470975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1470994, "end_char": 1471002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1471011, "end_char": 1471031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1471665, "end_char": 1471680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1472102, "end_char": 1472114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1472721, "end_char": 1472732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 SCR 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1473779, "end_char": 1473795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1979] 2 SCR 476", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1473802, "end_char": 1473818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1474039, "end_char": 1474059, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1474208, "end_char": 1474219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1474310, "end_char": 1474321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1474423, "end_char": 1474434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1474453, "end_char": 1474461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1474466, "end_char": 1474492, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1474840, "end_char": 1474851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1475109, "end_char": 1475116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1476985, "end_char": 1476996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1477310, "end_char": 1477321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1478003, "end_char": 1478016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Question is what is the implication of admitting D the position that \"an Additional Judge is not a Judge on probation'~\n\nas has been done by Shri Kankan in his counter-affidavit dated July 22, 1981 (filed in the Transfer Case No."}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1478445, "end_char": 1478471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 124( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1482761, "end_char": 1482773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1482792, "end_char": 1482800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1482809, "end_char": 1482835, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1483678, "end_char": 1483689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1483708, "end_char": 1483716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1483721, "end_char": 1483747, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1484807, "end_char": 1484818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1485052, "end_char": 1485060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1485203, "end_char": 1485214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1485375, "end_char": 1485386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1485661, "end_char": 1485672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1486478, "end_char": 1486493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.C. Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1486658, "end_char": 1486668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the former decision (P.C. Sethi's case) (supra) though the Chief Justice's order transferring the election petition from a Permanent Judge and allocating it to an ad hoc Judge appointed under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1486829, "end_char": 1486838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1487157, "end_char": 1487169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 143(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1489802, "end_char": 1489813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1490869, "end_char": 1490880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1491198, "end_char": 1491209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1491750, "end_char": 1491761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1492137, "end_char": 1492149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Great Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1493350, "end_char": 1493363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are two different ways in which this matter is governed in other countries ...... {Here follows a reference to the practices\n\ns. P. GUPTA v. UNION Tulzapurkar, J.) 925\n\nobtaining in Great Britain and the United States) ........... ."}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1495362, "end_char": 1495373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496008, "end_char": 1496016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496027, "end_char": 1496035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ihdian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1496181, "end_char": 1496187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "235 and in that behalf Krishna Iyer, J at p. 873 of the report has observed :\n\n\"In all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Ihdian justice will and should be accepted by the Government of India and the Court will have an oppor tunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have enterec:l into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given -by the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "Art. 217( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496819, "end_char": 1496831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1497231, "end_char": 1497239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Pocker Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1498615, "end_char": 1498630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for contesting resondents contended that the President must have the right to make a choice as no one functionary has been given any primacy and in support Counsel strongly relied upon the fact that during the constituent assembly debates a specific amendment was moved by Mr. B. Pocker Saheb from Madras to the original Draft Article 193( I) (which was in identical terms as the present Article in so far as is material) to the effect that the every Judge should be appointed by the President \"on the recommendation of the High Court concerned, after consultation with the Governor of the State concerned and with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India\"' clearly seeking to give higher importance or status to the Chief Justice of India in the matter (vide Constituent Assembfy Debates 1949, Vol VIII page 658) but the &aid amendment was rejected and the Draft Article became the present Art."}}, {"text": "Article 193( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1498665, "end_char": 1498680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1499234, "end_char": 1499245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1499677, "end_char": 1499688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pocker Saheb\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1500939, "end_char": 1500953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pocker Saheb\"s rejected amend ment has nothing to do with the primacy question at all because .", "canonical_name": "Pocker Saheb\"s"}}, {"text": "Pocker Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1501984, "end_char": 1501996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkar also understood the proposed amendment of Mr. Pocker Sahib in this manner and pleaded for its rejection on the ground that it sought to confer a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India which he thought was undesirable.", "canonical_name": "Pocker Saheb\"s"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1503526, "end_char": 1503537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1504193, "end_char": 1504204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1504506, "end_char": 1504517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pocker Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1504962, "end_char": 1504974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that giving primacy to the advice of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of High Court Judges is not to give power to veto any proposal as was contemplated by Mr .. Pocker Saheb's amendment nor would giving such primacy to his advice mean that the Chief Justice of India would be enjoying unfettered arbitrary powers, for, if his advice has proceeded on extraneous or non-germane considerations the same shall be subject to the judicial review just as the President's final decision is so subject if he were to disregard the advice of the Chief Justice of India unless the same is justified for cogent and convincing reasons.", "canonical_name": "Pocker Saheb\"s"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1505483, "end_char": 1505494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1506363, "end_char": 1506374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507007, "end_char": 1507018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1) and 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507236, "end_char": 1507258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507613, "end_char": 1507624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1510817, "end_char": 1510828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1511208, "end_char": 1511219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1512247, "end_char": 1512255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1512659, "end_char": 1512670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1512908, "end_char": 1512916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1513553, "end_char": 1513565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1513648, "end_char": 1513656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1513667, "end_char": 1513675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1516422, "end_char": 1516430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1516889, "end_char": 1516900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1517375, "end_char": 1517383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1517395, "end_char": 1517406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1517676, "end_char": 1517684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1517689, "end_char": 1517700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1519682, "end_char": 1519690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1520734, "end_char": 1520745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1520821, "end_char": 1520832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankalchand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1522031, "end_char": 1522048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Sankalchand Sheth, one of the transferees, was shifted from Gujarat High Court to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. '", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1522117, "end_char": 1522145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Sankalchand Sheth, one of the transferees, was shifted from Gujarat High Court to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. '"}}, {"text": "A.N. Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1522244, "end_char": 1522252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court against the Union of India and Chief Justice A.N. Ray challenging the order of transfer as void :and inoperative, inter-alia on grounds of promissory estoppel, no effective consultation: and want of consent on his part which should be read into Art.", "canonical_name": "A. N.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1522444, "end_char": 1522455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1522737, "end_char": 1522773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India in its affidavit in reply supported the impug11ed\n\norder, inter-alia, on the ground that the power of the President to transfer a Judge was absolute save and except that he had to co11sult the Chief Justice of India and as this had been done the transfer was\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Metha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1523256, "end_char": 1523261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a majority, consisting of Metha and D.A. Desai, JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1523367, "end_char": 1523378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.D. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1523524, "end_char": 1523534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.D. Desai, J. however, in a minority view, upheld the petitioner's contention as regards 'consent' on both the grounds, that is to say, he held that 'consent' must be read into Art.", "canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1523702, "end_char": 1523713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1524017, "end_char": 1524028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1524535, "end_char": 1524540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a statement being made by the learned Attorney-General for the Union of India to the effect that on the facts and circumstances of the case on record the then Government did not consider that there was any justification for transferring Justice Sheth from Gujarat High Court and propo sed to transfer him back to that High Court, Counsel for Justice Sheth stated that his client was prepared to withdraw his writ petition with the leave of the Court.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1524822, "end_char": 1524840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the appeal got settled as above to the satisfaction of Justice Sheth, the Constitution Bench desired to consider important issues arising in the case which related to the aspect of judicial independence involved in transfer of High Court Judges and after hearing arguments from Counsel on either side delivered its judgment expressing its views on the issues involved."}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1525279, "end_char": 1525290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1525646, "end_char": 1525657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526109, "end_char": 1526121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526350, "end_char": 1526361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526548, "end_char": 1526559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526879, "end_char": 1526890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1527493, "end_char": 1527504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1527736, "end_char": 1527747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1528471, "end_char": 1528482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1529992, "end_char": 1530000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandramoulehwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1530102, "end_char": 1530118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again after quoting a passage from the judgment in Chandramoulehwar' s(1) case and after referring to his own judgment in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) in -which he struck the same chord, he observe.d thus:\n\n\"It must also be borne in mind that if the Government departs from the opinion of the Chief Justice of India it has to justify its action by giving cogent and convincing reasons for the same and, if challenged, to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a case was mad.e out for not accepting the advice of the Chief Justice of India.\"", "canonical_name": "Chandramouleshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 SCR 666", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1530604, "end_char": 1530620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1531355, "end_char": 1531366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1533031, "end_char": 1533042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1533836, "end_char": 1533847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534055, "end_char": 1534066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534217, "end_char": 1534225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534236, "end_char": 1534248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534925, "end_char": 1534936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1536595, "end_char": 1536603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1536614, "end_char": 1536625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1539292, "end_char": 1539303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1539540, "end_char": 1539551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1540009, "end_char": 1540017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1540028, "end_char": 1540039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1540277, "end_char": 1540288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1541362, "end_char": 1541370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 3, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1541457, "end_char": 1541473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222, as inserted anew by Drafting Committee in the Revised Draft Constitution prepared on November 3, 1949, was discussed in the Constituent Assembly on November 16, 1949."}}, {"text": "November 16, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1541520, "end_char": 1541537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222, as inserted anew by Drafting Committee in the Revised Draft Constitution prepared on November 3, 1949, was discussed in the Constituent Assembly on November 16, 1949."}}, {"text": "B. R. Ambedkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1541544, "end_char": 1541558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. B. R. Ambedkar indicated the purpose of inserting the provision in the Revised Draft and gave at least two instances of transfers which would purely be in public interest.", "canonical_name": "B. R. Ambedkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1543693, "end_char": 1543704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1544991, "end_char": 1545002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1545179, "end_char": 1545190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1546813, "end_char": 1546824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government oflndia Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1547251, "end_char": 1547278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547352, "end_char": 1547361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(i)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547391, "end_char": 1547405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547879, "end_char": 1547887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547955, "end_char": 1547964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government oflndia Act 1935", "statute": "the Government oflndia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Government ofindia Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1547984, "end_char": 1548011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1548017, "end_char": 1548025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government ofindia Act 1935", "statute": "the Government ofindia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Judge in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1548456, "end_char": 1548498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1548505, "end_char": 1548561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1548655, "end_char": 1548690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935, did contain a provision for the transfer of a Judge and in that behalf reliance was placed\n\nSUPREMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1548728, "end_char": 1548734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1548998, "end_char": 1549002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "But Counsel has submitted that Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Amery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1549200, "end_char": 1549205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 enacted by the British Parliament and it was pointed out that though the actual proviso (c) used the word 'appointment', the Marginal Note of s. 2 ran thus : \"Judges to vacate office on 'transfer\" and even during the discussion that took place on the Bill, Earl of Munster addressing the House of Lords and the Secretary of State for India Mr. Amery addressing the House of Commons while explaining the provision that was being inserted with retrospective effect stated that the said provision was being made providing for vacating !"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1549572, "end_char": 1549576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1549772, "end_char": 1549781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1549789, "end_char": 1549818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1550097, "end_char": 1550115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, what bas been urged by counsel for the petitioners is that the Marginal Note to s. 2 of the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 as well as the debates in the House of Lords and House of Commons clearly indicate that proviso (c) which was added with retrospective effect to s. 220(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 really dealt with transfer of a High Court Judge when he was either appointed to another High Court or to the Federal Court, that is to say, the expression 'appointment' had been used really to connote a transfer, suggesting an interchangeable use of the two expressions by the British Parliament and, therefore, the basis adopted by the learnedPudges for drawing a distinction between 'appointment' and 'transfer ' would disappear and, therefore, the conclusion arrived at would not be correct."}}, {"text": "Hansard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1550399, "end_char": 1550406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel fairly stated that Reports of British Parliamentary Proceedings compiled by Hansard were not available to him when Sankatchand Sheth's case (supra) was argued by him before this Court but have since been made available now and he was making his submission before us."}}, {"text": "Sankatchand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1550438, "end_char": 1550455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel fairly stated that Reports of British Parliamentary Proceedings compiled by Hansard were not available to him when Sankatchand Sheth's case (supra) was argued by him before this Court but have since been made available now and he was making his submission before us.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1550888, "end_char": 1550902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1551013, "end_char": 1551042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1551266, "end_char": 1551274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1551481, "end_char": 1551510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1551818, "end_char": 1551826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1551877, "end_char": 1551888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1552110, "end_char": 1552121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sanka/chand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1552465, "end_char": 1552482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the aforesaid' discussion, in my view, no caie could be said to have been made out for reconsidering the decision of the majority in Sanka/chand Sheth's case (supra), according to which nonconsensual transfers are within the purview of Art.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1552568, "end_char": 1552579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1553087, "end_char": 1553098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1553819, "end_char": 1553830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554558, "end_char": 1554569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554781, "end_char": 1554792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1555109, "end_char": 1555120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1555593, "end_char": 1555604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1555995, "end_char": 1556006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1557042, "end_char": 1557053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1562118, "end_char": 1562121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1562175, "end_char": 1562183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565045, "end_char": 1565053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565503, "end_char": 1565511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565998, "end_char": 1566006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rashid Masood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1566547, "end_char": 1566560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16th April, 1981 in response to the Calling Attention Motion by Shri Rashid Masood and other M.Ps."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1566840, "end_char": 1566848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1566881, "end_char": 1566889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1568069, "end_char": 1568077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1568745, "end_char": 1568753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1570018, "end_char": 1570026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1570208, "end_char": 1570216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1570231, "end_char": 1570239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1571019, "end_char": 1571027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1571660, "end_char": 1571668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1573020, "end_char": 1573028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1573606, "end_char": 1573614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rashid Masood", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1574031, "end_char": 1574044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This apart, the fact that the Circular letter was intended to effect transfers of sitting Additional Judges be..:omes amply clear from what transpired during the debate that followed the Calling Attention Motion of Shri Rashid Masood and other M.Ps."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1575181, "end_char": 1575189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Satish Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1578275, "end_char": 1578290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following are the questions and answers : •\n\n'Shri Satish Aggarwal.' \""}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1586371, "end_char": 1586376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these have been made part of their pleadings by the petitioners (vide para 2 of Shri Tarkunde's petition and para 43 (0) of Shri Gupta's petition)\n\n~ duty is cast on the conteting respondents to deal with the same . ' . . - . . . . ' .. '", "canonical_name": "GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Tark.unde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1586752, "end_char": 1586761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to para 2 of Shri Tark.unde's petition, Shri Kankan has merely averred that \"the views stated to have been expressed by the Chief Minister of a State and a Cabinet Minister would have been their personal views and do not and could not have conveyed the policy of the Government\", while there is no specific reply to para 43 (0) of Shri Gupta's petition at all but an omnibus general submission in regard to para 43 (H) to para 43 (Q) has been made by Shri Kankan by stating thus : \"with regard to paras 43 (H) to 43 (Q) I submit that these paras are full of surmises and conjectures\".", "canonical_name": "Tark.unde"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590164, "end_char": 1590176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590293, "end_char": 1590304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590394, "end_char": 1590405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590565, "end_char": 1590576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590997, "end_char": 1591008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1591183, "end_char": 1591195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1592038, "end_char": 1592049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1592904, "end_char": 1592916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1593030, "end_char": 1593041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1593326, "end_char": 1593333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1597279, "end_char": 1597291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "23rd April, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1598272, "end_char": 1598288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23rd April, 1981, (filed in the Bombay High Court) asserted that the balance of convenience lay in refusing to grant an injunction rather than to grant one because it was claimed that persons who would be willi.ng to give their consent to be appointed as Judges in High Courts other than their own should not be deprived of the chance of such appointment merely by reason ofthe petitioners' having moved the Hon'ble Court questioning the validity of the Circular and that it would be against the public inter.est to delay or hold up appointments of persons as Judges to other High Courts by reason of pendency of the writ petition."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1600023, "end_char": 1600037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this behalf reliance bas been placed upon the statement made by the Law Minister on the floor of the Parliament on April 16, 1981 to the effect that it is not the intention of the Government to appoint all Additional Judges to outside High Courts This statement clearly suggests that the Government will be indulging in picking and choosing while appointing some Additional Judges to outside High Courts and retaining and appointing others in their own High Courts and in the absence of any guidelines the power can be exercised arbitrarily, either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism as pointed out by the petitio1rers."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1601439, "end_char": 1601446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1601904, "end_char": 1601916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981) it may' be stated that the gravamen of the challenge is directed against the President's action in dropping him outright on the expiry of his extended short term on June 6, 1981, i.e. during the pendency of the case before this Court and the action is challenged by the petitioners as well as by Shri S.N. Kumar as being violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1602073, "end_char": 1602081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1602094, "end_char": 1602105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1602341, "end_char": 1602353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1602736, "end_char": 1602747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 22,\n\n1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1603148, "end_char": 1603162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "full period of two years but there was a half-hearted and vague H denial thereof by Shri Kankan in his Counter-affidavit dated July 22,\n\n1981 who merely stated that the ;\\foresaid statement that both the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 ~.c.tt,\n\nChief Justices had recommended extension to the concerned three Judges for two years was untrue and incorrect, without specifying whether, if not both, any one had done so and if so who had recommended it, and further if the recommendation was not for all the three Judges it was for whom and if not for two years for what period?"}}, {"text": "July 17, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1603696, "end_char": 1603706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S.N. Kumar in his 'Counter Affidavit dated July 17, !"}}, {"text": "T.N. Chaturvedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1603957, "end_char": 1603972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "981 had also asserted that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had told him and a number of his colleagues that he (Chief Justice) had recommended the extension to the concerned three Judges (including himself), to which there was a reply from Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, Secretary (Justice) Government of India, in his Affidavit dated August 25, 1981 to the effect that in the nature of things the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court could not have told Shri S.N. Kumar that he had made a recommen<:lation in his (Shri S.N. Kumar's) favour and Shri Chaturvedi further averred categorically : \"I state that as a matter of fact there was real and effective consultation with the two Chief Justices and the President preferred the views of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court which were not favourable for a further appoint ment of.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "August 25, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1604038, "end_char": 1604053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "981 had also asserted that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had told him and a number of his colleagues that he (Chief Justice) had recommended the extension to the concerned three Judges (including himself), to which there was a reply from Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, Secretary (Justice) Government of India, in his Affidavit dated August 25, 1981 to the effect that in the nature of things the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court could not have told Shri S.N. Kumar that he had made a recommen<:lation in his (Shri S.N. Kumar's) favour and Shri Chaturvedi further averred categorically : \"I state that as a matter of fact there was real and effective consultation with the two Chief Justices and the President preferred the views of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court which were not favourable for a further appoint ment of."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1605062, "end_char": 1605075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, a Newspaper Report appearing in the issue of Hindustan Times of July 10, 1981 under the."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1605112, "end_char": 1605123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "overruled Chandrachud's.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1606330, "end_char": 1606341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 16, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1606560, "end_char": 1606576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that this Court on October 16, 1981 directed disclosure of relevant documents contained in the file relating to Shri S.N. Kumar concerning his short term extension and eventual non-continuance for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has or has not been full, complete and effective consultation between the appointing authority on the one hand and the constitutional functionaries on the other, particularly the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1608760, "end_char": 1608771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1609151, "end_char": 1609162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tufzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1611461, "end_char": 1611472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Tufzapurkar, J.) 969\n\npossession of one who consults must be unreservedly placed before the consultee.", "canonical_name": "Tulzapurkar"}}, {"text": "Delhi High -Court and", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1612394, "end_char": 1612415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all I3Udocuments compnsmg correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High -Court and the Union Law Minister, between the Chief Justice of India and the Union Law Minister and between tlie Chief Justice of Dlhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India and some notings made by the Union Law Minister have been disclosed."}}, {"text": "Dlhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1612536, "end_char": 1612551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all I3Udocuments compnsmg correspondence between the Chief Justice of Delhi High -Court and the Union Law Minister, between the Chief Justice of India and the Union Law Minister and between tlie Chief Justice of Dlhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India and some notings made by the Union Law Minister have been disclosed."}}, {"text": "May 27, 19l", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1613048, "end_char": 1613059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of this material clearly shows that, though initially the non-recommendation of extension to Shri S.N. Kumar was thought of on four grounds : (a) his behaviour in Court, (b) his slow disposal, (c) his doubtful integrity based on unverified and uninvestigated complaints and (d) adverse IB reports, ultimately the decision to drop him, according to the Union Law Minister's noting dated May 27, 19l, was based-on and confined to the aspect concerning his 'reputation and integrity' and the correspondence clearly shows that the two Chief Justices held exactly divergent and opposite views regarding the said ground on which the final decision was based: The correspondence and notings bring out the following facts very clearly: (a) the Delhi Chief Justice's view regarding Shri\n\nS.N. Kumar's integrity was based on (i) serious complaints (both oral and in writing) received by him against Shri S.N. Kumar, including some received from the Union]Law Minister himself and\n\n(ii) doubts expressed by some responsible Members of the Bar and some of his colleagues about his integrity; and while admitting that he had no investigating agency to."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1619159, "end_char": 1619172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the latter aspect the Chief Justice of India had all along maintained that that conduct on Shri Kumar's part by itself could not be regarded as blame-worthy in view of long standing practice obtining in that behalf in Delhi High Co:irt, and without more from that alone no inference of corruption or lack of integrity could be drawn."}}, {"text": "S~N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1619963, "end_char": 1619973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Chief Justice's letter to the Chief Justice of India on March 28, 1981, immediately following upon the meeting and oral\n\n972 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS ( 1982) 2 s.C.R.\n\ndiscussion is of no use because beyond stating that he had an opportunity \"to discuss this delicate matter with yotl\" and further stating that as regards the complaints about Justice S~N. Kumar's integrity and general conduct '\"the matter has already been discussed between us\" no further details are recorded as to what transpired between them during their meeting.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "May 7, 1981.but", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1624614, "end_char": 1624629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In substance the sum total of his reasons comes to this :-(i) that he did not want to\n\nbe embarrassed by the likely disclosure of the contents of his communication dated May, 7, 1981 to Shri S.N. Kumar as had happened in the case of his e.arlier communication dated 19th February, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India and (ii) that as he could not desist from expressing without fear or favour what he felt about certain matters (in relation to Shri S.N. Kumar) he communicated all that he wanted to say about him to the Union Law Minister through his letter of _May 7, 1981.but at the."}}, {"text": "S.N.· Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1625216, "end_char": 1625227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "regards (i), all that can be said is that it is surprising how he expected the Chief Justice of India not to put to Shri S.N. Kumar and seek his explanation on whatever he had come to kriow against him from any source including the Delhi Chief Justice, in fact, before supplying any material to the Union Law Minister he himself ought to have apprised S.N.· Kumar of all the material and all that he had heard about him and'held discussion with him to ascertain his version thereon and then conveyed both sides of the picture to .", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1625520, "end_char": 1625531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\nJustice of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1625629, "end_char": 1625684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217(1) required of him to place all relevant and material facts about Shri S.N. Kumar before the Chief\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1626485, "end_char": 1626496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankalc hand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1626572, "end_char": 1626590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, contrary to the principles laid down-by this Court in Sankalc hand Sheth' s case (supra) that the President must make the relevant data available to the Chief Justice of India for obtaining his considered opinion, the Union Law Minister did not forward the complaints which he had received against Shri S.N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India (which he forwarded to the Delhi Chief Justice); secondly, the Chief Justice did not forward \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials\" touching Shri S.N. Kumar's integrity to the Chief Justice of India inspite of the latter having specifically called for the same, and thirdly between them the Union Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice saw to it that the communication of May 7, 1981 (from the Delhi Chief Justice to the Union Law Minister) which contained \"further details\" and \"concrete facts or materials in regard to the allegations of lack of integrity against Shri S.N. Kumar was kept confidential from the ChiefJustice of India and was not shown to him.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1627962, "end_char": 1627973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1629210, "end_char": 1629221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3UPRBMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1631258, "end_char": 1631271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short in Shri S.N. Kumar's case it is quite clea, r that both these high constitutional functionaries, namely the un; on Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice abdicated their constituti onal responsibility or to use Justice Krishna Iyer's language they utterly failc; q tq <; lischare their \"accountability to the ju$tice constitut; ncy ,\"\n\n3UPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [ 19821 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "S.N . .Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1631352, "end_char": 1631364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe result is that the impugned decision against Shri S.N .", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "M.M. lsma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1631772, "end_char": 1631781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the above matters, with the resignation of Shri M.M. lsma, il Chief Justice of Madras High Court which has become effective, this Court is only concerned with the challenge made to the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Co11rt to Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Patna High Co11rt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1631957, "end_char": 1631974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the above matters, with the resignation of Shri M.M. lsma, il Chief Justice of Madras High Court which has become effective, this Court is only concerned with the challenge made to the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Co11rt to Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Patna High Co'11rt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1632058, "end_char": 1632076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2224 of I 98 I filed in the Patna High Co'11rt the challenge was made by two lawyers, Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thak11r Rampeti Sinha, the Secretary and President respectively of Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association which Shri K.B.N. Singh was impleaded as respondent No."}}, {"text": "Thak11r Rampeti Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1632142, "end_char": 1632163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2224 of I 98 I filed in the Patna High Co'11rt the challenge was made by two lawyers, Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thak11r Rampeti Sinha, the Secretary and President respectively of Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association which Shri K.B.N. Singh was impleaded as respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1632209, "end_char": 1632250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2224 of I 98 I filed in the Patna High Co'11rt the challenge was made by two lawyers, Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thak11r Rampeti Sinha, the Secretary and President respectively of Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association which Shri K.B.N. Singh was impleaded as respondent No."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1632457, "end_char": 1632475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 at his request by this Court's order dated September 15, 1981 Shri K.B.N. Singh was transposed as co- , petitioner and he has filed a self-contained comprehensive affidavit dated September I 6, 1981 making all the necessary averments and submissions in support of the challenge."}}, {"text": "September I 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1632593, "end_char": 1632612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 at his request by this Court's order dated September 15, 1981 Shri K.B.N. Singh was transposed as co- , petitioner and he has filed a self-contained comprehensive affidavit dated September I 6, 1981 making all the necessary averments and submissions in support of the challenge."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1632961, "end_char": 1632975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The brief facts c'ollcerning Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer are there : while he was practising as an advocate of the Patna High Court, Shri K.B.N. Singh was appointed as Judge of that High Court on September 15, 1966; he was made permanent fodge of that High Court on March 21, 1968; he was first appointed Acting Cief Justice and later-on Permanent Chief Justice of that Court by the Presidential Notification dated July 7, 1976 and he assumed charge of that office on July 19, 1976."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1633163, "end_char": 1633176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The brief facts c'ollcerning Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer are there : while he was practising as an advocate of the Patna High Court, Shri K.B.N. Singh was appointed as Judge of that High Court on September 15, 1966; he was made permanent fodge of that High Court on March 21, 1968; he was first appointed Acting Cief Justice and later-on Permanent Chief Justice of that Court by the Presidential Notification dated July 7, 1976 and he assumed charge of that office on July 19, 1976."}}, {"text": ".P. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1633562, "end_char": 1633571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the impugned Notification dated January 19, 1981 the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, was pleased to transfer\n\nJ:!i~ as the <;:hief Justice of the Hi$h Coµrt of Madras wit!:\\ effect\n\n\"'\n\n§.P. GUPTA JI, tiNiON (tuizapurkar, J.) 977\n\nfrom the day he would assume charge of his office.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1633781, "end_char": 1633792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1634168, "end_char": 1634179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1634593, "end_char": 1634604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1634860, "end_char": 1634871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1635436, "end_char": 1635448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1636480, "end_char": 1636491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1637068, "end_char": 1637082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. B. N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1638449, "end_char": 1638464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel for the petitioners (including Shri K. B. N.\n\nSingh) urged that the three grounds or aspects really get .", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1639265, "end_char": 1639276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kankan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1641806, "end_char": 1641812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\n1981 of Sbri K.B.N. Singh filed after be was transposed as a copetitioner containing all the relevant averments arid submissions in support of the challenge; (b) Counter-affidavit dated September 24, J 981 of Sbri Kankan filed on behalf of the Union of India; (c) Rejoinder-Affidavit dated September 28, 1981 of Sbri K. B. N. Singh in reply to Shri Kankan's counter-affidavit; (d) Counter-affidavit dated September 29, 1981 of the Chief Justice oflndia, re>pondent No.", "canonical_name": "Kankan"}}, {"text": "K. B. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1641909, "end_char": 1641923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\n1981 of Sbri K.B.N. Singh filed after be was transposed as a copetitioner containing all the relevant averments arid submissions in support of the challenge; (b) Counter-affidavit dated September 24, J 981 of Sbri Kankan filed on behalf of the Union of India; (c) Rejoinder-Affidavit dated September 28, 1981 of Sbri K. B. N. Singh in reply to Shri Kankan's counter-affidavit; (d) Counter-affidavit dated September 29, 1981 of the Chief Justice oflndia, re>pondent No.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "November 18, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1642857, "end_char": 1642874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50/6/80-Jus pertaining to the appointment of Chief Justices of Delhi High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court in the context of the proposed general policy of having all Chief Justices in various High Courts from outside also disclosed pursuant to this Court's order .dated November 18, 1981."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1644769, "end_char": 1644785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . ."}}, {"text": "K. D. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1644935, "end_char": 1644947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . .", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "December 20, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1645246, "end_char": 1645263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . ."}}, {"text": "M. M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1645355, "end_char": 1645367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . .", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "K.B.N . . Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1645484, "end_char": 1645499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "basis of the data which he had collected and which he had considered with the greatest objectivity he had suggested transfers of certain Chief Justices including that of Shri K. B. N. Singh (vide letter dated December 7, 1980) ;\n\n(4) that initially on December 7, 1980, the recommendation was to transfer Shri K. B. N. Singh to Rajasthan High Court to take the place of Shri K. D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice there, who was proposed to be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, but after the Union Law Minister had pointed out certain difficulties in the chain of the connected transfers, the Chief Justice of India gave a fresh thought to the problem and by about December 20, 1980 in supersession of his previous proposals the Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri M. M. Ismail Chief Justice of the Madras High Court should be transferred as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and Shrl K.B.N . .", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "7-12-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1646553, "end_char": 1646562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPOTTS [1982] 2 s.c.:l.t\n\n Reading items (a) to (e) above; and particularly the selfoontained comprehensive affidavit of Shri K.B.N. Singh, counteraffidavit of the Chief Justice of India and rejoinder-affidavit of Shri K. B. N. Singh in reply thereto together and proceeding on the basis of points of convergence only and excluding or ignoring the points of divergence between ihem arising from their respective affidavits, the following additional facts or aspects emerge very clearly :\n\n(6) that much prior to his suggesting the transfer of Shri\n\nK.B.N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan High Court on 7-12-1980, the Chief Justice of India had paid a visit to Patna High Court in February, 1980 after disclosing to Shri K.B.N. Singh the purpose of his visit and had during thafvisit met on February 24, 25 and 26, 1980 the Hon'ble Judges of that High Court and the Members of that Bar individually, the Members of the Advocates' Association collectively and the Judges of the District Court at Patna and held discussions with them, and on his objective assessment of the situation and the data collected he concluded that dissatifactory working conditions obtained in the High Court;\n\n(7) that in regard to the proposai to transfer Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh from Patna to Madras High Court, Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh and the Chief Jm; tice of India had discussions with each other on two occasions-one on the 5th January, 1980 over phone and the other on January 8, 1981 at the residence of the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "February 24, 25 and 26, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1646741, "end_char": 1646769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPOTTS [1982] 2 s.c.:l.t\n\n Reading items (a) to (e) above; and particularly the selfoontained comprehensive affidavit of Shri K.B.N. Singh, counteraffidavit of the Chief Justice of India and rejoinder-affidavit of Shri K. B. N. Singh in reply thereto together and proceeding on the basis of points of convergence only and excluding or ignoring the points of divergence between ihem arising from their respective affidavits, the following additional facts or aspects emerge very clearly :\n\n(6) that much prior to his suggesting the transfer of Shri\n\nK.B.N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan High Court on 7-12-1980, the Chief Justice of India had paid a visit to Patna High Court in February, 1980 after disclosing to Shri K.B.N. Singh the purpose of his visit and had during thafvisit met on February 24, 25 and 26, 1980 the Hon'ble Judges of that High Court and the Members of that Bar individually, the Members of the Advocates' Association collectively and the Judges of the District Court at Patna and held discussions with them, and on his objective assessment of the situation and the data collected he concluded that dissatifactory working conditions obtained in the High Court;\n\n(7) that in regard to the proposai to transfer Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh from Patna to Madras High Court, Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh and the Chief Jm; tice of India had discussions with each other on two occasions-one on the 5th January, 1980 over phone and the other on January 8, 1981 at the residence of the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "S.B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1649451, "end_char": 1649463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt about 7.30 p.m. the proposed transfer was further discussed and when during the discussion the question of his mother's advance age and illness cropped up, the Chief Justice of India told him that he was unable to agree with his view on the matter as there were other dependable persons in his family who could look after his mother, that in any case his brother Shri S.B.N. Singh, who was practising in the High Court, was quite capable of looking after his mother, to which Shri K.B.N. Singh replied that his mother had a special attachment to him and that he could not leave her to the care of his brother and other members of the family; during the discussion Shri K.B.N. Singh told the Chief Justice of India that it was possible that baseless compla.ints, which were the bane of Bihar, might have been made to him, and if so, he would like to remove any wrong impression tha.t might have been created, whereupon the Chief Justice of India told him that he never went by baseless ccmplaints and he did not believe that his (Shri K.B.N. Singh's) conduct was blame-worthy but that if he wanted to explain any matter, which according to him, had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court, he was free to do so; further, during the dis cussion the Chief Justice of India assured him that he\n\n984'.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "3rd, 4th and 6th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1653422, "end_char": 1653452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Courts the Union Law Minister had ascertained the views of the concerned Chief Ministers, namely, the Chief Minister of Madras, the Chief Minister of Kerala and the Chief Minister of Bihar on 3rd, 4th and 6th January, 1981 respectively, in the matter of the proposed transfers;\n\n(10) that the effective decision on the impugned transfer was taken by ."}}, {"text": "9th January, 198·1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1653604, "end_char": 1653622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Prime Minister on 9th January, 198·1 whereafter the necessary and relevant papers were forwarded to the President of India and the impugned Notification was issued on 19th January, 1981."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1656514, "end_char": 1656531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the impugned transfer order in the ultimate analysis is of the transferring authority (the President) this Court wanted to know from the learned Solicitor General as to what were the reasons which prompted the transferring authority to pass the impugned order and therefore, a clarification was invited, but the statement that was made by him on November 12, 1981, o( course, under instructions from proper quarters, instead of clarify- 'ing the position made it more puzzling."}}, {"text": "Nov.ember, 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1658288, "end_char": 1658307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this was intended to be conveyed by the statement of 'Nov.ember, 12, 1981 has been made clear by the learned Solicitor General later on, for, in his written note filed before this Court on November 18, 1981, he has made the following categorical statement : \"The impugned transfer, though not in pursuance."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1658751, "end_char": 1658759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1658911, "end_char": 1658919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1659317, "end_char": 1659325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1659975, "end_char": 1659983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.R.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1661142, "end_char": 1661154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place it has been urged that merely asserting that the said transrer has been made in public interest without categorising the public interest served thereby would be of no avail; and secondly, it is clear on record that during his visit to Patna in February, 1980 the Chief Justice of India had collected some data and information which showed that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to Sbri K.B.N. Singh and this bad created considerable misunderstanding and dissatisfaction in the working of the High Court which seems to have necessitated or justified Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer and this certainly implies some reflection on Shri K.R.N. Singh's behaviour and the inference is inescapable that the transfer is by way of punishment and that too is made without disclosing the data or particulars to him amounting to unfair-play.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Sbri K.B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1662352, "end_char": 1662369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Actually two categories of public interest have been indicated by the Chief Justice of India in bis counter-affidavit; so far as the shifting of Shri K.B.N. Singh from Patna High Court is concerned the reason indicated is that cert.ain persons were exploiting their proximity to Shri K.B.N. Singh which had created considerable misunderstanding and dissatification in the working of the High Court and surely reinedying dissatisfactory working conditions in a High Court serves one kind of high public interest; and so far as his posting at Madras High Court is concerned, the Chief iustice of India felt that it would be in fitness of things that an experienced and senior Chief Justice like Sbri K.B.N. Singh be posted as the Chief Justice of one of the premier High Courts in the country.", "canonical_name": "Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met"}}, {"text": "lridia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1665847, "end_char": 1665853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether there has been full and effective consultation between the transferring authority (the President) and the Chief Justice of lridia it is true that a mere recital in the\n\n990 ."}}, {"text": "19th Jnuary, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1665970, "end_char": 1665987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "StJl>REME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 S, C, ll\n\nimpugned Notification dated 19th Jnuary, 1981 about such consultation will not be of much avail especially wheh the factum of such full and effective consultation has been put in issue but here the contesting respondents' case on that aspect does not rest merely on the recital to be found in the impugned Notification but they have produced sufficient material on record to show that there was full and effective consultation as contemplated by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1666388, "end_char": 1666396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sbri K. B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1666639, "end_char": 1666658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri K. B. N. Singh obviously has no personal knowledge and one will have to consider what one or both the parties to the consultative process have to say on the matter.", "canonical_name": "Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met"}}, {"text": "September 29, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1667456, "end_char": 1667474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keeping the recital •about the consultation with him that is to be found in the impugned Notification aside, t11ere is a positive statement on oath made by the Chief Justice of India in his counter-affidavit dated September 29, 1981 that there was full and effective consultation between him and the ."}}, {"text": "K, B.N .. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1667777, "end_char": 1667792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President of India on the question of Shri K.B.N. Singh's transfer from Patna to Madras and that every relevant aspect of that question, which would include the language difficulty involved as well as the personal difficulty of Shri K, B.N .. Singh, was discussed by him fully with the President both before and after he had proposed the transfer and it is obvious that this statement of the Chief Justice of India partakes of the character of the evidence seeking to prove the factum and contents of the consultation.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1668712, "end_char": 1668730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presumably basing himself on this correspondence file\n\nShri Kankan in his counter-affidavit dated September 24, 1981 has\n\n."}}, {"text": "Union Law Minister", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1669324, "end_char": 1669342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that the data collected by the Chief Justice of India during his visit to Patna High Court in February, 1980 does not seem to have been placed before either the Union Law Minister or the Prime Minister but such an argument has to be rejected because the Chief Justice of India's letter dated December 7, 1980 to the Union Law Minister,· wherein the referenct to the col.lection of such data by the Chief Justice of India as a result of his discussion ."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1669884, "end_char": 1669900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with several lawyers and Judges of the concerned High Courts and to his having considered the same with greatest objectivity has been made, itself states ' that the same was written \"in furtherance of\" the discussion which both of them had on the previous day i.e. on December 6, 1980, on many an impt>rtant matter concerning the High Courts."}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1673426, "end_char": 1673437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1673558, "end_char": 1673570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1676290, "end_char": 1676301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1676531, "end_char": 1676542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1677519, "end_char": 1677531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 22Z(l) and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1681513, "end_char": 1681535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1682235, "end_char": 1682240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DESAI, J.\n\nMarch 18, 1981, till law courts and lawyers in their present form and structure survive, would be remembered as a day that raised storm of controversy leading to a spate of writ peti-tions in different High Courts in the country.", "canonical_name": ".Desai"}}, {"text": "Allahabad !Jigh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1683179, "end_char": 1683200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the first salvo was fired by Shri S.P. Gupta, Advocate practising in the Allahabad !"}}, {"text": "President of India, Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1683268, "end_char": 1683302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad High Court impleading President of India, Union of India, Chief Justice of.", "canonical_name": "President of India, Union of India"}}, {"text": "Governor of\n\nUttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1684044, "end_char": 1684070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent I, President of India, Respondent 3, Chief Justice of India and Respondent 5, Governor of\n\nUttar Pradesh .were subsequently dropped and their names from the array of respondents were deleted."}}, {"text": "J.L. Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1684732, "end_char": 1684742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This short-term extension presumably provoked Shri J.L. Kalra and some others, practising advocates, to file Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "N.N.\n\nGoswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1685038, "end_char": 1685051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of prayers have been made in this petition, one C which deserves mention is that a direction be issued that Shri N.N.\n\nGoswami, Shri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N. Vohra, three additional judges of the High Court of Delhi be appointed as permanent judges and a further direction that the term of Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges functioning in the same Court be extended for a period of two years.", "canonical_name": "N.N.\n\nGoswami"}}, {"text": "Sultan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1685058, "end_char": 1685070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of prayers have been made in this petition, one C which deserves mention is that a direction be issued that Shri N.N.\n\nGoswami, Shri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N. Vohra, three additional judges of the High Court of Delhi be appointed as permanent judges and a further direction that the term of Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges functioning in the same Court be extended for a period of two years.", "canonical_name": "Sultan Singh"}}, {"text": "May 1, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1685373, "end_char": 1685384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order made by this Court on May 1, 1981, his writ petition stood transferred to this Court and is registered as Transferred Case No."}}, {"text": "March 18, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1685550, "end_char": 1685563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a sequel io the issuance of the impugned circular dated March 18, 198 J , a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of western India was held at Bombay on April 3, where a resolution was adopted questioning the propriety of obtainin:i the consent of additional judges to be appoined as permanent judges in F other High Courts in advance and further resolved to lodge a strong protest with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1686035, "end_char": 1686048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. similar resolution appears to be adopted by the Bombay Bar Association at its Extraordinary General Meeting held on April 7, 1981."}}, {"text": "Iqbal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1686066, "end_char": 1686071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately Shri Iqbal\n\nM. Chagla and three other advocates filed a Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. Chagla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1686073, "end_char": 1686082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately Shri Iqbal\n\nM. Chagla and three other advocates filed a Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "M. Chagla"}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1686868, "end_char": 1686907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led to filing of an appeal by Union of India before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "April 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1687346, "end_char": 1687360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I in the High Court of Delhi on April 22, 1981, im.pleading initially Union of India as the sole respondent."}}, {"text": "P.K. Kathpalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1687481, "end_char": 1687495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that subsequently the Law Minister and one Mr. P.K. Kathpalia, Additional Secretary, Department of Justice were impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively."}}, {"text": "R.K.\n\nGarg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1688161, "end_char": 1688171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of the two additional judges so impleaded respondent 5 Shri S.N. Kumar has participated in the proceedings and has appeared through his counsel Shri R.K.\n\nGarg.", "canonical_name": "R.K.\n\nGarg"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1689302, "end_char": 1689313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1689677, "end_char": 1689688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1689853, "end_char": 1689865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1690573, "end_char": 1690587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1691364, "end_char": 1691375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1692207, "end_char": 1692218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H.R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1693793, "end_char": 1693804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Support was drawn for this statement from the 14th Report of the Law Commission and from the latest 80th Report of the Law Commission presided over by Mr. H.R. Khanna and from the study group set up by the Administrative Reforms Commission.", "canonical_name": "H. R. Khanna"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1694106, "end_char": 1694117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1695353, "end_char": 1695366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had not recommended Shri S. N. Kumar for appointment as additional judge after expiry of his initial term of two years on March 6, 1981."}}, {"text": "June 6, 198i", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1695471, "end_char": 1695483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incorrect averment in the petition has found its place in an order made by' the vacation Judge on June 6, 198i."}}, {"text": "July 6, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1695956, "end_char": 1695968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As almost identical contentions have been raised by Mr. Kankan in the various affidavits filed by him in every case, it is not necessary to recapitulate them here except recalling one averment made in his counter affidavit filed on July 6, 1981, in reply to the petition filed by Sbri Iqbal M. Chagla and others in Bombay High Court because it was the subject matter of debate."}}, {"text": "Iqbal M. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1696009, "end_char": 1696024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As almost identical contentions have been raised by Mr. Kankan in the various affidavits filed by him in every case, it is not necessary to recapitulate them here except recalling one averment made in his counter affidavit filed on July 6, 1981, in reply to the petition filed by Sbri Iqbal M. Chagla and others in Bombay High Court because it was the subject matter of debate.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "Articles 217, 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1696858, "end_char": 1696875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "O.N. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1697177, "end_char": 1697187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first group of cases the question of construction of Articles 217, 224 and other connected articles prominently figured in the context of circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, seeking consent of additional judges for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, },) 1003\n\nbeing appointed as permanent judges in ot, her High Courts and the short term extensions given to Shri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court and the final non-appointment of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "S.B. Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1697214, "end_char": 1697222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first group of cases the question of construction of Articles 217, 224 and other connected articles prominently figured in the context of circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, seeking consent of additional judges for\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, },) 1003\n\nbeing appointed as permanent judges in ot, her High Courts and the short term extensions given to Shri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court and the final non-appointment of Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar.", "canonical_name": "S. B. Wad"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697550, "end_char": 1697561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697788, "end_char": 1697799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1698202, "end_char": 1698213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1698396, "end_char": 1698407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1698466, "end_char": 1698474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1698493, "end_char": 1698504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1698815, "end_char": 1698826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 217 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1699726, "end_char": 1699746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1699777, "end_char": 1699789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1699926, "end_char": 1699949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703195, "end_char": 1703209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1703217, "end_char": 1703246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1703339, "end_char": 1703343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Taking cue from the Act of Settlement of the United Kingdom and section 220(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, whereby tenure of judges was altered from King's pleasure to one during .good behaviour in U.K. and."}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703369, "end_char": 1703383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703388, "end_char": 1703399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 202(3)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703526, "end_char": 1703543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 112(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703548, "end_char": 1703559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 203(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703827, "end_char": 1703841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 113(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703846, "end_char": 1703857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704220, "end_char": 1704231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704245, "end_char": 1704253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 125(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704262, "end_char": 1704273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704330, "end_char": 1704338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704343, "end_char": 1704351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704440, "end_char": 1704451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704510, "end_char": 1704518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704867, "end_char": 1704878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704888, "end_char": 1704899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1704904, "end_char": 1704912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1705224, "end_char": 1705232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "oflndia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1705260, "end_char": 1705267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "229 and upon the Chief Justice oflndia under Article 146 and conditions of service of the officers and servants of High Court as well as officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the Chief Justice of India, as the case may be, but in each case this power is to be exercised subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of any State or the Parliament, as the case may be, and in case of rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pension would require in case of High Court the approval of the Governor of the State and in case of Supreme Court approval of the President. ·", "canonical_name": "ofllndia"}}, {"text": "Article 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1705274, "end_char": 1705285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1705923, "end_char": 1705934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Granville Austin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1707917, "end_char": 1707933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the beacon of the judiciary were to remain bright, the courts must be above reproach, free from coercion and from political influence' (see The Indian Constitution--Cornerstone of a Nation by Granville Austin, pp.", "canonical_name": "Glanville Austin"}}, {"text": "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1707948, "end_char": 1707972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel tersely observed that the judiciary should be above suspicion and should be above party influence."}}, {"text": "A:rnbedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1708076, "end_char": 1708086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. A:rnbedkar concluded the debate saying that there would be ng difference gf opinion that the judiciary had to be independent of the executive\".", "canonical_name": "A:rnbedkar"}}, {"text": "S. Murtaza Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1708327, "end_char": 1708347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In another judgment forming part of the majority vie.w, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali at p. 485, after referring to various provisions of the Constitution, observed that \"these muniments highlight the concern of the founding fathers for judicial insulation, a sort of Monroe doctrine\".", "canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*"}}, {"text": "Bhagwatl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1708838, "end_char": 1708846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Bhagwatl in his dissenting judgment at p. 473 observed that 'independence of judiciary was held to be a part of our ancient tradition which has produced great judges in the past and judicial independence is prized as, a basic .", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "StJPlltlME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1709312, "end_char": 1709328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1008 StJPlltlME COURT tlEPOll."}}, {"text": "Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1710888, "end_char": 1710895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabji reinforced the conclusion reached in Mr. Sheth case that independence of jud; ciary is the fighting faith of the founding fathers when he drew our attention to 'the Government of Canada' by Dawson, 2nd edn.", "canonical_name": "Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Government of Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1711061, "end_char": 1711081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabji reinforced the conclusion reached in Mr. Sheth case that independence of jud; ciary is the fighting faith of the founding fathers when he drew our attention to 'the Government of Canada' by Dawson, 2nd edn."}}, {"text": "Shetreat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1713305, "end_char": 1713313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attention was also drawn to 'Judges on Trial' by Shetreat, E 1976 Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1713441, "end_char": 1713445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and after reading out the struggle for judicial independence, p<'inted reference was made to the fact that since Coke's disgrace 'the Crown could no longer expect to obtain the moral support which it had hitherto received from decisions pronounced by the Bench of the judges who were comparatively at least, with the men who held office subsequently to Coke's disgrace, indepen- F dent of the favours and the anger of the Crown'.", "canonical_name": "Coke"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1714264, "end_char": 1714277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power of appointment of High Court Judges and the Judges of the Supreme\n\nourt vests in the Presidept nd the President bein¥ a contitution~\n\nHHO stJPR.ilMll coutti 11.litioitts Ii ~82i 2 s.c.k."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1714792, "end_char": 1714799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715001, "end_char": 1715011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715013, "end_char": 1715024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme . Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1715110, "end_char": 1715125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 133 (3) confers power on the Parliament to enact a law enlarging the jurisdiction of the Supreme ."}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715128, "end_char": 1715139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 138", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715281, "end_char": 1715292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715393, "end_char": 1715404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715558, "end_char": 1715565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715568, "end_char": 1715579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 225, 230, 231 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715841, "end_char": 1715871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715972, "end_char": 1715983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1716142, "end_char": 1716151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1716460, "end_char": 1716464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conspectus of articles, not meant to be exhaustive, do indicate that Parliament has power to regulate Court's jurisdiction and as Hart and Webster in the 'Federal Judicial System' at p. 317 said that \"the bald truth is, isn't it that power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to regulate rights to judicial process whatever they are and substantive."}}, {"text": "Webster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1716469, "end_char": 1716476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conspectus of articles, not meant to be exhaustive, do indicate that Parliament has power to regulate Court's jurisdiction and as Hart and Webster in the 'Federal Judicial System' at p. 317 said that \"the bald truth is, isn't it that power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to regulate rights to judicial process whatever they are and substantive."}}, {"text": "Chimanlal Seta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1717366, "end_char": 1717380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This in one sense is conceded by Mr. Seervai who led on 'behalf of the petitioners when in his Sir Chimanlal Seta:Jvad Lectures styled : 'The position of the Judiciary under the Constitution of India', he tersely observed as under:\n\n\"The Court is essentially a check of the past upon the present."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1717445, "end_char": 1717466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1723262, "end_char": 1723272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.S", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1724218, "end_char": 1724221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the later months of the Truman Administration, the 12 member committee of federal judicial set up of the American Bar Association has come to play an increasingly significant role in the appointive process of the fderal judiciary in tbe U.S A. but the power still vests in the President whose nomination must be ratified ."}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nM. Jackson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1724784, "end_char": 1724802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ev!!n though tlJ.y§ tp~ power js jn ee<; utiv~ 1 Richard\n\n[19821 2 S.C.R.\n\nM. Jackson in his 'Study on the Machinery of Justice in England', noticed that political considerations have hardly entered the process of judicial selection since 1907."}}, {"text": "Henry J. Abraham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1725590, "end_char": 1725606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Council consists of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice, and nine persons with legal background chosen by the President for a once-renewable term of four years (see The Judicial Process by Henry J. Abraham p. 31)."}}, {"text": "Garner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1725616, "end_char": 1725622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garner, in bis \"Political Science and Government\" at-p. 726 notices tha_t in nearly all countries other than the U.S.A., the judges are appointed by the executive and even in the U.S.A., it is the method followed for the selection of the federal judges."}}, {"text": "Belgium", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1726025, "end_char": 1726032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "107, he notices that in Belgium the judges of the Court of Cassation must be appointed from two lists of nominees, each containing twice as many names as there are vacancies to be filled, one presented by the court itself, the other by the Senate."}}, {"text": "Dean Hal~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1726504, "end_char": 1726513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garner at p. 728 recalls the statement of Dean Hal~ in his study wherein he thus evaluates the system of appointment by the executive : \"Of all the methods of selecting judges, of which we have actually had considerable experience in this country, that of appointment by the executive has unquestionably produced the ablest and most satisfactory courts.\""}}, {"text": "Laski", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1726823, "end_char": 1726828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Laski in his Grammar of Politics, p. 545, notices that there are two methods of selection-election and nomination, and in England where practically all judicial appointments are under the control of the Lord Chancellor the nomination system is followed and there is similar practice in France, Italy and Germany where all judicial appointments are nominated by the executive.", "canonical_name": "Laskin"}}, {"text": "Italy", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1727117, "end_char": 1727122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Laski in his Grammar of Politics, p. 545, notices that there are two methods of selection-election and nomination, and in England where practically all judicial appointments are under the control of the Lord Chancellor the nomination system is followed and there is similar practice in France, Italy and Germany where all judicial appointments are nominated by the executive."}}, {"text": "Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1727127, "end_char": 1727134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Laski in his Grammar of Politics, p. 545, notices that there are two methods of selection-election and nomination, and in England where practically all judicial appointments are under the control of the Lord Chancellor the nomination system is followed and there is similar practice in France, Italy and Germany where all judicial appointments are nominated by the executive."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1727953, "end_char": 1727961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This method is also not fruitful because it leaves the door too wide open for measurement of fitness in terms of political eminence rather than judicial quality and he illustrates this statement by pointing out that Lord Halsbury used his power of nomination to elevate members of his own party.", "canonical_name": "Hulsbury"}}, {"text": "Law Commission of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1728627, "end_char": 1728650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At this stage it would be advantageous to recall that in the 80th Report of the Law Commission of India, it has been frankly admitted that most of .the High Courts to which a refe1ence was made by the Law Commission about the existing system of appointment of judges, have in their replies to the • questionnaire, expressed the view that the existing system is by and large sound."}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1730276, "end_char": 1730287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1730306, "end_char": 1730317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1730408, "end_char": 1730419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1731490, "end_char": 1731504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1972) 2 SCR 33", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1732735, "end_char": 1732750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.P. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1732861, "end_char": 1732871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this cotntext, Mr. S.P. Gupta, petitioner appearing in person contended that much of the evil flowing from the.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1733253, "end_char": 1733263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1733503, "end_char": 1733535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 124 and 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1733972, "end_char": 1733992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978", "statute": "the Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978"}}, {"text": "Shamsher Singh'.s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1734262, "end_char": 1734279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would have necessitated the ascertainment of tho position of the President in our Constitutional scheme but a decision of the seven judges Cons.titution Bll!llch of thii Court in Shamsher Singh'.s case has authoritatively concluded this point.", "canonical_name": "Shamsher Singh'.s"}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1734364, "end_char": 1734371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.N. Ray, C.J. speaking for himself, Palekar, Mathew, Chandrachud and Alagiriswami, JJ."}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1734397, "end_char": 1734409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.N. Ray, C.J. speaking for himself, Palekar, Mathew, Chandrachud and Alagiriswami, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Alagiris.wamy,"}}, {"text": "Article 77(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734992, "end_char": 1735005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1735395, "end_char": 1735399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the debates in the Co?stituent Assembly, Iyer, J. concluded as under:\n\n\"We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executiye and other powers under variou~ articles, shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well known exceptional situations."}}, {"text": "U.N.R. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1736218, "end_char": 1736228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Add to this the consi.stent view of this court that the position of the President under the Indian Constitution is akin to the position of the Crown under the British Parliamentary system (See Ramjawaya Kapur v.\n\nState of Punjab,(1) A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras(2) U.N.R.\n\nRao v. Indira Gandhi,.(3) In the case of U.N.R. Rao, the Constitution Bench held that Article 74 (1) was mandatory and, therefore, the President could not exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers."}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1736263, "end_char": 1736273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sardari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1736717, "end_char": 1736728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6) some observations from which may at first blush seem to support the conclusion reached in Sardari Lal'."}}, {"text": "Shodhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1736819, "end_char": 1736826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, once the decision in Sardari Lal' s case is overruled, observations in Shodhan's case may\n\nbe hardly of any assistance."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 236", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1736972, "end_char": 1736988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 SCR 505", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1736999, "end_char": 1737015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 461", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1737059, "end_char": 1737075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 SCR 294", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1737082, "end_char": 1737098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1737161, "end_char": 1737172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1738592, "end_char": 1738621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1738798, "end_char": 1738810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it would be advantageous to remember that in the memorandum of May 13, 1947, prepared by the Constitutional Adviser for the use of the."}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741176, "end_char": 1741186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741396, "end_char": 1741407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741430, "end_char": 1741441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741610, "end_char": 1741621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1741846, "end_char": 1741865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subarticle (2) provides that before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1742192, "end_char": 1742203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1742742, "end_char": 1742752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1742928, "end_char": 1742942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1743176, "end_char": 1743187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744172, "end_char": 1744182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744666, "end_char": 1744677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744679, "end_char": 1744690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744725, "end_char": 1744736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744805, "end_char": 1744816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744843, "end_char": 1744854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217 and\n\n224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744949, "end_char": 1744969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1745479, "end_char": 1745490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1745702, "end_char": 1745713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1745731, "end_char": 1745742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1746052, "end_char": 1746063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1746065, "end_char": 1746076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1746632, "end_char": 1746643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1746928, "end_char": 1746939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme <", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1746974, "end_char": 1746983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President, resign his office ;\n\n(b) a judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of Article 124 for the.removal of a judge of the Supreme <;:ourt ;\n\n./ 1\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1023\n\n(c) the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to bE a judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to any other High Court withiq the territory of India."}}, {"text": "fifteenth day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1748599, "end_char": 1748628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explanation-For the purpose of this clause-\n\n(a) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be included any period, after he has held any judicial office, during which the person has been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or any post, under th~ Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law ;\n\n(aa) in computing the period during which a person has been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period during which the person has held judicial office or the office of a member of tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of law after ht became an advocate;\n\n(b) in computing the period which a person has held\n\njudicial office in the territory of India or been an G advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period before the commencement of this Constitution during which he has held judicial office in any area which was comprised .before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, within India as defined by the Governl{ ment of India Act, 1935, or has been an advocate of any High Court in any su9h !"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1748678, "end_char": 1748693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749019, "end_char": 1749030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749114, "end_char": 1749125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750101, "end_char": 1750112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750174, "end_char": 1750185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750260, "end_char": 1750271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750364, "end_char": 1750375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750420, "end_char": 1750432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1750435, "end_char": 1750446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1751483, "end_char": 1751494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1753250, "end_char": 1753261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1756664, "end_char": 1756690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1756883, "end_char": 1756894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1757641, "end_char": 1757652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arthur T. Vanderbilt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1758431, "end_char": 1758451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in the \"Challenge on Law Reforms\" (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1955), pp."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1759585, "end_char": 1759596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1760523, "end_char": 1760534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1761043, "end_char": 1761054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1761334, "end_char": 1761345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764506, "end_char": 1764520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764531, "end_char": 1764545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764769, "end_char": 1764780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764796, "end_char": 1764807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764952, "end_char": 1764966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Coui", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1766430, "end_char": 1766442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or merely because Chief Justice of India who opted to come to the Supreme Coui:( and became the Chief Justice of India, his view as Chief Justice of India should have greater weight."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1766623, "end_char": 1766634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767957, "end_char": 1767968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768213, "end_char": 1768224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768441, "end_char": 1768452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768644, "end_char": 1768655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. B. N.\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1768924, "end_char": 1768939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While hearing the petition challenging the transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N.\n\nSingh of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court, Dr. Singhvi appearing for Mr. K. B. N: Singh vehemently traversed the argument of Mr. Garg that the view of the Chief Justice' of India must have primacy and it was aid that no such primacy as is contended for can be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of Ind; a. Specific submission was that if the proposal for transfer is initiated by Chief Justice of India it would be violative of Article 222.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "K. B. N: Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1769020, "end_char": 1769034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While hearing the petition challenging the transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N.\n\nSingh of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court, Dr. Singhvi appearing for Mr. K. B. N: Singh vehemently traversed the argument of Mr. Garg that the view of the Chief Justice' of India must have primacy and it was aid that no such primacy as is contended for can be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of Ind; a. Specific submission was that if the proposal for transfer is initiated by Chief Justice of India it would be violative of Article 222.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Ind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1769120, "end_char": 1769123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While hearing the petition challenging the transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N.\n\nSingh of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court, Dr. Singhvi appearing for Mr. K. B. N: Singh vehemently traversed the argument of Mr. Garg that the view of the Chief Justice' of India must have primacy and it was aid that no such primacy as is contended for can be accorded to the view of the Chief Justice of Ind; a. Specific submission was that if the proposal for transfer is initiated by Chief Justice of India it would be violative of Article 222."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1769382, "end_char": 1769393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1769399, "end_char": 1769410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1769950, "end_char": 1769961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1770760, "end_char": 1770772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1775461, "end_char": 1775472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1776132, "end_char": 1776143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1776269, "end_char": 1776280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1776607, "end_char": 1776618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1777222, "end_char": 1777233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1777236, "end_char": 1777247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1778742, "end_char": 1778753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1778910, "end_char": 1778921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1778985, "end_char": 1778996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1779258, "end_char": 1779268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1779407, "end_char": 1779416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1779466, "end_char": 1779477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1779546, "end_char": 1779557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1779582, "end_char": 1779593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781045, "end_char": 1781056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781103, "end_char": 1781114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781177, "end_char": 1781188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781480, "end_char": 1781491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781536, "end_char": 1781547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1781824, "end_char": 1781849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) An election petition was filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court which in course of time came to be assigned to Suraj'Bhan, J. who had retired on Fe1iruary 2, 1971, but the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, after obtaining previous consent of the President, requested Suraj Bhan, J. to sit and act as a Judge of that Court under Article 224A of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Suraj'Bhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1781897, "end_char": 1781907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) An election petition was filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court which in course of time came to be assigned to Suraj'Bhan, J. who had retired on Fe1iruary 2, 1971, but the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, after obtaining previous consent of the President, requested Suraj Bhan, J. to sit and act as a Judge of that Court under Article 224A of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Suraj'Bhan"}}, {"text": "Suraj Bhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1782063, "end_char": 1782073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) An election petition was filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court which in course of time came to be assigned to Suraj'Bhan, J. who had retired on Fe1iruary 2, 1971, but the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, after obtaining previous consent of the President, requested Suraj Bhan, J. to sit and act as a Judge of that Court under Article 224A of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Suraj'Bhan"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1782124, "end_char": 1782136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vyas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1782251, "end_char": 1782255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the allocation of the election petition to Suraj Bhan, J. the same was being heard by Vyas, J. and when an intimation was ent to the petitioner that his petition was allocated lo Suraj Bhan J. he objected to the same."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1782529, "end_char": 1782540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1782788, "end_char": 1782799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1782933, "end_char": 1782945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1783117, "end_char": 1783129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1783183, "end_char": 1783194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1783202, "end_char": 1783234, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 80A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1783302, "end_char": 1783313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1783449, "end_char": 1783461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784108, "end_char": 1784120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784574, "end_char": 1784585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784650, "end_char": 1784661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1787722, "end_char": 1787733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788801, "end_char": 1788812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788814, "end_char": 1788825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788852, "end_char": 1788863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788908, "end_char": 1788919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788971, "end_char": 1788982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1789130, "end_char": 1789144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1789146, "end_char": 1789157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1789686, "end_char": 1789697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1792154, "end_char": 1792162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1792813, "end_char": 1792824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1792882, "end_char": 1792893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1793065, "end_char": 1793076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1793385, "end_char": 1793388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1793408, "end_char": 1793414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gul>TA v. UNION (.Desai, J.) io4i\n\nwould be open to the Government to appoint him or to appoint anyone else completely ignoring any claim of such an additional judge whose tenure has expired.", "canonical_name": ".Desai"}}, {"text": "April 1st, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1794265, "end_char": 1794280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an emotionally surcharged voice we were told that there were more than 65 additional judges on April 1st, 1980 all over the country whose fate is in balance and, therefore, the Court should be very careful and circumspect in putting such construction on Article 224 which would not leave these 65 additional judges to the vicissitudes of executive smile or frown."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1794424, "end_char": 1794435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795639, "end_char": 1795650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795817, "end_char": 1795828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n1042", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795983, "end_char": 1795996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1796066, "end_char": 1796077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1796106, "end_char": 1796117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1797531, "end_char": 1797554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "J. C. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1797806, "end_char": 1797816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Be that as it may, the Committee appointed by the Government presided over by the 'then Chief Justice of India, Shri J. C. Shah, extensively examined the question of mounting arrears in the High Courts and found that the inadequacy of number of judges in each High Court is relatively a minor factor contributing to the mounting arrears but there are more weighty factors which.are to be tackled with."}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1798712, "end_char": 1798715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1799096, "end_char": 1799107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Frank Purter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1801413, "end_char": 1801425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the admonition of Frank Purter, J. I quote :\n\n\"In a democratic society like ours, relief n:iust come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of people's representatives.\"' (", "canonical_name": "Frank Purter"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1801716, "end_char": 1801727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parkison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1802118, "end_char": 1802126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Obligate the President by a mandamus to appoint adequate numbe1r of judges in High Courts and this intractable problem defying solution would evaporate like the morning dew, betrays woeful lack of appreciation of Parkison's Law that large number of judges may result in further mounting of arrears."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1804766, "end_char": 1804777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1804860, "end_char": 1804871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1804874, "end_char": 1804885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1804990, "end_char": 1805001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1805008, "end_char": 1805019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1805022, "end_char": 1805033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1805665, "end_char": 1805673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1805717, "end_char": 1805725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1806080, "end_char": 1806091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1806435, "end_char": 1806446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1806999, "end_char": 1807010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1807127, "end_char": 1807138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1808183, "end_char": 1808194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1809810, "end_char": 1809821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1809912, "end_char": 1809923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1810110, "end_char": 1810121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1810881, "end_char": 1810892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811113, "end_char": 1811124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 418", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1813797, "end_char": 1813803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Victoria", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1814757, "end_char": 1814774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a corollary the provision contrary to the implications to be derived from the federal character of the Australian Constitution was challenged as ultra vires in The State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth of Australia,(2) wherein the State of Victoria had challenged the power of Parliament of the Commonwealth requiring the State to pay payroll tax upoq wages paid by it to its employees in certain departments claiming that the legislation was contrary to the implications of the Australian Constitution."}}, {"text": "Parliament of Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1817143, "end_char": 1817163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alberta Legislation,(1) it was held that the Parliament of Canada posseses authority to legislate for the protection of the right."}}, {"text": "Canada as contemplated by the provisions of British North America Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1817598, "end_char": 1817667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1818618, "end_char": 1818628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Canada as contemplated by the provisions of British North America Act", "statute": "Canada as contemplated by the provisions of British North America Act"}}, {"text": "must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1818918, "end_char": 1818991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1819273, "end_char": 1819283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act", "statute": "But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1820219, "end_char": 1820225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Examining the submission in th1t case about implied and inherent limitations on the amending power of Parliament, Shelat, J. recalled the statement that the rule is established beyond cavil that in construing the Constitution of the United States, \"what is."}}, {"text": "Ivor Jennings", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1821319, "end_char": 1821332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C In Chapter III, Sir Ivor Jennings in The Law and the Constitution, refers to the conventions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "John Stuart Mill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1821491, "end_char": 1821507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At p. 80, the author observes as under : ·\n\n\" 'Political institutions', said John Stuart Mill, 'are the work of men; owe their origin and their whole existence to human will."}}, {"text": "William Holdsworth,(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1823249, "end_char": 1823270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conventions generally grow where the powers of the Government are vested in different persons or bodies or where, in the words of Sir William Holdsworth,(1) there is a mixed Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1823875, "end_char": 1823886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.\n\nWynes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1823921, "end_char": 1823930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. A.\n\nWynes in Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, p. 29 foot note 20, noticed that in the Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, etc."}}, {"text": "Keshavananda Bharti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1825007, "end_char": 1825026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was how implied limitations on the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution were spelt out in Keshavananda Bharti's case.", "canonical_name": "Keshavananda Bharti"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1825545, "end_char": 1825582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "438-439,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Oppen Heimer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1825954, "end_char": 1825966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conventions are ruks elaborated for effecting that co-operation'.(1) As Oppen Heimer in the Constitution of the German Republic, p. 9, observes, that 'conventions which have already begun to quite a considerable extent, not only to supplement, but also to modify, if not actually supersede express provisions' grow within a short time."}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1826435, "end_char": 1826443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1827047, "end_char": 1827058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1829899, "end_char": 1829910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1830026, "end_char": 1830037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1830364, "end_char": 1830375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1832440, "end_char": 1832451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1832532, "end_char": 1832543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1832578, "end_char": 1832589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1833163, "end_char": 1833173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1833808, "end_char": 1833813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1833967, "end_char": 1833977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1834569, "end_char": 1834580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1834772, "end_char": 1834783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1834827, "end_char": 1834838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1835408, "end_char": 1835419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": 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"start_char": 1837355, "end_char": 1837373, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1838113, "end_char": 1838121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1959] 2 SCR 821", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1839034, "end_char": 1839050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1960) 2 SCR 146", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1839057, "end_char": 1839073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1839251, "end_char": 1839262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840247, "end_char": 1840258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840400, "end_char": 1840411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840468, "end_char": 1840479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1841260, "end_char": 1841271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1841292, "end_char": 1841303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "O. N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1841710, "end_char": 1841721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Mr. S. N. Kumar and Mr. O. N. Vohra, the Chief Justice of India recommended an extension for a period of six months in order to gain time to make inquiries in respect of complaints which appear to have been menio60 SUPREME CoURT REPORtS [19821 2 s.c.i.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1842414, "end_char": 1842425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1843244, "end_char": 1843255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1844937, "end_char": 1844948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846067, "end_char": 1846078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846108, "end_char": 1846119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846337, "end_char": 1846348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846385, "end_char": 1846396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846584, "end_char": 1846598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846817, "end_char": 1846831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847057, "end_char": 1847071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847294, "end_char": 1847308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847534, "end_char": 1847545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847666, "end_char": 1847677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847859, "end_char": 1847870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1848003, "end_char": 1848014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1848129, "end_char": 1848140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1848484, "end_char": 1848515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 320(3} makes consultation obligatory with the Union Public Service Commission or State Public Service Commissions, in respect of inatters specified in the article."}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1850414, "end_char": 1850424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1850483, "end_char": 1850498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1850541, "end_char": 1850555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1851700, "end_char": 1851711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1851783, "end_char": 1851794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1851827, "end_char": 1851839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To recall the words of Justice K. Subba Rao ask them was in R. Pushpam & Anr."}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1852242, "end_char": 1852257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1852520, "end_char": 1852535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853107, "end_char": 1853121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1857186, "end_char": 1857200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1858900, "end_char": 1858914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1859698, "end_char": 1859709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1861267, "end_char": 1861278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "o. N. Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1861482, "end_char": 1861493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There might be differences of opinion as they have surfaced in the case of Mr. S. N. Kumar and Mr. o. N. Vohra.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863421, "end_char": 1863432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863495, "end_char": 1863506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 124 and 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863762, "end_char": 1863782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1864269, "end_char": 1864280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1864918, "end_char": 1864929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1865127, "end_char": 1865138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1865262, "end_char": 1865273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868225, "end_char": 1868236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1868900, "end_char": 1868907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Seervai submitteJ that this Court must avoid such construction of Article 124 which would enable the President to appoint Chief Justice of India without consultation with any judicial functionaries.", "canonical_name": "Seervai E"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868966, "end_char": 1868977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1870228, "end_char": 1870239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1870556, "end_char": 1870570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1871121, "end_char": 1871132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1871694, "end_char": 1871705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1876889, "end_char": 1876903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22/81 and the second filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi and brought before this Court in Transferred\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1073\n\n' Case No.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Sarvashri O. N.\n\nVohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1877341, "end_char": 1877363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two cases specifically challenge the constitutional validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981, sent by the Law Minister, Government of India, to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all States in India, and secondly granting of shortterm extension to three judges of Delhi High Court, Sarvashri O. N.\n\nVohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad, and subsequently not appointing Shri 0."}}, {"text": "S. N. -Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1877450, "end_char": 1877462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra and Shri S. N. -Kumar by not granting them a fresh tenure of High Court judgeship.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "High Court of the. State", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1878339, "end_char": 1878363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circular desired the Chief Minister of each State and the Governor of Punjab to obtain from all the additional judges working in the High Court of the."}}, {"text": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1879257, "end_char": 1879275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitutional validity of this circular is questioned in the petition filed by Shri Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla and Others.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1880555, "end_char": 1880566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March ~. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1889099, "end_char": 1889112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kumar was appointed an additional judge of Delhi High Court for a period of two years by a Presidential Notification dated March ~. 1979.,"}}, {"text": "March 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1890185, "end_char": 1890198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Response of the Chief Justice of India as evident from his note dated March 3, 1981, and his letter dated March 14, 1981, was that he."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1890221, "end_char": 1890235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Response of the Chief Justice of India as evident from his note dated March 3, 1981, and his letter dated March 14, 1981, was that he."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1890883, "end_char": 1890894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 19, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1891175, "end_char": 1891189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To continue with the chronology by the letter dated March 19, 1981, the Law Minister conveyed to the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court the reaction of the Chief Justice of India to the observations made by the Chief Justice for not recommending extension of Shri Kumar especially the charge of Vagueness and requested the Chief Justice to offer his omments on the question of continuance or otherwise of Shri Kumar in the light of the view ."}}, {"text": ". Bven", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1895008, "end_char": 1895014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to 'the other point about Shri Kumar not being helpful in the work of the High Court he appears to have enclosed a statement of disposals of Shri Kumar."}}, {"text": "V.M., Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1897122, "end_char": 1897136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on April 22, 1981, a writ petition was filed by Shri V.M., Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court questioning the validity of the Circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, and in this writ petition, inter alia, relief was sought in the form of a direction to convert 12 posts of additional judges in Delhi High into permanent judges and to appoint Shri N.N. Goswami, Sbri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N.- Vohra as permanent judges and to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court for a full term of two years.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "N.N. Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1897425, "end_char": 1897437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on April 22, 1981, a writ petition was filed by Shri V.M., Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court questioning the validity of the Circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, and in this writ petition, inter alia, relief was sought in the form of a direction to convert 12 posts of additional judges in Delhi High into permanent judges and to appoint Shri N.N. Goswami, Sbri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N.- Vohra as permanent judges and to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court for a full term of two years.", "canonical_name": "N.N.\n\nGoswami"}}, {"text": "O.N.- Vohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1897466, "end_char": 1897477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on April 22, 1981, a writ petition was filed by Shri V.M., Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court questioning the validity of the Circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, and in this writ petition, inter alia, relief was sought in the form of a direction to convert 12 posts of additional judges in Delhi High into permanent judges and to appoint Shri N.N. Goswami, Sbri Sultan Singh and Shri O.N.- Vohra as permanent judges and to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad, additional judges of Delhi High Court for a full term of two years.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "May I, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1897650, "end_char": 1897661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order made by this Court on May I, 1981, this case stood."}}, {"text": "May 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1897774, "end_char": 1897785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter was pending before this Court an Order was made on May 8, 1981, directing the Union of ldia to decide not less than 10 days before June 6, 1981, whether any."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1898132, "end_char": 1898146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the mean time on May 7, 1981, in response to the letter dated April 15, 1981, of the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has written a long letter and which bas been the subjectmatter of intensely ferocious controversy both as to the significance of its contents, propriety of the request contained in the letter not to show the same to the Chief Justice of India and the violation of the constitutional mandate of consultation as prescribed by Article 21.7, in the letter not being shown to the Chief Justice of India enabling him to offer bis comments and takiQg a decision not toITappoint Shri Kumar."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1898531, "end_char": 1898541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1900794, "end_char": 1900818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1408 of.1979 filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Jain Export Pvt."}}, {"text": "Jain Export Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1900823, "end_char": 1900844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1408 of.1979 filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Jain Export Pvt."}}, {"text": "New India Assurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1900857, "end_char": 1900885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. against the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.\n\nHe further states that in August 1980 the same col)eagu_e talked to him and another , colleague joined saying that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Shfi Kumar vis-avis the aforesaid cases and some others."}}, {"text": "Shfi Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1901053, "end_char": 1901063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. against the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.\n\nHe further states that in August 1980 the same col)eagu_e talked to him and another , colleague joined saying that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Shfi Kumar vis-avis the aforesaid cases and some others.", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "ofJndia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1903198, "end_char": 1903205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice ofJndia on May .::1, 1981, enquiring from him whether he had completed his inquiry in regard to the complaints regarding Shri Kumar's integrity and general conduct which the Chief Justice of Delhi High\n\nCourt had discussed with him as mentioned by him in bis letter dated March 28, 1981."}}, {"text": "May .::1, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1903209, "end_char": 1903223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice ofJndia on May .::1, 1981, enquiring from him whether he had completed his inquiry in regard to the complaints regarding Shri Kumar's integrity and general conduct which the Chief Justice of Delhi High\n\nCourt had discussed with him as mentioned by him in bis letter dated March 28, 1981."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1903598, "end_char": 1903603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He requested the Chief Justice oflndia to forward the advice in regard to the continuance or otherwise of Shri\n\nKumar and Shri S.B. Wad.", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1906449, "end_char": 1906457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1906468, "end_char": 1906479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 7, I 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1907785, "end_char": 1907797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And if the answer is in the affirmative, mere failure to show the letter dated May 7, I 981, would not invalidate the decision."}}, {"text": "March 28. 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1908637, "end_char": 1908651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court says in his letter dated March 28."}}, {"text": "Kuinar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1908993, "end_char": 1908999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is further borne out by what the Chief Justice of fndia writes in his letter dated May 22, 1981, that at the meeting between them on March 26, 1981, the reasons which prompted the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court not to recommend continuance of Shri Kuinar were discussed and this discussion included the complaint of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court about Shri Kumar's integrity."}}, {"text": "March 26, J 98", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1911114, "end_char": 1911128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is further internal evidence to buttress the conclusion that everything including all details set out in the letter dated May 7, 1981, concerning Shri Kumar's integrity was the subject-matter of discussion between the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Chief Justice of India at their meeting on March 26, J 98 t. If that be so, the conclusion is inescapable that the consultation is complete."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1911740, "end_char": 1911748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Deihl High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1912591, "end_char": 1912607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If independence of judiciary is likely to be threatened, it may or may not emanate fr.om the executive or from some outside agency but it would be corroded by the action of the members of the judiciary itself,' by internal corrosion, and if proof for this were needed, it is demonstratively supplied by a very improper request made by the Chief Justice of Deihl High Court to the\n\n1086 SOPRB~B cOUkT kilt>ORts [ t 982] 2 S.C.R.\n\nLaw Minister not to show the letter dated May 7, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1915121, "end_char": 1915124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gtneral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1917734, "end_char": 1917741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the learned Attorney Gtneral informed us that 'the Government of\n\nJOSS SUPREME (; OURt REi>otrs f 1982] i s.c.il."}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nJOSS SUPREME", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1917764, "end_char": 1917791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the learned Attorney Gtneral informed us that 'the Government of\n\nJOSS SUPREME (; OURt REi>otrs f 1982] i s.c.il."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1919298, "end_char": 1919309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1919317, "end_char": 1919338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1919445, "end_char": 1919456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "lustic", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1919516, "end_char": 1919522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the body of the petition it was averred that President of India in exercise of the power conferred by Article 222 (I) of the Constitution has made an order transferring Mr. lustic!"}}, {"text": "M.M.\n\nIsmail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1919525, "end_char": 1919537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M.\n\nIsmail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice, Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1919735, "end_char": 1919746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. Balakrishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1919960, "end_char": 1919974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question posed was whether the power to transfer a Judge of a High Court conferred on the P.resident under Article 222 can be used to defeat the right of puisne judges of the High Court to be considered for the post of Chief Justice of the High Court wherein a vacancy may have occurred, It was averred that on the elevation of Mr. V. Balakrishna Eradi, the then Chief Justice of Kerala High Court to."}}, {"text": "Subramania Poti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1920278, "end_char": 1920293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bench of the Supreme Court of India, the office of Chief Justice, Kerala High Court has been rendered vacant and other considerations being equal, the next senior-most pui°me judge who should legitimately occupy the same office is Mr.\n\nJustice Subramania Poti or any other judge of the Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "Subramanian Poti"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920387, "end_char": 1920398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1921322, "end_char": 1921333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1921602, "end_char": 1921613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 4, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1921725, "end_char": 1921741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further declaration was sought that the transfers\nof Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chief J, ustice K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras and Kerala respectively being not in public interest and also pecause Article 222 does not confer ariy power to transfer a Chief Justice, is unconstitutional by an order made by this Court -on February 4, 1981, from amongst those sought to be arrayed as respondents, the prayer to join Mr. M.M. Ismail and Mr. K.B.N . ."}}, {"text": "K.B.N . . singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1921842, "end_char": 1921857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further declaration was sought that the transfers\nof Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chief J, ustice K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras and Kerala respectively being not in public interest and also pecause Article 222 does not confer ariy power to transfer a Chief Justice, is unconstitutional by an order made by this Court -on February 4, 1981, from amongst those sought to be arrayed as respondents, the prayer to join Mr. M.M. Ismail and Mr. K.B.N . .", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1922068, "end_char": 1922079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.~.N. Sin?h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1923123, "end_char": 1923135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his 9ourt, hfi K.~.N. Sin?h applied for tran~-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 2 S.C.l.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "K B.N. Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1923290, "end_char": 1923302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "posing him from the array of respondents as petitioner and the same having been granted, Shri K B.N. Singh is now petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1923378, "end_char": 1923390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, in this case and be is represented by counsel Dr. L.M. Singhvi.", "canonical_name": "L; M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "P. Subramaniam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1924040, "end_char": 1924054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One P. Subramaniam filed Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "P. Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Article 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1924493, "end_char": 1924504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. Rajappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1924861, "end_char": 1924871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One A. Rajappa, an Advocate of Madras, filed Writ P.etition No.", "canonical_name": "A. Rajappa"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1925097, "end_char": 1925108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1925400, "end_char": 1925412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B .. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1927558, "end_char": 1927573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further stated that the Chief Justice of India while making recommendations for transfers pointed out that he had met several lawyers and judges of the concerned High Courts and expressed the view F that on the basis of data which he collected and which he had considered with greatest objectivity, Shri K.B .. N. Singh should be transferred.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1927656, "end_char": 1927667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1927838, "end_char": 1927843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Denying the averment of Shri K.B.N. Singh that trans- G fer was based on considerations which are not genuine and germane, it was stated that Shri Singh has given no basis for his averment that the transfer order i' likely to have been made because either the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India or the President of India or both of them have been misled by interested parties.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "I.N. Chaturvedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1928453, "end_char": 1928468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1982] 2 S, C.R.\n\nof Shri K.B.N. Singh for disclosure of documents bearing upon his transfer was resisted by Shri I.N. Chaturvedi, Secretary Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Cpmpany Affairs, claiming privilege against disclosure of documents.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1928971, "end_char": 1928984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L.M. Singhvi who led, ably supported by Shri H.M.\n\nSeervai and Shri Soli Sorabjee, put in the forefront the contention that the power to transfer a judge of the High Court is an extra-ordinary power vested in the President, the highest exec'utive in the country, which has to he exercised according to the advice of the council of ministers, if not properly controlled and adequate safeguards provi <led, would render indepedence of judiciary a myth.", "canonical_name": "Soli J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1929770, "end_char": 1929781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.H. Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1929927, "end_char": 1929937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the subject-matter of a very intelligent and enlightened debate in the Gujarat High Court wherein Mr. S.H. Sheth, a judge of the Gujarat High Court challen ged his transfer to Andhra Pradesh High Court.", "canonical_name": "S.H.\n\nSheth"}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1930001, "end_char": 1930007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the subject-matter of a very intelligent and enlightened debate in the Gujarat High Court wherein Mr. S.H. Sheth, a judge of the Gujarat High Court challen ged his transfer to Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "S.H.\n\nSheth", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1930369, "end_char": 1930380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I say familiar because I had the privilege of bearing arguments at the time of admission of the Special Civil Application filed by Mr. S.H.\n\nSheth in the Gujarat High Court and also when the petition was finally beard.", "canonical_name": "S.H.\n\nSheth"}}, {"text": "S.H. Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1930552, "end_char": 1930562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against the decision of the Gujarat High ·\n\nCourt quashing the order of transfer of Mr. S.H. Sheth and issuing a mandaus to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the transfer order was heard by a Constitution Bench or this Court presided over by Shri Y; V. Chandrachud, who,\n\n11s the quirk of fate shows, in his capacity [as Chief Justice now is\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.)' 1093\n\none of the respondents in this group of cases.", "canonical_name": "S.H.\n\nSheth"}}, {"text": "Y; V. Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1930742, "end_char": 1930759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against the decision of the Gujarat High ·\n\nCourt quashing the order of transfer of Mr. S.H. Sheth and issuing a mandaus to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the transfer order was heard by a Constitution Bench or this Court presided over by Shri Y; V. Chandrachud, who,\n\n11s the quirk of fate shows, in his capacity [as Chief Justice now is\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.)' 1093\n\none of the respondents in this group of cases.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Friedmann", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1932777, "end_char": 1932786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wish to steer clear of what Professor Friedmann stated, between the scylla of subservience to Government and the charybdis of remoteness from constantly changiag social pressures and economic needs (see Law in a Changing Society by W. Friedmann).", "canonical_name": "W. Friedmann"}}, {"text": "W. Friedmann", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1932971, "end_char": 1932983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wish to steer clear of what Professor Friedmann stated, between the scylla of subservience to Government and the charybdis of remoteness from constantly changiag social pressures and economic needs (see Law in a Changing Society by W. Friedmann).", "canonical_name": "W. Friedmann"}}, {"text": "November 4, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1933588, "end_char": 1933604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was heard by a special Bench of Gujarat High Court which by a unanimous order dated November 4, 1976, voided the order of transfer."}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1933906, "end_char": 1933920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1934255, "end_char": 1934269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1934536, "end_char": 1934544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutional validity of the order of transfer was challenged on the following grounds :\n\n(i) The order was passed without bis consent, such consent must be necessarily implied in Article 222(1) of the Constitution and, therefore, the transfer of a judge from one High Court to another High Court without his consent is unconstitutional;\n\n(ii) The order was passed in breach of the assurance given on behalf of the Government of India by then Law Minister Shri A.K. Sen who, while moving the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, said in the Lok Sabha that \"so far as High Court Judges are concerned they should not be transferred except by consent.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1934795, "end_char": 1934809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. sheth having accepted judgeship of Gujarat High Court on April 23, 1969, on the faith of the Law Minister's assurance, the Government of India was bound by that assurance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel;\n\n(iii) The order of transfer militated against public interest."}}, {"text": "Article 222( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1935387, "end_char": 1935402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1935465, "end_char": 1935479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1936580, "end_char": 1936594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1937210, "end_char": 1937224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1937741, "end_char": 1937752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1940422, "end_char": 1940432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1940626, "end_char": 1940640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1943577, "end_char": 1943588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1943735, "end_char": 1943746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1943935, "end_char": 1943946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cbandracbud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1944025, "end_char": 1944036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of policy transfers which loomed large in the present case, Cbandracbud, J. observed that whether it is necessary to transfer judges from one High Court to another in the interest of national integration is a moot point, but that is a policy matter with which Courts are not concerned directly (see p. 450).", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1945208, "end_char": 1945219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1945603, "end_char": 1945614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1946335, "end_char": 1946346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1946544, "end_char": 1946554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1946595, "end_char": 1946606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1948830, "end_char": 1948839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Selective transfers generally give rise to canards because ordinarily High Court judges are not transferred and as fate as 1963 the then Law Minister Mr. A. K. Sen assured the Parliament that a High Court judge should .", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1949903, "end_char": 1949914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M.r. Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1950057, "end_char": 1950069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stood conclded by the majority decision of the Constitution Bench but as the inatter is before a larger Bench, M.r.", "canonical_name": "H.M.\n\nSeervai"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1950695, "end_char": 1950706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1951176, "end_char": 1951179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1951248, "end_char": 1951259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1951661, "end_char": 1951672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1951751, "end_char": 1951780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1952621, "end_char": 1952632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government oflndia Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1952747, "end_char": 1952775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1952987, "end_char": 1953016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953269, "end_char": 1953280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953379, "end_char": 1953390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953780, "end_char": 1953791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even otherwise Jet me see whether presence or absence of the provision to transfer a judge in the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "Even otherwise Jet me see whether presence or absence of the provision to transfer a judge in the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953857, "end_char": 1953868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even otherwise Jet me see whether presence or absence of the provision to transfer a judge in the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "Even otherwise Jet me see whether presence or absence of the provision to transfer a judge in the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1953876, "end_char": 1953905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953968, "end_char": 1953979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954495, "end_char": 1954506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1954530, "end_char": 1954559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954715, "end_char": 1954726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954745, "end_char": 1954754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954810, "end_char": 1954819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954901, "end_char": 1954910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1954940, "end_char": 1954969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1954992, "end_char": 1955001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1955681, "end_char": 1955691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1955699, "end_char": 1955736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pethick Lawrence", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1955878, "end_char": 1955894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pethick Lawrence explaining the provision pointed out that the transfer of a judge of a High Court'to another High Court was implicit in the provision itself and that the proposal is merely intended to be beyond question what was certainly the intention in regard to it.", "canonical_name": "Pethick Lawrerice"}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1956264, "end_char": 1956275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925", "statute": "the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "This provision was omitted from the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1956443, "end_char": 1956508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act or the Charter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1956636, "end_char": 1956658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1956888, "end_char": 1956899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the Charter Act", "statute": "Act or the Charter Act"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1956993, "end_char": 1957004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the Charter Act", "statute": "Act or the Charter Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1957006, "end_char": 1957035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957242, "end_char": 1957253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957803, "end_char": 1957814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957957, "end_char": 1957968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1958453, "end_char": 1958464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1958554, "end_char": 1958565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "thus transpires that there was a provision in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1958648, "end_char": 1958727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1959244, "end_char": 1959255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It thus transpires that there was a provision in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It thus transpires that there was a provision in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "presence or absence of a power to transfer a judge in the Government of Inqia Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1959396, "end_char": 1959482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1959709, "end_char": 1959720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But presence or absence of a power to transfer a judge in the Government of Inqia Act 1935", "statute": "But presence or absence of a power to transfer a judge in the Government of Inqia Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1959853, "end_char": 1959882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1961120, "end_char": 1961131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1961454, "end_char": 1961469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshvananda Bharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1962216, "end_char": 1962235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on State of\n\nS, P, GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1105\n\nBombay v. Heman Alreia,(1) which decision was referred to with approval in Keshvananda Bharati' s case by Chandrachud, J. (p. 966).", "canonical_name": "Keshavananda Bharti"}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1962495, "end_char": 1962504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1962749, "end_char": 1962760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1963593, "end_char": 1963608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1964220, "end_char": 1964231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1964359, "end_char": 1964370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1964596, "end_char": 1964607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 SCR 735", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1964782, "end_char": 1964798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1964932, "end_char": 1964943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965377, "end_char": 1965388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965551, "end_char": 1965566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965929, "end_char": 1965940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965949, "end_char": 1965960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 25, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1968870, "end_char": 1968887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkar who piloted the Constitution in his speech on November 25, 1949, on the motion that the Constitution as settled by the Constituent Assembly be pssed, adopted the following observation with approval : -\n\n''.Courts may modify, they cannot replace."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1969990, "end_char": 1970001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1970429, "end_char": 1970440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hopefield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1971225, "end_char": 1971234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hopefield describes power and disability as jural contradiction."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1971971, "end_char": 1971982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1972080, "end_char": 1972094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1972208, "end_char": 1972215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) Salmond:on Jurisprudence by Fitzgerald, 7th Edn.", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "Fitzgerald", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1972236, "end_char": 1972246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) Salmond:on Jurisprudence by Fitzgerald, 7th Edn."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1972945, "end_char": 1972956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1973633, "end_char": 1973644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974180, "end_char": 1974194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222( !)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974826, "end_char": 1974841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974932, "end_char": 1974946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1983010, "end_char": 1983021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cliimanlal Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1983849, "end_char": 1983868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my judgment in Mr. Sheth's case, I observed in this behalf as under :\n\n\"I specifically asked Mr. Seervai, taking cue from his Sir Cliimanlal Setalvad Lecture titled 'Tipping the Scales' where he refers to 'reigning favourite' that there is a judge in the High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1984655, "end_char": 1984666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1984726, "end_char": 1984737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1985238, "end_char": 1985240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1988497, "end_char": 1988505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1989778, "end_char": 1989786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1990385, "end_char": 1990393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1990492, "end_char": 1990504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1991138, "end_char": 1991146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1994343, "end_char": 1994351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1995352, "end_char": 1995360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1995794, "end_char": 1995802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1996707, "end_char": 1996714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1998480, "end_char": 1998488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1998511, "end_char": 1998519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1998524, "end_char": 1998550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K.B N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1999083, "end_char": 1999095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two important affidavits are Shri K.B N. Singh, dated, September 16, 1981, and counter affidavit of the Chief Justice of India dated September 29, 1981.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1999864, "end_char": 1999873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only difficulty we experienced is that in the course of discussion some queries emerged and had to be left at that stage because Mr. Parasaran, learned Solicitor-General to whom we addressed our queries, frankly confessed his inhability to help because he did not appear for the.", "canonical_name": "K. Parasaran"}}, {"text": "September 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2000808, "end_char": 2000825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nIn his first affidavit dated September 7, 1981, the only averment worth referring to it that he had not at any titne consented to his transfer to Madras and that no reasons, grounds, questions or materials necessitating or justifying his transfer from Patna to Madras were ever disclosed to him or discussed with him by the President of India or the Government of India or by the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "23rd and 24th February 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2002296, "end_char": 2002323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that such a conference was held on 23rd and 24th February 1980 and that it was inaugurated by the Chief Justice of India is not disputed but what is controverted is that the visit was not specifically for the purpose of inaugurating Conforence but it was an official visit incidental to which the invitation to inaugurate the confernce was accepted."}}, {"text": "B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2006760, "end_char": 2006771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pointed out that Shri s, B. N. Singh, the brother of Shri Singh who was a practising advocate in the Patna High Court was quite .capab!e'of looking after the mother.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2007246, "end_char": 2007251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this reference being made by Shri Singh the Chief Justice of India told him that he did not go by baseless complaints, that he did not believe that his (Shri Singh's) conduct was blameworthy, but that if he wanted to explain .. any matter, which according to him had created.dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court he wa8 free to do so.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "K.C. Kankan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2009178, "end_char": 2009189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In between there are two affidavits, oneofShri K.C. Kankan, Deputy Secretry, Department of Justice, Ministry.", "canonical_name": "K.C.\n\nKankan"}}, {"text": "T. N. Chaturvedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2009405, "end_char": 2009421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. ui-dON (Desai, J.) ni3\n\nJustice and Company Affairs, being counter-affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, and the other by Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of India, specifically claiming privilege against disclosure of certain documents called for by Shri Singh.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "Singh.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2009569, "end_char": 2009575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. ui-dON (Desai, J.) ni3\n\nJustice and Company Affairs, being counter-affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, and the other by Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of India, specifically claiming privilege against disclosure of certain documents called for by Shri Singh.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "M. G. Ramachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2009970, "end_char": 2009988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this order a file was submitted to this Court containing the correspondence between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister, Chief Justice of India and the Prime Minister, and a letter from Shri M. G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu to Law Minister.", "canonical_name": "M. G. Ramachandran"}}, {"text": "Murti Bahauddin-Farooqi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2010898, "end_char": 2010921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a reference to Justice Murti Bahauddin-Farooqi, then Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Farooqi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2011040, "end_char": 2011047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ecommendation bearing on the question of -::onfirmation of Justice Farooqi as Chief Justice is not relevant but as we are dealing with the transfer and as the proposal has emanated from the Chief Justice of India, what were the relevant considerations present to the mind of the Chief Justice of India on the question of transfer have a vital bearing on the final outcome and, therefore, that part of the letter which recites a recommendation for transfer of Justice Farooqi can be taken into account.", "canonical_name": "Farooqi"}}, {"text": "Farooqi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2011968, "end_char": 2011975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viewed from this angle, the statement in this letter that several complaints have been received against Mr. Farooqi, some of which, on verification, seem well-founded, bas a direct nexus to the recommendation that Mr.\n\nJustice Farooqi, then Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir should be transferred as a puisne judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court.", "canonical_name": "Farooqi"}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2012188, "end_char": 2012215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viewed from this angle, the statement in this letter that several complaints have been received against Mr. Farooqi, some of which, on verification, seem well-founded, bas a direct nexus to the recommendation that Mr.\n\nJustice Farooqi, then Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir should be transferred as a puisne judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court."}}, {"text": "K B. N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2013713, "end_char": 2013726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna\n\nHigh Court be trasferred and posted as Chief Justice of Rajastban High Court and Shri Syed Sarwar Ali, seniormost puisne judge of the\n\nPatna High Court should be appointed as Acting Chief Justice of\n\nPatna High Court.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Syed Sarwar Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2013838, "end_char": 2013853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna\n\nHigh Court be trasferred and posted as Chief Justice of Rajastban High Court and Shri Syed Sarwar Ali, seniormost puisne judge of the\n\nPatna High Court should be appointed as Acting Chief Justice of\n\nPatna High Court.", "canonical_name": "Syed Sarwar Ali"}}, {"text": "Mobllmmad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2014068, "end_char": 2014077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the transfer of Shri Farooqi, Acting Chief Justice of J.ammu & Kashmir High Court, Mr. Justice Mobllmmad\n\n' =\\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1125\n\nHamid Hussain of the Allahabad High Court was to be promoted - and posted as Chief Justice of Jammu _& Kashmir High Court."}}, {"text": "Hamid Hussain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2014123, "end_char": 2014136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the transfer of Shri Farooqi, Acting Chief Justice of J.ammu & Kashmir High Court, Mr. Justice Mobllmmad\n\n' =\\\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1125\n\nHamid Hussain of the Allahabad High Court was to be promoted - and posted as Chief Justice of Jammu _& Kashmir High Court."}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2014454, "end_char": 2014468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am fairly satisfied that Chief Justice Satish Chandra should be transferred from .the High Court of Allahabad, but I do not want to express any final opinion on this question until!", "canonical_name": "Sa ti sh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Allahabad Bar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2014800, "end_char": 2014813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During my three days' stay at Allahabad, I will be meeting various members of the Allahabad Bar as also the Judaes of that High Court."}}, {"text": "January 15,\n\n1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2015219, "end_char": 2015236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Satish Chandra's transfer to Patna, in case it is necessary, may be made any time after January 15,\n\n1981 \"."}}, {"text": "M.H. Hussain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2015330, "end_char": 2015342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter thus involves the transfer of Acting Chief Justice Mr.\n\nFarooqi, Mr. Justice M.H. Hussain, Acting Chief Justice Mr. K.D.\n\nSharma, Chief Justice Mr. K.B.N. Singh and a near certain transfer of Chief Justice Mr. Satish Chandra."}}, {"text": "K.D.\n\nSharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2015369, "end_char": 2015381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter thus involves the transfer of Acting Chief Justice Mr.\n\nFarooqi, Mr. Justice M.H. Hussain, Acting Chief Justice Mr. K.D.\n\nSharma, Chief Justice Mr. K.B.N. Singh and a near certain transfer of Chief Justice Mr. Satish Chandra.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Farooqi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2016111, "end_char": 2016118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As far as Shri K.D. Sharma, Acting ChiefJustice of Rajasthan, Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna, Shri Farooqi, Acting Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir, and Shri M.H. Hussain, Judge of Allahabad High Court, are concerned, there was a firm proposal\n\n1126 SUPREME COUil!", "canonical_name": "Farooqi"}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2017699, "end_char": 2017705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that Shri Sharma was inducted as a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in in 1973 while the seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court Shri P. Stihramania Poli was inducted in the High Court in 1969 and that there were five other judges along with Mr. Poti who were inducted into the High Court prior to 1973: If te proposal of the Chief Justi<:e of India was implemented, a fairly junior judge would become Chief J.ustice over his seniors, a thing which would be seriously resented as the imposition would be utterly unjustified, destroying ruthlessly the natural expectations of judges who had accepted Hi1gh Court judgeship between 1969 and 1973.", "canonical_name": "Sharma"}}, {"text": "P. Stihramania Poli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2017829, "end_char": 2017848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that Shri Sharma was inducted as a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in in 1973 while the seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court Shri P. Stihramania Poli was inducted in the High Court in 1969 and that there were five other judges along with Mr. Poti who were inducted into the High Court prior to 1973: If te proposal of the Chief Justi<:e of India was implemented, a fairly junior judge would become Chief J.ustice over his seniors, a thing which would be seriously resented as the imposition would be utterly unjustified, destroying ruthlessly the natural expectations of judges who had accepted Hi1gh Court judgeship between 1969 and 1973."}}, {"text": "Poti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2017941, "end_char": 2017945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that Shri Sharma was inducted as a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in in 1973 while the seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court Shri P. Stihramania Poli was inducted in the High Court in 1969 and that there were five other judges along with Mr. Poti who were inducted into the High Court prior to 1973: If te proposal of the Chief Justi<:e of India was implemented, a fairly junior judge would become Chief J.ustice over his seniors, a thing which would be seriously resented as the imposition would be utterly unjustified, destroying ruthlessly the natural expectations of judges who had accepted Hi1gh Court judgeship between 1969 and 1973.", "canonical_name": "Poti"}}, {"text": "K.D. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2018459, "end_char": 2018470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears this very relevant aspect was completely overlooked while making the recommendation for the transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma to Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "December 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2018833, "end_char": 2018849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This faux pas on being brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India was rightly accepted saying that the Chief\n\nJustice of India \"did not realise that as many as six judges of the Kerala High Court are senior to Justice Shri K.D. Sharma and that makes it necessary to think abont the matter d:fresh\"; and, therefore, by letter dated December 8, 1980, the proposai to transfer Shri K.D. Sharma as Chief Justice of Kerala was."}}, {"text": "K.D. Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2019014, "end_char": 2019025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cancelled and in supersession of that proposal a fresh proposal was submitted that\n\nShri K.D. Sharma be transferred to Sikkim and Shri M.M.S; Gujral,\n\n... _ ......\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1127\n\nthe then Chief Justice of Sikkim be transferred as Chief Justice Kerala.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Sikkim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2019044, "end_char": 2019050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cancelled and in supersession of that proposal a fresh proposal was submitted that\n\nShri K.D. Sharma be transferred to Sikkim and Shri M.M.S; Gujral,\n\n... _ ......\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1127\n\nthe then Chief Justice of Sikkim be transferred as Chief Justice Kerala.", "canonical_name": "Sikkim"}}, {"text": "M.M.S; Gujral", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2019060, "end_char": 2019073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cancelled and in supersession of that proposal a fresh proposal was submitted that\n\nShri K.D. Sharma be transferred to Sikkim and Shri M.M.S; Gujral,\n\n... _ ......\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1127\n\nthe then Chief Justice of Sikkim be transferred as Chief Justice Kerala."}}, {"text": "Gujral", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2019210, "end_char": 2019216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even Mr. Gujral was inducted as a High Court judge five months later than Mr. Poti.", "canonical_name": "Gujral"}}, {"text": "December 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2019577, "end_char": 2019594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next letter dated December 18, 1980, by Chief Justice of India to Law Minister reveals one more fact that before the letter dated December 8, 1980, intimating the cancellation of poposal of transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma to Kerala High Court reached appropriate quarters, the proposal was already processed to the Prime Minister who appears to have approved the same and this becomes evident from a recital in the letter dated December 18,\n\n1980, that having communicated one proposal to the Prime Minister in regard tJ the appobtment of Kerala Chief Justice (Shri K.D.\n\nSharma) consequent upon the impending elevation of the then Chief Justice to Supreme Court, it was some what awkward to withdraw that proposal especially sine~ the Prime Minister was inclined to agree to that proposal."}}, {"text": "December 18,\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2019984, "end_char": 2020002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next letter dated December 18, 1980, by Chief Justice of India to Law Minister reveals one more fact that before the letter dated December 8, 1980, intimating the cancellation of poposal of transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma to Kerala High Court reached appropriate quarters, the proposal was already processed to the Prime Minister who appears to have approved the same and this becomes evident from a recital in the letter dated December 18,\n\n1980, that having communicated one proposal to the Prime Minister in regard tJ the appobtment of Kerala Chief Justice (Shri K.D.\n\nSharma) consequent upon the impending elevation of the then Chief Justice to Supreme Court, it was some what awkward to withdraw that proposal especially sine~ the Prime Minister was inclined to agree to that proposal."}}, {"text": "KD. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2020709, "end_char": 2020719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he had overlooked that Justic~ Shri KD.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Kerala' High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2020759, "end_char": 2020777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharma is junior to as many six judges of the Kerala' High Court and, therefore, his trans fer to that High Court was bound to invite a great amount of public criticism and it would also create administrative problems in the way of Justice Sharma himself."}}, {"text": "K. Bhimiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2021224, "end_char": 2021234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One other aspect in this letter worth noticing is that the Chief Justice of India informed the Prime\n\nMinister that he was trying to explore the possibility of recommending the appointment of the seniormost puisne judge of the Karnataka High Court, Shri K. Bhimiah, as Chief Justice of Kerala High Court In the penultimate paragraph of the letter the Chief Justice of India reiterates that the other proposals, for example, the proposal of transfer of Shri K.D. Sharma, Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court to Sikkim and the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief\n\n1128 sUtREMB COUkT REPORTS (1982J s.C.R.\n\nJustice of Patna High Court to Rajasthan High Court ."}}, {"text": "Syed Sarwar Al~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2022671, "end_char": 2022686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further proposal was that Shri Syed Sarwar Al~, seniormost puisne judge in the Patna High Court should be appointed as Acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. .", "canonical_name": "Syed Sarwar Ali"}}, {"text": "M .M.S. Gujral", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2025386, "end_char": 2025400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They include Chief Justices K.D. Sharma (Rajasthan), K.B.N. Singh (Patna), M .M.S. Gujral (Sikkim), Acting Chief Justice Farooqi (J & K), Chief Justice M.M. Ismail (Madras) and Justice M.H. Hussain, a puisM judge of the Allahabad High Court who was to be promoted, transferred and posted as Chief Justice, Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2025617, "end_char": 2025622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They include Chief Justices K.D. Sharma (Rajasthan), K.B.N. Singh (Patna), M .M.S. Gujral (Sikkim), Acting Chief Justice Farooqi (J & K), Chief Justice M.M. Ismail (Madras) and Justice M.H. Hussain, a puisM judge of the Allahabad High Court who was to be promoted, transferred and posted as Chief Justice, Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2025721, "end_char": 2025728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sharma was first proposed to be moved from Jodhpur to Ernakulam, i.e. Rajasthan to Kerala, from the\n\nHindi speaking belt to an area where Hindi is hardly welcome, Shri Gujral moves from Sikkim to Ernakulam, that is, from Sikkimese to Malayalam and from extreme norh to down south."}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2025732, "end_char": 2025741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sharma was first proposed to be moved from Jodhpur to Ernakulam, i.e. Rajasthan to Kerala, from the\n\nHindi speaking belt to an area where Hindi is hardly welcome, Shri Gujral moves from Sikkim to Ernakulam, that is, from Sikkimese to Malayalam and from extreme norh to down south."}}, {"text": "Gujral", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2025846, "end_char": 2025852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sharma was first proposed to be moved from Jodhpur to Ernakulam, i.e. Rajasthan to Kerala, from the\n\nHindi speaking belt to an area where Hindi is hardly welcome, Shri Gujral moves from Sikkim to Ernakulam, that is, from Sikkimese to Malayalam and from extreme norh to down south.", "canonical_name": "Gujral"}}, {"text": "Sikkim", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2025864, "end_char": 2025870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sharma was first proposed to be moved from Jodhpur to Ernakulam, i.e. Rajasthan to Kerala, from the\n\nHindi speaking belt to an area where Hindi is hardly welcome, Shri Gujral moves from Sikkim to Ernakulam, that is, from Sikkimese to Malayalam and from extreme norh to down south."}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2026457, "end_char": 2026463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ismail moved from Madras to Kerala not very far.", "canonical_name": "Ismail"}}, {"text": "Kshmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2026587, "end_char": 2026593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Farooqi who was first in Kshmir, then sent to Allahabad, brought back to Kashmir,."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2026684, "end_char": 2026694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Hamid .Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2026702, "end_char": 2026725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mohammad Hamid .Hussain moves from Allahabad to Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Indi~", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2027143, "end_char": 2027148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is an the more so because as it will be pointed out a little while latter that the Government of India pm:sibly out of deference to Chief Justice of Indi~, which ought to be the right attitude, had simply abdicated itself and accepted the proposals not for the reasons for which they were made but for entirely contrary and opposite reasons. '"}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2029280, "end_char": 2029294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And this is reinforced when one reads the case of Shri Satish Chandra, Chief Justice of Allahabad because it is suggested by the Chief Justice of India that he is fairly satisfied that Shri Satish Chandra should be transferred but that he will formulate the proposal by reaching a decision after a visit to Allahabad when he proposed to meet various members of the Allahabad Bar as also Judges of the High Court to ascertain the state of affairs in Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "Sa ti sh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Sa ti sh Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2029693, "end_char": 2029709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Shri Sa ti sh Chandra is the senior, exeperienced Chief Justice, that aspect is not to be collected by a visit to Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "Sa ti sh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Sbetb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2032905, "end_char": 2032910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be so because in his leading judgment in Mr. Sbetb's case be bas expressed in no uncertain terms that policy transfers on a wholesale basis which .Jeave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one:sided Governmental considerations are outside the contemplation o(, our Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "Chandr.achud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2034215, "end_char": 2034227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Transfer for these reasons would, according to the view expressed by Chandr.achud, J. in Mr. Sheth's case, be in public interest.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "beth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2034448, "end_char": 2034452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in view of the majority decisio!l iq Mr. $beth's ase, the more objectionable part\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) .", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "Sbri K. D. Sbarma:\"'to", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2035233, "end_char": 2035255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lying the letter by which transfers were first proposed show that all the relevant aspects were not taken into consideration, to wit, proposal to transfer Sbri K. D. Sbarma:\"'to Kerala, that these were not policy transfers because the Chief Justice of India was wholly opposed to policy transfers ; that these were selective transfers in appropriate cases meaning complaints against Mr. Justice Farooqi and the future investigation of complaints against Chief Justice Satish\n\nChandra, and the data collected in coune of enquiry with lawers and judges in respect of other j.udges whose transfer was proposed, that the personal consideration, i.e. the personal inconveniences, hardships and difficulties were to be kept out of consideration, and that the transfers were to be for objective reasons, namely, complaints against the concerned judges, were the governing considerations of the letter and this was operating on the mind of the ."}}, {"text": "Satish\n\nChandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2035546, "end_char": 2035561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lying the letter by which transfers were first proposed show that all the relevant aspects were not taken into consideration, to wit, proposal to transfer Sbri K. D. Sbarma:\"'to Kerala, that these were not policy transfers because the Chief Justice of India was wholly opposed to policy transfers ; that these were selective transfers in appropriate cases meaning complaints against Mr. Justice Farooqi and the future investigation of complaints against Chief Justice Satish\n\nChandra, and the data collected in coune of enquiry with lawers and judges in respect of other j.udges whose transfer was proposed, that the personal consideration, i.e. the personal inconveniences, hardships and difficulties were to be kept out of consideration, and that the transfers were to be for objective reasons, namely, complaints against the concerned judges, were the governing considerations of the letter and this was operating on the mind of the .", "canonical_name": "Sa ti sh Chandra"}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2036876, "end_char": 2036885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is there anything comparable between Ernakulam and Sikkim save and."}}, {"text": "K. D. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2037625, "end_char": 2037637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One additional fact which I only propose to mention and not comment upon is that all the relevant considerations were not thoro\n\nughly examined and analysed befc; ire making the proposal and this\n\nbecomt:s apparent from the fact that a very vital consideration that a junior may not be imposed over a senior was wholly overlooked when Mr. K. D. Sharma was proposed to be sent to Kerala because there were six judges senior to Mr. Sharma who would be puisne judges and over whom he would be the Chief Justice.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Wbeu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2038605, "end_char": 2038609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wbeu a high constitutional functionary like the Chief Justice of India make11 a proposal it is not conceivable tbat the proposal would be made first and the relevant facts bearing on the subject may be collected afterwards and examined and evaluated later on, on a preposition that if it becomes so necessary the proposal may be withdrawn."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2039040, "end_char": 2039051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2041294, "end_char": 2041310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Afterall, when a high con 'titutional functionary like the Chief Justice of India makes a proposal how speedly it is prossed at the highest level becomes discernible from the fact that the proposal dated December 7, 1980, passed though the Law Minister to the Prin; e Minister by December 9, 1980, and was approved by the Prime Minister and embarrassment was felt as disclosed by the letter of the Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": ".K.B.N. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2041821, "end_char": 2041834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incontrovertible fact situation that emerges from reading the correspondence is that the Chief Justice of India made the proposal for transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh in the letter dated December 7, 1980, reaffirmed it in the letter dated December 8, 1980, described it as tentative by saying that the proposal concerning Shri .K.B.N. Singh may wait further consideration by the letter dated December 18, 1980, and affirmed it to be a firm pro-posal by letter dated December 20, 1980, without whispering a word to Shri K.B.N. Singh."}}, {"text": "January S, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2043033, "end_char": 2043048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was for the first time in a telephonic talk in the evening of January S, 1981, the Chief Justice oflndia conveyed the proposal for transfer to Shri K.B.N. Singh, By that time two firm pro- • posals, one a tentative and another final were pending with the Government of India."}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2045196, "end_char": 2045199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.B. Farooqi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2047744, "end_char": 2047756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having settled what ought to be the governing form for transfer the Chief Justice proposed transfer of Acting Chief Justice K.D. Sharma Chief Justice K.B.N.\n\nSingh, Acting Chief Justice M.B. Farooqi and Justice M.H. Hussain Recalling the statement in the affidavit that there was full and effective consultation with the President of India prior to transfer, it has to be evaluated in the light of the contemporaneous written evidence in the form of the Itter of the Chief Justice of India dated\n\n1138 stJPtu!ME cOtJR'r ll."}}, {"text": "December 7, J 980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2048543, "end_char": 2048560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first proposal to t_ransfer Shri K.B.N. Singh finds its place in letter dated December 7, J 980."}}, {"text": "' Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2049170, "end_char": 2049177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The inescapable conclusion is that a firm proponal for transfer was submitted to Government as late as December 20, 1980, and about 15 days thereafter Shri' Singh was told for the first time about his proposed transfer and was invited to inform the Chief Justice of India about his' personal difficulties and im:onveniences.", "canonical_name": "Singhv i"}}, {"text": "January 9, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2049772, "end_char": 2049787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm decision was reached on January 8, 1981 it:ielf because it was stated to the court that the Prime Minister approved the proposal of transfer of Shri Singh on January 9, 1981."}}, {"text": "M M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2052011, "end_char": 2052022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The later suggestion that Shri Singh's transfer was proposed to subserve the public interest, namely, that he is a senior, experienced Chief Justice needed to preside over a premier High Court will not help because there was no question of sending a senior, experienced Chief Justice to Rajasthan High Court and at the relevant time there was no proposal for transfer of Shri M M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2052647, "end_char": 2052658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2052732, "end_char": 2052736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While laying down the parameters of the scope of consultation under Article 222 (1), Chandrachud, J. in his leading judgment of the majority view in Mr. Shth's case approved and affirmed the passage in Chandramouleshwar Prasad extracted earlier.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "Sbri K.B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2053907, "end_char": 2053924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this view held by him he proposed amongst others the transfer of Sbri K.B.N. Singh.", "canonical_name": "Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met"}}, {"text": "Oeneral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2056145, "end_char": 2056152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n•\n\nS.l•. OUt>TA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1141\n\nbecomes discernible when in the course of hearing in response to a query m'ade by the Court, the learned Solicitor-Oeneral made a statement on November 12, 1981, which is material for the decision on this point and, therefore, may be extracted hereunder:\n\n\"Throughout the Government had been of the view that as a policy the Chief Justices of the various High Courts should be from outside their states."}}, {"text": "Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2058519, "end_char": 2058528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A very emotional and passionate appeal was made by Mr.\n\nParasaran to consider these transfers as policy transfers.", "canonical_name": "K. Parasaran"}}, {"text": "Sbeth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2058885, "end_char": 2058890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the light of the statements hereinabove quoted, the appeal must fall on deaf ears,, for, the Government of India had a policy in embryonic stage and the Chief Justice of India was firmly opposed to any such policy be1:ause he is firmly committed to the view as laid down in his majo:rity judgment in Mr. Sbeth's case that policy transfers on a wholes.ale basis which leave no scope for considering the facts of each particular case and which are influenced by one-sided governmental considerations are outside the contemplation of our constitution.", "canonical_name": "Sheth"}}, {"text": "December 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2059169, "end_char": 2059185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He re-asserts this in his letter dated December 7, 1981."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2060608, "end_char": 2060621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference to the statement of the Law Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1980, upon a calling attention motion on the resolution of the Bar Council of India disapproving Government proposal to appoint seniormost judge of a High Court as Chief Justice of another High Court in the country, may be made."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2061742, "end_char": 2061759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then as late as September 3, 1981, the Law Minister informed the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs that he had sought views of the Chief Justice of India on the policy of having Chief Justices from outside as that by itself would considerably."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1981,.m", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2062403, "end_char": 2062423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At any rate, this unmistakable, unambiguous statement of the Law Minister on September 3, 1981,.m:uch after the commencement of hearing in this case in the Court, would remove\nany vestige of doubt that a decision on policy transfers was yet to,\n\nbe taken."}}, {"text": "November Ii, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2062841, "end_char": 2062858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a view expressed but no policy in July 1980, there was no such policy in January 1981 when Shri K.B.N. Singh was transferred, there was no policy as late as September 3, 1981, when the case was being heard and the statement made to this Court on November Ii, 1981, that the policy aspect could still be pressed into service later on, leave no room for doubt that the impugned transfer was not a policy transfer."}}, {"text": "5, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2063394, "end_char": 2063398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And there is nothing to show that between December 7, 1980, and January 5, !"}}, {"text": "Art. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2063974, "end_char": 2063982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 20,\" 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2065224, "end_char": 2065242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the proposal '-forwarded to the Government by the letter dated December 7, 1980, and the letter dated December 20,\" 1980, for transferring Shri K.B.N.\n\nSingh first to Rajasthan and then to Madras, it is nowhere stated what public interest is sought to be served by this transfer.·"}}, {"text": "M.M. 11\\mail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2065749, "end_char": 2065761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit it is stated that consequent upon the transfer of Shri M.M. 11\\mail from Madras to Kerala it was necessary to appoint a senior, uxperienced Chief Justice in the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2066288, "end_char": 2066297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OUf>tA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 1145\n\nwere, of coutse, some cases in which the Chief Justice was brought from outside and the cases pointed out were of Mr. Justice Das sent to Karnataka, Mr. Justice Sarjoo Prasad going to Rajasthan, and our esteemed ."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2066407, "end_char": 2066423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "colleague Mr. Justice R.S. Pathak going to Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Poti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2066783, "end_char": 2066787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the Chief Justice of India accepts unreservedly just and rightful expe'ctations of the seniormost puisne judge to be promoted as Chief Justice when he suggests that Mr. Poti, seniormost puisne judge in Kerala High Court will be deprived of his just and rightful expectation to become Chief Justice on the transfer of Shri K.D.\n\nSharma, and therefore, further suggested that Mr. Poti be appointed in a suitable vacancy as Chief Justice but outside Kerala, thereby, of course, denying rightful expectation of the seniormost puisne judge in that High Court.", "canonical_name": "Poti"}}, {"text": "P.R. Gokulakrlshnan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2067178, "end_char": 2067197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, Mr. P.R. Gokulakrlshnan is the seniorm, ost puisne judge of the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "M M. Isrnail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2067406, "end_char": 2067418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr, M M. Isrnail who was seniormost puisne judge was promoted as Chief Justice, Madras, on retirement of Mr. Ramaprasada Rao in the year 1979 who had by that time to his credit experience of 12 years of High Court judgeship.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Ramaprasada Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2067511, "end_char": 2067526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr, M M. Isrnail who was seniormost puisne judge was promoted as Chief Justice, Madras, on retirement of Mr. Ramaprasada Rao in the year 1979 who had by that time to his credit experience of 12 years of High Court judgeship."}}, {"text": "Gokulakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2067684, "end_char": 2067698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How it became a compelling necessity not to promote Mr. Gokulakrishnan even if Shri M.M.\n\nIsmail was to be transferred, left us guessing."}}, {"text": "M.M.\n\nIsmail", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2067712, "end_char": 2067724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How it became a compelling necessity not to promote Mr. Gokulakrishnan even if Shri M.M.\n\nIsmail was to be transferred, left us guessing.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "July 7, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2067843, "end_char": 2067855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gokulakrishnan was appointed as permanent judge of Madras High Court on July 7, 1969."}}, {"text": "March 20, J 969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2067925, "end_char": 2067940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Poti was appointed as Additional Judge \"of Kerala High Court on March 20, J 969. {"}}, {"text": "S. Sarwar Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2068319, "end_char": 2068332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Mr. S. Sarwar Ali inducted as High Cou.rt Judge on July 6, 1970, was recommended to be posted as Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court on the transfer of Mr. Singh.", "canonical_name": "Syed Sarwar Ali"}}, {"text": "July 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2068366, "end_char": 2068378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Mr. S. Sarwar Ali inducted as High Cou.rt Judge on July 6, 1970, was recommended to be posted as Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court on the transfer of Mr. Singh."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradei", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2069257, "end_char": 2069272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For over 30 years with some few exceptions the seniormost puisne judge was always promoted as the Chief Justice except in the case of Himachal Pradei; h when on setting up the High Court for the first time Mr. M.H. Beg was transferred from Allahabad and promoted as Chief Justice and posted at Simla."}}, {"text": "M.H. Beg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2069333, "end_char": 2069341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For over 30 years with some few exceptions the seniormost puisne judge was always promoted as the Chief Justice except in the case of Himachal Pradei; h when on setting up the High Court for the first time Mr. M.H. Beg was transferred from Allahabad and promoted as Chief Justice and posted at Simla."}}, {"text": "Poti the senionpost puisne judge of Kerala High Court and who is functioning as Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2070228, "end_char": 2070311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of Jndia,.through", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2074357, "end_char": 2074380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of Jndia,.through the affidavit initially of Shri S.M.H. Burney, Secretary, Ministry of Justice and subsequently by the affidavit of Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, holding the same post, claimed privilege on the ground that doctrine of candour demands that the correspondence bearing on the question of appointment or nonappointment of high constitutional functionaries should not be disclosed."}}, {"text": "S.M.H. Burney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2074413, "end_char": 2074426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of Jndia,.through the affidavit initially of Shri S.M.H. Burney, Secretary, Ministry of Justice and subsequently by the affidavit of Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, holding the same post, claimed privilege on the ground that doctrine of candour demands that the correspondence bearing on the question of appointment or nonappointment of high constitutional functionaries should not be disclosed."}}, {"text": "T.N. Chaturvedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2074501, "end_char": 2074516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of Jndia,.through the affidavit initially of Shri S.M.H. Burney, Secretary, Ministry of Justice and subsequently by the affidavit of Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, holding the same post, claimed privilege on the ground that doctrine of candour demands that the correspondence bearing on the question of appointment or nonappointment of high constitutional functionaries should not be disclosed.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075371, "end_char": 2075382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2075390, "end_char": 2075415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075417, "end_char": 2075428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075667, "end_char": 2075678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075721, "end_char": 2075732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2076222, "end_char": 2076232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Viscount Simones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2076797, "end_char": 2076813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the State of Punjab\n\nv. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, (1) Gajendragadkar, speaking for Sinha, C.J. and Wanchoo, J., referred to Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd ,(2) wherein Viscount Simones L.C. deduced the principle which has to be applied in such cases in the following words ;\n\n(1) (1961] 2 SCR 371.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simones"}}, {"text": "(1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2076909, "end_char": 2076925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2077894, "end_char": 2077913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2077942, "end_char": 2077954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2077971, "end_char": 2077990, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sodhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2078978, "end_char": 2078983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view in Sodhi's case was to some extent diluted by.reference to Conway."}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2079942, "end_char": 2079953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iqbal M. Chagla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2081835, "end_char": 2081850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The oniy point that now remains is whether the petitioners Iqbal M. Chagla and three others in the petition filed in the Bombay High Court, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, petitioner in the petition filed in tbe Delhi High Court and other advocates who have filed petitions in Patna and Madras High Courts have a locus standi to maintain the petitions.", "canonical_name": "Iqbal M •.\n\nChagla"}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2081920, "end_char": 2081933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The oniy point that now remains is whether the petitioners Iqbal M. Chagla and three others in the petition filed in the Bombay High Court, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, petitioner in the petition filed in tbe Delhi High Court and other advocates who have filed petitions in Patna and Madras High Courts have a locus standi to maintain the petitions.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Patna and Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2082040, "end_char": 2082068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The oniy point that now remains is whether the petitioners Iqbal M. Chagla and three others in the petition filed in the Bombay High Court, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, petitioner in the petition filed in tbe Delhi High Court and other advocates who have filed petitions in Patna and Madras High Courts have a locus standi to maintain the petitions."}}, {"text": "P.R,. Madu! Iern\\ld", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2082177, "end_char": 2082196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Attorney General did not raise this quesiion but Mr, P.R,."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2083989, "end_char": 2084000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2084028, "end_char": 2084039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2084293, "end_char": 2084304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J.K.\n\nKalra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2085123, "end_char": 2085134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21/81 arising from the petition filed by Shri J.K.\n\nKalra: and others in the Delhi High Court, Transferred Case No."}}, {"text": "K.]l.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2085525, "end_char": 2085538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24/81 in 'which Shri K.]l.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Madras High Co1Jrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2085695, "end_char": 2085713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 is allowed and the order dated January 19, 1981, transferring him as Chief Justi:ce of Madras High Co1Jrt is quashed and set aside and a manda mus is issued to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the said order."}}, {"text": "A. Rajappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2086187, "end_char": 2086197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2/81 arising from a writ petition filed by Shri A. Rajappa ip the Madras High Court and they accordingly stand disposed of.", "canonical_name": "A. Rajappa"}}, {"text": "Ripudaman Prasad Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2086496, "end_char": 2086518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "312/81 filed by Shri Ripudaman Prasad Singh has become infructuous and would $tand disp.", "canonical_name": "Ripudarnan Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2086663, "end_char": 2086669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qs<; d of\n\nae<:ordinly wi~~ no order s ~Q costs throughot,\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) i!.53\n\nPATHAK, J: Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nP. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2086721, "end_char": 2086733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981, filed by Shri S.\n\nP. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad, as a writ petition challenges the validity of a Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 issued by Shri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs in the Union Goverment and addressed to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the north-eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of Additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "P. Shivshankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2086879, "end_char": 2086893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981, filed by Shri S.\n\nP. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad, as a writ petition challenges the validity of a Circular letter dated March 18, 1981 issued by Shri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs in the Union Goverment and addressed to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the north-eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of Additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087527, "end_char": 2087535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087554, "end_char": 2087562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Murli Dhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2087880, "end_char": 2087890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In particular; he bas prayed for a declaration that three additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murli Dhar, Mr. Justice A. N.\n\nVerma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges and that the Circular letter of the Law Minister is void.", "canonical_name": "Murali Dhar"}}, {"text": "A. N.\n\nVerma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2087904, "end_char": 2087916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In particular; he bas prayed for a declaration that three additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murli Dhar, Mr. Justice A. N.\n\nVerma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges and that the Circular letter of the Law Minister is void.", "canonical_name": "A. N.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nN. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2088313, "end_char": 2088325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra, Shri S.\n\nN. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad for a further period of three months only.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2088335, "end_char": 2088344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vohra, Shri S.\n\nN. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad for a further period of three months only.", "canonical_name": "S. B. Wad"}}, {"text": "J. L. Katra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2088702, "end_char": 2088713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J. L. Katra and a few other advocates filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "C. R. Dalvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2089100, "end_char": 2089111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four advocates•practising in the High Court of Bombay, Shri Iqbal M. Chagla, Shri C. R. Dalvi, Shri M. A. Rana and Shri\n\nil54\n\n( 1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\nI • Sorab K. J. Modi filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "C. R. Dalvi"}}, {"text": "M. A. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2089118, "end_char": 2089128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four advocates•practising in the High Court of Bombay, Shri Iqbal M. Chagla, Shri C. R. Dalvi, Shri M. A. Rana and Shri\n\nil54\n\n( 1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\nI • Sorab K. J. Modi filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "M. A. Rana"}}, {"text": "Sorab K. J. Modi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2089168, "end_char": 2089184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four advocates•practising in the High Court of Bombay, Shri Iqbal M. Chagla, Shri C. R. Dalvi, Shri M. A. Rana and Shri\n\nil54\n\n( 1982} 2 S.C.R.\n\nI • Sorab K. J. Modi filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "Sorab K. J. Modi"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2089828, "end_char": 2089835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. M. fomail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2089894, "end_char": 2089906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She challenges the transfer of Shri M. M. fomail, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "M.\n\nM. famail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2089954, "end_char": 2089967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M.\n\nM. famail has filed an affidavit stating that he has decided not to pro- C•eed to Kerala, nor to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to rietirement by resignation of his office.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "M. M. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2090212, "end_char": 2090224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M. M. Ismail has resigned since.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "High _ Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2090300, "end_char": 2090322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An Advocate, Shri A. Rajappa, practising in the High _ Court of Madras, filed Transferred Case No."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nM. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2090439, "end_char": 2090452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He prays for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Shri M.\n\nM. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna, to the High Court of Madras is void.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2090490, "end_char": 2090510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He prays for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Shri M.\n\nM. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna, to the High Court of Madras is void."}}, {"text": "P. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2090707, "end_char": 2090721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 198( was filed in the High Court of Madras by Shri P. Subramanian, praying for the same reliefs as Shri Rajappa in Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "P. Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Rajappa in Transferred Case No. 2 of 1981.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2090760, "end_char": 2090802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 198( was filed in the High Court of Madras by Shri P. Subramanian, praying for the same reliefs as Shri Rajappa in Transferred Case No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2090824, "end_char": 2090836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two advocates, Shri D. N. Pandey and .", "canonical_name": "D. N. Pandey"}}, {"text": "Thakur :Ramapati Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2090848, "end_char": 2090870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Thakur :Ramapati Sinha, filed Transferred Case No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2090917, "end_char": 2090937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 in the High\n\nCourt at Patna challenging the order of transfer of Shri M. M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Shri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2095469, "end_char": 2095480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2095833, "end_char": 2095844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097040, "end_char": 2097051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097116, "end_char": 2097124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097174, "end_char": 2097182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097398, "end_char": 2097406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097461, "end_char": 2097468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097564, "end_char": 2097572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097657, "end_char": 2097665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097946, "end_char": 2097954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 223, 224 and 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098078, "end_char": 2098101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098244, "end_char": 2098252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098306, "end_char": 2098314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098387, "end_char": 2098395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098517, "end_char": 2098525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098696, "end_char": 2098704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 230", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098783, "end_char": 2098791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098899, "end_char": 2098907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2100516, "end_char": 2100527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2101030, "end_char": 2101038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2101303, "end_char": 2101310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2102042, "end_char": 2102053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2102710, "end_char": 2102721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2102777, "end_char": 2102785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2103185, "end_char": 2103193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2103272, "end_char": 2103280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2103872, "end_char": 2103880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104155, "end_char": 2104167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104394, "end_char": 2104402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104683, "end_char": 2104691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104777, "end_char": 2104786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105294, "end_char": 2105302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105351, "end_char": 2105359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105563, "end_char": 2105571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105753, "end_char": 2105764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106050, "end_char": 2106058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106300, "end_char": 2106311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106605, "end_char": 2106617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106707, "end_char": 2106715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107188, "end_char": 2107195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107541, "end_char": 2107549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107651, "end_char": 2107659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107770, "end_char": 2107781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 74,\n\n23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107956, "end_char": 2107968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2108798, "end_char": 2108806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2108837, "end_char": 2108843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2108845, "end_char": 2108874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2108883, "end_char": 2108889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1971) 3 SCR 483", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2109368, "end_char": 2109384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2109582, "end_char": 2109643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109711, "end_char": 2109717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109989, "end_char": 2109994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Judicial independence under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2110738, "end_char": 2110746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 21, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2110818, "end_char": 2110831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel explained in the Constituent Assembly on June 21, 1947 wben presenting the Report on the Principles of a Model Provincial Constitution : ·\n\n\"With so many checks and -counter-checks these appointments place the High Court Judges beyond any influence of the parties or any other influences and beyond any suspicion or doubt of such a nature."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2111243, "end_char": 2111251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "UNION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2111832, "end_char": 2111837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Pathak, i.)\n\nthe }udge wlll be apoinhid."}}, {"text": "hiin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2113466, "end_char": 2113470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Justice of India has been brought in, and it is apparent that, in virtue of the exalted office held by hiin and the circumstance that he is far -removed from the local pull of influences and the temptations of partisanship, he can be trusted to apply a strictly objective approach to the recommendation proceeding from the High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2114062, "end_char": 2114073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2114420, "end_char": 2114426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2114556, "end_char": 2114564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2115964, "end_char": 2115972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2117016, "end_char": 2117024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2117051, "end_char": 2117057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2117065, "end_char": 2117094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2118371, "end_char": 2118384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the Constituent Assembly Debates a proposal was made by a member that the appointment of Judges should require the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India (although that suggestion was made in connection with the appointment of Judges of the Supreme court), but that proposal was not accepte'd."}}, {"text": "Law Commission of India(2", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2118429, "end_char": 2118454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Commission of India(2) surveyed the machinery for appointing a Judge of a High Court and considered it desirable that the provision in clause (!)"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2118582, "end_char": 2118590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2119254, "end_char": 2119262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2119473, "end_char": 2119481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J.A.G. Griffith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2119648, "end_char": 2119663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The advice of each, the Chief Justice of lndia and\n\n{I) J.A.G. Griffith: The Politi<;~ of Judiciary,'pp.17, 18 •.\n\n(2) Ibid p. 75, • .. ·. . . . .", "canonical_name": "J.A.G. Griffith"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2123481, "end_char": 2123492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2123913, "end_char": 2123921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2124081, "end_char": 2124089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2125719, "end_char": 2125727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2125867, "end_char": 2125875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2126016, "end_char": 2126024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2126556, "end_char": 2126563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2128044, "end_char": 2128052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2131566, "end_char": 2131577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2132226, "end_char": 2132234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2134558, "end_char": 2134566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2135939, "end_char": 2135950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2138513, "end_char": 2138524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2139659, "end_char": 2139667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2140734, "end_char": 2140745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2141368, "end_char": 2141376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2144615, "end_char": 2144623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145326, "end_char": 2145337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145373, "end_char": 2145384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145935, "end_char": 2145946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2147576, "end_char": 2147589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S.N. Kumar was appointed an additional Judge of the High Court of Delhi\n\n0 for a period of two years by a notification dated March 6, 1979, and he assumed charge of his office the next day."}}, {"text": "Sbri S.N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2148402, "end_char": 2148417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly before the expiry of that period, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi addressed a letter dated February 19, 1981 to the Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs stating that while the pendency of cases in the High Court justified the appointment of additional Judges and normally the extension of the tenure of an additional Judge was recommended in the circumstances, he did not recommend the extension of Shri S.N. Kumar because, he said, serious complaints had been received, both oral and in writing, against him directly by the Minister as well as himself, that he had examined those complaints and found that some of them were not without basis, that responsible members of the Bar and some other colleagues had also complained about Sbri S.N. Kumar and that although he had no investigating agency to enquiie conclusively into the genuineness of the complaints the complaints had been persistent.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "March 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2149359, "end_char": 2149372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Kumar was reappointed as an additional Judge with effect from March 7, 1981 for a period of three months."}}, {"text": "28th March,1981,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2152035, "end_char": 2152051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "293HCJ/PPS, dated 28th March,1981, I discussed the matter with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my D.O. No."}}, {"text": "March 2'8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2152190, "end_char": 2152205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "292-HCJ/PPS, dated March 2'8, 1981 a copy of which was forwarded to you."}}, {"text": "New Iti.dia Assurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2154061, "end_char": 2154091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., against the New Iti.dia Assurance Co. Ltd.\n\nIn August, 1980, the same colleague of mine who talked to me earlier and another collague mentioned that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis-avis the aforesaid cases and some others."}}, {"text": "Jetter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2156397, "end_char": 2156403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Minister sought advice from his Secretariat whether the communication of the Jetter to the Chief Justice of India was unavoidable."}}, {"text": "May 22, J 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2159012, "end_char": 2159025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was mentioned in the letter dated May 22, J 981 written by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister."}}, {"text": "7-5·81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2163726, "end_char": 2163732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1183\n\njoined issue, but the details furnished by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in his letter dated 7-5·81 go farther\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2164413, "end_char": 2164421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2164721, "end_char": 2164729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2164899, "end_char": 2164907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2165618, "end_char": 2165676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2165754, "end_char": 2165762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2165791, "end_char": 2165800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2165819, "end_char": 2165823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166081, "end_char": 2166087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166472, "end_char": 2166480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The practice continued under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166820, "end_char": 2166831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2167844, "end_char": 2167852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Shive Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2167965, "end_char": 2167977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) B. Shive Rao: The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Document~\n\nyo1.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nShiva Rao"}}, {"text": "B.R. Ambedkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2168169, "end_char": 2168182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons given by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly for proposing this provision may be mentioned :\n\n\"The Drafting Committee felt that since all the High Courts so far as the appointment of judges is concerned form now a central subject, it was desirable to treat all the judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single cadre like the I.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred from one High Court to another.", "canonical_name": "B. R. Ambedkar"}}, {"text": "I.C.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2168511, "end_char": 2168517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons given by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly for proposing this provision may be mentioned :\n\n\"The Drafting Committee felt that since all the High Courts so far as the appointment of judges is concerned form now a central subject, it was desirable to treat all the judges of the High Courts throughout India as forming one single cadre like the I.C.S. and that they should be liable to be transferred from one High Court to another."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2171844, "end_char": 2171852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2173175, "end_char": 2173183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2173461, "end_char": 2173469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2175597, "end_char": 2175618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2175976, "end_char": 2175984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2176028, "end_char": 2176036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177058, "end_char": 2177066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177236, "end_char": 2177244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177517, "end_char": 2177531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177768, "end_char": 2177776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177845, "end_char": 2177853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177879, "end_char": 2177887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2178190, "end_char": 2178198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2178562, "end_char": 2178570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2178633, "end_char": 2178641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179649, "end_char": 2179657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179925, "end_char": 2179933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2180741, "end_char": 2180749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2180948, "end_char": 2180977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Munster", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2181374, "end_char": 2181381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, it seems to me, was the intent or the speeches made by the Earl of Munster in the House of Lords and the Secretary of State for India, Mr. L.S. Amery, and Mr. Pethick Lawrence in the House of Commons when the India (tvfiscellaneous Provisions) Bill was intro duced in the two Houses."}}, {"text": "L.S. Amery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2181446, "end_char": 2181456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, it seems to me, was the intent or the speeches made by the Earl of Munster in the House of Lords and the Secretary of State for India, Mr. L.S. Amery, and Mr. Pethick Lawrence in the House of Commons when the India (tvfiscellaneous Provisions) Bill was intro duced in the two Houses."}}, {"text": "was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2181786, "end_char": 2181838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2181989, "end_char": 2181994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182110, "end_char": 2182118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182163, "end_char": 2182171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182426, "end_char": 2182434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182720, "end_char": 2182735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was no provision then in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2183179, "end_char": 2183193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2183385, "end_char": 2183393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2183550, "end_char": 2183558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2184007, "end_char": 2184015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2184179, "end_char": 2184192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That had not infrequently been done during the ninety years of the High Courts in British India, and there was no reason why it could not have continued in tle High Courts under our Constitution."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2184388, "end_char": 2184396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2184560, "end_char": 2184568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185090, "end_char": 2185098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185369, "end_char": 2185377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185473, "end_char": 2185481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2185942, "end_char": 2185951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2186134, "end_char": 2186142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2186326, "end_char": 2186334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2186646, "end_char": 2186649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2186985, "end_char": 2186989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2187558, "end_char": 2187566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2188534, "end_char": 2188542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2188936, "end_char": 2188947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2189073, "end_char": 2189081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2189115, "end_char": 2189123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2189677, "end_char": 2189685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2189697, "end_char": 2189723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2189882, "end_char": 2189908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2192385, "end_char": 2192393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2192404, "end_char": 2192415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2193337, "end_char": 2193345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2194100, "end_char": 2194108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2197335, "end_char": 2197343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2198787, "end_char": 2198798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2199918, "end_char": 2199926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2200171, "end_char": 2200179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2200781, "end_char": 2200789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2200861, "end_char": 2200869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2201539, "end_char": 2201547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2201666, "end_char": 2201674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2202961, "end_char": 2202969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2203719, "end_char": 2203727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of\n\nPatna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2203832, "end_char": 2203852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice, High Court of\n\nPatna."}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2204516, "end_char": 2204524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KD. Shara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2207826, "end_char": 2207835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He recommended that Shri KD.", "canonical_name": "K. D. Sharma"}}, {"text": "K B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2210617, "end_char": 2210629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K B.N. Singh replied that bis mother was particularly devoted to him and he could not leave her to the care of his brother and other membersof the family.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "High Court of i\\ladras.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2213695, "end_char": 2213718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the transfer was intended to Madras was occasioned by the circumstance that Shri M.M. Ismail was being transferred from Madras to Kerala and it was necessary to send a senior and experienced Chief Justice to the High Court of i\\ladras."}}, {"text": "S.B.N, Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2213886, "end_char": 2213898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difficulty expressed by Shri K.B.N. Singh in regard to the condition ofliis mother's health was also considered by the Chief Justice of India, who felt that Shri S.B.N, Singh, his brother practising law in the High Court, and other dependable person in the\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 1203\n\nfamily at Patna could be relied on to look after the mother.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "K.B N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2219095, "end_char": 2219107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 18, 1980, the Chief Justice of [ndia requested the Prime Minister that the proposal to transfer Sbri K.B N. Singh to Rajasthan should\n\n<0 [1978] 1 §CR 423.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2219666, "end_char": 2219674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220644, "end_char": 2220652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220686, "end_char": 2220694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Governmf:nt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2222977, "end_char": 2222994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union Governmf:nt, according to evidence before us, has been actively engaged during the last two years in securing an acceptance of the policy from the Judiciary, and discussions have taken place from time to time between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister.", "canonical_name": "Union Governmf:nt"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2226473, "end_char": 2226481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2227215, "end_char": 2227236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh points out that there was opposition by the Tamil Nadu Government to the induction of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras on the ground that he was not acquainted with the Tamil language and would find difficulty in coping with his duties in the High Court at Madras."}}, {"text": "High Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2227444, "end_char": 2227464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for Shri K.B.N. Singh points out that there was opposition by the Tamil Nadu Government to the induction of Shri K.B.N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras on the ground that he was not acquainted with the Tamil language and would find difficulty in coping with his duties in the High Court at Madras."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2228003, "end_char": 2228023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Circular letter was addressed by the: Minister to the Chief Ministers of different States and to the Government of Punjab pointing out that several bodies and forums, including the States Re-organisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Association had suggested that one third of the Judges of a High Court should, as far as possible, be from outside the State in which the High Court was situated."}}, {"text": "High Court of the State", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2228551, "end_char": 2228574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He requested that the additional Judges working in the High Court of the State should be required to give their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court in the country, and they could name three High Courts, in order of preference, where they would prefer such appointment."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2232965, "end_char": 2232973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2234532, "end_char": 2234548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2235400, "end_char": 2235407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2238423, "end_char": 2238436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMIAH, J. This judgment can be conveniently divided in to fourteen parts thus :\n\nI. Jntroduction\n\n' ' II.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2238650, "end_char": 2238658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2238743, "end_char": 2238751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J!enkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2238847, "end_char": 2238861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217 (I) Is the opinion of the Chief Justice of India binding on\n4-\n\n, ..\n\nS.f>, GuPTA v. UNION (J!enkataramiah, J.) 1213\n\nthe President ?", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2239143, "end_char": 2239151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2239220, "end_char": 2239228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2239380, "end_char": 2239388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2239442, "end_char": 2239450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2239670, "end_char": 2239678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sankal Chand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2239860, "end_char": 2239878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Does the majority judgment of this Court in Sankal Chand Sheth's case holding that the consent of a Judge is not an essential condition of a valid transfer require reconsideration ?", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2240170, "end_char": 2240178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.N . . Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2240687, "end_char": 2240700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether there has been any error in the consultation preceding the decision not to appoint Shri S.N . .", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2241656, "end_char": 2241667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2241768, "end_char": 2241780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shriyuts Iqbal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241885, "end_char": 2241899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this cse are Shriyuts Iqbal, M. Chagla, C.R. Dalvi, M.A. Rane and Sorab K..J. Mody."}}, {"text": "M. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241901, "end_char": 2241910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this cse are Shriyuts Iqbal, M. Chagla, C.R. Dalvi, M.A. Rane and Sorab K..J. Mody.", "canonical_name": "M. Chagla"}}, {"text": "M.A. Rane", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241924, "end_char": 2241933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this cse are Shriyuts Iqbal, M. Chagla, C.R. Dalvi, M.A. Rane and Sorab K..J. Mody.", "canonical_name": "M. A. Rana"}}, {"text": "Sorab K..J. Mody", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241938, "end_char": 2241954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this cse are Shriyuts Iqbal, M. Chagla, C.R. Dalvi, M.A. Rane and Sorab K..J. Mody.", "canonical_name": "Sorab K. J. Modi"}}, {"text": "Union Law Minister", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2242063, "end_char": 2242081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 in this case are the Union Law Minister and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2242202, "end_char": 2242213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2243542, "end_char": 2243556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 14, 1981 it is alleged that the Managing Committee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society (representing the Solicitors practising in Bombay who were also advocates) passed similar resolutions and also authorised the petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244113, "end_char": 2244124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244334, "end_char": 2244348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2245507, "end_char": 2245518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2245976, "end_char": 2245987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2246016, "end_char": 2246030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1981 was originally filed in the High -Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court Bar after the Law Minister's letter of March 18, 1981 was written and three additional Judges of the Delhi High Court Sarva Shri O.N. Vohra, S.N.\n\nKumar and S.B. Wad who had originally been appointed as additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from March 7, 1979 were appointed as additional Judges for a period of three months only from March 7, 1981.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "V.M. Tar_kunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2246550, "end_char": 2246564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition to the declaration that the impugned letter of the Law Minister was uncom1titutional and void, Shri V.M. Tar_kunde has requested the Cour1t, among other prayers, to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Government (i) to convert the posts of additional Judges into permanent' posts in various High Courts commensurate with the regular business of the High Courts and arrears in consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court and the Chief Justice of India and (ii) to convert 12 posts of additional Judges in the Delhi High Court into permanent posts having regard to the regular business and the arrears of that Court.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "March 7, I 98", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2247266, "end_char": 2247279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the petition the propriety and constitutionality of appointing the three additional Judges referred to above for a period of three months only from March 7, I 98 I have been questioned."}}, {"text": "July 22, I 98", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2247559, "end_char": 2247572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necesrary to go into certain events and proceedings that took place till the counter affidavit was filed in this case on July 22, I 98 I except the fact that Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar had ceased to be Judges with effect effect from June 7, 1981 as they had not been appointed as additional Judges for any further period and that Shri\n\nS.B. Wad had been appointed as an additional Judge from June 7, 1981 for one year more."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2247680, "end_char": 2247692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necesrary to go into certain events and proceedings that took place till the counter affidavit was filed in this case on July 22, I 98 I except the fact that Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N. Kumar had ceased to be Judges with effect effect from June 7, 1981 as they had not been appointed as additional Judges for any further period and that Shri\n\nS.B. Wad had been appointed as an additional Judge from June 7, 1981 for one year more."}}, {"text": "K.C.\n\nKankan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2247910, "end_char": 2247922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter affidavit filed by Shri K.C.\n\nKankan, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, th-e petition is opposed.", "canonical_name": "K.C.\n\nKankan"}}, {"text": "S.N.\n\nKumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2248306, "end_char": 2248317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This counter affidavit contains more or less similar pleas contained in the counter affidavit filed in the petitio1~ filed by the Bombay lawyers and in addition to them certain further pleas are raised here in justification of the action taken by the Union Government in not appointing Shri O.N. Vohra and Shri S.N.\n\nKumar as additional Judges for a further period and in appointing\n\n• ...\n\n.J.. -\n\nS.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, 1.)", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "0.N. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2248539, "end_char": 2248549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The specific plea with regard to the non appointment of Shri 0.N. Vohra and Shri $.N. Kumar and the appointment of Shri S.B. Wad runs thus :\n\n\"(w) & (x) Shri Justice Vohra, Shri Justice Kumar and\n\nShri Justice Wad were appointed for a further period of 3 months from 7·3-1981.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "$.N. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2248559, "end_char": 2248569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The specific plea with regard to the non appointment of Shri 0.N. Vohra and Shri $.N. Kumar and the appointment of Shri S.B. Wad runs thus :\n\n\"(w) & (x) Shri Justice Vohra, Shri Justice Kumar and\n\nShri Justice Wad were appointed for a further period of 3 months from 7·3-1981.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "7·3-1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2248745, "end_char": 2248753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The specific plea with regard to the non appointment of Shri 0.N. Vohra and Shri $.N. Kumar and the appointment of Shri S.B. Wad runs thus :\n\n\"(w) & (x) Shri Justice Vohra, Shri Justice Kumar and\n\nShri Justice Wad were appointed for a further period of 3 months from 7·3-1981."}}, {"text": "6-6-1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2249727, "end_char": 2249735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After careful consideration of the material available with it and after taking into account the views expressed by the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and after giving full considerations to the views of both, Government decided not to give appointments for a further term to Shri Justice O.N. Vohra and Shri Justice S.N. Kumar on the expiry of their term on 6-6-1981."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tark", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2250473, "end_char": 2250482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his affidavit in addition to the pleas supporting the pleas urged by Shri V.M. Tark; unde, he has questioned the validity of th~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "J. L. Kalra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2250878, "end_char": 2250889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 of 1981 was filed in the High Court of Delhi by Shri J. L. Kalra and others, all advocates, under Article 226 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "J. L. Kalra"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2250923, "end_char": 2250934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Govi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2251042, "end_char": 2251052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners have prayerd for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Govi:rnment to make an assessment of the number of permanent and additional Judges required for the High Court of Delhi having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears, to create suich number of posts of permanent and additional Judges as may be necessary and to make appointments to those posts."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2251680, "end_char": 2251691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2251945, "end_char": 2251956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S P.\n\nGupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2252020, "end_char": 2252031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1981 was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Allahabad by Shri S P.\n\nGupta, Advocate, practising at Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Articles 216 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2252332, "end_char": 2252352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2252558, "end_char": 2252569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2252597, "end_char": 2252608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.N.\n\nYl'rma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2253056, "end_char": 2253068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Constitution by the Union Government in making appointments of additional Judges where permanent Judges had to be appointed and several other matters urged in the petition, the petitioner filed the above petition requesting the Court to issue appropriate directions having regard to the submissions made in the petition and principally he has prayed for a declaration that the three additional Judges-Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A.N.\n\nYl'rma and Mr. Justice N.N. Mittal must be deemed to have been\n.", "canonical_name": "A. N.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Supreme. Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2253675, "end_char": 2253698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1981 is filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an advocate practising in the Supreme."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2253705, "end_char": 2253715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2253954, "end_char": 2253970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She has also stated that the Union Government had acted illegally in not appointing Mr. Justice Subramanian Poti, the seniormost Judge of the Kerala High Court as the Chief Justice of that Court in the vacancy created by the appointment of Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, as a Judge of this Court.", "canonical_name": "Union Governmf:nt"}}, {"text": "Subramanian Poti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2254021, "end_char": 2254037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She has also stated that the Union Government had acted illegally in not appointing Mr. Justice Subramanian Poti, the seniormost Judge of the Kerala High Court as the Chief Justice of that Court in the vacancy created by the appointment of Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, as a Judge of this Court.", "canonical_name": "Subramanian Poti"}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2254177, "end_char": 2254194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She has also stated that the Union Government had acted illegally in not appointing Mr. Justice Subramanian Poti, the seniormost Judge of the Kerala High Court as the Chief Justice of that Court in the vacancy created by the appointment of Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, as a Judge of this Court."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2254296, "end_char": 2254307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2254420, "end_char": 2254431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2255056, "end_char": 2255067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2255338, "end_char": 2255349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2255361, "end_char": 2255382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.R.\n\nof Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2255543, "end_char": 2255591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as I was informed of the Notification of the President of India under Article 222 (1) of the Constitution of India, transferring me as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala, I decided (I) not to proceed to Kerala to take charge as the Chief Justice of the Hih Court\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2256248, "end_char": 2256258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M.M Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2256492, "end_char": 2256502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has prayed for a declaration that the orders of transfer passed by the Pre:sident on January 19, 1981 transferring Mr. Justice M.M Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and the transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as the Chief Justice of Madras High Court are void. ,", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2256916, "end_char": 2256927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257020, "end_char": 2257035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257454, "end_char": 2257465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257701, "end_char": 2257711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257754, "end_char": 2257769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257844, "end_char": 2257855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2258220, "end_char": 2258231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2258595, "end_char": 2258606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Thakur Ramapati Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2258670, "end_char": 2258691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 was originally filed in the High Court of Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution by two advocates Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thakur Ramapati Sinha ques tioning the validity of the order of the transfer of Mr. Justice M.M.\n\nIsmail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and the order of transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Ramapathi Sinha"}}, {"text": "M.M.\n\nIsmail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2258762, "end_char": 2258774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1981 was originally filed in the High Court of Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution by two advocates Shri D.N. Pandey and Shri Thakur Ramapati Sinha ques tioning the validity of the order of the transfer of Mr. Justice M.M.\n\nIsmail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and the order of transfer of Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2260361, "end_char": 2260382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2260475, "end_char": 2260496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2261339, "end_char": 2261348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2261353, "end_char": 2261362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2261432, "end_char": 2261453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Washington", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2261636, "end_char": 2261646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, necessary to remember and adopt it as our own rule of conduct what Washington wrote on June 8, 1783 in his message to the Governors of States in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "June 8, 1783", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2261656, "end_char": 2261668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, necessary to remember and adopt it as our own rule of conduct what Washington wrote on June 8, 1783 in his message to the Governors of States in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2262625, "end_char": 2262646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raghavachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2262661, "end_char": 2262675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(By courtesy : \"The Constitution of India\" .by N.R. ;.• Raghavachariar (1951) p. 17)."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2263374, "end_char": 2263395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thomas Jefferson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2264422, "end_char": 2264438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the end of three decades of experience one is bound to feel in the same way in which Thomas Jefferson felt about the Constitution of the United States of America in 1816."}}, {"text": "Samuel Karcheval", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2264520, "end_char": 2264536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He wrote to Samuel Karcheval on July 12, 1816:\n\n\"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant too sacred to be touched."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1816", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2264540, "end_char": 2264553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He wrote to Samuel Karcheval on July 12, 1816:\n\n\"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant too sacred to be touched."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2265441, "end_char": 2265452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nof Professor Frankfurter at Harvard University (who later became Justice Frankfurter) with reference to the American Constitution are\n\nequally apposite to our own : .,", "canonical_name": "Frank Purter"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2266398, "end_char": 2266409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2266413, "end_char": 2266423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2266783, "end_char": 2266794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2268689, "end_char": 2268707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T.P. Curran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2271464, "end_char": 2271475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For I remember what Mr. T.P. Curran of the Middle Temple said in the year 1790 :\n\n\" 'It is ever the fate of the indolent to find their rights become a prey to the active."}}, {"text": "Gouriet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2272285, "end_char": 2272292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The House of Lords having ruled in the Gouriet's case\n\n(supra) the Court's jurisdiction in England appears to have been confined to declaring contested legal rights subsisting or future, of the parties and of them only when the Attorney-General does not intervene."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2273010, "end_char": 2273026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of Order 53 which took effect on January 11, 1978, some six months after the decision in Gouriet's case reads :\n\n\"I. (1) An application for-(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari .. shall be made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with the provisions of this Order."}}, {"text": "Avory", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2275392, "end_char": 2275397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The phrase 'sufficient interest' whiCh, it is stated, owed its origin to an interlocutory observation made by the Court in R. v. Cotham(1) and to its use by Avory,' J. in his judgment iri Ex parte Stott(2) embraced all kinds of phrases 'a party', 'a person aggrieved',. '"}}, {"text": "April 9, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2275832, "end_char": 2275845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the aforesaid\n\nOrder 53 came into force the application out of which the case Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self- Employed and Smail Businesses Ltd.,(3) decided on April 9, 1981 by the House of Lords arose was instituted before the Queen's Bench."}}, {"text": "Order 53, rule 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2277400, "end_char": 2277416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 53, rule 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2278389, "end_char": 2278405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Canada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2280259, "end_char": 2280282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where the issue is justiciable and where the nature of the case is suitable the Court may grant declaratory relief to any citizen at its d iscre\n\ntion as can be seen from the decision oi the Supreme Court of Canada in Thorson v. AttorneyGeneral of Canada (No."}}, {"text": "Official Languages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2280419, "end_char": 2280441, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Laskin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2280453, "end_char": 2280459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act in Canada, Laskin, J. observed in that case thus :\n\n\"It is not the alleged waste of public funds alone that will support standing but rather the right of the citizenry to constitutional be baviour by Parliament, where the issue in such behaviour is justiciable legal question.\"", "canonical_name": "Laskin"}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2281162, "end_char": 2281166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act", "statute": "Dealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act"}}, {"text": "Yenkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2281185, "end_char": 2281198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OUl>TA v. UNION (Yenkataramiah, J.) 12~1\n\nparticular class to which he belongs' (vide W. Friedmann: 'Principles of Australian Administrative Law, (Second Edition) page 180).", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2281394, "end_char": 2281405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act", "statute": "Dealing with the right of a taxpayer to dispute the constitutional validity of the Official Languages Act"}}, {"text": "Dharamjigudem", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2281885, "end_char": 2281898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dharamjigudem."}}, {"text": "Dharamajigudem", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2281917, "end_char": 2281931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The villagers of Dharamajigudem formed a committee with the appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up the Primary Health Centre."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2282888, "end_char": 2282896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283036, "end_char": 2283044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283675, "end_char": 2283683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283896, "end_char": 2283906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2283914, "end_char": 2283933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2284011, "end_char": 2284022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in that case was an advocate of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "section 35(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284524, "end_char": 2284537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2284545, "end_char": 2284564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284669, "end_char": 2284679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284806, "end_char": 2284816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Advocate-General of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2285293, "end_char": 2285324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierre, Sarr N'Jie (2) and other decisions cited before it, this Court held that the Advocate-General of Maharashtra could not be treated as a\"person aggrievt:d' who was entitled to file an appeal under section 3 7 of the Advocates Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2285411, "end_char": 2285420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2285430, "end_char": 2285443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2285634, "end_char": 2285644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1971] 1 SCR 863", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2285653, "end_char": 2285669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2285743, "end_char": 2285756, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2285975, "end_char": 2285994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2287903, "end_char": 2287916, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2288013, "end_char": 2288023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2290202, "end_char": 2290210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chaudrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2290968, "end_char": 2290979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that D question Chaudrachud, C.J. observed :\n\n\"That disposes of the question as regards the maintainability of the writ petition.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2291311, "end_char": 2291321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2291815, "end_char": 2291826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2291836, "end_char": 2291846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 SCR 58", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2292028, "end_char": 2292043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 SCR 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2292050, "end_char": 2292065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.li", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2292081, "end_char": 2292118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65-66,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 2 s.c.li\n\ntion of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations."}}, {"text": "Article 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2292942, "end_char": 2292953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2293901, "end_char": 2293912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294487, "end_char": 2294493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2296060, "end_char": 2296071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2296187, "end_char": 2296197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2297096, "end_char": 2297106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298296, "end_char": 2298307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298317, "end_char": 2298328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298341, "end_char": 2298352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298551, "end_char": 2298567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298688, "end_char": 2298698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2298706, "end_char": 2298725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2299250, "end_char": 2299261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2299524, "end_char": 2299535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2301552, "end_char": 2301563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Shri P.R. Mridul, learned counsel appearing for the Law Minister, however, contends that the lawyers either as a class or individually cannot be permitted to file petitions for the issue of\n\nany direction to the Government concerning the appointment or ff transfer of Judges.", "canonical_name": "P.R. Mriduf"}}, {"text": "L.A. Stein", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2301860, "end_char": 2301870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has depended upon the writings of L.A. Stein, S.M. Thio, Joel Grossman all<l ic!iard S. Wells and Louis L. Jalfo\n\n.118\n\n.F\n\n."}}, {"text": "S.M. Thio", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2301872, "end_char": 2301881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has depended upon the writings of L.A. Stein, S.M. Thio, Joel Grossman all<l ic!iard S. Wells and Louis L. Jalfo\n\n.118\n\n.F\n\n."}}, {"text": "Joel Grossman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2301883, "end_char": 2301896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has depended upon the writings of L.A. Stein, S.M. Thio, Joel Grossman all<l ic!iard S. Wells and Louis L. Jalfo\n\n.118\n\n.F\n\n."}}, {"text": "Louis L. Jalfo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2301924, "end_char": 2301938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has depended upon the writings of L.A. Stein, S.M. Thio, Joel Grossman all<l ic!iard S. Wells and Louis L. Jalfo\n\n.118\n\n.F\n\n."}}, {"text": "Max Planck Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2302153, "end_char": 2302173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "quoted copiously from 'Judicial Protection Against The~ Executive' \\ published by the Max Planck Institute."}}, {"text": "Mridui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2302180, "end_char": 2302186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mridui argues that .an applicant must show that he has a legal or some special interest , which is sufficient in law to move the Court and that th1e duty which , is sought to be enforced is owed to him.", "canonical_name": "Mridul"}}, {"text": "J.A.G. Griffith", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2302569, "end_char": 2302584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusion reached by S.M. Thio in his essay\n\n.. entitled' ~Locus Standi in Relation to Mandamus' at page 133 in\n\nPublic Law, edited by J.A.G. Griffith on which Shri Mridul has relied is of significance.", "canonical_name": "J.A.G. Griffith"}}, {"text": "are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2307834, "end_char": 2307910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1976] 3 SCR 591", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2308675, "end_char": 2308691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2309059, "end_char": 2309067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2309782, "end_char": 2309790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1974] 3 SCR 760", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2310813, "end_char": 2310829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ldridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2310886, "end_char": 2310893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri )ldridul that a person who has indisputably the right to file these petitio11s cannot in law raise the questions urged before us in these cases."}}, {"text": "Alexis de Tocqueville", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2314147, "end_char": 2314168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the earliest writers who challenged in the year 183 5 itself the correctness of the doctrine of political question."}}, {"text": "Woodrow Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2314893, "end_char": 2314907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Woodrow Wilson put it in 1908:\n\n\" ........ government is not a machine but a living thing ...... No living thing can have _its organs offset against each other as checks, and live."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2315646, "end_char": 2315691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doctrine of political question was examined in the year 1962 by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Baker v. Carr.(1) That was a civil action in which the complaint was that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated had been denied equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America by virtue of debasement of their votes by reason of unconstitutional ."}}, {"text": "Tennessee", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2316082, "end_char": 2316091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "division of their electoral area situated in the State of Tennessee."}}, {"text": "Brennan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2316580, "end_char": 2316587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brennan, J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of six of the Judges, in the course of his decision, observed at page 691 thus:\n\n\"We come, finally, to the ultimate inquiry whether our precedents as to what constitutes a non-justiciable \"political question\" bring the case before us under the umbrella of that doctrine.", "canonical_name": "Brannan"}}, {"text": "S. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2317645, "end_char": 2317651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Adam Clayton Powell Jr.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2318291, "end_char": 2318314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff in that case Adam Clayton Powell Jr. was duly elected from a congressional district of New York as a member of the United States House of Representatives in 1966."}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2318642, "end_char": 2318648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Powell alongwith some others who were voters in the constituency then filed a suit claiming that the House could exclude him only if it found that he failed to meet the standing requirerrents of age, citizenship and residence contained in clause 2 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States of America and thus had excluded him unconstitutionally.", "canonical_name": "Powell"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2318881, "end_char": 2318889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Warren", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2319475, "end_char": 2319481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice Warren who spoke for the Court disposed of the defence based on political question at page 532 thus : ."}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2319865, "end_char": 2319871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2319919, "end_char": 2319925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, $ 5, discloses, a determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Powell"}}, {"text": "S. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2320026, "end_char": 2320032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Berger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2321033, "end_char": 2321042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In sum, the political question doctrine, according to R. Berger, interposes no obstacle to judicial determination of the rival legislative executive claims to receive or withhold information."}}, {"text": "Article 356(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2321988, "end_char": 2322002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c.Il", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2324388, "end_char": 2324425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tile questions raised in these petitions will be considered here after,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Ambed- B kar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2324595, "end_char": 2324607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking on the nature of the Draft Constitution, Dr. Ambed- B kar in his speech delivered on November 4, 1948, in the Constituent Assembly saic; I :\n\n\"All federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of federalism.", "canonical_name": "Ambed- B kar"}}, {"text": "November 4, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2324635, "end_char": 2324651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking on the nature of the Draft Constitution, Dr. Ambed- B kar in his speech delivered on November 4, 1948, in the Constituent Assembly saic; I :\n\n\"All federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of federalism."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2327373, "end_char": 2327382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2327624, "end_char": 2327635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2327718, "end_char": 2327729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2328152, "end_char": 2328163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2328514, "end_char": 2328528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2328790, "end_char": 2328801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2329270, "end_char": 2329281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2331444, "end_char": 2331455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2331893, "end_char": 2331904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332385, "end_char": 2332396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332465, "end_char": 2332476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332499, "end_char": 2332510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332526, "end_char": 2332537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 366(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332781, "end_char": 2332796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332831, "end_char": 2332842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2333193, "end_char": 2333209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334082, "end_char": 2334093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334168, "end_char": 2334179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334462, "end_char": 2334474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334942, "end_char": 2334957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335248, "end_char": 2335259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335408, "end_char": 2335420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335616, "end_char": 2335627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335749, "end_char": 2335760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2336477, "end_char": 2336488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "may be appropriate to refer here to the position prevailing under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2336540, "end_char": 2336639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2336648, "end_char": 2336659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It may be appropriate to refer here to the position prevailing under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It may be appropriate to refer here to the position prevailing under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2337089, "end_char": 2337167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2337300, "end_char": 2337311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2337501, "end_char": 2337512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The appointment of a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2337520, "end_char": 2337549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2338589, "end_char": 2338600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2340925, "end_char": 2340936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2341994, "end_char": 2342005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2342758, "end_char": 2342769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2342834, "end_char": 2342845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2342853, "end_char": 2342882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2343140, "end_char": 2343167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor,(1) the effect of section 256 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provided that no recommendation should be made for the grant of magisterial powers to, or the withdrawal of any magistenal powers from any person save after consultation with the District Magistrate of the District in which he was working or with the Chief Presidency Magistrate, as the case might be, was considered by the Federal Court."}}, {"text": "[1945] FCR 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2343550, "end_char": 2343563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2344001, "end_char": 2344012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2344378, "end_char": 2344389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2344498, "end_char": 2344509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2345237, "end_char": 2345248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2346257, "end_char": 2346268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2346619, "end_char": 2346630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2347563, "end_char": 2347574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2347927, "end_char": 2347941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2348404, "end_char": 2348418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2348996, "end_char": 2349004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349009, "end_char": 2349017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349044, "end_char": 2349052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349054, "end_char": 2349063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 348(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349068, "end_char": 2349079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349093, "end_char": 2349100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349105, "end_char": 2349113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349131, "end_char": 2349142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349164, "end_char": 2349172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 146(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349174, "end_char": 2349185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 229(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349190, "end_char": 2349201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349223, "end_char": 2349234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349312, "end_char": 2349323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 127(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349325, "end_char": 2349336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 146(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349338, "end_char": 2349349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349351, "end_char": 2349362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349364, "end_char": 2349375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349377, "end_char": 2349385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349387, "end_char": 2349395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349397, "end_char": 2349405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349410, "end_char": 2349421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 341(1), 342(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349423, "end_char": 2349442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349447, "end_char": 2349458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349532, "end_char": 2349543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Comptroller and Auditor General of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2349958, "end_char": 2349998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370(1) (b) (i) )- It is significant that the words 'after consultation with' in Article 150 were substituted by the words 'on the advice of' by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, since the .Parliament wanted, as can be seen from the Notes on Clauses in the relevant Bill which later on became the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, the President to prescribe the form of the accounts of thej Union and of the States with the concurrence of and not merely in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India."}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2350112, "end_char": 2350126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351439, "end_char": 2351453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351877, "end_char": 2351892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2352268, "end_char": 2352282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2352408, "end_char": 2352421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2352769, "end_char": 2352782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2353702, "end_char": 2353716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2353722, "end_char": 2353736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354047, "end_char": 2354060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354112, "end_char": 2354123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 102(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354335, "end_char": 2354349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354547, "end_char": 2354558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2354839, "end_char": 2354850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2355113, "end_char": 2355126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2355300, "end_char": 2355311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2355398, "end_char": 2355412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2355689, "end_char": 2355703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2356036, "end_char": 2356050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2356098, "end_char": 2356111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1971] 3 SCR 483", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2356150, "end_char": 2356166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2356344, "end_char": 2356358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2356598, "end_char": 2356609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2356756, "end_char": 2356763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2358185, "end_char": 2358196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359302, "end_char": 2359316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359576, "end_char": 2359587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359702, "end_char": 2359713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2359796, "end_char": 2359808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power of the Governor with regard to matters connected with appointment or dismissal of judicial officers was construed by this Court giving the final voice regarding such appointment or dismissal only to the Governor under Article 233 of the Constitution notwithstanding the vesting of control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court under Article 235 in the case of The Stare of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi.(1) In that case Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) reconciled and interpreted Article 233, Article 234, Article 235 and Article 31 l thus :\n\n\"That the Governor appoints District Judges and the Governor alone can dismiss or remove them goes without sayiog."}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359857, "end_char": 2359868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359870, "end_char": 2359881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359883, "end_char": 2359894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359899, "end_char": 2359909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2360799, "end_char": 2360832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provisos can be given their full effect without giving rise to\n\n(5) [1966] l ~CR 771 at l'I' 789·7?Q:•\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982) 2 s.C.Ji\n\nother implications."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2361518, "end_char": 2361526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2361629, "end_char": 2361637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2362237, "end_char": 2362245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2364624, "end_char": 2364634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2364639, "end_char": 2364650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1975] 1 S.C.R. 814", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2365159, "end_char": 2365178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2365843, "end_char": 2365854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2366039, "end_char": 2366053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2366100, "end_char": 2366111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2366722, "end_char": 2366730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 124(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2368528, "end_char": 2368542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2368992, "end_char": 2369003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2370016, "end_char": 2370031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J.W. Garner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2371445, "end_char": 2371456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The methods by which Judges are chosen in the different countries of the world may be broadly classified according to Prof.\n\nJ.W. Garner into three types- (I) election by the legislature, (2) election by the people and (3) appointment by the executive either absolutely or from a list of nominees presented by the courts or with the concurrence of an executive council or the upper chamber of the legislature."}}, {"text": "Rhode Island", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2371889, "end_char": 2371901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choice by the legislature was a favourite method of selection in the American States for sometime but this system has been abandoned in all the States except Rhode Island, Verment, South Carolina and Virginia."}}, {"text": "Verment", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2371903, "end_char": 2371910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choice by the legislature was a favourite method of selection in the American States for sometime but this system has been abandoned in all the States except Rhode Island, Verment, South Carolina and Virginia."}}, {"text": "South Carolina", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2371912, "end_char": 2371926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choice by the legislature was a favourite method of selection in the American States for sometime but this system has been abandoned in all the States except Rhode Island, Verment, South Carolina and Virginia."}}, {"text": "Virginia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2371931, "end_char": 2371939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choice by the legislature was a favourite method of selection in the American States for sometime but this system has been abandoned in all the States except Rhode Island, Verment, South Carolina and Virginia."}}, {"text": "Switzerland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2371945, "end_char": 2371956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Switzerland the Judges of the federal tribunal are chosen by the legislative assembly of the federation."}}, {"text": "Napolean", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2372142, "end_char": 2372150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the advent of Napolean this system was abolished as it had become discredited by then."}}, {"text": "R.M. Jackson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2373847, "end_char": 2373859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See R.M. Jackson, 'The Machinery of Justice in England' 1960 Edition p. 232)."}}, {"text": "Morse Erskine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2373966, "end_char": 2373979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter written by the end of 1951 to Morse Erskine, a member of the California Bar, Lord Jowitt who was the Lord ,."}}, {"text": "Jowitt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2374018, "end_char": 2374024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter written by the end of 1951 to Morse Erskine, a member of the California Bar, Lord Jowitt who was the Lord ,."}}, {"text": "Albert Napier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2375704, "end_char": 2375717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by John Honnold (1964) p. 270)\n\nSir Albert Napier, the permanent secretary of the office of Lord Chancellor in a paper prepared in about the year 1963 said m11ch tht: same thing as Lord Jowitt as tollows ;\n\n\"The Lord Chancellor is the most appropriate Minister to advise on appointments and promotions for the very reason that he is a Judge and is qualified for that position\n\nby actual practice at the Bar."}}, {"text": "Venkaiaramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2376979, "end_char": 2376992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNiON (Venkaiaramiah, i.j .", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Section 72(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2377584, "end_char": 2377597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2377605, "end_char": 2377653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378018, "end_char": 2378028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900", "statute": "the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900"}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2378036, "end_char": 2378067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378289, "end_char": 2378303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378478, "end_char": 2378492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378842, "end_char": 2378851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2379928, "end_char": 2379939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2380475, "end_char": 2380486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2380856, "end_char": 2380867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2381882, "end_char": 2381885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llenkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2381906, "end_char": 2381920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appointment of a Judge who is a member of the superior judiciary for such short\n\nS.1•. OtJP'tA v. UNION (llenkataramiah, J.) 1215\n\nperiod appears to be peculiar to our country.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2382350, "end_char": 2382359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts Actjor the Charter Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2382367, "end_char": 2382407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Judges of the High Courts established under that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2382464, "end_char": 2382516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2382656, "end_char": 2382665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges of the High Courts established under that Act", "statute": "Judges of the High Courts established under that Act"}}, {"text": "Article 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2383149, "end_char": 2383160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges of the High Courts established under that Act", "statute": "Judges of the High Courts established under that Act"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384084, "end_char": 2384098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384211, "end_char": 2384225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2384237, "end_char": 2384277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384394, "end_char": 2384408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384477, "end_char": 2384488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2384496, "end_char": 2384525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384583, "end_char": 2384592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2384600, "end_char": 2384640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384722, "end_char": 2384733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2384837, "end_char": 2384848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2385286, "end_char": 2385297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2385305, "end_char": 2385334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386036, "end_char": 2386050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386069, "end_char": 2386080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2386088, "end_char": 2386117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386215, "end_char": 2386226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2386234, "end_char": 2386263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388234, "end_char": 2388245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388335, "end_char": 2388346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2388354, "end_char": 2388383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388453, "end_char": 2388464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Articles 198 and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388569, "end_char": 2388589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Articles 198 and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388605, "end_char": 2388625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2390171, "end_char": 2390182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 198(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2391171, "end_char": 2391185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 192(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2391308, "end_char": 2391322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Otti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2393069, "end_char": 2393073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have a very strong feeling in this matter and have during my long\n\n1280 SuPRllMil COURT Rili>Otti's [19821 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nShiva Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2393196, "end_char": 2393209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B.\n\nShiva Rao ; 'The Framing of India's Constitution' Vol.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nShiva Rao"}}, {"text": "Article 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2393336, "end_char": 2393347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2393356, "end_char": 2393367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June' 7, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2393661, "end_char": 2393674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June' 7, 1949 after hearing the plea of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 'that all Judges of the High Court shall have to be permanent', the Constituent Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Drafting Committee to delete Articles 198 (2) and 199 of the Draft Constitu tion providing for the appointment of acting and additional Judges in High Courts."}}, {"text": "Articles 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2393871, "end_char": 2393883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394575, "end_char": 2394586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394588, "end_char": 2394599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394604, "end_char": 2394615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394734, "end_char": 2394745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2395016, "end_char": 2395027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2395035, "end_char": 2395064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2395119, "end_char": 2395130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2395158, "end_char": 2395169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2396099, "end_char": 2396110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2396682, "end_char": 2396693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2396795, "end_char": 2396806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2396837, "end_char": 2396848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2396875, "end_char": 2396887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397036, "end_char": 2397047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397147, "end_char": 2397158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397272, "end_char": 2397283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397388, "end_char": 2397399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397783, "end_char": 2397794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2397941, "end_char": 2397952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Courts Arrears Committee", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2399002, "end_char": 2399031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact of such expansion was noticed by the High Courts Arrears Committee \"as far back as 19il9."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2399163, "end_char": 2399195, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2403207, "end_char": 2403218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2404603, "end_char": 2404614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2404863, "end_char": 2404874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2405225, "end_char": 2405236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2405439, "end_char": 2405450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2405515, "end_char": 2405526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2405640, "end_char": 2405651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2406116, "end_char": 2406127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2406135, "end_char": 2406146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2406666, "end_char": 2406677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "T.N.\n\nChaturvedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2407363, "end_char": 2407379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the statements filed on behalf of the Central Government alongwith the affidavit dated August 29, 1981 of Shri T.N.\n\nChaturvedi, Secretary (Justice), Government of India, the following facts emerge :\n\n(a) The total number of main cases pending\n\n(b) Average disposal of main cases per Judge per year during the 'years 1978, 1979\n\nilDd 19?0~\n\nAs on As on 31-12-1978 31-12-1979\n\n6,13,799 6,17,239\n\nAs on 31-12-1980\n\n6,78,951\n\n~60\n\n.....\n\n...\n\ni..\n\n....\n\ns. P.GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n(c) The sanctioned strength of permanent Judges in all the High Courts as on 18-3-1981.", "canonical_name": "T. N. Chaturvedy"}}, {"text": "31-12-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2408394, "end_char": 2408404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To dispose of the arrears of cases as on 31-12-1980 they need approximately four years since many of them are bound to be heavy Division Bench matters which consume a lot of time."}}, {"text": "31.12.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2408613, "end_char": 2408623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of them, it may be noted that 2,59,827 cases were more than two years old as on 31.12.1980."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2409817, "end_char": 2409828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2409954, "end_char": 2409965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2410873, "end_char": 2410884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2411529, "end_char": 2411540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2411981, "end_char": 2411992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2413195, "end_char": 2413206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2413471, "end_char": 2413482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2414756, "end_char": 2414768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2414919, "end_char": 2414931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2415958, "end_char": 2415970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August lO, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2416172, "end_char": 2416187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, set aside the order dated August lO, 1973."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2416728, "end_char": 2416739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2416786, "end_char": 2416798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417249, "end_char": 2417260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417326, "end_char": 2417337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417711, "end_char": 2417721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417980, "end_char": 2417988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2418901, "end_char": 2418912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2420014, "end_char": 2420022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2420044, "end_char": 2420054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "I I India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2420252, "end_char": 2420261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are therefore, of the opinion that clause 7 of the Bill violates article 21 of the Constitution to the extent that a person who has held office as a Judge of the High Court, can be appointed to preside over a Special Court merely in consultation with the Chief Justice of\n\nI I India\"."}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2420387, "end_char": 2420398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Edward Coke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2421661, "end_char": 2421672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke is remembered with gratitude by all who cherish the independence of the judiciary as an inviolable part of a democratic Government. '"}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2421971, "end_char": 2421975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That when all the other judges basely succumbed to the mandate of a sovereign who wished to introduce despotism under the forms of juridical procedure Chief Justice Coke did his duty at the sacrifice of his office'.", "canonical_name": "Coke"}}, {"text": "J.L. Campbell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2422141, "end_char": 2422154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The extract from 11 Coke 63 which is found at pages 271 and 272 of the 'The Lives of The Chief Justices of England' by J.L. Campbell, Vol."}}, {"text": "Bancroft", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2422306, "end_char": 2422314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Archbishop Bancroft suggested that in order to curb the indepen dence of Lord Coke the King himself should commence to decide whatever cause he pleased in his own person."}}, {"text": "James", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2422879, "end_char": 2422884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hearing this, King James asked ;\n\n\"My Lords, I always thought, and by my soul I have often heard the boast, that your English law was founded upon reason."}}, {"text": "Winston Churchill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2424095, "end_char": 2424112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking on the Judge's Remuneration Bill in the House of Commons in March, 1954 Sir Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of, England observed in the course of his speech thus :\n\n\"The principle of the complete independence of the Judiciary from the Executive is the foundation of many things in our island life."}}, {"text": "Salisbury", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2427554, "end_char": 2427563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "525 at p. 1062)\n\n1296 SlJPRBMB COlJRT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\nMoving the very same Bill in the House of Lords the Marquess of Salisbury described the high esteem in which Parliament regarded the judiciary thus :\n\n\"But even Parliament has put Judges in a very special position."}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2429704, "end_char": 2429718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2429842, "end_char": 2429856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2429964, "end_char": 2429978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2430163, "end_char": 2430174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2431206, "end_char": 2431217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2431223, "end_char": 2431234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Act of Settlement 1700", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2431750, "end_char": 2431772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2432354, "end_char": 2432365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act of Settlement 1700", "statute": "the Act of Settlement 1700"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2432370, "end_char": 2432381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act of Settlement 1700", "statute": "the Act of Settlement 1700"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2432476, "end_char": 2432490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act of Settlement 1700", "statute": "the Act of Settlement 1700"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2432591, "end_char": 2432602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act of Settlement 1700", "statute": "the Act of Settlement 1700"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2432722, "end_char": 2432736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act of Settlement 1700", "statute": "the Act of Settlement 1700"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2433193, "end_char": 2433204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Malaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2434693, "end_char": 2434699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1930, the claimant, then in his 49th year was offered an appointment as a puisne Judge of the Supreme Court in Malaya."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2435279, "end_char": 2435292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 7, 1942, the claimant was informed that the Secretary of State could not justify retaining him now that his post was necessarily In abeyance and there was no alternative but to award him pension on abolition of his office and the claimant's appointment, accordingly, ended on July 7, 1942, 17 months before h:s 62nd birthda)'."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2435561, "end_char": 2435573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 7, 1942, the claimant was informed that the Secretary of State could not justify retaining him now that his post was necessarily In abeyance and there was no alternative but to award him pension on abolition of his office and the claimant's appointment, accordingly, ended on July 7, 1942, 17 months before h:s 62nd birthda)'."}}, {"text": "s 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2435594, "end_char": 2435598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act of Settlement, 1700", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2435791, "end_char": 2435814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2436242, "end_char": 2436249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Lord Goddard, C.J. that the provisions of the Act of Settlement relating to the tenure of office of Judges of the Supreme Court in England did not apply to the Straits Settlements or to any other colony; it was for the Crown by exercise of the prerogative or Parliament by statute to set up courts in an acquired territory, and the conditions under which Judges of those courts held office depended upon the terms on which the Crown or Parliament established them."}}, {"text": "Straits Settlements Act, 1866", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2436758, "end_char": 2436787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act of Settlement, 1700", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2438017, "end_char": 2438040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.V. Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2438431, "end_char": 2438441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nature of constitutional conventions, understandings and practices, according to A.V. Dicey \"Make of a body, not of laws, but of constitutional or political ethics\"."}}, {"text": "Freeman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2438567, "end_char": 2438574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Freeman writes in his 'Growth of the English Constitution (1872)' that when an Englishman speaks of the."}}, {"text": "A:L. Goodhart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2440817, "end_char": 2440830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A:L. Goodhart."}}, {"text": "Articles 74, 75, 77, 85 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2441271, "end_char": 2441302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2442586, "end_char": 2442592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.S. Atiyah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2444163, "end_char": 2444174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. P.S. Atiyah, who has tried to analyse the nature of promissory obligations in the light of the theories of 'promising' associated with the natural lawyers, the utilitarians and a number of other legal philosophers in his book entitled 'Promise, Morals and Law, (1981), Oxford, observes at pages 141-142 thus:\n\n\"Some philosophers have recognised that the binding force of promises may vary in a similar sort of way, but the implica.tions of this have not (I think) been properly grasped."}}, {"text": "K.N. Waochoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2446119, "end_char": 2446131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Courts, it is seen that a suggestion had been made by K.N. Waochoo, Chief Justice of India, in 1967 that such an undertaking should be taken.", "canonical_name": "K.N. Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2449372, "end_char": 2449383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2449388, "end_char": 2449402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkataramlaii", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2449818, "end_char": 2449832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramlaii, J.)\n\nH0.5\n\nJudge by fresh appointments until such vacancy arises provided the arrears in the High Court requiring his 'continuance as an additional Judge persist.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2450381, "end_char": 2450395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2451211, "end_char": 2451225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2451664, "end_char": 2451678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2452243, "end_char": 2452258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORfS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2452507, "end_char": 2452542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the high office to which appointment has to be made under Article 217( I) of the Constitution and to the association of the high dignitaries who have to be consulted before any such appointment is made the application of principles of natural justice as of right is ruled out and non-compliance with such principles\n\n1306 SUPREME COURT REPORfS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Hutcheson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2453664, "end_char": 2453673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following words of Judge Hutcheson are illuminating indeed."}}, {"text": "Jerome Frank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2454660, "end_char": 2454672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(See Jerome Frank : 'Law and the Modern Mind\n\n(1963) p. 112)."}}, {"text": "Venkatarainiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2454757, "end_char": 2454771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarainiah, J, j i3o1\n\nThe following observations of Denning, L.J. (as he then was) in.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2454814, "end_char": 2454821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarainiah, J, j i3o1\n\nThe following observations of Denning, L.J. (as he then was) in.", "canonical_name": "Denoning M.R."}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2456539, "end_char": 2456553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2456913, "end_char": 2456934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457024, "end_char": 2457035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R.R. Diwakar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2457286, "end_char": 2457298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When two members of the Draft Constituent Assembly Shri R.R. Diwakar and Shri S.V.\n\nKrishnamurthy Rao moved an amendment to clause (1) of Article 193 of the Constitution for adding clause (d) which read as \"(d) every judge shall be liable to be transferred to other High Courts\" it was recorded that there was no need for the amendment as clause le) of Article 193 (I) of the Constitution provided that the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed to be a judge of another High Court."}}, {"text": "S.V.\n\nKrishnamurthy Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2457308, "end_char": 2457331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When two members of the Draft Constituent Assembly Shri R.R. Diwakar and Shri S.V.\n\nKrishnamurthy Rao moved an amendment to clause (1) of Article 193 of the Constitution for adding clause (d) which read as \"(d) every judge shall be liable to be transferred to other High Courts\" it was recorded that there was no need for the amendment as clause le) of Article 193 (I) of the Constitution provided that the office of a judge shall be vacated by his being appointed to be a judge of another High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457368, "end_char": 2457379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457583, "end_char": 2457594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457752, "end_char": 2457763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B.\n\nShiva Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2458423, "end_char": 2458436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B.\n\nShiva Rao: 'The Framing of India's Constitution', Volume IV, p. 166).", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nShiva Rao"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2458647, "end_char": 2458658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2459326, "end_char": 2459337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2459382, "end_char": 2459393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2459938, "end_char": 2459949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "16th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2460169, "end_char": 2460188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 16th November, 1949 an amendment to that Article was adopted by the Constituent Assembly which required."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2460368, "end_char": 2460379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2460607, "end_char": 2460618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2460726, "end_char": 2460737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2460855, "end_char": 2460866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2461114, "end_char": 2461125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2464668, "end_char": 2464679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2464889, "end_char": 2464900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2464925, "end_char": 2464936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2465590, "end_char": 2465601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2466006, "end_char": 2466017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2466119, "end_char": 2466130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2466393, "end_char": 2466404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2466463, "end_char": 2466474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467055, "end_char": 2467066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467466, "end_char": 2467477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467547, "end_char": 2467561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467849, "end_char": 2467863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2468094, "end_char": 2468105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2468498, "end_char": 2468509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469017, "end_char": 2469028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469316, "end_char": 2469327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469392, "end_char": 2469403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 51. c-49)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2469638, "end_char": 2469714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One other reason which prompts me to say so is as follows : By way of comparison we may refer here to some of the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469868, "end_char": 2469877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469905, "end_char": 2469917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469939, "end_char": 2469948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469976, "end_char": 2469987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2469992, "end_char": 2470001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470029, "end_char": 2470040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470043, "end_char": 2470052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1981] 1 SCR 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2470153, "end_char": 2470169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470403, "end_char": 2470412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "England which appears to have been used as a model for some of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471216, "end_char": 2471227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471301, "end_char": 2471312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471389, "end_char": 2471398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471431, "end_char": 2471442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H.M. Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2471486, "end_char": 2471498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is argued by Shri H.M. Seervai, learned counsel for the petitioners in Transfer Case No.", "canonical_name": "H.M.\n\nSeervai"}}, {"text": "Sakal Chand Sheth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2471612, "end_char": 2471629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1981 that the majority decision of this Court in Sakal Chand Sheth' s case (supra) holding that the consent of the Judge concerned is not necessary for transferring him from one High Court to another High Court under Article 222 of the Constitution requires to be reconsidered for the reason that the assumption of Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) and Krishna Iyer, J. that there was no provision for transfer of Judges of High Courts in the Government of India Act, 1935 is erroneous and that every such transfer should be considered as a fresh appoint ment of the Judge concerned in the court to which he is transferred.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471780, "end_char": 2471791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges of High Courts in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2471976, "end_char": 2472034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2472242, "end_char": 2472253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges of High Courts in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Judges of High Courts in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2472781, "end_char": 2472826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Saka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2472910, "end_char": 2472914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and (2}, If, there was such a provision, whether the decision of, the majority in Saka!", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "Chand Shfth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2472917, "end_char": 2472928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chand Shfth's case (supra) requires to pe rl'<; onsi<ll'el'd 7\n\nIt is true that Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) arid Kriha Iyer, J. have both stated in the course of their opinions that there was no provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 providing for the transfer of a Judge from one.", "canonical_name": "Chand Shfth"}}, {"text": "arid Kriha Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2473030, "end_char": 2473045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chand Shfth's case (supra) requires to pe rl'<; onsi<ll'el'd 7\n\nIt is true that Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) arid Kriha Iyer, J. have both stated in the course of their opinions that there was no provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 providing for the transfer of a Judge from one."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2473134, "end_char": 2473163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwati.-J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2473555, "end_char": 2473567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati.-J. , observed, fo that case at page473; \"Neither in proviso (c) nor in any other provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 was the word 'transfer' used and there was also no specific prvision in that Act conferring power to transfer a' High Court Judge.\"", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati.-J."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2473664, "end_char": 2473693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2474146, "end_char": 2474161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2474190, "end_char": 2474201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2474213, "end_char": 2474242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 26, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2474937, "end_char": 2474953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 26, 1944, the British Parliament enacted the India (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1944 by which clause (c) was added at the end of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475111, "end_char": 2475122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2475130, "end_char": 2475159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475161, "end_char": 2475170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475616, "end_char": 2475625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475701, "end_char": 2475710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2475877, "end_char": 2475888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "July 4, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2475989, "end_char": 2476001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the proviso to Section 220 (2) was given retrospective effect Then reliance is placed on the speech of Earl of Munster made on July 4, 1944 in the House of Lords in support of the Bill which latter became the said amending Act, the relevant part of which read thus :-\n\n\"Clause 2 of the Bill makes it clear that if a Judge of the High Court is transferred to another High Court or to the Federal Court, he shall not retain his office of a judge of the High Court from which he was transferred."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2476132, "end_char": 2476140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2476461, "end_char": 2476471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2476479, "end_char": 2476516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "our own Judicature Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2477198, "end_char": 2477226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2477256, "end_char": 2477263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925", "statute": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Pethick Lawrerice", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2477451, "end_char": 2477468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pethick Lawrerice also observed :\n\n\"With respect to the Judges, I understand the proposal is merely intended to put beyond question what was certainly the intention in regard to them.", "canonical_name": "Pethick Lawrerice"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2477864, "end_char": 2477875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925", "statute": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2478111, "end_char": 2478120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925", "statute": "In our own Judicature Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2478419, "end_char": 2478428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MacNaughten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2478890, "end_char": 2478901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord MacNaughten in the Privy Council considered it well settled that the marginal notes cannot be referred to for purposes of construction, Thakurain Ba/raj Kunwar v. Rae Jagatpal Singh (1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 132, 142 and Lord Hanworth M.R. referring to the Superannuation Act of 1859, said : \"It was contended that these catchwords could be used to explain the meaning of sections upon which they appear."}}, {"text": "(1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 132", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2479072, "end_char": 2479095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hanworth M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2479110, "end_char": 2479123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord MacNaughten in the Privy Council considered it well settled that the marginal notes cannot be referred to for purposes of construction, Thakurain Ba/raj Kunwar v. Rae Jagatpal Singh (1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 132, 142 and Lord Hanworth M.R. referring to the Superannuation Act of 1859, said : \"It was contended that these catchwords could be used to explain the meaning of sections upon which they appear."}}, {"text": "by Baggallay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2479303, "end_char": 2479315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explt1ined:by Baggallay L. J. in Att.-Gen."}}, {"text": "Rupert Cross", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2480153, "end_char": 2480165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 'Statutory Interpretation' by Sir Rupert Cross (1976 Edition), we have a very instructive passage explaining the rl!lative importance of certain parts of a statute, including side notes (or marginal notes)."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2484907, "end_char": 2484911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2484923, "end_char": 2484948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2485324, "end_char": 2485328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Official Secrets Act 1911", "statute": "the Official Secrets Act 1911"}}, {"text": "Upjohn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2486766, "end_char": 2486772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Upjohn, L.J. : \"While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at.", "canonical_name": "Upjohn"}}, {"text": "section 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2489873, "end_char": 2489887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2489895, "end_char": 2489923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 200(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490165, "end_char": 2490179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "section 220(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490391, "end_char": 2490405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of a High Court could become a Judge of another High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Judge of a High Court could become a Judge of another High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2490467, "end_char": 2490505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490559, "end_char": 2490570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of a High Court could become a Judge of another High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Judge of a High Court could become a Judge of another High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution providing for transfer in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2490578, "end_char": 2490650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490874, "end_char": 2490884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act", "statute": "Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2490892, "end_char": 2490945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bari of Munster and Mr. Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act and if I may say so got into an error of proximity when they relied on section 10 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, which established the\n\nupreme Court of Judicature in England consisting of His Majesty's High Court of Justice and His fajesty's Court of Appeal both of which were in iJhe same building at the Royal Courts of Justice."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2491177, "end_char": 2491190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act", "statute": "Amery who spoke in the British Parliament on the subject were probably influenced by the marginal note in the amending Act"}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2491373, "end_char": 2491385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act provided that the office of any Judge of the High Court would be vacated by his being appointed as a Judge of the Court of Appeal and the same Act", "statute": "Act provided that the office of any Judge of the High Court would be vacated by his being appointed as a Judge of the Court of Appeal and the same Act"}}, {"text": "Sakal Chand Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2491810, "end_char": 2491826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am of the view that there is no error committed by the learned Judges in stating so in Sakal Chand Seth's case (supra) and the decision in that case is not liable to be reconsidered on the ground now urged before us.", "canonical_name": "Sa11kalchand Sheth"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492061, "end_char": 2492072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492110, "end_char": 2492125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492170, "end_char": 2492181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492355, "end_char": 2492370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On this slender material we cannot hqld that there was a provision for transfer of a High Court Judge under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492806, "end_char": 2492821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2493163, "end_char": 2493177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMll COURT R~PORtS (1982]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2494799, "end_char": 2494828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "326 • SUPRBMll COURT R~PORtS (1982] s.c."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2495497, "end_char": 2495507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2495512, "end_char": 2495523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2496547, "end_char": 2496558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2496570, "end_char": 2496599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2496830, "end_char": 2496841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2497330, "end_char": 2497341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2497372, "end_char": 2497383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2497607, "end_char": 2497621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2497840, "end_char": 2497851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2498664, "end_char": 2498679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499143, "end_char": 2499154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499295, "end_char": 2499306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499512, "end_char": 2499523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499902, "end_char": 2499913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499964, "end_char": 2499978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2500050, "end_char": 2500061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2500346, "end_char": 2500360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2500638, "end_char": 2500659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2501165, "end_char": 2501176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2502329, "end_char": 2502340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503117, "end_char": 2503128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503283, "end_char": 2503298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503450, "end_char": 2503461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503575, "end_char": 2503583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2504184, "end_char": 2504196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2504762, "end_char": 2504773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2504780, "end_char": 2504792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2505105, "end_char": 2505116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2505121, "end_char": 2505133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2505360, "end_char": 2505371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2505689, "end_char": 2505700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uma Shankar Bajpai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2506111, "end_char": 2506129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case a preliminary objection was taken to the Constitution of the B.ench before which the case came up for hearing as the Bench consisted of Justice Uma Shankar Bajpai, who had been originally appointed as an additional Judge of that Court under the Government of India Act, 1915 and who after some extensions had been appointed as a permanent Judge on March 17, 1937 with effect from April l, 1937."}}, {"text": "Judge of that Court under the Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2506182, "end_char": 2506241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 17, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2506315, "end_char": 2506329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case a preliminary objection was taken to the Constitution of the B.ench before which the case came up for hearing as the Bench consisted of Justice Uma Shankar Bajpai, who had been originally appointed as an additional Judge of that Court under the Government of India Act, 1915 and who after some extensions had been appointed as a permanent Judge on March 17, 1937 with effect from April l, 1937."}}, {"text": "April l, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2506347, "end_char": 2506360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case a preliminary objection was taken to the Constitution of the B.ench before which the case came up for hearing as the Bench consisted of Justice Uma Shankar Bajpai, who had been originally appointed as an additional Judge of that Court under the Government of India Act, 1915 and who after some extensions had been appointed as a permanent Judge on March 17, 1937 with effect from April l, 1937."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2506377, "end_char": 2506406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 220(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2506745, "end_char": 2506759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2506767, "end_char": 2506796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bajpai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2506798, "end_char": 2506804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the contentions, which appears to have been urged in this case, was that without taking a fresh oath as required by section 220(4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, Bajpai, J. could not function as a Judge."}}, {"text": "s. 220(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2507024, "end_char": 2507033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2507472, "end_char": 2507477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2508012, "end_char": 2508018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2509568, "end_char": 2509582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2509689, "end_char": 2509703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2510033, "end_char": 2510047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2510147, "end_char": 2510161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2510219, "end_char": 2510233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2510367, "end_char": 2510378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2511327, "end_char": 2511341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2511436, "end_char": 2511447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2511807, "end_char": 2511821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2511922, "end_char": 2511933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2512486, "end_char": 2512497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2513351, "end_char": 2513365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2514196, "end_char": 2514210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2514540, "end_char": 2514551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2514562, "end_char": 2514576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 222( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2515173, "end_char": 2515188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2515858, "end_char": 2515869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2516558, "end_char": 2516569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2516580, "end_char": 2516595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2516916, "end_char": 2516927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2517401, "end_char": 2517412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519008, "end_char": 2519019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519266, "end_char": 2519277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519426, "end_char": 2519437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519507, "end_char": 2519518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519594, "end_char": 2519605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519811, "end_char": 2519822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2520488, "end_char": 2520499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2520757, "end_char": 2520783, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3 to 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2520983, "end_char": 2520997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lok Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2521533, "end_char": 2521542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next step is the consideration of the said notice by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha."}}, {"text": "Rajya Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2521566, "end_char": 2521577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next step is the consideration of the said notice by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha."}}, {"text": "Supreme Codrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2523228, "end_char": 2523241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If thereafter the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the me:mbers of that House present and voting and an address is presented to the President in the prescribed manner by each House of\n\nParliament in the same session, a Judge of the Supreme Codrt or of a High Court can be removed from office."}}, {"text": "Bhagavad Gita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2524663, "end_char": 2524676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following words of the Bhagavad Gita are quite relevant here:\n\n11-34,\n\n(To the honourd, infamy is surely worse than death)\n\nIf a Judge with a bad reputation is transferred, then it would not subserve any public interest at all since the people in the State _ to which be is transferred will not have faith in him."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2525140, "end_char": 2525151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2525333, "end_char": 2525344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2525527, "end_char": 2525538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 218 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2525781, "end_char": 2525801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2526212, "end_char": 2526238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526716, "end_char": 2526727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526838, "end_char": 2526846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526910, "end_char": 2526921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526926, "end_char": 2526937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2526989, "end_char": 2527000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527603, "end_char": 2527614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527746, "end_char": 2527757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527768, "end_char": 2527779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527902, "end_char": 2527913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528005, "end_char": 2528016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528151, "end_char": 2528162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528362, "end_char": 2528373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528546, "end_char": 2528557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528816, "end_char": 2528826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529250, "end_char": 2529261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529344, "end_char": 2529355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529492, "end_char": 2529507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529648, "end_char": 2529659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2530421, "end_char": 2530432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2530980, "end_char": 2530991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531104, "end_char": 2531115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531164, "end_char": 2531175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531251, "end_char": 2531262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531317, "end_char": 2531328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531500, "end_char": 2531511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531569, "end_char": 2531581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531719, "end_char": 2531730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2532104, "end_char": 2532120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the term .'Judge' did not also include a 'Chief Justice' all Chief Justices of High Courts who were holding office immediately before the commencement of the Constitution had to vacate their offices on January 26, 1950 because Article 376 (1) and (2) referred to 'Judges' only."}}, {"text": "Article 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2532129, "end_char": 2532140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2532519, "end_char": 2532530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2533106, "end_char": 2533117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S,' Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2538456, "end_char": 2538469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The States Reorganisation Commission presided over by Justice S,' Fazal Ali, former Judge of the , Supreme Court of India • in its Report prepared in the year 1955 observed at paragraph 861 thus:\n\n\"861."}}, {"text": "M.C, Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2539634, "end_char": 2539647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Study Team on Centre-State Relationships (Shri M.C, Setalvad, former Attorney-General was the Chairman of the Team) appointed by the Administrative Reforms Commission also considered the question of appointment of High Court Judges in its Report submitted in the year 1968.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544414, "end_char": 2544425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "China", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2544991, "end_char": 2544996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the letter half of the eighteenth century in China, there was in vogue a rule called the 'Law of Avoidance'. \""}}, {"text": "Article 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2545704, "end_char": 2545714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 51A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2546396, "end_char": 2546407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 3, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2546549, "end_char": 2546564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; ...... \"\n\nArticle 51A of the Constitution which lays down the funda mental duties of the citizens of India was introduced into the Con•- titution with effect from January 3, 1977 probably to remind Indians of certain values which they were slowly neglecting during the period of thirty years following the independence of the country."}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2546869, "end_char": 2546883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2547638, "end_char": 2547645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire country from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari possesses this great inner bond of unity."}}, {"text": "Kanya Kumari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2547649, "end_char": 2547661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire country from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari possesses this great inner bond of unity."}}, {"text": "Supreme -Court who", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2549351, "end_char": 2549369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Are not the Judges of the Supreme -Court who come from different State deciding cases from all the States in which very often they have to construe one local law or the other ?"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2549856, "end_char": 2549867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation. Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2550562, "end_char": 2550595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the reorganisation of States took place in 1956, the States Reorganisation."}}, {"text": "H.N.\n\nKunzru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2550639, "end_char": 2550651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commission consisting of Shri Justice Fazal Ali, Shri H.N.\n\nKunzru and Shri K.M. Panikkar strongly pleaded as stated earlier for appointment of at least one-third of Judges of a High Court from outside the State.", "canonical_name": "H N.\n\nKunzru"}}, {"text": "Article 348", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2550873, "end_char": 2550884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2553775, "end_char": 2553786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2554944, "end_char": 2554955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2555185, "end_char": 2555196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2555348, "end_char": 2555359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2555916, "end_char": 2555927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 1, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2556849, "end_char": 2556861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 1, 1939, the submarine, Thetis, which had been built by the respondents in that case under contract with the Admiralty was undergoing her submergence test in Liverpool Bay, and while engaged in the operation of a trial dive sank to the bottom owing to the flooding '/ of her two foremost compartments and failed to return to the surface with the result that all who were in her, except four sur vivors were overwhelmed."}}, {"text": "Liverpool Bay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2557012, "end_char": 2557025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 1, 1939, the submarine, Thetis, which had been built by the respondents in that case under contract with the Admiralty was undergoing her submergence test in Liverpool Bay, and while engaged in the operation of a trial dive sank to the bottom owing to the flooding '/ of her two foremost compartments and failed to return to the surface with the result that all who were in her, except four sur vivors were overwhelmed."}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2561233, "end_char": 2561247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Simon who spoke for the House of Lords in this case expressed his disagreement with the decision of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia (No.2) (1)\n\n(1) [1931] AC 704.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simones"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of South Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2562092, "end_char": 2562124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) (1931) A.C. 704, the Judicial Committee reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had refused to order the inspection of documents which the minister in charge of the department objected to produce on grounds of public policy, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court with the direction that it was one proper for the exercise of the court's power of inspecting documents to determine whether their production would be prejudicial to the public welfare."}}, {"text": "du Parcq", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2563142, "end_char": 2563150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doubt expressed on the point by du Parcq L.J. in the present case is fully justified."}}, {"text": "Crown froceedings Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2564025, "end_char": 2564052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2564163, "end_char": 2564173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Crown froceedings Act, 1947", "statute": "the Crown froceedings Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Robinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2564526, "end_char": 2564534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Robinson's case (supra) which was dissented from by the House of Lords as stated above arose out of an action in South Australia."}}, {"text": "South Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2564639, "end_char": 2564654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Robinson's case (supra) which was dissented from by the House of Lords as stated above arose out of an action in South Australia."}}, {"text": "Grosvenor Hotel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2566631, "end_char": 2566646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2)(2) and Wednesbury Corporation v, Ministry of Housing and Local Government) (3) When it was asserted by the Attorney General that so long as the objection was taken in proper form, the Judge must treat the claim of privilege as conclusive, in Re Grosvenor Hotel's case (supra) Lord Denning, M.R. after referring to the practice prevailing in Scotland and Commonwealth countries, observed .at pages 361-362 thus :\n\n\"In view of these developments, I think that it is open to the House and I believe to us, to reconsider that matter : and I must say that, in my."}}, {"text": "C.K. Allen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2569673, "end_char": 2569683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Vide Appendix 4 to 'Law and Orders, by C.K. Allen, 2nd Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Viscount Kilmuir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2569712, "end_char": 2569728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir also made 'a statement on June 6, 195_6 in the House of Lords on the question of Crown privilege arising out of the decision in Duncan's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "June 6, 195_6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2569755, "end_char": 2569768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir also made 'a statement on June 6, 195_6 in the House of Lords on the question of Crown privilege arising out of the decision in Duncan's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Kilmuir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2570332, "end_char": 2570339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) that the disclosure of the particulardocument would injure public interest e.g. by endangering public security or prejudicing diplomatic relations and (b) that the document fell within a class which the public interest required to be withheld from production, Lord Kilmuir stated thus:\n\n\"The claiming of Crown privilege on the first ground that I have mentioned has always been acceptable to the courts and public opinion."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RllPORTS [1982] s.c.k", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2572052, "end_char": 2572087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suggestion goes much further than the position in Scotland, where the power of the judge is only exercisable 'in very special circumssances' and does not permit any examination of the ground of the\n\nSUPREME COURT RllPORTS [1982] s.c.k."}}, {"text": "Denoning M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573741, "end_char": 2573754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467-468)\n\nThe three decisions of the Court of Appeal nferred to above which had been decided by Lord Denoning M.R., Harman and Salmon, L.JJ.", "canonical_name": "Denoning M.R."}}, {"text": "Harman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573756, "end_char": 2573762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467-468)\n\nThe three decisions of the Court of Appeal nferred to above which had been decided by Lord Denoning M.R., Harman and Salmon, L.JJ.", "canonical_name": "Harmen"}}, {"text": "Salmon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573767, "end_char": 2573773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467-468)\n\nThe three decisions of the Court of Appeal nferred to above which had been decided by Lord Denoning M.R., Harman and Salmon, L.JJ.", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "Venkataramlah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573881, "end_char": 2573894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came up for consideration again before the Court of Appeal in\n\n.. I\n\n• -\n\nU•. GtJl>t'A v. tJ1'llON (Venkataramlah, J.) 1361\n\nConvay v. Rimmer (1) consisting of Lord Denning, M.R. Davies and Russell, L. JJ.. The relevant facts of this case were these.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "M.R. Davies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573955, "end_char": 2573966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came up for consideration again before the Court of Appeal in\n\n.. I\n\n• -\n\nU•. GtJl>t'A v. tJ1'llON (Venkataramlah, J.) 1361\n\nConvay v. Rimmer (1) consisting of Lord Denning, M.R. Davies and Russell, L. JJ.. The relevant facts of this case were these."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2573971, "end_char": 2573978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came up for consideration again before the Court of Appeal in\n\n.. I\n\n• -\n\nU•. GtJl>t'A v. tJ1'llON (Venkataramlah, J.) 1361\n\nConvay v. Rimmer (1) consisting of Lord Denning, M.R. Davies and Russell, L. JJ.. The relevant facts of this case were these.", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Browne", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2575077, "end_char": 2575083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Browne, J. allowed the appeal by the defendant and the Attorney General and disallowed the claim for discovery."}}, {"text": "Davies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2575657, "end_char": 2575663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other two learned Judges, however, felt that Duncan's case (supra) could not be departed from by the Court of Appeal and that the observations in the three cases referred to above questioning the validity of the privilege based on the class to which the particular document belonged were not binding Davies L.J. with whom Russell L.J. agreed observed at pp.", "canonical_name": "Davies"}}, {"text": "LORD DEN-\n\nNING", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2576077, "end_char": 2576092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LORD DEN-\n\nNING, M.R., HARMON and SALMON, L.JJ.. The judgments in those cases are, of course, most weighty and most interesting; but, within the greatest respect, ."}}, {"text": "HARMON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2576100, "end_char": 2576106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LORD DEN-\n\nNING, M.R., HARMON and SALMON, L.JJ.. The judgments in those cases are, of course, most weighty and most interesting; but, within the greatest respect, .", "canonical_name": "Harmen"}}, {"text": "SALMON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2576111, "end_char": 2576117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LORD DEN-\n\nNING, M.R., HARMON and SALMON, L.JJ.. The judgments in those cases are, of course, most weighty and most interesting; but, within the greatest respect, .", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "HARMAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2577092, "end_char": 2577098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Third, all those decidons proceeded on the basis that then: was a difference or dichotomy, as HARMAN, L.J: called it in Re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No.", "canonical_name": "Harmen"}}, {"text": "VISCOUNT SIMON", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2577680, "end_char": 2577694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fourth, all of the judgments proceeded on the basis that the observations of VISCOUNT SIMON in Duncan's case [1942] 1 All E.R. 587 as to class cases were obiter and wrong.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simones"}}, {"text": "Hodson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2581445, "end_char": 2581451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Hodson observed at page 904 : \"It is strange if civil servoots alone are supposed to be unable to be candid in their statements made in the course of duty without the protection of an absolute privilege denied other fellow subjects\"."}}, {"text": "Ross", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2584128, "end_char": 2584132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant said that there came into bis possession from an anonoymous source a copy of a letter written about him to the Board by Mr. Ross, Assistant Chief Constable of Sussex."}}, {"text": "Sussex", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2584163, "end_char": 2584169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant said that there came into bis possession from an anonoymous source a copy of a letter written about him to the Board by Mr. Ross, Assistant Chief Constable of Sussex."}}, {"text": "Edmund- Davies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2590149, "end_char": 2590163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And, though I agree with my noble and learned friend, Lord Edmund- Davies, in believing t411t l\\ court may ref11e t<?", "canonical_name": "Edmund- Davies"}}, {"text": "S.A. De Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2591324, "end_char": 2591337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, accoding to Prof. S.A. De Smith, as matters now stand \"a government department can seldom expect to succeed in a claim based solely on prospective deteriment.", "canonical_name": "S.A. de Smith"}}, {"text": "Gibbs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2595250, "end_char": 2595255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to refer to the observaions of Gibbs, A.C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Sankey v. Whit/an & Ors.(1} decided in November, 1978 at page 542 which are as follows :\n\n\"What are now equally well es'tablished are the respective roles of the court and of those usually the Crown\n\nwho assert Crown privilege.", "canonical_name": "Gibbs"}}, {"text": "William Marbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2599556, "end_char": 2599571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case William Marbury and three others severally moved the U.S. Supreme Court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State for the United States, to show cause as to why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as Justices of the Peace in the District of Columbia."}}, {"text": "District of Columbia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2599871, "end_char": 2599891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case William Marbury and three others severally moved the U.S. Supreme Court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State for the United States, to show cause as to why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as Justices of the Peace in the District of Columbia."}}, {"text": "Ar1ams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2599963, "end_char": 2599969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit fi, led in support of the petition they pleaded that Ar1ams the former President had nominated the applicants to tbe Senate for their advice and consent to be appointed Justices of the Peace ; that the Senate advised and consented to the appointments, that commissions in due form were signed by the said President appointing them Justices, that the seal of the urated States was in turn affixed to the said commissions and that Madison had declined to cause them to be delivered even though they had acquired the right to the offices."}}, {"text": "Levi Lincoln", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2600531, "end_char": 2600543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the proceedings certain questions were put to the Attorney-General Levi Lincoln relating to the Commissions and where they had been kept and on objection being raised to the questions the court said that 'if Mr. Lincoln wished time to consider what answers he should make, they would give him time, but they had no doubt he ought to answer."}}, {"text": "S. 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2601209, "end_char": 2601215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2601441, "end_char": 2601449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In United States v. Burr(4) Chief Justice Marshall ruled:\n\n\"thBt the President of the United States may be subpoenaed and examined as a witness and required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted.", "canonical_name": "Marshall"}}, {"text": "Wigmore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2602187, "end_char": 2602194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Wigmore the scope of the privilege in America, beyond secrets in the military or international sense is by no means clearly defind."}}, {"text": "Arthur Schles'inger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2607744, "end_char": 2607763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor Arthur Schles'inger Jr. States : \"The secrecy system has become much less a means by which Government protects national security than a means by which the Government safeguards its reputation, dissembles its purposes, buried its mistakes, mani pulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself\" (Quoted by Curt Mathews, St. Lewis Post-Despatch Feb. 26, 1973, sec."}}, {"text": "Curt Mathews", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2608062, "end_char": 2608074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor Arthur Schles'inger Jr. States : \"The secrecy system has become much less a means by which Government protects national security than a means by which the Government safeguards its reputation, dissembles its purposes, buried its mistakes, mani pulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself\" (Quoted by Curt Mathews, St. Lewis Post-Despatch Feb. 26, 1973, sec."}}, {"text": "Feb. 26, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2608100, "end_char": 2608113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor Arthur Schles'inger Jr. States : \"The secrecy system has become much less a means by which Government protects national security than a means by which the Government safeguards its reputation, dissembles its purposes, buried its mistakes, mani pulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself\" (Quoted by Curt Mathews, St. Lewis Post-Despatch Feb. 26, 1973, sec."}}, {"text": "Sweden", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2608590, "end_char": 2608596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pertinent to refer to the practice prevailing in Sweden."}}, {"text": "Donald C. Rowat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2608661, "end_char": 2608676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his article entitled 'Laws on Acces to Official Documents', Donald C. Rowat writes :-\n\n\"When I visited Sweden in 1973 to study its unique system of openness, I was lucky enough to accompany a reporter who worked for the Swedish national press agency, as he made his daily rounds of three government departments."}}, {"text": "Prussia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2610579, "end_char": 2610586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The official statistics of Prussia, in general, make public only what cannot do any harm to the intentions of the powerwielding bureaucracy."}}, {"text": "H.H. Gerth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2611884, "end_char": 2611894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans.),"}}, {"text": "C. Wright Mills", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2611899, "end_char": 2611914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans.),"}}, {"text": "Max Weber", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2611930, "end_char": 2611939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948, pp."}}, {"text": "Kegan Paul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2611984, "end_char": 2611994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948, pp."}}, {"text": "S.R.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2612033, "end_char": 2612049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "233-4) (By courtesy of Dr. S.R.\n\nMaheshwari).", "canonical_name": "S. R.\n\nMaheshwari"}}, {"text": "Gopal Krishna Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2612298, "end_char": 2612319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Opposing the Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill which came up for discqssion in the Imperial Legislative Assembly in March, 1903, Gopal Krishna Gokhale pleaded : ."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2612375, "end_char": 2612393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The proper and only remedy worthy of the British Government is not to gag newspapers as proposed in this Bill but to discourage the issue of confidential circulars which seek to take away in the dark what has been promised again and again in Acts of Parliament, the Proclamations of Sovereigns and the responsible utterances of successive viceroys."}}, {"text": "Saiyad Muhammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2614467, "end_char": 2614482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saiyad Muhammad and Asutosh Mukherjee also opposed the Bill. '"}}, {"text": "Asutosh Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2614487, "end_char": 2614504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saiyad Muhammad and Asutosh Mukherjee also opposed the Bill. '"}}, {"text": "S.R Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2614803, "end_char": 2614817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The need for making access to information about the activities of Government more liberal has been explained .by Dr. S.R Maheshwari in the book entitled ''.Open\n\nGovernment in India\" (1981) at pp.", "canonical_name": "S. R.\n\nMaheshwari"}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2617423, "end_char": 2617443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2617479, "end_char": 2617490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2618579, "end_char": 2618602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "(1961) 2 SCR 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2618897, "end_char": 2618913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2618979, "end_char": 2618994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2619469, "end_char": 2619475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Seervani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2619940, "end_char": 2619948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not impressed by Mr. Seervani's argument that the Act could not have intended that the head of the department would permit the production of a document which belongs to the noxious class.", "canonical_name": "Seervai E"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2621499, "end_char": 2621510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2622135, "end_char": 2622141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623269, "end_char": 2623275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623422, "end_char": 2623428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623583, "end_char": 2623589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623594, "end_char": 2623600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623681, "end_char": 2623687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623773, "end_char": 2623779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alagiris.wamy,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2623910, "end_char": 2623924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar question arose again before this Court in State of U.P. v. Raj Narain and Ors.(1) Ray, C.J. speaking for himself and Alagiris.wamy, Sarkaria and Untwalia, JLobserve.i&at pages 348-349 thus: ·\n\n\"The several decisions to which reference has already been made establish that the foundation of the law behind sections 123 and 163 of the Evidence Act is the same as in English law.", "canonical_name": "Alagiris.wamy,"}}, {"text": "sections 123 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2624098, "end_char": 2624118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yenkatafamiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2625475, "end_char": 2625488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yenkatafamiah, J.) 1385\n\ncontents of the document are so 'described that it could be seen at once that in the public interest the documents 'are to be withheld. (", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "S8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2630541, "end_char": 2630543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Burmah Oil Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2631836, "end_char": 2631850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The wise words of Lord Keith in Burmah Oil Co.' s case (supra) that the public interest might 'demand' though no doubt only in a very limited number of cases, that the inner working of government -should be exposed to public gaze, and there may be some, whowould regard this as likely to lead, not to captious or ill-informed criticism, but to criticism calculated to improve the nature of that working as affecting the individual citizen also had to be kept in view by the Court while dealing with this case."}}, {"text": "Bray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2633277, "end_char": 2633281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle was stated in a work of the highest authority 93 years ago by Bray J., Bray on Discovery, 1st ed. (", "canonical_name": "Bray"}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2633751, "end_char": 2633758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time such an undertaking has always been D implied, as Jenkins J. said in Alterskye v. Scott (1948) 1 All E.R. 469, 471."}}, {"text": "Talbot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2634016, "end_char": 2634022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modern authorities are well discussed by Talbot J. in Distillers Co. (Bichoimicals) Ltd. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1975) Q.B. 613, 621 and I would accept all he says, particularly as to the weighing of the public interest involved : see p. 625.\""}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2634502, "end_char": 2634513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2635018, "end_char": 2635029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S N. Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2635644, "end_char": 2635654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since Shri S N. Kumar himself took active interesf in the litigation and asked for relief, the absence of locus stand!", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2637023, "end_char": 2637034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2637574, "end_char": 2637588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2638396, "end_char": 2638407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2639425, "end_char": 2639439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi, High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2640044, "end_char": 2640061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the matter badbeen placed in the above light in this case perhaps the task of the Court would have been less onerous .. But in the course of the arguments, serious allegations of political vndetta, consplracy, malice, fraud etc, were made against the Prime Minister, Law Minister an_d the -Chief Justice of the Delhi, High Court."}}, {"text": "January I, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2641210, "end_char": 2641225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As can be seen from the List of Judges of the High Courts as on January I, 1980, there were 12 additional Judges in the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Jutice", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2641333, "end_char": 2641339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of them one died in 1980 and nine (including Mr. Jutice Wad) had been either made permanent ."}}, {"text": "Febrnary 19, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2644721, "end_char": 2644738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been appointed as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court before Febrnary 19, 1961 on which date he wrote the first letter expressing his opinion against the reappointment of Shri S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "Delhi High .Court is", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2644881, "end_char": 2644901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the Chief Justice of the Delhi High .Court is not impleaded as a respondent in the case."}}, {"text": "HIGH COURT OF DELHI", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2645572, "end_char": 2645591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In discharge of his constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Law Minister on Fi:brnary 19, 1981 as follows:\n\n\\. ••• , • i l\n\n[1982) 2 S.C, R.\n\nSECRET & CONFIDENTIAL\n\nCHIEF JUSTICE\n\nHIGH COURT OF DELHI\n\nD.O. No~ 275-HCJ/PPS\n\nNew Delhi, the 19th February, 1981\n\nMy dear Shiv Shankerji,\n\nMr. Justice S.N. Kumar was appointed an Additionai Judge of this Court for a period of two years vide Notificatfon No."}}, {"text": "Shiv Shankerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2645659, "end_char": 2645673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In discharge of his constitutional obligation, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Law Minister on Fi:brnary 19, 1981 as follows:\n\n\\. ••• , • i l\n\n[1982) 2 S.C, R.\n\nSECRET & CONFIDENTIAL\n\nCHIEF JUSTICE\n\nHIGH COURT OF DELHI\n\nD.O. No~ 275-HCJ/PPS\n\nNew Delhi, the 19th February, 1981\n\nMy dear Shiv Shankerji,\n\nMr. Justice S.N. Kumar was appointed an Additionai Judge of this Court for a period of two years vide Notificatfon No.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "P. Shiv Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2647312, "end_char": 2647327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regards,\n\nShri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice And Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi\".\"", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "PRAKASH NARAIN", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2647451, "end_char": 2647465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours sincerely,\n\nSd/-\n\n(PRAKASH NARAIN)\n\nA reading of the aforesaid ietter shows that it was being written in anguish and with a feeling of sincerity.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Na.rain"}}, {"text": "May 22, I 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2648401, "end_char": 2648414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that even the Chief Justice of India has not given the names of Judges and of lawyers who were consulted by him as stated in his Jetter dated May 22, I 981."}}, {"text": "Article 217( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2649620, "end_char": 2649635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Dell1i", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2649678, "end_char": 2649698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the High Court of Dell1i which is situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, consultation with the Governor does not arise (vide section 4 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966)."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2649802, "end_char": 2649811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2649819, "end_char": 2649845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2650037, "end_char": 2650051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi High Court Act, 1966", "statute": "the Delhi High Court Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "Y. V. Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2654654, "end_char": 2654671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ With warm regards,\n\nEncl: Hon'ble Mt. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, 5, Krishna Menon Marg, New Delhi.\"", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Prakash Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2654757, "end_char": 2654771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Prakash Narain)\n\nAlongwith this letter, a statement of cases was sent as stated in its last paragraph.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Na.rain"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi\n\nNew Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2655077, "end_char": 2655107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That letter runs as under :\n\n\"Secret\n\nChief Justice High Court of Delhi\n\nNew Delhi\n\nD.O. NO."}}, {"text": "Shiv Shankerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2655208, "end_char": 2655222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "293-HCJ/PPS March 28, 198l\n\n•' -\n\nI S.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 1399\n\nMy dear Shiv Shankerji,\n\nI am in receipt of your D.O. No.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "12th November, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2657542, "end_char": 2657561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268-HCJ/PPS dated 12th November, 1980 on the complaints of Shri Sabir Hussain."}}, {"text": "Vobra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2658037, "end_char": 2658042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I may please be informed whether the nature of cases assig ned to Justice Kumar, in the terms of time normally required for their disposal, was roughly similar to the nature of cases disposed of by Justice Vobra and Justice Wad."}}, {"text": "Sabir Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2662965, "end_char": 2662978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "complaint of Mr. Sabir Hussain, Advocate, I had looked into he relevant files besides showing the complaint to Justice Kumar.", "canonical_name": "Sabir Hussains"}}, {"text": "ice V ohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2665610, "end_char": 2665620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no special distinction between the work that was being done by the Bench of which Justice Kumar was a member and the Benches of which Just ice V ohra and Justice Wad were the members."}}, {"text": "Penkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2666549, "end_char": 2666562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dttPtA ' UNION (Penkataramiah, J.) 1405\n\nI Letters Patent Appeal, 9 Civil Writ Petitions and 1 First Appeal from Order besides 7 Misc.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "P. Shiv Shanker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2667649, "end_char": 2667664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regards,\n\nBriel: 3 Shri P. Shiv Shanker, Minister of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.\"", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": ". N. Vohra G", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2667893, "end_char": 2667905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Prakash Narain)\n\nThree statements are enclosed with this letter showing the\n\nnumber of cases disposed of by Sbri S.B. Wad, Shri 0.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "i'enkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2670204, "end_char": 2670218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OUP'tA v. UNION (i'enkataramiah, J.) 1407\n\nHe categorically informed me that he.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "P. Shiv Shankar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2671085, "end_char": 2671100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary (Justice)\"\n\nSd/· (P. Shiv Shankar)\n\n19-5-81.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "19-5-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2671103, "end_char": 2671110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary (Justice)\"\n\nSd/· (P. Shiv Shankar)\n\n19-5-81."}}, {"text": "Wad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2672979, "end_char": 2672982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "True, that there are no complaints against Shri Wad.", "canonical_name": "Wad"}}, {"text": "Sliri O.N. Vohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2673120, "end_char": 2673136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is to say, Sliri O.N. Vohra, Shri S.N. Kumar and Shri S.B. Wad should all be extended by six months.\""}}, {"text": "S.N; Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2673645, "end_char": 2673655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When you had tendered your advice dated 3rd March,· 1981 the following I.B. report regarding Shri\n\nS.N; Kumar had been brought to your notice :- . ,", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "Y.V~ Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2674238, "end_char": 2674254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regards,\n\nShri Y.V~ Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court, New Delhi.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Shiv Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2674784, "end_char": 2674796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the urgency involved; the Chief Justice of India sent his reply as per letter of May 22, 1981 through a special messenger from Simla to the Law Minister which reads as follows :-\n\n\"Chief Justice of India\n\nConfidential By Special Messenger\n\nMy dear Shiv Shanker,\n\nSupreme Court of India New Delhi\n\nCamp: Simla May 22, 1981\n\nI am in receipt of your letter (D.O. No.", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India New Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2674799, "end_char": 2674831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the urgency involved; the Chief Justice of India sent his reply as per letter of May 22, 1981 through a special messenger from Simla to the Law Minister which reads as follows :-\n\n\"Chief Justice of India\n\nConfidential By Special Messenger\n\nMy dear Shiv Shanker,\n\nSupreme Court of India New Delhi\n\nCamp: Simla May 22, 1981\n\nI am in receipt of your letter (D.O. No."}}, {"text": "T.P.S. Chawla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2677081, "end_char": 2677094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Kumar was sitting with Justice T.P.S. Chawla for quite some time during the period under consideration and it is a matter of wide knowlege that Justice Chawla takes an enormously long time over the cases which come before him."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2679051, "end_char": 2679063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You have annexed to your letter an extract of a further report from the r. B. which says that :\n\n(Portion relating to l.B. report omitted)\n\nOn my return on May 26, 1981 I will get into touch with Justice Kumar and make enquiries from him as also from other persons who are likely :o be in the know of the matter."}}, {"text": "Y. V. Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2679558, "end_char": 2679575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Y. V. Chandrachud)\n\nThis letter recommends a further extension by three months to Shri S.N. Kumar pending further enquiry by the Chief Justice of India on the contents of some l.B. report.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Ku.mar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2679944, "end_char": 2679950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) that serious complaints were received against Justice S.N. Kumar orally as well as in writing;\n\n(2) that Justice Ku.mar was not very helpful in disposing of cases; and (3) that some responsible members of the Bar and the Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumar's integrity\" given by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court were unsustainable.", "canonical_name": "Shti Kumar"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2680612, "end_char": 2680634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest of the contents are self-explanatory.. This\n\nleter is followed by the letter of May 29, 1981 by the Chief Justice of lndia to tile Law Mipister whi1; h rµns as under ; ~\n\ns.P. GUPTA v. UNION (Venkataramiah; J.) 1413\n\n\"CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA\n\nConfidential\n\nMy Dear Shiv Shanker,\n\nSUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\nNEW DELHI May 29, 1981\n\nWhile in Simla, I received your letter dated May 21, 1981 in connection with the extension of the term of Justice S.N. Kumar and Justice S.B. Wad whose term as Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court is due to expire on June 6, 1981."}}, {"text": "Y.V. Chandrachud", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2682505, "end_char": 2682521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours sincerely,\n\nSd/- (Y.V. Chandrachud)\n\nThis letter recommends an extension of two years of Shri S.N.\n\nKumar instead of three months' extension recommended in the letter of May 22, 1981.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "22. 5. 81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2683368, "end_char": 2683377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I regret that notwithstanding my specific request as to details, the CJ.I. did not furnish me the same and on the contrary reading his letter dated 22."}}, {"text": "C.J. Dellii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2684941, "end_char": 2684952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it were that simple I would not have joined issue, but the details furnished by the C.J. Dellii in his letter dated 7-5-81 go further.", "canonical_name": "C.J. Dell1i"}}, {"text": "7-5-81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2684973, "end_char": 2684979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it were that simple I would not have joined issue, but the details furnished by the C.J. Dellii in his letter dated 7-5-81 go further."}}, {"text": "C.J. Drlhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2685487, "end_char": 2685497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the veiws of C.J. Drlhi_ be given credence as it is in his association that the Judge concerned discharges his duties and that .he has a better occasion and opportunity to watch his working and conduct.", "canonical_name": "C.J. Dell1i"}}, {"text": "O.N.\n\nVohra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2688586, "end_char": 2688597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For similar reasons you were particular that your letter regarding Shri O.N.\n\nVohra should not be sent to him as also for the additional reason that a senior counsel whose name figured .therein had enjoined secrecy.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "O.N.\n\nVohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2688758, "end_char": 2688769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Your letter regarding Shri O.N.\n\nVohra dated 22nd May, 1981 has since been received by us.", "canonical_name": "O.N. V.:ihra"}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2692258, "end_char": 2692261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High , Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2693545, "end_char": 2693563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "informed the Chief Justice of India that the old established practice in Delhi High , Court is that.a part heard matter goes with the Judges and is heard by him whether he goes over from the appellate side to the original side or vice versa."}}, {"text": "March 26, 1981.and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2694852, "end_char": 2694870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That means that the Chief Justice of India had been furnished all the particulars by the Delhi Chief Justice earlier at the meeting which took place on March 26, 1981.and the Chief Justice of}ndia had also the explanation of Shri S.N. Kumar."}}, {"text": "Delhi High. Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2695527, "end_char": 2695544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High."}}, {"text": "Sanjay Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2697079, "end_char": 2697092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court had stated that he was looking int<,> the file of the 'Kissa Kursi Ka' case in which Shri 0.N. Vohra had convicted late Shri Sanjay Gandhi (son of the Pi:ime Minister) who was later on acquitted by the Supreme\n\nCourt, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court was looking into irrelevant papers at the instance of the Law Minister or the Prime Minister to find out some material against Shri O.N. Vohra who was also not continued as additional Judge and hence his opinion given against Shri S.N. Kumar also was a motivated one."}}, {"text": "Kissa Kursi Ka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2697547, "end_char": 2697561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the above reference to his looking into the file of 'Kissa Kursi Ka' case, we do not have any other material to draw the above conclusjon except the fact that Shri Vohra also had not been continued.", "canonical_name": "Kissa Kursi Ka Case"}}, {"text": "Sbri Vohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2697782, "end_char": 2697792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Vohra himself has not questioned the decision taken in his behelf."}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700132, "end_char": 2700146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700867, "end_char": 2700881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2701167, "end_char": 2701178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.N. K'umar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2702637, "end_char": 2702648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fiist, the Court directed for the purpose of deciding this case the disclosure of the documents relating .to , the ' appointment to a high constitutional office which may not have been possible in any other Commonwealth country even now and secondly the Court has come to the conclusion that it is open to the Court to determine whether the decision not to reappoint Shri S.N. K'umar was due to cogent reasons or not in the peculiar circumstances of this case even when the relevant constitutional provisions are silent about it.", "canonical_name": "Sbri S.N.\n\nKumar"}}, {"text": "High Court df Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2703795, "end_char": 2703814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the President not to appoint Shri S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the High Court df Delhi cannot, therefore, be interfered with. ."}}, {"text": "P. Shiv Shanker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2707123, "end_char": 2707138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- (P. Shiv Shanker)\n\nChief Ministers (by name) (except North-Eastern States)\n\nIn its Fourteenth Report, the Law Commission suggested that\n\nF .", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nShiv Shanker"}}, {"text": "Adminisirative Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2709711, "end_char": 2709744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise, the Study Team on Centre-State Relations appointed by _the Adminisirative Reforms Commission also suggested that so far as practicable one-third of the number of judges of a High Court\n\nhould be from."}}, {"text": "~Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2712242, "end_char": 2712254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While rejecting the contention that the transfers of High Court Judges during the emergency in the year 1976 had been made in the interests of national integration, ~Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) observed in Sakal Chand Seth's case (supra) at page 450 thus :\n\n\"As regard the first, no one can deny that whatever measures are required to be taken in order to achieve national integration would be in public interest.", "canonical_name": "Y; V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 SCR 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2716637, "end_char": 2716652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2716905, "end_char": 2716916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Irtdia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2717299, "end_char": 2717305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is insisted upon, the cons.ultation with the Chief\n\nJustice of Irtdia itself may turn out to be ineffective for the very same reason for he cannot be expected to have personal knowlege about many persons whose names are recommended by the Chief Justices of the various High Courts and Governors."}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2717550, "end_char": 2717561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2718298, "end_char": 2718312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2718409, "end_char": 2718423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719227, "end_char": 2719241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719506, "end_char": 2719517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719551, "end_char": 2719565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719772, "end_char": 2719786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719998, "end_char": 2720013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 224(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2720017, "end_char": 2720031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2721353, "end_char": 2721367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2721761, "end_char": 2721775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2721780, "end_char": 2721791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722068, "end_char": 2722082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722202, "end_char": 2722216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722256, "end_char": 2722267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KB.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2722723, "end_char": 2722734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PART XI\n\nWe are concerned in the case of Shri KB.N. Singh with the question Whther the order of his transfer as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras is valid or not.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2722948, "end_char": 2722959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2723308, "end_char": 2723319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2723857, "end_char": 2723868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2724093, "end_char": 2724104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "fodia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2725090, "end_char": 2725095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fair reading of the letter of the Chief Justice of fodia dated December 7, 1980 shows that there was prior discussion about the question of transfers of Chief Justices of High Courts and that there was a suggestion by the Government that.there should be atransfer of all Chief Justices of High Courts so that in every High .. C.ourt there was a Chief Justice who hailed from outside the State."}}, {"text": "ofllndia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2726025, "end_char": 2726033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even 1though it' appears from someof the speeches of the Law Ministert.that such a policy had not taken a fi'nal shape, the ChierJustice:ofllndia had been told that the Government had'an'ideato bring1int0forcesuch a policy before the middle1ofl980.. From certain notings\" on the file• relating to the appointment of ChieHustice of the Delhi High Curt which weredisclosed by'the Union Governmnt as per ordersof the Court dated November.18, 1981 it.", "canonical_name": "ofllndia"}}, {"text": "C.J.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2727771, "end_char": 2727777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would avoid discriminatory treatment which would have otherwise invited undue criticism ..\n\nIn view of the discussion with the C.J.I., it appears desirable to appoint Shri Justice Prakash Na.rain as the Permanent Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and Shri Justice Kuppuswami as Permanent Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, subject to the general policy decition oil having the Chief Justice: from outsid.e that High Court."}}, {"text": "Prakash Na.rain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2727824, "end_char": 2727839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would avoid discriminatory treatment which would have otherwise invited undue criticism ..\n\nIn view of the discussion with the C.J.I., it appears desirable to appoint Shri Justice Prakash Na.rain as the Permanent Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and Shri Justice Kuppuswami as Permanent Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, subject to the general policy decition oil having the Chief Justice: from outsid.e that High Court.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Na.rain"}}, {"text": "Kuppuswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2727912, "end_char": 2727922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would avoid discriminatory treatment which would have otherwise invited undue criticism ..\n\nIn view of the discussion with the C.J.I., it appears desirable to appoint Shri Justice Prakash Na.rain as the Permanent Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and Shri Justice Kuppuswami as Permanent Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, subject to the general policy decition oil having the Chief Justice: from outsid.e that High Court."}}, {"text": "Moreoye", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2733782, "end_char": 2733789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the said statement is in a letter and not in a statute and is one made in the context of previous correspondence and discussions which have gone on for some\n\nS.P. GtJPt~, v. VNION.{Penkataramialr, J.) 1437\n\ntie in an inforryial W~Y: Moreoye, r: a, p.J?ljcy is, not somethiJ)gv wbih should take the form of a formal statute or a written code."}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2734399, "end_char": 2734410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M, M,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2736121, "end_char": 2736126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justices-Shri M, M, Ismail and Shri K.-B.N. Singh were transferredat thC'first instance."}}, {"text": "K.-B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2736143, "end_char": 2736156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justices-Shri M, M, Ismail and Shri K.-B.N. Singh were transferredat thC'first instance.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2737009, "end_char": 2737020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2737031, "end_char": 2737045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B N. Singli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2738849, "end_char": 2738862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that earlier the ChiefJusiice .if India had recom mended that Shri K.B N. Singli should be transferred to the R.ajasthan High Court.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "R.ajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2738892, "end_char": 2738913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that earlier the ChiefJusiice .if India had recom mended that Shri K.B N. Singli should be transferred to the R.ajasthan High Court."}}, {"text": "J(B.N. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2739019, "end_char": 2739031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of transfers then proposed;' It had not taken a final shape since s'hri J(B.N. Singh had not yet been informed about it and his views liad not yet been ascertained.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "M.M. !Smail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2739155, "end_char": 2739166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when 'it was decided to transfer Shri M.M. !", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2739807, "end_char": 2739818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2739898, "end_char": 2739909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741300, "end_char": 2741311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 8,. 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2741676, "end_char": 2741692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again on January 8,."}}, {"text": "Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2741693, "end_char": 2741714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1981 Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met thei Chief Justice of.", "canonical_name": "Sbrj K.B.N. Singh.met"}}, {"text": "Slfri'K'.B~N. SingH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2741927, "end_char": 2741946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the• Chief Justice of India.reads : •\n\n\"2(f) It is true, as stated by Slfri'K'."}}, {"text": "M:M.\n\nIsmail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2742103, "end_char": 2742115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B~N. SingH in paragraph 8 of bis affidavit, that I conveyed 'to him onthe evening of January 5, 19811 over thetelepb'one that it was proposed to transfer Shri Justice M:M.\n\nIsmail to Kerala and that he, Shri K.B; N: Singh mayhave to go to Madras.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "K.B!N; Singli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2742202, "end_char": 2742215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I telephoned'Shri K.B!N; Singli on January 5, 1981 in order to zpprise him of the likeli\n\nhQQd , of.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "MiM. Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2742746, "end_char": 2742757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was .piopPSed to transfer Shri Justice MiM. Ismail ."}}, {"text": "IIle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2743878, "end_char": 2743882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Sbri K.B.N. Singh has stated in patagraph 9 of his affidavit that be tnet me in Delhi three or four day!i later, told IIle or his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties in the event of his transfer to Madras, that he was with me for about 10-15 minutes and that t was nott-committal in the matter of his transfer."}}, {"text": "K. B. N Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2746041, "end_char": 2746054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) The statement contained in paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Shri K. B. N Singh that he had not conveyed to me his consent to the proposed transfer is true.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Venkatciramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2747603, "end_char": 2747617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. GUPTA Y. UNION (Venkatciramiah, J.) 1443\n\nPatna to Madras as the Chief Justice of the Madras High ; Court.", "canonical_name": "Venkatararniah"}}, {"text": "January 8, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2748281, "end_char": 2748295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not possible fo accept the submission that _no such discu)lsion could have taken place at all after Shri K B.N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India on the evening of January 8, 198 I because the Prime Minister had taken the decision on January 9, I 981 and there was no written record in support of it."}}, {"text": "January 9, I 981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2748351, "end_char": 2748367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not possible fo accept the submission that _no such discu)lsion could have taken place at all after Shri K B.N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India on the evening of January 8, 198 I because the Prime Minister had taken the decision on January 9, I 981 and there was no written record in support of it."}}, {"text": "K.B.N.' Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2749723, "end_char": 2749736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, therefore, no merit in this contention also,\n\nThe last submission on the above question was that whereas the Chief Justice of India had recommended that Shri K.B.N.' Singh should be transferred as a part of selective transfers, the President had treated them as part of the policy of haviiJg a Chief Justice in every High Court from outside the State which had not taken a final shape and therefore there was no consensus on the object to be achieved by the transfer.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB. COURT RB1>6RTS (1982] 2 s.c.tt.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2750150, "end_char": 2750190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB."}}, {"text": "M.M Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2750795, "end_char": 2750805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transfers of Shri M.M Ismail and Shri K.B.N. Slngh were ord.ered.", "canonical_name": "M.M,'.K. Ismail"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Slngh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2750815, "end_char": 2750827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transfers of Shri M.M Ismail and Shri K.B.N. Slngh were ord.ered.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2751508, "end_char": 2751519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.B.N. Sin'gh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2751651, "end_char": 2751664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But since the c'aurt is informed that both the Chief Ministers had been consulted about the transfer of Shri K.B.N. Sin'gh, there is no need to probe into this point any further,,\n\nThe decision to transfer a Judge under Article 222 of the Constitution, as already stated, is an administrative one.", "canonical_name": "K.B.N. Singh 011"}}, {"text": "Article 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2751762, "end_char": 2751773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 SCR 34", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2752580, "end_char": 2752595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2753796, "end_char": 2753807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2754043, "end_char": 2754054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1969] 3 SCR 108", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2754857, "end_char": 2754873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".President of United States", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2757679, "end_char": 2757706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".President of United States\n\nAs is also true in the case of a state governor, which' in most respects is' a similar office' mandamus does not lie to control the administrative or executive discretion of the President of the United States, and if the President delegates one of his functions to another officer, an order by the latter is an administrative order of the President, which .cannot be vacated by mandamus."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2760128, "end_char": 2760139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Agriculture Marketing Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2761261, "end_char": 2761292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Miik Marketing Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2761565, "end_char": 2761585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint of the appellants who were members of the sou'th east regional committee of the Miik Marketing Board was that the board's terms and prices for the sale of milk to the board did not take fully into account the variations between the producers and the cost of bringing milk to a liquid market."}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2762494, "end_char": 2762501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Court of Appeal by a majority (Diplock and Russel L. JJ.", "canonical_name": "Diplock"}}, {"text": "Russel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2762506, "end_char": 2762512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Court of Appeal by a majority (Diplock and Russel L. JJ.", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Denning M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2762525, "end_char": 2762537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning M.R. disseritirig) set aside the order of-the Divisional Court.", "canonical_name": "Denoning M.R."}}, {"text": "Upjon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2763532, "end_char": 2763537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Upjon in his concurring judgment observed that even if the words in a statute conferred an unfetterep discretion on the Minister, it ought not to make any difference in this case.", "canonical_name": "Upjohn"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2764015, "end_char": 2764020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Padfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2764761, "end_char": 2764769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The importance of he decision in Padfield's case (supra) was underscored by Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v.\n\nAma/¥amatq Engineering Union(1) thus :\n\n\"The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered."}}, {"text": "Article 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2766472, "end_char": 2766483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2770862, "end_char": 2770866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_2_53_68_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "JAIN MALLEABLES\n\nBHARAT SAHAY\n\nDecember 8, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL {SLAM\n\nAND A. V ARADARAJAN, JJ.]\n\n53 A\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958, section 14A (I) read with .1ection 25B and C\n\nGovernmet of India Notifications dated 9-9-1975 and 14-7-1,977, scope of.\n\nThe respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant, under 'section i4A read with section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground of requirement for personal occupation, in view of the fact that he\n\nas forced to pay penal rent of Rs. 1,448 from his Government accommodation as per Government of India notification dated 9-9-1975 and the special order dated 22-1-1916 requiring him to. vacate the Government accommodation by 31-12-1975. After presentation of the eviction petition and service of notice under section 25B of the Act, the appellant filed a petition for grant of leave to defend the main petition and raised several objections in the written statement. One such objection was that in view of the later circular of the Government dated 14-7-19\"7, the respo!ldent was not required to vacate the Government accommodation and, therefore, he w11s not entitled to evict the appellants under the provisions of section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The said objection having been disallowed by the Additional 'Rent Controiler the appell!!nt filed Civil Revision Petition before the Delhi High Court, which met with the same fate. Hence the appeal against that order by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : I. The respondent landlord is entitled to have recourse to section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for evicting the appellants from the premises in question.\n\n[68 A-B]\n\nThe second notification dated 14-7-1977 of the Government, without taking away the obligation imposed by the first notification dated 9-9-75 on Govern men! employees owning houses in their own names or in the name of any other member of their families, within the limits of their place of posting, vacate the Government accomodation within three months from !st of October, 1975, has given an option to those employees to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to the obligation mentioned in the second notification, namely, that. the house owning Government employee will have to pay normal rent for the Government accommodation if the income from his 1>wn ho11se does not e11ceed Rs 1,000 per mensem half the market rent if the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [!982] 2 s.c.il.\n\nincome from his own house exceeds Rs. 1,000 per mensem but does not exceed Rs. 2,000/- per mensem and full market rent if the income from his house is above Rs. 2,000 per mensem with effect from 1-6-1977. [64 C-E]\n\n3. In the present case, (iJ even apart from the first notification dated 9-9-1975 which is general in nature and has been modified by the second notification dated 14-7-1977 there is the stiecial. order dated 22-1-1976 which required the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation by 31-12-1975, failing which he is to pay market rent with effect from 1-1-1976: (ii) the market rent/ licence fee which the respondent had to pay for the Government accommodation on the date of institution of the Eviction Petilion was Rs. 1,448 per mensem and it had been increased to Rs. 1,543 per mensem and further enhanced to Rs. 2,898 per mensem by the letter dated 17/18-7-1981 of the Assistant Director of Estates addressed to the respondent: (iii) there is nothing on record to show that the obligation imposed upon respondent by the first notification to vacate the Government accommodation within three months from !st of October, 1975 and by the special order dated 22-1-1976 by 31st December, 1975 has been withdrawn; (iv) the respondent has an option to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to certain obligations contained in the two notifications without vacating the Government accommoda tion within a period of three months from 1st of October, 1975 and (v) it is not open t.o the apoellants to compel the respondent to exercise his option and continue to occupy the Government accommodation in order that he may continue to occupy the premises in question as the tenant. [64 E-H, 65 A-BJ\n\nBusching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani and Anr., [1977] 3 S.C.R. 312 referred to.\n\nE K.D. Singh v. Shri Hari Babu Kanwal, [1980] 1 RCR 90, overruled.\n\nJ.L. Paul v. Ranjit Singh, [1980] 2 SCR 527, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTJoN : Civil Appeal No. 1472 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the !st February, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. I 22 of 1980.\n\nMadan Bhatia, Rojiv Behl and Sushi! Kumar for the Appellant.\n\nL.M. Singhvi, L.R. Gupta M. V. Goswami and L. K. Pandey for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the one word order dated 1.2.1980 ofthe learned Single Judge of the\n\n1A1N MALlEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 55\n\nDelhi High Court dismissing Civil Revision Petition No. I 22 of 1980 in limine.\n\nThe tenants who were respondents in the Rent Control Eviction Petition, filed the Civil Revision Petition against the Rent Controller's order dated 30. 10.1979, declining to permit them to raise certain grounds of defence while granting leave to defend the eviction petition on certain other grounds.\n\nSpecial leave to appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court has been granted by this Court only on the question whether s. 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is applicable or not to the facts and circumstances of the case \"in view of the later Circular of 1977\". The \"later Circular of 1977\" mentioned in the special leave granted by this Court on 5.8.1980 is the Office Memorandum dated 14.7.1977 of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Directorate of Estates, hereinafter referred to as the \"second notification\".\n\nThe same Joint Secretary to the Government of India in the same Ministry had issued the earlier Memorandum dated 9.9.1975, hereinafter referred to as the \"first notification\".\n\nThe respondent-landlord filed the Petition for eviction of the apellants under s. 14A read with s. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the \"Act\". In the Eviction Petition the respondent had alleged that by virtue of his being a Government servant he has been allotted residential accommodation at No. 83 Lodhi Estate, New Delhi since November 1971. Under the first notification he is required to vacate the Government accommodation and shift to his own house No. 11-B Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, which is now in the occupation of the appellants, and if he failed to do so he is to incur the obligation of paying rent/licence fee of Rs 1,448 per mensem on the ground that he owns a residential building in the Union Territory of Delhi and still continues to occupy Government accommodation: The appellants have not vacated the premises occupied by them in spite of several assurances given by them since February 1976. The respondent is paying a penal rent of Rs. 1,448 per mensem for the Government accommodation because he had not vacated that accomodation provided to him by the Government as a Government servant.\n\nAfter presentation of the Eviction Petition and service of notice under s. 25B of the Act, the appellants filed a Petition for grant of leave to defend the main Petition. One of the objections disallowed, with which we are concerned in this appeal, is that in view of the second notification the respondent is not required to vacate the\n\nSUPREME toURt REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.i.\n\nGovernment accommodation now available to him and that he is, therefore, not entitled to evict the appellants under the provisions of s. 14A of the Act. The Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellants against the order of the Additional Rent Controller has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as mentioned above. The appellants have, therefore, filed this appeal by special leave against that order.\n\nWe are concerned in this appeal with s. 14A (I) of the Act, which reads thus :\n\n\"14A (1) Where landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him .by the Central Government or any local authority is required, by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns, in the Union territory of Delhi, a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order to such landlord notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession of _any premises let out by him :\n\nProvided that nothing in this section shall be construed as conferring a right on a landkird owning, in the Unio, o territory of Delhi, two or more dwelling houses, whether in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, to recover the possession of more than one dwelling house and it shall be lawful for suci1 landlord to indicate the dwelling house, possession of which he intends to recover.\n\nThere is no dispute that the respondent is the owner of the premises in question, namely, 11-B Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, now occupied by the appellants on a rent of Rs. 2, I 00 per mensem and that he is at present in occupation of Government accommodation at No. 83 Lodhi Estate, New Delhi and is obliged to pay\n\nJAIN MALLEABLES v. ilil:ARAT SAiIAY (Varadara}an, J.) )1\n\npenal rent/licence fee of Rs. 1,448 per mensem.\n\nThe relevant por tion of the first notification reads thus :\n\n\"That undersigned is directed to say that the question of allotment of Government residential accommodation to officers owing houses at or near the stations of their posting\n\nhas been under consideration of Government for some B time past. It has now been decided, in supersession of all previous orders on the subject, as follows :-\n\n(i) Those Government servants, who build houses in future at the place of their posting, within the limits of C any local or adjoining municipality, whether with or without Government assistance, or who become owners of houses .in future-either in their own names or in the names of any members of their familiesshall be required to vacate Government accommoda tion in their occupation from the date their own houses 0 are fit for occupation.\n\n(ii) Those Government servants, who have already built houses at the place of their posting within the limits of any local or adjoining municipality' whether with or without Government assistance, or who own houses either in their own names or in the names of any members of their families-shall be required to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them, within three months from the 1st of October 1975.\n\nIf they do not vacate Government accommodation after that period, they would be charged licence fee at market rates.\n\n(iii) Hence onward, no Government accommodation should be allotted to an officer O\\irning a house at the place of his posting within the limits of any local or adjoining municipality.\n\nA certificate shall be obtained from a prospective allottee that he has no house at the station of his posing within the limits of any local or adjoining municipality-either in his own name or in name of any member of his family.\n\n(iv)\n\nSUPREME cobR'i' REPOR.ts [ 19821 i s.c.Ii..\n\n(v)\n\nThe Ministry of Home Affairs, etc. are requested to bring the above decision of Government to the notice of all their attached and subordinate offices, and ensure that the decision is implemented in respect of different pools of Government residence under their control.\n\n4. Jn so far as general pool accommodation is concerned, the Ministry of Home Affairs, etc., are requested to bring this to the notice of all Government Servants who are eligible for general pool accommodation as well as those who have already been allotted accommodation from the general pool, asking them by 15th October, 1975 to indicate whether they have their own houses as covered by these orders.\n\nIn case they have, a declaration may be obtained from them in the prescribed proforma and forwarded to the Directorate of Estate (Coordination I Section) by 15th November, 1975.\n\nOther officers who do not own houses should also furnish a declaration to that effect.\n\nAll officials who have been allotted general pool accommodation may be advised that it is their responsibility to inform the Directorate of Estates, when they or any member of their families become owners of houses in future, within one month from the date of becoming such owners. All officers eligible for general pool accommodation may also be warned that severe action will be taken against them in case they furnish any incorrect information\".\n\nIn addition to this general first notification relating to Government accommodation in the occupation of Government employees there is a special order dated 22.1.1976 of the Assistant Director of Estates, New Delhi calling upon the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation No. 83 Lodhi Estate allotted to him since 31.12.1975, failing which he would be charged market rent with effect from 1.1.1976 at the rate fixed by Government from time to time and informing him that a .bill at the market rate of licence fee for the said premises will follow.\n\nJAIN MALLEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 59\n\nIn the affidavit filed in support of the Petition for grant of leave to defend the main Eviction Petition the appellants have stated that the respondent is occupying a huge, massive and palatial bungalow in the Lodhi Estate, New Delhi built on an area of about two acres and allotted to him by the Government and that whereas he is paying an alleged rent of Rs. 1,448 per mensem for that accommodation, he is getting a rent of Rs. 2, 100 per mensem for his premises occupied by the appellants and he is thereby gaining a sum of Rs. 652 per mensem. The appellants have further stated in that affidavit that there is a clear shift in the policy of the Government whereby Government accommodation is made available to even those employees who happen to have their own houses at Delhi and that Government have modified the notification relied upon by the respondent whereby house owing officials have become eligible for allotment of Government accommodation at the places of their posting with effect from 1.6.1977.\n\nThe notification said to modify the first notificatition is the second notification. The relevant portion of that notification reads thus:\n\n\"The undersigned is directed to say that the orders contained in this Ministry's office Memorandum No. 12031 (1)/74-Pol. II, dated 9.9.1975, as modified from time to time have been reconsidered. Government has decided that the restrictions on allotment of accommodation to houses owning officers should be modified with effect from l.6.1977, making house owning officers eligible for Government accommodation as communicated in this Ministry's Office Memorandum of even number dated the 29th June,\n\n1977. It has also been decided that allotment of such accommodation to a house owning official will be on normal rent if the income from his own house does not exceed Rs. 1,000 p.m. or half the market rent if the income exceeds Rs. 1,000 p.m. but does not exceed Rs. 2,000 p.m. and on full market rent if the income is above Rs. 2,000 p.m. Rent will be recovered on the same basis w.e.f, 1.6.1977 also from those house owing officials who are retaining Government accommodation on payment of market rents.\n\nThese decisions will apply equally whether the house is owned by the officer or bis/her wife/husbanc\\ or by his/her dependent children,\n\nSUPREMt COURT REPOR'JS\n\n(1982) 2 s.c.R.\n\n3. Allotment of accommodation to house owning officers who have already vacated Government accommodation.\n\nSuch officers will be considered for allotment of accommodation in their turn on the basis of their priority date under the allotment rules.\n\nNo preference should be shown to them in the matter of allotment in consideration of the fact that they were earlier in occupation of Government accommodation and bad vacated it in compliance with the earlier orders to which the officers are normally entitled without restriction of any locality or without any reference to the types of accommodation which the officers were occupying previously.\n\nAs usual, officers eligible for types V and above should also be considered for allotment in the types next below on the basis of their priority for such types.\n\nAfter accepting initial allotment, they will be eligible for change in the normal manner in accordance with the allotment rules.\n\nIn so for as the general pool is concerned officers who have already vacated Government accommodation may submit fresh applications for allotment of accommodation in the prescribed application form, indicating the details of the houses owned by them or their spouses or dependent children, alongwitb documentary proof of the income they derive from the houses they own.\n\nHouse owing officers, who are continuing in Government accommodation, should also furnish suitable documentary proof of the income they get from their private houses, to enable the Director of Estates to fix the licence fee recoverable from them w.e.f. 1.6.1977\".\n\nMr. Madan Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellants, sub mitted that while under the first notification the respondent was required to vacine the Governmnt accommo<lati<m within three\n\niAIN MALLEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 61\n\nmonths from 1.10.1975 on pain of being liable to pay licence fee at the market rate if he failed to vacate within that time, Government employees like respondent have become eligible for Government accommodation under the second notification and are, therefore, not obliged to vacate the Government accommodation and that the respondent is, therefore, not entitled to seek eviction of the appellants from his premises under s. l 4A of the Act though he may file a Petition for eviction under s. 14 (I) (e) of the Act which is a general provision applicable to all landlords who seek to evict their tenants on the ground that they require the premises for their own bonafide occupation. Section 14 (1) (e) reads thus:\n\n\"14.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant :\n\nProvided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\n(d)\n\n(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation :\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this clause, \"premises let for residential purposes\" include any premises which having been let for use as a resic!ence are, witho11t the con-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19821 2 s.c I\\\n\nsent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes ;\n\nJn support of the contention that in view of the second noti~ B fication the respondent is not entitled to have recourse to the proc\n\n. visi.ons of s. 14A of the Act, Mr. Madan Bhatia relied upon the decision of this Court in Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T.\n\nMenghani and Anr.(1) where the Court has observed at page 323 thus :\n\n\"Supposing the landlord, after exploiting the easy process of s. 14A, relets the premises for a higher rent; the social goal boomerangs because the ten ant is ejected and the lanlord does not occupy, as he would have been bound to do, if he had sought eviction for bona fide occupation under s. 14 (I) (e).\n\nSection 19 obligates the landlord in this behalf. In literal terms, that section does not apply to eviction obtained under s. 14A. But the scheme of that section definitely contemplates a specific representation by the petitioner-landlord to the Con troll er that because he has been ordered to vacate the premises where he is residing E therefore, he requires immediate possession for his occupation ............ Ollce we grasp this cardinal point, the officer's application for eviction under s. 14A can be entertained only on his averment that he, having been asked to vacate, must get into possession of his own ............ The cause of action is not only the government order to vacate, but his F .consequential urgency to recover his own building.\"\n\nMr. Madan Bhatia relied also on the decision of learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in K. D. Singh v. Shri Hari Babu Kanwal,(1) where the learned Judge has observed thus :\n\n\"At the time when this application was brought in February 1977, the Circular of 9,9.1975 held the field.\n\nUnfortunately, for the. landlord this position under-went change when the Central Government issued a revised Circular dated 14.7.1977 by which the orders contained in\n\n(l) [1977] 3 SCR 312.\n\n(2) [1980] l RCR. 90,\n\nJAlN MALLEABtES v. BHARA'l' SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 63\n\nthe earlier circular dated 9.9.1975 were modified after reconsideration..................... A vital change thuse took place by the Circular of 14.7.1977, namely, that there is no direction to a person who owns a house and who is in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government to vacate such residential accommodation... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once therefore, the revised Circular of 14. 7.1977 has come, the very basis on which the Eviction Application under s.14 A of Act was brought has ceased to exist and cannot avail him . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It must be realised that s.14A was brought in only for a limited purpose to enable the Government servants in getting immediate possession of their house when they had been directed to vacate the Government accomodation. The special legislation was made to serve special purpose in pursuance of the Circular of 9.9.1975.\n\nOnce that purpose has been modified and the Government bas revised its decision and there is no directionto vacate such residential accommodation, it is impermissible in law to allow a Government servant to invoke s. l 4A and frustrate the beneficial Act of the Rent Control legislation like the Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct\".\n\nWe do not agree with this view of the learned Judge.\n\nI~ is seen from paragraph 3 of the Order of the Additional Rent Controller, which was sought to be revised by the High Court, that the respondent is paying a rent of Rs. 1,448 per mensem for the Government accommodation No. 83 Lodhi Estate, New Delhi. In the reply affidavit filed in the Special Leave Petition the respondent has stated that he is liable to pay Rs. 1,543 per mensem for the Government accommodation as penal rent on account of bis failure to vacate the same. The respondent has produced in this Court a communicatio? addressed to him by the Assistant Director of Estates, New Delhi saying that without prejudice to any other action which may be taken in respect of the Government accommodation which has been allotted to him, his liability will continue to increase to Rs. 2,898 per mensem and three times that rate on the expiry of 15 days from the date of service of orders of eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 till he vacates and restores the premises to the Central Public Works Department. These facts and the liability ofthe\n\n64 SUPREME COUR't REPORTS [1982) 2 s.c.lt\n\nrespondent to pay full market rent for the Government accommodation with effect from 1.6.1977 and the second notification in the light of his getting rental income exceeding Rs. 2,000 per mensem from his own premises show that the respondent has to incur certain obligations on his failure to vacate Government accommodation on the ground that he owns in the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child. We do not find anything in the second notification taking away the obligation which has been imposed on the respondent by the first notification to vacate the Government accommodation within three months from the !st of October 1975.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the second notification, without (taking away the obligation imposed by the first notification on Government employees owning houses in their own names or in the name of any other member of their families, within the limits of their place of posting, to vacate the Government accommodation within three months from the first of October 1975, has given an option to those employees to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to the obligation mentioned in the second notification, namely, that the house owning Government employee will have to pay normal rent for the Government accommodation if the income from his own house does not exceed Rs. 1,000 per mensem of half the market rent if the income from his own house exceeds Rs. 1,000 per mensem but does not exceed Rs. 2,000 per mensem and full market rent if the income from his house is above Rs. 2,000 per mensem with effect from 1.6.1977.\n\nIn the present case the market rent/licence fee which the respondent had to pay for the Government accommodation occupied by him on the date of institution of Eviction Petition was Rs. 1,448 per mensem and it had been increased to Rs. 1,543 per mensem as stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent in the Special Leave Petition and it has been further enhanced to Rs. 2,898 per mensem by the letter dated 17/18-7-1981 of the Assistant Director of Estates addressed to the respondent and referred to above. The respondent has thus an option to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to the said obligation without vacating the Government accommodation within a period of three months from the 1st of October, 1975. We are of the opinion that it is not open to the appellants to compel the respondent to exercise his option and continue to occupy the Government accommodation in order that they may continue to occupy the premises in question as the tenants. Even apart from the first notification which is general in nature and has been modified by the\n\nJAIN MALLEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 65\n\nsecond notification as mentioned above, there is the special order dated 22, 1.1976 which required the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation by 31.12.1975, failing which he is to pay market rent with effect from 1.1.1976 as mentioned above. In these circumstances it is not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Madan Bhatia that the respondent is not entitled to have recourse to s. 14A of the Act for seeking eviction of the appellants from the premises in question, having regard to first and second notifications and the special order dated 22.1.1976. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the decision of another learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in JL Paul v. Ranjit Singh (supra) where we find the following observations:\n\n\"The last objection of the petitioner is that the nQtifications granting a right to the Government employee to 'seek eviction under Section 14A of the Act have been withdrawn, that this defence raises a triable issue and, therefore, . the Controller ought to have granted leave to contest so that\n\nhe may produce evidence on record in support of this part of his defence.\n\nThe right to claim eviction accrues to a landlord under s. 14A of the Act and not under any notification issued by the Government. The Government noti- . fication, general or special, only requires a landlord Government allottee to vacate the accommodation as he owns his house or pay penal rent. The respondent submits . that the general notification dated September 9, I 975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975 have never been withdrawn. His contention is that there has been a noti fication about the rate of rent/licence fee to be paid by a . Government employee, if he is also owner of his own house at the place of his posting and does not vacate allotted premises. In short his contention is that right of eviction is available to a landlord allottee of Government accommodation if he fulfils the conditions mentioned in s. I 4A of the Act. According to him there is modification that if the income of the landlord from his own house does not exceed Rs. 1,000 per month, he is liable to pay. only the normal . rent of the Government allotted accommodation, but if his income from his own house exceeds Rs. 1,000 and does not exceed Rs. 2,000 he is liable to pay half the market rent . and in cases where his income from his own house is above\n\n~P1'.EME COURT REPORTS {1982] 2 s.c.R..\n\nRs 2,000 per month, he is liable to pay full market rent.\n\nThe respondent contends that s. I 4A of the Act conferring upon a landlord/Government allottee (a right) to get his own vacated has never been repealed. The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that mere assertion of the petitioner that the notifications have been withdrawn is vague and does not give him any right to leave to contest and lead any evidence .... If any notification has been withdrawn or cancelled, such an order must be in writing. The petitioner/tenant in his application does not disclose any notification under which the Government notification requi- _. ring a landlord/Government employee to vacate has been withdrawn.\n\nThus the notification dated September 9, 1975 stands modified to the extent as to what rate of rent would be payable by the respondent Government allottee/landlord owning his own house if he retains the allotted premises, that is, if he fails to vacate the Government accommodation in pursuance of the general order dated September 9, 1975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975. The income of the respondent from his own house, that is, suit property No. 164 Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi is Rs. 1,950 per month.\n\nHe is getting Rs. 850 per month from the petitioner occupying first floor and Rs. I, 100 per month from 'Escorts' occupying the ground floor.\n\nIn accordance with the notification dated July 14, 1977, the respondent/landlord is thus liable to pay half the market rent from June I,\n\n1977 if he does not vacate the Government allotted accommodation. In fact after the issue of notification dated July 14, 1977 the respondent has been directed to pay half the market rent by means of an order dated September 20, 1977 issued by the Directorate of Estates, Government of India with effect from June l, 1977.\n\nIn short, it is certain that there is the general notification dated September 9, 1975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975 requir.ng the respondent/landlord to vacate the Government allotted residential accommodation or in default to pay half the market rent. fa other words he is to incur certain obligations, The liability is 011 account of the fact that he owns\n\nJAIN MALLEABLES v. BitARAT SAHAY (Varadara}an, J.)\n\nthe house in suit in the Union Territory of Delhi, his place of posting.\n\nOn December 12, 1979 Directorate of Estates was required to state whether the notification dated September 9, 1975 stands withdrawn or it was simply modified. The Directorate of Estates in his letter dated December 14, 1979 informed that the Memorandum dated September 9, 1975 was not withdrawn but was only modified by the Memorandum dated July 14, 1977.\n\nSo if the two notifications dated September 9, 1975 and July 14, 1977 are read together, it appears that there is no cancellation of the earlier notification and that it is only a notification of the rate of rent payable by an allottee owning his own house.\n\nUnder this notification dated July 14, 1977 it is further provided that with effect from June 1, 1977 rent of allotted premises shall be recovered from the house owning officials retaining the premises at the rates mentioned therein. The respondent is, therefore, liable to pay the rent accordingly and thus liable to iricur obligation in default of vacating the premises.\n\nThe respondent satisfies the requirement of s. 14A of the Act. There is no defence available to the petitioner against the eviction application under s. 14A of the Act\".\n\nIn the present case also there is nothing on record to show that the obligation imposed upon respondent by the first notification to vacate the Government accommodation within three months from\n\nthe Ist of October 1975 and by the special order dated 22.1.1976 by H 31.12.1975, has been withdrawn. The respondent can continue to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (198~] i s.c.k.\n\noccupy the Government accommodation only subject to certain obligations. We, therefore, hold that the respondent is entitled to have recourse to s. l 4A of the Act for evicting the appellants from the premises in question. Accordingly the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' I", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "JAIN MALLEABLES", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAIN MALLEABLES\n\nBHARAT SAHAY\n\nDecember 8, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL {SLAM\n\nAND A. V ARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "December 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAIN MALLEABLES\n\nBHARAT SAHAY\n\nDecember 8, 1981\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL {SLAM\n\nAND A. V ARADARAJAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368, "end_char": 379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9-9-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 620, "end_char": 628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,448 from his Government accommodation as per Government of India notification dated 9-9-1975 and the special order dated 22-1-1916 requiring him to."}}, {"text": "22-1-1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 657, "end_char": 666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,448 from his Government accommodation as per Government of India notification dated 9-9-1975 and the special order dated 22-1-1916 requiring him to."}}, {"text": "31-12-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 724, "end_char": 734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vacate the Government accommodation by 31-12-1975."}}, {"text": "section 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "14-7-19\"7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One such objection was that in view of the later circular of the Government dated 14-7-19\"7, the respo!ldent was not required to vacate the Government accommodation and, therefore, he w11s not entitled to evict the appellants under the provisions of section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act."}}, {"text": "section 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1216, "end_char": 1227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1392, "end_char": 1408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said objection having been disallowed by the Additional 'Rent Controiler the appell!!nt filed Civil Revision Petition before the Delhi High Court, which met with the same fate."}}, {"text": "section 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14-7-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[68 A-B]\n\nThe second notification dated 14-7-1977 of the Government, without taking away the obligation imposed by the first notification dated 9-9-75 on Govern men!"}}, {"text": "9-9-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[68 A-B]\n\nThe second notification dated 14-7-1977 of the Government, without taking away the obligation imposed by the first notification dated 9-9-75 on Govern men!"}}, {"text": "st of October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2072, "end_char": 2091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of October, 1975, has given an option to those employees to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to the obligation mentioned in the second notification, namely, that."}}, {"text": "1-6-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 per mensem with effect from 1-6-1977. ["}}, {"text": "1-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2928, "end_char": 2934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order dated 22-1-1976 which required the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation by 31-12-1975, failing which he is to pay market rent with effect from 1-1-1976: (ii) the market rent/ licence fee which the respondent had to pay for the Government accommodation on the date of institution of the Eviction Petilion was Rs."}}, {"text": "1-1-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3075, "end_char": 3083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order dated 22-1-1976 which required the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation by 31-12-1975, failing which he is to pay market rent with effect from 1-1-1976: (ii) the market rent/ licence fee which the respondent had to pay for the Government accommodation on the date of institution of the Eviction Petilion was Rs."}}, {"text": "17/18-7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3376, "end_char": 3383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,898 per mensem by the letter dated 17/18-7-1981 of the Assistant Director of Estates addressed to the respondent: (iii) there is nothing on record to show that the obligation imposed upon respondent by the first notification to vacate the Government accommodation within three months from !"}}, {"text": "1st of October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of October, 1975 and by the special order dated 22-1-1976 by 31st December, 1975 has been withdrawn; (iv) the respondent has an option to continue to occupy the Government accommodation subject to certain obligations contained in the two notifications without vacating the Government accommoda tion within a period of three months from 1st of October, 1975 and (v) it is not open t.o the apoellants to compel the respondent to exercise his option and continue to occupy the Government accommodation in order that he may continue to occupy the premises in question as the tenant. ["}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 S.C.R. 312", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4288, "end_char": 4307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 527", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia, Rojiv Behl and Sushi!", "canonical_name": "Madan Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Rojiv Behl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia, Rojiv Behl and Sushi!"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia, Rojiv Behl and Sushi!"}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4722, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. Singhvi, L.R. Gupta M. V. Goswami and L. K. Pandey for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "L.M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "L.R. Gupta M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. Singhvi, L.R. Gupta M. V. Goswami and L. K. Pandey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "L. K. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.M. Singhvi, L.R. Gupta M. V. Goswami and L. K. Pandey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the one word order dated 1.2.1980 ofthe learned Single Judge of the\n\n1A1N MALlEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 55\n\nDelhi High Court dismissing Civil Revision Petition No.", "canonical_name": "VARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the one word order dated 1.2.1980 ofthe learned Single Judge of the\n\n1A1N MALlEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 55\n\nDelhi High Court dismissing Civil Revision Petition No.", "canonical_name": "VARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5561, "end_char": 5567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5575, "end_char": 5603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5.8.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The \"later Circular of 1977\" mentioned in the special leave granted by this Court on 5.8.1980 is the Office Memorandum dated 14.7.1977 of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Directorate of Estates, hereinafter referred to as the \"second notification\"."}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6261, "end_char": 6267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6292, "end_char": 6320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6532, "end_char": 6541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83 Lodhi Estate, New Delhi since November 1971."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11-B Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, which is now in the occupation of the appellants, and if he failed to do so he is to incur the obligation of paying rent/licence fee of Rs 1,448 per mensem on the ground that he owns a residential building in the Union Territory of Delhi and still continues to occupy Government accommodation: The appellants have not vacated the premises occupied by them in spite of several assurances given by them since February 1976."}}, {"text": "s. 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7841, "end_char": 7847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8174, "end_char": 8180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this appeal with s. 14A (I) of the Act, which reads thus :\n\n\"14A (1) Where landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him .by the Central Government or any local authority is required, by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns, in the Union territory of Delhi, a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order to such landlord notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession of _any premises let out by him :\n\nProvided that nothing in this section shall be construed as conferring a right on a landkird owning, in the Unio, o territory of Delhi, two or more dwelling houses, whether in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, to recover the possession of more than one dwelling house and it shall be lawful for suci1 landlord to indicate the dwelling house, possession of which he intends to recover."}}, {"text": "1st of October 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Those Government servants, who have already built houses at the place of their posting within the limits of any local or adjoining municipality' whether with or without Government assistance, or who own houses either in their own names or in the names of any members of their families-shall be required to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them, within three months from the 1st of October 1975."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11735, "end_char": 11759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ii..\n\n(v)\n\nThe Ministry of Home Affairs, etc."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12064, "end_char": 12088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn so far as general pool accommodation is concerned, the Ministry of Home Affairs, etc.,"}}, {"text": "15th October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are requested to bring this to the notice of all Government Servants who are eligible for general pool accommodation as well as those who have already been allotted accommodation from the general pool, asking them by 15th October, 1975 to indicate whether they have their own houses as covered by these orders."}}, {"text": "15th November, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12565, "end_char": 12584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In case they have, a declaration may be obtained from them in the prescribed proforma and forwarded to the Directorate of Estate (Coordination I Section) by 15th November, 1975."}}, {"text": "22.1.1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13282, "end_char": 13291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition to this general first notification relating to Government accommodation in the occupation of Government employees there is a special order dated 22.1.1976 of the Assistant Director of Estates, New Delhi calling upon the respondent to vacate the Government accommodation No."}}, {"text": "1.6.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14741, "end_char": 14749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants have further stated in that affidavit that there is a clear shift in the policy of the Government whereby Government accommodation is made available to even those employees who happen to have their own houses at Delhi and that Government have modified the notification relied upon by the respondent whereby house owing officials have become eligible for allotment of Government accommodation at the places of their posting with effect from 1.6.1977."}}, {"text": "29th June,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15379, "end_char": 15389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government has decided that the restrictions on allotment of accommodation to houses owning officers should be modified with effect from l.6.1977, making house owning officers eligible for Government accommodation as communicated in this Ministry's Office Memorandum of even number dated the 29th June,\n\n1977."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17655, "end_char": 17667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Madan Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellants, sub mitted that while under the first notification the respondent was required to vacine the Governmnt accommo<lati<m within three\n\niAIN MALLEABLES v. BHARAT SAHAY (Varadarajan, J.) 61\n\nmonths from 1.10.1975 on pain of being liable to pay licence fee at the market rate if he failed to vacate within that time, Government employees like respondent have become eligible for Government accommodation under the second notification and are, therefore, not obliged to vacate the Government accommodation and that the respondent is, therefore, not entitled to seek eviction of the appellants from his premises under s. l 4A of the Act though he may file a Petition for eviction under s. 14 (I) (e) of the Act which is a general provision applicable to all landlords who seek to evict their tenants on the ground that they require the premises for their own bonafide occupation.", "canonical_name": "Madan Bhatia"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18577, "end_char": 18587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19885, "end_char": 19891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20134, "end_char": 20140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20364, "end_char": 20369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20380, "end_char": 20390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20503, "end_char": 20509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 312", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21599, "end_char": 21615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22199, "end_char": 22203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22330, "end_char": 22335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9.9.1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22616, "end_char": 22624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special legislation was made to serve special purpose in pursuance of the Circular of 9.9.1975."}}, {"text": "Act of the Rent Control legislation like the Delhi Rent Control", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23919, "end_char": 23975, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "st of October 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24839, "end_char": 24857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of October 1975."}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27338, "end_char": 27344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27517, "end_char": 27529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L.M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the decision of another learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in JL Paul v. Ranjit Singh (supra) where we find the following observations:\n\n\"The last objection of the petitioner is that the nQtifications granting a right to the Government employee to 'seek eviction under Section 14A of the Act have been withdrawn, that this defence raises a triable issue and, therefore, .", "canonical_name": "L.M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "Section 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27870, "end_char": 27881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28167, "end_char": 28173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 9, I 975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28469, "end_char": 28487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the general notification dated September 9, I 975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975 have never been withdrawn."}}, {"text": "December 26, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28516, "end_char": 28533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the general notification dated September 9, I 975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975 have never been withdrawn."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30158, "end_char": 30175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the notification dated September 9, 1975 stands modified to the extent as to what rate of rent would be payable by the respondent Government allottee/landlord owning his own house if he retains the allotted premises, that is, if he fails to vacate the Government accommodation in pursuance of the general order dated September 9, 1975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30836, "end_char": 30849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the notification dated July 14, 1977, the respondent/landlord is thus liable to pay half the market rent from June I,\n\n1977 if he does not vacate the Government allotted accommodation."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31760, "end_char": 31777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 12, 1979 Directorate of Estates was required to state whether the notification dated September 9, 1975 stands withdrawn or it was simply modified."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31963, "end_char": 31980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Directorate of Estates in his letter dated December 14, 1979 informed that the Memorandum dated September 9, 1975 was not withdrawn but was only modified by the Memorandum dated July 14, 1977."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32462, "end_char": 32474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this notification dated July 14, 1977 it is further provided that with effect from June 1, 1977 rent of allotted premises shall be recovered from the house owning officials retaining the premises at the rates mentioned therein."}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32791, "end_char": 32797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32897, "end_char": 32903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_114_120_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "i14\n\nBABU SINGH CHAUHAN\n\nRAJKUMARI JAIN & ORS.\n\nFebruary 1, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nU.P. Urban Buildings (Regu/atiOn of Letting, Rent and Eviction) ALf 1972-Sectlons 16(1) (b) and 17(2)-Scope of\n\nSection 16(1) (b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 empowers the District Mag_istrate to release the whole or any part of a building or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord.\n\nSection 17(2) provides that where a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes or is released in his favour under section 16(1) (b) for residential purpose!' the allotment of the remaining part thereof under clause {a) of sub-section (l) shall be made in favour of a person nominated by the landlord.\n\nOn intimation from the tenant that he was vacating the premises, the rent control authority allotted them to the appellant without informing the landlady about the allotment. On appeal the District Judge cancelled the allotment made in favour of the appellant\n\nThe landlady then made an application for delivery of possession of the premises. This application was rejected on the ground that she had not applied for release of the accommodation.\n\nHer application under section 16(1) (b) for release of the premises was rejected and the accommodation was rea\\Jotted to the appellant. The District Magistrate affirmed the order of the rent control\n\nauthority.\n\nThe landlady's writ petition impugning the orders of the courts below was al.lowed by the High Court. the case was remitted to the courts below for reconsideration afresh of the question of allotment.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since the landlady was not in actual physical possession of the premises neither section 16(1) (b) nor section 17(2) had any application to the facts of this case.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The order of the prescribed authority allotting the premises to the appellant was without jurisdiction and against the plain terms of section 17(2) of the Act. The District Judge had rightly allowed the landlady's appeal and cancelled the allotment to the appellant.\n\nD.S. CUAUHAN v. RAiKUMARI ii5\n\nThe object of the- Act is that where a tenant inducted by the landlord voluntarily vacates the premises, pardy occupied by the landlord, allotment in the vacancy should be made only to a person nominated by him, the dominant purpose of such provision being to remove any inconvenience to the landlord by imposing or thrusting on tbe premises an unpleasant neighbour or a tenant who invades the landlord's right of priVacy. While empowering the prescribed authority to allot the accommodation, the Act safeguards the right of the landlord to have a tenant of his choice. [117 BC, DJ\n\nIn the inst.ant case if a tenant was thrust on the respondent without allowing her an opportunity to nominate a tenant of her choice it would violate the very ', spirit and tenor of section 17(2). [120 F]\n\nPossession by a landlord of his property may assume various forms : a C landlord living outside the town might retain possession over his property or a part of it either by leaving it in charge of a servant or by putting his household effects locked up in the premises.\n\nSuch occupation would be full and complete possession in the eye of law. [119 F]\n\nIn the instant case from the fact that the landlady was residing in another tqwn and so was not actually residing in the premises it could not be '!aid that she D was not in possession of the premises or that she had severed her connection with her own property. [119 G]\n\nThe High Court was justified in quashing the orders of the rent control authority because no attempt had been made to approach the landlady for making a nomin1tion in respect of the premises vacated by the original tenant.\n\nE All that the landlady did was to ask for the release of the premises. Even if this was refused it was incumbent on the rent control authority to have fulfilled the requirements of section 17(2) before making an allotment in favour of the appellant or a'oyone else.\n\nSimply because the landl.ady was living outside the town it could not be said that the provisions of this subsection wriuld not apply and that the authorities concerned could make an allotment in favour of any person without giving an opportunity to her to exercise her privilege to nominate F a tenant. [120 A.CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8i2 of 1980\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd November, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.\n\nWrit No. 479 of 1978.\n\n11..K. Garg, V.J. Prands and S.K. Jain fot the Appellant.\n\nShanti Bhushan, R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain and Pankaj Kalra for Respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed againsta judgment dated November 23, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court allowing a writ petition quashing the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanding the case to him for considering. the question afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made by the High Court.\n\nThe appeal involves a short and simple point but the case appears to have had rather a long and chequered career. Put briefly, the facts of the case fall within a narrow compass so far as the points for decision are concerned.\n\nThe first repondent, Smt.\n\nRajkumari Jain, inducted Shri Thapalayal as a tenant in the premises in dispute which are situated in the town of Bijnor. The tenant intimated his intention to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to vacate the premises on 25.6.1974 On receipt of the aforesaid application of the tenant a Rent Control Inspector was directed to visit the spot and after visiting the same he reported that the premises in question were likely to fall vacant on 9.6.74.\n\nThe prescribed authority by its Order dated 1.6. 74 allotted the premises to the appellant. In fact, the appellant had applied to the authority on 20.5.74 for allotment of the accommodation to him. It appears that these proceedings were taken behind the back of the respondent· landlady who was not taken into confidence either by the appellant or by the Rent Control authorities. It was only after the prescribed authority had allotted the premises to the appellant and the respondent-landlady came to know of this fact that she moved the prescribed authority for cancellation of the allotment but her prayer was rejected.\n\nThereafter, the landlady filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bijnor which was allowed and the allotment in favoµr of the appellant was cancelled oe the ground that the provisions of s. 17(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') were not complied with.\n\nBefore narrating further sequence of.facts, it may be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 17(2) of the Act may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Where a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes or is released in his favour\n\n11.S. CHAUHAN v. RAJKUMARI (Paza/ Ali, J.) 117\n\nunder clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 for resi- A dential purposes, the allotment of the remaining part thereof under clause (a) of the said sub:section (I) shall be made in favour of a person nominated by the landlord.\"\n\nA perusal of this statutory provision would clearly disclose that the object of the Act was that where a tenant inducted by the landlord voluntarily vacates the premises, which are a part of the building .occupied by the landlord, an allotment in the vacancy should be made only to a person nominated by the landlord. The dominant purpose to be subserved by the Act is manifestly the question of removing any inconvenience to the landlord by imposing or thrusting on the premises an unpleasant neighbour or a tenant who invades the right of privacy of the landlord.\n\nIt is obvious that if the tenant has vacated the premises by himself and not at the instance of the landlord, there is no question of the landlord occupying the said premises because he has got a separate remedy for evicting the tenant on the ground of personal necessity.\n\nThe statute, hqwever, while empowering the prescribed authority to allot the accommodation, safeguards at least the right of the landlord to have a tenant of his choice.\n\nIn the instant case, the admitted position seems to be that\n\nwhen the prescribed authority allotted the premises to the appellant, E the landlady was not taken into confidence nor was she asked to induct either ihe appellant or somebody else as the tenant of the premises which were likely to fall vacant or which may have fallen vacant.\n\nThis was undoubtedly an essential requirement of the provisions of s. 17(2) of the Act as extracted above.\n\nIn these circumstances, there could be no doubt that the Order of the prescrib- F ed authority allotting the premises to the appellant was completely without jurisdiction and against the plain terms of s, 17(2) of the Act. It was in view of this serious legal infirmity that the District Judge allowed t.he appeal filed by the landladY. on 27.1.1976 and cancelled the allotment of the accommodation to the appellant.\n\nOn 2.2.76 the landlady herself filed an application before the District G Magistrate, Bijnor for delivery of possession of the said premises to her but the District Magistrate rejected the application by his\n\nOrder dated 8.3.76 on the ground that as the landlady had not applied for release of the accommodation, she could not be allotted the premises straightaway. On 5.4.76 the District Supply Officer, ff , Pijnor directed the counsel for tlje landlady to noll'.linat~ a persoq\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA for allotment of the premises.\n\nAs against this, the la11dlady a1, plied for release of the accommodijtion to her in terms of the provisions of s. 16(1) (b) of the Act which rus thus :\n\n\"16.\n\nAllotment and release of vacant building.\n\n(I) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the District Magistrate may by order :\n\n(a) xx xx\n\n(h) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order).\"\n\n• The prayer of the landlady under s. 16(1) (b) also appears to have been ignored by the Rent Control authorities and by an Order dated 15.4.76, the District Supply Officer reallotted the accommodation to the appellant.\n\nThis led the landlady to file another appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bijnor who by his Order dated 21.9.77 rejected the plea of the landlady, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of allotment.\n\nThe respondent-landlady thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court challenged the orders of the District Supply Officer as also of the District Judge who had affirmed that order and confirmed the order of allotment in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe High Court by the impugned order allowed the writ petition and sent the matter back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider the question of allotment afresh in view of the observations made by the High Court._\n\nThe appellant then obtained special leave of this Court against the order of the High Court and hence this appeal before us.\n\nIn support of the appeal, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel G for the appellant submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact given by the District Supply Officer and the District Judge confirming the allotment in favour of the appellant and that too in a writ jurisdiction.\n\nHe also submitted that the landlady was not at all in actual physical posses-.\n\nH sion of the premises and had been living outside Bijnor and, therefore, neither the provisions of s. 16(1) (b) nor those of s. l 7(2) of ihe Act would apply to the f11ct$ of tbe present 1>ase.\n\nOn the otlm\n\n\n11.s. CHAUHAN v. RAIKUMARI (Fazal Ali, J.) 119\n\nhand, tbe counsel for the respondent submitted that initially the only A question before the Rent Control Authority was whether the allotment should be made to the appellant even though he was not nominated by the landlady under s. 17(2) of the Act. It is common ground that the appellant was not a nominee of the landlady and, as discussed above, the District Judge in his iirst order had quashed the allotment on the ground that the provisions of s. 17(2) had not B been complied with.\n\nIt was also argued on behalf of the respondent-landlady that the circumstances having changed; she now wanted to stay in Bijnor permanently and as she wanted additional accommodation she had applied to the District Magistrate under s. 16(1) (b) for releasing the building in her favour.\n\nThis application was not at all considered on merits by the District Magistrate or by any court for that matter.\n\nIf the respondent could succeed in convincing the District Magistrate that a case for release of the entire building was made out, then the question of allotting the premises to the appellant would not have arisen at ali.\n\nWe have gone through the judgment of the High Court in the light of the arguments of the parties and we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the mere fact that the lady did not actually reside in the premises which were locked and contained her household effects, it cannot be said that she was not in possession of the preniises so. as to make s. !7(2) inapplicable.\n\nPossession by a landlord of his property may assume various forms.\n\nA landlord may be serving outside while retaining his possession over a property or a part of the property by either leaving it incharge of a servant or by putting his household effects or things locked up in the premises.\n\nSuch an occupation also wonld be full and complete possession in the eye of I aw.\n\nIt was further argued by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the landlady had absolutely no reason to stay in Bijnor because she was staying with her son in some other town. That by itself is hardly a good\n\nground for the landlady who was a widow to sever her connections G with her own property.\n\nMoreover, we do not want to make any observations on the meri!s of this matter as the High Court has rightly remanded the case for a fresh decision on all the points involved.\n\nSo far as the second point is concerned, viz., the question of 11llotment of th~ prelllises to th~ appe.llant! the Hih Court was fully\n\njustified in quashing the order of the District Supply Officer as affirmed by the District Judge because despite several opportunities no attempt had been made to approach the landlady to nominate a tenant.\n\nThere is no evidence to show that either the prescribed authority or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ever approached the landlady for making a nomination in respect of the premises vacated by the original tenant and she refused to do .so.\n\nAll that the landlany did was to ask for the release of the premises but even if this was refused -it was incumbent on the Rent Control authorities to have fulfilled the essential conditions of s. 17(2) of the Act before making any allotment in favour of the appellant or for that matter any other person. It was suggested that as the landlady was not living in the premises which were Jocked up, section 17(2) did not apply.\n\nWe haye already rejected this argument because even occupation of a part of a building by the owner which she may visit 'off and on is' possession in the legal sense of the term and, therefore, it cannot be said that the provision of s. 17(2) would not apply and that the Rent Control authorities could make an allotment in favour of any person without giving an opportunity to the landlady or the landlord to exercise her/his privilege of nominating a tenant.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the object of the Act seems to be to arm the owner with the power of nomination so as to .protect him/her from unpleasant tenants or indecent neighbours who may make the life of the owner a hell.\n\nMoreover, the conduct displayed by the appellant in this case clearly shows that if be was thrust on the resp_ondent without her being allowed an opportunity to nominate a tenant, it will violate the very spirit and tenor of\n\ns, 17(2) of the Act.\n\nAs we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court has to be upheld we refrain from making any further observations on the merits or any aspect of the matter which have to be gone into _afresh as directed by the High Court.\n\nWe find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only.).\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed,", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "i14\n\nBABU SINGH CHAUHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABU SINGH CHAUHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJKUMARI JAIN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJKUMARI JAIN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 1, 1982\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1818, "end_char": 1831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2067, "end_char": 2080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4052, "end_char": 4065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Garg", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11..K. Garg, V.J. Prands and S.K. Jain fot the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V.J. Prands", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11..K. Garg, V.J. Prands and S.K. Jain fot the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11..K. Garg, V.J. Prands and S.K. Jain fot the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4722, "end_char": 4736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain and Pankaj Kalra for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain and Pankaj Kalra for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Jain"}}, {"text": "P.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain and Pankaj Kalra for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Pankaj Kalra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4763, "end_char": 4775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Jain, P.K. Jain and Pankaj Kalra for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed againsta judgment dated November 23, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court allowing a writ petition quashing the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanding the case to him for considering."}}, {"text": "Rajkumari Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajkumari Jain, inducted Shri Thapalayal as a tenant in the premises in dispute which are situated in the town of Bijnor.", "canonical_name": "RAJKUMARI JAIN & ORS"}}, {"text": "Thapalayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajkumari Jain, inducted Shri Thapalayal as a tenant in the premises in dispute which are situated in the town of Bijnor."}}, {"text": "Bijnor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajkumari Jain, inducted Shri Thapalayal as a tenant in the premises in dispute which are situated in the town of Bijnor."}}, {"text": "9.6.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5903, "end_char": 5909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant intimated his intention to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to vacate the premises on 25.6.1974 On receipt of the aforesaid application of the tenant a Rent Control Inspector was directed to visit the spot and after visiting the same he reported that the premises in question were likely to fall vacant on 9.6.74."}}, {"text": "20.5.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the appellant had applied to the authority on 20.5.74 for allotment of the accommodation to him."}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6737, "end_char": 6745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7003, "end_char": 7016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7260, "end_char": 7270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8873, "end_char": 8881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27.1.1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in view of this serious legal infirmity that the District Judge allowed t.he appeal filed by the landladY. on 27.1.1976 and cancelled the allotment of the accommodation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "2.2.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2.2.76 the landlady herself filed an application before the District G Magistrate, Bijnor for delivery of possession of the said premises to her but the District Magistrate rejected the application by his\n\nOrder dated 8.3.76 on the ground that as the landlady had not applied for release of the accommodation, she could not be allotted the premises straightaway."}}, {"text": "District G Magistrate, Bijnor", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9395, "end_char": 9424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2.2.76 the landlady herself filed an application before the District G Magistrate, Bijnor for delivery of possession of the said premises to her but the District Magistrate rejected the application by his\n\nOrder dated 8.3.76 on the ground that as the landlady had not applied for release of the accommodation, she could not be allotted the premises straightaway."}}, {"text": "5.4.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9701, "end_char": 9707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5.4.76 the District Supply Officer, ff , Pijnor directed the counsel for tlje landlady to noll'.linat~ a persoq\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9814, "end_char": 9854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5.4.76 the District Supply Officer, ff , Pijnor directed the counsel for tlje landlady to noll'.linat~ a persoq\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9999, "end_char": 10007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10364, "end_char": 10372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15.4.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10465, "end_char": 10472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• The prayer of the landlady under s. 16(1) (b) also appears to have been ignored by the Rent Control authorities and by an Order dated 15.4.76, the District Supply Officer reallotted the accommodation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Bijnor", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10606, "end_char": 10639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led the landlady to file another appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bijnor who by his Order dated 21.9.77 rejected the plea of the landlady, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of allotment."}}, {"text": "21.9.77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10663, "end_char": 10670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led the landlady to file another appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bijnor who by his Order dated 21.9.77 rejected the plea of the landlady, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of allotment."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11401, "end_char": 11415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the appeal, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel G for the appellant submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact given by the District Supply Officer and the District Judge confirming the allotment in favour of the appellant and that too in a writ jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11882, "end_char": 11890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12489, "end_char": 12497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12761, "end_char": 12769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15173, "end_char": 15181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15376, "end_char": 15389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15640, "end_char": 15648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_121_185_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "\\ ,..- )-\n\n121 A\n\n'STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.\n\n_SWAPAN KUMAR GUHA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 2, 1982\n\n[ Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. A. VARADARAJAN, AND\n\nAMARBNDRA NATH SBN, JJ.]\n\nPrize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme1 (Banning) Act 1978 (43of1978) Ss. 2(c), 2(e), 3, 7 and 13-'Money Circulation Scheme'-What is-Firm Accepting deposits from public-Payment of interest at 48% per annnm though deposit receipt indiCate only 12%-ll'hether promotion of'money circulation scheme'-\n\n'Whethe~ 'offence' committed under the Act.\n\n Criminal Procedure Code 1973, S.154, 156, 157-F.l, R.-Cognlzable offence- D Necessity of disclosure-No cognizable offence disclosed-Court justified in quashing the investigation.\n\nCri-fninal Trial-F.I.R.-Condition precedent to comncement cf investiga. lion-Police have no unfettered discretion to commence investigation-Power to investig'!le to be exercised as-provided in Cr. P.C.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes-Rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes- Whether affects primary test that language used in enactment when clear and plain to apply.\n\nWords & Phrases-' Money circulation scheme'-What is-Meaning of.\n\nThe firm 'Sanchaita Investments', commenced its business on July 1,1975, its three partners, the three respondents in the appeal contributii; ig a total capital of Rs. 7,000/-. The firm carried on business as financers and investors and in its business the firm accepted loans or deposits from the general public for different periods repayable with interest af 12% per annum.\n\nUnder the terms of deposits, the depositors had a right to withdraw the deposit with the firm at any time. In case of premature withdrawal the depositors were to Jose interest of 1 %.\n\nUnder the terms and conditions -of the Cli;:posit the firm had also the liberty to repay the amount with interest to any depositor at any time before the expiry of the stipulated period of deposit without giving any reason. The firm was carrying on its business on a very extensive scale.\n\nIn the year 1978 Parliament passed the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act 1978. The Act !came info force on December 13, 1978 H and section 12 provided a two years period for winding up verr knd. o~ bu.sin~~~ relating to prize chits and money circulat(Q!\\ cb_emes •.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C-R.\n\nOo 13th December, 1980 the Commercial Tax Officer lodged a complaint of violation of the Act by the firm with the police. The FIR stated that the firm bad been offering fabulous interest at 48% per annum to its members, later reduced to 36% though the loan certificate receipts showed the rate of interest to be 12% only. The amount In excess of 12% clearly indicated that the\n\n1Money Circulation Scheme' was being promoted and conducted for the making of quick and/or easy money and that prizes and for gifts in cash were also awarded to agents, promoters and members, and that the firm and its three partners in conducting such oney circulation schemes had violated section 3 of the Act and were therefore punishable under section 4. On the same day tbJ office of the firm was searched by the police and a sum of Rs. 42 1akhs was recovered. The residences of the partners were also searched and large amounts of cash as well as documents were seized. Certain lists of agents seized during the investigation showed that code numbers were asigned to many of the agents and that the agents had acquired large properties at various places and had also started; new business activities. The partners were arrested and enlarged on bail.\n\nThe firm and its partners filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the F.l.R. and the proceedings arising out of it including the Validity of the searches and seizure of docuinents, papers and cash. It was contended that the F.I.R. doesnot disclose any offence under the Act which does not apply to the firm and that there was no violation of any provisions of the Act. The petition was contested by the State Government contending that the payment of interest .by the fir 1n and its partners at the clandestine rate of 36% against the bank rate of. 12% in the context of the scheme promoted and conducted by the firm was tantamount to arr activity which was banned under tb.e Act. and that in the process of its working, the scheme of the firm generated quick and easy money so as to render such scheme ilr arrangement a 'moey circulation scheme' within the meaning or the Act. The High Court held that the Act did not apply to the firm and that the searches and seizure:) were wrongful, illegal and improper and quashed the pro::eedings and directed the return or all documents and the refund, of the cash seized.\n\nIn the appeals to. this Court it was contended on behalf of the State Government that: (t) the question of applicability of the Act will only come up for consideration after the investigation has been completed and all relevant materials have been gathered on sOoh investigation and that at the investigation stage, the Court does not interfere and also does not quash any proceedings before the investigation has been comoleted, (2) materials which had been gathered as a result of the inve.stigation indicate that though the loan certificate\n\ns1iulate interest to be paid@ 12% much larger sum by way of interest ranging between 36@ to 48% was actually paid to the depositors, in cash in a clandestine manner, depriving and defrauding the revenue of its legitimate dues, (3) the nature of business carried on by the tirm indicates that the firm is conducting a 'Money circulation scheme' thereby violating s. 3 of the Act, and (4) tbe s.earches have been carried out in accordance with s. 7 of the Act and the cash money and other books and douJ!lel\\IS have peen !awfully seized ·-\n\n) .,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR 123\n\nOn behalf of the respondents it was contended that : (I) Investigation has to be done when an offence is disclosed for collecting materials for establish .. ing an offence and any investigation when no offence isdisclosed by the F.I.R. and the other materials, means unnecessary harassment for the firm and its partners and illegal and improper deprivation of their liberty and property, (2) even if all the aitegations in the F.l.R. and in the ather materials before the Court are accepted to be correct, the said allegation do not go to show that the firm is conducting a money circulation scheme and do Iiot disclose any offence under the Act, (3) if 'no offence under the Act is disclosed and the Act has no application, there cannot be any qqestion of any search or seizure under the Act, and (4) to be a chit fund or a rnony circulation scheme, an element of uncer tainty or luck is essential and in so far as the transactions carried on by the firm are concerned, the said element is nowhere.\n\nDismissing the-appeals.\n\nHELD : By the Court\n\n1. The investigation which has been commenced upon the First Information Report is without jurisdiction and must, therefore, be quashed. No further investigation shall take place in pursuance or on the basis of the F.I.R. dated December 13, 1980 lodged by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation. [143 DJ\n\n2. The documents, books, papers, cash and other articles seized during the investigation shall be retained by the police in their custody for a period of two months and will be returned, on the expiry of that period, to persons from whom they were seized. [148 CJ\n\n[Per Chandrachud, C.J. and Varadarajan J.]\n\n1. Two conditions must be satisfied before a person can be held guilty of an.offence under sectioD. 4 read with sections 3 and 2 (c) of the Act. In the first place, it must be proved that he is promoting or conducting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money and secondly, the chance or opportuitity of rn'aking quick or easy mony must be shown to depend upon an event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into that scheme. [132 F-G]\n\n2. Besides the prize chits, what the Act aims at banning is money G circulation schemes. The activity charged as falling within the mischief of the Act must be shown to be a part of a scheme for making quick or easy money, dependent upon the happening or non-happening Qf any event or contingency relative or applicatle to the enrolment of members into that scheme. [133 E-FJ\n\nA transaction under which, one party deposits with the other or ff lends to that other a sum of money on promise of being paid interest at a rate higher than the agreed rate of interest cannot, without more, be a 'money circu\n\nsi.Ji>RllMil coultt RilPoitrs [ 1982) 3 s.c.li..\n\nA lation scheme' within the moaning of section 2 (c) of tho Act, howsoever high the promised rate of interest may. be in comparison with the agreed rate. What section 2 (c) requires is that the reciprocal promises, express or implied, must depend for their performance on the happening of an event or contingency relative or appJicable to the enrolment of meip.bers into the scheme. [134 A-BJ,\n\nIn the instant case it seems impossible to bold on the basis of the allegations in the F.I.R. that any offence can be said to be made out primafacie under section 3 of the Act. In the first place, the F.I.R. does not allege, directly or indirectly, that the firm was promoting or conducting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme. Secondly, the F.l.R. does not contain any allgation whatsoever that persons who advanced or deposited their monies with the firm were participants of a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent upon any such event or contingency. The F.I.R bears the stamp of hurry and want of care. It seems to assume, that it is enough for the purposes of section 2 (c) .to show that the accused is promoting or condcting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, an assumption which is fallacious. An essential ingrediCnt of section 2 (c) is that the scheme for making quick or easy money must be dependent on any event Or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into tho scheme. [13S DG]\n\nA First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requiremnts of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation.\n\n[13$ O]\n\n5. -There is no allegation even in any of the affidavits filed on behalf of the State and its officers that the depositors and the promoters are animated by .a community of interest in the matter of the schme being dependent upon any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into it.\n\nThat being an essential ingredient of the offence charged, it cannot be said in the absence of any allegation whatsoever in that behalf, that there is \"reason to suspect\" the commission of that offence within the meaning of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so as to justify the investigation undertaken by --- - the State authorities. [138 B-D]\n\n6. The rule of strict interpretation of penal sta_tutes does not lo any ___ ... __ way affect the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is thc_language used in the Act and, when the words are clear and plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. 1.139 Bl\n\n7. The investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F .I.R. The judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable ·..;.- offence and the CQde does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. [142 BC]\n\n~.·. ~\n\nWEST BSNOAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR 125\n\n8. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under section 157 or the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the .F .I.R. prim a facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court bas then no power to stop the investigation, for to do sO would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences On the other hand, if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified In quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. (142 D-F]\n\nW.H. King v. R<public of India [1952] SCR 418, 424; M.V. Joshi v. M.U.\n\nShimpi, [1961] (3) SCR 986, 993-994; R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab [1960] (3)\n\nSCR 388, 392-393; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari [t970] (3) SCR 946; Stat• of West &ngal v. S.N. Basak [1963] (2) SCR 52; Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration [1974) (3) SCR 794 and King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed 11 I.A. 203, rererred to.\n\n9. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must-be exercised strictly on the coµdition on which it is granted by the Code. [ 142 G]\n\nPrabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup, (1974] 2 SCR 12, 22-23, rererred to.\n\n10. The State Government, the Central Government and the Reserve Bank or India must be given a reasonable opportuility to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute . an inquiry into the affairs of the firm and in the meanwhile to regulate its affairs. Such a step is essential in the interests of countless small depositors who, otherwise will be ruined by being deprived of their !ire's savings. (147 H; 148 A-BJ\n\n[Per A.N. Sen, J.]\n\n1. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interest of justice. If, howei.:er, no offence is_disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unDcceSsary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. Tho liberty and property or any individual are s8.cred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them. An- -investigation is carried on for the purpose or gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is djsclosed, a proper investigation in the interest of justice becomes necessary to collect -materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence or a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender tnay go unpunished to the deteriment or the cause or justlce and the society at large. (170 F-H; 171 A]\n\n126 SUPREME COiiRt REPORTS {1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\n2. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an, offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious deteriment of the welfare of the societt and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. [171 AC]\n\n3. Whether an offence has been discloi; ed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made is disclosed or not, the Court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint of the F.I.R. and the Court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. On a consideration of all the . relevant materials, the Court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that the offence is disclosed the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and wiH generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for prciving the offence. If, on the other hand the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual. [171 G-H; 172 A-BJ\n\nW.H. King v. Republic of India [1952) SCR 418, 424; M.V. Joshi v. M.U.\n\nShimp/, [1961] (3) SCR 986, 99J.994; R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab [1960] (3) E SCR 388,392-393; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari [1970)(3) SCR 946; State of West Benga/v. S.N. Bosak [1963] (2) SCR 52; Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration [1974] (3) SCR 794 and King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed 711.A. 203.\n\nreferred to.\n\n4. The word 'scheme' has not been defined in the Act. It has however, has been defined in tbe Rules. Cl. 2 (g) of the Rules state that a \"scheme means a mOney circulation scheme or as the case may be a prize chit as defined in cl. -(c) and (e) respectively ofs. 2\", The word 'scheme' as contemplated ins. 2 (c) of the Act is therefore, to be money circulation scheme witbin the meaning of the Act. To be money circulation scheme, a scheme must be for the making of quick or easy n1oney on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the cnrolinent of the members into the scheme. The scheme has necessarily to be judged as a whole, both from the view point of the promoters and also of the members. [181 B-D]\n\nIn the instant case investment of monies with the firm have been made with the expectation of getting interest@ 48% and a big part of in black in a clandestine manner. The transaction cannot be considered to be a scheme for 1he making of quick or easy money, though it may offend against revenue laws or any other law. Transactions in black money do not come within the Mischief\n\nWEST BBN'GAL V. SWAPAN' KUMAR 127\n\nof this Act. Judged from the point of vie_w of the depositors, it cannot, therefore, be said that their investment in the firm ror high return by way of interest part of which is above board and a part of which is clandestine, wil1 form any part of a scheme for making easy or quick money, [181 D-H; 182 A-Bl\n\n5. There is nothing to ind icatc that the firm makes any investment in consultation with its depositors. The materials indicatP. that the firm indulges in high risk investments and also advances monis to political parties. Neither of these acts are illegal and do not go to show that the firm inakes easy or quick money. The materials however show that the firm pays a larger amount by way of interest than payable on the basis of the rates stipulated in the Joan certificate and the excess amount of interest is paid to the depositor in a clandestine manner. This does not, in any way, indicate the exitence of any scheme for making quick or easy.money. [182 C-EJ\n\nIn the instant case the requirements of a money circulation scheme are not satisfied. As there is no money circulation scheme. there can be no scheme as contemplated in the Act in view of the definition of scheme in the Rules. The materials, appear to disclose violation of revenue laws. The materials do Dot disclose that the firm is promoting or circulating money circulation scheme and the question, therefore, of any'violation of s. 3 of the Act does not arise. L182 G-H]\n\n' In the instant case as the firm is not conducting or promoting a money circulation scheme. and as no case is made that the firm is conducting or promoting a chit fund, the Act cannot be said to be applicable to the firm. [183 A]\n\n6. As no offence under the Act is at all disclosed, it will be manifestly unjust to allow the process of criminal code to be issued or continued against the firm and to allow any investigation which will be clearly without any authority. [184 E] '\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1129 of 1981.\n\n(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated F the 12th March, 1981 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 37 of 1981.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1130 OF 1981\n\n(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 5th March, 1981 of the Calcutta High Cout in Matter No. 2829 of 1980)\n\nSomnath Chatterjee, M. K. Ramamurthi, S, C. Birla, for the Appellants in C, J\\, J129/81 11n\\! .C.J\\, 1130/81\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nA.K. Sen, (For r.I in CA. 1130/81) S. S. Ray, (For r.2 in CA. 1130/81), Kapil Sibal, (For'r.1 in C.A. 1129/SI), B. Gupta & T.K. Bose, (for r, I in CA. 1130/81) and Rathin Das with them.\n\nS.S. Ray, (For r. 6), Tarun Kumar Bose, D. Manda/, Miss Bina Gupta & 0.P. Khaitan with him for Respondents Nos. 5 & 6 in the Appeals:\n\nK.L. Hat hi & Mrs. H. Wa hi for the Intervener-Mrs. Sarla Sahedad Puri.\n\nThe following judgments were del.ivered :\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J, My learned Brother A.N. Sen has dealt fully with the various points argued before us.\n\nI agree respectfully with his judgment, but desire to add a few words in view of the importance which this matter has acquired by reason of the immense circulation of 'black money' clearly and almost concededly involved in the affairs of the firm which i.s facing a prosecution.\n\nThese appeals by special leave arise out of the judgment dated March 5, 198 l of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Matters Nos. 2829 of 1980 and 37 of 1981. The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka. The two Matters in the Calcutta High Court were in the nature of wit petitions under article 226 of the Conititution which were fileJ bt the firm and its part ners for quashing an investigation commenced against the firm.\n\nAllowing the writ petitions, the High Court issued a writ of Manda mus directing the State Government and its concerned officers to \"forthwith recall, cancel and withdrew the First Information Report .. and all proceedings taken on the basis thereof\", since the searches, seizures and arrests made in pursuance of the said F.I.R. are, according to the High Court, illegal and without jurisdictioti. It has directed that the books, documents and moneys seized during the search be returned to the firm and its partners, including a sum of Rs. 52,11,930.\n\nThe short question for consideration in these appeals by special leave is whether the f'.I.R. loded by the Commercial Tax Officer,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 129\n\nBureau of Investigation, against the firm and its partners discloses an offence under section 3 of \"The Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act\", 43 of 1978. The Act, which was passed by the Parliament, came into force on December 13, 1978 and the two years' period allowed by section 12 for winding up every kind of business relating to Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes expired on December 12, 1980. The F.I.R., which was lodged the next day .on December 13. reads thus :\n\n~ '>- \"To\n\nSir,\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation,\n\n10, Madan Street, Calcutta-72.\n\nOn a secret information that 'Sanchaita Investments' of 5-6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta, is carrying on business of promoting and/or conducting prize chit and/or money circulation scheme enrolling members of such chit and/or scheme, participating in those, and/or receiving and remitting monies in pursuance of such chits and/or scheme in violation of the provisions of. the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978, inquiry was held secretly to verify correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid secret information. Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchaita Investments' is a partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Shri Swapan Kumar Guba and that it was floated in or around 1975.\n\nEnquiry further reveals. that the said firm bad been offering fabulous interest @ 48% per annum to its members until very recently. The rate of interest has of tare been reduced to 36% per annum. Such high rates of interest were and are being paid even though the loan certificate receipts show the rate of interest to be 12% only. Thus, the amount in excess of 12% so paid clearly sb9ws that the 'Money Circulation Scheme' is being promoted and conducted for the making of quick and/or easy money. Prizes and/or gifts in cash were and are also awarded to agents, prornQtrs and members too,\n\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn view of the a hove, Sarvashri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Sambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guba appear to have been carrying on business in the trade name of Sanchaita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation scheme in violation of section 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes \\(Banning) Act, 1978 and are therefore, punishable under section 4 of the said Act.\n\nNecessary action may therefore, be kindly taken against the aforesid offenders along with other accomplices as provided in the law. '\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/- Commercial Tax Officer,\n\nBureau of Investigation.\"\n\nSection 4 of the Act provides that whoever contravences the provisions of section 3 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, the imprisonment shall not be less than one year and the fine shall not be less than one thousand rupees. Though the F.I.R. is riddled with the \"and/or\" clauses more appropriate in deeds of conveyancing, it is clear from its tenor and is common ground that the gravamen of the accusation, against the accused is that they are conducting a 'money circulation scheme'. The reference in the F.I.R. to 'prize chits' reflects but a common human failing to err on the safe side and the notorious effort of draftsmen to embrace as much as possible so that no argument may be shut out for want of pleading.\n\nSince the sole question for consideration arising out of the F.l.R., as laid, is whether the accused are conducting a mon.ey circulation scheme, it is necessary to understand what is comprehended within the statutory meaning of that expression.\n\nSection 2(c) of the Act provides :\n\n\" 'Money circulation scheme' means any scheme, by H whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money, or for the receipt of any money or valuable thin!!\n\n\" ' • '\"i •,_ . f.\n\nI i\n\nI'\n\nWBST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, c. J.)\n\nas the consideration for a promise to pay money, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into tlie scheme, whether or not snch money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscriptions.\"\n\nGrammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of life and I prefer in this case not to go merely by the commas used in clause (c) because, though they seem to me to bav~ been placed both as a matter of convenience and of meaningfulness, yet, a more thoughtful use of commas and other gadgets of punctuation would have helped make the meaning of the clause clear beyond controversy.\n\nBesides, how far a clause which follows upon a comma governs euery clause that precedes the comma is a matter not free from doubt. I, therefore, consider it more safe and\n\n.. satisfactory to discover the true meaning of clause (c) by having regard to the substance of the matter as it emerges from the object and.purpose of the Act, the context in which the expression is used and tho consequences necessarily following upon the acceptance of any particular interpretation of the provision, the contravention of which is visited by penal consequences.\n\nCommas or no commas, and howsoever thoughtfully one may place them if they are to be there, I find it impossible to take clause\n\n(c) to mean that any and every activity \"for the making of quick or easy money\" is comprehended within its scope. For the matter of that, I cannot believe any law to ban every kind of activity for making quick or easy money, without more, on pain of penal conse- -- \\_ - quences. It is far too vague and arbitrary to prescribe that >1'. \"whosoever makes quick or easy money shall be liable to be punish- • ed with fine or imprisonment\". For then, in the absence of any demarcation of legitimate money-making activities from those which fall within the ban, the question whether the penal provision is attracted in a given case wiil depend upon the will and temper, sweet or sour, of the magistracy.\n\nBesides, speaking of law and morals, it does not seem morally just or proper to say that no person shall make quick or easy money, especially quick.\n\nA person who makes quick money may do so legitimately by the use of his wits and wisdom and no 'moral tyrpitude may attach to it.\n\nOne need not travel after to find speaking examples of this.\n\nIndeed, there are honournble meq (al!d now wqmen) in all professions re-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\ncognised traditionally as noble, who make quite quick money by the use of their talents, acumen and experience acquired over the years by dint of hard work and industry.\n\nA lawyer who charges a thousand rupees for a Special Leave Petition lasting five minutes\n\n(tha\\ is as far as a Judge's imagination can go), a doctor who charges a couple of thousands for an operation of tonsilitis lasting ten minutes, an engineer, an architect, a chartered accountant and other professionals who charge likewise, cannot by any stretch of imagination be brought into the drag-net of clause (c).\n\nSimilarly, there are many other vocations and business activities in which, of late, people have been notoriously making quick money as, for example, the builders and real estate brokers. I cannot accept that the provisions of clause (c) are directed against any of these categories of persons. I do not suggest that law is powerless to reach easy or quick money and if it wills to reach it, it can find a way to do it.\n\nBut the point of the matter is that it will verge upon the ludicrous to say that the weapon devised by law to ban the making of quick or easy money is the provision contained in section 2(c) of the \"Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act\".\n\nIn order to give meaning and content to the definition of the expression 'money circulation scheme' which is contained in section 2(c) of the Act, one has, therefore, to look perforce to the adjectival clause which qu.alifies the words \"for the making of quick or easy money\". What is within the mischief of the Act is not \"any\n\nscheme, by whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money\" simpliciter, but a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, \"on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme\", (whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or their periodical subscriptions). Two conditions must, therefore, be satisfied before a person can be hetd guilty of an offence under sec. 4 read with secs. 3 and 2(c) of the Act. In the first place, it must be proved tbar he is promoting or conducting a sch_eme for the making of quick or easy money and secondly, the chance or opportunity of making quick or easy money must be shown to depend upon an event or contingency relative or appli cable to the enrolment of members into that scheme. The legislative draftsman could have thoughtfully foreseen and avoided all reasonable controversy over the meaning of the expression 'mone:)'\n\nirvula!ion sphefl!~' by shapin~ its gejipition in this form :\n\n' v\n\n\\ :.~\n\nWEST BENGAL v, SWA~AN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C. J.) 133\n\n'money circulation scheme' means any scheme, by . whatever name called,\n\n(i) for the making of quick or easy money; or\n\n(ii) for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as\n\nthe consideration for a promise to pay money, B\n\non any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of• members into the scheme, whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscriptions;\n\nI have reshaped the definition, in order to bring out its meaning clearly, without adding or deleting a single word or comma from the original text of section 2 (c).\n\nThe substance of the matter is really not in doubt : only the form of the definition is likely to create some doubt as to the meaning of the expression which is defined and, therefore, I have made a formal modification in ihe definition without doing violence to its language and indeed, without even so much as altering a comma.\n\nThere is another aspect of the matter which needs to be underscored, with a view to avoiding fruitless litigation in future.\n\nBesides the prize chits, what the Act aims at banning is money circulation schemes. It is manifestly necessary and mdeed, to say so is to state the obvious, that the activity charged as falling within the mischief of the Act must be shown to be a part of a scheme for making quick or easy money, dependent upon the happening or non-happening of any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into that scheme.\n\nA 'scheme,' according to the dictionary meaning of that word, is 'a carefully arranged and systematic progflm of action', a 'systematic plan for attaining some object', 'a project', 'a system of correlated things'. (see Webster's New World Dictionary, and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II), The Systematic programme of action has to be a consensual arrangement between two or rr ore persons under which, the subscriber agrees to advance or lend money on promise of being paid more money on the happening of any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the programme. Reciprocally, the person who promotes or con-· ducts the programme promises, on receipt of an advance or loan,\n\n134 SUPllEMB COURT REPtiRTS (1982] 3 s.C.ll.\n\nto pay more money on the happening of such event or contingency.\n\nTherefore, a transaction under which, one party deposits with the other or lends to that other a sum of money on promise of being. paid interest at a rate higher than the agreed rate of interest cannot, without more, be a 'money circulation scheme' within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Act, howsoever high the promised rate of interest may be in comparision with the agreed rate. What that section requires is that such reciprocal promises, express or implied, must depend for their performance on the happening of an event or • contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme.\n\nIn other words, there has to be a community of interest in the happening of such event or contingency. That explains why section 3 makes it an offence to \"participate\" in the scheme or to remit any money \"in pursuance of such scheme\". fle who conducts or promotes a money-spinning project may have manifold resources from which to pay fanciful interest by luring the unwary customer.\n\nBut, unless the project envisages a mutual arrangement under which, the happening or non-happening of an event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into that arrangement is of the essence, there can be no 'money circulation scheme' within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Act.\n\nNumerous persons lend their hard-earned monies in the hope of earning high returns. It is notorious that, eventually, quite a few of them lose both the principal and the interest, for no project can succeed against the basic laws of economics.\n\nSharp and wily promoters pay A's money to B and B's to C in order to finance interest at incredible rates; and eventually, when high-risk investment made by them at the cost of the credulous lenders fails, the entire arrangement founders on the rock of foolish optimism. The promoters, of course, have easy recourse to gadgets of the law of insolvency. It is difficult to hold that the lender, himself a victim of the machinations of the crafty promoter, is intended by the Act to be arraigned as an accused. I do not think that any civilised law can intend to add insult to injury.\n\nThe question as to whether the First Information Report prjma facie discloses an offence under section 4 read with section 3 of the Act has to be decieed in the light of these requirements of section 2 (c) of the Act. I have already reproduced in extenso the F .I.R. lodged by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation.\n\nAnalying it carefully, and even liberally, it makes the\n\n' r\n\n/-_,_ \"\"\n\nWEST BENGAt v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C. J.) t3S\n\nfollowing allegations against the firm 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners :\n\n(I) The firm had been offering fabulous interest@ 48% per annum to its members, which rate of interest was later reduced to 36% per annum;\n\n(2) Such high rate of interest was being paid even though the loan certificate receipts . show that interest was liable to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum only; and\n\n(3) The fact that interest was paid in excess of I 2% shows C clearly that a 'Money Circulation Scheme' was being promoted and conducted for the making of quick or easy money.\n\nIt seems to me impossible to hold on the basis of tliese allegations that any offence can be said to be made out prima facie under section 3 of the Act.\n\nIn the first place, the F.I.R. does not allege, directly or indirectly, that the firm was promoting or conducting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme. Secondly, the F.I.R. does not contain any allegation whatsoever that persons who advanced or deposited their monies with the firm were participants of a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent upon any such event or contingency.\n\nThe F.l.R. bears on its face the stamp of hurry and want of care. It seems to assume, what was argued before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee on behalf of the prosecution, that it is enough for the purposes of section 2 (c) to show that the accused is promoting or conducting a scheme for the making .of quick or easy money, an assumption which I have shown to be fallacious. An essential ingredient of section 2 (c) is that the scheme for making quick or easy money must 'be dependent on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolement of members into the scheme. A First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting p9int of. a lawful iµvestigation.\n\nIn answer to the writ petitions filed by the accused in the Calcutta High Court, affidavits were filed on behalf of the pro-\n\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\nA secuting agency, which do not improve matters in any way. The affidavit filed by Arun Kanti Roy, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West'Bengal, alleges that :\n\n(i) The actual payment of a very high rate of interest against the professed rate of 12% attracted huge B amounts of idle money into circulation ;\n\n(ii) The investment of money as collected is not under the regulatory control of the Reserve Bank of India or any other agency of the State dealing with credit control in relation to the country's economy;\n\n(iii) The pooling of the purchasing power and the financial resources and the unfettered deployment thereof have resulted in the concentration of tremendous economic power in the hand's of a few, posing a potential threat to the equilibrium of the country's economy;\n\n(iv) The entire process is speculative in nature and directed towards luring away the investing public to the speculative market for making quick and easy money;\n\n(v) The very basis of the so-called contractual arrange- E ment between the firm and its depositors is founded on the. fradulent device to assure to the people a high rate of interest, the major portion of which is paid through unaccounted for money, thereby encouraging the growth of such unaccounted money in the hands of the investing public; F\n\n(vi) The professed rate of interest is a mere subterfuge to provide a cloak of bona fides and legality to the underb and transactions, through which unaccounted for money comes into play in the market, generating further unaccounted for money, a part whereof gocis\n\nback to the depsitors in the form of the balance of inierest over 12% paid in cash, month by month ;\n\n(vii) The firm did not have enough income or resources so as to be able to pay interest at such high rates ;\n\n(viii) The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that .interest was being paid out of the capital itself;\n\nI -~· ~- ,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachad, C. J.) d1\n\n(ix) \"The depositor becomes a member of the investment scheme of the firm by subscribing to it and the payment of the quick and easy money by way of high rate ·\n\nof interest is dependent upon the period of investment and/or efflux of time which are very much relative and/ or applicable to the membership of the depositors of the scheme to which the depositor agrees to subscribe\";\n\nand\n\n(x) Iu the process of its working, the scheme of the firm generates quick and easy money so as to render such scheme or arrangement a 'money circulation scheme' within the meaning of the Act.\n\n~ The Assistant Commissioner of Police Shri Sunil Kumar\n\n' .\n\nCbakravarty has adopted these pleas and statements in his own affidavit.\n\nIt is clear from these averments that even at the stage when the State of West Bengal and its concerned officers submitted detailed affidavits to the High Court, there was no clear basis for alleging and no material was disclosed to show that, prima facie, the firm was promoting or conducting a scheme for making quick or easy money which was dependent upon an event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into that scheme.\n\nThe burden of the State's song is that the scheme conducted by the accused generates black money and will lparalyse the economy of the country. These are serious matters indeed and it is unquestionable that a private party cannot be permitted to issue bearer bonds by the back door. The fact that the accused are indulging in an economic activity which is highly detrimental to national interests is a matter which must engage the prompt and serious attention of the State and Central Governments. But the narrow question for our consideration is whether on the basis of the allegations made against th_e accused, there is reason to suspect that . they are guilty of an offence under section 4 read with sections 3 and 2 (c) of the Act. The allegation which we have reproduced in clause (ix) above from the affidavit of Arun Kanti Roy is the nearest that can be considered relevant for the purpose of section 2 (c) of the Acts.\n\nBut even that allegation does not meet the requirement of that section since, what it says is that \"the payment of quick and easy money by way of high rate of interest is dependent upon the period\n\nSUl>trn.Mll COURt REPoRTS\n\n(1982} 3 S.C.R.\n\nof investment and/or efflux of time which are. very much relative and/or applicable to the membership of the depositors of . the scheme to which the depositor agrees to subscribe\". This is too tenuous to show that the scheme is dependent upon an event or contingency of the description mentioned in section 2(c), apart from the fact that the only participation which is alleged as against the depositors is that they become members of the \"investment scheme\" by subscribing to it. There is no allegation even in any of the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of West Bengal and its concerned officers that the depositors and the promoters are animated by a community of interest in tbe matter of the scheme being dependent upon any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into it.\n\nThat being an essential ingredient of the offence charged, i( cannot be said .in the absence of any allegation whatsoever in that behalf, that there is \"reason to suspect\" the commission of that offence within the meaning of section 15 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so as to justify the investigation i.ndertaken by the State\n\nauthorities .\n\n• My learned Brother, A.N. Sen J., bas considered exhaustively the various authorities cited at the Bar by both the sides on the question as to the power of the courts to quash an i1ivestigation.\n\nI fully concur with his careful analysis of those authorities and would content myself with a broad indication of the trend of law bearing on the subject.\n\nShri Ashok Sen and Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray pressed upon us with considerable insistence the principle reiterated in W.H. King v. Republic of India, (')that a statute which creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment must be construed strictly in favour of the subject. The principle that no person can be put in peril of hii life and liberty on an ambiguity is well-established. But, as observed in M. V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi (2) when it is .said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, what is meant is that the c'ourt must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of th.e words used and it must not strain the words : \"To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.R. 418, 424.\n\n(1) [1961] 3 SCR 993-994.\n\nWEST BBNGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C. J.) 13~\n\nshould be o construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute\", and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred.\n\nBut I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fudamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear and plain, the CDurt must accept the expressed intention of the Legislature. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter any further in view of the fact that the language of section 2(c) is, in my opinion, clear arid admits of no doubt or difficulty.\n\nIn R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab,(') the question which arose for consideration was whether a first information report can be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe Court held on the facts before it that no case for quashing the proceedings was made out but Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the Court observed that though ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused must be tried under the provisions of the Code, there are some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction of the Court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. One such category, according to the Court, consists of cases where the allegations in he F.l.R. or t]le complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in. their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a matter merely of looking at the F.l.R. or the complaint in order to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, said t)le Court, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused.\n\nIn S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, (') a first information report was lodged naming an Additional District Magistrat~ G (Judicial) as the principal accused. His application under section 159 of the Criminal Procedure Code asking t bat the Judicial Magistrate should himself conduct a preliminary inquiry was dismissed, but the Court observed that though the Code of Criminal\n\n{I) [1960) SCR 388, 392-393.\n\n(2) [1970) 3 S.C.R. 946.\n\n' \\ :. ' > ,,_ \\ , l , - '\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nProcedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been commit ted, in appropriate cases, an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and that the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police from misusing their legal powers.\n\nShri Som Nath Chatterjee has placed great reliance on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak,(1) in which it was held that the statutory powers given to the .police under sections J 54 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of powers under section 439 or under the inherent powers conferred b)' section 561A of the Code. It must be remembered that no question arose in that case as to whether, the allegations contained in the F.I.R. disclosed any offence at all.\n\nThe contention of the accused in that case was that the statutory power of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV of the Code is not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act 1949 and that being so, the investigation undertaken by the police was without jurisdiction.\n\nThat contention was negatived and, therefore, ihe application filed by the accused under sections 439 and 561 A of the Code was dismissed.\n\nIn Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration,(') the application filed by the accused under sction 56lA of the Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent, but that was because t':e Court found (per Sarkaria L page 797) that pdma facie, the allegation in the F.l.R., if taken as correct, disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused.\n\nThe only other decision to which I need refer is that of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Kawaja Nazir. Ahmad,(') which conscitutes, as it were, the charter of the prosecution all over for saying that no investigation can ever be quashed.\n\nIn a passage oft-\n\n(I) [1963) 2 S.C.R. 52.\n\n(2) [1974) 3 S.C.R. 794.\n\n(3) 71 I.A. 203.\n\n.. ! ':-\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 141\n\nquoted but much-misunderstood, Lord porter, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, observed :\n\n\"In their Lordships' opinion, however, the more serious aspect of the. case is to be found in the resultant interference by the court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found noi guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime with out requiring an~ authority from the judicial authorities, and it would,' as their Lordships.think, be an unfortunate result if it shou1a be 'held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the .judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order • is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under section 491 of the Criminal procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nIn such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then.', (pp. 212- 213)\n\nI do not think that this decision supports the wide proposition canvassed before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee. In the case before the Privy Council, similar charges which were levelled against the accused in an earlier prosecution were dismissed. The High Court quashed the investigation into fresh charges after examining the previous record, on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that tl:e evidence against the accused was unacceptable. The question before the Privy Council was not whether the fresh F.I.R. disclosed any offence at all.\n\nIn fact, immediately after the passage which I have extracted above, the Privy Council qualified its state J11ept by saying ; ·\n\n142 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R.\n\n\"No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no Wfence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation.\"\n\nIf anything, therefore, the judgment shows that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F.I; R. It shall also have been noticed, which is sometims overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to qualify its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases ..\n\n. The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of inveftigation under section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima fa cie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and th.e rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (supra) will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the F.l.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would he justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received.\n\nThere is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom.\n\nThe power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by'tbe Code. l may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew J. in bis majority judgment in Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup(1) to the following effect :\n\n(1) [1974) 2 S.C.R. 12, 22-23,\n\n,_ .. ----<-.\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, c. J.) 143\n\n\"We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure bas been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years.\n\nUnder our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance wit.b the procedure established by Law.\"\n\nFor these reasons, which, frankly, are no different from those given by my learned Brother A.N. Sen, I am of the opinion that the investigation which has been commenced upon the First Information Report is without jurisdiction and must, therefore, be\n\nquashed.\n\nI do accordingly and direct that no further investigation D shall take place in pursuanc! or on the basis of the F.I. R. dated December 13, 1980 lodged by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, Madan Street, Calcutta.\n\nI am free to confess that it is with considerable regret that I have ome to the conclusion that the investigation must be quashed.\n\nIf the State authorities bad applied their mind carefully to the requirements of section 2 ( c) of the Act, this appeal might have had a different story to tell, the bare outlines of which I must now proceed to narrate.\n\nThe firm 'Sanchai ta Investments' commenced its business on July I, 1975, its three partners contributing a total capital of Rs. 7000\n\n(Rupees seven thousand). On December 25, 1978 an advertisement appeared in the \"Hindu\" in the name of firm, claiming falsely that its business was \"approved by the Reserve Bank of India\".\n\nSince the representation was likely to mislead the public, the Reserve Bank advised the firm in May 1979 too issue a suitable corrigendum, which the firm did.\n\nOn July 6, 1979, Shri Rudolph L. Rodrigues. a Member of the\n\nLok Sabha, wrote a confidential Jetter to Shri. Charan Singh, the H then Deputy Prfme Minister, coinplaininll that the business of the fil'lll\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.R.\n\nwas \"a cover-up for a parallel banking system for black money\".\n\nA copy of Shri Rodrigues' letter was forwarded by the Director, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry ''of Finance, to the Chief Officer, Department of Non-Banking Companies, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta,_ for inquiry. By his letter dated August 7, 1979 the Chief Officer pointed out the difficulty in directing investigation into the affairs of the.firm since, its capital being less than Rs, one lakh, it did not come within the definition of a Non-Banking institution as provided in section 54 (c) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. On September 13, 1980 the Deputy Secretary Finance Department Government of West Bengal, wrote a letter to the Chi•f Officer requesting him to exall!ine the question whether the business of the firm came within the purview of the prize Chits and Money Circu lation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 and if noi, under which Act the affairs of the firm could be regulated. On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control.\n\nThe letter of Shri Ashok Mitra appears to have been handed over , informally to Dr. K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, who, by his reply dated October 22, 1980, informed Shri Mitra that the legal department of the Reserve Bank was of the opinion that the mere acceptance of Joans by the firm would not ordinarily be covered by the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. There was further correspondence on the subject between the authorities of the Government of Jndia and the State Government._ but nothing came out of it.\n\nThe Act came into force on December 13, 1978 and immediately on the expiry of the two years' period of grace allowed by it, the F.I.R. was lodged against the firm on December 13, 1980.\n\nOn that day, the office of the firm at 5-6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta, was searched by the police, during the course of which a sum of Rs. 42,16,530 (Rupees forty two lacs, sixteen thousand, five hundred and thirty) was recovered.\n\nThe amount was tied in separate bundles of notes of different denominations.\n\nSever11l books of accounts were also seized during the search,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 145\n\nOn the same date, a search was carried out at the residence of Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee, a partner of the firm, when the following articles were seized :\n\n(I) One pass-book of Syndicate Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta, in the name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\", 9, Royd Street, Calcutta-17. (The account was in a fictitious name and the pass-book shows that a sum of Rs.\n\nTwenty-eight crores was lying in credit in that account).\n\n(2) A sum of Rs .. 9,95,000 (Rs. nine lacs ninety-five thousand) tied in separate bundles of 11otes of the denomination of Rs. I 00 and 50.\n\n(3) A country-made 6 chamber revolver, with one bullet inside.\n\nFrom the house of another partner, Biharilal Murarka, certain account books were seized.\n\nDuring, the course of investigation until January 8, 1981 when it was stopped by an order of this Conrt, as many as eighty places were searched by the police and a large number of documents were seized. It is apparent from these documents that the firm was paying to its depositors interest at the rate of 48 per cent upto September 1979 and 36 per cent thereafter for a short period. The interest was paid to each depositor every month by the agents who called on each depositor personally for that purpose. The interest in excess of 12 per cent was invariably paid in cash. The on coming elections to legislative bodies in 1980 appear to have led to reduction in the rate of interest, since the firm's circulating capital was needed by \"political parties\". Which parties, I do not know, but this much is fairly certain from the facts which have emerged before us that the funds available to the firm were diverted frequently for the use of political parties.\n\nCertain lists of agents were seized during the investigation which show that Code numbers were assigned to at least 84 of them.\n\nThe agents have acquired large ptoperties at various places, consisting of lands, apartments, cars eN $ome of the a!lents have .started\n\n11ew business activities .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA staggering revelation which came to light as a result of the searches at the office of the firm is that, as of September I, 1980, the firm was holding deposits to the tune of Rs. 73,51,23,500\n\n(Rupees seventy-three crores, fifty-one lacks, twenty-three thousand and five hundred).\n\nThse deposits were received by the firm from persons drawn from all parts of the eountry, the pride of place belonging to Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Hyderabad.\n\nRemittances also appear to have been received by the firm from overseas clients. A compilation prepared by the State authorities in pursuance of an interim order passed by this Court shows that the total amount of deposits made by persons who had deposited a sum of Rs. 10,000 or less each comes to Rs. 11,49,40,950 (Rupees eleven crores, forty-nipe lacs, forty-thousand, nine hundred and fifty).\n\nThe documents relating to the account in the fictiiious name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\" show that a person alleged to bear.that name was introduced to the Syndicate .Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta by 111e firm's partner Sambhu Prosad Mukherjee. The pass-book relating to the account (Cutrent Account No. 210) shows that the account was opened with a cash deposit of Rs. 28 lacs.\n\nA total sum of Rupees twenty seven crores, ninety seven lacs eightysix thousand and odd was deposited in that account until December 6, 1980, all deposits being in cash. Such cash deposits varied often between 50 to 80 lacs at a time .. The amount of nearly Rs. 28 crores was withdrawn from the account steadily from November 11,\n\n1980. The account was closed on December 6, 1980, that is, a week before the F.I.R. was lodged on December 13, 1980. Some of the entries in the pass-book do not tally with the Bank's Ledger.\n\nA study of Current Account No. S-502 in the name of the firm with the United Bank .of India, High Court Branch, Calcutta, shows that the firm had invested several lacs of rupees in various concerns numbering about forty.\n\nLacs of rupees have been transferred by the firm to various concerns.\n\nDocuments seized from the office premises of the firm show that the partners and their family members are insured with the LJ.C. in heavy amounts. They have acquired large properties, particularly in Bombay.\n\n--£-\n\n\\ ~·'-\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 147\n\nSeveral offices and concerns in Bombay were searched by the police and interesting discoveries were made. Their magnitude and variety are too large for the scope of this judgment. I will close this narrative by saying that the income-tax returns of Shambhu Prosad Mukherjee reveal that he had shown a sum of Rs. 8,00,000 as prizes received from Delhi Lotteries in 1979 and that the firm has not filed any income-tax return after the financial year ending June 30, 1977. It had asked for an extension of time on the ground that its accounts were not finalised but the Department rejected that prayer on December 9, 1980.\n\nWith further indulgence they have managed cleverly to secure is not yet known.\n\nThese facts disclose a bizzare state of affairs. A token capital of Rs. 7,000 has begotten a wealth of crores of rupees within a span of five years. A bank account opened by the firm in a fictitious name had a sum of Rs. twentyeight crores in it, which was withdrawn within a week before the lodging of the F.I.R. Interest was being paid to depositors at the incredible rate of 48 p.c. p.a. The firm had no ostensible source of income from which such exorbitant amounts could be paid and its account books, such as were seized from its head-office, give no clue to its income or its assets. The partners of the firm have become millionaries overnight. Clerks and Chemists that they and some of their agents were in 1975, to-day they own properties which will put a prince to shame. \"Rags to riches\" is how one may justly describe this story of quick and easy enrichment.\n\nThere is no question that this vast wealth has been acquired by the firm by generating and circulating black money.\n\nIndeed, rightly did Shri Ashok Sen appearing for the firm, ask us to be free to proceed on the assumption that the exorbitant amount of interest was.being i:iaid from out of unaccounted money.\n\nIn these circumstances though I see no alternative save to stop all further investigation on the basis of the F.I.R. as laid, no offence being disclosed by it under section 4 of the Act, I am unable to accept the contention of Shri Ashok Sen that all documents, books papers and cash seized so far during the investigation should be returned to the firm and its partners forthwith.\n\nThe firm appears to be on the brink of an economic crisis, as any scheme of this nature is eventually bound to be. Considering the manner in which the firm has manipulated its accounts and its affairs, l have no doubt that it will secret the large funds and destroy the incriminating documents if they are returned \\Q it., Th.~ State Gover11ll\\l\\t, •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (!982) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nthe Central Government and' the Reserve Bankof India must be given a reasonable opportu.nity to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute an inquiry into the affairs of the firm and, in the mean while, to regulate its affairs. I consider such a step essential in the interests of countless small depositors who, otherwise, will be ruined by being deprived of their life's savings. The big black money bosses will take any loss within their stride but the small man must receive the protection of the State wliich must see to it that the small depositors are paid back their deposits with the agreed interest as quickly as possible. I therefore direet that the documents, books, papers, cash and other articles seized during the investigation shall be retained by the police in their custody for a period of two months from today and will be returned, on the expiry of that period, to persons from whom they were seized, subject to any lawful directions which may be given or obtained in the me_anwhile regarding their custody and return.\n\nD With this modification, I agree respectfully with Brother A.N.\n\nSen that the appeals be dismissed.\n\nVARADARAJAN J. I agree with the judgment and the final order proposed by the learned Chief Justice.\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, J. This appeal by special leave bas been filed by the State of West Bengal and three officers of the State against an order passed by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The facts material for the purpose of this appeal have been fully set out in the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The facts material for the purpose of this appeal may, however, be briefly indicated :\n\nSanchaita Investments is a partnership firm duly registered under the Indian Partnership Act.\n\nSancbaita Investments (hereinafter referred to as the firm) bas its principal place of business at Nos. 5 and 6. Fancy Lane, Calcutta.\n\nShambhu Prasad Mukherjee, Bihari Lal Murarka and Swapan Kumar Guba are the three partners of the Firm. The capital of the partnership firm is Rs. 7,000/-. The firm carries on the business as financiers and investors and in its business the firm accepts loans or deposits from the general public for different periods repayable with interest @I 2% per annum. Under the terms of deposits, the depositors have a right to withdraw their deposits with the firm at any time before the expiry of the fixed\n\n\\ ...... /'-.\n\nWBsT BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 14§ ,.\n\nperiod of the deposit. In case of premature withdrawal, the depositors however loses interest of I% and is paid interest @ 11 % per annum. Under the terms and conditions of the deposits, the firm has also the liberty to repay the amount with interest to any depositor at any time before the expiry of the stipulated period of the deposit and in the event of such repayment by the firm, the firm is not required under the terms and conditions of the deposit or loan, to give any reason. It appears that the firm has been carrying on its business on a very extensive scale.\n\nIn the year 1978, the Parliament passed an Act called the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nOn the 13th December, 1980, the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, lodged a complaint of violation of the Act by the firm with. the Police. The F.I.R. has been set out in full in the judgment of the learned Trial Judge and the same reads as follows :\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation,\n\n10, Madras Street.\n\nCalcutta 72\n\nSir,\n\n13.12.1980\n\nOn a secret information that 'Sanchaita Investments' of 5 and 6 Fancy Lane, Calcutta, is carrying on business of promoting and/or conducting prize chit and/or money circulation scheme enrolling members of such chit and/or scheme participating in these, and/ or receiving and remit ting monies in pursuance of such chits and/or scheme in violation of the provisions of the prize chits and money circulation scheme (Banning) Act, 1978.\n\nInquiry was held secretly to verify correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid secret information. Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchita Investments' is a Partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guba and th1t it was floated in or around\n\ntso\n\n- Sui>RBME touat R.Bi>oHs [1982] 3 s.c.R,\n\n1975.\n\nEnquiry further reveals that the said firm had been offering fabulous interest @ 48% per annum to its members until very recently. The rate of interest has of late been reduced to 36% per annum.\n\nSuch high rates of interest were and are being paid even though the loan certificate receipts show the rate of interest to be 12% only.\n\nThus, the amount in excess of 12% so paid clearly shows that the 'Money Circulation Scheme' is being promoted and conducted for the making of quick and/or easy money, prizes and/or gifts in cash were and are also awarded to agents, promoters and members too.\n\nIn view of the above, Saravsree. Bihari Prasad Murarka Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guha appear to have been carrying on business in the trade name of 'Sanchita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation scheme in violation of section 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1976 are therefore, punishable under S. 4 of the said Act. Necessary action may, therefore, be kindly taken against the aforesaid offenders along with other accomplice as provided in the law.\n\nYours faithfully\n\nSd/- Illegible 13.12.1980 Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation.\"\n\nOn the 13th of December, two of the partners of the firm were arrested. The office of the. firm and also the houses of the partners were searched.\n\nVarious documents and papers were seized and a large amount of cash was also seized from the office and also from the risidence of one of the partners. _Two partners who were arrested were, however, thereafter enlarged on bail.\n\nThe firm and its two partners, namely, Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee and. Bihari Lal Murarka filed this writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the F.I.R. and the procedings arising out of the same iluding the validity of the searches\n\n',--.\n\nI )- )\n\n/'\\,~\n\nWEST BENGAt v. SWAPAN ltUMAR (A.N. Sen, },) 151\n\nand seizure of documents, papers and cash. The respondents in the writ petition were six. The first respondent was the State of West Bengal, Respondents No. 2 was the Officer who had lodged the F.I.R., Respondent No. 3 was the Assistant Commissioner of Police and Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, and respondent No. 4 was the Investigating Officer in the cases pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta. Respondent No. 5 was the Reserve Bank of India and Respondent No. 6 was the Union of India.\n\nIn brief the case made .bY the firm and its partners in the writ petition is that the firm is a non-banking financial institution which carries on business of accepting deposits or loans from the general public on terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement of loan or deposit, pays interest to persons who invest or advance money to the firm in terms of the. agreement between the parties and repays all amounts received from the parties with nterest in terms of the agreement between the parties. The further case made by the writ petitioners in the writ petition is that the amounts which they\n\nrceive from parties are reinvested by them and out of the investments made by the firm, the firm pays the interest to the depositors and also the principal amount deposited by them in terms of the agreement between the parties. In the writ petition there is a denial of the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the case is further made that even if the allegations made in the F.I.R. are assumed to be correct, there cannot be any question of any violation of the Act and no offenc~ under the Act is disclosed. It is the positive case of the writ petitioners in the writ petition that the Act has no application to the firm. In the writ petition, the validity of the F.I.R. and the proceeding arising therefrom is challenged mainly on the ground that the F.l.R. does not disclose any offence under the Act which does not apply to the firm and there can be question of any violation of any provisions of the Act which has no application to the firm at all.\n\nIn answer to the averments made in writ petition, an affidavit affirmed by Shri Arun Kanti Roy, was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, an affidavit affirmed by Shri Sunil Kumar Chakra. vorty on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 was filed and an affidavit affirmed by. Shri Rani Annaji Rao on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India was also filed. In the affidavit affirmed by Arnn Kanti\n\nRoy, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department and Ex-officio Director\n\n152 SUPREM\" COURt REPORTS [ 1982] 3 s.c.K.\n\nof Small Savings, Government of West Bengal, on behalf of Respondents No. I and 2, that is, the State of West Bengal and Shri B.K. Kundu, there is an assertion that the Respondents come within the mischief of the Act and they have violated S. 3 of the Act. The . relevant averments are contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the said affidavit and it is necessary to set out the same in their entirety :\n\n\"6. With reference to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition, I say that the petitioner firm accepts loans and/or deposits from all and sundry for varying periods without any authority of law.\n\nAlthough the professed rate of interest , of such deposit is at the rate of 12% per annum, the petitioner firm was actually paying interest at the rate of 48% per a!mum, which was recently reduced to 36% per annum. The actual payment of such high rate of interest against the professed rate of 12% attracts huge amount of idle money into circulation and the investment of money as collected is not under the regulatory control of the Reserve Bank of India or any other agency of the State dealing with credit control in relation to the country's economy. The receipt of such money from the members of public at such high rate of interest is without any fetters as against the case of the receipt of money by banking companies as also non-banking companies which are regulated under different provisions of law, to which I will crave reference at the time of hearing, tf necessary.\n\nThe pooling of the purchasing power and/or the financial resources and the employment there of being unfettered has resulted in the concentration of tremendous economic power in the hands of a few posing a potential threat to the equilibirium of the country's economy. The term of the deposit are unilaterally determined without any scrutiny by the Reserve Bank of India or with reference to the norms as to the credit control which the said Bank lays down and follows from tiiµe !to time. The acceptances of such deposits from the members of public with unrestricted use of the moneys so collected are completely repugnant to the accepted modes of public savings and investment thereof for generation of goods and services contributing to the economic growth of the country. The entire process is\n\n, .\n\nWEST BIJNOAt v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.\\ 153'\n\nspeculative in nature and directed towards luring away the investing public to the speculative market for making quick and easy money. These are some of the activities which are sought to be banned by the banning provisions of the said Act, which has replaced similar regulatory measures contained in the several directions issued by the Reserve.\n\nBank of India under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, to the various financial institutions and non-banking companies, The present Act is applicable not only to such companies but also to individuals and firms.\n\nAll allegations contrary to and save as aforesaid are denied.\n\n7. With reference to paragraph 5 of the petition I call upon the petitioner to disclose full particulars of their deposit scheme, which is disclosed will go to show that the terms and conditions are wholly arbitrary and contrary to the economic norms. The very basis of the so called contractual arrangement between the petitioner firm and its depositors is founded on the fradulent device to assure the people with a high rate of interest, the major portion of which is paid through unaccounted for money, thereby encouraging growth of such unaccounted for money in the hands of the investing public.\n\nThe professed rate of interest is a mere subterfuge to provide a cloak of bonafide and legality over the under-hand transactions through which unaccounted for money comes into play in the market generating further unaccounted for money, a part thereof goes back to the depositors in the form of the balance of interest over 12% paid in cash month by month.\n\nAll allegations contrary to and save as aforesaid are denied.\n\n8. With reference to paragraph 8 of the petition I say that the petitioners have been very much working on the above scheme to which the depositors have subscribed.\n\nWhether such deposits are one time deposits and whether such deposits actually earn income in excess of the interest actually paid to the depositors or a matter of detailed investigation, which were in progress until the same was stopped by the order cif the learned Court of Appeal passed on 8th January, 1981. From whatever particulars are so far available to the answering respondents it can be\n\n• c\n\nB4 SUPIU!Mlr eoukt REPoRts\n\n. J il982J 3 s.c.R.\n\nstated that the firm did not have so much income as the quantum of interest that was being paid by it and the irresistibal conclusion from such state of affairs is that payment of interest was being made out of capital itself.\n\nAll allegations contrary to and save as aforesaid are denied.\n\n9. With reference to paragraph 7 of the petition I reiterate the statements made hereinbefore and deny all allegations contrary thereto.\n\nI specifically deny that no quick or easy money is accepted or received by the depositors or lenders or that payment of any such meney is not contemplated or made by the firm as purported to be alleged. The depositor becomes a member of the invest ment scheme of the company by subscribing to it and the payment of the quick and easy money by way of high rate of interest is dependent upon the period of investment and/ or effiux of time which are very much relative and/or applicable to the membership of. the depositors of the scherr e, to which the depositor agrees to. subscribe. In the process of its working the scheme of the firm generates quick and easy money so as to render such scheme or arrangement as a money circulation scheme within the mea.ning of the said Act. All allegations contrary to and save as aforesaid are denied.\n\nThe followin~ further averments contained in paragraph 22 and in paragraph 30 of the said affidavit may also be noted :\n\n\"22 .............. .\n\nI further say that payment of interest at the clandestine rate of 36% or 46% as against the aforesaid rate of 12% is in the context of the scheme promoted and conducted by the petitioners tantamount to activity which is banned under the banking provisions of the said Act.\n\n30 ............ .\n\nNo question of the depositors being ruined should arise if the petitioners had been runuing their business on sound economic line and had invested the fund collected from the depositors in safe and sound investment. The\n\nweSr BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\n!SS\n\nvery fact that the petitioners are apprehersive of innumerable depositors being ruined goes to show that they engaged themselves and also the depositors in the spE'culative market and have rendered the investment insecure by reasons of the very nature of the business i.e. money circulation scheme transacted by them.\"\n\nIn the affidavit affirmed by Shri Sunil Kumar Chakraverty, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, Government of West Bengal, Finance, Taxation Department and filed on behalf of Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the deponent adopts the. statements made in the affidavit of Arun Kanti Roy and the deponent denies that the searches and seizures were unlawful and illegal. The deponent further stated that as a result of the searches effected a mass of documents and a large amount of cash had been seized and the documents were being scrutinised.\n\nIn the affidavit affirmed by Shri Rani Annaji Rao, filed on behalf of Reserve Bank of Jndia, the deponent has stated that the Jl.eserve Bank of India which has no regulatory control over the firm has been unnecessarily made a party to ilie proceeding. It has been further stated in the said affidavit .that as desired by the parties and the Court, the Reserve Bank of India was placing the materials which had come to the knowledge of the Reserve Bank.\n\nIn this affidavit reference has been made to . certain correspondence between the State Finance Minister, Union Finance Minister and the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and also to various queries made and the enquiries made by the Reserve Bank of India. It has been further stated that the view of the legal department of the Reserve Bank on the basis of the enquiries made had Leen indicated to the Finance Minister of the State of West Bengal.\n\nIn this connection it will be relevant to set out two letters which have been annexed to the said affidavit filed on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India and are annexures D and E thereto. Annex.ure D is the copy of a letter addressed by Shri Ashok Mitra, State Finance Minister to the Union Minister for Finance and the said letter reads as follows :\n\n\"Informally handed over to DG (K) at Calcutta.\n\nAshok Mitra D.O. No. IM. 28-2-80 Calcutta, October 1, 1980\n\nSUPREME COUl!.t REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.i\\ ..\n\nDear Shri Venkataraman,\n\nIn the con1ext of the action being taken by the Government of West Bengal .under the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes {Banning) Act, 1978, a question has arisen whether an organisation called 'Sanchaita Investments, with the address at 5 & 6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta-I come within the purview of the above Act. A reference in the matter has been made by our authorised officer under the above act to the Chief Officer, Department of Non- Banking Companies, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta today.\n\nI am enclosing a copy of an advertisement published by the above organisation in the local newspapers as also a copy of a loan certificate receipt issued by the said organisation. I may mention that the authorised officer has issued notice under the above Act to a \"Sanchaita Savings Schme {P) Ltd.\" which is to be distinguished from 'Sanchaita Investments'. It appears that the organisation called \"Sachaita Investments\" is receiving large amount of monies from the public ostensibly as loans, and in lieu they are issuing loan certificates receipts.\n\nWhile we have no documentary evidence, the nes is strongly circulating in the market that the organisation is in fact offering rates of interest as high as 30 to 40 per cent evn though the loan certificate receipts indicate a rate of interest of 12 per cent only. There seems reasonable grounds for suspicion that this organisation is involved in extremely high-risk investments which only can enable them to pay such rates of interest. Since the security of monies deposited by the . public is involved, we would suggest that a thorough enquiry be conducted by the Government of India into the activities of this organisation particularly for finding out whether they are infringing provisions of any relevant status. It is felt necessary to conduct such an investigation on an urgent basis since large amounts of public monies are reported to be kept with this organisation, which does not seem as yet to have subjected to any regulatory control.\n\nWe are meanwhile awaiting a reply to our reference (copy enclosed) to the Reserve Bank of India regarding the applicability of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes\n\n(Banning) Act, 1978 to this organisation.\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 157\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri R.V. Venkataraman,\n\nUnion Minister for Finance, North Block, New Delhi-110001\"\n\nYours sincerely, Sd/- Ashok Mitra\n\nAnnexure E is a letter by Shri K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank to Dr. Ashok Mitra,\n\nState Finance Ministry.\n\nThe said letter is also here further set out :\n\n\"D.O. DNBC No. 2020/102 (Gen) L0-80/81\n\n22nd Oct., 1980 D Sanchaita Investments.\n\nMy Dear Ashok,\n\nYou might recall that during my recent visit to Calcutta; you had sent me a copy of your D.O. Letter dated October I, 1980 to Shri Venkataraman, Union\n\nMinister for Finance as also of a letter dated September 30, 1980 addressed to our Chief Officer, DNBC, Calcutta, in connection with the above firm.\n\nI have had the position examined by our Legal Department. According to them (vide extract of the note dated 17th October, 1980, enclosed for your confidential information) the acceptance of loans simpliciter by the firm by issue of receipts (as per the specimen received by us from our Calcutta Office) without floating any scheme or arrangement would not ordinarily be covered by the definition of \"Prize Chit\" and hit by the provisions of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978.\n\nHowever, you may also like to consult your Legal Adviser on the subject.\n\n2. As you may know, there are a few writ petitions pending in the Calcutta Hijjh Court where the interpreta-\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nti on of section 2 (e) of the Banning Act is involved. In that context I have thought it advisable to write to you on a confidential basis, rather than send a separate official reply. I shall therefore be grateful if you could leave instructions with your staff to keep this matter and the views of ollr legal department strictly confidential.\n\nWith warm regards,\n\nSd/- K.S. Krishnaswamy\n\nDr. Ashok Mitra, Miiiister of Finance\"\n\nFurther supplementary affidavits had also been filed.\n\nOn consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case and the materials which were placed before the learned Judge, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Act did not apply to the firm and the learned Judge further held that the searches and seizures were also wrongful, illegal and i01proper; and in view of his finding the learned Judge quashed the proceedings and directed the return of all documents and the refund of cash monies seized, to tbe writ-petitioners. It appears from the judgment of the learned Judge that the matter had been very fully argued before him and the learned Judge in an elaborate judgment had considered the arguments advanced before him and thereupon recorded his findings and passed the order allol'<ing the said writ petition.\n\nAgainst the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge, the State of West Bengal and its three officers have preferred this appeal with special leave granted by this Court. The writ petitioners, the Reserve Bank of India and Union of India have been made respondents in this appeal. It does not appear that Union of India has participated in the proceedings before the learned Judge and no affidavit on behalf of the Union of India appears to have been filed before the learned Judge.\n\nMr. Som Nath Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has attached the judgment under appeal on the main ground that the learned Judge in this extraordinary jurisdiction should not have held that the Act has no application to the H Respondent Firm and should not have on the basis of the said finding interfered with the investigation into the affairs of the\n\nfirm.\n\nMr. Chatterjee contends that the question of applicability\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 159\n\nof the Act will only come for consideration after the investigation has been completed and all relevant materials have been gathered on such investigation. It is the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that at the investigation stage, the Court does not interfere and does not quash any proceedings . before the investigation has been completed. In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee bas referred to a number of decisions of this Court,, I shall consider the relevant decisions referred to by Mr. Chatterjee at the appropriate time. Mr. Chatterjee bas submitted that after the investigation has been completed and all relevant materials have been gathered a charge under the Act may or may not be framed against the appellant firm for violation of the provisions of the Act. It is his submission that if the materials collected do not indicate any infringement of the Act._ no charge against the firm will be preferred, and all the accused persons will be discharged; if, on the other band, materials gathered disclose an offences under the Act, proper charge against the accused persons will be framed and it will be open to the accused persons to raise the plea in the course of the prosecution that no offence under the Act bas been committed by them and the Act has no application to the transactions of the firm and to the firm.\n\nIn the case of State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak,(1) this Court\n\nheld at page 55-56 as follows ;- E\n\n\"The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the 'Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and s. 156 with investigation into such offences and under these section the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the Police to investigate catfnot be interfered with by the exercise of power under s. 561-A of Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAs to the powers of the Judiciary in regard to statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor .v, Khawaja Nazir Ahmed (1944) L.R.I.A. 203, 212 observed as follows ;-\n\n(I) [1963) 2 S.C.R. 52.\n\n\n[1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\n'The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of indivi dual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each•to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to inter vene in an appropriate case when moved under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometime been thought that s. 561A has given increased powers to the Courf which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section give no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently posseses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are th9se expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers ·\n\nhad survived the passing of that Act.'\n\nWith the interpretation which has been put on the statutory, duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, were in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the pow.ers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station\".\n\nIn the case of State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldhana and Ors.,(1) this Court at p. 39-40 observed :\n\n\"The next contention ;, that the High Court was in error in exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 at a stage when the Addi.\n\nChief Judicial Magistrate who has jurisdiction to entertain and try the case has not passed upon the issues before him, by taking upon itself the appreciation of evidence involving facts about which there is an acrimonious dispute between the parties and given a clean bill to the suspects against whom the first information report was filed.\n\nBy so directing the learned Addi. Chief\n\n(I) ~1980] 2 S.C.R. 16,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 161\n\nJudicial Magistrate the judgment of the High Court virtiually disposed of the case finally. As we are setting aside the judgment of the High Court with the result that the case would go back to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, it would be imprudent for us to make any observation on facts involved in the case.\n\nThere is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the Superintendent over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book.\n\nOnce it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and .the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under S. 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end.\n\nOn a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in S. 173 (B), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether .bY the person or persons charged .with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction . of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate\".\n\nSame views have been reiterated by this Court in the other\n\nJi'\n\ndecisions which were cited by Mr. Chatterjee. In the case of S.N.\n\nG Sharma v. Bipan Kumar Tiwari,(1) this Court at p. 951 referred to the observations of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor v.\n\nKhwaja Nazir Ahmed(') which have been quoted in the judgment of\n\n(I) [1970] 3 SCR 946. tJ\n\n(2) 71 I.A. 203.\n\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthis Court in th~ earlier decision and then proceed to hold at )\n\n- pp. 951·952 :\n\n\"Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that such an interpretation is .likely to be very prejudicial particularly to Officers of the judiciary who have to deal with cases brought up by the police and frequently give decisions which the police dislike. In such cases, the police may engineer a false report of a cognizable offence against the judicial officer and may then harass him by carrying on a prolonged investigation of the offence .< made out by the report. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable person can always seek a remedy by invoking ) the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers\".\n\nRelying on these decisions and the principles enunciated therein, Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the learned Judge clearly erred in interfering with the investigation and quashing the proceedings at the stage of investigatibn before framing of charges against the accused persons.\n\nMr. Chatterjee argues that there is no allegation of mala fide in the instant case and the learned Judge has also come to a conclusion that there is no case of any mala Ii.de on ··~ the part of the appellants.\n\nMr. Chatterjee has submitted that the materials which have been gathered as a result of the investigation which could be carried on only for a short while go to indicate that the transactions of the firm are not above board and they are not what they pretend or purport to be.\n\nIt is his submission that materials gathered clearly indicate that though the loan certificates stipu'. late interest to be paid@ 12% a much larger sum by way of interest ranging between 36% to 48% is actually paid to the depositors, and the amount which is paid in excess of the rate stipulated in the loan certificates is paid in cash in a clandestine manner, depriving and defrauding revenue of its legitimate dus.\n\nMr. Chatterjee comments that the payment of interest in this clandestine manner at a very high rate which is not shown or other\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 163\n\nwise accounted for results not only in generation of black.money, but paralyses the economy of the State.\n\nMr. Chatterjee has further commented that in view of this allurement to the depositors of payment of large' sums of money in a clandestine manner, the firm which has a share-capital of only Rs. 7000 has succeeded in alluring depositors and the deposits received by the firm with the capital of Rs. 7000 now exceed crores of rupees. Mr. Chatterjee submits that a firm which carries on clandestine business of this nature is not entitled to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nc Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the violation of S. 3 of the Act has been alleged and it is his contention that the nature of business carried on by the firm indicates that the firm is conducting a 'Money Circulation Scheme'. According to Mr. Chatterjee, 'Money Circulation Scheme' by virtue of its definition in S. 2 (c) of the Act means any scheme' by whatever name called, for the making D of quick or easy money.\n\nIt is his argument that the transactions disclose that the firm and the depositors are both trying to make quick or easy money, the scheme being that the depositors will deposit money against certificate stipulating interest to be paid @ 12% but they will in fact be paid interest at a much higher rate and thereby make quick or easy money and the firm invests the money received from the depositors Jn such transactions as to enable them to earn easy or quick money.\n\nMr. Chatterjee has further argui:_d that money circulation scheme has to be interpreted to mean any scheme for the making of quick or easy money, or for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the consideration for a promise to pay money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enroiment of members into the scheme, whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscription. Further investigation according to Mr. Chatterjee, can only show whether the scheme of making quick or easy money depends on any contingency relative in the enrolment of members into the scheme. Mr. Chatterjee submits that the question of proper interpretation of the provisions of the Act and also of what money circulation scheme means, should come up only after investigation has been completed and all relevant materials have been collected. It is Mr. Chatterjee's submission that the interpretation of the provisions of the Act and particularly what 'Money Circulation Schem~' means~ is qo\\ to be made in ii\n\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nhypothetical way in the absence of relevant materials being gathered on completion of investigation. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that after all the materials have been collected on completion of the investigation, it may be that materials may show that the firm is not conducting a Money Circulation Scheme and no charge against the firm may at all be preferred; if however, on the other hand, the materials, indicate that the firm is conducting a money circulation scheme and a charge is preferred, it will be open to the accused persons to take the defence that the business conducted by them is not one which will be considered to be a money circulation scheme within the meaning of the Act. As I have earlier observed, the main grievance of Mr. Chatterjee is that the Court should have interfered at the stage of investigation and quashed the proceedings.\n\nMr. Chatterjee has next contended that S. 7 of the Act, clearly empowers a Police Officer not below the rank of an officer-in-charge of a police station to enter, search and seize in the manner provided in the said section. It is Mr. Chatterjee's contention that the searches have been carried ont duly in terms of the provisions con tained in the said section and cash money and other books and documents have been lawfully seized in terms of the provisions contained in the said section. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that even if there had been any irregularity in the matter of searches and seizure, the searches and seizure are not rendered illegal and void as a result thereof. Various decisions were also referred to by Mr. Chatterjee in support of his submissions.\n\nMr. A.K. Sen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the firm bas submitted that the learned Judge on a proper consideration of all the relevant materials and the provisions of the Act has correctly come to the conclusion that no offence under the Act is disclosed and the Act bas no application to the firm and G in that view of the matter the Learned Judge was perfectly justi fied in quashing the proceeding against the firm, and in directing the return of the documents and cash money seized by the police to the firm. Mr. Sen has argued that investigation has to be done when an offence is disclosed for collecting materials for establishing ar.\n\nH offence. It is the argument of Mr. Sen that if no offence is disclosed there cannot be any investigation and any investigation when no offence is disclosed by the F .I.R. and the other materials,\n\n• '\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\n16S\n\nmeans unnecessary harassment for the firm and its partners and illegal and improper deprivation of their liberty and property. Mr. Sen submits that it is no doubt true that when an offence is disclosed, the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation into an offence. He, however, contends that when no offence is disclosed, it, indeed, becomes the duty of the. Court to interfere with any in vestigation which is improperly and illegally carried on to the serious prejudice of the persons. In support of this contention Mr. Sen. has referred to the decision 'of the Judicial Committee in the case of King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmed (supra) and has relied on the following observations at p. 213:\n\n\"No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake investiga tion.h\n\nIn this connection, Mr. Sen also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab(') and has placed very strong reliance on the following observations at p. 393:\n\n\"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted. in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged ; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would he legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person.\"\n\nMr. Sen has also referred to the decision of this Court in Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration;(') in which the aforesaid observations\n\nmade by Gajendragadkar, J. in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, (supra) have been reproduced and reiterated. Mr. Sen\n\n(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R 388.\n\n(2) [1970] S.C.R. 794.\n\n166 ~UPRBME CoURT REPOilTS [1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nfurther points out that in the case of S.N. Sharma v. Bipin Kumar Tiwari (supra), this Court at p. 951 recognises that \"in appropriate . cases the aggrieYed person can always seek remedy by invoking powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution under\n\nwhich, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers\".\n\nMr. Sen has argued that the Learned Judge having properly appreciated the legal position has made the correct approach to the consideration of the present case. It is his argument that the Learned Judge has carefully considered the. materials which have been placed before him including the F.I.R. and he has properly analysed the provisions of the Act and on a proper interpretation of the Act and on a proper appreciation of the materials which were there before the Learned Judge, the Learned Judge has come to the conclusion that no offence under the Act is disclosed and the Act has no application to the firm.\n\nMr. Sen argues th1,1t for a proper appreciation . of the question whether the materials disclose any offence under the Act, it is imperative to interpret the Act. He contends that it will not be a proper approach to leave the question - of interpretation to the stage after the investigation is complete, as according to Mr. Sen, there can be no investigation unless an offence has been disclosed.\n\nMr. Sen argues that if the materials do not disclose any offence, no investigation can be permitted to find out whether as result of the invetigation an offence may be disclosed or not. Mr. Sen submits that investigation can legitimately go on, once an offence is disclosed for collecting materials for establishing and proving the offence. It is the contention of Mr. Sen that the case of the appellants is that the firm is conducting money circulation scheme which is banned by the Act. Mr. Sen argues that to find out whether the firm is conducting a money circulation scheme, it is necessary to consider what a money circulation scheme is within the meaning of the Act and to find out whether on the materials alleged in the F.I.R. and also in the affidavits, it can be said that the busi- . ness carried on by the firm is one in the nature of conducting a money circulation scheme. Mr. Sen has argued that the learned Judge in bis judgment has correctly interpreted what constitutes •money circulation scheme' within the meaning of the Act, and it is the argument of Mr. Sen that such interpretation is absolutely essential to find out whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. make out\n\n, -\n\n- WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 167\n\na case that the fitm is conducting a money circulation scheme. Mr.\n\nSen submits that the materials on record including the allegations made in the F.LR. even if they are all assumed to be correct, do not go to show that the firm is conducting a money circulation scheme; and, in that view of the matter there cau be no investigation, if no offence under the Act is disclosed.\n\nAnalysing the F.I.R. and the other materials which have been_ placed before the Court, Mr .• Sen submits that the materials go to indicate-( I) that the firm is accepting deposits or loans from the public for a term against loan certificates which stipulate payment of interest @ 12%; (2) though interest is stipulated to be paid @ 12%, the firm, in fact, is paying interest at a much higher rate. It used to pay interest @ 48% previously and is now paying interest @ 36%. The amount of interest paid in exces of the stipulated rate of 12% is paid in cash in a clandestine manner to the depositors.\n\nThe excess amount of interest paid is not accounted for and results in accummulation of black-money; (3) the firm invests the monies received from the depositors in high risk investments earning huge amount of unaccounted profits. The investments made by the firm and the earnings from the investments made, also result in generation of black-money; (4) because of the allurement of high rate of interest offered to the depositors, a major part of which is given in unaccounted black-mon, ey, the firm which has a slfare-capital of\n\nabout Rs. 7000 only has received deposits over crores of rupees.\n\nIt is the contention of Mr. Sen that even if all these allegations which are there in the F.l.R. and also in the other materials which have been placed before the Court are accepted to be correct, the said allegations do not go to show that the firm is conducting a money circulation scheme and do not disclose any. offence under the Act. Mr. Sen in this connection 'has commented that though in the F.I.R. it has been alleged that the firm is carrying on business of promoting Prize Chits; no such case was sought to be made out before the Learned Judge or before this Court and there are no allegations or materials to show that the firm is carrying on business of promoting prize chits; and the only case that has been sought to be made before the Trial Court and also this Court is that the firm is carrying on business of conducting or promoting money circulation scheme.\n\nMr. Sen has argued that the money circulation scheme has been defined in S. 2 (c) of the Act to mean \"any scheme, by whatever name called, for the making of quick or esay money, or for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the considera-\n\n' 168\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [i982] 3 s.c.i\\..\n\ntion for a promise to pay money, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscription\".\n\nAccording to Mr. Sen, the essential requirements of a money circulation scheme are (1) There must be a scheme for the making of quick or easy money on any event of contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme whether or not such money\n\nis derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscription; or (2) there must be a scheme for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the consideration for promise to pay money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into a scheme, whether or not such money or thirig is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or from periodical subscription. Mr. Sen submits that neither F.I.R. nor any of the other materials go to show that the business carried on by the firm is, in any way, in the nature of conducting or promoting a money circulation scheme. In this connection Mr. Sen has drawn our attention to the statement of objects for the passing of this enactment. Mr. Sen has further submitted that this enactment which is in the nature of penal one has to be construed in the event of doubt or ambiguity in a manner beneficial to the party against whom any accusations is made.\n\nMr. Sen bas further argued that the rules framed under the Act can also be taken into consideration for proper interpretation of the Act and the learned Judge in the instant case was justified in referring io the rules in construing the provisions of the Act. In this connection Mr. Sen bas referred to the decision in Ex parte Wier In re Wier(') and has relied upon the following observations at p. 879;\n\n\"We do not think that any other section of the Act throws any material light upon the proper construction of this section, and if the question had depended upon the Act alol)e we should have 4ad great doubt what the proper construction was; but we are of opinion that, where the construction of the Act is ambiguous and doubtful on any point, recourse may be had to the rules which have been\n\n(I) [1871) 6 Cb. A.C. 875.\n\nI ) . .....\n\n- \"''.\n\nWEST BENGAL •• SWAPAN KUMAR IA.N. Sen, J.) 169\n\nmade by the Lord Chancellor under the authority of the Act, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction bas been put on the Act, that i.t is our duty to adopt and follow that construction\".\n\nMr. Sen in this connection has drawn our attention to the relevant rules and he has argued that the rules leave no room for doubt that the Act bas no application to the firm and no offence under the Act has been disclosed by the firm.\n\nMr. Sen has submitted that the construction of the Act by the Learned Judge is correct and it is his submission that in view of the provisions of the Act properly interpreted, there cannot be any doubt that the Act has no. application to the interest case and there can be no question of any violation\n\no(the said Act by the firm. It is the submission of Mr. Sen that the approach and the reasoning of the learned Judge are both sound. Mr. Sen has next contended that the search and seizure carried on in the instant case are als.o illegal and unjustified. It is the argument of Mr. Sen that if no offence under the Act is disclosed and the Act has no application, there cannot be any question of any search or seizure under the Act. Mr. Sen has argued that the search and seizure done in the instant case have also not been done in confirmity with the provisions of law.\n\nMr. Sen bas sumitted that learned judge has. correctly come to the conclusion that the search and seizure in the instant case were also illegal.\n\nIn this connection Mr. Sen referred to a number of decisions.\n\nMr. Ray and Mr. Sibal who followed Mr. Sen mainly adopted the submissions made by Mr. Sen. Mr. Ray, further contended that to be a chit fund or to be a money circulation scheme, an element of uncertainty or luck is essential. It is the argument of Mr. Ray , that in so far as the transactions carried on by the firm in the instant case are concerned, the said element is no where there. Mr. Ray, in this connection referred to the definition of conventional chit and has argued that the conventional chits have not been broug4t within the purview of this Act. Mr. Ray has drawn our attention to the decision of this .Court in the case of Srinivasa Enterprises v. Union of India(') in which the validity of the Act came to be challanged in this Court and was upheld by this Court.\n\n<O (19SOJ 4 sec so1.\n\ni7o sUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [19821 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe appeal before us has been argued at great length. A number of decisions have also been cited from the Bar. I have already referred to some of the decisions which were cited before us.\n\nI do not propose to consider all the case which were referred to in the course of argument by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties as I do not consider the same to be necessary.\n\nAs I have already stated that the matter appears to have been elaborately argued before the learned Trial Judge who in bis judgment has fully set out the relevant facts and circumstances of the case bas noted the arguments which were advanced before him and the learned Judge has also referred to a number of decisions.\n\nI may, however, note that Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has made a grievance before us that some of the decisions cited by him have not been considered by the learned Judge. Though. the matter has been argued at great length, yet, to my mind, the case appears to rest in a fairly short compass.\n\nIn my opinion, the legal position is well-settled. The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. The observations of the Judicial Committee and the observations of this Court in the various decisions which I have earlier quoted, make this position abundantly clear. The pr/positions enunciated by the Judicial Committee and this Court in the various decisions which I have earlier noted, are based on sound principles of justice. Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation; in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary barrassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for • nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are secred and sacrosanct and the Court zealously guards them and protects them.\n\nAn investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed.\n\nWhen an Qffence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interest of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the o.ffender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequen-\n\n/ _.._ .._ __ {'f'\n\n' '\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J:) 171\n\nces and the offender may go unpunished to the deleriment of the cause of justice and. the society at large.\n\nJustice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious deteriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disdosed. The decision on which Mr. Chatterjee has relied are based on this sound principle, and in all these cases, an offence had been disclosed. Relying on the well-settled and sound principle that the Court should not interfere with an investigation into an offence at the stage of investigation and should allow the investigation to be completed, this Conrt had made the observations in the said decisions which I have earlier quoted reiterating and reaffirming the sound principles of justice. The decisions relied on by Mr. Chatterjee, do not lay down, as it cannot possibly be laid down as a broad proposition of law, that an.investigation must necessarily be permitted to continue and will not be prevented by the Court at the stage of investigation even if no offence is disclosed. While adverting to this specific question as to whether an investigation can go on even if no offence is disclosed, the judicial Committee in the case of King Emperor v. Khwaja Nizam Ahmed (supra) and this Court in R.P.\n\nKapur v. State of Punjab (supra), Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration (supra), S.N. Sharma v. Bipin Kumar Tiwari (supra) have clearly laid down that no investigation can be permitted and have made the observations which I have earlier quoted and which were relied on by Mr. Sen.\n\nAs I have earlier observed this proposition is not only based on sound logic but is also based on fundamental principles of justice. as a person against whom no offence is disclosed, cannot be put to any harassment by the process of investigation which is likely to put his persoaal liberty and also property which are considered secred and sacroscent into prril and jeopardy.\n\nWhether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.\n\nIn considering whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be made, is disclosed or not, the Court has mainly to take into consideration the complaint or the F.I.R. and the Court may in appropriate cases take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. On a consideration of\" ali the relevant\n\n172 SUPR~ME COURT itilPORTS\n\n(!~82] S.C.R\n\nmaterials, the Court has to come to the conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court , will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual.\n\nIn the instant case, the offence complained of is violation of the Act.\n\nFor a proper adjudication of the case and for a proper appreciation of the question, it, therefore, becomes necessary to consider the relevant materials and also the provisions of the Act for being satisfied as to whether the relevant materials go to indicate any violation of the Act and disclose any offence under the Act.\n\nThe materials are mainly contained in the F.I.R. which has been earlier set out in its entirety.\n\nAn analysis of the F.I.R. mentions the following allegations on the basis of which the said F.I.R. has been lodged :\n\nSanchaita Investments is a partnership Firm. Its partners are Behari Prasad Murarka, Sri Sambhu Mukherjee and Sri Swapan Kumar Guba The firm was started in and around 1975.\n\nThe Firm bad been offering fabulous interest @ 48% to its members until very recently. The rate of interest has of late been reduced to 36% per annum.\n\nSuch high rate' of interest were and are being paid even though the loan certificate receipts show rate of interest to be 12% only.\n\nThus, the amount in excess of 12 % so paid clearly shows that 'Money Circulation Scheme' is being promoted and conducted for the making of quick and/or , er.sy money, prizes and/or gifts\n\nPrizes or gifts in cash are also being awarded to agents promotors and members too.\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nIn view of the above, Sarvshri Behari Prasad Murarka,\n\nSambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guha appears to have been carrying on the business in the trade name of 'Sanchaita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation Scheme in violation of S. 2 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978,\n\nThe other materials are contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 27 and 30 of the affidavit and the two documents, namely, the article published in the Newspaper 'Business Standard' dated 1611.1980 and the documents seized in the course of searches. I have earlier set out in extenso the statement made in the said paragraphs of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State.\n\nA copy of the article has been enclosed to the affidavit filed on behalf of the State. The document seized in the course of searches and handed over to Court in the course of the arguments was a letter addressed by an officer of the Air Force to the firm in which the officer makes a grievance that the Fir'? which was paying interest @ 48% has now reduced the same to 36% in view of advances made to political parties. The letter further records the fact that the firm hopes to pay the enhanced rate of interest of 48% in the near future.\n\nAn analysis of these materials suggest that the firm is carrying on activities of accepting deposits from the members promosing to pay them interest on such deposits at an agreed rate of 12% as stipulated in the loan certificate; but, in fact, it has been paying interest to them at much higher rate of interest The materials further indicate . that the firm is making high risk investments of the monies received from the depositors and has also been advancing monies to political parties.\n\nThe crux of question is whether these allegations disclose an offence under the Act namely, violation of S. 3 of the Act even if all these allegations are deemed to be correct.\n\nThe question whether these allegations disclose an offence under the Act and can be the basis for any suspicion that an offence under S. 3 of the Act has been committed or not, must necessarily \"'.. depend on the provisions of the Act and its proper interpretation.\n\nThe Act has been enacted for implementing the recommendations of a Study Group of the Reserve aank of India under tll~\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nChairmanship of Shri James S. Raj the then Chairman of the Unit Trust of India, constituted for examining in depth the provisions of Chapter IIIB of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the directions issued thereunder to Non-Banking Companies in order to assess their adequacy in the context of ensuring the efficacy of the monetary and credit policies of the country and affording a degree of protection to the interests of the depositors who place their savings with such companies. Paragraph 2 of the Statement of\n\nObjects and Reasons of the Act states :\n\n\"Prize chits would cover any kind of arrangement under which moneys are collected by way. of subscriptions, contributions, etc. and prizes, gifts, are awarded. The prize chit is really a form of lottery. Its basic feature is that the foreman or promoter who ostensibly charges no commission collects regular subscriptions from the members. Once a member gets the prize, he is very often not required to pay further instalments and his name is dropped from further lots. The institutions conducting prize chits are private limited comp.anies with a very low capital base contributed by the promotoers, directors or their close relatives. Such schemes . confer monetary benefit only on a few members and on the promotor com panies. The Group had, therefore, recommended that prize chits or money circulation schemes, by whatever name called, should be totally banned in the larger interests of the public and suitable legislative measures. should be undertaken for purpose.\"\n\nThe relevant portion of paragraph 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons reads as follows :-\n\nThe Bill proposes to implement the above recommenda. tion of the Group by providing for the banning of the promotion or conduct of any prize chit or money circulation scheme, by whatever name called, and of the participa tion of any person in such chit or scheme. The Bill provides for a period of two years within which the existing units carrying on the business of prize chits or money circulation schemes may be wound up and provides for penalties. and other incidental matters.\"\n\n\n,(.\n\n' '\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 175\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the main object of the Act is to ban promotion or conduct of any Prize Chit or money circulation scheme, by whatever name called, and of the participation of any person in such chit or scheme.\n\nS. 2 of the Act deals with definitions.\n\nMoney Circulation Scheme is defined in S. 2 (c) in the following words:-\n\n\"Money circulation Scheme' means any scheme, by whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money, or for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the consideration for a promise to pay money, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme, whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscriptions.\"\n\nPrize Chit is defined in S. 2 (e) in the following terms :-\n\n\"prize chit' includes any transaction or arrangement by whatever name called under which a person collects whether as a promotor, foreman, agent or in any other capacity, monies in one lump sum or in instalments by way of contributions or subscriptions or by sale of unit, certificates or other instruments or in any other manner or as membership fees or admission fees or service charges to or in respect of any savings,. mutual benefits, thrift or any other scheme or arrangement by whatever name called, and utilises the monies so collected or any part thereof or the income accruing from investment or other use of such monies for all or any of the following purposes, namely:-\n\n(i) giving or awarding periodically or otherwise to a specified number of subscribers as determined by lot, draw or in any other manner, prizes or gifts in cash or in kind, whether or not the recipient of the prize or gift is under a liability to make any further payment in respect of such scheme or arrangement;\n\n(ii) refunding to the subscribers or such of them as have not won any prize or gift, the whole or part of the subscriptions, contibutions or other monies collected with or without any bonus, premium, interest or other advantage by whatvr name alled, on the termin<1 '\n\nA .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [198213 s.c.R.\n\ntion of the scheme or arrangement, or on or after the expiry of the period stipulated therein, hut does not include a conventional chit.\n\nA Conventional Chit which is specifically excluded in the definition of prize chits in S. 2 (c) (ii) is defined in S. 2 (a) as follows:-\n\n\"Conventional Chit\" means a transaction whether called chit, chit fund, kuri or by any other name by or under which a person responsible for the conduct of the chit enters into an agreement with a specified number of persons that every one of them shall subscribe a certain sum of money (or certain quantity of grain instead) by way of periodical instalments for a definite period and that each subscriber shall, in his turn, as determined by lot or by auction or by tender or in such other manner as may be provided for in the chit agreement, be entitled to a prize amount\".\n\nS. 3 of the Act the violation of which alleged reads :-\n\n\"No person shall promote or conduct any prize chit or money circulation scheme, or enrol as a member to any such chit or scheme, or participate in it otherwise, or receive or remit any money in pursuance of such chit or scheme.\"\n\nS. 7 of the Act provides :\n\n\"(!) It shall be lawful for any police officer not below the rank of an officer in charge of a police station :\n\n(a) to enter, if necessary by force, whether by day or\n\nnight with such assistance as he considers necessary any premises which he has reason to suspect, are being used for purposes connected with the promotion or conduct of any prize chit or money circulation scheme in contravention of the provisions of this Act;\n\n(b) to search the said premises and the persons whom he\n\nJllay find therein ;\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 177\n\n(c) to take into custody and produce before any judicial Magistrate all such persons as are concerned or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of their having been concerned with the use of the said premises for purposes connected with, or with the promotion or conduct of, any such prize chit or money circulation scheme as aforesaid;\n\n(d) to seize all things found in the said premises which are intended to be used, or reasonably suspected to have been used, in connection with any such prize or money circulation scheme as aforesaid.\n\n(2) Any officer authorised by the State Government may:-\n\n(a) at all reasonable times, enter into and search any premises which he has reason to suspect, are being used for the purposes connected with, or conduct of, any prize chit or money circulation scheme in contravention qf the provisions of this Act ;\n\n(b) examine any person h•ving the control of, or employed in conne.ction with, any such prize chit or money circulation scheme ;\n\n(c) order the production of any documents, books or records in the possession or power of any person having the control of, or employed in connection with, any such prize chit or money circulation scheme ; and\n\n(3) AU searches under this section shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973\".\n\nS. 13 confers necessary powers to make rules and reads as under:-\n\n\"(!) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette and in consultation with the Reserve Bank, make rules for the purpose of ~rrying out the pro. visions of the Act.\n\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.lt.\n\n(2) Jn particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for :-\n\n(a) the office of the Reserve Bank to whom full information regarding any prize chit or money circulation scheme may be furnished under the first proviso to subsection (I) of Section 12, and the form in which and the period within which such information may be furnished;\n\n(b) the particulars relating to the winding up plan of the business relating to prize chits or money ciculation schemes.\"\n\nThe complaint alleges violation of S. 3 of the Act. In other words, the complaint is that the firm )s promoting or conducting a prize chit or a money circulation scheme. The definition of prize chit has been earlier set out. I have also earlier analysed the F.I.R. and the other materials on the basis of which the complaint is made and the materials which have been placed before the Court. The materials do not indicate any thing to disclose that the firm is promoting or conducting any prize chit. I may also here note that no argumenis have been advanced on behalf of the appellants that the firm is promoting or conducting any prize chit; and in my opinion, rightly, as the allegations do not give any indication whatsoever of any case of a prize chit being promoted or conducted by the firm. The argument on behalf of the appellants has been that the firm is promoting or conducting a money circulation scheme. Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act may suggest that the prize chit and a money circulation scheme are more or less of like nature, yet, in view of the separate definitions ofthese two being given in cl. 2 of the Act and in view of the further fact that S. 3 speaks of prize chit or money circulation scheme, each of the aforesaid must be considered to be separate and distinct for the purposes of the Act; and promoting or conducting either prize chit or any money circulation scheme or both must be held to be an offence under the Act.\n\nI shall now proceed to consider whether the materials disclose that the firm is promoting or conducting a money circulation scheme l have already set Ql!t the definition of moner circulation schem~\n\n--.\\-\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 179\n\nas given in S. 2 (c) of the Act.\n\nOn a plain reading of the said definition, the requirements of a money circulation scheme are :\n\n(i) there must be a scheme;\n\n(ii) there must be members of the scheme;\n\n(iii) the scheme must be for the making of quick or easy money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme or there must be a scheme for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the consideration for a promise to pay money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to enrolment of members into the scheme;\n\n(iv) the event of contingency relativo or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme will however\n\nnot he in any way affected by the fact whether or not D such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscription.\n\nOn a proper interpretation of this definition, it clearly appears that the condition in the said definition 'on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or periodical subscription' qualifies both the provisions contained therein, namely, (i) money circulation scheme means a scheme by whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money, (ii) or money circulation scheme means any scheme for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the . consideration for the promise to pay money. Taking into consideration the language used in the section and particularly the two commas, one after the words \"easy money\" and the other after the words \"pay money\", it becomes clear that this stipulation is intended to cover both; and the interpretation contended for by Mr. Chatterjee that the further provision in the definition namely, \"on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme, whether or not such money or thing is derived from entrance money of such scheme or periodical subscription\" applies only to the second part, namely, money circulation scheme 'means any scheme, by Whtever name called, for the receipt\n\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof any money or valuable thing as the consideration for a promise to pay money, is not sound'. On this interpretation, of Mi'.\n\nChatterjee, the provision in the definition, namely, 'money circulation scheme means any scheme by whalever name called for the making of quick or esay money' will indeed become vague and meaningless.\n\nFor properly appreciating whether the offence of promoting or conducting a money circulation scheme is disclosed or not, it becomes necessary to consider whether the materials, even if they are all accepted to be correct, indicate that the business carried on by the firm satisfies the requirements of money circulation scheme and disclose an offence under the Act.\n\nThe materials show that the firm accepts loans or deposits from general public for a term against loan certificaes which stipulate payment of interest @ 12%. Materials also indicate that the firm pays stipulated amount of interest and further pays a much larger amount of interest in a clandestine manner to the persons who invest their monies in the firm against loan certificates. The materials further indicate that the persons who have invested their monies with the firm against loan certificates used to receive, in fact, the stipulated amount of interest @ 12% and also usecl to receive an additional sum as further interest @ 36% in a clandestine manner.\n\nThe materials also indicate that this further rate of interest @ 36% paid clandestinely in additional to the stipulated rate of 12% has been reduced now to 24%, because of investments by the firm with politieal parties. In other words, the materials go to show that though the rate of interest stipulated in the loan certificate was 12% the firm used to pay altogether interest@ 48% previously and is now paying interest @ 36% inclusive of payment of interest stipulated in the loan certificate.\n\nThe materials also indicate that the firm invest the deposits or loans received from the general public in high risk investments. The materials, however, do not show that the payment of interest at the stipulated rate of 12% or at any enhanced rate in excess of the stipulated rate depends on any event or contingency or relative or applicable to the enrolment of any new depositors. The materials also do not indicate that the firm makes any discrimination in the matter of payment of interest to its depositors. The materials also do not indicate that the payment of interest to the depositors whether at the stipulated rate or at the\n\nnhanced rate is dependent on any element of chance and the\n\nWEST llENGAt v. SWAPAN KUMAR {A.N. Sen, J.) i8!\n\nmaterials do not indicate that any kind of gifts is made by the firm to the depositors in addition to the payment of interest.\n\nThe first question that requires to be considered is whether these materials go to indicate that there is any scheme The word 'scheme' has not been defined in the Act.\n\nThe word 'scheme', however, has been defined in the Rules, in cl. 2 (g) thereof. Cl. 2 (g) of the Rules state that a \"scheme means a money circulation scheme or . as the case may be a prize chit as defined in cl. (c) and (e) respectively of s. 2\". The word 'scheme' as contemplated in S. 2 (c) of the Act is therefore, to be money circulation scheme within the meaning of the Act. To be a money circulation scheme, a scheme must be.for the making of quick or easy money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of the members into the scheme. The scheme has necessarily to be judged as a whole both from the view point of the promotors and also of the members.\n\nEven if it be assumed that the firm may be considered to be the promotor and the persons who invest their monies in the firm are members, the question has still to be considered whether investments of the monies with the firm in expectation of getting interest@ 48% and a big part of it in black in clandestine manner, can be said from the view point of the depositors that the investment is for the making of qnick or easy money. If any individual invests is money in expectation of getting a high return, say 50% or more and there is nothing clandestine in the transaction which is above board, can it be said that the investment is for making easy money or quick money?\n\nVarious individuals may invest their monies in their business which may yield very high profits.\n\nMany individuals also may indulge in speculative business in expectation of high return of their money and may succeed or may not succeed in speculative transactions. If such transactions are made openly and not in violation of any law, I have no doubt in my mind that it can never be said that . such investment has been made for making quick or easy money, and such transactions can never come within the scheme for making•easy or quick money as enumerated in the Act.. The further question that, however, arises for consideration is whether the position will be any different, if a part of the transaction is not above board and is secretive in nature. To my mind, that will not make arly difference and the transaction cannot be considered to be a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, though the transaction may offend against revenue laws or any other law. Transactions in black money do not come within the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nmischief of this Act. Judged from the point of view of the depofr tors, it cannot, therefore, be said that their investment in the firm for high return by way of interest, part of which is above board and a part of which is clandestine, will form any part of a scheme for making easy or quick money. It is further to be noted that this return on investment by way of interest is not dependent on any event or contingency whatsoever and has nothing to do with any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of any new members, even if the depositors be assumed to be members.\n\nJudged from the point of view of the firm, there is nothing to indicate that the firm makes any investment in consultation with its depositors.\n\nThe materials only indicate that the firm indulges in high risk investments and also advances monies to political parties.\n\nNeither of these acts appears to be illegal and they do not go to show that the firm makes easy or quick money. It is no doubt true that the materials go to show that the firm plays a larger amount by way of interest than payable on the basis of the rates stipulated in the loan certificate and the firm pays the excess amount of interest to the depositors in a clandestine manner. The clandestine manner of payment of interest in excess of the stipulated rate does not, in any way, inclicate the existence of any scheme for making quick or easy money. It is again to be pointed out that in any event the materials do not indicate that the payment of interest by the firm in excess of the stipulated rate is in any way dependent on any event or contingency. There is nothing to indicate any scheme for the receipt\n\n) .___.\n\n. .J..\n\nof the money by the firm from its depositors as a consideration for / - promise to pay the interest in excess of the stipulated rate and also ' -,., to pay back principal amount on the expiry of the term dependent in any way on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of new depositors, considering the depositors to be members. I am, therefore, of the opinion, that not any, of the requirements of a money circulation scheme is satisfied in the instant case.\n\nAs there is no money circulation scheme, there can be no scheme as contemplated in the Act in view of the definition of scheme in the Rules. The materials, appear to disclose violation of revenue laws. They, however, do not disclose any violation of the Act.\n\nThe materials do not disclose that the firm is promoting or conducting money circulation scheme and the question, therefore, of\n\n' i '\n\nW~ST.BENGAL v. SWAi>AN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 183\n\nany violation of S. 3 of the Act does not arise in the instant case.\n\nAs the firm is not conducting or promoting a money circulation scheme, and as no case is made that the firm is conducting or promoting a chit fund, the Act cannot be said to be applicable to the firm. In my opinion, it does not become necessary to refer .to the rules for coming to the conclusion. I may, however, add that a considertion of the rules also clearly lends support to the conclusion to which I have come. I find that the learned Jud.ge has very carefully and elaborately considered all the aspects in his judgment and in the course of elaborate discussion, he has noted all the contentions raised by the parties and has careful!~ considered them. The learned Judge on a careful consideration of all aspects and on a proper interpretation of the Act, has expressed the view that no olfence under the Act is disclosed against the firm which does not conduct or promote money circulation scheme or a chit fund and the Act has no application to the firm. It may also be noted that the learned Judge has also in his judgment referred to the report of the Reserve Bank and the opinion of the learned Advocate General of the State which lent support to the view taken by the learned Judge. The view expressed by the learned Judge that the materials do not disclose that the firm is promoting or conducting a money circulation scheme and the Act has, therefore, no application to the firm meets with my approval and I agree wiih the same.\n\nBefore concluding it will be pro per to refer to the decision of . this Court in'the case of Srinivas Enterprises v. Union of India(') which were relied on before the learned Judge and has been considered by me. In this case, the validity of the Act was challenged before this Court while upholding the validity of the Act for reasons stated in the judgment, Krishna Iyer, J. who spoke for the Beneh observed at p. 514 as follows :-\n\n\"In many situations, the poor and unwary have to be saved the seducing processes resorted by unscrupulous racketeers who glamourize and prey upon the gambling instinct to get rich quick through prizes. So long as there is the restless spell of a chance, though small, of securing a prize, though on paper, people change the prospect by\n\nc11 [1980J 4 sec so1.\n\n184 SUPREME C<il1RT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.a.\n\nsubscribing to the speculative scheme only to lose what they had. Can you save moths from the fire except by putting out the fatal flow ? once this prize facet of the chit scheme is given up, it becomes substantially a 'conventional chit' and the ban of the law ceaS'es to operate. We are unable to pursuade ourselves that the State is wrong in its assertion, based upon expert opinions that a complete ban of prize chits is an everall or excessive blow. Therefore, we decline to strike down the legislation on the score of Article 19 (!)\n\n(f) and (g) of the Constitution.\"\n\nAs I have earlier noticed the materials iu the instant case do not disclose any element of chance in the matter of business carried on by the firm. It may however, be said that these observations which were made while dealing with a case of chit fund are not of very great assistance while considering what may be a money circulation scheme within the meaning of the Act.\n\nAs no offence under the Act is at all disclosed, it will be manifestly unjust to allow the process of criminal code to. be issued or continued against the firm and to allow any investigation which E will be clearly without any authority.\n\nIn the view that I have taken, I do not consider it necessary to deal with other aspects namely, as to whether the \"searches and seizures were lawfully and properly done.\n\nI, therefore, hold that the proceedings against the firm and its partners arising out of the F.I.R. must be quashed as the F.l.R. and the other materials do not disclose any offence under the Act and as such no investigation into the affairs of the firm under the Act can be permitted or allowed to be continued. I, accordingly, quash.the proceedings against that firm and its partners and order that no investigation under the Act into affairs of the firm is to be carried on or continued.\n\nH I agree with the final order proposed by the learned Chief Justice in regard to the return of the documents, books an!l cash.\n\n:.1\n\nWBST BBNOAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR ( A.N. Sen, J.) t 85\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. I, however, make no order as to costs.\n\nThe Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1130 of ~1981 will also govern Civil Appeal No. 1129 of 1981.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 295, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SWAPAN KUMAR GUHA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SWAPAN KUMAR GUHA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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["}}, {"text": "Per Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "148 CJ\n\n[Per Chandrachud, C.J. and Varadarajan J.]\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "148 CJ\n\n[Per Chandrachud, C.J. and Varadarajan J.]\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Varadarajan"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7597, "end_char": 7613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9467, "end_char": 9469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. does not contain any allgation whatsoever that persons who advanced or deposited their monies with the firm were participants of a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent upon any such event or contingency."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10947, "end_char": 10958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10966, "end_char": 10992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12168, "end_char": 12179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1974] 2 SCR 12", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13478, "end_char": 13493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13546, "end_char": 13564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, the Central Government and the Reserve Bank or India must be given a reasonable opportuility to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute ."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank or India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13573, "end_char": 13594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, the Central Government and the Reserve Bank or India must be given a reasonable opportuility to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute ."}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13945, "end_char": 13953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147 H; 148 A-BJ\n\n[Per A.N. 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K. Ramamurthi, S, C. Birla, for the Appellants in C, J\\, J129/81 11n\\!", "canonical_name": "Som Nath Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20634, "end_char": 20650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2829 of 1980)\n\nSomnath Chatterjee, M. K. Ramamurthi, S, C. Birla, for the Appellants in C, J\\, J129/81 11n\\!"}}, {"text": "C. Birla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20655, "end_char": 20663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2829 of 1980)\n\nSomnath Chatterjee, M. K. Ramamurthi, S, C. Birla, for the Appellants in C, J\\, J129/81 11n\\!"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20763, "end_char": 20771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA.K. Sen, (For r.I in CA.", "canonical_name": "A.N.\n\nSen"}}, {"text": "S. S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20798, "end_char": 20807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1130/81) S. S. Ray, (For r.2 in CA.", "canonical_name": "S. S. Ray"}}, {"text": "Kapil Sibal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20835, "end_char": 20846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1130/81), Kapil Sibal, (For'r.1 in C.A. 1129/SI), B. Gupta & T.K. Bose, (for r, I in CA."}}, {"text": "B. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1130/81), Kapil Sibal, (For'r.1 in C.A. 1129/SI), B. Gupta & T.K. Bose, (for r, I in CA."}}, {"text": "T.K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1130/81), Kapil Sibal, (For'r.1 in C.A. 1129/SI), B. Gupta & T.K. Bose, (for r, I in CA."}}, {"text": "Rathin Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20927, "end_char": 20937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1130/81) and Rathin Das with them."}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20950, "end_char": 20958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray, (For r. 6), Tarun Kumar Bose, D. Manda/, Miss Bina Gupta & 0.P. Khaitan with him for Respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. S. Ray"}}, {"text": "Tarun Kumar Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20972, "end_char": 20988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray, (For r. 6), Tarun Kumar Bose, D. Manda/, Miss Bina Gupta & 0.P. Khaitan with him for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "D. Manda/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20990, "end_char": 20999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray, (For r. 6), Tarun Kumar Bose, D. Manda/, Miss Bina Gupta & 0.P. Khaitan with him for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Bina Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21006, "end_char": 21016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray, (For r. 6), Tarun Kumar Bose, D. Manda/, Miss Bina Gupta & 0.P. 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Wa hi for the Intervener-Mrs. Sarla Sahedad Puri."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21201, "end_char": 21212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments were del.ivered :\n\nCHANDRACHUD, c. J, My learned Brother A.N. Sen has dealt fully with the various points argued before us.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "March 5, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21650, "end_char": 21662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals by special leave arise out of the judgment dated March 5, 198 l of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Matters Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21698, "end_char": 21717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals by special leave arise out of the judgment dated March 5, 198 l of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Matters Nos."}}, {"text": "State of West Be.ngal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21801, "end_char": 21822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka."}}, {"text": "Sanchaita Investments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21875, "end_char": 21896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka."}}, {"text": "Swapan Kumar Guha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21922, "end_char": 21939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka.", "canonical_name": "SWAPAN KUMAR GUHA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21941, "end_char": 21964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka.", "canonical_name": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Beharilal Muratka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21969, "end_char": 21986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are, in substance, by the State of West Be.ngal while the contesting respondents are a firm called 'Sanchaita Investments' and its three partners, Swapan Kumar Guha, Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Beharilal Muratka."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22073, "end_char": 22084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23037, "end_char": 23046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23055, "end_char": 23110, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23244, "end_char": 23254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23358, "end_char": 23375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act, which was passed by the Parliament, came into force on December 13, 1978 and the two years' period allowed by section 12 for winding up every kind of business relating to Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes expired on December 12, 1980."}}, {"text": "Calcutta-72", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23548, "end_char": 23559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reads thus :\n\n~ '>- \"To\n\nSir,\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation,\n\n10, Madan Street, Calcutta-72."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23635, "end_char": 23643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a secret information that 'Sanchaita Investments' of 5-6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta, is carrying on business of promoting and/or conducting prize chit and/or money circulation scheme enrolling members of such chit and/or scheme, participating in those, and/or receiving and remitting monies in pursuance of such chits and/or scheme in violation of the provisions of."}}, {"text": "Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23931, "end_char": 23992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bihari Prasad Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24189, "end_char": 24210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchaita Investments' is a partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Shri Swapan Kumar Guba and that it was floated in or around 1975.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Prasad Murarka"}}, {"text": "Sambhu Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24217, "end_char": 24233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchaita Investments' is a partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Shri Swapan Kumar Guba and that it was floated in or around 1975.", "canonical_name": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Swapan Kumar Guba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24243, "end_char": 24260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchaita Investments' is a partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Shri Swapan Kumar Guba and that it was floated in or around 1975.", "canonical_name": "SWAPAN KUMAR GUHA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Sarvashri Bihari Prasad Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24938, "end_char": 24969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prizes and/or gifts in cash were and are also awarded to agents, prornQtrs and members too,\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn view of the a hove, Sarvashri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Sambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guba appear to have been carrying on business in the trade name of Sanchaita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation scheme in violation of section 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes \\(Banning) Act, 1978 and are therefore, punishable under section 4 of the said Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25155, "end_char": 25164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25271, "end_char": 25280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25510, "end_char": 25519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25584, "end_char": 25593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26714, "end_char": 26726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30685, "end_char": 30697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30706, "end_char": 30761, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30887, "end_char": 30899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31566, "end_char": 31572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32173, "end_char": 32184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legislative draftsman could have thoughtfully foreseen and avoided all reasonable controversy over the meaning of the expression 'mone:)'\n\nirvula!ion sphefl!~' by shapin~ its gejipition in this form :\n\n' v\n\n\\ :.~\n\nWEST BENGAL v, SWA~AN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C. J.) 133\n\n'money circulation scheme' means any scheme, by .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "'money circulation scheme", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32198, "end_char": 32223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legislative draftsman could have thoughtfully foreseen and avoided all reasonable controversy over the meaning of the expression 'mone:)'\n\nirvula!ion sphefl!~' by shapin~ its gejipition in this form :\n\n' v\n\n\\ :.~\n\nWEST BENGAL v, SWA~AN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C. J.) 133\n\n'money circulation scheme' means any scheme, by ."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32801, "end_char": 32810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34822, "end_char": 34831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35288, "end_char": 35297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35835, "end_char": 35844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36786, "end_char": 36795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36806, "end_char": 36815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36883, "end_char": 36892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37856, "end_char": 37865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Som Nath Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38513, "end_char": 38532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to assume, what was argued before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee on behalf of the prosecution, that it is enough for the purposes of section 2 (c) to show that the accused is promoting or conducting a scheme for the making .of quick or easy money, an assumption which I have shown to be fallacious.", "canonical_name": "Som Nath Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38601, "end_char": 38610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38794, "end_char": 38803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arun Kanti Roy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39433, "end_char": 39447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed by Arun Kanti Roy, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West'Bengal, alleges that :\n\n(i) The actual payment of a very high rate of interest against the professed rate of 12% attracted huge B amounts of idle money into circulation ;\n\n(ii) The investment of money as collected is not under the regulatory control of the Reserve Bank of India or any other agency of the State dealing with credit control in relation to the country's economy;\n\n(iii) The pooling of the purchasing power and the financial resources and the unfettered deployment thereof have resulted in the concentration of tremendous economic power in the hand's of a few, posing a potential threat to the equilibrium of the country's economy;\n\n(iv) The entire process is speculative in nature and directed towards luring away the investing public to the speculative market for making quick and easy money;\n\n(v) The very basis of the so-called contractual arrange- E ment between the firm and its depositors is founded on the.", "canonical_name": "Arun Kanti Roy"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39763, "end_char": 39784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed by Arun Kanti Roy, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West'Bengal, alleges that :\n\n(i) The actual payment of a very high rate of interest against the professed rate of 12% attracted huge B amounts of idle money into circulation ;\n\n(ii) The investment of money as collected is not under the regulatory control of the Reserve Bank of India or any other agency of the State dealing with credit control in relation to the country's economy;\n\n(iii) The pooling of the purchasing power and the financial resources and the unfettered deployment thereof have resulted in the concentration of tremendous economic power in the hand's of a few, posing a potential threat to the equilibrium of the country's economy;\n\n(iv) The entire process is speculative in nature and directed towards luring away the investing public to the speculative market for making quick and easy money;\n\n(v) The very basis of the so-called contractual arrange- E ment between the firm and its depositors is founded on the."}}, {"text": "Chandrachad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41292, "end_char": 41303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fradulent device to assure to the people a high rate of interest, the major portion of which is paid through unaccounted for money, thereby encouraging the growth of such unaccounted money in the hands of the investing public; F\n\n(vi) The professed rate of interest is a mere subterfuge to provide a cloak of bona fides and legality to the underb and transactions, through which unaccounted for money comes into play in the market, generating further unaccounted for money, a part whereof gocis\n\nback to the depsitors in the form of the balance of inierest over 12% paid in cash, month by month ;\n\n(vii) The firm did not have enough income or resources so as to be able to pay interest at such high rates ;\n\n(viii) The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that .interest was being paid out of the capital itself;\n\nI -~· ~- ,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachad, C. J.) d1\n\n(ix) \"The depositor becomes a member of the investment scheme of the firm by subscribing to it and the payment of the quick and easy money by way of high rate ·\n\nof interest is dependent upon the period of investment and/or efflux of time which are very much relative and/ or applicable to the membership of the depositors of the scheme to which the depositor agrees to subscribe\";\n\nand\n\n(x) Iu the process of its working, the scheme of the firm generates quick and easy money so as to render such scheme or arrangement a 'money circulation scheme' within the meaning of the Act.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 41941, "end_char": 41952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ The Assistant Commissioner of Police Shri Sunil Kumar\n\n' .", "canonical_name": "Sunil Kumar Chakraverty"}}, {"text": "Cbakravarty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41959, "end_char": 41970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cbakravarty has adopted these pleas and statements in his own affidavit."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42098, "end_char": 42118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from these averments that even at the stage when the State of West Bengal and its concerned officers submitted detailed affidavits to the High Court, there was no clear basis for alleging and no material was disclosed to show that, prima facie, the firm was promoting or conducting a scheme for making quick or easy money which was dependent upon an event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into that scheme."}}, {"text": "Central Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42963, "end_char": 42982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the accused are indulging in an economic activity which is highly detrimental to national interests is a matter which must engage the prompt and serious attention of the State and Central Governments."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43170, "end_char": 43179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43190, "end_char": 43206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43387, "end_char": 43396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43956, "end_char": 43968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44700, "end_char": 44710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44720, "end_char": 44746, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ashok Sen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45182, "end_char": 45191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Sen and Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray pressed upon us with considerable insistence the principle reiterated in W.H. King v. Republic of India, (')that a statute which creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment must be construed strictly in favour of the subject.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Sen"}}, {"text": "Siddhartha Shankar Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45201, "end_char": 45223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Sen and Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray pressed upon us with considerable insistence the principle reiterated in W.H. King v. Republic of India, (')that a statute which creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment must be construed strictly in favour of the subject."}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 SCR 993", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45989, "end_char": 46005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46732, "end_char": 46744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46954, "end_char": 46965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46975, "end_char": 47001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47101, "end_char": 47115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held on the facts before it that no case for quashing the proceedings was made out but Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the Court observed that though ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused must be tried under the provisions of the Code, there are some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction of the Court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings."}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48215, "end_char": 48226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970) 3 S.C.R. 946", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48446, "end_char": 48465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48765, "end_char": 48773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49133, "end_char": 49159, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49325, "end_char": 49336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49380, "end_char": 49392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 439 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49988, "end_char": 50008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50273, "end_char": 50281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration,(') the application filed by the accused under sction 56lA of the Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent, but that was because t':e Court found (per Sarkaria L page 797) that pdma facie, the allegation in the F.l."}}, {"text": "[1963) 2 S.C.R. 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 50695, "end_char": 50713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974) 3 S.C.R. 794", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 50720, "end_char": 50739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51489, "end_char": 51494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime with out requiring an~ authority from the judicial authorities, and it would,' as their Lordships.think, be an unfortunate result if it shou1a be 'held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52233, "end_char": 52244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54071, "end_char": 54079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of inveftigation under section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed.", "canonical_name": "A.N.\n\nSen"}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54155, "end_char": 54166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54373, "end_char": 54384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khwaja Nazir Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54721, "end_char": 54739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and th.e rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (supra) will apply."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55538, "end_char": 55544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew J. in bis majority judgment in Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup(1) to the following effect :\n\n(1) [1974) 2 S.C.R. 12, 22-23,\n\n,_ .. ----<-."}}, {"text": "[1974) 2 S.C.R. 12", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55665, "end_char": 55683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57222, "end_char": 57231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanchai ta Investments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57372, "end_char": 57394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm 'Sanchai ta Investments' commenced its business on July I, 1975, its three partners contributing a total capital of Rs."}}, {"text": "July I, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57422, "end_char": 57434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm 'Sanchai ta Investments' commenced its business on July I, 1975, its three partners contributing a total capital of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 25, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57525, "end_char": 57542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 25, 1978 an advertisement appeared in the \"Hindu\" in the name of firm, claiming falsely that its business was \"approved by the Reserve Bank of India\"."}}, {"text": "July 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57849, "end_char": 57861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 6, 1979, Shri Rudolph L. Rodrigues."}}, {"text": "Rudolph L. Rodrigues", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57868, "end_char": 57888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 6, 1979, Shri Rudolph L. Rodrigues."}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57955, "end_char": 57967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charan Singh, the H then Deputy Prfme Minister, coinplaininll that the business of the fil'lll\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Rodrigues", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58170, "end_char": 58179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of Shri Rodrigues' letter was forwarded by the Director, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry ''of Finance, to the Chief Officer, Department of Non-Banking Companies, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta,_ for inquiry."}}, {"text": "Department of Non-Banking Companies, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58296, "end_char": 58364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of Shri Rodrigues' letter was forwarded by the Director, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry ''of Finance, to the Chief Officer, Department of Non-Banking Companies, Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta,_ for inquiry."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58400, "end_char": 58414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his letter dated August 7, 1979 the Chief Officer pointed out the difficulty in directing investigation into the affairs of the.firm since, its capital being less than Rs, one lakh, it did not come within the definition of a Non-Banking institution as provided in section 54 (c) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934."}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58647, "end_char": 58657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58669, "end_char": 58700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 13, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58705, "end_char": 58723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 13, 1980 the Deputy Secretary Finance Department Government of West Bengal, wrote a letter to the Chi•f Officer requesting him to exall!ine the question whether the business of the firm came within the purview of the prize Chits and Money Circu lation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 and if noi, under which Act the affairs of the firm could be regulated."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58778, "end_char": 58789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 13, 1980 the Deputy Secretary Finance Department Government of West Bengal, wrote a letter to the Chi•f Officer requesting him to exall!ine the question whether the business of the firm came within the purview of the prize Chits and Money Circu lation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 and if noi, under which Act the affairs of the firm could be regulated."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59070, "end_char": 59085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control."}}, {"text": "Ashok Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59092, "end_char": 59103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Mitra"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59130, "end_char": 59150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control."}}, {"text": "Vcnkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59175, "end_char": 59187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control.", "canonical_name": "Vcnkataraman"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59213, "end_char": 59232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1980, Shri Ashok Mitra, Finance Minister for the State of West Bengal, wrote a letter to Shri Vcnkataraman, Finance Minister to the Government of India, complaining that the firm was involved in high-risk investments and that large amounts of public moneys were kept in deposit with the firm, which were not subjected to any regulatory control."}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59452, "end_char": 59457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of Shri Ashok Mitra appears to have been handed over , informally to Dr. K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, who, by his reply dated October 22, 1980, informed Shri Mitra that the legal department of the Reserve Bank was of the opinion that the mere acceptance of Joans by the firm would not ordinarily be covered by the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978."}}, {"text": "K.S. Krishnaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59511, "end_char": 59528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of Shri Ashok Mitra appears to have been handed over , informally to Dr. K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, who, by his reply dated October 22, 1980, informed Shri Mitra that the legal department of the Reserve Bank was of the opinion that the mere acceptance of Joans by the firm would not ordinarily be covered by the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978.", "canonical_name": "K.S. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "October 22, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59591, "end_char": 59607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of Shri Ashok Mitra appears to have been handed over , informally to Dr. K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, who, by his reply dated October 22, 1980, informed Shri Mitra that the legal department of the Reserve Bank was of the opinion that the mere acceptance of Joans by the firm would not ordinarily be covered by the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978."}}, {"text": "Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59779, "end_char": 59840, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Jndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59921, "end_char": 59940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was further correspondence on the subject between the authorities of the Government of Jndia and the State Government._"}}, {"text": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60668, "end_char": 60692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sever11l books of accounts were also seized during the search,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 145\n\nOn the same date, a search was carried out at the residence of Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee, a partner of the firm, when the following articles were seized :\n\n(I) One pass-book of Syndicate Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta, in the name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\", 9, Royd Street, Calcutta-17. (", "canonical_name": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Syndicate Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60781, "end_char": 60795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sever11l books of accounts were also seized during the search,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 145\n\nOn the same date, a search was carried out at the residence of Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee, a partner of the firm, when the following articles were seized :\n\n(I) One pass-book of Syndicate Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta, in the name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\", 9, Royd Street, Calcutta-17. ("}}, {"text": "Calcutta-17", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60873, "end_char": 60884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sever11l books of accounts were also seized during the search,\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 145\n\nOn the same date, a search was carried out at the residence of Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee, a partner of the firm, when the following articles were seized :\n\n(I) One pass-book of Syndicate Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta, in the name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\", 9, Royd Street, Calcutta-17. ("}}, {"text": "Biharilal Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61266, "end_char": 61283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the house of another partner, Biharilal Murarka, certain account books were seized.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Lal Murarka"}}, {"text": "January 8, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61363, "end_char": 61378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During, the course of investigation until January 8, 1981 when it was stopped by an order of this Conrt, as many as eighty places were searched by the police and a large number of documents were seized."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 62577, "end_char": 62612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63032, "end_char": 63038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thse deposits were received by the firm from persons drawn from all parts of the eountry, the pride of place belonging to Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63040, "end_char": 63045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thse deposits were received by the firm from persons drawn from all parts of the eountry, the pride of place belonging to Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63047, "end_char": 63053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thse deposits were received by the firm from persons drawn from all parts of the eountry, the pride of place belonging to Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63058, "end_char": 63067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thse deposits were received by the firm from persons drawn from all parts of the eountry, the pride of place belonging to Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Sambhu Prosad Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63682, "end_char": 63705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The documents relating to the account in the fictiiious name of \"Apcar Ave Toon\" show that a person alleged to bear.that name was introduced to the Syndicate .Bank, Gariahat Branch, Calcutta by 111e firm's partner Sambhu Prosad Mukherjee.", "canonical_name": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "December 6, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63966, "end_char": 63982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A total sum of Rupees twenty seven crores, ninety seven lacs eightysix thousand and odd was deposited in that account until December 6, 1980, all deposits being in cash."}}, {"text": "November 11,\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64159, "end_char": 64177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 crores was withdrawn from the account steadily from November 11,\n\n1980."}}, {"text": "United Bank .of India, High Court Branch", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64435, "end_char": 64475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S-502 in the name of the firm with the United Bank .of India, High Court Branch, Calcutta, shows that the firm had invested several lacs of rupees in various concerns numbering about forty."}}, {"text": "Shambhu Prosad Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65183, "end_char": 65207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will close this narrative by saying that the income-tax returns of Shambhu Prosad Mukherjee reveal that he had shown a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Delhi Lotteries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65279, "end_char": 65294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,00,000 as prizes received from Delhi Lotteries in 1979 and that the firm has not filed any income-tax return after the financial year ending June 30, 1977."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65389, "end_char": 65402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,00,000 as prizes received from Delhi Lotteries in 1979 and that the firm has not filed any income-tax return after the financial year ending June 30, 1977."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65536, "end_char": 65552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had asked for an extension of time on the ground that its accounts were not finalised but the Department rejected that prayer on December 9, 1980."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66983, "end_char": 66992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bankof India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 67625, "end_char": 67645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Central Government and' the Reserve Bankof India must be given a reasonable opportu.nity to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute an inquiry into the affairs of the firm and, in the mean while, to regulate its affairs."}}, {"text": "A.N.\n\nSen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68701, "end_char": 68710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D With this modification, I agree respectfully with Brother A.N.\n\nSen that the appeals be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "A.N.\n\nSen"}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68743, "end_char": 68754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VARADARAJAN J. I agree with the judgment and the final order proposed by the learned Chief Justice.", "canonical_name": "Varadarajan"}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68844, "end_char": 68862, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Sanchaita Investments is a partnership firm duly registered under the Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69283, "end_char": 69375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sancbaita Investments", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 69378, "end_char": 69399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sancbaita Investments (hereinafter referred to as the firm) bas its principal place of business at Nos.", "canonical_name": "Sancbaita Investments"}}, {"text": "Bihari Lal Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69540, "end_char": 69558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shambhu Prasad Mukherjee, Bihari Lal Murarka and Swapan Kumar Guba are the three partners of the Firm.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Lal Murarka"}}, {"text": "Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70716, "end_char": 70777, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70824, "end_char": 70843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th December, 1980, the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, lodged a complaint of violation of the Act by the firm with."}}, {"text": "Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation,\n\n10, Madras Street.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71087, "end_char": 71164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The F.I.R. has been set out in full in the judgment of the learned Trial Judge and the same reads as follows :\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation,\n\n10, Madras Street."}}, {"text": "13.12.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71185, "end_char": 71195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta 72\n\nSir,\n\n13.12.1980\n\nOn a secret information that 'Sanchaita Investments' of 5 and 6 Fancy Lane, Calcutta, is carrying on business of promoting and/or conducting prize chit and/or money circulation scheme enrolling members of such chit and/or scheme participating in these, and/ or receiving and remit ting monies in pursuance of such chits and/or scheme in violation of the provisions of the prize chits and money circulation scheme (Banning) Act, 1978."}}, {"text": "Sanchita Investments", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71761, "end_char": 71781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Enquiry reveals that the said 'Sanchita Investments' is a Partnership firm, partners being Shri Bihari Prasad Murarka, Shri Sambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guba and th1t it was floated in or around\n\ntso\nSui>RBME touat R.Bi>oHs [1982] 3 s.c.", "canonical_name": "Sancbaita Investments"}}, {"text": "Saravsree. Bihari Prasad Murarka Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72601, "end_char": 72657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above, Saravsree."}}, {"text": "Sanchita Investments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72743, "end_char": 72763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bihari Prasad Murarka Sambhu Prasad Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guha appear to have been carrying on business in the trade name of 'Sanchita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation scheme in violation of section 3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1976 are therefore, punishable under S. 4 of the said Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72825, "end_char": 72834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72935, "end_char": 72939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th of December", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73193, "end_char": 73209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th of December, two of the partners of the firm were arrested."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74004, "end_char": 74024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent was the State of West Bengal, Respondents No.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS"}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner of Police and Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74112, "end_char": 74198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 was the Assistant Commissioner of Police and Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, and respondent No."}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 74283, "end_char": 74321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 was the Investigating Officer in the cases pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74348, "end_char": 74369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 was the Reserve Bank of India and Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Reserve Bank of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74399, "end_char": 74413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 was the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Arun Kanti Roy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 76053, "end_char": 76067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the averments made in writ petition, an affidavit affirmed by Shri Arun Kanti Roy, was filed on behalf of respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "Arun Kanti Roy"}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Chakra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 76147, "end_char": 76165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2, an affidavit affirmed by Shri Sunil Kumar Chakra.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Kumar Chakraverty"}}, {"text": "Rani Annaji Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 76256, "end_char": 76271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Rani Annaji Rao on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India was also filed.", "canonical_name": "Rani Annaji Rao"}}, {"text": "Arnn Kanti\n\nRoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76356, "end_char": 76371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Arnn Kanti\n\nRoy, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department and Ex-officio Director\n\n152 SUPREM\" COURt REPORTS [ 1982] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "B.K. Kundu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76605, "end_char": 76615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 2, that is, the State of West Bengal and Shri B.K. Kundu, there is an assertion that the Respondents come within the mischief of the Act and they have violated S. 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76719, "end_char": 76723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bank of India under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79160, "end_char": 79215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "8th January, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80921, "end_char": 80938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether such deposits are one time deposits and whether such deposits actually earn income in excess of the interest actually paid to the depositors or a matter of detailed investigation, which were in progress until the same was stopped by the order cif the learned Court of Appeal passed on 8th January, 1981."}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Chakraverty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 83411, "end_char": 83434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Shri Sunil Kumar Chakraverty, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, Government of West Bengal, Finance, Taxation Department and filed on behalf of Respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Kumar Chakraverty"}}, {"text": "Rani Annaji Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 84004, "end_char": 84019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Shri Rani Annaji Rao, filed on behalf of Reserve Bank of Jndia, the deponent has stated that the Jl.eserve Bank of India which has no regulatory control over the firm has been unnecessarily made a party to ilie proceeding.", "canonical_name": "Rani Annaji Rao"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of Jndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84040, "end_char": 84061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Shri Rani Annaji Rao, filed on behalf of Reserve Bank of Jndia, the deponent has stated that the Jl.eserve Bank of India which has no regulatory control over the firm has been unnecessarily made a party to ilie proceeding."}}, {"text": "Jl.eserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84096, "end_char": 84119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Shri Rani Annaji Rao, filed on behalf of Reserve Bank of Jndia, the deponent has stated that the Jl.eserve Bank of India which has no regulatory control over the firm has been unnecessarily made a party to ilie proceeding."}}, {"text": "Leen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84816, "end_char": 84820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been further stated that the view of the legal department of the Reserve Bank on the basis of the enquiries made had Leen indicated to the Finance Minister of the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 85399, "end_char": 85411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28-2-80 Calcutta, October 1, 1980\n\nSUPREME COUl!.t REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.i\\ ..\n\nDear Shri Venkataraman,\n\nIn the con1ext of the action being taken by the Government of West Bengal .under the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes {Banning) Act, 1978, a question has arisen whether an organisation called 'Sanchaita Investments, with the address at 5 & 6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta-I come within the purview of the above Act.", "canonical_name": "Vcnkataraman"}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85462, "end_char": 85487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28-2-80 Calcutta, October 1, 1980\n\nSUPREME COUl!.t REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.i\\ ..\n\nDear Shri Venkataraman,\n\nIn the con1ext of the action being taken by the Government of West Bengal .under the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes {Banning) Act, 1978, a question has arisen whether an organisation called 'Sanchaita Investments, with the address at 5 & 6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta-I come within the purview of the above Act."}}, {"text": "Sanchaita Savings Schme {P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86183, "end_char": 86215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I may mention that the authorised officer has issued notice under the above Act to a \"Sanchaita Savings Schme {P) Ltd.\" which is to be distinguished from 'Sanchaita Investments'."}}, {"text": "Sachaita Investments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86317, "end_char": 86337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the organisation called \"Sachaita Investments\" is receiving large amount of monies from the public ostensibly as loans, and in lieu they are issuing loan certificates receipts."}}, {"text": "R.V. Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 87705, "end_char": 87722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 157\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri R.V. Venkataraman,\n\nUnion Minister for Finance, North Block, New Delhi-110001\"\n\nYours sincerely, Sd/- Ashok Mitra\n\nAnnexure E is a letter by Shri K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank to Dr. Ashok Mitra,\n\nState Finance Ministry."}}, {"text": "Ashok Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 87807, "end_char": 87818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 157\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri R.V. Venkataraman,\n\nUnion Minister for Finance, North Block, New Delhi-110001\"\n\nYours sincerely, Sd/- Ashok Mitra\n\nAnnexure E is a letter by Shri K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank to Dr. Ashok Mitra,\n\nState Finance Ministry.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Mitra"}}, {"text": "K.S. Krishnaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 87851, "end_char": 87868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 157\n\nWith regards,\n\nShri R.V. Venkataraman,\n\nUnion Minister for Finance, North Block, New Delhi-110001\"\n\nYours sincerely, Sd/- Ashok Mitra\n\nAnnexure E is a letter by Shri K.S. Krishnaswamy, Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank to Dr. Ashok Mitra,\n\nState Finance Ministry.", "canonical_name": "K.S. Krishnaswamy"}}, {"text": "D Sanchaita Investments", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88052, "end_char": 88075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2020/102 (Gen) L0-80/81\n\n22nd Oct., 1980 D Sanchaita Investments."}}, {"text": "Ashok", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88086, "end_char": 88091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My Dear Ashok,\n\nYou might recall that during my recent visit to Calcutta; you had sent me a copy of your D.O. Letter dated October I, 1980 to Shri Venkataraman, Union\n\nMinister for Finance as also of a letter dated September 30, 1980 addressed to our Chief Officer, DNBC, Calcutta, in connection with the above firm.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Sen"}}, {"text": "Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 88225, "end_char": 88237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My Dear Ashok,\n\nYou might recall that during my recent visit to Calcutta; you had sent me a copy of your D.O. Letter dated October I, 1980 to Shri Venkataraman, Union\n\nMinister for Finance as also of a letter dated September 30, 1980 addressed to our Chief Officer, DNBC, Calcutta, in connection with the above firm.", "canonical_name": "Vcnkataraman"}}, {"text": "17th October, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88504, "end_char": 88522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to them (vide extract of the note dated 17th October, 1980, enclosed for your confidential information) the acceptance of loans simpliciter by the firm by issue of receipts (as per the specimen received by us from our Calcutta Office) without floating any scheme or arrangement would not ordinarily be covered by the definition of \"Prize Chit\" and hit by the provisions of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Hijjh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 89044, "end_char": 89064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As you may know, there are a few writ petitions pending in the Calcutta Hijjh Court where the interpreta-\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982] 3 S.C.R.\n\nti on of section 2 (e) of the Banning Act is involved."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89137, "end_char": 89146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90593, "end_char": 90614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petitioners, the Reserve Bank of India and Union of India have been made respondents in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Reserve Bank of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90619, "end_char": 90633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petitioners, the Reserve Bank of India and Union of India have been made respondents in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91275, "end_char": 91285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee contends that the question of applicability\n\nWEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.) 159\n\nof the Act will only come for consideration after the investigation has been completed and all relevant materials have been gathered on such investigation."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92908, "end_char": 92934, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92936, "end_char": 92947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93023, "end_char": 93029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93347, "end_char": 93353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93359, "end_char": 93382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963) 2 S.C.R. 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 93589, "end_char": 93607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93969, "end_char": 93975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94218, "end_char": 94225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95261, "end_char": 95269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1980] 2 S.C.R. 16", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 95687, "end_char": 95704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96910, "end_char": 96916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97103, "end_char": 97109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 946", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 97947, "end_char": 97963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98601, "end_char": 98627, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98807, "end_char": 98815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101064, "end_char": 101072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101148, "end_char": 101152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101412, "end_char": 101416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103984, "end_char": 103988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105253, "end_char": 105256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen has argued that investigation has to be done when an offence is disclosed for collecting materials for establishing ar.", "canonical_name": "Sen"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107568, "end_char": 107571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen\n\n(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R 388.", "canonical_name": "Sen"}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S.C.R 388", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 107577, "end_char": 107595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107896, "end_char": 107904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110507, "end_char": 110510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nSen submits that the materials on record including the allegations made in the F.LR.", "canonical_name": "Sen"}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112966, "end_char": 112970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen bas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114977, "end_char": 114984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection Mr. Sen bas referred to the decision in Ex parte Wier In re Wier(') and has relied upon the following observations at p. 879;\n\n\"We do not think that any other section of the Act throws any material light upon the proper construction of this section, and if the question had depended upon the Act alol)e we should have 4ad great doubt what the proper construction was; but we are of opinion that, where the construction of the Act is ambiguous and doubtful on any point, recourse may be had to the rules which have been\n\n(I) [1871) 6 Cb."}}, {"text": "WEST BENGAL", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115542, "end_char": 115553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL •• SWAPAN KUMAR IA.N. Sen, J.) 169\n\nmade by the Lord Chancellor under the authority of the Act, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction bas been put on the Act, that i.t is our duty to adopt and follow that construction\"."}}, {"text": "SWAPAN KUMAR IA.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115557, "end_char": 115579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL •• SWAPAN KUMAR IA.N. Sen, J.) 169\n\nmade by the Lord Chancellor under the authority of the Act, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction bas been put on the Act, that i.t is our duty to adopt and follow that construction\"."}}, {"text": "Sen that if no offence under the Act is disclosed and the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116617, "end_char": 116678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117120, "end_char": 117123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray and Mr. Sibal who followed Mr. Sen mainly adopted the submissions made by Mr. Sen. Mr. Ray, further contended that to be a chit fund or to be a money circulation scheme, an element of uncertainty or luck is essential."}}, {"text": "Sibal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117132, "end_char": 117137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray and Mr. Sibal who followed Mr. Sen mainly adopted the submissions made by Mr. Sen. Mr. Ray, further contended that to be a chit fund or to be a money circulation scheme, an element of uncertainty or luck is essential."}}, {"text": "Behari Prasad Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124871, "end_char": 124892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its partners are Behari Prasad Murarka, Sri Sambhu Mukherjee and Sri Swapan Kumar Guba The firm was started in and around 1975.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Prasad Murarka"}}, {"text": "Sarvshri Behari Prasad Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125607, "end_char": 125637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nIn view of the above, Sarvshri Behari Prasad Murarka,\n\nSambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guha appears to have been carrying on the business in the trade name of 'Sanchaita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation Scheme in violation of S. 2 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978,\n\nThe other materials are contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 27 and 30 of the affidavit and the two documents, namely, the article published in the Newspaper 'Business Standard' dated 1611.1980 and the documents seized in the course of searches."}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125830, "end_char": 125834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1611.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126092, "end_char": 126101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WEST BENGAL v. SWAPAN KUMAR (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nIn view of the above, Sarvshri Behari Prasad Murarka,\n\nSambhu Mukherjee and Swapan Kumar Guha appears to have been carrying on the business in the trade name of 'Sanchaita Investments' in prize chits and money circulation Scheme in violation of S. 2 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978,\n\nThe other materials are contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 27 and 30 of the affidavit and the two documents, namely, the article published in the Newspaper 'Business Standard' dated 1611.1980 and the documents seized in the course of searches."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127416, "end_char": 127420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127623, "end_char": 127627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "James S. Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127915, "end_char": 127927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act has been enacted for implementing the recommendations of a Study Group of the Reserve aank of India under tll~\n\n(1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nChairmanship of Shri James S. Raj the then Chairman of the Unit Trust of India, constituted for examining in depth the provisions of Chapter IIIB of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the directions issued thereunder to Non-Banking Companies in order to assess their adequacy in the context of ensuring the efficacy of the monetary and credit policies of the country and affording a degree of protection to the interests of the depositors who place their savings with such companies."}}, {"text": "Chapter IIIB of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128027, "end_char": 128078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130295, "end_char": 130299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130375, "end_char": 130379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130870, "end_char": 130874, 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12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135893, "end_char": 135903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136149, "end_char": 136153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137031, "end_char": 137085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137250, "end_char": 137255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "statute": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act"}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137304, "end_char": 137308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "statute": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act"}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137855, "end_char": 137859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "statute": "Though the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143002, "end_char": 143007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143021, "end_char": 143026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143181, "end_char": 143185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143225, "end_char": 143229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.ll.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 145324, "end_char": 145362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Transactions in black money do not come within the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148007, "end_char": 148011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149864, "end_char": 149876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the validity of the Act was challenged before this Court while upholding the validity of the Act for reasons stated in the judgment, Krishna Iyer, J. who spoke for the Beneh observed at p. 514 as follows :-\n\n\"In many situations, the poor and unwary have to be saved the seducing processes resorted by unscrupulous racketeers who glamourize and prey upon the gambling instinct to get rich quick through prizes."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150869, "end_char": 150879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 152563, "end_char": 152569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_186_195_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "AMITABH SHRIVASTAVA\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.\n\nFebruary 4, 1982\n\n(D.A: DESAI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nRu/ts relating to admission to medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh dated 17-4-1979-Reservation of seats to certain categories-Minimum marks reduced from 50 per cnt in the aggregate to 43 per cent, by an xecutive order dated 10th March, 1980-Stage at which the benefit ari'sing from the said executive order is to be applied, explained-Ru/es 2, 7, 9 and 20, scope of.\n\nThere are six medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh. Admission to the first year of M.B.B.S Course is on the basis of the qualifying examination. There D were 720 seats in tose six colleges in the year 1979-80,\n\nUnder Rule 7 reservations are made for certain categories. One such is for the sons and daughters of military personnel of Madhya Pradesh and 21 seats in all were reserved for that category.\n\nUnder Rule 20, the qualifying marks to be obtained by Candidates other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, shall be 50 per cent in the aggregate and 33 per cent in each of the subjects. In case the required number of candidates for admission are not available, according to the above percentage of qualifying marks, the Board conducting the pre-medical examinations under Rule 2 shall have power to lower the marks up to 5 per cent in the aggregate for all categories of candidates.\n\nUnder Rule 9, in case sufficient number of candidates do not qualify for admission under any reserved category and any seats remain vacant, such vacant seats shall be filled by preparing a combined merit list •of all the remaining categories of candidates on the waiting list and the candidates shall be admitted according to merit in the list so prepared.\n\nThe appellant who was a son of a military personnel got only 43.6 per cent of marks in the aggregate, and he could not get a seat under the reserved category even after the marks were lowered to 45 per cent under Note 1 to Rule 20 by the Board. Even after that was done, 7 seats remained vacant out of 21 seats reserved for the sons and daughters of military personnel. On 10-3-1980, the Governmeiit by an executive Order reduced the minimum aggregate to 43 per cent. The Board, prepared a combined list under Rule 9 and applying the minimum of 43 per cent granted admission, as per that list, and refused admission to the appellant. The question arose whether the selection should be based on the combined list prepared under Rule 9 or on taking 43 per cent as the qualifying marks in the aggregate. ·\n\nAMITABH v. M. P. STATH (Varadarajan, J.) 187\n\nAllowing the appeal by special leave, the Court,\n\nHELD : Since the minimum qualifying marks were reduced to 43 per cent by an executive order without any provision therefor in the statutory rules, Rule 9 of the statutory rules could not be applied at that stage, and the appellant who bad secured 43.6 per cent of marks in the aggregate shou1d have been admitted in the category to which he belonged. The difference between 45 per cent in the aggregate, to -which the minimum qualifying marks were reduced uuder Note (1) to Rule 20 and 43.6 per cent of marks in the aggregate secured by the appellant is so little that it could not be a valid or sufficient reason for giving a go-bye, on the gro'und of merit, to the reservation provided for in Rule 7 of the Rules. [194 G-H, 195 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLAlE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 853 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4.11.1980 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Case Misc.\n\nPetition No. 167 of 1980.\n\nShh- Dayal, P.S. Das Gupta and J.B. Dadachanji for the Appellant.\n\nGopal Subramaniam and S.A. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of K.K. Due. J. of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 167 of 1980, with whom the learned Chief Justice of that High Court had agreed on a difference of opinion between the learned Judge and A. R. Navkar, J. The petition filed .under Article 226 of the Constitution was for the issue of a writ, order or direction for the writ petitioner's admission into one of the medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh for the M .B.B.S. course, commencing in the academic year 1979-80. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we allowed the appeal by a brief order on 14.1.1982 without any order as to costs, on account of the urgency of the matter, reserving our reasons to be given later, and directed the respondents to admit the appeHant to the M.B.B.S course for the academic year 1981-82 for which admissions are admittedly goipg on even now.\n\nWe are presently giving reasons.\n\nThe. Government of Madhya Pradesh,. Public Health and Family Welfare Department, have framed Rules on 17.4.1979 for\n\n1 88 SUl>REME COU!tt .REPORTS ( J 982] :l S.C.R.\n\nadmission into the Medical, Dentistry and Ayurvedic Colleges in the State. In this appeal we are not concerned with the Dentistry and Ayurvedic Colleges. There are six Medical Colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh affiliated to different universities. There are 720 seats for admission into the first year course in those six colleges.\n\nRule 5(l) of the aforesaid ules, hereinafter refer to as the Rules, lays down that no candidate shal.1 be admitted to the M.B.B.S. course unless he has passed the B.Sc. Part I (three years degree course Medical Grouj>) examination of the recognised universities of the State with Physics, Chemistry, Biology (Zoology and Botany) or any examination of any other university or board recognised as equivalent thereto with practical tests in each subject provided the candidate has passed in each of those subjects in theory and practi: .cal separately. Under rule 6 of the Rules no candidate shall be admitted to the medical college unless he completes the age of 17 years on the 31st December of the year of ailmission to the college. Rule 1(3) provides for the pre-medical examination being held every year for selection of candidates for admission to the medical colleges in the State and says tbat all admissions to those colleges have to be made only from the merit list prepared on the basis of the result of that examination except in the case of seats placed at the disposal of the Government of India or other States.\n\nUnder Rule 7 certain number of seats have to be reserved for specific categories of candidates passing the pre-medical examination as below:\n\nFifteen percent shall be reserved for women candidates;\n\nFifteen percent shall be reserved for each of the categories of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes candidates;\n\nSeats not exceeding 3 percent may be reserved for children of military personnel who have to produce the necessary certificates. .,\n\nApart from those reservations, under Rule 8 seats not exceeding 3 per cent are reserved for nominees of the Government of India and three seats are reserved for candidates nominated by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in consideration of three seats reserved in the medical colleges in that State for candidates of. the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nUnder Rule 20, selection of candidates from amongst those who had appeared and qualified in the written rexamination shall be made strictly on merit as disclosed by the total number of marks obtained by a candidate in the pre-medical examination. The qualifying marks for admission shall be 50 per cent in the aggregate and 33 percent in each of the subjects. For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates the minimum qualifying marks shall be 45 per cent in aggregate and 30 per cent in each of the subject. In case the required number of candidate for admission are not available according to the above percentage of qualifying marks the Board conducting the pre-medical examination under Rule 2 shall have power to lower the marks up to 5 per cent in the aggregate for all categories of candidates. If even with the relaxation granted by the Board, as above, required number of candidates in the categories of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not available for admission the Government has power to grant special relaxation in the maximum qualifying marks to the extent considered necessary.\n\nUnder Rule 9, in case sufficient number of candidates do not qualify for admission under any reserved category and any seats remain vacant, such vacant seals shall be filled by preparing a combined merit list of all the remaining categories of candidates on the waiting list and the candidates shall be admitted according to merit in the list so prepared.\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to any of the other rules for the purpose of this appeal.\n\nIndisputably, the appellant belongs to the third category of seats reserved under Rule 7 as he is a son of a military personnel settled in Madhya Pradesh. Sons and daughters of military personnel of Madhya Pradesh are entitled to 21 seats in all out of 720 seats available in the six medical colleges in the State. As per the minimum number of qualifying marks prescribed in Rule 20, namely, 50 per cent in the aggregate and 33 per cent in each of the subjects, children of military personnel secured only 8 seats, and 13 seats in that category remained vacant and all other categories secured only 361 seats and 338 seats of those categories remained vacant. The appellant did not qualify for admission on the basis of the marks specified in Rule 20 for the academic year I 979-80. Then the Board applied Note(!) to Rule 20 which provides for lowering the mini mum qualifying marks upto 5 per cent in the aggregate ', for all categodes of candidates. After that w&s done 6 more candidates\n\nbelonging to the category of sons and daughters of military personnel and 274 more candidates belonging to all other categories secured admission and 7 seats belonging to the category of children of military personnel and 64 seats of all other categories remained vacant.\n\nEven then the appellant could not secure admission as he bad secured only 43.6 per cent of inarks in the aggregate and 33 per cent in each of the subjects in the pre-medical examination and in the merit list prepared according to rule 9 he ranked 74 and only 71 candidates in that 'list could be admitted on the basis of merit.\n\nThen the Madhya Pradesh Government issued an executive notification dated IO March, 1980 regarding relaxation of qualifying marks for the purpose of admission to the medical colleges. That notification is to the effect that for the year 1979-80 candidates who have obtained at least 43 per cent of marks in the aggregate in the pre-medical examination shall be admitted to the medical colleges in the unfilled seats on the basis of merit according to the rules.\n\nOrdinarily, the appellant who had secured 43.6 per cent of marks in the aggregate in the pre-medical examination and another candidate in the category of children of military personnel should have got admission after the lowering of the minimum qualifying marks to 43 per cent in the aggregate, leaving 5 seats in that category still vacant.\n\nBut Rule 9 was applied and a combined list of all the remaining categories on the waiting list was prepared and the candidates were admitted according to merit in the list so prepared and consequently the appellant who belongs to the category of children of military personnel and had secured 43.6 percent of marks in the aggregate in the pre-medical examination could not secure admission.\n\nThese facts are not in dispute.\n\nThe appellant filed a writ petition for the aforesaid relief contending that as minimum qualifying marks have been reduced by the Notification dated 10.3.1980 to 43 per cent in the aggregate and as he had secured 43.6 per cent marks he should have been given admission in the category to which he belongs. The writ petition was at first heard by K.K. Dube and A.R. Navkar, JJ.\n\nA.R. Navkar, J, who decided in favour of the appellant, had observed in his judgment thus :\n\n\"The reduction of percentage of marks for admission by the Government on J0.3.1980 (Annexure II) clearly shows that the candidates who got 43 per cent of marks\n\n:.-·\n\nwill be eligible for admission. There is no dispute that the petitioner got 43.6 per cent of marks in the pre-medical examination. Therefore, applying this order of reduction of qualifying marks (Annexure II), I am of the opinion that the right of the petitioner for admission in the medical college cannot be defeated by resorting to Rule 9 of the Rules.\n\nAs mentioned above, Rule 9 of the Rules, in my opinion, is a mandatory one. It says, 'if any seats remain vacant, such vacant seats shall be filled in by preparing a combined merit list of all the remaining categories of candidates on waiting list. This was not done when the percentage of marks for admission was reduced from 50 per cent to 45 per cent for all categories. Therefore, in my opinion, . it cannot be done to defeat the right of the petitioner .. .'I am of the opinion that the present petitioner cannot be denied his right of admission to the med1r.al college if he is otherwise eligible to get admission. Denial of admission to him by purporting to act on the strength of Rule 9 of the Rules, in my opinion, will not be justified and will amount to denial to him the protection given to him by Article 14 of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that the petition deserves to be allowed ... \"\n\nBut K.K. Dube, J. who took the opposite view has, after extracting E notification dated 10.3.1980, observed in his judgment thus:\n\n\"The reduced qualifying marks limit is only for filling up the vacant seats and the notification does not seek to amend Rule 20 or substitute 43 per cent for 50 per cent marks in the aggregate as minimum qualifying marks limit laid down under Rule 20.\n\nIndeed, the notification does not state that the reduced qualifying mljrks limit is in substitution of the one provided in Rule 20. That being the position, Rule 9 would necessarily operate, and it is for selecting from amongst the candidates for the number of seats remaining vacant by operation of Rule 9.\n\nThe petitioner's contention would have some substance if Rule 9 was not there. The effect of Rule 9 is to wipe out the reservation for admission to any of the reserved categories.\n\nThe main idea is that the best candidates be given admission to the medical colleges. The reservation is for the purpose of securinlJ a co1wession and must operate in a like manner\n\nas provided in the Rules. The reservation is riot absolute, and, therefore, when the minimum qualifying marks were reduced to 43 per cent it was only for filling up the vacant seats as obtained by operation of Rule 9 of the Rules, according to the merit in the combined merit list. We are unable to agree with the contention that the reduction in the eligibility to 43 per cent in the Government notification dated March 10, 1980 could be availed of by the petitioner and other similar candidates for filling up the 7 vacant seats in the reserved quota of the children of military personnel\".\n\nThe learned Chief Justice before whom the matter came up on account of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges who originally heard the writ petition, as mentioned above. while agreeing with K.K. Dube, J, has observed in his judgment thus:\n\n\"When even on reduction of qualifying marks under Note (i) the required number of candidates do not qualify for admission under any reserved category and seats remain vacant, Rule 9 begins to apply and as directed by that Rule \"such vacant seats sliall be filled in by preparing a combined merit list of all the remaining categories of candidates in the waiting list and the candidates shall be admitted according to the merit in the list so prepared\".\n\nAt this stage there is no further scope for reservation. In oiher words, the reservation comes to an end after the required number of candidates in a reserved category do not become available on reduction of qualifying marks in the aggregate by the Board in exercise of its power under Note (i) to Rule 20. It is generally expected that there would be a long waiting list of qualified candidates in the general category who would be available for filling in the seats transferred from a reserve category to general category. In 1979, however, it so happened that there were vacancies in the general category, that is, there were not sufficient number of qualified candidates who could have exhausted the general category under Rule 9. It is at this stage that the Government issued the order dated I 0th March, 1980. It is in the interpretation and application pf this order that difference of opinion has arisen. The\n\norder.has not been issued under the Rules. It is an inde- A pendent order. The order does not expressly refer to any reservation. The order directs selection of candidates for vacant seats on the basis of merit from those who had secured aggregate marks up to 43 per cent. The order was passed at a stage when the reserved categories had come to an end under Rule 20 read with Rule 9 as sufficient number of candidates were not available. In my opinion, therefore, Dube, J. was right in holding that the order dated 10th March, 1980 did not bring back the reservation and selection had to be made on the basis of a combined merit list for all the vacant seats irrespective of whether\n\nthey originally belong to any reserved category.........\n\nThere is yet another important factor to be taken notice of. Not only the vacancies in the reserved category of children of military personnel but there were also vacancies in the category of women to be filled in on the basis of a combined merit list and no reservation was at all allowed in working out the order of 10th March, 1980.\n\nThe way in which this order was applied by the Board had apparently the approval of the Government and no other candidate excepting the petitioner has come forward to challenge its application.\n\nAs already pointed out, the order is not a statutory order. It is an order passed by the State Government in the exercise of its executive power.\n\nThe Government's approval of the manner in which the Board has applied the order goes to show that that was the intention of the Government in passing the order.\n\nAlthough the approval of the Government of a particular mode of application of an order is not decisive of its meaning and it is for the Court to decide the correct meaning, still when the meaning of an order which is purely executive is in doubt the way in which it has been applied by all concerned is a relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding its true meaning .. The uniform application of the order by the Board with apparent approval of the Government for filling in all the vacant seats, goes a long way to show that the Government intended that the order should be applied y preparing a common merit list without continuing the reservations. In these circumstances, evefl if the interpretation P\\lt forw!\\l\"~ by the learned counsel fof\n\nthe petitioner and accepted by Navkar, J. can he accepted as a possible interpretation of the order, it would not be right for me to hold that it conveys the true ipeaning\".\n\nWe are inclined to agree with the conclusion reached by. A.R.\n\nNavkar, J., though for different reasons.\n\nThe matter is simple. . Under Rule 20, the minimum number of marks prescribed for admission into the Medical Colleges in the State is 50 per cent in the aggregate and 33 per cent in each of the subjects. On that basis, out of the total of 720 seats available in all the six medical colleges in foe State only 8 out of 2 l of the category of soris and daughters of military personnel, and only 361 out of 699 available for all other categories could be and were admitted in the academic year 1979-80. Rule 9, which has been relied upon by the respondents as well as by K. K. Dube, J. and the Chief Justice says that in case sufficient number fof candidates do not qualify for admission under any reserved category, barring, of course, the category of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates, and any seats remain vacant, such vacant seats shall be filled by preparing a combined merit list of all the remaining categories of candidates on the waiting list and the candidates shall be admitted according to merit in the list so prepared. But that Rule was not appllied by the respondents and could not be applied under the circumstances of the case when 338 seats in all other categories and 13 seats of the category of sons and daughters of military personnel could not be filled in 1979-80 on the basis of the said minimum number of qualifying marks, namely, 50 per cent in the aggregate and 33 per cent in each of the subjects. Then Note (1) to Rule 20 providing for lowering of the qualifying marks upto 5 per cent in the aggregate -\n\nfor all categories was' applied. Even then 64 seats of all other categories and 7 seats of the category of sons and daughters of military personnel could not be filled and remained vacant. Then the Government by an executive order issued the notification dated 10th March, 1980 reducing the minimum qualifying marks to 43 per cent in the aggregate, and it is only at this stage Rule 9 was applied with the result that in the category of sons and daughters of military personnel only 2 more candidates could secure admission and 7 seats of that category had to be filled by other categories. We are of the opinion that since the minimum qualifying marks were reduced to 43 per cent by an executive order without any provision therefor in the statutory rules, Rule 9 of the statutory rules could pot be applied at that stage, and that the appellant who had secured\n\n43.6 per cent of mai:ks in the aggregate should have been admitted in the category to which he belongs. We think that the difference between 45 per cent in the aggregate, to which the mifiimum qualifying marks were reduced under Note {If to Rule 20 and 43.6 per cent of marks in the aggregate secured by the appellant is so little that it could not be a valid or sufficient reason for giving a go-bye, on the ground of merit, to the reservation provided for in Rule 7 of the Rules. The appellant deserves to be admitted even for this reason.\n\nIn these circumstances we are unable to agree with the view taken by K.K. Dube, J. and the Chief Justice, and we agree with the conclusion reached by A-.R. Navkar, J. The appeal is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs. As already directed the appellant shall be admitted to the M.B.B.S. course for the academic year 1981-82 in the ategory mentioned in Rule 7\n\n(3) (c) of the Rules.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "AMITABH SHRIVASTAVA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMITABH SHRIVASTAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 4, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 4, 1982\n\n(D.A: DESAI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nRu/ts relating to admission to medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh dated 17-4-1979-Reservation of seats to certain categories-Minimum marks reduced from 50 per cnt in the aggregate to 43 per cent, by an xecutive order dated 10th March, 1980-Stage at which the benefit ari'sing from the said executive order is to be applied, explained-Ru/es 2, 7, 9 and 20, scope of."}}, {"text": "D.A: DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are six medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "10-3-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2100, "end_char": 2109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-3-1980, the Governmeiit by an executive Order reduced the minimum aggregate to 43 per cent."}}, {"text": "Shh- Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shh- Dayal, P.S. Das Gupta and J.B. Dadachanji for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P.S. Das Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3580, "end_char": 3594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shh- Dayal, P.S. Das Gupta and J.B. Dadachanji for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shh- Dayal, P.S. Das Gupta and J.B. Dadachanji for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramaniam and S.A. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.A. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Subramaniam and S.A. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of K.K. Due."}}, {"text": "K.K. Due", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of K.K. Due.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Dube"}}, {"text": "A. R. Navkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4019, "end_char": 4031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of 1980, with whom the learned Chief Justice of that High Court had agreed on a difference of opinion between the learned Judge and A. R. Navkar, J. The petition filed .under Article 226 of the Constitution was for the issue of a writ, order or direction for the writ petitioner's admission into one of the medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh for the M .B.B.S. course, commencing in the academic year 1979-80.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Navkar"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14.1.1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we allowed the appeal by a brief order on 14.1.1982 without any order as to costs, on account of the urgency of the matter, reserving our reasons to be given later, and directed the respondents to admit the appeHant to the M.B.B.S course for the academic year 1981-82 for which admissions are admittedly goipg on even now."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of Madhya Pradesh,."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 1(3) provides for the pre-medical examination being held every year for selection of candidates for admission to the medical colleges in the State and says tbat all admissions to those colleges have to be made only from the merit list prepared on the basis of the result of that examination except in the case of seats placed at the disposal of the Government of India or other States."}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from those reservations, under Rule 8 seats not exceeding 3 per cent are reserved for nominees of the Government of India and three seats are reserved for candidates nominated by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in consideration of three seats reserved in the medical colleges in that State for candidates of."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7104, "end_char": 7127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10289, "end_char": 10314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the Madhya Pradesh Government issued an executive notification dated IO March, 1980 regarding relaxation of qualifying marks for the purpose of admission to the medical colleges."}}, {"text": "K.K. Dube", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11857, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was at first heard by K.K. Dube and A.R. Navkar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Dube"}}, {"text": "A.R. Navkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was at first heard by K.K. Dube and A.R. Navkar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Navkar"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13316, "end_char": 13326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10.3.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13510, "end_char": 13519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result, therefore, is that the petition deserves to be allowed ... \"\n\nBut K.K. Dube, J. who took the opposite view has, after extracting E notification dated 10.3.1980, observed in his judgment thus:\n\n\"The reduced qualifying marks limit is only for filling up the vacant seats and the notification does not seek to amend Rule 20 or substitute 43 per cent for 50 per cent marks in the aggregate as minimum qualifying marks limit laid down under Rule 20."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14893, "end_char": 14907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to agree with the contention that the reduction in the eligibility to 43 per cent in the Government notification dated March 10, 1980 could be availed of by the petitioner and other similar candidates for filling up the 7 vacant seats in the reserved quota of the children of military personnel\"."}}, {"text": "I 0th March, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16582, "end_char": 16599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is at this stage that the Government issued the order dated I 0th March, 1980."}}, {"text": "Dube", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, therefore, Dube, J. was right in holding that the order dated 10th March, 1980 did not bring back the reservation and selection had to be made on the basis of a combined merit list for all the vacant seats irrespective of whether\n\nthey originally belong to any reserved category.........\n\nThere is yet another important factor to be taken notice of."}}, {"text": "10th March, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17219, "end_char": 17235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, therefore, Dube, J. was right in holding that the order dated 10th March, 1980 did not bring back the reservation and selection had to be made on the basis of a combined merit list for all the vacant seats irrespective of whether\n\nthey originally belong to any reserved category.........\n\nThere is yet another important factor to be taken notice of."}}, {"text": "Navkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19076, "end_char": 19082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, evefl if the interpretation P\\lt forw!\\l\"~ by the learned counsel fof\n\nthe petitioner and accepted by Navkar, J. can he accepted as a possible interpretation of the order, it would not be right for me to hold that it conveys the true ipeaning\"."}}, {"text": "A.R.\n\nNavkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19277, "end_char": 19289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.R.\n\nNavkar, J., though for different reasons.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Navkar"}}, {"text": "K. K. Dube", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19894, "end_char": 19904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 9, which has been relied upon by the respondents as well as by K. K. Dube, J. and the Chief Justice says that in case sufficient number fof candidates do not qualify for admission under any reserved category, barring, of course, the category of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates, and any seats remain vacant, such vacant seats shall be filled by preparing a combined merit list of all the remaining categories of candidates on the waiting list and the candidates shall be admitted according to merit in the list so prepared.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Dube"}}, {"text": "A-.R. Navkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22429, "end_char": 22441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances we are unable to agree with the view taken by K.K. Dube, J. and the Chief Justice, and we agree with the conclusion reached by A-.R. Navkar, J. The appeal is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs.", "canonical_name": "A. R. Navkar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_196_200_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "• 196\n\nSAT PAL GUPTA & ANR.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA & ANR.\n\nFebruary s; 1982\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.D.KOSHAL, J.]\n\nEssential Commodities Act, 1955-\"Foodstuff\"-Meaning of-Rice bran used to feed poultry a11d cattle-Whelher essential commodity within the mea11ing of the Act.\n\nSub-clause (i) of section 2(a) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 defines an ' 1essential commodity\" to mean \"cattle fodder including oilcakes and other coilcentrates\" and by sub--clause (v) an \"essential commodity\" me:lns \"food~ stuffs, including edible oih1eeds and oils.\" Clause 3 of the Haryana Rice Bran (Distribution and Price) Control Order 1967 provides that no dealer or owner of a ri!=C mill shall sen or offer to sell or supply rice bran save against a permit granted by certain officers of the State Government.\n\nBy a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the appellants impugned the validity of clause 3 of the Control Order on the ground that rice bran is not an essential commodity and that for this reason power under section 3 could not be exercised for the purpose of regulating its sale or supply. The High Court rejected the appellants' writ petition.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Rice bran being a \"foodstuff\" wilin the meaning of section 2(a) ~\n\n(v) of the Act, it is an essential coinmodity and therefore, the-power conferred by section 3 can be used to regulate its production, sale or supply. [199 Fl\n\nThe term \"foodstuffs\" means food of any kind. The dictionar:Y meanings of \"food\" are not restricted to what is eaten by human beings for nourishment and sustenance. According to them, what one takes into the system to maintain life _and growth or what is taken into the body of an organism in order to sustain growth is food.\n\n[199 C-E]\n\nRice bran, which is a bye-product of the husking and milling process of paddy, consists of the layer that lies between husk and the kernel. It is a food stuffWhicli is commonly used as poultry and cattle feed. Any stuff which is commonly used as food by the generality of living beings is foodstuff ; it is not legitimate to restrict its ineaning to things used as food by human heinfis. The animal kingdom is not any the Jess important in the cosmic scheme tban the human empire and it is a distortion to say that it is a matter of little or no concern to the State whether the cattle and the poultiy get their due ration of the means of their subsistence. Cattle feed and poultry feed are feed to the cattle and the poultry and therefore they are foodstuffs. (198 E-H]\n\n/ ---\n\nSA'tPAL v. HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 191\n\nCattle and poultry are living cOlnl)Onents of the natural environment and thero is no reason to exclude that which they eat or feed upon from the meaning of the word''foodstuffs\". If what the human beings eat is food, so is what the other living beings eat. \"Cattle fodder\" is expressly brought within the cOmpass of essential c; ommodities by section 2(a) (i). It would be illogical ir', in that context, rice bran is excluded from the purview of essential commodities on the ground that it is eaten by the poultry and not by Homo Sapitns. (199 B-C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1099(N) of 1972.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th October, 1971 of the Punjab aqd Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 3400 of 1971.\n\nB.P .. Maheshwari arid Suresh Sethi for the Petitioner.\n\nK.G. Bhagat and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. The appellants, in this appeal by special leave, are dealers in rice, paddy and rice ~Jan. They also have an associate rice milling and husking plant which is run under the name and style of Jagdamba Rice Mills, Traori.\n\nSection 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 -of 1955, empowers the Central Government, under the circumstances stated in that section, to issue notified orders providing for the regulation of production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity,\n\nUnder Section 5, the Central Governmcint can delegate its powers to a State Govetnment or an officer or authority subordinate to it.\n\nIn exercise of that power, the Central Government issued a notification on July 24, 1967 delegating to the State Governments the power conferred upon it by Section 3 of the Act.\n\nIn exercise of such del'egated power, Respondent I, the State of Haryana, promulgated the Haryana Rice Bran (Distribution and Price) Control Order, 1967. Clause 3 of the said Order provides that no dealer or owner of a rice mill shall sell -or offer to sell or supply rice bran save against a permit granted by the Director, Food and Supplies, or the District )\\1agistrate or any othe~ officer authorised by the Director in that behalf .• The appellants filed a. writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challen$ing clause 3 of the aforesaid Control Order, on the\n\n198 SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS (19821 3 s.c.A.\n\nA ground that rice bran is not an essential commodity and therefore, the power conferred by section 3 of the Act cannot be exercised for the purpose of regulating its sale or supply. This contention has been negatived by the High Court.\n\nIt is true that the power conferred by section 3( I) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, can be exercised by the Central Government or its delegate, only if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to provide for the regulation of any 'essen tial commodity'. The only sub-clauses of section 2(a) which are relevant for the purpose of deciding whether rice bran is an essential commodity, are sub-clauses (i) and (v). Sub-clause (i) of section 2(a) defines an 'essential commodity' to mean \"cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other .concentrates\".\n\nBy subclause (v), an 'essential commodity' means \"foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oi\\s\". If rice bran is either cattle fodder or foodstuff, it would be an essential commodity and the Central Government or its dele- . gate, the State Government, would have the power to regulate its production, supply and distribution, and trade and commerce therein.\n\n' Coming first to the question argued by Shri Mabeshwari as to whether rice bran is a 'foodstuff', it is well known that rice bran is commonly used as poultry feed and not uncommonly as cattle feed.\n\nThis is undisputed. Rice bran is a bye-product of the husking and milling process of paddy and consists of the layer which lies between the husk and the kernel. The affidavit of Shri T.K. Banerji, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryaoa which was filed in the High Court shows that rice bran is used in place of wheat bran or wheat middlings in livestock feeding. To the same effect is the affidavit. filed in this Court by Shri H.D. Bansal, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryana. If this is the true position, we are unable to\n\npreciate that rice bran cannot be considered to be a foodstuff. /Any stuff which is commonly used as food by the generality of living beings is foodstuff: it is not legitimate to restrict the meaning of that word to things which a.re used as food by human beings. The animal kingdom is not any the less important in the cosmic scheme\n\nI r than the human empire and it is a distortion to say that it is a , matter of little or no concern to the State whether the cattle and the /; poultry get their due ration of the means of their subsistence. Cattle\n\n) feed and poultry (eed are food to the catle and the poultry, and therefore they are foodstuffs.\n\n-l--\n\n----r--\n\nSAtPAL \\>. ltARYANA (Chandrachud, t.J.) 199\n\nThe word 'foodstuffs' which occurs in clause (v) of Section 2(a) is not defined in the Act and therefore it mu>t receive its ordinary and natural meaning, that is to say, a meaning which takes account of and accords with the day-to-day affairs of life. Cattle and poultry are living componenis of the natural environment and there is no reason to exclude that which they eat or feed upon, from the meaning of the word 'foodstuffs'. If, what the human beings eat is food, so is what the other living beings eat. 'Cattle fodder' is expressly brought within the compass of essential commodities by clause (i) of section 2(a). It would be illogical if, in that context, rice bran is excluded from the purview of essential commodities on the groimd that it is eaten by the poultty and not by Homo Sapiens.\n\nBy 'foodstuffs' is meant food of any kiud. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition) says that 'food' is \"what one takes into the system to maintain life and growth\". According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 'food' means \"material consisting of carbohydrates, fats, proteins alld supplementary substances, that is taken or absorbed into the body of an organism in order to sustain growth, repair, and all vital processes and to furnish energy for all activity of the organism; something that nourishes or develops or sustains\". These dictionary meanings of the word \"food\" are not restricted to what is eaten by human beings for nourishment and sustenance. According to them, what one takes into the system to maintain life and growth or what is taken into the body of an organism in order to .sustain growth is food.\n\nWe are therefore of the op1mon that rice bran being a foodstuff within the meaning of section 2(a)(v) of the Act, it is an essential commodity and therefore, the power conferred by section 3 can be used to regulate its production, sale or supply.\n\nThe affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Haryana have attempted to make out a case that rice bran is also used for human consumption. A research bulletin brought out by the Department of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Punjab University, Chandigarh, is cited therein as showing that the oil extracted from rice bran can be used in a variety of ways in the edible field as, for example, for fat-frying, cooking and in the preparation of salads and sauces, and that in Japan, it has been used for edible purposes for many years. This claim may. or may not be true but we would like to have better evidence to uphold it. It may be possible, in\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982! 3 s.c.il.\n\ncourse of time, to process rice bran by the use of advanced food technology in order to make it a common article of food for human consumption.\n\nOur attention is drawn by Shri Bhagat, who appears on behalf of the Haryana Government, to a decision of this Court in M/s Sachdeva & Sons & Ors v. State of Punjab & Ors (Civil Appeal No. 817 of 1980 decided on May 7, 1980) in which it was held that rice bran is \"cattle fodder\" within the meaning of section 2(a)(i) of the Act. We need not go into that question since we are of the view that rice bran, being a foodstuff, is an essential commodity.\n\nC The decisions in The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(') and Shriniwas Pannalal Chockani v. The Crown(') which were cited by Shri Maheshwari and Shri Bhagat respectively do not bear upon the question in issue before us and need not, therefore, be discussed.\n\nD For these reasons we dismiss the appeal, but without costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nm [19521 2 s, c.R. 871\n\n(2) A.I.R. (38) 1951 Nagpur 226\n\n·-", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "196\n\nSAT PAL GUPTA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAT PAL GUPTA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.D.KOSHAL, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 294, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 554, "end_char": 562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act 1955"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1349, "end_char": 1358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2929, "end_char": 2941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th October, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th October, 1971 of the Punjab aqd Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "B.P .. Maheshwari arid Suresh Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.P .. Maheshwari arid Suresh Sethi for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. The appellants, in this appeal by special leave, are dealers in rice, paddy and rice ~Jan.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Jagdamba Rice Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also have an associate rice milling and husking plant which is run under the name and style of Jagdamba Rice Mills, Traori."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3744, "end_char": 3753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3761, "end_char": 3786, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 -of 1955, empowers the Central Government, under the circumstances stated in that section, to issue notified orders providing for the regulation of production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity,\n\nUnder Section 5, the Central Governmcint can delegate its powers to a State Govetnment or an officer or authority subordinate to it."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Governmcint", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 -of 1955, empowers the Central Government, under the circumstances stated in that section, to issue notified orders providing for the regulation of production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity,\n\nUnder Section 5, the Central Governmcint can delegate its powers to a State Govetnment or an officer or authority subordinate to it."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of that power, the Central Government issued a notification on July 24, 1967 delegating to the State Governments the power conferred upon it by Section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4294, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of such del'egated power, Respondent I, the State of Haryana, promulgated the Haryana Rice Bran (Distribution and Price) Control Order, 1967."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4839, "end_char": 4871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 3 of the said Order provides that no dealer or owner of a rice mill shall sell -or offer to sell or supply rice bran save against a permit granted by the Director, Food and Supplies, or the District )\\1agistrate or any othe~ officer authorised by the Director in that behalf .• The appellants filed a. writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challen$ing clause 3 of the aforesaid Control Order, on the\n\n198 SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS (19821 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5279, "end_char": 5310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5520, "end_char": 5532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Mabeshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Coming first to the question argued by Shri Mabeshwari as to whether rice bran is a 'foodstuff', it is well known that rice bran is commonly used as poultry feed and not uncommonly as cattle feed.", "canonical_name": "Mabeshwari"}}, {"text": "T.K. Banerji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Shri T.K. Banerji, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryaoa which was filed in the High Court shows that rice bran is used in place of wheat bran or wheat middlings in livestock feeding."}}, {"text": "Haryaoa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6576, "end_char": 6583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Shri T.K. Banerji, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryaoa which was filed in the High Court shows that rice bran is used in place of wheat bran or wheat middlings in livestock feeding."}}, {"text": "H.D. Bansal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed in this Court by Shri H.D. Bansal, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryana."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed in this Court by Shri H.D. Bansal, Director, Food and Supplies, Haryana."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7562, "end_char": 7573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltARYANA (Chandrachud, t.J.) 199\n\nThe word 'foodstuffs' which occurs in clause (v) of Section 2(a) is not defined in the Act and therefore it mu>t receive its ordinary and natural meaning, that is to say, a meaning which takes account of and accords with the day-to-day affairs of life.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9323, "end_char": 9338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9418, "end_char": 9427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Department of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Punjab University, Chandigarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9664, "end_char": 9744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A research bulletin brought out by the Department of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Punjab University, Chandigarh, is cited therein as showing that the oil extracted from rice bran can be used in a variety of ways in the edible field as, for example, for fat-frying, cooking and in the preparation of salads and sauces, and that in Japan, it has been used for edible purposes for many years."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A research bulletin brought out by the Department of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Punjab University, Chandigarh, is cited therein as showing that the oil extracted from rice bran can be used in a variety of ways in the edible field as, for example, for fat-frying, cooking and in the preparation of salads and sauces, and that in Japan, it has been used for edible purposes for many years."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982! 3 s.c.il.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be possible, in\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1982!"}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention is drawn by Shri Bhagat, who appears on behalf of the Haryana Government, to a decision of this Court in M/s Sachdeva & Sons & Ors v. State of Punjab & Ors (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Haryana Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10391, "end_char": 10409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention is drawn by Shri Bhagat, who appears on behalf of the Haryana Government, to a decision of this Court in M/s Sachdeva & Sons & Ors v. State of Punjab & Ors (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "May 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "817 of 1980 decided on May 7, 1980) in which it was held that rice bran is \"cattle fodder\" within the meaning of section 2(a)(i) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10624, "end_char": 10639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maheshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10917, "end_char": 10927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C The decisions in The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(') and Shriniwas Pannalal Chockani v. The Crown(') which were cited by Shri Maheshwari and Shri Bhagat respectively do not bear upon the question in issue before us and need not, therefore, be discussed.", "canonical_name": "Mabeshwari"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_1_8_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI\n\nDELHI SAFE DEPOSIT CO. LTD.\n\nJanuary 12, 1982\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961-Sec_tion 37-Scopt of-Assessee, partner of a manag~ ing agency firm-Managed companY advanced loan to another /ir\"1 at tM instance ofapartnerof the'firm-Loan turned out to be a bad debt-Loss of managed\n\ncompany partly made good by assessee~Reimbursed amount, if could be claimed C as deduction under section 37,\n\nThe assessee was a partner of a firm of managing agents. At the instance of one of the partners of the managing agency firm the managed company advanced to another firm a Jarge sum of money as loan. Eventually by reason of the failure of the borrower to repay the loao the managed company suffered Joss which was made good partly by the assessee and partly by one of its partners.\n\nD Later, the managing agency firm had been reconstituted.\n\nWhen the assessee in its returns claimed as a deduction the sum paid by it in that year in pai'tial discharge of its liability, the Income Tax Officer disaUowed it holding that the assessee was not legally bound to make the payment and\n\nthcfore it was not a busiD.css expenditure which could be allowed as a deduction.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed the order of the Income Tax Officer on the grounds that (a) the loss was actually the loss of a firm which was no more -in existence; (b) the loss had been borne by the asscsaee on personal considerations and (c) the loss was a loss of the managing agency and not of the partners concerned.\n\nAccepting the assessee's appeal the Tribunal held that even if there was a change in the constitution of the managing agency firm the assessee's liability as a partner had not ceased, that tho payment could not be treated as one made on personal considerations and that th.o asseasee had made the payment in question purely on business considerations with the sole object of maintaining its busiD.ess connection which was yielding profit.\n\nThe High Court answered the reference in favour of the assessee.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The true teot of. expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpoaes or trade or business is that it is incurred by the assessee as inci- H dental to its trade for the purpose of keeping tho trade going and of making it\n\nr•Y and not in any other capacity than of a trader. (6 DE)\n\nIn the instant case the expenditure was rightly held to be deductible under s. 37 of the Act. Th~ assessee incurrCd the eXpenditure to avoid any adverse effect on its reputation, to protect the managing agency which was an income earning apparatus and for retaining it with the reconstituted firm in which the assessee's interest was the same as before. It was Jikely that but for-the expenditure, the fair name of the assessee would have been tarnished and the managing agency would have been terminated. The expenditure incurred on the preservation of a profit earning asset of a business has always been held to be a deductible expenditure. The expenditure incurred by the assessce was neither gratuitous nor one incurred outside the trading activities of the assessee. [7 CEl\n\nUshers's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce, [1915] A. C. 433, British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton, [1926] A. C. 205, Mitchell v. B. W. Noble Ltd. [1927] 1 K. B. 719; referred to.\n\nCommissioner of lncomt! tax, Kera/a v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd .• [19641 7 S.C.R. 693, followed.\n\nThe fact that the firm has not claimed the expenditure as its own does not affect the right of the asmsee to claim deduction in respect of the amount in D question in its assessment proceedings. [7 H, 8 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1235 of !974.\n\n.Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated tbe 22nd March, 1973 of the Delhi High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 65 of 1968.\n\nS.C. Manchanda, J. Ramamurthy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai and Bishambar Lal for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave. is directed against the judgment and order dated March 22, 1973 of the Delhi High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 65 of 1968 made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi pursuant to an order made by the High Court under section 256{2) of the Indian Income-tax.\n\nAct, J 9(i I (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').\n\nH The facts of the case are these : The assessee (the respondent herein) is a public limited company. The assessee was a partner of a firm of managing agents known as M/s. Morari Lal Batra & Co.\n\n• - ii\n\n--·' }\n\nI •\n\nC.l.T. v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramiah, J.) 3\n\n(hereinafter referred to as 'the managing agency firm') which was managing another public limited company called M/s. Bharat Carbon & Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the managed company'). There were in all three partners in the managing agency firm, the two other partners being V .K. Batra and Lal Balwant Roy who held 50% share and 25% share respectively in that firm.\n\nThe assessee held the remaining 25% share. At the instance of V.K. Batra who held the major share in the managing agency firm, a l.arge sum was advanced by the managed company to a firm known as M/s. H.K. Sinha & Sons at Calcutta. When a demand for repayment was made, M/s. H.K. Sinha & Sons repudiat . ed the claim except to the extent of Rs. 11,409 and ultimately\n\nthe managed company suffered a loss to the extent of Rs. 1,90,092\n\non account of the said transaction. Consequently it became necessary for the managing agency firm to make good the said loss.\n\nThereupon the assessee and Lal Balwant Roy together undertook to pay to th_e managed company Rs. 95,092 out of which the share of the assessee was Rs. 47,500. The blance of the amount was undertaken to be paid by R.K. Batra, brother of V.K. Batra. The managing agency firm was also reconstituted with the assessee, Lal Balwant Roy and R.K. Batra as partners, R.K. Batra taking the place of V.K. Batra. During the previous year corresponding to the assessment year 1962 63, the &jfessee paid a sum of Rs. 9,500 to the managed company in partial discharge of its liability of Rs. 47,500 referred to above and claimed it by way of deduction in the assessment year in question in the assessment proceedings under the Act before the Income-tax Officer. The Income.tax\n\nOfficer disallowed the said claim on the ground that the assessee was not legally bound to make the payment and . hence it was not a business expense that could be allowed under the Act.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax before whom the order of assessment was questioned by the assessee affirmed the order of assessment on the above question on three grounds : (a) the amount in question was actually the toss of a firm which was no more 'in existence; (b) th'e'' loss in question had been borne by the assessee on personal considerations, .and (c) the loss was the loss <i'f the managing agency firm and not of the partners concerned and since the managing agency firm had not claimed that loss in its return, none of its partners could claim it.\n\nWhen the matter was taken up in appeal' before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the claim of the asscssee was ai:cepted.\n\nThe\n\n'.A\n\nTribunal held inter alia that even if there was a change in the constitution of the managing agency firm, the liability of the assessee as a partner had not ceased, the assessee being a company, the payment could not be treated as one made on personal considerations and that the assessee had made the payment in question purely on business considerations with the sole object of maintaining its business connection which was yielding profit.\n\nThe Tribunal was also of the view that there was no bar to the assessee claiming the loss in question in its own assessment even though it could have been first claimed by the firm and then in the hands of the partner.\n\nAn application under section 256(1) of the Act having been rejected by the Tribunal, the appellant moved the High Court under section 256(2) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court thereupon passed an order directing the Tribunal to refer the following question for its consideration :\n\nD \"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of\n\nthe case, the assessee was entitled to any allowance on account of the share of loss made good by it to the managed company ?\"\n\nAfter the reference was made to it, the High Court answered the question in the affirmative anti in favour of the assessee. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court by special leave, as stated above.\n\nThe first question which needs to be examined is whether the amount in question can be treated as an expenditure laid out or e)tpended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee which is admissible as a deduction under section 37 of the Act. It is no doubt true that the solution to a question of this nature sometimes is difficult to arrive at. But, however difficult the task \\ may be, a decision on that question should be given having regard to the decisions bearing on tile question and ordinary principles of coriunercial trading and of commercial expediency. The facts found in the present case are that the assessee was carrying nbusiness as a partner of the managil!g agency firm and it also had othe.r businesses. The managing agency agreement with the managed company was a profitable source of income and that the assessee had continuously earned income from that source. But on account of the .; negligence on the part of one of its partners, there arose a serious ' dispute which could have ordinarily resulted in a long drawn out\n\n-·\n\n-+ J\n\nII ..... }-\n\n...\n\nC.l.T. v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (v:enkataramiah, J.) 5\n\nlitigation between the managing agency firm and the managed company affecting seriously the reputation of the assessee ib. ·\n\naddition to any pecuniary loss which the assessee. as a partner was liable to bear on account of the joint and _several liability arising under the law of partnership. The settlement arrived at between the parties prevented effectively the hazards involved. in any litigation and also helped the assessee in continuing to enjoy the benefit of the managing agency which was a sound business proposition. It also assisted the assessee in retaining the business reputation unsullied. which it had built up over a numberof years. It is also material to notice here that it was not shown that t.he settlement was a gratuitous arrangeinent entered into by the assessee to benefit the defaulting partner exciusively even thoughihe might have been benefitted to some extent. It is no doubt true that it was voluntary in character but on the facts and in the circumstances of the case whether it would make any difference at all is the point for consideration.\n\nDealing with the question whether an expenditure incurred by a brewery in aid of their tenants of tied houses as a necessary incident of the profitable working of the brewery business was an admissible expenditure in the computation of the income-tax liability of the brewery, Lord Summer upholding the above claim observed\n\nin Usher's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce(') thus: E\n\n\"Where the whole and exclusive purpose of the expenditure is the purpose of the expender's trade, and the object which the expenditure serves is the same, the mere fact that to some extent the expenditure enures to a third party's benefit, say that of the publican, or that the brewer incidentally obtains some advantage, say in his character of landlord cannot in law defeat the effect of the finding as to the whole and exclusive purpose.\"\n\nIn British Insulated and Helsy Cables Ltd., v. Atherton(') Lord Cave ovserved . .\n\n\"It was made clear in the above cited cases of Usher's Wiltshire Brewery v. Bruce, [1915] A.C. ,433 and Smith v.\n\nIncorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and\n\n(1) (1915] A.C.433.\n\n(2) [1926] A.C. 205.\n\n,: .. ~·\n\n6 SUPREME COURT REPOl\\TS I I 982] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nWales, [1914] 3 K.B. 674 that a sum of money expended, not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expendiency, and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on the business, may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade.\"\n\nRowlatt, J. in Mitchell v. B. W. Noble Ltd.(1) held that the money spent on getting rid of a director and saving the company from scandal was deductible. Affirming the aboce view, the Court of Appeal (whose judgment appears at page 73 I) held that as the payment was not made to secure an actual. asset so as effectually to increase the. capital . of the company but was made in order\n\nto enable the director( to carry on the business of the company as they had done in the past unfettered by the presence of the retiring director, which might have had a bad effect on the credit of the company, it must be treated as the income and not as capital expenditure and was deductible as such for incometax purposes.\n\nThe true test of an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade or business is that. it is incurred by the assessee as incidental to his trade for the purpose of keeping the trade going and of making it pay and not in any other capacity than of a trader. In Commissioner of lncometax, Kera/av. Malayalam Plantation Ltd.(2) Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) summarised the legal position at page 705 thus :-\n\n\"The aforesaid discussion leads to the following result: The expression \"for the purpose oft~ business\" is wider in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning profits\". Its range is wide : it may take in not only the day to day running of a business but also the rationalization of its administration and modernization of its machinery; it may include measure for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive process.or assertion of hostile titles; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business.\n\n(l) [1927] l K.B. 719.\n\n(2) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 693.\n\n'\n\n~,·\n\n+ '\n\nc.1tr:v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramlah, J.) 7\n\nHowever wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it. The purpose shall be for the purpose of the business that is to say, the expenditure incurred shall be for carrying on of the business and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business.\"\n\nIn the instant case, the assessee incurred the expenditure in question to avoid any adverse effect on lits reputation, to protect the managing agency which was an income earning apparatus and . for retaining it with the reconstuted firm in : which the interest of the assessee was the same as before. It was likely that but for the expenditure, the fair name of the assessee would have been tranished or rendered suspicious and the managing agency would have been terminated. The expenditure incurred on the preservation of a profit earning asset of a business has always been held to be a deductible expenditure by courts. In the circumstances, it is c:lifficult\n\nto hold that the expenditure incurred by the assessee was either gratuitous or one incurred outside the trading activities . of the assessee. . The expenditure was, therefore, rightly held to be deductible under section 37.\n\nWe, therefore, reject the contention of the Revenue that the amount in question could not be claimed as a deduction under section 37 of the Act.\n\nThe next contention of the Department is that the payment in question should have been first assessed as a loss in the assessment proceedings of the firm and in the absence of any claim oiade in the course of such proceedings by the firm, it was not possible to allow its deduction in the assessment of the assessee.\n\nReliance is placed on sections 187 and 67 of the Act in support of this submission. It is seen that th~ expenditure in question had not been incurred by the firm.\n\nEven if the amount had been paid through the firm by the assessee, µ. would not be payment of the firm's funds.\n\nIn the accounts of the firm, there would be a credit and debit entry cancelling each other showing a receipt from the assessee and a payment to the managed company, not in any way affecting the capital structure of the firm.\n\nJf the amount had been paid by the assessee directly to the managed company which appears to be more probable then the expenditure is obviously one incurred by the assessee itself though on account of the firm, In any view of the matter, the fact that the firm has not claimed the\n\nexpenditure as its own does not affect the right of the assessee to claim deduction in respect of the amount in question in its -assess ment procemlings which it is legitimately entitled to do. It is not shown how in the peculiar circumstances of the case there is any statutory b1ir to the claim made by the assessee.\n\nB We ure satisfied that in the circumstances of the case the decision of the High Court does not call for interference. -\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramlah,", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 12, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 12, 1982\n\n[R.S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961-Sec_tion 37-Scopt of-Assessee, partner of a manag~ ing agency firm-Managed companY advanced loan to another /ir\"1 at tM instance ofapartnerof the'firm-Loan turned out to be a bad debt-Loss of managed\n\ncompany partly made good by assessee~Reimbursed amount, if could be claimed C as deduction under section 37,\n\nThe assessee was a partner of a firm of managing agents."}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 H, 8 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S.C. Manchanda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, J. Ramamurthy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, J. Ramamurthy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3911, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda, J. Ramamurthy and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and Bishambar Lal for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Bishambar Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and Bishambar Lal for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "section 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharat Carbon & Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramiah, J.) 3\n\n(hereinafter referred to as 'the managing agency firm') which was managing another public limited company called M/s. Bharat Carbon & Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the managed company')."}}, {"text": "V .K. Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4990, "end_char": 5001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were in all three partners in the managing agency firm, the two other partners being V .K. Batra and Lal Balwant Roy who held 50% share and 25% share respectively in that firm.", "canonical_name": "V .K. Batra"}}, {"text": "Lal Balwant Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were in all three partners in the managing agency firm, the two other partners being V .K. Batra and Lal Balwant Roy who held 50% share and 25% share respectively in that firm."}}, {"text": "V.K. Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5145, "end_char": 5155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of V.K. Batra who held the major share in the managing agency firm, a l.arge sum was advanced by the managed company to a firm known as M/s. H.K. Sinha & Sons at Calcutta.", "canonical_name": "V .K. Batra"}}, {"text": "H.K. Sinha & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5283, "end_char": 5300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of V.K. Batra who held the major share in the managing agency firm, a l.arge sum was advanced by the managed company to a firm known as M/s. H.K. Sinha & Sons at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of V.K. Batra who held the major share in the managing agency firm, a l.arge sum was advanced by the managed company to a firm known as M/s. H.K. Sinha & Sons at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "R.K. Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blance of the amount was undertaken to be paid by R.K. Batra, brother of V.K. Batra.", "canonical_name": "V .K. Batra"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7227, "end_char": 7256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter was taken up in appeal' before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the claim of the asscssee was ai:cepted."}}, {"text": "section 256(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 256(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "enkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (v:enkataramiah, J.) 5\n\nlitigation between the managing agency firm and the managed company affecting seriously the reputation of the assessee ib. ·", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12445, "end_char": 12452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowlatt, J. in Mitchell v. B. W. Noble Ltd.(1) held that the money spent on getting rid of a director and saving the company from scandal was deductible."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13506, "end_char": 13515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malayalam Plantation Ltd.(2) Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) summarised the legal position at page 705 thus :-\n\n\"The aforesaid discussion leads to the following result: The expression \"for the purpose oft~ business\" is wider in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning profits\"."}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C.R. 693", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14355, "end_char": 14374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramlah,", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14399, "end_char": 14437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'\n\n~,·\n\n+ '\n\nc.1tr:v. DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. (Venkataramlah, J.) 7\n\nHowever wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it.", "canonical_name": "DELHI SAFE DEPOSIT co. 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{"document_id": "1982_3_201_206_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "SMT. KALLOO & ORS.\n\nDHAKADBVI & ORS .\n\nFebruary 9, 1982\n\n[B.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nCode of Civil Procedure 1908 s. 47 and Or. XX!.\n\nLandlord.and Tenant-Decree for p0Jse1sion obtained by landlord execution against tenant-Matter compromised-Tenant to continue in portion of property and pay damages for use and occupation without default-Breach by tenant-Execution petition by landlord-Whether maintainable._ Test-Whether the compromise extin~\n\nguishes decrees and creates fresh /ecue or provides mere mode for discharge of decree.\n\nThe predecessor of the respondents filed a suit for eviction of the predecessor of the appellants from a shop and obtained a decree on March 21, 1960 for eviction. The decree-ho Ider filed an application for the execution of the decree on March 22, 1966 and. during the pendency of these proceedings, a compromise was entered into between the parties, and the Executing Court passed an order dated March 21, 1968 in terms of the compromise. The compromise provided for the judgment-debtor to give vacant possession of the remaining half of the shop to the decree-holder by December '31, 1972 and to pay damages for use and / occupation by the 5th of every month to the decree-holder at Rs. 110/- per month, and that on six months damages being due the decree-holder will be entitled to have the shop vacated.\n\nThe decree-holder filed an execution petition for. recovery of possession on Novell\\ber 25, 1975 alleging that the judgment debtor had not paid damages at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month from July 1, 1975. The judgment-debtor contested the execution proceedings contending that the terms of compromise created a fresh lease in favour of the judgment-debtor in resp.:ct of the remaining half of the shop, and that the decree was therefore not executable. The Executing Court upheld the objection holding that the compromise dated March 21, 1968 amounted to a fresh lease.\n\nOn appeal, the District Judge, set side the order of the Executing Court, . but in Second Appeal, the High Court upheld the order of the District Judge, and dismissed the appeal.\n\nIn tho appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant/ judgment-debtor, that the compromise dated March 21, 1968 created a fresh lease, in favour of the judgment-debtor in respect of the undelivered half of th_e shop and the. decree-holder's remedy was by way of .a suit for recOvery of possession.\n\n202 SUPREME cotJllt R~PORTS (19821 3 s.t.ll.\n\nDismissing t.he appeal,\n\nHELD : When a compromise takes place in the course of execution of a decrCe for eviction the compromise may extinguish the deCree and create a fresh iease, or the compromise may provide a mere mode for the discharge of the decree. What actually takes place depends upon the intention of the parties to the compromise, and the intention has to be gathered from the terms of the compromise and the surrounding circumstances including the order recorded by the Court on the basis of the compromise. [205 C-D]\n\nIn the instant case para l of the compromise petition and the order of the Executing Court recording the compromise disclose the intention of the parties.\n\nThe judgment-debtor had already vacated \"half of the shop and given its possession\" and time was granted till December 31, 1972 for vacating and delivering possession of the other half of the shop as the judgment-debtor wanted time till then Jest bis busiriess \"will be ruined by vacating the shop in hurry.'' This shows that the intention of the parties was nOt to create a fresh lease in respect of the half of the shop in possession of the judgmeOt-debtor but to help him to find out alternative accommodation and time for vacating was given till December 31,\n\n1972. Further, the term 'damages', and not 'rents' is used in the compromise petition as well as the order of tbe Executing Court. The intention of the parties clearly was not to extinguish the decree for eviction but to create a mode of its full discharge. [205 E-H)\n\nKonchada Ramamurthy Subudhi & Anr. v. Gopinath Naik, [1968] 2 SCR 559, referred to.\n\nE CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2612 of\n\n1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th January, 1981 of the Madhya Pradesh High court (Jabalpur Bench) in M.P. No. 87 of 1980.\n\nAm/an Ghosh or the Appellants.\n\nSobhagmal Jain and S.K. Jain for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBAHARUL ISLAM, J. This appeal by special leave is by the judgment-debtors. The material facts which are not in dispute may be stated thus :\n\n2. The predecessor of the respondents (hereinafter referred • to as 'the decree-holder') filed a suit for eviction of the predecessor bf ihe appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'the judgment-debtor') and obtained a decree on 21.3.1960, inter alia, for eviction from a\n\n' .\n\nKALLOO v. DllAKADEVI (/Jaharal Islam, J.) 203\n\nshop. The decree-holder filed a petition for execution of the decree for eviction in the executing court on 3.1.1961.\n\nThe petition was dismissed on 20.1.1961.\n\nA fresh petition for execution was filed on 19.1.1965. It was also dismissed on 20.3.1965.\n\nThe decreeholder again filed an application for execution of the decree on 22.6.1966.\n\nDuring the pendency of this execution proceeding, the parties filed a compromise petition on 31.3.1968.\n\nThe terms of the compromise on the interpretation of which the result of this appeal depends were as follows :\n\n(Material portions only) :\n\n\"In the above case, a compromise has taken place between the parties as follows :\n\n(I) That for the present the judgmentdebtor is not getting a shop. His established business will be ruined by .vacating the shop in hurry.\n\nTherefore, the judgmentdebtor wants time till '3L12.1972 from the decree n holder for vacating half the shop in his possession. So\n\nthe judgment-debtor will vacate the shop and give possession thereof to the decree holder by 31.12. 1972.\n\nHe has vacated half the shop and given its possession.\n\n(2) That during this period the judgment-debtor shall pay damages to the decree-holder for use of the shop @ I IO/- per month.\n\n(3) That the damages shall be paid upto the 5th of every month.\n\nIn the event of non-payment of damages for any six months, the decree-holder shall. be entitled to get the shop immediately vacated, by filing execution, from the possession of th~ judgment-debtor, without any objection as regards limitation.\n\n• E\n\nJi'\n\n(4) The decree-holder wants. to have new shutters put up after removing the present shutters in the front portion of the shop. The judgment-debtor will not be entitled G to object to this.\n\nHe will help in the putting of girders and he will vacate the portion.\n\nIf he will demur to it, the decree-bolder can have the shop vacated, without any objection as regards the above limitation.\n\n204 SUPREME COUllT iIBMkTS [1982J j s.C.R.\n\nSo, the aforesaid compromise be accepted and kept on record.\"\n\n3. It is also not in dispute that at the time of the compromise, half of the shop had _been vacated and its possession delivered to the decree-holder as stated in the compromise petition. In order to appreciate the intention of the parties to the compromise, it is also necessary to refer to the order dated 21.3 .1968 recorded. by the execution court on the basis of the compromise. The material para of the order is para 3 and it is in the following terms :\n\n\"The judgment-debtor 'to give vacant possession of the shop to the decree-holder by 31.12.72 according to the compromise and he will pay damages for use and occupation by the 5th of every month to the decree-holder according to the compromise @ Rs. 110/· per month. On six months' damages being due, the decree-holder will be entitled to have the shop vacated.\n\nThe decree-holder will provide shutters in the front portion.\n\nThe judgment debtor will not object to them.\n\nThe case is decided in terms of the com promise.\n\nThe compromise be recorded.\"\n\n4. On 25.11.1975, the decree-holder filed an execution petition for recovery of possession of the portion of shop in possession of the judgment-debtor, alleging that the judgment-debtor had not paid damages at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month from 1.7.1975.\n\nNotice of the execution petition was issued to the judgment-debtor who appeared and raised several objections to the execution proceedings.\n\nBut we are concerned in _this appeal only with one wl; lich was that in terms of the compromise, a fresh lease was created in favour of the judgment-debtor in respect of the remaining half of the shop.\n\nIt was therefore submitted that the decree was not executable. The Executing Court upheld the objection ho)ding that the compromise dated 21.3.1968 amounted to a fresh lease.\n\nAn appeal was taken to the Court of the District Judge who set aside the order of the Executing Court. In a second appeal, the High Court upheld the order of the District Judge, and dismissed the appeal. It is against this order of the High Court is. this appeal by special leave.\n\n./ ~\n\n' /_\n\n-.. '\n\nKALLOO v. DHAKADEVI (Baharul Islam, J.) 205\n\n5. The only point urged before us by Shri Amlan Ghosh, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor was that the compromise dated 21.3.1968 created a fresh lease in favour of the judgmentdebtor in respect of the undelivered half of the shop, and the decreeholder's remedy was by a suit for recovery of its possession.\n\nWhen a compromise petition is filed in an execution proceeding, and a contention is raised by the judgment-debtor on a subsequent execution being started by the decree-holder that the compromise bas given rise to a fresh contract between the parties and that the decree sought to be executed is not executable, what is\n\nto be seen is whether the decree has been extinguished as a result C of the compromise and a fresh contract has emerged. When a compromise takes place in the course of execution of a decree-for eviction, the compromise may extinguish the decree and create a fresh lease, or the compromise may provide a mere mode for the discharge of the decree. What actually takes place depends on the intention of the parties to the compromise.\n\nAnd the intention has\n\nD , to be gathered from the terms of the compromise and the surrounding circumstances including the order recorded by the Court on the basis of the compromise.\n\n7. In the instant case, paragraph I of the compromise petition E quoted above and the order of the . Executing Court recording the compromise are important and disclose the intention of the parties.\n\nParagraph I of the compromise petition shows that the judgmentdebtor had already \"vacated half of the shop and given its possession\" and time was granted till 31.12.1972 for vacating and delivering possession f the other half of the shop as the judgment-debtor F wanted time till then lest his business \"will be ruined by vacating the shop in hurry\".\n\nThis clearly shows that the intention of the parties was not to create a fresh lease in respect of the half of the shop in possession of the judgment-debtor, but to help the judgment: debtor find out, not in a hurry; alternative accommodation for his shop so that his established business waq not 'ruined' and time for G vacating the half of the room was given till 31.12.1972.\n\nAnd this was also how the compromise petition waq understood by the Executing Court when it recorded in para 3 of its order : \"The judgment-debtor to give vacant possesssion of the shop to the decreeholder by 31.12.1972 according to thPcompromise-............ \". The H intention of the parties clearly was not to extinguish the decree for .eviction but to create a mode of it~ f11ll dischar¥e\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe above interpretation gets support from the use of the term 'damages', and not 'rents', in the compromise petiiion as well as the order of the Executing Court. The view we have taken gets support also from a decision of this Court reported. in [1968] 2 SCR 559.(') In that case, the appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respon<)ent from the appellant's house.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the trial court In appeal compromise was entered into between the parties and the decree was passed in terms of the compromise.\n\nThe compromise provided for the responden <'s continuation of possession of the house for five years, but it enabled the appellant to execute the decree by evicting the respondent, if the latter failed to pay rent for three consecutive months.\n\nWhen the appellant sought to evict the respondent, the latter claimed protection from eviction on the ground that the compromise decree created a lease.\n\nIt was held by this Court that the facts that the appellant bad filed a suit for eviction of the respondent and the compromise decree enabled him to execute the decree by evicting the respondent, showed that the intention of the parties, which was the decisive test, was not to enter into a relationship of landlord and tenant.\n\n9- This appeal\n\n0has no merit and is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(!) Kanchada Ramamurth1 Subudhl & Ors. v. Goplnath Naik.\n\nI --- -1 _ _,. • )", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "KALLOO & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALLOO & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DHAKADBVI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHAKADEVI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 9, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 9, 1982\n\n[B.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.J\n\nCode of Civil Procedure 1908 s. 47 and Or."}}, {"text": "B.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAHARUL ISLAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908"}}, {"text": "March 21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 685, "end_char": 699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The predecessor of the respondents filed a suit for eviction of the predecessor of the appellants from a shop and obtained a decree on March 21, 1960 for eviction."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-ho Ider filed an application for the execution of the decree on March 22, 1966 and."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "during the pendency of these proceedings, a compromise was entered into between the parties, and the Executing Court passed an order dated March 21, 1968 in terms of the compromise."}}, {"text": "Novell\\ber 25, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1437, "end_char": 1456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "recovery of possession on Novell\\ber 25, 1975 alleging that the judgment debtor had not paid damages at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1552, "end_char": 1564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "110/- per month from July 1, 1975."}}, {"text": "December 31,\n\n1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This shows that the intention of the parties was nOt to create a fresh lease in respect of the half of the shop in possession of the judgmeOt-debtor but to help him to find out alternative accommodation and time for vacating was given till December 31,\n\n1972."}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 559", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Am/an Ghosh or the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhagmal Jain and S.K. Jain for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhagmal Jain and S.K. Jain for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COUllT iIBMkTS [1982J j s.C.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6836, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "204 SUPREME COUllT iIBMkTS [1982J j s.C.R.\n\nSo, the aforesaid compromise be accepted and kept on record.\""}}, {"text": "21.3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to appreciate the intention of the parties to the compromise, it is also necessary to refer to the order dated 21.3 .1968 recorded."}}, {"text": ".1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to appreciate the intention of the parties to the compromise, it is also necessary to refer to the order dated 21.3 .1968 recorded."}}, {"text": "31.12.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material para of the order is para 3 and it is in the following terms :\n\n\"The judgment-debtor 'to give vacant possession of the shop to the decree-holder by 31.12.72 according to the compromise and he will pay damages for use and occupation by the 5th of every month to the decree-holder according to the compromise @ Rs."}}, {"text": "25.11.1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7957, "end_char": 7967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25.11.1975, the decree-holder filed an execution petition for recovery of possession of the portion of shop in possession of the judgment-debtor, alleging that the judgment-debtor had not paid damages at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "1.7.1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8198, "end_char": 8206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "110/- per month from 1.7.1975."}}, {"text": "21.3.1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8691, "end_char": 8700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Executing Court upheld the objection ho)ding that the compromise dated 21.3.1968 amounted to a fresh lease."}}, {"text": "Amlan Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9117, "end_char": 9128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only point urged before us by Shri Amlan Ghosh, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor was that the compromise dated 21.3.1968 created a fresh lease in favour of the judgmentdebtor in respect of the undelivered half of the shop, and the decreeholder's remedy was by a suit for recovery of its possession."}}, {"text": "31.12.1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph I of the compromise petition shows that the judgmentdebtor had already \"vacated half of the shop and given its possession\" and time was granted till 31.12.1972 for vacating and delivering possession f the other half of the shop as the judgment-debtor F wanted time till then lest his business \"will be ruined by vacating the shop in hurry\"."}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 559", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11936, "end_char": 11952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_207_217_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "-· \\\n\nRAM PY ARE CHAUDHARY & ANR.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.\n\nPebruary II, 1982\n\n[0.A. DBSAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965-S. 29(2} read with r. 445(1)-Election of membtrs-Po/I held but declaration of result withheld by injunclion-Term of office fixed under statute-How reckoned-Power to remove elected representatives- Construction of.\n\nThe management of a cooperative society registered under the U.P.\n\nCooperative Societies Act vests in a committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. The term of elected members of a committee, accordiiig to s. 29(2) read with r. 445(1) is three 'Cooperative years' including the cooperative year in which they are elected. 'Cooperative year' means the year commencing on the 1st day of July and ending on the 30th day of June n.Xt following. Fresh members are to be elected before the expiry of the term of existing elected members failing which an administrator ca.n be appointed by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies to manage the affairs of the cooperative society till the reconstitution of the committee.\n\nIn this case the term of the cooperative society in question was drawing to a close and the poll to elect frosh members w.S held on September 11, 1978.\n\nThe result of the poll could not be declared immediately owing to an injunction issued by a court in a suit filed by a voter whose name bad not appeared in the electoral roil. The result was, however, declared ultimatelY on January 28, 1980, and appellant No. 1 was elected Chairman of the committee on January 29, 1980.\n\nBy an order dated July 1, 1981, made under s. 29(4) (b), the Deputy Registrar.\n\nCooperative Societies. appointed an administrator to manage the affairs of the society on the ground that the term of members of.the Committee had expired on June 30, 1981.\n\nThe appellants challenged the validity of the order under Art. 226.\n\nThe High Court upheld the impugned order and dismmissed the petition on the ground that once the poll was held and even though the result of the election was not announed, the term would commence from the date of the poll.\n\nThe ahppellant 1 ssuhb°:'ittedbeethatdeve 1 n thdogh hthefipotlltas heJJd on s 2 ep 8 tem 19 b 8 e 0 r\n\nG .\n\nII, 1978, t e resu t avi.g n ec are •Ort e rs 1me on anuary , , the term of three cooperative years of the elected members wou1d expire on June 30, 1982.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. (a) Election means the process of being elected and the term of office is of elected members.\n\nThe term of office as member cannot .begin to run unless the statu1 9f bein' a tl!eoir i! acquired o~ being declared electe~.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOP.TS [1982) 3 s.c.ll.\n\nA The result of the election having been declared on January 28, 1980, the term nf\n\n members commenced from the cooperative year beginning on July l, 1979 and ending with June 30, 1980 and since their term was three cooperative years including the year of election, it would expire on June 30, 1982. The order appointing the admin_istrator was, therefore illegal.\n\n[213 H, 214 H, 215 A, 216 F-G)\n\n(b) The provision of s. 29(4) (b) was not attracted as the process of election had begun with the holding of the poll before the expiry of the term and, once the poll was held as a part of the programme of election, it had to progress to the statutory end of declaration of result. [216 B-E)\n\n2. The various stages of election were clearly demarcated in the Rules.\n\nMere holding of poll, which means recording of votes, without anything more would be inconsequential. . It is the counting of votes and the consequent declaration of result which. would determine who has become eligible fo{ office by the democratic process.\n\nNo election process can be said to be complete uDless the votes are recorded and counted and the result of the election declared and publicised. [212 G-H, 213 E-G]\n\n3. The election process is sacrosanct and members elected must be permitted to discharge their functions as chosen representatives of the.-'electorate for the statutori!Y prescribed terrri and therefore the plea that the administrator should not be disturbed as only four months would remain for the expiry of the term cannot be countenanced.\n\nThe drastic power of removing elected representatives before the eXpiry of their term must receive strict and narrow interpretation. (217 A-CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 478 of 1982\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.\n\nWrit No. 7869 of 1981.\n\nS.N. Singh for the .Appellants.\n\nG.N. Dikshit and Shoba Dikshit for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The District Co-operative Federation (Zila Sahakari Federation), Basti ('Federation' for short) is a co-operative society\n\nG registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 ('Act' for short).\n\nAs provided by section 29 of the Act, the management of the Federation vests in a committee designated as Committee of Management.\n\nThe committee consists of I 0 elected members\n\nH and I nominated member.\n\nAs the term of the Committee was drawing to a close, programme for election of the new committee of management was anaounced as required by Part VI of the U.P.\n\nCo-operative Societies Rules, 1968 ('Rules' for short). Pursuant to\n\nRAM PYARE v. u.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 209\n\nthis programme poll was held on September 11, 1978. It is not made clear to us when the counting of the votes commenced,. though rule 444(1) provides that counting of the votes will take place immediately after the close of the poll except when postponed in a given set of circumstances. Sub-rule (4) of rule 444 provides that Election Officer shall announce the result of election as soon as the counting is completed indicating the number of votes secured by each candidjlte. It appears that one Shri Kashi Nath whose name did not appear in the voter's listand who, on account of the omission, could not contest the election filed Civil Suit No. 29.1 of 1978 in the Court of Munsif, Basti on September 9, 1978 and asked for and obtained ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the. defendants in foe suit from conducting the election of Board of Directors (Committee of Management), President, Vice-President\n\nand the del'egates of District Co-operative Federation, Basti and/or announcing the result of election.\n\nDefendants Nos. 1 to 4 ii• the suit appeared and contested the application for interim injunction .\n\nThe learned Munsif after hearing both sides confirmed the injunction in the following terms :\n\n\"6-C. is allowed and the defendants No. 1 to 4 are directed not to conduct the election and not to declare the result, if any, of Board of Directors of District Co.operative\n\nFederation, Basti, till disposal of the suit\".\n\nThis order was made on September 21, 1978. It appears that by the time the suit was filed and ex parte ad interim injunction obtained, the poll was already held, but by the injunction, the defendants in the suit were prohibited from declaring the result and accordingly the result was not declared.\n\nIt now appears that the result was declared on January 28, 1980, and the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman took place on January 29, 1980.\n\nAppellant No. 1 was elected as Chairman. The term of the members of the Committee of Management as provided by rule 445 as amended on June 30, 1981, is three co-operative years including the year of election. The Ragistrar of Co-operative Societies pursuant to the amended rule 445 issued a teleprinter message to various authorities indicating that the term of the committee of management has expired and administrator sho1,1ld be appointed as provided by subsection (4) (b) of section 29 of the Act.\n\nPursuant to this teleprinter message, the Deputy Registrar; Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur made an order on July !, 1981, that the term of the members of the committee of management of the Federation bs expired on June\n\n30, 1981, and proceeded to appoint an administrator.\n\nThe appellants questioned the validity and legality of the order of the Deputy Registrar in Writ Petition No. 7869 of 1981 filed in the Hi&h Court of Judicature at Allahabad.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that even though under rule 445 the term of the office of the elected members of the committee of management of co-operative sociely is three co-operative years including the co-operative year of their election, once the poll is held and even though the result of the election is not announced, the term would commence from the date of the poll and therefore the decision of the Deputy Registrar that the term expired on June 30, 1981, is correct.\n\nThe High Court accordingly dismissed the writ petition.\n\nHence this appeal by special leave limited to one point only, namely, the commencement and completion of the term of office of the members of the committee of management of the sec., nd appellant.\n\nSection 29(1) provides that the management of every cooperative society shall vest in a committee of management constituted in accordance with the Act, the rules and the bye-laws.\n\nSub-section\n\n(2) provides that the term of the elected members of the committee of management shall be such as may be provided in the rules or the bye-laws of the society.\n\nRule 445(1) provides that exceot as otherwise provided in rules 406, 433, 434 and 435 the term of the office of the elected members of the committee of management of a cooperative society shall be three co-operative years including the co-operative year of their election.\n\nExplanation appended to this Rule clarifies how the period of three co-operative years is to be computed. In substance the explanation clarifies that :\n\n\"For the purpose of determination on the term of a elected member the co-operative year during which the elections are held shall count as full year irrespective of the period left after such election in that co-operative year\".\n\nThere is a proviso to this explanation which is immaterial.\n\nThe G expression 'co, operative year' is defined in seciion 2(i) of the Act to mean the year commencing on the l st day of July and ending on the 30th day of June next following.\n\nPart VJ of the Rules sets out procedure for holding the election.\n\nElection of members of committee of management of a co-operative society has to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Act and rules l!l!!l lh~ J?istrit M aistr11te of the district in which the\n\n-./-\n\nRAM PYARB v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 211\n\nheadquarter of the society is situated, shall' take steps to organise the election under the 'superintendence, direction and control of the Registrar [see rule 439(1)]. Sub-rule (I) of rule 439 provides that the election In a co-operative society or societies or a class or classes of co-operative societies shall be held on such due date or dates as the Registrar may by order fix and the District Magistrate concerned shall on such dates being so fixed appoint by order one or more Election Officers or different Election Officers for different class or classes of society or for different areas for this purpose. Sub-rule (3) provides that the Election Officer shall perform all such functions as are enjoined upon him by the Rules or as may be incidental to or necessary for the discharge of his duties.\n\nRule 444 provides that the counting of votes will take place immediately after the closing of the poll and in case it is not possible to count votes immediately after the close of the poll, the ballot boxes shall be sealed by tlie Election Officer and kept in the safe custody in the nearest police station. Sub-rule (4) of rule 444 provides that the Election Officer shall announce the result of election as soon as the counting is completed indicating the number of votes secured by each candidate.\n\nSub-rule (6) proxides that the Election Officer shall display a list of elected candidates on the notice board of the society and also at such public places as he lllay deem fit.\n\nSub-rule (7) provides that a copy of the iist prepared under sub-rule (6) shall be sent to the Dirtrict Assistant Registrar concerned or the offic.er authorised under sub-rule (2) of rule 440 and also to .Secretary /Managing Director of the Society concerned.\n\nHaving noticed the conspectus of the provisions bearing on the topic 'election to a co-operative society', the principal point canvassed in this petition may be examined. According to the appellant even though the poll was held on September 11, 1978, the result, as required by rule 444(4), was declared for the first time on January 28, J980, the term of three co-operative years of the elected members of the co-operative society will expire on June 30, 1982.\n\nOn the other hand, according to the respondents, as the poll was held on September 11, 1978, the term of three co-operative years including the co-operative year of the election has expired on 30th June, 1981 and therefore the order appointing the administrator was legal and valid.\n\nThe question that emerges on riyal contentions is as to from what date the term of the elted memb~~~ f ti\\~ C(ommitt~~ <if\n\nmanagement shall commence.\n\nThe period of three vears as ampli fied by the Explanation to rule 445(1) is to bereckoned not from the date of the election but the term shall be. three co-operative years including the co-operative year of .the election.\n\nThe co-operative year, as pointed out earlier, commences on July 1 and ends on June\n\n30 of the next succeeding year. Therefore, if the term commences from the date of poll which happened to be September 11, 1978, the whole of co-operative year commencing from July 1, 1978 would have to be. taken into reckoning for computing the term of three years and, therefore, three years would expire on June 30, 1981.\n\nThe question, however, is whether mere holding of the poll cons titutes election of the members of committee of management or the result being declared after the counting has been completed and notified in the manner prescribed by sub-rules (6) and (7) of ruie 444 would provide the starting point for a terminus quo for the term of office to commence.\n\nIf the term was to commence on the declaration of the result of election, in this case admittedly the result was declared on January 28, 1980, that date would fall within D the co-operative year from July l, 1979 to June 30, 1980, and the term of three co-operative years would expire on June 30, 1982.\n\nAt one stage, Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the respondents stated that there is no stage like declaration of result when the election of the members of the committee of management of a co-operative society is held .. Sub-rule (4) of rule 444 clearly indi- . cates to the contrary and it casts an obligation on the Election\n\nOfficer to announce the resuli of election as soon as the counting is complete and he is also under a duty to indicate the number of votes secured by each candidate. His duty does not end there.\n\nHe bas to display a list of elected candidates on the notice board of the society and also at such public places as he may dem fit.\n\nHe is also under an obligation to send a copy of the list prepared under\n\nsub-n1le (6) to the District Assistant Registrar concerned.\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that there is nothing like a stage of announcement of the result of election when election is held for electing members of the committee of management of a co-operative society.\n\nIn fact, the various stages of election are clearly demarcated in the rules.\n\nIf the poll has become necessary and is held the unavoidable and inescapable stage. of counting of votes and the next stage of announcement of result and subsequently publicising the result are part and parcel and necessary adjuncts of condm; ting poll. If the rules provide for all the three stages it is difficult to accept the submission that by merely\n\n; .. .._ y-·\n\n.... /--\n\n..;../\n\n---·~\n\nRAM PYARE v. U.P. STA1E (Desai, J.) id\n\nholding of the poll, the process of election can be said to have been completed and the term of members who had contested would commence from the time of holding the election. That is what the High Court holds. Says the High Court :\n\n\"that the elections since were held o_n 11 :9.78, mere act of not declaring the result on account of any order issued by \\he Court or a stay order grauted by it which was subsequently vacated could not be taken as ifthe term of. the committee of the management has not commenced\" .\n\n- The High Court, at another stage, _observed that the postponement of declaration of the result did not justify the holding of the view that elections had not been held in September 1978.\n\nTaken to the logical end, the judgment of the High Court would imply that elected and non-elected members both who participated in the poll would have their term as members commence since the poll is held.\n\nCoul_d this be the intendment ·.of rule 445(1)?\n\nThis approach betrays lack of knowledge of the democratic process of election.\n\nWhen the number of the members to be elected to the committee of management is fixed and candidates in excess of the fixed number are desirous of seeking office, the democratic process postulates holding of elections.\n\nMere holding of poll which means recording of votes without anything more would be inconsequential. It is the counting of votes and the.consequent declaration of.result showing who amongst the contesting candidates has secured highest number_ of votes or large number of votes which would determine who has become eligible for office by the democratic process. _ Therefore, recording of votes is a preliminary stage, te counting of votes and declaration of result are integral and inseparable part of process of holding and completing the process of election.\n\nNo election process can be said to be complete unless the votes are recorded, they are counted and_ those who have secured highest number of votes are declared elected and the result is publicised, as required by the relevant provision.\n\nRule_ 445(1) provides that the term of office of the elected members of a committee of management of a co-operative society shall be three co-operative years including the co-operative year of their election.\n\nThis provision indicates the terminus quo for commencement of the term, viz., that the term of office of the elected members would bi three co-operative years including the year of their election. Election means process of being electedand the term of office is of the elected member, not of contesting member. 1When candidates offer themselves for election, they are\n\ncalled candidates and unless elected the term of such candidates would not commence. Their term ould commence when elected.\n\nThe expression 'year of their election' even on literal and gram matic:al construction would mean the year in which the member concerned whose term is in dispute, is declared elected meaning thereby he became eligible for office and entitled to e•ter office as a member.\n\nApart from literal construction, the completed process of election comprehends nomination, recording of votes, counting of votes and declaration of result and publicising and notifying the . result.\n\nThere ends the process of election.\n\nRecording of votes is a mere stage in the process of election.\n\nEven when votes are recorded, the candidates contesting the poll do not acquire the status of members of committee of management.\n\nThat status is acquired on being declared elected.\n\nAnd unless that status is acquired the term of office as member cannot begin to run.\n\nTherefore, the expression 'co-operative year of their election year', upon trlie construction can only mean the year in which the member is declared elected and not the year in which he contested the poll.\n\nTurning to the facts of this case, undoubtedly the poll was held on September 11, 1978, but in view of the injunction granted by the learned Munsif the respondents were restrained from declaring\n\nth~ result.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respon dents in the High Court, the fact. that the result was declared on January 28, 1980, is admitted. The relevant portion teads as under;\n\n\"4. That the election of the committee of management of the Federation was held on 11.9. 78 and not on 28.1.80 as alleged in the writ petition. In fact, the election was actually' held on 11.9.78, but the declaration of the result of election stayed in pursuance of the order of learned Munsif, Basti, in Suit No. 29 J of 1978 (Kashi Nath Tripathi v. D.M., Basti).\n\nConsequent upon the order of the learned Munsif, the election officer also passed similar order on 11.9.78 on which date the election was held. Th-e result was subsequently declared on 28.1.80\".\n\nIt is thus an admitted position that even though the poll was held on September II, 1978, on account of the injunction granted by the Court, the result was declared on January 28, 1980.\n\nOn the very next day, i.e. January 29, 1980, first appellant was elected as Chairman of the Federation.\n\nOnce it is admitted that the result was declared on January 28, 1980, the term of the members of the committee of the management would commence fron1 the co-\n\n~ ,·.~\n\n!!.AM PYARll v. ti.P. STATE (Desai, J.)\n\n~IS\n\noperative year July 1, 1979, ending with June 30, 1980, and including this year the term would be of ihree years. Therefore, obviousiy the term would expire on June 30, 1982.\n\nMr. Dixit; however, urged that where for any reason whatsoever, election of the elected members of the committee of management has not taken place or could not take place before the expiry. of the term of elected members, the committee of management shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws of the society, cease to exist on the expiry of the said term. In support of this submission he relied upon sub-section\n\n(4) (a) and (b) of section 29. They may be extracted :\n\nc 'y \"29. Committee of management :\n\n--. \\\n\n\\ -·\n\nx x x\n\n(4) (a) . Where, for any reason whatsoever the election of the elected members of the committee of management has not taken place or could not take place before. expiry of the term of elected members, the committee of. management shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or the rules, or the bye-laws of the Society, cease to exist on the expiry of such term.\n\n(b) On or as soon as may be after the expiry of such ·\n\nterm, the Registrar shall appoint an Administrator for the management of the affairs of the society until the reconstitution of the Committee of Management in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws of the society, and the Registrar shall have power to change the Administrator from time to time :\n\n• Provided that so long as no Administrator is appointed under this sub-section, the Secretary\n\nor the Managing Director, as the case may be, of G the society shall be in chrge. only of the current duties of the committee of management.\n\nExplanation-Where results of the election of members of the Committee of Management have not been or could not H be declared, for any reason whatsoever, before the expiry of the term of the elected members of the outgoing ommiloo\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.il..\n\nA tee, it shall be deemed that the election of the elected members of the committee has not taken place within the meaning of this su_b-section\".\n\nSub-section 4(a) would. not be attracted at all in the facts of this case because when the terrn of the members of the former committee of management expired, poll was held on September 11, 1978.\n\nOnce poll was held as a part of the programme of the election it must progress to the statutory end of declaration of result.\n\nUnless the term begins to run it cannot come to an end.\n\nSub-section (4)\n\n(a) caters to a situation where the term of the members of a committee of management bas begun and the election could not be held before the expiry of the term then, notwithstanding that no election has been held the term of the member~ of the former committee would come to an end and the committee of management would cease to exist on expiry of said term.\n\nSub-section (4) (b) would only by be attracted if the term:expires as contemplated by subsection (4) (a). If the term expires and the old managing committee whose term has expired ceases to exist and the election has not been held or could not be held to elect a new committee of management then in the interregnum the Registrar has the power to appoint an administrator for the management of the affairs of the society.\n\nIn the fact situation as we have in the present case, sub-section (4) (a) and (b) are not attracted and, therefore, the provision therein contained would ncit assist the respondent in any manner.\n\nAs the term of the committee of management would commence from the co-operative year fromJuly ; 1979 to June 1980, the same would expire on June 30, 1982. On this reckoning the Registrar could not have ismed teleprinter message declaring that the term bas come to an end on June 30, 1981.\n\nIf the term had not expired, the administrator could not he appointed as contemplated by subsection (4) (b) of section 29. Therefore, the order of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division dated July l, 1981, appointing administrator is without jurisdictioi; i and is clearly illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside.\n\nMr. Dixit lastly urged that even on the view this Court would take, the term of the committee .of management would expire on June 30, J 982, and therefore, hardly a period of four months remains and the Court should not, therefore, disturb the administrator.\n\nThis submission does not commend to us because the Government by executive fiat cannot reduce the term of office statutorily fixed.\n\nFurther, the elections to panchayats, co-operative societies and\n\n1 ' '\n\n-· '\n\nRAM PYAIUJ'V. u.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 217\n\nsmaller local bodies provide an apotheosis or a training ground for success of our larger experiment of parliamentary democracy.\n\nElection process is sacrosanct, Members elected must be permitted te discharge their functions as chosen representatives of the electorate\n\nfor the statutory terms.\n\nSuch a drastic power of removing elected representatives before the expiry of term and substituting non-elected persons must receive strict and narrow interpretation at the hands of the courts.\n\nIf allowed to foster it would be the negation of the democratic process and would engulf the whole fabric of democratic institutions which we are trying to build up. Therefore, even though the term would expire roughly after four months, we would be perfectly justified in removing the administrator and re-instating the elected representatives. ·\n\nAccordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued quashing the impugned order dated July I, 1981, of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur.\n\nIt is declared that the term of the committee of management of District Co-operative Federation Limited, Basti, and the !st appel !ant-Chairman has not expired and the elected member§ continue to occupy the office.\n\nThe administrator is hereby directed to hand over the charge forthwith to the Chairman of the Committee of Management. There will be no order as to costs. ·\n\nH.L.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "RAM PY ARE CHAUDHARY & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM PYARE CHAUDHARY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 29(2} read with r. 445(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965", "statute": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Societies Act vests in a committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules", "statute": "Cooperative Societies Act vests in a committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "30th day of June n.Xt following", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 846, "end_char": 877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cooperative year' means the year commencing on the 1st day of July and ending on the 30th day of June n.Xt following."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1289, "end_char": 1307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the term of the cooperative society in question was drawing to a close and the poll to elect frosh members w.S held on September 11, 1978."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was, however, declared ultimatelY on January 28, 1980, and appellant No."}}, {"text": "29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1621, "end_char": 1629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was elected Chairman of the committee on January 29, 1980."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1650, "end_char": 1662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated July 1, 1981, made under s. 29(4) (b), the Deputy Registrar."}}, {"text": "s. 29(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1870, "end_char": 1883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointed an administrator to manage the affairs of the society on the ground that the term of members of.the Committee had expired on June 30, 1981."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOP.TS [1982) 3 s.c.ll.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2697, "end_char": 2736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "acquired o~ being declared electe~.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOP.TS [1982) 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The result of the election having been declared on January 28, 1980, the term nf\n\n members commenced from the cooperative year beginning on July l, 1979 and ending with June 30, 1980 and since their term was three cooperative years including the year of election, it would expire on June 30, 1982."}}, {"text": "s. 29(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3156, "end_char": 3164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "478 of 1982\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "S.N. Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Singh for the .Appellants."}}, {"text": "G.N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dikshit and Shoba Dikshit for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Shoba Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Dikshit and Shoba Dikshit for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The District Co-operative Federation (Zila Sahakari Federation), Basti ('Federation' for short) is a co-operative society\n\nG registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 ('Act' for short)."}}, {"text": "District Co-operative Federation (Zila Sahakari Federation), Basti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. The District Co-operative Federation (Zila Sahakari Federation), Basti ('Federation' for short) is a co-operative society\n\nG registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 ('Act' for short)."}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kashi Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Shri Kashi Nath whose name did not appear in the voter's listand who, on account of the omission, could not contest the election filed Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "Court of Munsif, Basti", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6110, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29.1 of 1978 in the Court of Munsif, Basti on September 9, 1978 and asked for and obtained ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29.1 of 1978 in the Court of Munsif, Basti on September 9, 1978 and asked for and obtained ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6904, "end_char": 6922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was made on September 21, 1978."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It now appears that the result was declared on January 28, 1980, and the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman took place on January 29, 1980."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7813, "end_char": 7823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July !, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this teleprinter message, the Deputy Registrar; Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur made an order on July !,"}}, {"text": "June\n\n30, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1981, that the term of the members of the committee of management of the Federation bs expired on June\n\n30, 1981, and proceeded to appoint an administrator."}}, {"text": "Hi&h Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8250, "end_char": 8287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7869 of 1981 filed in the Hi&h Court of Judicature at Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VJ of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 28, J980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12677, "end_char": 12693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appellant even though the poll was held on September 11, 1978, the result, as required by rule 444(4), was declared for the first time on January 28, J980, the term of three co-operative years of the elected members of the co-operative society will expire on June 30, 1982."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13007, "end_char": 13022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, according to the respondents, as the poll was held on September 11, 1978, the term of three co-operative years including the co-operative year of the election has expired on 30th June, 1981 and therefore the order appointing the administrator was legal and valid."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14560, "end_char": 14565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At one stage, Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the respondents stated that there is no stage like declaration of result when the election of the members of the committee of management of a co-operative society is held .. Sub-rule (4) of rule 444 clearly indi- ."}}, {"text": "11.9. 78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20378, "end_char": 20386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the election of the committee of management of the Federation was held on 11.9."}}, {"text": "28.1.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 and not on 28.1.80 as alleged in the writ petition."}}, {"text": "11.9.78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20483, "end_char": 20490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the election was actually' held on 11.9.78, but the declaration of the result of election stayed in pursuance of the order of learned Munsif, Basti, in Suit No."}}, {"text": "September II, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20927, "end_char": 20945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus an admitted position that even though the poll was held on September II, 1978, on account of the injunction granted by the Court, the result was declared on January 28, 1980."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22016, "end_char": 22026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25311, "end_char": 25321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25399, "end_char": 25417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the order of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division dated July l, 1981, appointing administrator is without jurisdictioi; i and is clearly illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside."}}, {"text": "July l, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25424, "end_char": 25436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the order of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division dated July l, 1981, appointing administrator is without jurisdictioi; i and is clearly illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside."}}, {"text": "June 30, J 982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25686, "end_char": 25700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dixit lastly urged that even on the view this Court would take, the term of the committee .of management would expire on June 30, J 982, and therefore, hardly a period of four months remains and the Court should not, therefore, disturb the administrator."}}, {"text": "RAM PYAIUJ'V.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26033, "end_char": 26046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the elections to panchayats, co-operative societies and\n\n1 ' '\n· '\n\nRAM PYAIUJ'V. u.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 217\n\nsmaller local bodies provide an apotheosis or a training ground for success of our larger experiment of parliamentary democracy."}}, {"text": "July I, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27077, "end_char": 27089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued quashing the impugned order dated July I, 1981, of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27140, "end_char": 27149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued quashing the impugned order dated July I, 1981, of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur."}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_218_234_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "BHIKOBA SHANKAR DHUMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.\n\nMOHAN LAL PUNCHAND TATHED & ORS.\n\nFebruary 11, 1982\n\n[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND A. VARDARAIAN, JJ.]\n\nMaharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, as it stood prior to amendment of Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act 21 of/975-\n\nLocus standi of former landlords to file an appeal under the Act-Construction of non-analogous statutes, applying the doctrine of stare decisis, explained-Scope of section 21 as to dropping of the proceedings if ileath occurs of a person holding on tM appointed day land in ex<:ess of the ceiling area prescribed in the Act, after filing the return and before a notification containing the declaration regarding sur~\n\nplus land held by him is published in the Official Gazelle under section 21 of the Act and possession of such surp/u.1 land is taken over by the authorities concerned, explained.\n\nBhikoba. the tenant (the predecessor of the appellants), as required by section 12 of the Maharashtra Land Ceiling Act, filed before the Special Deputy Collector a return in the prescribed form furnishing particulars of land including the extent of 21 acres 28 guntas bearing Survey No. 34 in his possession on the appointed day, that is, January 26, 1962. After recording the statement of Bbikoba and considering all the other relevant material before him, the Special Deputy Collector found that Bhikoba was in possession of surplus land to the extent of 132 acres 1 guntas, as per bis order dated March 27, 1965. The appeal filed by Bhikoba was partly allowed by the appellate authority by its order <hrted April 13, 1966 and the matter was remanded to the , Special Deputy Collector with certain directions. Thereafter Bhikoba died.on January 31, 1969 .. On \"June 27, 1969, the Special Deputy Collector after ]1hearing the legal representatives held that BhikoQa was a surplus holder of land to the extent of 16 acres and 26 guntas.\n\nAn appeallagainst that ordr filed by the four sons of Bhikoba was dismissed on November 4, 1970 as premature, since the holders had not yet exercised their choice under section 16(2) of the Act and a declaration under section 21 had not yet been made.\n\nWhen a notice was issued under section 16 of the Act to the heirs of Bhikoba to exercise their choice in respect of the land to be retained by them out of Bhikoba's holding to the extent of the ceiling area, the heirs of Bhikoba filed objections on November 23, 1971 pleading, inter a/ia, that a holder of land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act would be divested of bis title to the surplus land only when its possession was taken from him after the publication of the notification under section 21 of the Act and since such notification had not yet been puQlished and possession of the surplus land had not been taken, Bhikoba continued to be the owner of the entire land till his death and that as inheritance could not remairi in abeyance, bis heirs at law became entitled to t~\n\nBHllCOBA SHANKAll v. MOHAN LAL 219\n\n. entire land and that if a fresh determination was then made there would be no surplus.land at all in their hands which had to be surrendered.\n\nThe Special Deputy Collector accepted the plea of the heirs of Bbikoba and dropped further proceedings by his order dated Marc.h 13, 1973.\n\nRespondents I to 4, former landlords, who would have become entitled to claim.relier under the Act at the time when the distribution of Surplus land held by Bhikoba was taken up for consideration preferred an appeal against the order of the Special Deputy\n\nCollecor dropping tbe groceedings, before the Maharashtra Revenue TribllnaI.\n\nThe Tribunal dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated January 31, 1975. A petiticn filed under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court of Bombay challenging the decision of the Tribunal was allowed by tho High Court by its judgment dated July 30, 1980 and the matter was remanded to the Special\n\nDeputy Collector to continue the Proceedings commenced on the basis of the return filed by Bhikoba. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHBLD: !. Respondents I to 4 had locus standi to file not only an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal but also later on a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. It is no doubt true that at the first instance the land which is declared a surplus land in the bands of any D person would vest in the State Government under the Land Ceiling Act.\n\nBut the said land had to be distributed in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act.\n\nAny person who is entitled to gl.'ant of land under any of -the provisions of the Act may question any order which would have the effect of reducing the extent of total surplus land in any village. Respondents\n\nI to 4 were the former landlords of the land bearing Survey No. 34 which formed part of the holding of Bhikoba in the instant case.\n\nThey cannot, therefore, be E characterised :asiust strangers to these proceedings. (226 F-H, 227 A-BJ\n\n2. It is very hazardous to decide cases in which proprietary rights arise for determination on the basis of decisioris rendered under taxation laws which have their own peculiarities. The Land Ceiling Act is not one levying tax on the income during the previous year or previous years or of it period other than the previous year in the bands of an assessee but a Law imposing a ceiling on the holding of a person or a family as on a specified date.\n\nThe Act has to be construed in Rccordance with its scheme and object which is equitable distribution\n\nf land in the hands of those who held land in excess of the ceiling limit on the appointed day, or those who would acquire subsequently laQd in excess of the ceiling or those who own lands which exceed the-ceiling Jimit by reason of their conversion into a different class.\n\n[227 E-G] • In order to achieve that object te Legislature enacted sections 3 and 4 of the Act declaring that no person could on or after the appointed day hold land in excess of the ceiling area and compelling every person acqu_iring or coming into possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed day to file a return before the Collector furnishing particulars of all land held by bim. (227 G-H, 228 A]\n\n3 : l. A close reading of the provisions contained in sections 3, 4 and 18 to 21 of the Land Ceiling Act shows that the det.:rmination of the extent of surplus land of a holder has to be m3de as on the specified date which is made further clear by the following requirements under section 12 of the Act. If any person has at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area. such person should file a return within the prescribed period from the appointed day furnishing to each of the Collectors '\"Yithin whose jurisdiction any land in his holding is situated, in the form prescribed containing the particulars of all land held by him.\n\nIf any person acquires, holds or comes into possession of any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed day, such person has to furnish a return within the prescribed period from the date of taking possession of any land in e_xcess of the ceiling area.\n\nIf any person whose land is converted into another class of land in the circumstances described in section 11-A (formerly numbered as section\n\n11) thereby causing his holding to exceed the ceiling area then such person bas to file a return within the prescribed period from the date of such conversion (such date being a date to be notified in the Official Gazette by the State Government in respect of any area). [228 F-H, 229 A-B]\n\n 3:2. If a person is found to be in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed dayi he incurs the liability to surrender any surplus land as on the appoipted day itself even though the actual extent of such surplus land is determined on a subsequent date.\n\nSimilarly those who acquire land in excess of\n\nhe ceiling area on or after the appointed day would become liable to surrender surplus land on the date of taking possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area.\n\nA person whose case falls under section t l~A of the Act becomes liable to surrender any surplus land in his possession as on the date of conversion of land into irrigable land. (229 D-F]\n\n3:3. The liability to surrend.er surplus laud would not in any way come to an end by reason of the death of such holder before the actual extent of surplus land is determined and notified under section 21 of the Act. Section 21 of tbe Act, no doubt, states that the title of the holder in the surplus land would become vested in the State Government only on such land being taken possession of after a declaration regarding the surplus land i!i published in the Official Gazette. But the liability to surrender the surplus land, however, relates back to the appointed day in the case of those who fall under section 12(1) (a) of the Act, to the date of taking possession of any land in excess of the coiling. area in the case Of those who come under section 12(1) (b) of the Act and to the date of conversion of land into a different class in the case of those who come under section 12(2) of the Act. Any other construction would make the Act unworkable and the determination of the extent of surplus land of a holder ambulatory and . indefinite. [229 F-H, 230 A]\n\n3:4. Further, section 8 of the ~Act prohibits transfer or partition of any land held by a person holding land in excess of the cefling 1, Lrea on or after the appointed day until the land in excess of the ceiling is determined under the Act.\n\nSection 10 provides that if any person after the fourth day of August, 1959 but\n\nBHIKOBA SHANKAR V. MOHAN LAL 221\n\nbefore the appointed day transferred or pmitioned any land in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Act or any land is transferred or\n\nparitioned in contravention of provisions of section 8 then in calculating the. ceiling area which that person is entitled to hold the area so transferred or partitioned should be taken into consideration and land exceeding the ceiling area so calculated should be deemed to be in exces of the ceilin~ area for that holding-notwithstanding the land remaining with him may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area. [230 BDl\n\n3:5. The expression 'holding• used in sections 3, S, 6 and 10 shows that the statute treats a holding as a unit for purposes of determination or surplus land which can be acquired from such holding.\n\nSection 2(14) which defines the expression 'to hold land' as 'to be lawfully in actual possession of land as owner or tenant' reqUires that the expression 'holding' should be conc; trued accol'dingly.\n\nSection3 of the Act expressly imposes a limit on the holding of agricultural land on the commencement of the Act. The extent of surplus land which the Goveru-' ment can acquire under the Act from a holder cannot therefore be made to\n\nepend Ui)on the date on which a declaration indicating the extent of surplus land is notified in the Official Gazette under section 21 and the date on which. such surplus land is taken possession of.\n\nTt cannot be also made to depend upon the holder who has incurred the liability on the relevant date being alive on the date on which the declaration is made under section 21 and pas session of surplus land is taken.\n\nThe proceedings initiated by a return filed by a holder cannot be dropped if such holder dies before a declaration is made under section 21 and surplus land is taken possession of.\n\nTo bold otherwise would frustrate the very object and purposes of the Act. [230 D-H]\n\n3:6. The surplus I and in lhe case of a person who at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land <including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area has got to be determined as on the appointed .day even though such person may die before the actual extent of surplus land is determined and notified under section 21 of the Act. The persons on whom his 'holding' devolves on hh death would be liable to surrender the surplus land as on the appointed day because the liability attached to the holding of the deceased would not come to an' end on his death.\n\nThe heirs of the deceased cannot be permitted to contend to the contrary and allowed to get more land by way of inheritance that what they would have got if the death of the person had taken place afrer the public1tio1J of the notification under section 21 .\n\n[231 G-H, 232 AC]\n\nRaghunath Laxman Wani & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1972] I S.C.R._48, appl_ied.\n\n3:7. The introduction of the second paragraph of the new section 3(2) does not alter the position as to the true legal position and scope of section 21 of the Act The said paragraph was introduced by way of abundant caution to get over the po'isible objection raised on the basis of the decision in the case of Dadarao Kashiram.\n\nThe said paragraph is merely declaratory of what the true legal position had a1waYs been even from tbe commencement of the Act.\n\nThe said paragraph in the new section 3(2) refers to two contingencies-(i) the death of a person who wai pgldiri¥ land in eces~ of the ceilin~ limit; and (iii the deatq\n\nof any member of a family unit~ owning land in excess of the ceiling on the appointed day.\n\nIt provides that the death of the person. or the\n\neath of a member of the. family unit as the case may be should be ignored. The death of a person after the appointed day also would make no difference so far as the liability of his holding to part with a surplus land is concerned.\n\n[232 F-H, 233 A, E-F]\n\n3:8. In the instant case, (i) the proceedings commencing with the return filed by Bhikoba could not be dropped merely because be died before a notification was issried urider section 21 of the Act.\n\nThe proceedings have to be continued and the surplus land in the hands of Bhikoba as on the appointed day should _be determined and taken possession of in accordance with law; (ii) the heirs of Bhikoba are entitled to participate in the si:tid proceedings representing the est-ate of Bhikoba and (iii) they would be entitled as heirs at Jaw only such land that may remain after surrendering the surplus land as may be determined under the Act. (233 G-H, 234 A-BJ\n\nDadaro Kashiram v. The State of Maharashtra, (1970) 72 Born. L.R. 246,. overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1667 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th July, 1980 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1931 of 1975.\n\nU, R. La/it and Mrs. Jayshree Wad for the Appellants.\n\nNaunit Lal for Respondents Nus. I to 4.\n\nR.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court :.vas delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave is directed agaipst the judgment and order dated July 30, 1980 of the HiKh Court of Judicature at Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 1931 of 1975.\n\nThe question for consideration in this appeal is whether the proceedings commenced with the filing of a return by a person holding on the appointed day land in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to a. the 'Act') would become infructuous and would have to be dropped if such person !lies before a notification containin11 the declaration regarding surliHIKOBA SHANKAR V. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) . 223\n\nplus land held by him is published in the Official Gazette under section 21 of the Act and possession of such surplus land is taken over by the authorities concerned.\n\nAn extent of land measuring 21 A, 28 G, bearing Survey No. 34 situated in village Maoori, Taluka Rahuri of Ahmedoagar district in the State of Maharashtra belonged to respondenis I to 4 but was in the possession of their tenant by name Bhikoba on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. January 26, 1962, which was the appointed day as defined by section 2(4) of the Act.\n\nThe Act was passed for the purpose of imposing a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the acquisition and distribution of land held in excess of such ceiling; and for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid. Section 2(16) of the Act defined the expression \"land\" as land which was used or capable of being used for pur poses of agriculture and included the sites of farm buildings oo, or appurtenant to such land.and land on which grass grows naturally.\n\nCb apter II of the Act coo taioed the provisions (Sections 3 to 7) prescribing the ceiling on holding of land, Chapter III contained the provisions (Sections 8 to 11) imposing restriction on alienation and acquisitions of land and laying down the con!ltquences of con traventioos of . those provisions, Chapter IV contained provisions (Sections 12 to 21) for determining the extent of surplus land, Chapter V contained provisions (Sections 22 to 26) for determination of compensation payable to expropriated persons and Chapter VI which included' (Sections 27 to 29) dealt with the mode of distribution of surplus land amongst those who were landless and who o!herwise deserved to be granted land. These and the other provisions in the Act were enacted with the object of providing for the mor6..equitable distribuiion of agricultural land amongst the peasantry in the State of Maharashtra.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that Chapters II and III of the Act came to be substituted by new Chapters II and III by section 4 of the Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975'.\n\nSection 5 of the said Act, however, read as follows :\n\n\"5. Notwithstanding the substitution of the Chapters\n\nII and Ill by section 4 of this Act all proceedings pending H immediately before the commencement date in any court or tribunal or before any authority for the purpose of\n\ndetermining the ceiling area in respect of any holdings and the •urplus land in such holdings in pursuance of the provisions in the original Chapters II and III shall be continued and disposed of by or under the principal Act, as if that Act had not been ame.nded by the Amending Act, 1972; and the amount of compensation for such surplus land acquired by the State Govetnment. under sub-section (4), or as the case may be, sub-section (5), of section 21 shall be at the rate provided in the principal Act as unamended by this Act.\n\nAfter the ceiling area is determined and the area delimited as surplus land is declared finally under section 21 of the principal Act, then, subject as aforesaid, the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall apply to such holding and land declared as surplus land.\"\n\nThere was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975. In view of the saving clause contained in section 5 of the Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975 reproduced above this case has to be decided in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapters II and III as they stood before their substitution since the proceedings with which we are concerned bad already commenced and were pending immediately before _the commencement of the said Amending Act. Hence reference will be made hereafter to the provisions contained in Chapters II and III as they stood before their substitution. '\n\nSection 3 of the Act as it was originally enacted read as follows:\n\n~ \"3. In order to provide for the more equitable distribution of agricultural land amongst the peasantry of the State of Maharashtra (and in particular, to provide that landless persons are given land for personal cultivation). on the commencement of this Act, there shall be imposed to the extent, and in the manner hereinafter provided, a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land throughout the State.\"\n\nSection 4 of the Act prohibited holding of land by any person jµ excess of the ceilin!l area l)nd declared that sqbject to the prollllJKOBA SHANKMl v. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) 225\n\nvisions of the Act, all land held by .a person in excess of the ceiling area should be deemed to be surplus land and dealt with in the manner provided by the Act. Sections 5 to 7 of the Act laid down the principles for the computation of the ceiling area in various cases.\n\nAs required by section 12 of the Act as it stood at the commencement of the Act Bhikoba, the tenimt concerned in this case, filed before the Special Deputy Collector (especially empowered by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Collector under the Act) a return in the prescribed form furnishing particulars of land including the extent of 21 A, 28 G. bearing Survey No. 34 referred to above in his possession on the appointed day. After recording the statement of Bhikoba and considering all the other relevant material before him the Special Deputy Collector found that Bhikoba was in possession of surplus land to the extent of 132 A. 1 G. and he made an order accordingly on March 27, 1965. Against that order Bhikoba filed an appeal and tJir appellate authority by its order dated April 13, 1966 partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter with some directions. Thereafter Bhikopa died on January 31, 1969. On June 27, 1969, th~ Special Deputy Collector after hearing the legal representatives of Bhikoba held that Bhikoba was . a. surplus holder of )aod to the extent of 16 A. and 26 G. Against that order Daulatram, Triambak, Dattatraya and Madhukar, the four sons of Bhikoba who are shown as the legal representatives (a to d) in this case filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. That appeal was dismissed onNovember 4, 1970 on the ground that it was a premature one as the holders had not let exercised their choice under section 16(2) of the Act and a declaration under section 21 had not yet been made. Thereafter a notice was issued to the heirs ofEhikoba under section 16 of the Act to exercise their choice in respect of land to be retained by them out of Bhikoba's holding to the extent of the ceiling area. The heirs of Bhikoha filed objections to the said notice on November 23, 1971 pleading inter alia that a holder of land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by _the Act would be divested of his title to the surplus land only when its possession was taken from him after the publication of the notification under section 21 of the Act and since such notification had not yet been published and possession of surplus land had not been taken, Bhikoba continued to be the owner of the entire land (including the extnt determined as surplus land) till his death and\n\nthat as inheritance could not reµtain in abeyance, his heirs at Jaw became entitled to the entire land. They contended that if a fresh determination was then made there would be no surplus land at all in their hands, which had to be surrendered. They, therefore, prayed that the proceedings which were commenced with the return filed by Bhiko ha should be dropped as they bad become infructuous.\n\nThe Special Deputy Collector accepted the plea of the heirs of Bhikoba and dropped furiher proceedings as prayed for by them by his order dated March 13, 1973.\n\nThe respondents I to 4 who would have become entitled to claim relief under the Act at the time when the distribution of surplus land held by Bhikoba was taken up for consideration preferred an appeal against the order of the Special Deputy Collector dropping the proceeding; as mentioned above before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal by its \"judgment dated January 31, 1975 dismissed the appeal following the decision of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Dadarao Kashiram v. The State of Maharashtra(').\n\nAggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, respondents I to 4 filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in Special Civil Application No. 1931 of 1975 before the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThat petition was allowed by the High Court by its judgment dated July 3.l, 1980 by which the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Special Deputy Collector to continue the proceedings commenced on the basis of the return filed by Bhikoba in the presence of his legal representatives to determine the surplus land held by Bhikoba as on the appointed day and to dispose of the same in accordance with law.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is filed again~! the aforesaid judgment of the High Court.\n\nThere is no merit in the first contention urged in suppo; i of the above appeal viz. that respondents I to 4 had no locus standi to file an appeal against the order of the Special Deputy Collector dated March 13, 1973 dropping the proceedings which commenced with the return filed by Bhikoba. It is no doubt true that at the first instance the land which is declared as surplus land in the hands of any person would vest in the State Government. But the said ]and has to be distributed in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act.\n\nAny person who is entitled to\n\n(I) [1970) 72 Bom. L.R. 246.\n\n-,,\n\n-··\\\n\n-· '\n\nBHIKOBA SHANKAR v. MOHAN LAL ( Venkataramiali, I,) 227\n\ngrant of land under any of the provisions of the Act may question any order which would have the effect of reducing the extent of total surplus land in any village.\n\nRespondents 1 to 4 were the former. landlords of the land bearing Survey No. 34 which formed part of the holding of Bhikoba. They cannot, therefore, be characterised as just strangers to these proceedings. It cannot, therefore, be said that respondents 1 to 4 had no locus srandi to file an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and then a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the. High Court. This contention is, therefore, rejected.\n\nThe next contention of the appellants is based on the judg ment of the High Court of Bombay in Dadarao Kashiram' s case ·(supra). It is no doubt true that the said decision supports the contention of the appellants that the proceedings initiated by a return filed by a holder of land would be come infructuous on his death if it takes place before a notification is issued under section 21 of the Act. The said decision was rendered by the High Court relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bilis C. Reid(') and the decision of this Court in its Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. Amarchand N. Shroff(!-) by the heirs & legal representatives bothiof which arose under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. We do not have provisions corresponding to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in the Act.\n\nIt is very hazardous to decide cases in which proprietory rights arise for determination on the basis of decisions rendered under taxation laws which have their own pecularities.\n\nThe Act is not one levying tax on the income during the previous year or previous years or of a period other then the previous year in the hands of an assessee hut a law imposing a ceiling on the holding of a person or a family as on a specified date. The Act has to be construed in accordance with its scheme and object which, as stated earlier, is equitable distribution of land amongst the landless by taking over surplus land in the hands of those who held land in excess of the ceiling limit on the appointed day, or those who would acquire subsequently land in excess of the ceiling or those who own lands which exceed the ceiling limit by reason of their conversion into a different class. In order to achieve that object, the Legislature enacted sections 3 and 4 of the Act declaring that no person could on or after the appointed day hold land in e•cess of the ceiling area and com pelling every person acquiring or oming into possession of !lny\n\n/ '\n\n(I) 1931 A.I.R. Bom. 333.\n\n(2) [1963] Suppl.''.lfS.C.R. 699,\n\nland in excess of the ceiling area on. or after the appointed day to file a return before the Collector furnishing particulars of al! land held by him.\n\nSection 18 of the.Act requires the Collector to hold an enquiry into the several matters set out therein including the total area of land held by a person on the appointed day.\n\nSections 19 and 20 of the Act provide for the restoration of land to a land lord in certain cases. Section 21 provides that, as soon as may be, after the Collector has considered the matters referred to in section 18 and the questions, if any, under sub-section (3) of section 20, he shall make a declaration stating therein his decision on (a) the total area of land which the person (who has filed a return) is entitled to hold as the ceiling area, (b) the total area and particulars of land which is in excess of the ceiling area, (c) the name of the person to whom possession 'of land is to be restored under section 19, and area and particulars of such land, (d) the area, description and full particulars of the land which is delimited as surplus land and\n\n(e) the area and particulars of land which is to be forfeited to the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10 or under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act.\n\nAfter a declaration under sub-section (I) of section 21 is made, as stated above, the Collector has to notify in the prescribed form in the Official Gazette the area, de.scription and full particulars of the land which is delimited as surplus land, and also of the land which is to be forfeited to the State Government.\n\nAny declaration made under section 2 l of the Act is subject to the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in appeal and subject to any decision that may be made in such appeal, the Collector is empowered to take possession of the surplus land and with effect from the date of taking over possession, such surplus land vests in the State Government.\n\nA close reading of the aforesaid prov1s10ns of the Act shows that the determination of the extent of surplus land of a holder has to be made as oil the appointed day. If any person has at any time after the fourth day of.August, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area, such person should lile a return within the prescribed period from the appointed day furnishing to each of the Collectors within whose jurisdiction any land in his holding is situated, in the form prescribed. containing the particulars of all land held by him. If any person acquires, holds or comes into f possession 'of any land including >•any exempted land jn exess of the ceilin!J are11 on or after the appointed day, such,\n\n. .\n\n.,._ •\n\n.JlllliKOBA SHANKAR v. MOHAN LAL ( Venkataramiah, J.) 229\n\nperson has to furnish a return as stated above within the prescribed period from the date of taking possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area. If any person whose land is converted into another class of land in the circumstances described in section 11-A (formerly nJJmbered as section (l l) thereby causing his holding to exceed the ceiling area then such person has to file a return as mentioned above within the prescribed period from the date of such conversion (such date being a date to be notified in the Official Gazette by the State Government in respect of any area). It is obvious from the foregoing requirements prescribed under section 12 of the Act that the crucial date with reference to which the extent of the surplus land held by a person is to be determined is the appointed day in the case of persons holding lard in excess of the ceiling area at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day and in the case of those acquiring, holding o.r coming into possession of such excess land on or after the appointed day, the day on which they acquire possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area. In the case of those who are affected by section ll-A of the Act, the crucial date is the date of conversion. If a person is found to be in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area at any time after the fourth date of August, 1959 but before the appointed day, he incurs the liability to surrender any surplus land as on the appointed day on the appointed day itself even though the actual extent of such surplus land is determined on a subsequent date. Similarly those who acquire land in excess of. the ceiling area on or after the appointed day would become liable to surrender surplus land on the date of taking possession of any land -in excess . of the ceiling area. A person whose case falls under section 11-A of the Act becomes liable to surrender any surplus land in his possession as on the date of conversion of land into irrigable land.\n\nThis liability to surrender surplus land would not in any way come to an end by reason of the death of such holder before the actual extent of surplus land is determined and notified under section 21 of the Act. It is no doubt true that section 21 of the Act states that the title of the holder in the surplus land would become vested in the State Government only on such land being taken possession of after a declaration regarding the surplus land is published in the Official Gazette. But the liability to surrender the surplus land, however, relates back to the appointed day in the case of those who fall under section 12(l)(a) of the Act, tot.he date of taking possession\n\nSUPRBMR COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.a.\n\nof any land in excess of the ceiling area in the case of those who come under section 12(1)(b) of the Act and to the date of conversion of land into a different class in the case of those who come under section 12(2) of the Act.\n\nAny other construction would make the Act unworkable and the determination of the extent of surplus land of a holder ambulatory and indefinite. It is significant that section 8 of the Act prohibits transfer or partition of any land held by a person holding land in excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed day until the land in excess of the ceiling is determined under the Act. Section JO provides that if any person after the 4th day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day transferred or partitfoned.any land in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Act or any land is transferred or partitioned in contravention of provisions of section 8 then in calculating the ceiling area which that person is entitled to hold the area so transferred or partitioned should be taken into consideration and land exceeding the ceiling area so calculated should be deemed to be in excess of the ceiling area for that ho/ding-notwithstanding the land remaining with him may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area.\n\nThe expression '.holding' used in sections 3, 5, 6 and 10 shows that the statute treats a holding as a unit for purposes of determination of surplus land which can be acquired from such holding.\n\nSection 2(14) which defines the expression to hold land' as 'to be lawfully in actual possession of land as owner or tenant' requires that the expression 'holding' should be construed accordingly. Section 3 of the Act expressly imposes a limit on the holding of agricultural land on the commencement of the Act.\n\nThe extent of surplus land which the Government can acquire under the Act from a holder cannot therefore be made to depend upon the date on which a declaration indicating the extent of surplus land is notified in the Official Gazette under section 21 and the date on which such surplus land is taken possession of. It cannot also be made to depend upon the holder who has incurred the liability on the relevant date being alive on the date on which the declaration is made under section 21 and possession of surplus land is taken. The acceptance of the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings initiated by a return filed by a holder have to be dropped if such holder dies before a declaration is made under section 21 and surplus land \"is taken possession of would frustrate the very object and purposes of the Act.\n\n' -\n\nBHIKOBA SHANli:AR v. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) 23 l\n\nIn Raghunath Laxman Wan( & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(') this Court had to examino the scheme of the Act while considering the question whether in the case of a family, the ceiling area would be liable to fluctuations with the subsequent increase or decrease in number of the family members. Dealing with that question tlae Court observed thus :\n\n\"The scheme of the Act seems to be to determine the ceiling area of each person (including a family) with reference to the appointed day. The policy of the Act appears to be that on and after the appointed day no person in the\n\nState should be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area as determined under the Act and that ceiling area would be that which is determined as on the appointed day. Therefore, if there is a family consisting of persons exceeding five in number on January 26, 1962, the ceiling area for that family would be the basic ceiling are a plus I/6th thereof per member in excess of the number five. The ceiling area so fixed would not.be liable to fluctuations with the subsequent increase or decrease in the number of its members, for, there is, apart from the explicit language of secs. 3 and 4, no provision in the Act providing for the redetermination of the ceiling area of a family on variations in the number of its members. The argument that every addition or reduction in the number of the members of a family requires redetermination of the ceiling area of such a family would mean an almost perpetual fixation and refixation in the ceiling area by the Revenue authorities, a state of affairs hardly to have been contemplated by the legislature. The argument would also mean that where a surplus area is already determined and allotted to the landless persons such area would have to be taken back and given to a family, the number of whose members subsequently has augmented by fresh llirths.\"\n\nThe above view supports our conclusion that the surplus land in the case of a person who at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area has got to be determined as on the appointed day even though such person may\n\n(I) [1972] J S.C.R 48.\n\ndie before the actual extent of surplus land is determined and notified under section 21 of the Act. The persons on whom his 'holding' devolves on his death would be liable to surrender the surplus land as on the appointed day because the liability attached to the holding of the deceased would not c,, me to an end on his death. The heirs of the deceased cannot be permitted to contend to the contrary and allowed to get more land by way of inheritance than what they wonld have got if the death of the person had taken place after the publication of the notification under section 2L\n\nAt this stage it is necessary to refer to another contention of the appellants based on the second paragraph of sub-section .(2) of section 3 of the new Chapter II of the Act which is substituted in the place of the original Chapter II by the Maharashtra Act 21 of\n\n1975. The relevant part of the said paragraph reads :\n\n\"In determining surplus land from the holding of a person, or as the case may be, of a family unit, the fact that the person or any member of the family unit has died (on or after the commencement date or any date subsequent to the slate on which tfte holding exceeds the ceiling area, but before the declaration of surplus land is made in respect of that holding) shall be ignored; and accordingly, the surplus land shall be determined as if that person, or as the case may be, the member of a family unit had not died.\"\n\nIt is contended that because for the first time the Legislature by introducing the above said paragraph directed that if a person dies after the commencement of the Act but before the declaration of surplus land is made in respect of his holding, the fact of his death should be ignored and the surplus land should be determined as if that person had not died; it should be held that before the introduction of that paragraph the proceedings needed to be dropped on the death of the person taking place before the declaration was made. It appears to us that the said paragraph was introduced by way of abundant caution to gef over the possible objection raised on the basis of the decision in the case of Dadarao Kashirarn. The\n\nsaid paragraph is merely declaratory of what the true legal position had always been even from the commencement of the Act. The introduction of an express provision to the above effect does not have the effect of altering the true legal position as explained by us above even without the aid of such .express provision. This becomes\n\nBHIKOBA SHANKAR v. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) 233\n\nfurther clear from the observationsJound in the decision of this Court in Raghunath Laxman Wani' s case (supra). It may be noticed that the said paragraph in the new section 3(2) refers to two contingencies -(i) the death of a person who was holding land in excess of the ceiling limit and (ii) the death of any member of a family unit owning land in excess of the ceiling on the appointed day. It pro\n\nvides that the death of the person or the death of a .member of the family unit as the case may be should be ignored. One of the contentions urged before ibis Court in that case was that the Tribunal was wrong in not taking into consideration the three children born in the family after the appointed day while determining the ceiling area to which the family of the appellants therein was entitled to.\n\nThis Court rejected that plea and upheld the decision of the Tribunal observing that \"the argument that every addition or reduction in the number of the members of the family requires redetermination of the ceiling area of such a family would mean an almost perpetual fixation and re-fixation in the ceiling area by the Revenue authorities, a state of affairs hardly to have been contemplated by the Legislature\". This cone! us ion was reached by this Court without the aid of any provision in the Act at the relevant time correspond ing to the second paragraph of the new section 3(2) of the Act.\n\nThis case was no doubt one relating to a claim based on the birth of three children. In principle it applies to the case where the number of members of a family decreases on account of death of any of its members, as observed by the Court. On the same analogy it has to be held that the death of a person after the appointed day 'also .would make no difference so far as)he liability of his holding to part with the surplus land is concerned. Hence it has to be held that the introduction of the second pa, ragraph of the new section 3(2) does not lead to any conclusion different from the one which we have reached in this appeal.\n\nIn view of the foregoing, the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Dadarao Kashiram's case (supra) cannot be considered as. a correct one and we, therefore, overrule it.\n\nThe High Court was right in the present case in holding that the proceedings commencing with the return filed by Bhikoba could not be dropped merely because he died before a notification was issued under section 21 of the Act. The proceedings have to he continued and the surplus land in the hands of Bhikoba as on the appointed day shoyl(I b~ determine~ and take~ !'ossession of iq\n\nA accordance with law. The heirs of Bhikoba are entitled to participate in the said proceedings representing the estate of Bhikoba.\n\nThey would be entitled as heirs at law only such land that may remain after surrendering the surplus land as may be determined under the Act.\n\nB In the result, the appeal fails and is here by dismissed. No costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 150, "entities": [{"text": "BHIKOBA SHANKAR DHUMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHIKOBA SHANKAR DHUMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHAN LAL PUNCHAND TATHED & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAN LAL PUNCHAND TATHED & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 97, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 11, 1982\n\n[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND A. VARDARAIAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act", "statute": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act", "statute": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act"}}, {"text": "Bhikoba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 897, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikoba.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 969, "end_char": 979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act", "statute": "Chapters II land III by the Mahallishtra Act"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 in his possession on the appointed day, that is, January 26, 1962."}}, {"text": "Bbikoba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the statement of Bbikoba and considering all the other relevant material before him, the Special Deputy Collector found that Bhikoba was in possession of surplus land to the extent of 132 acres 1 guntas, as per bis order dated March 27, 1965.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "March 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1497, "end_char": 1511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the statement of Bbikoba and considering all the other relevant material before him, the Special Deputy Collector found that Bhikoba was in possession of surplus land to the extent of 132 acres 1 guntas, as per bis order dated March 27, 1965."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by Bhikoba was partly allowed by the appellate authority by its order <hrted April 13, 1966 and the matter was remanded to the , Special Deputy Collector with certain directions."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Bhikoba died.on January 31, 1969 .. On \"June 27, 1969, the Special Deputy Collector after ]1hearing the legal representatives held that BhikoQa was a surplus holder of land to the extent of 16 acres and 26 guntas."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Bhikoba died.on January 31, 1969 .. On \"June 27, 1969, the Special Deputy Collector after ]1hearing the legal representatives held that BhikoQa was a surplus holder of land to the extent of 16 acres and 26 guntas."}}, {"text": "BhikoQa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1856, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Bhikoba died.on January 31, 1969 .. On \"June 27, 1969, the Special Deputy Collector after ]1hearing the legal representatives held that BhikoQa was a surplus holder of land to the extent of 16 acres and 26 guntas.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "November 4, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeallagainst that ordr filed by the four sons of Bhikoba was dismissed on November 4, 1970 as premature, since the holders had not yet exercised their choice under section 16(2) of the Act and a declaration under section 21 had not yet been made."}}, {"text": "section 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2153, "end_char": 2163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 23, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a notice was issued under section 16 of the Act to the heirs of Bhikoba to exercise their choice in respect of the land to be retained by them out of Bhikoba's holding to the extent of the ceiling area, the heirs of Bhikoba filed objections on November 23, 1971 pleading, inter a/ia, that a holder of land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act would be divested of bis title to the surplus land only when its possession was taken from him after the publication of the notification under section 21 of the Act and since such notification had not yet been puQlished and possession of the surplus land had not been taken, Bhikoba continued to be the owner of the entire land till his death and that as inheritance could not remairi in abeyance, bis heirs at law became entitled to t~\n\nBHllCOBA SHANKAll v. MOHAN LAL 219\n\n."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2689, "end_char": 2699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marc.h 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Deputy Collector accepted the plea of the heirs of Bbikoba and dropped further proceedings by his order dated Marc.h 13, 1973."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3737, "end_char": 3748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I to 4 had locus standi to file not only an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal but also later on a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "said land had to be distributed in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4 and 18 to 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6610, "end_char": 6620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fourth day of August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If any person has at any time after the fourth day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7469, "end_char": 7479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7504, "end_char": 7515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8740, "end_char": 8750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8763, "end_char": 8773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9626, "end_char": 9635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10178, "end_char": 10187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10599, "end_char": 10609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10761, "end_char": 10774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11321, "end_char": 11331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11562, "end_char": 11572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11745, "end_char": 11755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12243, "end_char": 12253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12740, "end_char": 12750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12922, "end_char": 12934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13006, "end_char": 13016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dadarao Kashiram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13176, "end_char": 13192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The introduction of the second paragraph of the new section 3(2) does not alter the position as to the true legal position and scope of section 21 of the Act The said paragraph was introduced by way of abundant caution to get over the po'isible objection raised on the basis of the decision in the case of Dadarao Kashiram.", "canonical_name": "Dadarao Kashirarn"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13354, "end_char": 13366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14067, "end_char": 14077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Jayshree Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U, R. La/it and Mrs. Jayshree Wad for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14908, "end_char": 14918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal for Respondents Nus."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14949, "end_char": 14960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.N. Poddar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15030, "end_char": 15043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court :.vas delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave is directed agaipst the judgment and order dated July 30, 1980 of the HiKh Court of Judicature at Bombay in Special Civil Application No.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15706, "end_char": 15719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lies before a notification containin11 the declaration regarding surliHIKOBA SHANKAR V. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15797, "end_char": 15807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maoori", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15982, "end_char": 15988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 situated in village Maoori, Taluka Rahuri of Ahmedoagar district in the State of Maharashtra belonged to respondenis I to 4 but was in the possession of their tenant by name Bhikoba on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. January 26, 1962, which was the appointed day as defined by section 2(4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Taluka Rahuri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 16003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 situated in village Maoori, Taluka Rahuri of Ahmedoagar district in the State of Maharashtra belonged to respondenis I to 4 but was in the possession of their tenant by name Bhikoba on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. January 26, 1962, which was the appointed day as defined by section 2(4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Ahmedoagar district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 situated in village Maoori, Taluka Rahuri of Ahmedoagar district in the State of Maharashtra belonged to respondenis I to 4 but was in the possession of their tenant by name Bhikoba on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. January 26, 1962, which was the appointed day as defined by section 2(4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16043, "end_char": 16054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 situated in village Maoori, Taluka Rahuri of Ahmedoagar district in the State of Maharashtra belonged to respondenis I to 4 but was in the possession of their tenant by name Bhikoba on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. January 26, 1962, which was the appointed day as defined by section 2(4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16253, "end_char": 16265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(16)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16563, "end_char": 16576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16810, "end_char": 16832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 3 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16860, "end_char": 16875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 8 to 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16959, "end_char": 16975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 12 to 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17146, "end_char": 17163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 22 to 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17241, "end_char": 17258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 27 to 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17358, "end_char": 17375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17816, "end_char": 17825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cb apter II of the Act", "statute": "Cb apter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17986, "end_char": 17995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapters II and III shall be continued and disposed of by or under the principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18285, "end_char": 18369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amending Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18588, "end_char": 18598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1972", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18779, "end_char": 18789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1972", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18970, "end_char": 19055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19110, "end_char": 19119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act", "statute": "There was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19592, "end_char": 19601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act", "statute": "There was a further modification made in the new Chapters II and III by the Maharashtra Act"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19772, "end_char": 19792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to provide for the more equitable distribution of agricultural land amongst the peasantry of the State of Maharashtra (and in particular, to provide that landless persons are given land for personal cultivation)."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20088, "end_char": 20097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 5 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20437, "end_char": 20452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20563, "end_char": 20573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhikopa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Bhikopa died on January 31, 1969.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "Daulatram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21706, "end_char": 21715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a. surplus holder of )aod to the extent of 16 A. and 26 G. Against that order Daulatram, Triambak, Dattatraya and Madhukar, the four sons of Bhikoba who are shown as the legal representatives (a to d) in this case filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Triambak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21717, "end_char": 21725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a. surplus holder of )aod to the extent of 16 A. and 26 G. Against that order Daulatram, Triambak, Dattatraya and Madhukar, the four sons of Bhikoba who are shown as the legal representatives (a to d) in this case filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Dattatraya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21727, "end_char": 21737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a. surplus holder of )aod to the extent of 16 A. and 26 G. Against that order Daulatram, Triambak, Dattatraya and Madhukar, the four sons of Bhikoba who are shown as the legal representatives (a to d) in this case filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Madhukar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21742, "end_char": 21750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a. surplus holder of )aod to the extent of 16 A. and 26 G. Against that order Daulatram, Triambak, Dattatraya and Madhukar, the four sons of Bhikoba who are shown as the legal representatives (a to d) in this case filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."}}, {"text": "4, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21936, "end_char": 21943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That appeal was dismissed onNovember 4, 1970 on the ground that it was a premature one as the holders had not let exercised their choice under section 16(2) of the Act and a declaration under section 21 had not yet been made."}}, {"text": "section 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22042, "end_char": 22055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22091, "end_char": 22101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ofEhikoba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22169, "end_char": 22178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter a notice was issued to the heirs ofEhikoba under section 16 of the Act to exercise their choice in respect of land to be retained by them out of Bhikoba's holding to the extent of the ceiling area."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22185, "end_char": 22195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhikoha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22347, "end_char": 22354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The heirs of Bhikoha filed objections to the said notice on November 23, 1971 pleading inter alia that a holder of land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by _the Act would be divested of his title to the surplus land only when its possession was taken from him after the publication of the notification under section 21 of the Act and since such notification had not yet been published and possession of surplus land had not been taken, Bhikoba continued to be the owner of the entire land (including the extnt determined as surplus land) till his death and\n\nthat as inheritance could not reµtain in abeyance, his heirs at Jaw became entitled to the entire land.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22645, "end_char": 22655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhiko", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23232, "end_char": 23237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They, therefore, prayed that the proceedings which were commenced with the return filed by Bhiko ha should be dropped as they bad become infructuous.", "canonical_name": "Bhikoba"}}, {"text": "March 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23436, "end_char": 23450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Deputy Collector accepted the plea of the heirs of Bhikoba and dropped furiher proceedings as prayed for by them by his order dated March 13, 1973."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23825, "end_char": 23841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal by its \"judgment dated January 31, 1975 dismissed the appeal following the decision of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Dadarao Kashiram v. The State of Maharashtra(')."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23893, "end_char": 23928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal by its \"judgment dated January 31, 1975 dismissed the appeal following the decision of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Dadarao Kashiram v. The State of Maharashtra(')."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24156, "end_char": 24176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1931 of 1975 before the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "July 3.l, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24245, "end_char": 24259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That petition was allowed by the High Court by its judgment dated July 3.l, 1980 by which the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Special Deputy Collector to continue the proceedings commenced on the basis of the return filed by Bhikoba in the presence of his legal representatives to determine the surplus land held by Bhikoba as on the appointed day and to dispose of the same in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25240, "end_char": 25261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25928, "end_char": 25939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26405, "end_char": 26415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26510, "end_char": 26527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said decision was rendered by the High Court relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bilis C. Reid(') and the decision of this Court in its Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. Amarchand N. Shroff(!-) by the heirs & legal representatives bothiof which arose under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26750, "end_char": 26777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "do not have provisions corresponding to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26782, "end_char": 26853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27801, "end_char": 27817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We do not have provisions corresponding to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "We do not have provisions corresponding to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28223, "end_char": 28233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 19 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28401, "end_char": 28419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28500, "end_char": 28510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28607, "end_char": 28617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28670, "end_char": 28680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29014, "end_char": 29024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29275, "end_char": 29285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29332, "end_char": 29342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29401, "end_char": 29411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29704, "end_char": 29713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fourth day of.August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30241, "end_char": 30267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If any person has at any time after the fourth day of."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31127, "end_char": 31137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31526, "end_char": 31536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32746, "end_char": 32756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33081, "end_char": 33091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33129, "end_char": 33139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33508, "end_char": 33524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMR COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.a.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33571, "end_char": 33608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the liability to surrender the surplus land, however, relates back to the appointed day in the case of those who fall under section 12(l)(a) of the Act, tot.he date of taking possession\n\nSUPRBMR COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "section 12(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33688, "end_char": 33704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33813, "end_char": 33826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34007, "end_char": 34016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th day of August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34280, "end_char": 34303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section JO provides that if any person after the 4th day of August, 1959 but before the appointed day transferred or partitfoned.any land in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the objects of the Act or any land is transferred or partitioned in contravention of provisions of section 8 then in calculating the ceiling area which that person is entitled to hold the area so transferred or partitioned should be taken into consideration and land exceeding the ceiling area so calculated should be deemed to be in excess of the ceiling area for that ho/ding-notwithstanding the land remaining with him may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34518, "end_char": 34527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3, 5, 6 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34926, "end_char": 34949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35088, "end_char": 35101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35285, "end_char": 35294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35641, "end_char": 35651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35880, "end_char": 35890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36133, "end_char": 36143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38626, "end_char": 38636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39123, "end_char": 39133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39267, "end_char": 39276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dadarao Kashirarn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40684, "end_char": 40701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to us that the said paragraph was introduced by way of abundant caution to gef over the possible objection raised on the basis of the decision in the case of Dadarao Kashirarn.", "canonical_name": "Dadarao Kashirarn"}}, {"text": "Raghunath Laxman Wani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41170, "end_char": 41191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This becomes\n\nBHIKOBA SHANKAR v. MOHAN LAL (Venkataramiah, J.) 233\n\nfurther clear from the observationsJound in the decision of this Court in Raghunath Laxman Wani' s case (supra)."}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41262, "end_char": 41274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42476, "end_char": 42488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43028, "end_char": 43040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43513, "end_char": 43523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_235_243_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "HARBANS SINGH\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 12, 1982\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., D.A. DESAI AND\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.J\n\nPenafCode-Death Sentence imposed on three accused for the same ojfence- One accused executed-Sentence of death commuted in case of another accused- Mercy petition rejected by President in another-Court if could interfere.\n\nBy a common judgment the petitioner and the two other accused (JS and KS) were convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of four persons. The High Court affirmed their conviction and sentence.\n\nThe special leave petition filed by JS was dismissed and he was executed.\n\nThe sentence of death passed on KS was commuted by this Court into imprison ment fof life. The petitioner's ('HS's) speciaf leave petition and later his review petition were dismissed by this Court and his petition to the President of India for commutation of death sentence was dismissed, whereupon he filed the present petition.\n\n(Per Chandrachud, CJ and D.A. Dsai, J. 'A, N. Sen, J. concurring.)\n\nHELD : The petitioner and the other two co-accused were sentenced to death by a common judgment. No distinction could at all be made between the part played by KS and the petitioner. Since the death sntence in bis case was commuted by this Court it would be unjust to confirm the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner. (238 BCJ\n\nIn view of the background of the case it would not be wrong if this Court had Commuted the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner but in the interest of comity between the powers of this Court and the powers of the President it would be more in the fitness of things if this Court were to recommend that the President be so good as to exercise his power under Article 72 of the Constitution to commute the death sentence into impriSonment for life because the President had already considered the mercy petition of the .Petitioner once and had rejectod it. [238 E-G]\n\n[The Court directed that prior to the actual execution of any death s111tence the Jail Superintendent should ascertain personally whether the\n\n, sentece of d.:ath impose<l ppon any of the co-accused of the prisener\n\nwho was due to be hanged had been commuted.·· If it had been commuted, the Superintendent should apprise the superior authoritiesof the matter, who must take prompt steps for bringing the matter to the notice of the Court concerned.] [239 AB]\n\n(Per A.N. Sen, J. concurring)\n\nB It would be unjust to allow the death sentence imposed on the petitioner.\n\nexecuted. [242 G]\n\nConsidering that the responsibility, involvement and complicitY of the petitioner in the commission of the offence is the same as that of the other co-accused, it would be sheer travesty of justice if for the same offence the petitioner had to pay the extreme penalty of death while the death sentence imposed on the co-accused, for the very same offence had been commuted to one of life imprisonment. Had the petitfoner mentioned either in the special leave petition or review petition or mercy petition to the President this all important and significant fact, death sentence imposed on him would have been commuted.[242 CF]\n\nApart fom the very wide jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of the Constitution this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power atid jurisdiction for dealing with.any extraordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this and interfere case, this is a fit case where this Court should entertain the present petition. [243 AC]\n\nSince in the instant case the petitioner's mercy petition had earlier been considered by the President propriety and decorum require that the matter should be referred back to the President. [243 D]\n\nF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 7453\n\nof 1981.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nA.P. Mohanty for the Petitioner.\n\nR.K. Bhatt for the Respondent.\n\nThe following judgments of the Court were delivered\n\nCHANDRACHUD C.J. By this writ petition the petitioner Harbans . Singh prays that the death sentence imposed upon him sb.olJl<! not b~\n\nexecuted in view of the following circumstances.\n\nHARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh.\n\nMohinder Singh died in an \"encounter\" with the police.\n\nThe petitioner and the other two accused, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh, were committed to stand their trial for the murder , of the aforesaid four persons.\n\nBy a judgment dated May 1, 1975 the leari; ted Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit, convicted all of them for the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh and Bira Singh and sentenced them to death.\n\nOn October 20, 1975 the High Court of Allahabad affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1080 of 1975.\n\nJeeta Singh filed Special Leave Petition No. 343 of 1976 in this Court which was dismissed on April 15, 1976. Kashmira Singh filed Special Leave Petition No. 104 of 1976 from jail and obtained leave on the question of sentence.\n\nBy an order dated April JO, 1977 his appeal (No. 172 of 1977) was allowed by a Bench consisting of Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ. who commuted his sentence of death into imprisonment for life. The petitioner, Harbans Singh, filed Special Leave Petition No. 658 of 1978 from jail which was dismissed by Sarkaria and Shinghal, JJ. on October 16, 1978.\n\nHis Review Petition (No. l 40/79) was dismissed by Sarkaria and A.P.\n\nSen, JJ. on May 9, 1980. It appears that though the Registry of this Court had mentioned in its Office Report that Kashmira Singh's death sentence was already commuted, that fact was not brought to the notice of tlie Court specifically when the petitioner's Special Leave Petition and his Review Petition were dismissed.\n\nThe petitjoner had filed a petition to the President of India for commutation of his sentence, which was dismissed on August 22, 1981.\n\nUpon the dismissal of that petition, the execution of the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner was fixed for October 6, 1981, whereupon he filed this petition in this Court. ·\n\nThe course which this case has taken makes a sad reading.\n\nThre~ persons were sentenced to death by a common judgment and, regretfully, each one has .eventually met with a. different fate.\n\nOne of those three persons, Jetta Singh, who did not file any Review Petition or Writ Petition in this Court was executed ou October 6, •\n\n1981. The other person, Kasltmira Singh, succeeded in having his death sentence commuted intCI life imprisonmen\\, The petitionei:\n\nwas to be executed on the same day on which Jeeta Singh was executed but, fortunately, he filed this Writ Petition on which we passed an order staying the execution of his death sentence.\n\nAs we have stated earlier, the petitioner and the two other co. accused were sentenced to death by a common judgment. We have seen the facts from which it is clear that no distinction at all can be made between the part played by Kashmira Singh on the one hand and the petitioner on the other.\n\nSince Kashmira Singh's death sentence was commuted by this Court, it would be unjust to comirm the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner. That will involve the Court as well as the authorities concerned in the violation of rudimentary norms governing the administration of justice.\n\nIt is unfortunate that Jeeta Singh could not get the benefit of the commutution of Kashmira Singh's sentence.\n\nWere he to approach this Court like the petitioner, the sentence imposed upon him would have been commuted into life imprisonment because no distinctio.n could have been made between his case and that of Kashmira Singh whose sentence was commuted prior to the execu tion of Jeeta Singh.\n\nThe question which then arises for consideration is as to the proper course to be adopted in the circumstances of the case.\n\nIn view of the background of the case, to which we have referred above, it would not be wrong if we were ourselves to commute the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner to imprisonment for life.\n\nBut in the interest ofcomity between the powers of this Court an.ct the powers of the .President of India, it will be more jn the fitness o~ things if we were to recommend that the President of India may be so good as to exercise his power under Article 72 of the Constitution to commute the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner into imprisonment. for life.\n\nThis is so because the President of India has already considered the mercy petition of the petitioner once and has rejected it.\n\nWe, therefore, recommend that for reasons aforesaid, which could' not have been before the President of India when be rejected the mercy petition, he may commute the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner.\n\nThe fate of Jeeta Singh ha• a posthumous moral to tell.\n\nHe cannot-profit by the direction which we propose to give because he , is now beyond the prO!'esses of human tribunals.\n\nBut we direct\n\n\n- i----\n\n_f-'\n\nHAil.BANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 239\n\nthat prior to the actual execution of any death sentence, the Jail Superintendent should ascertain personally whether the sentence of death imposed upon any of the co-accused of the prisoner who is due to be hanged. has been commuted, If it has been commuted, the Superintendent should apprise the superior authorities of the matter, who, in turn, must ta 1ke prompt steps for bringing the matter to the notice of the Court concerned.\n\nOrder accordingly. The execution of the death sentence is stayed until the decision of the President to w.hom a: copy of this judgment should be forwarded forthwith,\n\nAMARBNDRA NATH SEN, J .. I have l\\ad the benefit of reading the judgment to be delivered by the learned Chief Justice, T agree with the order proposed by him, I, however, wish to make some observations of my own.\n\nThe relevant facts of the case have been succinctly and briefly stated by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment. Three persons, namely, the petitioner, Kashmira Singh ani Jeeta Singh were convicted under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit by his judgment dated !st May, 1975. The High Court of Allahabad affirmed the judgment of the Trial Judge in Crimina1 Appeal No. 1080 of 1975 and confirmed the death sentence of the said three accused by its judgment dated\n\n20th October, 1975. Jeeta Singh filed in this Court a Special Leave Petition (No. 343 of 1976) which was dismissed by this Court on 15th April, 1976, It appears that after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition of Jeeta Singh by this Court, Jeeta Singh was executed on the 6th of October, 1981.\n\nKashmira Singh filed a Special Leave Petition No, 104 of 1976 in this Court and leave was granted by this Court on the question of sentence only.\n\nBy an ?rder passed by this Court on the I 0th April 1977 this Court allowed the appeal of Kashmira Singh (172/1976) by leave of this Court and this Court commuted his sentence of death to one of imprisonment of life. The other accused Harbans Singh who has filed this petition had also filed a special leave petition No.658of1978. The Sj)ecial Leave Petition filed by Harbans Singh was dismissed by this Court on 16th October 1978, It appears that Harbans Singh had, applied for review of the said order of this Court and the review petition of Harbans Singh (140 of 1979) was also dismissed by this Court on 9th May, 1980, Harbans Singh had thereafter filed a petition to the President of 1 India under Art, 72 of the Constitution, The Petition of Harbans\n\n240 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSingh to the President of India was dismissed on the 22nd August, 1981.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the Petition of Harbans Singh to the President, the date for execu_tion of the death sentence imposed upon him was fixed and Harbans Singh, bas thereafter moved this Court and bas filed this writ petition praying for commutation of his death sentence and in. the alternative praying for a direction to the authorities to allow him the facilities to meet his near and dear ones before the sentence of death imposed upon him is actually executed.\n\nThe unfortunate position appears to be that in respect of the very same offence committed, one of the accused persons, namely, Jeeta Singh has already been hanged; the death sentence imposed on another accused, namely, Kashmir& Singh, has been commuted to one of life imprisonment; and Harbans Singh, the present petitioner, is now awaiting death sentence to be executed.\n\nWhen this Court dismissed the special leave petition of Jeeta Singh by its order dated 15th April, 1976, the decision of this Court in the case of Bachan Singh v: State of Panjab,(1) was not there. It appears from the report that Bachan Singh' s case in which constitu- tional validity of the qeath penalty wa~ upheld by this Court came to be decidd by this Court on 9th May, 1980. It further appears that in that case the validity. of the death sentence was upheld by four of ihe learned Judges on the Bench, but Bhagwati J. dissented from the view expressed by the majority and he was of the opinion that \"S.\n\n302 of the IPC in so far as it provides for imposition of death penalty as an alternative to life sentence, is ultra vires and void as being violative of Art. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as it does not provide any legislative guidelines as to when life should be extinguished by imposition of death sentence\".\n\nThe majority judgment of the Be11ch was delivered by Sarkaria, J. on behalf of himself, Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta and Untwalia, JJ. While upholding the constitutio.nal validity of death sentence, this Court in Bachan Singh' .\"case laid down certain principles on the basis of which capital punishment may normally be imposed, recognising at the same time that the punishment to be inflicted was a matter of iudicial discretion to be exercised with due care and caution.\n\nWhen a bench of this Court dismissed the special leave H petition of Jeeta Singh who has since been executed, this Court\n\n(I) [I980J 2 sec 684.\n\n-'---\n\nliARBANS SINGH v. u. P, STATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 241\n\nmust have on a consideration of the facts and circumstances come to the conclusion that death penalty had been rightly imposed on Jeeta Singh and there was no need for interference by this Court with the judgment or the sentence imposed.\n\nThe special leave petition of Kashmira Singh was entertained by another Bench of this Court: Though arising out of the same offence, this Court must have felt that there were circumstances which did not justify the imposition of the extreme penalty of death and this Court commuted the sentence of death to one of life imprisonment. It may be noticed that at the time the special leave petition of Kasbmira Singh was entertained by this Court' and his death sentence was commuted by an order of this Court dated 10th April, 1977, the decision in the case of Bachan Singh was not there, though various other decisions which came to be co_nsidered' in the case of Bachan Singh were there.\n\nThe Special Leave Petition of the Petit_ioner was dismissed by\n\nthis Court on the 16th December, 1978. The review petition was D also dismissed by a Bench pr_esided over by Sarkaria, J. on the 9th of May, 1980, the very day on which Bachan Singh's case appears to have been decided.\n\nIt unfortunately appears that the attention of the Bench which dismissed the special leave petition and also the review petition of the petitioner was not drawn to the fact that special leave petition of the co-accused Kashmira Singh had already been entertained by this Court and the death sentence imposed on Kashmira Singh had been commuted by this Court to one of life imprisonment. The Bench which dismissed the special leave petition and also the review petition of the present petitioner Harbans Singh must have felt on consideration of the facts and circumstances that death penalty had been rightly imposed on Harbans Singh and no interference by this Court was called for.\n\nThough the Bench must have come to its decision on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, yet, to. my mind, the Bench would not have dismissed the special leave petition and the review petition of Harbans Sfngh and would have commuted his death sentence to one of life imprisonment, had the Bench been informed that in the identical case, the co-accused of the petitioner had earlier filed a special leave petition which had already been entertained by this Court and the capital punishment of the co-accused Kashmira Singh had been commuted by this Court to one of. life imprisonment. It may be noticed that\n\nSIJPRBME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(i982) 3 S.C.R,\n\nthe responsibility, involvement and complicity of the petitioner Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence is the same as that of the co-accused Kashmira Singh.\n\nAs I have earlier noticed, Harbans Singh had filed a petition to the President of india after the dismissal of his petition for Special Leave and hi~ petition for review by this Court for commu talion of death sentence and the said Petition of Harbans Singh has also been rejected by the President.\n\nTo my mind, it will be a sheer travesty of justice and the course of justice will he perverted, if for the very same offence, the petitioner has to swing and pay the extreme penalty of death whereas the death sentence imposed on bis co-accused for the very same offence is commuted to one of life imprisonment and the life of the co-accused is shared.\n\nThe case of the Petitioner Harbans Singh appears, indeed, to be unfortunate, as neither in his special leave petition and the review petition in this Court nor in his mercy petition to the President of India, this all important and significant fact that the life sentence imposed on his co-accused in respect of the very same offence has been comprnted to one of life imprisonment has been mentioned.\n\nHad this fact been brought to the notice of this Court at the time when the Court dealt with the special leave petition of the petitioner or even his review petition, I have no doubt in my mind that this Court would have commuted his death sentence to one of life imprisonment. For the same offence and for the same kind of involvement, responsibility and complicity, capital punishment on one and life imprisonment on the other would never have been just. I also feel that had. the. petitioner in his mercy petition to the President of India made any mention of this fact of commutation of death sentence to one of life imprisonment on his co-accused in respect of the very same offence, the President might have been inclined to take a different view on his petition.\n\nIn the circumstances hereinabove stated, I am of the opinion that it will be manifestly unjust to allow the death sentence imposed on the petitioner to be exeuted. The question that, however, troubles me is weather this Court retains any power and jurisdiction 'to entertain and pass any appropriate orders on the question of sentence imposed on the petitioner in view of the fact that not only his special leave petition and review petition have been dismissed by this Court but also the further fact that his petition for clemency bas also been rejected by the President.\n\nllARBANS SINGH v. u.P. stATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 243\n\n' Very wide powe.rs have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of the Constitution T am of the opinion that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly u11ed only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this caae, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where1 this Court should entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this Court should interfere.\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court would have been justified in commuting the death sentence imposed on the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.\n\nAs, however, the case of the Petitioner had earlier been considered by the President of India to whom the petitioner had presented the petition for mercy, I am of Ille opinion that propriety and decorum require that the matter should be referred back to the President instead of this Court deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.\n\nWith these observations, I respectfully agree with the order passed by the learned Chief Justice.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nA ,", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "HARBANS SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Harbans . Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 12, 1982\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., D.A. DESAI AND\n\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.J\n\nPenafCode-Death Sentence imposed on three accused for the same ojfence- One accused executed-Sentence of death commuted in case of another accused- Mercy petition rejected by President in another-Court if could interfere."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's ('HS's) speciaf leave petition and later his review petition were dismissed by this Court and his petition to the President of India for commutation of death sentence was dismissed, whereupon he filed the present petition."}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1724, "end_char": 1734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2397, "end_char": 2405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "239 AB]\n\n(Per A.N. Sen, J. concurring)\n\nB It would be unjust to allow the death sentence imposed on the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Arts. 32 and 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4018, "end_char": 4039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.P. Mohanty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4042, "end_char": 4054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nA.P. Mohanty for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "R.K. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments of the Court were delivered\n\nCHANDRACHUD C.J. By this writ petition the petitioner Harbans .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Harbans . Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4215, "end_char": 4230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments of the Court were delivered\n\nCHANDRACHUD C.J. By this writ petition the petitioner Harbans .", "canonical_name": "Harbans . Singh"}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh."}}, {"text": "Kashmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh.", "canonical_name": "Kasltmira Singh"}}, {"text": "Jeeta Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh.", "canonical_name": "Jeeta Singh"}}, {"text": "Jindi Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh."}}, {"text": "Surjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh."}}, {"text": "Bira Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh."}}, {"text": "Gnrmeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237\n\nThe petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh."}}, {"text": "October 20, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4990, "end_char": 5006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20, 1975 the High Court of Allahabad affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20, 1975 the High Court of Allahabad affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Jeeta Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5114, "end_char": 5125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jeeta Singh filed Special Leave Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Jeeta Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "172 of 1977) was allowed by a Bench consisting of Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5455, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "172 of 1977) was allowed by a Bench consisting of Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, Harbans Singh, filed Special Leave Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Harbans . Singh"}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "658 of 1978 from jail which was dismissed by Sarkaria and Shinghal, JJ."}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5655, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "658 of 1978 from jail which was dismissed by Sarkaria and Shinghal, JJ."}}, {"text": "A.P.\n\nSen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l 40/79) was dismissed by Sarkaria and A.P.\n\nSen, JJ."}}, {"text": "August 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6201, "end_char": 6216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitjoner had filed a petition to the President of India for commutation of his sentence, which was dismissed on August 22, 1981."}}, {"text": "Jetta Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of those three persons, Jetta Singh, who did not file any Review Petition or Writ Petition in this Court was executed ou October 6, •\n\n1981.", "canonical_name": "Jeeta Singh"}}, {"text": "Kasltmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other person, Kasltmira Singh, succeeded in having his death sentence commuted intCI life imprisonmen\\, The petitionei:\n\nwas to be executed on the same day on which Jeeta Singh was executed but, fortunately, he filed this Writ Petition on which we passed an order staying the execution of his death sentence.", "canonical_name": "Kasltmira Singh"}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the interest ofcomity between the powers of this Court an.ct the powers of the .President of India, it will be more jn the fitness o~ things if we were to recommend that the President of India may be so good as to exercise his power under Article 72 of the Constitution to commute the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner into imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "President of 1 India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8607, "end_char": 8617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AMARBNDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9929, "end_char": 9947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The execution of the death sentence is stayed until the decision of the President to w.hom a: copy of this judgment should be forwarded forthwith,\n\nAMARBNDRA NATH SEN, J .. I have l\\ad the benefit of reading the judgment to be delivered by the learned Chief Justice, T agree with the order proposed by him, I, however, wish to make some observations of my own.", "canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ"}}, {"text": "Kashmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons, namely, the petitioner, Kashmira Singh ani Jeeta Singh were convicted under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit by his judgment dated !", "canonical_name": "Kasltmira Singh"}}, {"text": "S. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10351, "end_char": 10357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10413, "end_char": 10448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons, namely, the petitioner, Kashmira Singh ani Jeeta Singh were convicted under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit by his judgment dated !"}}, {"text": "6th of October, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10951, "end_char": 10971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "343 of 1976) which was dismissed by this Court on 15th April, 1976, It appears that after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition of Jeeta Singh by this Court, Jeeta Singh was executed on the 6th of October, 1981."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other accused Harbans Singh who has filed this petition had also filed a special leave petition No.658of1978.", "canonical_name": "Harbans . Singh"}}, {"text": "16th October 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11534, "end_char": 11551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sj)ecial Leave Petition filed by Harbans Singh was dismissed by this Court on 16th October 1978, It appears that Harbans Singh had, applied for review of the said order of this Court and the review petition of Harbans Singh (140 of 1979) was also dismissed by this Court on 9th May, 1980, Harbans Singh had thereafter filed a petition to the President of 1 India under Art, 72 of the Constitution, The Petition of Harbans\n\n240 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSingh to the President of India was dismissed on the 22nd August, 1981."}}, {"text": "9th May, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11730, "end_char": 11743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sj)ecial Leave Petition filed by Harbans Singh was dismissed by this Court on 16th October 1978, It appears that Harbans Singh had, applied for review of the said order of this Court and the review petition of Harbans Singh (140 of 1979) was also dismissed by this Court on 9th May, 1980, Harbans Singh had thereafter filed a petition to the President of 1 India under Art, 72 of the Constitution, The Petition of Harbans\n\n240 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSingh to the President of India was dismissed on the 22nd August, 1981."}}, {"text": "President of 1 India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11798, "end_char": 11818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sj)ecial Leave Petition filed by Harbans Singh was dismissed by this Court on 16th October 1978, It appears that Harbans Singh had, applied for review of the said order of this Court and the review petition of Harbans Singh (140 of 1979) was also dismissed by this Court on 9th May, 1980, Harbans Singh had thereafter filed a petition to the President of 1 India under Art, 72 of the Constitution, The Petition of Harbans\n\n240 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1982) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSingh to the President of India was dismissed on the 22nd August, 1981.", "canonical_name": "President of 1 India"}}, {"text": "Kashmir& Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12684, "end_char": 12698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unfortunate position appears to be that in respect of the very same offence committed, one of the accused persons, namely, Jeeta Singh has already been hanged; the death sentence imposed on another accused, namely, Kashmir& Singh, has been commuted to one of life imprisonment; and Harbans Singh, the present petitioner, is now awaiting death sentence to be executed.", "canonical_name": "Kasltmira Singh"}}, {"text": "15th April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12925, "end_char": 12941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this Court dismissed the special leave petition of Jeeta Singh by its order dated 15th April, 1976, the decision of this Court in the case of Bachan Singh v: State of Panjab,(1) was not there."}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13068, "end_char": 13080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the report that Bachan Singh' s case in which constitu- tional validity of the qeath penalty wa~ upheld by this Court came to be decidd by this Court on 9th May, 1980."}}, {"text": "S.\n\n302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13446, "end_char": 13453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13461, "end_char": 13464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13604, "end_char": 13618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment of the Be11ch was delivered by Sarkaria, J. on behalf of himself, Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta and Untwalia, JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13874, "end_char": 13879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment of the Be11ch was delivered by Sarkaria, J. on behalf of himself, Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta and Untwalia, JJ."}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13884, "end_char": 13892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment of the Be11ch was delivered by Sarkaria, J. on behalf of himself, Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta and Untwalia, JJ."}}, {"text": "sec 684", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14372, "end_char": 14379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Kasbmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that at the time the special leave petition of Kasbmira Singh was entertained by this Court' and his death sentence was commuted by an order of this Court dated 10th April, 1977, the decision in the case of Bachan Singh was not there, though various other decisions which came to be co_nsidered' in the case of Bachan Singh were there.", "canonical_name": "Kasltmira Singh"}}, {"text": "10th April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15190, "end_char": 15206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that at the time the special leave petition of Kasbmira Singh was entertained by this Court' and his death sentence was commuted by an order of this Court dated 10th April, 1977, the decision in the case of Bachan Singh was not there, though various other decisions which came to be co_nsidered' in the case of Bachan Singh were there."}}, {"text": "9th of May, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15559, "end_char": 15575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The review petition was D also dismissed by a Bench pr_esided over by Sarkaria, J. on the 9th of May, 1980, the very day on which Bachan Singh's case appears to have been decided."}}, {"text": "Harbans Sfngh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16552, "end_char": 16565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "my mind, the Bench would not have dismissed the special leave petition and the review petition of Harbans Sfngh and would have commuted his death sentence to one of life imprisonment, had the Bench been informed that in the identical case, the co-accused of the petitioner had earlier filed a special leave petition which had already been entertained by this Court and the capital punishment of the co-accused Kashmira Singh had been commuted by this Court to one of.", "canonical_name": "Harbans . Singh"}}, {"text": "SIJPRBME COIJRT REPORTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16965, "end_char": 16988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that\n\nSIJPRBME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(i982) 3 S.C.R,\n\nthe responsibility, involvement and complicity of the petitioner Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence is the same as that of the co-accused Kashmira Singh."}}, {"text": "President of india", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17243, "end_char": 17261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As I have earlier noticed, Harbans Singh had filed a petition to the President of india after the dismissal of his petition for Special Leave and hi~ petition for review by this Court for commu talion of death sentence and the said Petition of Harbans Singh has also been rejected by the President.", "canonical_name": "President of 1 India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 32 and 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19793, "end_char": 19809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1982_3_244_250_EN", "year": 1982, "text": "PADMA SRINlVASAN\n\nPREMIER INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nFebruary 16, 1982.\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND\n\nD.A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nMotor Vehicles Act 1939, s. 95(2)(a) as amended by Motor Vehicles ( Amtndment) Act 56 of 1969-Applicability of.\n\nAccident claim_:_Liabilily of insurer-Material date for ascertainment of exten.t of liability- Whether date of accident or date of insurance policy.\n\nContract-Contract in accordance with a particular. statute law but not identifying the provision of law-Breach of contract-Determination of quantum of damages-Law in force on date breach of contract committd or law in force on date contract made.\n\nSection 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 prescribes the requirements of an insU.rance policy and the \"limits of liability\" thereunder. Section 95(2) (a) was amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 56 of 1969 to provide that the insurer's liability under a policy of insurance be increased from the existing \"twentythousand rupees\" to \"fifty-thousand rupees\". The amendtnent came into force on March 2, 1970.\n\nThe appellant's husband, who was driving a scooter was knocked down dead by a truck on April 5~ 1970. The owner of the truck bad taken a statutory insurance policy with the respondent which was operative from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970.\n\nThe appellant. filed an application before the Motor Accident's Claims Tribunal under section 1 lOA of the Act seeking compensation for her husband's death. The respondent denied its liability and contested the application The Tribunal passed an award holding that the appellant was entitled to recover compensation in the sum of Rs. 60,000 for self and her children, but limited the liability of the respondent-insurer to a sum of Rs. 50,000.\n\nThe respondent in its appeal to the High Court contended that on the date on which the insurance policy was issued, its statutory liability was limited to a H sum Rs, 20,000 only, and therefore the Tribunal was in error in passing an award against it for a sum of Rs. 50,000. This contention was accepted, and the appeal was allowed.\n\nPADMA V. PREMIER INSURANCE CO. 245\n\nIn the claimant •s appeal to this Court on the question whether the insurers liability for third party risks under the statutory. policy must be held to be limited to Rs. 20,000 according to the relevant legal provision as it existed on the date on which the policy came into force, or wheiher that liability can be extended to Rs. 50,000 in accordance with f:he legal provision as it stood on the date of the accident, the accident having occurred during the currency of the policy.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. The material date for ascertaining the extent of liability of the insurer is the date of the accrual of the cause of action for a claim arising out of an accident, which in general would be the ate of the accident and therefore, the insurer's Jiability arising out of an accident which happens after March 2, 1970 has to be determined on the basis of the amended provisions of section 95(2)\n\n(a) of the Act, even though the policy of insurance may have been issued prior to th~ date of the amendment, that is, prior to March 2, 1970. [249 G-H; 250ABl\n\n2. The governing factor for determiniD.g the application of the appropriate law is not the da.te on which the policy of insurance came into force, but the date on which the cause of action accrued foi; enforciD.g liability arising under\n\nthe terms of tho policy. [248 G] D\n\n3. The application of a Jaw to facts which came into existence after that law has come into force does not involve giving retrospective operation to the law, merely because _the fcts to which the law is being applied are relatable to a contract or an instrument whfoh had com~ into operation prior to the date on which the law itself had come into force. [249 E-F) ·\n\n4. If the parties to a contract agree that one shall pay to the oiher damages for breach of contract in accordance with the law contained in any particular l'tatute without identifying the law as the provision Which is in force on the date of the contract, the Jaw which will apply for determining the quantum of damages is the one which is in force on which the breach of contract is committed, that being 'the date on which the caus~ of action arises, and not the law which was in force on the dte on which tbe contract was n1ade. (249 B-C]\n\nIn. the instant case, the insurance policy came into fQrce on June 30, 1969 and. covered the period from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970. The amendment by which the statutory liability of the insurer was increased from Rs. 20,000 to Rs: 50,000 came into force on March 2, 1970. The accident which gave rise to these proceedings occurred on April 5, 1970. The extent of the insurer's liability must therefore be determined by the application of the law introduced by the Amendment which had come into force before the date of accident. [248C; 249E]\n\nSanjiva Shelly S. v. Anantha, [1978] 2 Kamataka Law Journal 227, approved.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1282 of 1976.\n\nSUPREM~ COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.C.R.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated the 8th and 9th January 1976 of the Karnataka High Cort in Misc. First Appeal No. 19 of 1973.\n\nK.N. Bhatt for the Appellant.\n\nK.C. Dua for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was. delivered by_\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This appeal by certificate of fitness arises ont of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated January 9, 1976 in Misc. First Appeal No. 19 of 1973.\n\nOn April 5, 1970, the appellant's husband was driving. a scooter, MYL 8574, on the Kasturba Road, Bangalore, when a goods truck, MYT 3298, knocked him dead. The owner of the truck had taken a statutory insurance policy with the respondent.\n\nThe Premier Insurance Co. J., td., Gandhinagar, Bangalore, which was operative from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970. The appellant filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore, under section 110-A of the Mo.tor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking compensation for her husband's death. The respondent denied its liability on the ground, amongst others, that its record did not disclose that it had issued any insurance policy in respect . of the particular truck. On a consideration of the entire evidence, the Tribunal passed an award on November 20, I 972, holding that the appellant was entitled to recover compensation in t.Jie sum of Rs. 60,000 for herself and her children. The Tribunal limited the liability of the respondent-insurer to a sum of Rs. 50,000.\n\nThe respondent filed an appeal in the High Couri contending that on the date on which the insurance policy was alleged to have been issued by it, its statutory liability was limited to a sum of Rs. 20,000 only and, therefore, the Tribunal was in error in passing an award against it in the sum of Rs. 50,000. This contention was accepted by the High Court and hence this appeal by the claimant.\n\nH Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (The Act), bears the heading \"Insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks\". By section 94 (I) of the Act, no person can use a motor\n\nvehicle in a public place, except as a passenger, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of the chapter. Section 95 prescribes the requirements of the insurance policy and the \"limits of\n\nliability\" thereunder. Broadly, by sub-section (I) of section 95, a policy of insurance must insure the person or classes of persons speeified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Section 95\n\n(2) (a) of the Act, with which alone we are concerned in this appeal, was originally cast thus :\n\n\"95 (2)-Subject to the proviso to sub-section (I}, a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely -\n\n(a) where the vehicle is a vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of goods, a limit of twenty thousand rupees.\"\n\nThis section was amended by Amendment Act I 00 of I 956 which, inter alia, introduced therein tho words \"in all\" after the words \"twenty thousand rupees\".\n\nWe are not concerned with that\n\namendt. What we are concerned with is the amendment made to clause (a) of section 95 (2; by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 56 of 1969, which substituted therein the word \"fifty\" for the word \"twenty\". Section 95 (2) (a) so amended reads thus :\n\n\"95 (2)-Subject to the proviso to sub-section (I), a policy\n\nof insurance shall cover any liability incurred in\n\nrespect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely :- ·\n\n(a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all ....... \"\n\nThus, the insurer's liability under the statutory policy was increased by this amendment from twenty thousand rupees to fifty thousand\n\n~J:Upees. The amendment came into force on March 2i 1970,\n\n248 SUPRllME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c.R. ·\n\nThe question which arises for consideration is whether the insurer's liability for third party risks under the statutory policy must be held to be limited to Rs. 20,000 according to the relevant legal provision as it existed on the date on which the policy came into force or, whether, that liability can be extended to Rs. 50,000 in accordance wi i h the legal provision as it stood on the date of the accident, the accident having occurred during the currency of the policy. The relevant dates which have to be borne in mind in this behalf are these : The insurance policy came into force on June 30, 1969 and covered the period from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970; the amendment by which the statutory liability of the insurer was increased from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 50,000 came into force on March 2,\n\n1970, and the accident which gave rise to these proceedings\" occurred on April 5, 1970.\n\nThe High Court, in its judgment, has referred to the principles governing retrospectivity of statutes and has held by the application of those principles that the amendment introduced by Amending Act 56 of 1969 is prospective in nature and cannot be given any retrospective effect. We consider that. the High Court, with respect, has failed to appreciate the true nature of the issue before it. The certificate of insurance, Exhibit p. 9, which was issued by the respondent's agent on May 31, 196Q for the period June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970 shows that the respondent-insurer had undertaken \"liability as the one under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act,\n\n1939\". That must mean liability as determinable und~[, Chapter VIII at the relevant time, that is to say, at the time when the liability arises.\n\nSince the liability of the insurer to pay a claim under a motor-accident policy arises on the occurrence of the . accident and not until then, one must necessarily have regard to the state of the law obtaining at the time of the accident for determining the extent of the insurer's liability under a statutory policy. In this behalf, the governing factor for determining the application of the appropriate law is not the date on which the policy of insurance came into force but the date on which the cause of action accrued for enforcing liability arisin~ under the terms of the policy. That we consider to be a reasonable manner in which to understand and interpret the contract of insurance entered into by the insured and the insurer in this case. The contraeting parties did not incorporate the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act in their contract.\n\nThat is to say, they di~ not identify the liability of the promisor on\n\nthe basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII as they stood on the date when the contract was made. They merely• referred to the provi sions of Chapter VIII, which means \"the provisions of Chapter VIII in force at any given time\", the given time being the date on which the right to sue accrues or, correspondingly, the liability arises. If the parties to a contract agree that one shall pay to the othe.r damages for breach of contract in accordance with the law contained in any particular statute, without identifying the law as the provision which is in force on the date of the contract, the law which will apply for determining the quantum of damages is the one which is in force on the date on which the breach of contract is committed, that being the date on which the cause of action arises, and not the law which was in force on the date on which the contract was made.\n\nThus, there is no question here, as the High Court thought, of giving retrospective operation to the amendment introduced by\n\nAmending Act 56 of 1969, by which the statutory liability of D the insurer was increased from twenty thousand rupees to fifty thousand rupees with .effect from March 2, 1970.\n\nThat question would have arisen if the accident had happened prior to that date. The accident having happened on April 5, 1970, the question as to the extent of the insurer's liability must be deter mined by the application of the law)ntroduced by the Amendment E which had come into force before the date of the accident. The application of a law to facts which come into existence after that law has come into force does not involve giving .retrospective operation to the law, merely because the facts to which the law is being applied are relatable to a contract or an instrument which had come into operation prior to the date on which the law itself had come into force.\n\nWe endorse the view taken by the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Sanjiva Shetty S. v. Anantha.(1) The Full Bench overruled the judgment which is under appeal in the instant case and held that the material date for ascertaining the extent of liability of the insurer is the date of the accrual of the cause of action for a claim arising out of an accident, which in general would be the date o{ the accident and therefore, the insurer's liability arising out of an accident which happens after March 2, 1970, has to be\n\n(!) (1978] 2 Karnataka Law Journal 227,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.a.\n\ndetermined on the basis of the amended provisions of section 95 (2)\n\n(a) of the Act,· even •though the policy of insurance may have been issued prior to the date of the amendment, that is, prior to March 2, 1970.\n\nFor these reasons, we set aside the judgment of the High Court, restore the award of the Tribunal dated November 20, 1972 and allow the appeal with costs throughout.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "PADMA SRINlVASAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PADMA SRINlVASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PREMIER INSURANCE CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREMIER INSURANCE CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 16, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 16, 1982."}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 95(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 664, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 95(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939"}}, {"text": "March 2, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendtnent came into force on March 2, 1970."}}, {"text": "April 5~ 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1149, "end_char": 1162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's husband, who was driving a scooter was knocked down dead by a truck on April 5~ 1970."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1271, "end_char": 1284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The owner of the truck bad taken a statutory insurance policy with the respondent which was operative from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1288, "end_char": 1301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The owner of the truck bad taken a statutory insurance policy with the respondent which was operative from June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970."}}, {"text": "Motor Accident's Claims Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1351, "end_char": 1383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed an application before the Motor Accident's Claims Tribunal under section 1 lOA of the Act seeking compensation for her husband's death."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1390, "end_char": 1399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939"}}, {"text": "section 95(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 5, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4714, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accident which gave rise to these proceedings occurred on April 5, 1970."}}, {"text": "K.N. Bhatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Bhatt for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Dua for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by_\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This appeal by certificate of fitness arises ont of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated January 9, 1976 in Misc."}}, {"text": "Karnataka High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5428, "end_char": 5448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by_\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J. This appeal by certificate of fitness arises ont of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated January 9, 1976 in Misc."}}, {"text": "Premier Insurance Co. J., td., Gandhinagar, Bangalore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Premier Insurance Co. J., td.,"}}, {"text": "Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore, under section 110-A of the Mo.tor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking compensation for her husband's death."}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 20, I 972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a consideration of the entire evidence, the Tribunal passed an award on November 20, I 972, holding that the appellant was entitled to recover compensation in t.Jie sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6935, "end_char": 6979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7069, "end_char": 7079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7306, "end_char": 7316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7443, "end_char": 7453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7776, "end_char": 7786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8581, "end_char": 8591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 2i 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9078, "end_char": 9091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment came into force on March 2i 1970,\n\n248 SUPRllME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1982) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "March 2,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9934, "end_char": 9948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 came into force on March 2,\n\n1970, and the accident which gave rise to these proceedings\" occurred on April 5, 1970."}}, {"text": "May 31, 196Q", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificate of insurance, Exhibit p. 9, which was issued by the respondent's agent on May 31, 196Q for the period June 30, 1969 to June 29, 1970 shows that the respondent-insurer had undertaken \"liability as the one under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act,\n\n1939\"."}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10654, "end_char": 10692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14291, "end_char": 14301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14556, "end_char": 14573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, we set aside the judgment of the High Court, restore the award of the Tribunal dated November 20, 1972 and allow the appeal with costs throughout."}}]}