• •

SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,

WEST BENGAL

SATYEN BHOWMICK AND ORS.

January 15, 1981

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]

Official Secrets Act-Section 14-Scope of-Advocate taking, notes on evidence of witnesses in respect of proceedings held in camera-Court, if could . prohibit taking notes-Court 'if could compel the advocate to produce his notes for inspection-Advocate if could claim privilege under section 126 of Evidence C Act.

Section 14 of the Official Secrets Act provides that in addition to and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offenc.e under this Act, the prosecution makes an application that publication of any evidence to be given would be prejudicial D to the safety of the State. The Court may make an order prohibiting the publication of evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of proceedings if it is of opinion that the proceedings 'vould be prejudicial to the safety of the State.

On the allegation that the accused had passed on some military secrets to the enemy resulting in serious detriment to the safety and security of the country E the accused were charge-sheeted under sections 3, 9 and ,10 of the Act.

During the commitment inquiry the prosecution prayed that the accused should not be allowed to have access to or be given copies of statements of witnesses recorded by the Magistrate. The defence lawyers were allowed to take notes of the statements of witnesses. When the Magistrate asked the defence Ja, vyers to produce their note-books for perusal, they claJmed privilege F under section 126 of the Evidence Act on the ground that they contained certain instructions given to them by the accused which amounted to privileged communication and that for this reason they could not be looked into by the Court.

The Magistrate upheld the objection .

Purporting to folloW one of its earlier decisions the High Court in a revision filed by the State held that the Magistrate should have taken legal action against G the lawyer for flouting its order by not producing the note-books on the ground of privilege. It also held that in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Act not only could the public be excluded from the hearing but evP:n the statements of witnesses recorded by the C.ourt could not be made available to the accused or his counsel.

In appeal to this Court it was contended that the opening words of section 14 H really amounted to a non-obstante clause overriding the provisions of all Acts including the Code of Criminal Procedure and the mode of trial contemplated 'hy section 14 would take precedence over the mode of trial provided bys. 251-A

ors. 252 of the Code and (2) the l\, Iagirr:-:tc could not only hold the proceedings in camera but could exclude publication of any evidence, including the right of accused to get notes of the statements recorded during the police investigation or during inquiry or trial.

HELD : The opening words of section 14 'in addition and without prejudice to any powers \Vhich a Court may possess" clearly reval that the intention B of the legislature was to give only an enabling additional power to the Court regarding holding of the proceedings in camera. The legislature never intended that the inherent powers possessed by the Court to hold the proceedings in camera in suitable cases should in any way be affected by section 14.

The intention was merely to give an addition<il power to strengthen the hands of the Court for holding the proceedings in camera where tbe necessities of the situation demanded. [669F-H] c

It is we11 settkd that a non-obstante clause has the efft:l"t of overriding the provisions of a law or of the law in which the said clause is inserted.

The non-obstante clause cannot reasonably be read as overriding anythil)g contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment.

Normally a non-obstante clause is always expressed in a negative form i.e. by using the words "notwithstanding anything contained" or "an:Ything contained in previous law shall not affect the provisions of a particular Act" and so on.

[670B-EJ

In the instant case the words "in addition and without prejudice to any powers" cannot be construed to be a non-obstante clause at all so as to override other provisions of the Act or those of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

[670EJ

E Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. [1953] S.C.R.

referred to.

Interpretation of Statutes, Vepa P. Sarathi, 2nd Edn. referred to.

Section 14 not only confers powers on a Court for holding the proceedings. in camera but also to exclude publication of any evidence \Vhich includes theright of the accused to get copies of the statements recorded during police investigation or during the inquiry or during tria-1.

[670G]

The right to obtain copies of statements of witnesses recorded by the police is a very valuable right because without having those statements in his possession, it would be difficult for the accused to defend himself effectively. If an accused is not supplied either the statements recorded by the police or the statements of witnesses recorded at the inquiry or the trial he cannot defend himself and instruct his lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses successfully and eITectively so as to disprove the prosecution cnse.

[671D~E]

Section 14, therefore, could never have intended to take away or deprive an accused of this valuable right which has been conferred on him by the Criminal law of the land. The first part of the section does not prohibit or exclude giving to 3n accused person copies of the statements of witnesse"i either during police investigation or in court but is mentioned merely as a motive or reason for holding proceedings in camera.

The entire sentence starting from "application is m<tde by the prosecution on the ground that the publication of any evidence to he given or of any statement to be made in the course of the

SUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWMICK (Faza/ Ali, J.) 663

proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State" that all or any A portion of the public should be excluded during any part of the bearing has to be read conjunctively as one composite sentence and there is no wan-ant for truncating it into two separate parts dealing with diiierent subject matters. The words 'publication of any evidence' do not indicate that the accused should not be allowed access to the evidence recorded by the Court : they are merely made to highlight the ground for holding the proceedings in camera because if public are allowed to be present during the hearing the evidence which is B recorded in their presence will amount to publication and it is in that sense <done that the word publication -has been used in section 14.

[671F-HJ

If it is held tbat section 14, by using the word 'publication' deprives an accused of getting any copies of the statement of witnesses or of the judgment under section 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Criminal Rules of Practice framed by the High Court then it would be difficult to uphold the C constitutional validity of section 14 because in that event the procedure would become extremely unreasonable, harsh and prejudicial to the accused as a result of which the case would have been tried according to a procedure which was not in consonance with the provisions of article 21 of the Constitution. [6720-H]

The apprehension that if the accused was allowed access to copies of statements recorded by the police or the Magistrate it would amount to publication, is not well founded.

Under the provisions of section 5 of the Act, any person who is found in possession or control of any document or information and niak.es it public would also be deemed to have committed an offence under that section and would be prosecuted and liable to a heavy penalty. This prohibits even the lawyers from disclosing the evidence outside the Court.

[673B-C]

In the instant case the Magistrate \Vas fully justified in not compelling the lawyer to surrender his register which contained a part of the privileged com- 1nunication and even if the lawyer had taken down the evidence in extcn<; o for the Jimited purpose of using it to defend the accused or cros5-examine the \vitnesses, he could not be prevented from doing so, nor does section 14 contemplate or envisage such a course of action. [673E-FJ

The Superintendent and Reme1nbrancer of Legal Affairs, Wt>st Bengal v.

F Satyen Bhawrnik & Ors., A.I.R. 1970 C<llcutta 535, overruled.

Anthony A!lc11 Fletcher v. Starl' 78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 313 approved.

Narcsh Shridhar Mirajkar & On-. \'. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [1966} 3 S.C.R. 744 relied on.

CRIMINAi APPELLATE JL'RISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 368 ol 1975

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 5-4-1974 of the Calcutta High Court in Cr!. Revn. No. 193 of 1971.

D. N. Mukherjee, M. M. Kshtriy11. A. K.

Ganguli and G.

Chatterjee fo1 the appellant.

T. S. Arora for RR 1, 3 to 17.

A Uma Dutta for Respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAZAL Au, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated April 5, 1974 of the Calcutta High Court by which the order of the trial court was set aside and the case was remitted for fresh hearing in the light of the directions given by the High Court.

The High Court further directed that the Commitment Inquiry held by Mr. R. P. Roy Chowdhury who was the Trial Magistrate, should be held by some other Magistrate.

The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and the central controversy turns upon the interpretation of s. 14 of the Official

Secrets Act., 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It appears that a complaint was filed on the 20th March 1969 against 38 accused persons under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 3 9, and l 0 of the Act.

The charges against the accused were no doubt very serious and concerned the security of the State, as the 2ccused persons are alleged to have passed 011 some military secrets to the enemy resulting in serious detriment to the safety and security of our cormtry. _ Of the 38 accused persons named in the chargesheet, only 17 were in custody and a commitment inquiry into the charges was held against them by the trial Magistrate.

During the commitment inquiry the State filed an application under s. 14 of the Act praying that the proceedings be held in camera and public should be excluded from attending the hearings of the case because the statements made in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State.

It was also prayed that apart F from excluding the public from the hearings of the proceeding, the accused should not be allowed to have access to, or be given copies of, the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Magistrate or those recorded earlier during police investigation.

The Magistrate partly allowed the application but permitted the defence lawyer to take copious notes of the statements of witnesss in order to be in a position G to cross-examine the witnesses.

Subsequently, the Magistrate directed the lawyer to produce his notebook so that the Magistrate may examine if only a summary of the evidence had been taken by the lawyer or the statements had been taken in extenso in which case it would amount to publication and, therefore, would be barred by s. 14 of the Act.

The lawyer of the defence appearing before the Magistrate first agreed to show his note-book but later claimed privilege under s. 126 of the

~· Evidence Act on the ground that the register in which he had takeri down the notes of the evidence also contained certain instructions given

to him which amounted to a privileged communication and could not be looked into by the Court.

In this view of the matter the Magistrat~ found himself helpless and proceeded with the inquiry. As the prosecution was nor satisfied with the procedure adopted by the Magistrate, the State filed a revision before the High Court for quashing of the order of the Magistrate in allowing the lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses without impounding the notes comprising the statements of the witnesses taken down in extenso by the lawyer.

The High Court after hearing the counsel for the parties thoroughly examined the entire position and ultimately came to a finding that the Magistrate should have taken legal action against the lawyer for flouting the orders of the Court by not producing the notebook on the plea C of privilege which did not hold any water.

The High Court was further of the opinion that in view of the provisions of s. 14 of the Act not: only could the public be excluded from taking part at the hearing but even the statements of witnesses recorded by the court or other documents could not be made available to the accused or his counsel nor could copies of the said documents be given to the accused. In this view of the matter the High Court quashed the order of the Magistrate and remitted the case to the trial court to be heard by some other Magistrate in view of the directions given by it.

Hence, this appeal to this Court.

We have been taken through the entire judgment of the High Court by the learned counsel for the parties.

The two Judges who decided the case agreed in the conclusion but have given separate reasons for coming to the conclusion arrived at by them.

The only question that is to be determined in the present appeal is as to the scope and ambit of s. 14 of the Act.

Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the State, however, submitted that on a close scrutiny of the language employed in s. 14, it wonld appear that the statute contains •a two-fold bar-0) that publication of any evidence cannot be given, and (2) that public should be excluded from attending the hearing of the proceedings.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that s. 14 does not in any way deprive the valuable right of the accused to get copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the commitment inquiry or the documents or statements recorded by the police which is a statutory right conferred on the accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal rules framed thereunder by various High Courts. All that s. 14 prohibits is that the public be excluded from attending the hearings of the inquiry.

Since the Magistrate had already acceded to this prayer of the accused, there was nothing more that could be done by him.

D ..

It appears that the Calcutta High Court has been consistently taking the view as adumbrated by the learned counsel for the appellant, viz., that the court has a discretion under s. 14 of the Act not only to hold the proceedings in camera by excluding the public but also has the discretion to prohibit publication of any evidence given in the course of the proceedings.

In Rame11dra Singh v. Mohit Choudhary & Ors.(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court went to the extent of holding that the Act prescribes a special procedure and, therefore, overrides the procedure for trial under s. 251 A or 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Act of 1955. In this connection, the High Court observed as follows :-

"The prosecution is under the Official Secrets Act and, it is unlikely that the Legislature would provide for a camera trial and at the same time provide for giving copies of all documents under section 173 to the accused.

This strikes at the root of secrecy and goes counter to the provisions of trial in camera and this is why the Legislature purposely used the word 'complaint' and provided for a special procedure regarding cognisance.

This view finds support from the provisions of Section 14 of the Act providing for camera trial.

The Official Secrets Act provides for a special procedure of com plaint and if it was upon a complaint by a person authorised under the Act, cognisance was taken under Section 190(1)(a)and not under Section 190(1)(b).

The procedure for trial would therefore, be under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under Section 251A. In respect of prosecution under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no compulsory provision for giving copies of documents referred to under Section 173 and the opposite parties are not, therefore, entitled to copies as of right."

The decision under appeal follows the aforesaid decision and has taken the same 'ew. In a later decision in In Re Anthony Allen Fletcher v. State('), the Calcutta High Court seems to have struck a slightly different note.

In that case, the court was considering the question of bail and the exclusion of the public from attending the H bearing of the case, where the following observations were made :

(!) AIR 1969 Calcutta 535.

(2) 78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 313.

'On a consideration of the provisions of the Statute as also the imprimatur of the judicial decisions, we ultimately hold that in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 14 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 when it reasonably appears to the Court that a trial eatiis apertfa would have the risk of any publication of any evidence to be given or any statements to be made in course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State, the Court in exercise of its discretion can exclude the public from such proceedings

and that this power is in addition to the inherent power exercised by the Court to do justice."

It may be noticed that the High Court did not go to the extremr~ of holding that even the statements or evidence recorded by the Magistrate in the course of th~ proceedings would have to be excluded under s. 14.

All that was held by the High Court was that the Court has a discretion to exclude the public from the proceedings and that this power of exclusion was available to the court apart from the inherent power which ewry Court possessed in this matter.

With dur' respect we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by th'

Calcutta High Court in Fletcher's case (supra) as mentioned above.

However, we find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken b; r the High Court in the judgment under appeal for the reasons that wt: shall give hereafter.

We might also mention that s. 14 was interpreted by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State af Maharashtra & Anr. ( '), where this Court while dealing with the question of holding proceedings in camera observed as follows :-

"Having thus ehnnciated the universally accepted proposition in favour of open trials, it is necessary to consider whether this rule admits of any exceptions or not.

Cases may occur where the requiremnt of the administration of justice itself may make it necessary for the court to hold a trial in camera.

While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot overlook the fact that the primary function of the Judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a case is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? .......... That is why we

(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744

668 SUPREME tOURT REPORTS (1981] 2 s.c.R.

feel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if th~ ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. . . . . . . . . It is the fair administration of justice which is the end of judicial process, and so, if ever a real conflict arises between fair administration of justice itself on the one hand, and public trial on the other, inevitably, public trial may have to be regulated or controlled in the interest of administration of justice."

While interpreting the scope and ambit of s. 14 this Court inc Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars case (supra) observed as follows :-

"It would be noticed that while making a specific provision authorising the court to exclude all or any portion of the public from a trial, s. 14 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers by its opening clause."

It may be pertinent to note that while this Court was fully alive to the contents of s. 14, it neither held that the opening part of the section amounted to a non obstante clause nor that the section in any way deprived the accused of the right of getting copies of the statements. of witnesses recorded by the court or before the police. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was concerned with a defamation case but the obs.ervations made by this Court fully apply to the_ facts of the present case also on the view that we take: on. the scope and ambit of s. 14 of the Act.

There can be no doubt that an open trial held in public is the general rule and seems to be the very concomitant of a fair and reasonable trial, yet the public can be excluded from the hearings of the trial and the proceedings can be held in camera only under very exceptional circumstances as pointed out by this Court in the aforesaid rose. This being the position, section 14 must be interpreted so as to fall in line with the observations made and the test laid down by this Court regarding the doctrine of holding proceedings in camera.

A close and careful scrutiny of s. 14 would itself clearly show that the section does hot contemplate the type of exclusion that the High Court seems to think.

It is true that offences under the Act are very serious offences and maintenance of secrecy is of the very essence of the matter but that by itself will not justify the legislature to pass an Act so as to deprive H an accused of the valuable right to defend or for that matter to stifle the defence itself.

The importance of holding trial in camera in cases under the Official Secrets Act has been emphasised iin R. v. Socialist -

~-".

~UPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWMICK (Fazal Ali,!.) 6 69

Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd. & Anr.(1), where Lord Widgery, A C. J., observed as follows :-

"When one has an order for trial in camera, all the public and all the press are evicted at one fell swoop and the entire supervision by the public is gone ..... The actual conduct of the trial, the success or otherwise of the defendant, does B not turn on this kind of thing, and very often the only value of the witness's name being given as opposed to it being withheld is that if it is published up and down the country other witnesses may discover that they can help in regard to the case and come forward."

With this background we shall now proceed to examine the language of section 14 of the Act itself which may be extracted thus :-

"14. Exclusion of public from proceedings.

In addition and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offence under this Act or the proceedings on appeal, or in the course of the trial of a person under this Act, application is made by the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State, that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the Court may make an order to that effect, but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place in public."

To begin with, the opening words of the section, namely, 'In addition and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may • possess' clearly reveal that the intention of the legislature was to give

- , Oll!y an enabling additional power to the court regarding holding the proceedings in camera.

In other words, the legislature never intended that the inherent powers possessed by the court to hold the proceeding in camera in suitable cases would be in any way affected by section 14 but the intention was merely to give an additional power to strengthen the hands of the court for holding the proceedings in camera where the necessities of the situation demanded.

Thus, to begin with, section 14 is merely an enabling and not a barring provision. Mr.

Mukherjee argued that the opening woros of section 14, referred to above, really amount to a non-obstante clause overriding the provisiOllll

(l) [1975] l All ER 142.

!0-152SCI/81

of all Acts including the Code of Criminal Procedure and the mode of trial contemplated by s. 14 would take precedence over the mode of trial provided by s. 251 A or 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

We are, however, unable to agree with this extreme argument wliich in fact overstates the law. It is well settled that a non-obstante clause has doubtless the effect Olf overriding the provisions of a law or of the law in which the said clause is inserted. Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes'''' defines a non-obstante clause thus :-

"A section sometimes begins with the phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained etc.'.

Such a clause is called a non-obstante clause and its general purpose is to give the provision contained in the non-obstante clause an overriding effect in the event of a conflict between it and the rest of the Secti-On."

In Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v.

Arabinda Bose & Anr.(').

Sastri, C.J., held that the non-obstante clause cannot reasonably be read as overriding anything contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment.

These are the well settled rules of interpretation of a non-obstante clause.

Normally, a non-obstante clause is always expressed in a negative form, that is to say, by using the words 'notwithstanding anything contained' or 'anything contained in a previous law shall not affect the provisions of a particular Act' and so on. In the instant case, the words 'in addition and without prejudice to any powers cannot be construed to be a nonohstante clause at all so as to override other provisions of the Act or those of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In these circumstances, therefore, the argument of Mr. Mukherjee that the opening words of s. 14 amount to a non-obstante clause cannot be accepted on a simple and plain interpretation of the opening part of section 14.

This takes us to the substantive portion of the Act on which reliance was placed both by Mr. Mukherjee and by the High Court so ) as to hold that the section not only conferred powers on a court foi:- .. t . . holding the proceedings in camera but !llso to exclude publication of

iny evidence which includes the right of the accused to get copies of the statements recorded during police investigation or during the inquiry or during trial. With great respect to the learned Jndges of the Calcutta High Court, we feel that the main part of the section has not been correctly inrerpreted by them.

The High Court seems to have taken for granted that section 14 consists of two separate parts, one, providing for a trial in camera, and the other prohibiting publication of

•S:cond Bdn, P. 422.

: (I) [19531 SCR I,

evidence.

By the expression 'publication of evidence' is meant, according to the High Court, the power to deprive an accused of the

right to get copies of the evidence recorded by the court or the statO.:' ments recorded during the police investigation.

We might mention: here that as s. 13(3) of the Act clearly provides that no court shall

take cognizance of any offence under the Act except upon a complaint made by or under the authority of the Government or any person em,

powered by it, it is manifest that s. 251 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by the Act of 1955, will not apply because the present case was not inslituted on a police report but on the basis of a complaint. As the occurrence had taken place before the Code of 1973, therefore, the provisions of s. 207 of the Code of 1973 would

not apply to the present case.

The question, however, is: does the first part of s. 14 empower the court to take away the valuable right of an accused of getting copies of the statements recorded by the Magistrate before the Court ? Even before the amending Act of 1955, under the criminal rules framed by various High Courts, an accused was undoubtedly entitled to have copies of the statements of witnesses recorded by the police.

This is a very valuable right because without having the statements recorded by the police in his possession, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an accused to defend himself effectively.

It is well settled that fouler the crime the higher should be the proof. If an accused is not supplied either the statements recorded by the police or the statement of witnesses recorded at the inquiry or the trial, how can be possibly defend himself and instruct his lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses successfully and effectively so as to disprove the prosecution case. We, therefore, think that s. 14 could never have intended to take away or deprive an accused of this valuable right which has been conferred on him by the criminal law of the land. The legislature when it passed the Act in 1923 was aware of the provisions of the Code of Criminal ,!Procedure which had conferred the valuable right on an accused in order to defend himself.

Indeed, if any of these rights were to be taken away, we should have expected a clearer and more specific language used in section 14 to connote such an intention. Our reading of s. 14 is merely this : that the first part of the section does not prohibit or exclude giving to an accused copies of the statements of witnesses either during police investigation or in court but is mentioned merely as a motive or reason for holding the proceedings in camera.

The entire sentence starting from 'application is made by the prosecution. on the ground that the publication of any evidence to he given or of any statement to be made in the course of tbe proceedings would be prejudicial to tbe safety of the State, that all or any portion of the

public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing' has to be read conjunctively as one composite sentence and there is no warrant for truncating it into two separate parts dealing with different subject matters.

The words 'publication of any evidence' on which great stress has been laid by Mr. Mukherjee and the High Court do not indicate that the accused should not be allowed access to the evidence recorded by the court, are merely made to highlight the ground for holding the proceedings in camera because if public are allowed to be present during the hearing the evidence which is recorded in their presence it will amount to publication and it is in that sense alone that the word 'publication' has been used in section 14.

Indeed, if the interpretation put by the High Court or by Mr. - Mukherjee is accepted then the provisions of section 14 will have to be struck down as being violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

This. Court has now widened the horizon of the concept of liberty, as contained in Art. 21 so as to give the word 'procedure' a very wide counotation. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (') while detailing the attributes of a fair trial as contemplated in Art. 21 this Court observed as follows :-

"The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 mnst answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied."

Thus, if we hold that s. 14 by usin~ the word 'publication' deprives i_ an accused of getting any copies of the statement of witnesses or 'Of

the judgment under s. 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Criminal Rules 308 and 3 IO framed by the Calcutta High Court, then it would be difficult to uphold the constitutional validity of s. 14 because then the procedure would become extremely unreasonable harsh and prejudicial to the accused as a result of which the case would have been tried according to a procedure which was not in consonance with the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been considered by the High Court perhaps because Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) came much later.

Mr. Mukherjee submitted that if the accused is allowed to have access to the statements recorded by the police or is given a copy of the statement recorded by the Magislrate, then it will amount to publication and will en4anger the safety and security of the country becaus0

the accused or the lawyer who is defending the accused may publish the statements or disclose the same to other persons. This apprehension, in our opinion, is not well founded.

The Act itself takes particular "care of such a situation because under the provisions of s. 5 of the Act any person who is found in possession or control of any document or information and makes it public would also be deemed to have committed an offence under that section and would be prosecuted and , entitled to a heavy penalty.

This, therefore, prohibits even the lawyers from disclosing the evidence outside the court. So far as the arguments and the discussion of the evidence inside the court is concerned, so long as the proceedings are in camera the danger of publication is completely excluded.

The High Court had been rather bitter on the trial Magistrate when it observed that he could compel the lawyer to submit his register. Tho observations made by the High Court on the conduct of the Magistrate or on the lawyer were not at all called for because both of them were doing their duties according to law. On the view that we have taken, the Magistrate was fully justified in not compelling the lawyer to surrender his register which undoubtedly contained a part of the privileged communication and even if the lawyer had taken down the evidence in exlenso for the limited purpose of using it to defend the

accused or cross-examine the witnesses, he could not be prevented from doing so, nor does s. 14 contemplate or envisage such a course of action. The Magistrate also in declining to give copies of the statements concerned to the accused, took an erroneous view of s. 14 of the Act which, as we have already held, did not debar the Magistrate from giving copies to the accused for the purpose of his defence. Thus, are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court under appeal is vitiated by an error of law and it has not correctly interpreted s. 14 of the Act. Similarly the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v.

Satyen Ehowmik & Ors. (') cannot be held to be good law and must be overruled.

Thus on an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and a true interpretation of the language employed in s. 14 -0f the Act, we reach the following conclusions :- ·

l. That s. 14 apart from providing that the proceedings of the H Court may be held in camera under the circumstances men•

(I) AIR 1970 Calcutta 535.

tioned in the Section, does not in any way affect or override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to enquiries or trials held thereunder. •

2. That s. 14 does not in any way deprive the valuable rights of the accused to get copies of the statement recorded by the Magistrate or statements of witnesses recorded by the police the documents obtained by the Police during the in vestigation as envisaged by criminal Rules 308 and 310 framed under the Code of Criminal Procedure hy various . High Courts nor does s. 14 in any way affect the right of . __, the accused to get copies under s. 548 of the Code of Cri- J~ minal Procedure.

3. That the opening words of s. 14 do not amount to a nonobstante clause but are merely in the nature of an enabling provmon reserving the inherent powers of the Court to exclude the public from the proceedings if the Court is of the opinion that it is just and expedient to do so.

4. That there was absolutely no impropriety on the power of the Magistrate in not taking action against the defence lawyer for his refusal to show his register because the lawyer had rightly claimed privilege under s. 126 af the Evideuce Act as the register contained instructions given by the client which being privileged could not be disclosed to the Court.

On a parity of reasoning we find no impropriety on the conduct of the lawyer in refusing to show the statement of witnesses recorded by the Court in extenso in order to prepare himself for an effective cross-examination of the witnesses.

Hence the strictures passed by the High Conrtl on the Magistrate as also on the lawyer of the defence were, in our opinion, totally unwarranted.

,,-J,

5. That if. the lawyer of the defence or staff of the Conrt or any one who was not excluded from the hearing of the case made any attempt to disclose the contents of the documents or the statements of the witnesses, exposed himself to a prosecution on a charge under s. 5 of the Act.

' For the reasons given above, we overrule the view of the High Court and the reasons given therefor that s. 14 af the Act prohibits the giving of copies of the statement concerned to the accused or that H (he lawyer is prohibited from taking the statements in extenso and had a duty to show the same to the court. We also overrule the view taken by the High Court regarding the interpretation of s. 14 of the Act.

SUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER v. s. BHOWM!CK (Fazal Ali, J.) 675

We do not agree with the lligh Court that the case should be tried by some other Magistrate but as lot of time has elapsed, surely the Magistrate against whose orders revision was taken to the High Court must have been transferred by this time. Therefore, the case will now be inquired into by a Magistrate who is available in the light of the observations made by us. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

N.K.A .

SATYEN BHOWMICK AND ORS

January 15, 1981

A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.

Official Secrets Act

Section 14

section 126

Evidence C Act

Section 14

Official Secrets Act

sections 3, 9

section 126

section 14

section 14

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 14

section 14

section 14

Code of Criminal Procedure

Vepa P. Sarathi

Section 14

Section 14

section 14

section 14

section 548

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 14

article 21

section 5

section 14

Narcsh Shridhar Mirajkar

State of Maharashtra

D. N. Mukherjee

M. M. Kshtriy11

A. K.

Ganguli

G.

Chatterjee

T. S. Arora

A Uma Dutta

FAZAL Au

R. P. Roy Chowdhury

s. 14

20th March 1969

s. 120B

Indian Penal Code

sections 3

s. 14

s. 14

s. 126

s. 14

s. 14

Mukherjee

s. 14

s. 14

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 14

Calcutta High Court

s. 14

s. 251

Official Secrets Act

section 173

Section 14

Official Secrets Act

Section 190(1)(a)

Section 190(1)(b)

Section 252

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 251A

Section 252

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 173

Section 14

Official Secrets Act, 1923

s. 14

Fletcher

s. 14

[1966] 3 S.C.R. 744

s. 14

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkars

s. 14

s. 14

Supreme Court

s. 14

section 14

s. 14

Official Secrets Act

Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd.

Widgery

section 14

section 14

section 14

section 14

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 14

s. 251

Code of Criminal Procedure

Sarathi

Sastri

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 14

section 14

section 14

s. 13(3)

s. 251

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 207

s. 14

s. 14

section 14

s. 14

section 14

section 14

Arts. 14 and 21

Constitution of India

Art. 21

Art. 21

Article 14

Article 21

Article 14

Article 21

s. 14

s. 548

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 14

Art. 21

Maneka Gandhi

s. 5

s. 14

s. 14

s. 14

s. 14

s. 14

s. 14

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 14

s. 548

s. 14

s. 126

s. 5

s. 14

s. 14


K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.

January 23, 1981

[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VBNKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Kerala Essential Articles Control (Ten1porary Powers) Act, 1961-Section 2(a) and Section 3-Raw cashewnuts-Whether "foodstuff" within the meaning of section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955-State Government, if co1npetent to declare raw cashewnuts as essential article-Declaratio1t, whether / contravenes section 2(a) of the Kera/a Act. ,_.,,-.

By an order made on March 20, 1976 the Kerala State Government declared that raw cashewnut was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kersla Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and thereofter pro.qiulgated the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order

1977 under section 3 thereof, regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnuts in the State of Kerala. The expression "essential article" ii defined D in section 2(a) of the Kerala Act as "an article (not being an essential con1- 111odity a.~ defined in the Essential Co1nmoditie~ Act, 1955) which may be declared by the Government by a notified order to be an essential article". Under Section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 essential commodity means "foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils."

In their petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioners who were E engaged in the processing of raw cashewnuts urged that raw cashewnut being a foodstuff, which was an essential commodity under the Central Act, the State Government could not make a declaration that it was an essential article under sectiein 2(a) of the State Act and that for this reason the declaration and the impugned order were ultra vires the State Act.

On behalf of the State Government it was contended that the expression "foodstuffs" meant only those articles which could be directly consumed \Vithout any kind of processing since the order regulated only the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnut5 which were used as industrial raw material, they could not be called foodstuffs in the strict sense and were not an "essential .! ,_ commodity" within the meaning of that term under the Central Act.

1~11owing the petitions,

HELD: Raw cashewnut is a foodstuff under section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act. No order could therefore be made by the State Government under section 3 thereof in respect of raw cashewnuts. Therefore the declaration

made by the State Government to the effect that raw cashewnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act and the impugned order made thereunder are liable tc be quashed.

[694 B-C]

The words in parenthesis in section 2(a) of the State Act makt; it clear that the State Government can declare as an essential article under the State Act

K. J. PILLAI v. UNION 677

only .., article which is not an essential commodity under the C,, ntra! Act. It

is a well known rule of interpretation th.at associated words take their meaning from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction noocltur a .sociis.

When the term 'foodstuffs' is associated with edible oilseeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is .appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including nil articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after processing. [687 C]

Having regard to the fact that the object of the Central Act is to regulate production, supply and distribution of essential commodities amongst the people, the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning as including even raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles.

[687 D-E]

The dictionary meaning of 'foodstuff' is 'a substance with food value' and

the raw material of food before or after processing'. Therefore 'foodstuff' C need not necessarily mean only the final food product which is consumed. It , also includes raw food articles which may, after processing, be used as food by human beings.

[688 F]

Srate of Bombay v. Virkun1ar Gulabchand Shuh !1952] S.C.R. 877 and Tiktl Ram; i & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradc.1h S: Ors. fl956] S.C.R. 393 at 418 referred to.

Although as a result of large exports of cashewnut it is now in short supply and its price is beyond the reach of the common man, it is an article of food eaten in raw form and is used in various preparations.

It is eaten in all parts , of the country though it is grown in a few States. It i_s exported as foodstuff.

It is, therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an es.scntial commodity.

[692 M-G]

There is no substance in the argument that cashewnuts can be treated a<; an essential article only for the purposes of export and not an essential commodity under the Central Act.

The Central Government can make an Order w1der the Central Act even when an essential commodity is used for industrial purposes or for purposes of export. Essential commodities do not cease to be essential commodities under the Central Act merely because they are exported after they are processed in India. [693 Bl

The argument that so long as the Central Government had not 1nade an order in respect of raw cashewnuts the State Government can pass an order is not available in the circumstances by reason of the definition of essential article in the Kerala Act. [693 El

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 116, 186-189/77, G . 3935-63/78 3922-24/78, 1221/77, 3821-27 /78, 3828-31 /78, 44-50/ 77, 4237;'78, 4400/78, 92-97 /;77.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)

F. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 116/77.

R. M. Poddar for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. No. 116/77.

Lal Narain Sinha Attorney Genl., P. K. Pillai and T. P. Soundara Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P. No. 116/77.

N. M. Abdul Khader,, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the Respondent.

R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.

Lal Narain Sinha Att-Genl. and R. M. Poddar, for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.

P, K. Pillai and T. P. Saundra Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.

C Nos. 186-189/77.

N. M. Abdul Khader, M.A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the State.

F. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J, John, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.

N. M. Abdul Khader, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.

A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.

Nos. 3935-63 /78.

E P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran, for the Petitioners in W.P.

Nos. 3922-24/78.

K. M. K. Nair, for the Respondent in W.P. Nos. 3922-24/78.

R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 1221/77.

F K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I.

A. S. Nambiyar for Respondent No. 2.

Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 5.

P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioners in W.P.

G Nos. 3821-27 /78.

K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3821-27 /78.

A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswarmz for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.

Nos. 3821-27 /78.

P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioner in W.P. Nos. 3828-31/78.

K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I in W.P. Nos. 3828-31/7.8.

.. - ..

A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran for Respondent No. 2 in W.P.

Nos. 3828-31/78.

R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Pet.itioners in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.

Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 44-50;77.

. K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.

P. Gcvindan Nair, Mrs. Baby Krishnan and Mrs. V. ID. Khanna, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4237 /78 .

K. M. K. Nair for the Respondent in W.P. No. 4237 /78.

D. Govindan Nair and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioners in e W.P. No. 4400/78.

K. M. K. Nair for the Resipondent in W.P. No. 4400/78.

R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 92-97/77.

fl:!iss A. Sub.hashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 92-97,'77.

K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 92-97 /77.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VF.NKATARAMIAH, J.

The common question which arise for coosideration in the above writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India relates to the validity of the declaration made by the State Government of orala on March 20, 1976 dec:aring that raw cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the

power under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.

Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G KeraJa.

The petitioners are persons engaged in the cashewnut processing industry in the State of Kerala.

Since the impugned declaration and the Order seriously interfered with the right of the petitio'ners to purchase sufficient quantities of raw ca, hewnuts for processing in their factories and imposed several other restrictions on them, they have filed the above petitions.

Although the validity of several other It Orders was also questioned in the present petitions, the petitioners . confine-0 their chal:e'nge only to the impugned declaration and the

Order in the course of the arguments since according to them it was not necessary to urge thl"ir contentions as against those orders.

The recital in the preamble to the Order stales that it was being made in order to ensure the maintrnance of supplies of raw casbewnuts which was considered to be essential for the continued employment of a large number of workmen in the State of Kerala and for their equitable distribution and availabi; ity at fair prices. It ill further recited that the Order was being made as the State Government felt a doubt about the question whether the Kcrala Raw Cashewnuts (Marketing and Distribution) Onler, 1976 issud under the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, i 971, for the very same purpose would continue to remain in force.

The main provisions of the Order broadly related to the prohibition of sale of raw cashewnuts to any person other than an agent authorised to purchase by c:ause 3 thereof, appointment of Co-operative Societies as subagents, imposition of rcstrictio'ns on processing or conversion of raw cashewnuts and their distribution amongst the occupiers of cashewnut processing factories, appointment and powers of Cashew Special Officer and other incidental and ancillary matters.

The explanatory 'note attached to the Order stated that it was intended to regulate the procurement and distribution of raw cashcwnuh by the

State Government.

The Order is issued by the State Government of Kerala umler section 3 of the Kerala Act, the object of which is to provide, in the intepost of the general public, for the control of the production, supply F and distribution of, a'nd trade and commerce in certain articles which, as the title of the Act indicates, are considered to be essential for the community.

Th•o Kerala Act as originally enacted was intended to be in force for a period of five years from the date of its commencement.

By successive amendments, its life is extendc<l to twenty years from the commencement of the Act.

Although it makes provision for -G conferring power on the State Government to make appropriate <>rders regarding regulation of production, supply and distribution of essential articles substantially on the lines on which the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) (hereinafter derrcd to as 'the Central Act') passed by the Parliament provides for the regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of essential commodities as defined Jf in the Oontral Act, the Kerala Act does not itself specify any article as an essential article.

But the expression 'essential article' is defined by section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act thus :

.... -

.. 2. Definition.-In this Act, unless lhe context otherwise requires, Al

(a) "essential article" means any article (not being an essential commodity as defined in lhe Essential Commodities Act, 1955) which may be declared by lhe Government by notified order to be an essential article."

From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act only an article which i• not an essential commodity as defined in the Central Act.

When such a declaration is made in respect of any article, lhe State Government acquires the .power to make an order u'nder section 3 thereof in respect of such artiele.

The State Government is, however, precluded from deelaring any article which is an essential commodity under the Central Act as an essential article and from making

an order for the purpose of controlling its production, supply and distribution.

This is obvious from the words in the parenthesis in section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act defining the word 'essential article'.

That the object of the Kerala Act is only to provide for regulation of production, supp:y and distribution of a'n article which is not an essential commodity as defined under the Central Act is also clear from what is stated by the Kerala Government in lhe letter dated December 5, 1961 addressed by the Law Secretary, Government of Kerala to the Oentral Government seeking the assent of lhe President to the Bill passed by the Kerala Legislature.

The relevant part of the letter reads :

" •••••••••••••••••• ! •••••••

Sub : The Kera/a Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Bill 1960.

I am to forward herewith two copies--of the Kerala Essen- • tial Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Bill, 1960, as passed by the Legislative Assembly and reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President.

2. The Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949, as amended by the Kerala Acts 24 of 1958 and 3 of 1959, was in force in the Kerala State till 25-1-1960 when it expired by efflux of time.

The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of

1955) applies only in the case of essential commodities specified in lhat Act. At present there is no law in the State to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and co=erce in, essential articles required for industrial

and other purposes, which do not fall within the ambit of the Central Act.

For the implementation of the scheme under the programme of industrialisation during the Third Five Year Plan it may become necessary to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, articles which are not essential commodities and unless the Govt. have such powers, difficulties arc likely to arise.

3. The object of the present legislation is to take power for the control of essential articles which are not essential commodities within the meaning of the Central Act.

It empowers Govt. to declare any article, not being an essential commodity within the meaning of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to be an "essential article" and to control, by notified order, the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any such article.

This is an enabling measure and is modelled on the Central Essential Commodities Act. It is intended to be in force only for a period of five years.

4. The subject-matter of the legislation falls within the scope of entries 26 and 27 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely :-

26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III.

27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisiQns of entry 33 of List III.

Hence the State Legislature is competent to enact the measure.

5. The provisions of the Bill may attract Articles 301 and 304(b) of the Constitution as imposing a reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce. Accordingly the previous sanction of the President for the introduction of the Bill in the State Legislature has been obtained as required by the proviso to article 304 (b) in the letter of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry referred to as third paper above".

One of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners in support of these petitions is that raw cashewnut being a foodstuff (which is an essential commodity under the Central Act), the State Gt>vernment 'li of Kerala could not make a declaration to the effect that it was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act and consequently the impugned Order was outside the scope of the Kerala Act.

' •

behalf of the State Government, it is contended that raw cashewnut is not a foodstuff and even if it is held to re a foodstuff having regard to the nature and object of the Order, it should be treated as being within the competence of the State Gowrnment.

The relevant part of section 2(a) of the Central Act containing the definition of the expression 'essential commodity' reads thus :

"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) "essential commodity" means any of the following classes of commodities :-

(i) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;

(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; ,,

Since it is argued on behalf of the State Government that 'foodstuffs' o only mean those articles which can be directly consumed without any kind of processing and that raw cashewnuts which are intended to be used as industrial raw material cannot, therefore, be called as 'foodstuffs' in the strict sense, it is necessary to examine the history of legislation relating to the trade and commerce within a State and production, supply and distribution of goods in India.

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, entries 27 and 29 of List II in the Seventh Schedule read as follows :

"27. Trade and commerce within the Province; markets and fairs; money lending and money lenders.

29. Production, supply and distribution of goods; development of industries, subject to the provisions of List I with respect to the development of certain industries under Federal control."

Entry 34 of List I read as :

"34. Development of industries where development, under a Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest."

From the above entries it is clear that the subject of trade and commerce within the Province and subject to entry 34 of List I, the subject of production, supply and distribution of goods were with; n B the competence of the Provincial Government.

As a result of the emergency proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of

the Government of India Act, 1935 on the outbreak of the Second World War the Federal Legislature acquired the power to make laws on all the subjects in the Provincial List.

The laws made by the Federal Legislature on the provincial subjects after the Prochrnation of Fmergency were to cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation of Emergency had ceased to operate except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.

The Proclamation of Emergency was revoked on April 1, 1946. Consequently all laws made by the Federal Legislature on the subjects in the Provincial List were to cease to have effect after the expiry of September 30, 1946. During the period of emergency the Federal Legislature bad passed a Jaw enabling the F<:<leral Government to issue Orders with respect to trade and commerce within the Provinces and the production, supply and distribution of several commodities which were considered to be essential and those Orders were also to cease to have effect on the expiry of September 30, 1946. Since it was felt that the Federal Legislature should continue to have power to make Jaws on the subject of production, supply and distribution of certain essential commodities, on March 26, 1946 the British Parliament passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39) amending, among others, sub-section (4) of section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as to the effect of Jaws passed by virtue of the Proclamation of Emergency. The relevant part of that Ar.t read :

"2. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall during the period mentioned in section four of this Act have power to make Jaws with respect to the following matters-

(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within a Pre>- vince) in, and the production, supply and distribution of cotton and woollen textiles, papers (including newsprint). foodstuffs (including edible oil se'ds and oils) petroleum and petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles,. coal, iron, steel and mica; and

(b) ............... ._ .................. .

(c) .................................. . but any law made by the Indian Legislature which that Legislature would not but for the provisions of this section, have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the

K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkalaramiah, !.) 685

said period except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof."

Section• 4 of that Act specified the duration of the legislative power conferred on the Federal Legislature by sect10n 2 and section 5 prescribed the duration of laws passed by virtue of a Proclmnation of Emergency.

It is seen from section 2(1) (a) of the above British Act that for the first time, the subject of foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oils) was dealt with separately in a constitutional document. The Governor-General in exercise of the extended legislative power granted by the British Act promptly issued within the specicd period the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance

1946 (XVIII of 1946) extending the controls in respect ol' certain essential commodities including foodstuffs beyond the fits! day of October, 1946 and the said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act No. XXIV of 1946) enacted by the Federal Legislature in November, 1946. Section 2(a) of that Act defined the expression 'essential commodity' as meaning 'foodS'iuffs' and certain other articles mentioned therein.

Section 2(e) defined 'foodstuffs' as 111c1uding edible oil seeds and oils.

The operation of the said Act was extended by competent legislative acts upto March 31, 1950.

Since by Entries 26 and 27 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the subject of trade and commerce within he State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 ef List III and the subject to production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List JTJ had been assigned to the Svcs :nd Entry 33 of List III only dealt \\oth trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of the products of industries where the control of such industries hy the Union was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, having regard to the then existing conditions, Article 369 was l enacted as a temporary and transitional measure conferring legislative ' power on the Parliament during a; period of five years from the commencement of the Constitution to make 1'aws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List, namely:

(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, raw cotton (including ginned cotton and unginncd cotton or kapoas), cotton seed. paper (including newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oil), cattle fodder (including oil-cakes and other concentrates). coal (including coke and derivatives of coal), iron, steel and mica;

11 -l52SCT/81

(b) offonces against Jaws with respect to any of the matters mentioned in clause (a), jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of those matters, and fees in respect of any of those matters but not including fees taken in any court.

It was provided that any law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the provisions of Article 369 of the Constitution have bee'n competent to make would, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the period of five years from the co=encement of the Constitution except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.

It may be noticed that clause (a) of Article 369 of the Constitution specifically referred to foodstuffs (including oilseeds and oil) and cattle fodder (including oil-cakes and other concentrates).

Ily virtue of the power under Article 369, the Parliament extended the life of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 till January 26, 1955. As the subjects referred to in Article 369 of the Constitntion were of national importance and it was thought that it was clesirable that the Parliament should also have concurrent power to make Jaws with respect to them, the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954 was enacted on February 22, 1955 substituting Entry 33 of List Ill by the following new Entry :

"33. Trade and co=erce in, and the production, supply and distribution of,-

( a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products;

(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;

(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;

(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and

(e) raw jute."

It was pursuant to the new Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that Parliament enacted the Central Act (i.e. the Essential Commodities Act, 1955).

H It is not disputed by the State Government that if raw cashewnut is foodstuff within the meaning of the Central Act, it cannot be declared as an essential article under the Krala Act.

What is, however,

-11 j

K. L. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramaiah, /.) 687

urged is that since the Order regulates only procurement and distribution of raw cashewnut as industrial raw material for processing in the factories it is not being dealt with as foodstuff.

Hence it should not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act. There are at least two good reasons to reject this contention advanced on behalf of the State Government-first, the language used in section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and secondly the purpose of the Ce'ntral Act.

Section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act reads : 'foodstuffs. including edible oilseeds and oils'.

It is a well known rule of interpretation that associated words take their meaning from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis.

When 'foodstuffs' are associated with edible oilseeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including all articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after processing. It is in this wider sense that the said term has been understood by Indian courts as can be seen from some of the decisions to which we shall presently refer. Secondly, having regard to the history of legislation relating to foodstuffs dealt with above and the object of the Central Act which regulates the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities amongst the poverty stricken Indian people, the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning as including even raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles.

Any interpretation that may be given in this case should not be governed by its consequence on the impugned Order but in the light of the importance of the Central Act in the context of the national economy.

A narrow interpretation may result in the exclusion of several articles from the purview of the Central Act although nobody bas entertained any doubt so far about their being essential commodities.

We shall now see what cashewnut means.

Casbewnut is an edible t -- seed or nut belonging to the family of anacardiaceae and grows mostly in tropical and sub-tropical regions where humidity is great. It is generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South America.

Cashewnut is shaped like a kidney or large thick bean. 'It appears as though one of its ends had been forcibly sunk into the calyx end of a fleshy pear-shaped fruit, called the cashew apple which is about three times as large as the nut and of reddish or yellow colour.

The cashew apple is much used where the tree grows, in beverages, jams and jellies but is unimportant commercially.

The nut has two walls or shells, the outer of which is smooth and glass-like over the surface thin and somewhat elastic but stout and of olive green

colour until mature wheb it becomes strawberry roan.

The inner shell is considerably harder and must be cracked like the shells of other nuts ...... The fruits are picked by hand and the nuts arc first detached. then thorouglLy dried in the sun ...... 13y improved

mthods of roasting, the nuts pass through large n:volving cylinders of sheet iron with perforated sid". which are made to revolve above well-controlled flames.

The oil drains into containers below and is salvaged ...... Later, the inner she:ls are broken open by hand Jabour and the kernels given further beating treatment hy which the skins are removed and the kernels made ready for consumption'. (Vide Encyclopaedia Britannica 1962 Edn. Vol. 4, pp. 958-959). It is not disputed that the raw cashewnut with which we arc now con- - cerncd is used by the petitioners for processing in their factories in order to make it fit for human consumption. It is also stated that even the raw cashewnut kernel is eaten by human beings.

It is well known that the food eaten by human beings consists of cereals like wheat, rice or other coarse grains, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables, sugar, fruits and nuts, animal foodstuffs and sea food like meat. beaf, mutton and fish and dairy products like milk, butter, eggs etc.

According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word 'food' means 'fodder' also.

One of the meanings of the word 'food' given in that Dictionary is 'material consisting of carbohydrates, fats, protdns and supplementary substances (as minerals. vitamins) that is taken or absorbed into the body of an organism in order to sustain growth, repair, and all vital processes and to furnish energy for all activity of the orgabism'. In the same Dictionary 'foodstuff' is defined as 'a substance with food valll'~' and 'the raw material of food before or after processing'.

One of the usages of the said word is given as 'a bountiful crop of cereal foodstuffs'.

Therefore, 'foodstufl' noed not necessarily mean only the final food product which is consumed. It also includes raw food articles which may after processing be us•od as food by huma'n beings.

The earliest of the Indian cases cited before us on the interpretation of the expression 'foodstuffs' is Shriniwas Panrw/a/ Cliocklwni & Ors. v. The Crawn ( 1). In that case the conviction of the appellant of an offence punishable under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Tem- -porary Powers) Act. 1946 had been challenged.

The chargo of which the appellant had been found guilty by the judgment under appeal was that he had transported 'bharda' or 'chuni bharda' which was a foodstuff without the required permit.

The contention of the appellant was that it was just cattle feed which was not fit for human consump-

-~ - ----~-- -- (!) A.T.R. 1951 Nag. 226.

tion and therefore it could not he said that he had violated the !aw on the footing that the material transported was 'tur dal' a foodstuff th~ transport of which alone without a permit was an offence. The said argument was rejected by the Nagpur High Court with the following observations :

"The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that as the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordimnce, 1946 [XVIII (18 of 1946)] and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 [XXIV ( 24) of 1946], dealt with "foodstuffs" and not "cattle feed" export c; if chuni, a cattle feed was not prohibited under the Foodgrains Export Restrictions Order, 1943.

The term "foodstuff" has not been defined either in the Ordinance or in the Act. In common parlance, foodstuffs mean "materials used as food".

The term is not used only for material which is immediately fit for human consumption but it also applies to material which can be used as food after subjecti'ng it to processes like grinding, cleaning etc. For instance, paddy as such is not fit for human consumption but rice in it is, and yet paddy is called foodstuff.

So also tur.

There is no reason to suppose that the word "food stuffs" is not used, in these Jaws, in this usual sense but is used in the restricted sense of material which is fit for human consumption immediately without subjecting it to a'ny process.

If such a restricted meaning is aco<pted, it would lead to evasion of the law in question by mixing some foreign matter with the stnff that is immediately fit for human consumption.

The test is not whether it can be immediately used for human consumption but whether it can be so used after subjecting it to the usual processes.

The uncleand tnr dal (ie. tur dal without separating from it wastage and foreign matter) which was being exported on 26-12-1946 in this case was such a foodstuff and comes within the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance 1946, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946". . .

In the State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(') this Court was called upon to decide whether 'turmeric' was 'foodstuff' in a rase arising under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powm) Act, 1946.

Vi:vian Bose, J. who delivered the judgment after observing :

(1) [1952] S.C.R 877.

"So far as "food" is concerned it can be used in a wide as well as a narrow sense and, in my opinion, much must depend upon the context and background. Even in a popular sense, when one asks another, "Have you had your food", one means the composite preparations which normally go to constitute meal---curry and rice, sweetmeats, pudding, cooked vegetables and so forth.

One does not usually think separately of the different preparations which enter into their making of the various condiments and spices and vitamins, any more than one would think of separating in his mind the purely nutritive elements of what is eaten from their nonnutritive adjuncts.

So also, looked at from another point of view, the various adjuncts of what I may term food proper which enter into its preparation for human consumption in order to make it palatable and nutritive, can hardly be separated from the purely nutritive elements if the effect of their absence would be to render the particular commodity in its finished state unsavoury and indigestible to a whole class of persons whose stomachs are accustomed to a more spicely prepared product".

held:

€ "As we have seen, turmeric falls within the wider definition of 'food' and 'foodstuffs' given in a dictionary of international standing as well as in several English decisions. It is, I think, as much a Hfoodstuff", in its wider meaning, as sausage skins and baking powder and tea.

In the face of all that I would find it difficult to hold that an article like F turmeric cannot fall within the wider meaning of the term

"foodstuffs".

Following the above decision of this Court, the High Court of Calcutt! held in Atulya Kumar De & Ors. v. The Director of Procurement and Supply & Ors.(') that paddy was foodstuff within the meaning of that expression used in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 even though paddy could not be consumed without further processing. The relevant part of the decision runs thus :

"The first point taken is that the power conferred by the Act (read with the notification) upon the State of West Bengal is only in relation to foodstuffs and that paddy is not foodstuff. It is stated that the description of paddy at "Rice in

(1) A.LR. 1953 Cal. 548.

the "husk" is a colourable attempt to avoid this difficulty. In-

'The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah' (AIR 1952 S.C. 335), it was held that turmeric is "foodstuff" within the meaning of the Spices (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order 1944" read with S. 2(a) of the Act. It was held that the term "foodstuff" is ambiguous and may have a vide meaning or a narrow one. Whether the term is nsed in a particular Statute in its wider or narrower sense cannot b: answered in the abstract but must be answered with due regard to the background and context. Thus in -'James v.

Jones' [ ( 1894) 1 Q.B. 304], baking powder was held to be an article of food while in-'Hinde v. Allmond' (1918) 81 L.J.K.B. 893, it was held that tea was not. Now the act has been passed to control the production and distribution of essential commodities.

What can be looked upon more of an essential commodity than both rice and paddy? In West Bengal, the two things most essential for the sustenance of human life are rice and paddy. Mr. Mukherjee admits that rice is an essential commodity & a foodstuff, but he says that paddy is not because nobody can eat paddy. But that is a very narrow view tu take. Paddy is only a stage in the production of rice and the one cannot be food without the other being food as well.

Nobody eats the busk in paddy; but nobody eats the skin of mango or the shell of a egg and yet they are unquestionably articles of food.

In my opinion paddy is 'foodstuff' within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act and the notification."

To the same effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nathuni Lal Gupta & Ors. v. The State & Ors.(') in which wheat and

wheat products were held to be foodstuffs. The High Court of Punjab

4. and Haryana in Sujan Singh Matu Ram v. The State of Haryana(2 ) and the High Court of Orissa in Bijoy Kumar Routrai & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors. (8) also lay down the same principle.

In Tika Ramji & Ors. etc v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(') G this Court observed :

"The essential commodities therein comprised inter alia food>tuffs which would include sugar as well as sugarcane ----- (!) A.LR. 1964 Cal. 279.

(2) A.IR. 1968 Punjab & Haryana 363.

(3) A.LR. 1976 Orissa 138.

(4) [1956] S.C.R. 393 at 418.

and both sugar and sugarcane therefore came within the jurisdiction of the Centre."

The above observation makes it manifest that even a raw rr.atcria) like sugarcane used in the manufacture of sugar is a 'foodstuff'.

Younus v. Sub-Inspector of Police(') is a case in which the question whether raw cashewnut was foodstuff or not directly arose for

COl!iideration. The learned Judge who decided the case held :

"The reasoning adopted for holding that wheat and paddy are foodstuffs applies with equal force in the case of cashewnuts.

There is no scope for doubt that cashew kernel is an eatable commodity both in its raw form and also when fried.

It is taken in as part of the food and is also used in the preparation of food. That its kernel should be separated from the shell or outer covering or that it should be processed before use does not make raw cashewnuts any-the-less "foodstuff."

' It is also significant that 'raw cashewnut' is included in the group of edible fruits in Chapter 8 of section II dealing with vegetable products of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

It was, however, urged that even though cashewnut was an article which could be eaten, it was an article which was eaten by very few persons on rare occasions and hence it is difficult to conceive cashewnut as an essential co=odity. It is no doubt true that cashewnu1 having become expensive, it is now more of a luxury. Due to export of cashewnut on a large scale, it is a commodity which is in short supply in the country and therefore the price at which it sells is beyond the reach of the common man.

But nevertheless it is an article of food. It is eaten in raw form and after it is fried. It is also commonly used in various perparations of food like pulav. sweets etc.

There is no basis for the assertion that it is a rnrc commodity outside the State where it is grown. It is eaten not only in Kera!a but also in other parts of the country. When cashewuut is exported. it is exported as a foodstuff.

Now it cannot be that cashewnut eaten abroad is a foodstuff, and whatever is consumed within the country is not a foodstuff.

It is therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an essential commodity.

Its importance as a foodstuff can also be seen from the statemoots filed in these cases in which it is stated that in the H State of Kerala in the year 1976-77 the total quantity of raw cashewnut procured was in the order of 60,000 tonnes, the number of workers

(t) 1978 K.L.T. 427.

-11

engaged in the cashewnut processing industry was about 1,20,000 and that thrc were 269 cashew factories.

It was next urged that cashewnut could be treated as an essential article only for the purpose of export and not an essential commodity under the Central Act. This again is not correct. The Central Government can make an Order under the Central Act even when an essential conmmdi.ty is used for industrial purpose or for purposes of export.

Essential commodities do not cease to be essential commodities under the Central Act merely because they are exported after they are processed in India. Foodgrains (Prohibition of Use in Manufacture of Starch) Order, 1971, The Fruit Products Order, 1955, The Gur (Regulation of Use) Order, 1968, Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, Rice (Prohibition of Use in Wheat Products) Order, 1971. Vegetable Oil (Standards of Quality) Order, 1972, Vegetable Oil Product Producers (Regularion of Refined Oil Manufacture) Order, 1973 and the Essential Commodities (Regulation of Production and Distribution for puriposes

of Export) Order, 1966 demonstrate the diverse purposes for which an Order can be made under the Central Act.

It was next urged that as long as the Central Government had not passed an order in respect of the same matter, it was open to the Government of Kerala to pass the impugned Order.

Reliance was E also placed on the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji's case (supra), in which U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,

1954 was upheld even though sugarcane was an essential commodity under the Central Act.

In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether there was any repugnancy between a Central Jaw and a State law.

We are not concerned here with such a question.

F If a question of application of Article 254 of the Constitution had arisen, it would have been open to consider whether there was any. repugnancy at all between the two laws having regard to the scopo and exrent of the field occupied by the Central law and the State Jaw.

But the real question which now arises for decision in these petitions is whether the Kerala Legislature ever intended to treat any article G which comes within the scope of the Central Act as an essential article. The language of section 2(a) of the Kcrala Act steers clear of all essential commodities under the Ce'ntral Act by excluding them from the operation of the Kcrala Act.

The power of the Central Gowrnmcnt to make an order under the Central Act in respect of raw cashewnut which is a foodstuff cannot be doubted. If that is so H the Kerala Act cannot apply to it. The argument that as long as the Central Government had not made an Order in respect of raw cashewnut, the Kerala Government can pass an Order is not available in the , circumstances by reason of the definition of the 'essential article' in the Kerala Act. It might have been open to consideration if the said definition had not contained the words in the parenthesis.

On a careful consideration of the matter, we are satisfied that raw casheWnut is a foodstuff failing under section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act. It follows that no Order can be made by the Government of Kerala under section 3 thereof in respect of raw cashewnut.

The action of the Kerala Government is beyond the power conferred on it hy the Kerala Legislature.

In the result, we hold that the declaration made by the Govern- 1ncnt or J(c-raJa to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article under the Kerala Act and the impugned Order made thereunder are liable to be uashcd and they are accordingly quashed.

All the other contentions including those relating to the alleged infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners raised m these petitions are left open.

Before concluding, we propose to advert to the last submi'8ion made before us on behalf of the State Government. It was submitted that the rashcwnut industry in Kcrala was _a labour-oriented industry and if the declaration and the Order were struck down, a number of workmen would be adversely affected.

It was also snbmitted that the entire economy of the State of Kerala which largely depended on the export trndc in cashcwnuts would be d'srurted. If any such serious problem arises, it can always be set right by the competent Legislature or the appropriate Government taking needful remedial action in the light of Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

The petitions are accord; ngly allowed.

In the circumstances of the case, there shall he no order as to costs.

P.B.R.

Petitions allowed.

K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC

January 23, 1981

January 23, 1981

[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VBNKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

A. P. SEN

Section 2(a)

Section 3

section 2(a)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

section 2(a)

March 20, 1976

Kerala State Government

section 2(a)

section 3

section 2(a)

Section 2(a)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Art. 32

section 2(a)

section 2(a)

section 3

section 2(a)

Central Government

India

Article 32

F. S. Nariman

R. N. Banerjee

J. B. Dadachanji

K. J. John

R. M. Poddar

Lal Narain Sinha

P. K. Pillai

T. P. Soundara Rajan

N. M. Abdul Khader

M. A. Feroze

K. M. K. Nair

K. Pillai

T. P. Saundra Rajan

M.A. Feroze

K. J, John

A. Feroze

A. S. Nambiar

P. Parameswaran

E P. Govindan Nair

K. Sukumaran

A. S. Nambiyar

A. Subhashini

P. Govindan Nair

P. Parameswarmz

P. Gcvindan Nair

P. Gcvindan Nair, Mrs. Baby Krishnan and Mrs. V. ID.

Baby Krishnan

V. ID. Khanna

D. Govindan Nair

A. Sub.hashini

fl:!iss A. Sub.hashini for Respondent No.

VF.NKATARAMIAH

Article 32

Constitution of India

section 2

State Government of

Kerala

section 3

G KeraJa

section 3

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Parliament

Jf in the Oontral Act

section 2

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

section 3

section 2

Kerala Government

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Essential Commodities Act

Seventh Schedule

Articles 301 and 304(b)

article 304

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

section 2(a)

section 2(a)

Government of India Act, 1935

Seventh Schedule

section 102

Government of India Act, 1935

April 1, 1946

September 30, 1946

March 26, 1946

British Parliament

section 102

Government of India Act, 1935

section 5

section 2(1)

Section 2(a)

Section 2(e)

March 31, 1950

Seventh Schedule

Article 369

Supreme Court

Article 369

Article 369

Article 369

January 26, 1955

Article 369

February 22, 1955

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

section 2(a)

Section 2(a)

Karnataka

Tamil Nadu

East Africa

Central and South America

section 7

Nagpur High Court

vian Bose

High Court of Calcutt

State of West Bengal

S. 2(a)

West Bengal

Mukherjee

Calcutta High Court

High Court of Punjab

High Court of Orissa

Order can be made under the Central Act

Government of Kerala

Tika Ramji

Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order

Article 254

Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,

1954

Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,

1954

Kerala Legislature

section 2(a)

Central Gowrnmcnt

section 2(a)

section 2(a)

section 3

Kcrala

Seventh Schedule