STATE OF RAJASTHAN

SMT. KALKI & ANR.

April 15, 1981

(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BA~ARUL !SLAM, JJ.J

Co11stit11tio11 of India, Article J36-S11pre111e Co11rt will interfere in any matter to prel'ent the miscarriage of justice.

Material discrepancies in the evidence, explained.

Words and phrases-Whether the word "related"' means "interested"'.

Respondent Kalki alias Kali and her husband Amara (along with four other co-accused) were charged, convicted under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment. While Kalki was also convicted and sentenced under section 148 I.P.C. for two years' rigorous fmprisonment, the other five accussed were convicted and sentenced under section 147 I.P.C. for rigorous imprisonment for a period of one and a half years.

In appeal the High Court of Rajasthan D acquitted all of them on the grounds (i) that P.W. I, the widow of the deceased "is ........ a highly interested witness, inasmuch as, she is the wife of the deceased and there was an enmity between the deceased and the accused on account of the dispute about the agricultural land" and (ii) "that there are material discrepancies in her statement".

This Court granted special leave to appeal only against Kalki and her E husband and refused it as against the four.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at F are bordering on perversity and have resulted in miscarriage of justice, the Court will not decline to quash such findings to prevent miscarriage of justice.

[507 F-G]

Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. In the depositions of witnesses there are always some G normal discrepancies however honest and truthful the witnesses may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. There are no material discrepancies in the evidence of P.W. I so as to reject the evidence in its entirety.

[507 D-E]

3. "Related" is not equivalent to "interested". A witness may be called "interested" only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a

RAJASTHAN v. KALK! (Baharul Islam J.) 505

litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished.

A A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be "interested". In the instant case, P.W. 1 had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the respondents. (507 A-BJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Crirpinai Appeal No. 543 of 1976. B

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the llth May 1975 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal Nos. 277, 413 to 416 and 918 of 1971.

Badri Das Sharma for the Appellant.

' Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BAHARUL IsLAM, J. This appeal by special leave on behalf of the State of Rajasthan is directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court acquitting the two respondents, Shrimati Kalki alias Kali and her husband, 'Amara (alongwith four other coaccused).

Respondent Kalki was convicted under Section 302 and Section 148 of the Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life and for rigorous imprisonment for two years, respectively. The five other accused persons including respondent, Amara, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 and under Section 14 7 of the Penal Code, and each of them was sentenced to imprisoment for life and to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment respectively.

The material facts of the prosecution case were that there was a land dispute between Nimba (P.W.6) father of the deceased, Poona, on the one hand, and respondent Amara and the members of his family, on the other.

On July 17, 1970 at about sunset the accused persons of whom respondent Kalki was armed with an axe and respondent, Amara with a dharia, came to the house of the deceased.

At th11t time the deceased was inside his hut with hls wife Mooli (P.W.l). Amara called Poona. Poona came out followed by his wife Mooli, when he was knocked down by Amara and Rama whereupon Kalki gave him blow with the axe on the neck. Poona met with instantaneous death. Mooli (P.W.l) raised an outcry when Geli, mother of the deceased (P.W.2) who had been at some distance from the hut came running to the place of occurrence and saw the assailants leaving the place.

Nimba lodged a report at the police station at Nana.

Police registered a case. In due course the case was sent to, and tried by, the Session Judge who convicted and sentenced the six accused persons including the two respondents as stated above.

4. This Court granted special leave to appeal only against the two respondents and refused it as against the other four. The question before us is whether the two respondents or any of them caused the death of Poona. There is no dispute that Poona met a homicidal death.

The High Court has set aside the Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Session Judge on the grounds (1) that P.W.I the widow of the deceased "is ... a highly interested witness, in as much as, she is the wife of the deceased and there was an enmity between the deceased and the accused on account of the dispute about the agricultural land", and (2) "that there are material dis crepancies in her statement".

We have been led through the evidence of P. W. l, the only eye witness in the case, of P.W.2, Geli, who says that she saw the respon dents leaving the place of occurrence with the weapons in their hands, and of P.W.5 the Medical Officer, who held the Post-Mortem exami nation on the deceased. His evidence fully supports the evidence of P.W.l, who deposed that respondent Kalki gave a blow on the neck of the deceased with an axe. P. W. 5 found one incised wound measuring 5" x 2" x 4" on the lateral side of the left side of neck.

On a perusal of the evidence of these withesses, we do not have the least doubt in our mind that it was respondent Kalki who gave an axe blow on the neck of the deceased and that respondent Amara came along with his wife with a dharia with the common intention of causing the death of Poona. In fact it was he who called out Poona from inside the hut, and felled down and facilitated the murder of Poona by his wife, Kalki.

5. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on the evidence of P. W.1 on two grounds : (!) she was a "highly interested" witness because she "is the wife of the deceased", and (2) there were discrepancies in her evidence.

With respect, in our opinion, both the grounds are invalid. For, in the circumstances of the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True, it is she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an 'interested'

RAJASTHAN v. KALK! ( Baharul I slam J) 507

witness.

She is related to the deceased. 'Related' is not equivalent to 'interested'.

A witness may be called 'interested' only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'. In the instant case P. W.l had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the respondents.

The second ground on which the High Court refused to place reliar; ce on the -evidence of P. W. 1 was that there were "material discrepancies". As indicated above we have perused the evidence of P.W.J. We have not found any "material discrepancies" in her evidence.

The discrepancies referred to by the High Court are, in our opinion, minor, insignificant, natural and not 'material'.

The discrepancies are with regard to as to which accused "pressed the deceased and at which part of the body to the ground and sat on which part of the body; with regard to whether the respondent Kalki gave the axe blow to the deceased while the latter was standing or lying on the ground, and whether the blow was given from the side of the head or from the side of the legs.

In the depositions of witnesses there are always some normal discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be.

These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like.

Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. As indicated above we have n0t found any material discrepancies in the evidence of the P. W. I.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appeal involved only appreciation of evidenc~ and this Court may not interfere with the findings of facts resulting from appreciation of evidence. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at are bordering on perversity and result in miscarriage of justice, this Court will not decline to quash such findings to prevent the miscarriage of justice.

8. In our opinion the guilt of the two respondents has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonabie doubt and their acquittal resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.

A In the result we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned High Court and convict respondent Kalki alias Kali under section 302 of the Penal Code and respondent, Amara, under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and sentence each of them to suffer imprisonment for life.

B The appeal is allowed.

The respondents are said to be on bail. They shall surrender forthwith to serve out their sentences.

V.D.K.

Appeal allowed.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN

KALKI & ANR

April 15, 1981

0. CHINNAPPA REDDY

A.P. SEN

Amara

section 302

I.P.C

Kalki

section 148

I.P.C

section 147

I.P.C

High Court of Rajasthan D

Article 136

Supreme Court

Baharul Islam

Badri Das Sharma

Dalveer Bhandari

BAHARUL IsLAM

Kalki

Section 302

Section 148

Penal Code

Amara

Section 302

Section 149

Section 14

Penal Code

Nimba

July 17, 1970

Mooli

Poona

Mooli

Rama

Geli

Nimba

Nana

Article 136

section 302

Penal Code

Section 302

Penal Code

V.D.K.


RAFIQ & ANR.

MUNSHILAL & ANR.

April 16, 1981

[D.A. DESAI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]

Procedure-Litigant entrusted appeal to an advocate-Advocate failed to appear in Court at hearing-Appeal dismissed-Litigant, whether entitled to have the appeal restored for hearing.

Costs-Appeal dismissed on account of absence of advocate at hearing- Costs, if could be recovered from Advocate.

On knowing that the High Court had dismissed his appeal on the ground that his Advocate was not present in the Court when the matter was taken up for hearing the appellant moved an application for the recall of the order dismissing the appeal and for permission to participate in the hearing of the appeal. The High Court rejected this application stating that no satisfactory explanation had been furnished by the Advocate for his slackness in filing the affidavit for nearly 15 days after it was drafted.

On the question whether the litigant is entitled to have his case reheard by the High Court.

HELD : It is not proper that an innocent litigant, after doing everything E in his power to effectively participate in his proceedings by entrusting his case to the Advocate, should be made to suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his agent. For whatever reason the Advocate might have absented himself from the Court, the innocent litigant could not be allowed to suffer injustice for the fault of his Advocate. [511 Bl

The respondent's costs should be recovered from the Advocate who F absented himself from Court. [511 D]

[The Court directed the appeal to be restored to its original position in the High Court and heard.]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1415 of 1981.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 7th January 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.

Application No. 113 of 1981 in Second Appeal No. 1484 of 1973.

O.P. Rana, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Appellants.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A.K. Sanghi for Respondent No. I.

The Judgment of the Court was delivere, d by

DESAI, J. Special leave granted.

[1981] 3 S.C.R.

We have heard Mr. 0. P. Rana, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent.

The High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the present appellant in the absence of the learned counsel for the appellant.

When the appellant became aware of the fact that his appeal had been disposed of in the absence of his advocate, he moved an application in the High Court to recall the order dismissing his appeal and permit him to participate in the hearing of the appeal.

This application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that though the application was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on 29th October, 1980, the same was not presented to the court till November 12, 1980 and that there is no satisfactory explanation for this slackness on the part of the learned advocate who was requested to file the application.

The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things.

The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure.

After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss.

Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may iscourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute.

What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his

RAFIQ v. MUNSHILAL (Desui, J.) 511

power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one wh::i would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is w:1ether it is propr that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter.

We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order.

We direct that the appeal be restored to its orginal number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the c::>sts of the respondent here.

As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/- should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr.A.K.Sanghi.

Appeal allowed to the extent indicated with costs in the manner E indicated.

P.B.R.

Appeal allowed.

RAFIQ & ANR

MUNSHILAL & ANR

April 16, 1981

D.A. DESAI

BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.

O.P. Rana

M. Qamaruddin

A.K. Sanghi

DESAI

0. P. Rana

29th October, 1980

November 12, 1980

A.K. Sanghi

High Court of Allahabad

A.K.Sanghi


KULJEET SINGH @ RANGA

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

April 21, 1981

[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]

Constitution of India, Article 32-No material furnished for justifying the reduction of the death sentence-Dismissed.

The petitioner, alongwlth ar.other accused was convicted by the Additional Session Judge for the murder of two young children and sentenced to death. Their conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions filed by them against their conviction and sentence were dismissed by this Court. By this Writ Petition the petitioner asked for re-appraisal of his case and reconsideration of the death sentence imposed upon him,

Dismissing the ~Writ Petition and upholding the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner once again,

HELD : I. The answers given by the petitioner furnished no material a all for justifying the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life.

[515 E-F]

2. The Sessions Court and the High Court were right in comin~ to the conclusion that the two accused were guilty of the offence of which they were charged.

There is voluminous evidence of unimpeachable character which establishes his complicity in the mu rd er. The evidence regarding the theft of the Fiat Car, the blood group of the accused, the manner of the arrest and the recovery of incriminating weapons at their instance leave not even the slightest doubt that it was they who committed the murders. [514 D, 515 D-E]

3. It is true that the murder of the two particular children was not preplanned.

But that was because the accused did not know that they would hit upon those particular children that evening. What is important is that the accused had made all the preparations for committing the murder. The plan was that they would offer a lift to some young children, try to extort ransom from their parents by kidnapping them and do the children to death in the event of any impediment arising in the execution of their plan. The impediments here were the uncommon courage of the brave little children who did not make an abject surrender to their destiny and the fact which emerged during their molestation that their father was a mere government servant whose salary was too small to permit the payment of a handsome ransom. (515 G-H, 516 A-Cl

4. The accused trapped the children like helpless mice. The children got into the car but could not get out of it. In the boot of the car were kept formidable weapons which were ultimately used for committing the murder. In addition, the accused carried sharp weapons with them. The author of the injury on the boy was clearly the petitioner since his hands were more free than those of his co-accused who was at the wheel. The strategy to which they

KULJEET SINGH V. UNION 513

adhered to the last without contrition of any kink was so deep laid. Their A inhuma'nity defies all belief and description. [516 E-F]

5. The case of the petitioner can not be 'separated from that of his co-accused. The petitioner was an active participator in the whole episode and but for his willing cooperation, his co-accused could never have succeeded in his design. Many atrocities were committed, many falsehood uttered, many escapades achieved and many an evidence concealed or destroyed by them. The petitioner's B part in carrying out the nefarious plan is no less significant than that of his co-accused and he is no less guilty than him. There is no room for treating the one differently from the other. [517 A-CJ

6. The survival of an orderly society demands !he extinction of persons like the accused who are a menace to social order and security. They ar~ professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. [516 G-H]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petit10n No. 539 of 1981.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

R.K. Garg, D.K. Garg and R.C. Kaushik for the Petitioner.

M.K. BanarjPe, Addi!. Sol. Genl. and A. Subhashini for Respondent No. I.

N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRACHUD, c. J.

Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus, the petitioner herein, was convicted along with one Jasbir Singh alias Billa, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi for various offences in connection with the murder of two young children, Geeta Chopra and her brother Sanjay. The two accused were sentenced to death for the offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the

Penal Code andfto varying terms of imprisonment under sections 363, 365, 366 and 376 read with section 34 of the Code. Tl1e order of conviction and sentence, including the sentence of death, was confirmed by the Delhi High Court by its judgment dated November 16, 1979 whereupon the two accused filed Special Leave Petitions 562 and 1739 of 1980 in this Court, challenging their conviction and sentence.

Those Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on December 8, 1980

by a Bench of this Court consisting of Justice 0., Chinappa Reddy, Justice Baharul Islam and one of us the Chief Justice. By this writ Petition, the petioner virtually asks for the re-appraisal of his case and a reconsideration of the dismissal of his Special Leave Petition.

A The thrust of the petition is against the sentence of death imposed on the petitioner.

By an order dated February 24, 1981 the learned Chamber Judge, Justice A.C. Gupta, had stayed the execution of the death sentence pending disposal of the Writ Petition. By an order dated B March 23, 1981 we had directed that the petitioner should be produced on March 30 in the Chief Justice's Chamber and that the execution of the death sentence should be stayed until further orders.

The petitioner was accordingly produced before us in the presence of his counsel, Shri R.K. Garg.

Counsel for the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were also present. We questioned .

C the petitioner on matters bearing, as we thought, on the question of sentence.

We will refer tci the result of that somewhat unusual exercise a little later.

First, regarding the conviction itself. There is voluminous evidence of unimpeachable character which establishes conclusively the complicity of the petitioner in the murder of Geeta and Sanjay.

Dr.

M.S. Nanda (PW 56) gave a lift to Geeta and Sanjay from Dhaula Kuan to Go! Dak-khana. Bhagwan Das (PW 6), wh0 was going along on a scooter, rang up the Police Control Room at 6.44 p.m. saying that a woman was shouting "Bachao, Bachao" in a Fiat Car and that he saw a scuJfle going on between the woman and the driver on one hand and between the boy and the person sitting next to the driver on the other.

The man sitting next to the driver was the petitioner himself.

The information given by Bhagwan Das was reduced into writing by the police officer, the report being ex. PW 61A. Bhagwan Das had mentioned over the telephone that the number of the car was HRK 8930 but it was wrongly taken down as MRK 8930.

Inderject Singh (PW 9), another public-spirited citizen like Bhagwan Das, who works in the Delhi Develop; nent Authority as a Junior Engineer, chased the Fiat Car on his scooter, since he heard the shrieks of a girl coming from the Fiat Car and saw the boy and the girl fighting with the two men who were sitting on the front seat.

As he was chasing the car, the boy was showing to him his bleeding shoulder through the back wind screen of the car. lnderjeet Singh chased the car over some distance, but whereas he was bound by the traffic rules and had to stop at the red traffic signal, the Fiat car had the liberty to jump the signal and speed away.

After the light turned green, Inderjeet Singl1 resumed his chase but could not find the car.

He therefore went straight to the Rajinder Nagar Police Station and lodged his report, Ex. PW-9A.

He told

the police that he saw a scuffle between the boy and the girl who A were seated on the back seat on one hand and the iwo men who were seated on the front seat in a Fiat car, HRK 8930.

The police felt obsessed by their notorious difficulty that the offence was noncongnizable and tiiat the incident had taken place in an area which was not within the "territorial jurisdiction ' of the Police Station.

Inderjeet Singh had to persuade the Police do the needful by impres- B sing upon them that he had come to lodge the report purely on humanitarian grounds. Inderjeet Singh lodged his report at 6.45 P.M and strangely, the Rajinder Nagar Pvlice Station slept over the report for more than an hour.

At 10. 15 P.M. the petitioner and his companion Billa visited C the Willingdon Hospital because Billa had a cut injury on his head.

The features of the skiagrams taken by Sadhu Ram (PW 21) of Billa's skull are indentical with those of the skiagrams taken by Satish Aggarwal (PW 19) of his skull after bis arrest.

The fingerprints on the X-ray slip, which were taken on the night of the incident when the accused went to the Willingdon Hospital, are also D proved to be of Billa's. In addition to these tell-tale pieces of evidence for collecting which due credit must be given to the police, the evidence , regarding the theft of the Fiat car, the blood-group of the accused, the manner of their arrest and the recovery of incriminating weapons at their instance leave not the slightest doubt that it is they who committed the murder of Sanjay and Geeta.

The Sessions E Court and the High Court were therefore right in coming to the conclusion that the two accused are guilty of the offences of which they are charged.

On the question of sentence, the answers given by the petitioner when we questioned him on the 30th March, furnish no F material at all for justifying the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life.

The petitioner is an unmarried man and appears to have no dependents.

His father is gainfully employed and his mother, according .to him, used to work as a nurse in a hospital. The petitioner has submitted to us a written application saying that he bears an unblemished past and is not a professional G criminal.

We have given our anxious consideration to the question as to whether the imposition of the death sentence should be reviewed, but we are unable to find any reason for doing so.

It is true that the H murder of the two pc.rticufar children was not pre-planned.

But that \\as because the accused did not know that they would hit

upon those particular children that evening.

What is important is that the accused bad made all the preparations for committing the murder of a person or persons whom they would apparently oblige by offering a lift. The plan which they had batched was that they would offer a lift to some children, try to extort reason from their parents by kidnapping them and do the children to death in the event of any impediments arising in the execution of their plan.

The imediments here were the uncommon courage of the brave little children who did not make an abject surrender to their Destiny and the stark fact which emerged during their molestation that their father was a mere government servant whose salary was too small to permit the payment of a handsome ransom.

We have not the slightest doubt that the death of the Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears a professional stamp. The murder was most certainly not committed on the spur of the moment as a result of some irresistible impulse which can be said to have overtaken the accused at the crucial momeat.

In other words, there was a planned motivation behind the crime though the accused had no personal motive to commit the murder of these two children.

Any two children would have been good enough for them.

The accused had loosened the handles of the doors of the car so that they should fall down when the children, after getting into the car, close the doors behind them.

By this process it was ensured that the children would get into a trap like helpless mice.

They got into the car but could not get out of it.

In the boot of the car were kept formidable weapons which were ultimately used for committing the murder of the children. In addition, the accused carried sharp weapons with them which explains the injury caused to Sanjay in the car itself. The author of that injury was clearly the petitioner since his hands were more free than those of Billa who was on the wheel. The injured children were taken to a park in order apparently to lull them into a false sense of security.

The true purpose of doing so was to let the dusk fall so that the most dastardly act could be committed under the cover of darkness.

So deep-laid was the strategy to which they adhered to the last without contrition of any kind.

Their inhumanity defies all belief and description.

The survival of an orderly society demands the ex:inction of the life of persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and ecurity. They are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society.

The case of the petitioner cannot be separated from that of A Billa. The two sail in the same boat and must stand or fall together.

The petitioner was an active participator in the who!~ expisode and but for his willing cooperation, Billa could never have succeeded in his design.

In fact, the petitioner was in the company of Billa right from the moment that the children entered their car until they themselves, Ranga and Billa, entered the military compartment and B were arrested. In between many atrocities were committed, many falsehoods uttered, many escapades achieved and many an evidence concealed or destoryed.

The petitioner's part in carrying out the nefarious plan is no less significant than that of Billa and he is no less guilty than him.

There is no room for treating the one differently from the other. They were hand in glove with each other.

We, therefore, vacate the stay orders 'in regard to the execution of the death sentence imposed on the petitioner and once again uphold the death sentence imposed upon him.

We hope that the President will dispose of the mercy petition stated to have been filed by the petitioner as expeditio.usly as he finds his. convenience.

The writ is accordingly dismissed.

N.K.A.

Petition dismissed.

KULJEET SINGH @ RANGA

UNION OF INDIA & ANR

April 21, 1981

Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J.

A.P. SEN

BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.

Constitution of India

Article 32

Cl

4

Article 32

Constitution of India

R.K. Garg

D.K. Garg

R.C. Kaushik

M.K. BanarjPe

A. Subhashini

N.C. Talukdar

R.N. Poddar

CHANDRACHUD

Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga Khus

Jasbir Singh alias Billa

Geeta Chopra

Sanjay

section 302

section 34

Penal Code

sections 363, 365, 366 and 376

section 34

Delhi High Court

November 16, 1979

December 8, 1980

Chinappa Reddy

Baharul Islam

February 24, 1981

A.C. Gupta

R.K. Garg

Union of India

Delhi Administration

Geeta

M.S. Nanda

Dhaula Kuan

Bhagwan Das

Bhagwan Das

Inderject Singh

Delhi

lnderjeet Singh

Inderjeet Singl1

Rajinder Nagar Police Station

Inderjeet Singh

Rajinder Nagar Pvlice Station

Billa

Willingdon Hospital

Sadhu Ram

Satish Aggarwal

Chopra

Ranga

A Billa

N.K.A.


MOHAN LAL

MANAGEMENT OF

M/S BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD.

April 21, 1981

[ A. C. GUPTA AND D.A. DESAI, JJ. ]

Retrenchment-Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act-Whether termination of the services of a workman who has put in 240 working days within a period of one year amounts ro retrenchment and whether for non-compliance with the provisions of section 25F the termination of service is ab initio void-Sections 25A and 25B, scope of-Effect of terminqtion of service which is ab initio void and inoperative, explained.

The appellant was employed with the respondent as Salesman at its Delhi Sales Depot on a salary of Rs. 520/- per month from 8th December, J 973. His service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974.· Consequent upon his termination, an industrial dispute was raised and referred to the Labour Court, Delhi, on 24th April, 1976.

The Labour Court, on evaluation of evidence both oral and documentary, held that the termination of the service was in accordance with the standing orders justifying the removal of the employee on unsuccessful probation during the initial or extended period of probation and, therefore, .the termination would not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) read with section 25 F of the Industrial Dispute Act. The Labour Court accordingly held that the termination was neither illegal nor improper nor unjustified and the claim of the appellant was negatived. Hence the appeal by special leave.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The termination of service of the appellant was ab initio void and inoperative. His case not being covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories referred to under section 2(oo) and he has rendered continuous service for one year, the termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. The pre-condition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied in this case and therefore he will be entitled to all benefits including back wages etc.

(534F G, 535-C-D)

2. Where the termination is illegal especially where thre is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workmen concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court had held H that before granting reinstatement the court must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compesantion.

MOHANLAL V. BHARAT ELECTRONICS 519

Here, no case has been made out for departure from the normally accepted A approach of the courts in the field of social justice: (535A C)

Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chopra (P.P.), (1970) 2 Labour Law Journal, 63 and Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourke/av. A.K. Roy and Others, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 343, referred to.

3:1.

Niceties and semantics apart, termination by the employer of the B service of a workman for any reason whatsoever in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment betwen the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf, and termination of the service of a workman C on the ground of continued illhealth. (524 E-F)

3:2. It was not open to the Labour Court to record a finding that the service of the appellant was terminated during the period of probation on account of his unsatisfactory work which did not improve in spite of repeated warnings when there was not even a whisper of any period of probation in the appointment order or in the rules. The termination of service being, for a reason other than the excepted category, it would indisputably be retrenchment within .the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act. (523 G-H, 524A, 525Z)

Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, [1956] S.C.R. 172; Hariprasad Shivshankar :Jhukla v, A. D. Divikar, [1957] S.C.R. 121; State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. [1960] 2

4. Before a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in consonance with section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, he has to show that he F has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that employer who has retrenched him from service. (529 C)

5:1. The language employed in sub-sections (I) and (2) of section 25B does not admit of any dichotomy, namely, (a) sub-section (1) providing for uninterrupted service and (b) sub-section (2) comprehending a case where the workman is in continuous service.

Sub-sections (I) and (2) introduce a deeming fiction as to in what circumstances a workman could be said to be in continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A. (530 G H) ·

5:2.

Sub-section (1) provides deetning fiction in that where a workman is in service for a certain period for that period even if service is interrupted on

account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not ff illegal or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the

part of the workman. Sub-section (I) mandates that interruptions therein indicated are to be ignored meaning thereby that on account of such cessation an interrupted service shall be deemed to be uninterrupted and such uninterrupted service shall for the purposes of Chapter V-A be deemed to be continuous service. (530H, 531A, C-D)

5:3. Sub-section (2) incorporates another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It is not necessary for the purposes of sub-section (2) (a) that the workman should be in service for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) his case would be governed by sub-section (1) and his case need not be covered by sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) envisages a situation not governed by sub-section (1). And sub-section (2) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just proceeding the relevant date beini: date of retrenchment. .

(531D-E. 532A-B)

Both on principle and on precedent section 25B(2) comprehends the situation where workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date that is the date of retrenchment, if he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and Chapter V-A. In the instant case, the appellant's case indisputably falls within section 25 B(2) (a) and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Chapter V-A. (534B-D)

Surendra Kumar and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum Labour Court, New Delhi and Another, [1981] l S.C.R. 789 followed.

CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 364 of 1981.

Appeal by special leave from the Award dated the 31st May, J 980 of the Additional Labour Court, Delhi in Industrial l.D. No. 62 of 1976.

V. M. Tarku11de, Hemani Sharma and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant.

S. Markendaya for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J.

The appellant Mohan Lal was employed with the respondent M/s .Bharat Electronics Limited as Salesman at its Delhi

Sales Depot on a salary of Rs. 520 per month from 8th December, A 1973.

His service was abruptly terminated by letter dated 12th October 1974 with effect from 19th October, 1974. Consequent upon this termination, an industrial dispute was raised and the Delhi Administration, by its order dated 24th April, 1976 referred the following dispute to the Labour Court, Delhi for adjudication :

"Whether the terminaticn of services of Shri Mohan Lal is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?"

' As the respondent management at one stage failed to participate in the proceedings, the reference was heard ex-parte and the Labour Court made an award on 2nd May, 1977 directing re-instatement of the appellant with continuity of service and full back wages at the rate of Rs. 520 per month from the date of termination till re-instatement. Subsequently, respondent moved for setting aside the ex-parte award and seeking permission to participate in the proceedings, which motion was granted. The respondent inter alia contended that the appellant was a salesman appointed on probation for six months and subsequently on the expiry of the initial period, the period of probation was extended upto 8th Sept., 1974 and on the expiry of this extended period of probation, his service was terminated by letter dated 12th October, 1974, as he was not found suitable for the post to which he was appointed.

The Labour Court, on evaluation of evidence both oral and documentary, held that the termination of the service was in accordance with the standing orders justifying the removal of the employee on unsuccessful probation during the initial or extended period of probation; and therefore the termination in this case, according to the Labour Court, would not constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2( oo) read with section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act.

Accordingly it was held that the termination was neither illegal nor improperno r unjustified and the claim of the appellant was negatived.

Hence, this appeal by special leave.

The only point for determination is whether even in the circumstances, as pleaded by the respondent termination of service of the appellant would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the expression as defined in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 ('Act' for short) ? If the answer is in affirmative, the consequential question will have to be answered whether in view of

the admitted position that the mandatory pre-condition prescribed by section 25F for a valid retrenchment having not been satisfied, the appellant would be entitled to re-instatement with' back wages or as contended by Mr. Markandey in the special facts of this case, the Court should not direct re-instatement but award compensation in lieu of re-instatement.

An apparent contradiction which stares in the eye on the stand taken by the respondent is overlooked by the Labour Court which has resulted in the' miscarriage of justice.

In this context the facts as alleged by the respondent may be taken as true.

Says the respondent, that the appellant was appointed by order dated July 21, 1973.

The relevant portion of 1 he order of which notice may be taken is paragraph 2.

It reads as under :

"This appointment will be temporary in the first instance but is likely to be made permanent."

Paragraph 4 refers to the consequences of a temorary appointment, namely, that the service would be terminable without notice and without any compensation in lieu of notice on either side. Paragraph 6 provides that the employment of the appellant shall be governed by rules, regulations and standing orders of the company then in force and which may be amended, altered or extended from time to time and the acceptance of the offer carries with it the necessary agreement to obey all such rules, regulations and standing orders.

There is not even a whisper of any period of probation prescribed for the appointment nor any suggestion that there are some rules which govern appointment of the appellant which would initially be on probation.

Thus, the appointment was temporary in the first instance and there was an in!ler indication that it was likely to be made permanent.

Even if this promise of likely to be made permanent is ignored, indubitably the appointment was temporary.

The respondent, however, says that note 3 at the foot of the appointment order intimates to the appellant that in the event of his permanent appointment the temporary service put in by him will be counted as part of probationary period of service as required under the rules.

This consequence would follow in the event of permanent appointment being offered and this is clear from the language employed in note 3.

In this case no permanent appointment having been offered, the consequence set out in note 3 could not have emerged. Assuming, however, that this note incorporates all the necessary rules and regulations in the contract of employment, it was incumbent upon

I )

the respondent to show that even when appointment is not shown to be on probation in the order of appointment, in view of the rules governing the contract of employment there shall always be a period of probation for every appointee. Witness Bawdekar who appeared on behalf of the respondent stated in his evidence that the appellant was appointed as a probationary salesman.

Even according to him prescribed period of probation was six months. He then stated that by the letter dated July JO, 1974, respondent informed the appellant that his service should have been terminated on the expiry of initial period of probation, i.e. on June 8, 1974. However, as a special case the probation period was extended upto September 8, 1974.

No rule was pointed out to us enabling the respondent to extend the initial period of probation. Assuming even then that such was the power of the respondent, on September 9, 1974, the period of probation having not been further extended nor termination of service having been ordered during or at the end of the probationary period on the ground of unsuitability, the consequence in law is that either he would be a temporary employee or a permanent employee as per the rules governing the contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent.

Admittedly his service was terminated by letter dated October 12, 1974, with effect from October 19, 1974. It is not the case of the respondent that there was any further extention of the probationary period.

Thus, if the initial appointment which was described as temporary is treated on probation, even according to the respondent the period of probation was six months, it expired on June 8, 1974. Even if by the letter dated July 10, 1974, the period of probation was said to have been extended, on its own terms it expired on September 8, 1974.

The service of the appellant was terminated with effect from October 19,

1974. What was the nature and character of service of the appellant from September 8, 1974 when the extended period of probation expired and termination of his service on October 19, 1974? He was unquestionably not on probation. He was either temporary or permanent but not a probationer. How is it open then to the Labour Court to record a finding that the service of the appellant was terminated during the period of probation on account of his unsatisfactory work which did not improve in spite of repeated warnings? The Labour Court concluded that notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was not shown to have been placed on probation in the initial appointment letter but in view of the subsequent orders there was a period of probation prescribed for the appellant and that his service was terminated during the extended period of

probation. This is gross error apparent on the face of the record which, if not interfered with, would result in miscarriage of justice.

If on October 19, 1974, the appellant was not on probation and assuming maximum in favour of the respondent that he was a temporary employee, could termination of his service, even according to the respondent, not as and by way of punishment but a discharge of a temporary servant, constitute retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00), is the core question.

Section 2(oo) reads as under:

"2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching-the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health."

Niceties and semantics apart, terination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf, and termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. It is not the case of the respondent that termination in the instant case was a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. If such a position were adopted, the termination would be ab initio void for violation of principle of natural justice or for not following the procedure prescribed for imposing punishment. It is not even suggested that this was a case of voluntary retirement or retirement on reaching the age of superannuation or absence on account of continued ill-health. The case does not fall under any of the excepted categories. There is thus termination of

service for a reason other than the excepted category. It would indisputably be retrenchment within the meaning of the word as defined in the Act. It is not necessary to dilate on the point nor to refer to the earlier decisions of this Court in vit:w of the later two pronouncements of this Court to both of which one of us was a party. A passing reference to the earliest judgment which was the sheet an ch cir till the later pronouncements may not be out of place.

In Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar(1), after referring to Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union("), a Constitution Bench of this Court quoted with approval the following passage from the aforementioned case :

"But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment."

This observation was made in the context of the closure of an undertaking and being conscious of this position, the question of the correct interpretation of the definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in section 2(oo) of the Act was left open. Reverting to that question, the view was reaffirmed but let it be remembered that the

two appeals which were heard together in Shukla's case were cases E of closure, one Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and another Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda With specific reference to those cases, in State Bank of India v.

N. Sundara Money,(3) Krishna Iyer J. speaking for a three judges bench, interpreted the expression 'termination ...... for any reason whatsover' as under:

"A break-down of s. 2(oo) unmisrakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. 'Termination ... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So, the sole question is-- has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive.

A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term.

To pro-

(I) [1957] S.C.R. 121.

(2) [1956] S.C.R. 872.

SUPRME COURT REPORTS

tect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of terminatiOn by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced.

May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of section 25F and section 2(00) .. Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that 'retrenchment' is no longer terra incognito but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days-automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from section 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to section 25F(l).

True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract section 25F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient."

It would be advantageous to refer to the facts of that case to appreciate the interpretation placed by this Court on the relevant section. State Bank of India appointed the respondent by an order of appointment which incorporated the two relevant terms relied upon by the Bank at the hearing of the case.

They were : (i) the appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the Bank's discretion; (ii) the employment, unless terminated earlier, will automatically cease at the expiry of. the period i.e. 18.I 1.1972. It is in the context of these facts that the Court held that where the termination was to be automatically effective by a certain date as set out in the order of appointment it would nontheless be a retrenchment within the meaning section 2(oo) and in the absence of strict compliance with the requirements of section 25F, termination was held to be invalid.

Continuing this line of approach, in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v.

The Presiding officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Ors.,_(1) a bench of three judges examined the specific contention that the decision in

Sundara Money's case runs counter to the construction placed on H that section by a Constitution Bench and, therefore, the decision is

(I) [1977] S.C.R. 586.

per incuriam. This Court analysed in detail Shukla' s case and Sundara

Money's case and ultimately held that the Court did not find anything in Shukla' s case which is inconsistent with what has been held in Sundara Money's case.

In reaching this conclusion it was observed that in Shukla' s case the question arose in the context of closure of the whole of the undertaking while in Hindustan Steel's case and Sundara ltfoney's case the question was not examined in the context of closure of whole undertaking but individual termination of service of some employees and it was held to constitute retrenchment within the meaning of the expression.

This question again cropped up in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala(1).

Rejecting the contention for reconsideration of Sundara Money's case on the ground that it conflicted with a Constitution Bench decision in Shukla' s case and adopting the ratio in Hindustan Steel's case that there was nothing in the two aforementioned decisions which is inconsistent with each other and taking note of the decision in Ddhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee(') wherein this Court had held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of service which was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(00), the Court held that discharge of the workman on the ground that she had not passed the test which would enable her to obtain confirmation was retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) and, therefore, the requirements of section 25F had to be complied with. It was pointed out that since the decision in Shukla' s case, the Parliament stepped in and introduced section 25FF and section 25FFF by providing that compensation shall be payable to workman in case of transfer or closure of the undertaking, as if the workmen had been retrenched.

The effect of the amendment was noticed as that every case of termination of service by act of employer even if such termination was as a consequence of transfer or closure of the undertaking was to be treated as 'retrenchment' for the purposes of notice, compensation, etc.

The Court concluded as under :

"Whatever doubts might have existed before Parliament enacted sections 25FF and 25FFF about the width of section 25F there cannot be any doubt that the expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' now covers every kind of termination of service except those not

(2) [1978] 1.S.C.R. 591

expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as sections 25FF and 25FFF."

Reverting to the facts of this case, termination of service of the appellant does not fall within any of the excepted, or to be precise, excluded categories.

Undoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where pre-requisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in section 25F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. In State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors.,(1) this Court held that failure to comply with the requirement of section 25F which prescribes a condition precedent for a valid retrenchment renders the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative.

In other words, it does not bring about a cessation of service of the workman and the workman continues to be in service. This was not even seriously controverted before us.

It was, however, urged that section 25F is not attracted in this case for an entirely different reason. Mr. Markendaya contended that before section 25F is invoked, the condition of eligibility for a workman to complain of invalid retrenchment must be satisfied.

According to him unless the workman has put in continuous service for not less than one year his case would not be govern(;!d by section 25F. That is substantially correct because the relevant provision of section 25F provides as under :

"25F. "No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until:-

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the terminal ion of service;

(1) [1960) 2 S.C.R. 866 at 872,

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent of fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate government by notification in the Official Gazette)."

Before a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in conso nance with section 25F, he has to show that he has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that employer who has retrl':nched him from service.

Section 25B is the dictionary clause for the expression 'continuous'. It reads as under ;

"25B (I) a workman shall be paid to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;

(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (I) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer-

(a) for a period of of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to he made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than-

(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) two hundred and forty days. in any other case;

SU~REME COURT REPORTS [ 1981] 3 s.c.R.

(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made has actually worked under the employer for not less than-

(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.

Explanation-J<'or the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which-

(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement <'r

as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)

Act, 1946, or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;

(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;

. (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and

(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.

Mr. Markendaya contended that clauses (I) and (2) of section 25B provide for two different contingencies and that none of the G clauses is satisfied by the appellant.

He contended that sub. section (I) provides for uninterrupted service and sub-section (2) comprehends a case where 'the workman is not in continuous service.

The language employed in sub-sections (I) and (2) does not admit of this dichotomy.

Sub-seciions (I) and (2) introduce a deeming H fiction .as to in what circumstances a workman could be said to be in continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA.

Sub-section

(1) provides a deeming fiction in that where a workman is in service

for a certain period he shall be deem.ed to be' in continuous service for that period even if service is interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a l0ckout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman.

Situations such as sickness, autho rised leave, an accident, a strike not illegal, a lockout or a cessation of work would ipso facto interrupt a service.

These interruptions have to be ignored to treat the workman in uninterrupted service and such service interrupted on account of the aforementioned causes which would be deemed to be uninterrupted would be continuous service for the period for which the workman has been in service.

In industrial employment or for that matter in any service, sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lockout and a cessation of work not due to any fault on the part of the workman, are known hazards and there are bound to be interrup tions on that account.

Sub-section (I) mandates that interruptions therein indicated are to be ignored meaning thereby that on account of such cessation an interrupted service shall be deemed to be un interrupted and such uninterrupted service shall for the purposes of Chapter VA be deemed to be continuous service. That is only one part of the fiction.

Sub-section (2) incorporates . another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of subsection (!) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year or six months, as the case may be, if the .workman during the period of 12 calendar months just preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under that employer for not less than 240 days. Sub-section

(2) specifically comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service as per the deeming fiction indicating in subsection (I) for a period of one year or six months. In such a case he is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if he satisfies the conditions in clause (a) of sub-section (2).

The conditions are that commencing the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, in case of retrenchment the date of retrenchment, if in a period of 12 calendar months just preceding such date the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purposes of Chapter VA. It is not necessary for the purposes of sub-section (2) (a) that the workman should be in service

for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) his case would be governed by sub-section (I) and his case need not be covered by sub-section (2).

Sub-section (2) envisages a situation not governed by sub-section (!). And sub-section (2) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.

In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in sub-section 2(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant date, i.e., the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained, move backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the period of 12 months, the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three facts are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in sub-section 2(a) it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification enacted in section 25F. On a pure grammatical construction the contention that even for invoking sub-section (2) of section 25B the workman must be shown to be in continuous service for a period of one year would render sub-section (2) otiose and socially beneficial legislation would receive a set back by this impermissible assumption. The contention must first be negatived on a pure grammatical construction of sub-section (2). And in any event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it would render sub-section (2) otiose. The language of sub-section

(2) is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on it. But as Mr.Markandaya referred to some authorities, we will briefly notice them.

In Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen(1), referring to section 25B as it then stood read with section 2(eee) which defined continuous service, this Court held as under:

"The position therefore is that during a period of employment for less than 11 calendar months these two

persons worked for more than 240 days. In our opinion that would not satisfy the requirement of section 25B.

Before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar months and, next that during those 12 calendar months had worked for not less than 240 days. Where, as in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar months it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more. For, in any case, the requirements of section 25B would not be satisfied by the mere fact of the number of working days being not less than 240 days.''

If section 25B had not been amended, the interpretation which it received in the aforementioned case would be binding on us. However, section 25B and section 2(eee) have been the subject-matter of amendment by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1964.

Section 2(eee) was deleted and section 25B was amended. Prior to its amendment by the 1964 amendment Act, section 25B read as under:

"For the purposes of ss. 25C and 25F a workman who during the period of 12 calendar months has actually worked in an industry for not less than 240 days, shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry."

We have already extracted section 25B since its amendment and the change in language is the legislative exposition of which note must be taken. In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr.(1), Chinnappa Reddy. J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stomping Works (P) Ltd. case, held as under :

"These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less

(1) [1981] I S.C.R. 789.

than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether. or not he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months, it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year."

In a concurring judgment Pathak J. agreed with this interpretation of section 25B(2).

Therefore, both on principle and on precedent it must be held that section 25B(2) comprehends a situation where a workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. If he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of section 25B and Chapter VA.

Reverting to the facts of this case, admittedly the appellant was employed and was on duty from December 8, 1973 to October 19, 1974 when his service was terminated.

The relevant date will be the date of termination of service, i.e. October 19, 1974. Commencing from that date and counting backwards, admittedly he had rendered service for a period of 240 days within a period of 12 months and, indisputably, therefore, his case falls within section 25B(2) (a) and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Chapter VA.

Appellant has thus satisfied both the eligibility qualifications prescribed in section 25F for claiming retrenchment compensation.

He has satisfactorily established that his case is not covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories and he has rendered continuous service for one year.

Therefore, termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. As pre-condition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service is ab initio void, invalid and inoperative. He must, therefore, be deemed to b~ in continuous service.

The last submission was that looking to the record of the appellant this Court should not grant reinstatement but award com- H pensation. If the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that

he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits.

Undoubtedly, in some decisions of this Court such as"Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chopra (P. P.),{1) and Hindustan Steel Ltd.

Rourke/a v. A. K. Roy and Others(2) it was held that the Court before granting reinstatement must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement 'or to award compensation. But there is a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits.

No case is made out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice and we do not propose to depart in. the case.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Labour Court dated May 31, 1980, is set aside. We hold that the termination of service of the appellant was ab initio void and inoperative and a declaration is made that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits, namely, back wages in full and other benefits, if any. However, as the Award is to be made . by the Labour Court, we remit the case to the Labour Court to make an appropriate Award in the light of the findings of this Court. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in this Court quantified at Rs. 2000 within four weeks from the date of this judgment and the costs in the Labour Court have to be quantified by the Labour Court.

S.R.

(!) [1970] 1 L.L.J., 63

(2) [1970] 3 S.C, R. 343 ..

Appeal allowed.

April 21, 1981

A. C. GUPTA

D.A. DESAI, JJ.

Section 2(oo)

section 25F

Sections 25A and 25B

8th December, J 973

12th October, 1974

19th October, 1974

Labour Court, Delhi

24th April, 1976

section 2(oo)

section 25

section 2(oo)

Supreme Court

[1970] 3 S.C.R. 343

section 2(oo)

section 2(oo)

section 25F

section 25B

section 25B(2)

section 25B

section 25

CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

V. M. Tarku11de

Hemani Sharma

P. H. Parekh

S. Markendaya

DESAI

Mohan Lal

Mohan Lal

2nd May, 1977

8th Sept., 1974

section 2( oo)

section 25F

section 2(oo)

Industrial Dispute Act, 1947

section 25F

Markandey

July 21, 1973

Bawdekar

July JO, 1974

June 8, 1974

September 8, 1974

September 9, 1974

October 12, 1974

October 19, 1974

July 10, 1974

October 19,

1974

section 2(00)

Section 2(oo)

section 2(oo)

Shukla

Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd.

Dinesh Mills Ltd. Baroda

Krishna Iyer

s. 2(oo)

section 25F

section 2(00)

section 25F(b)

section 25F(l)

section 25F

State Bank of India

18.I 1.1972

section 2(oo)

section 25F

Sundara Money

Sundara

Money

Hindustan Steel

Sundara ltfoney

Sundara Money

section 2(00)

section 2(oo)

section 25F

Parliament

section 25F

section 25F

sections 25F

section 25F

sections 25F

section 25F

section 25F

section 25F

Markendaya

section 25F

section 25F

section 25F

[1960) 2 S.C.R. 866

section 25F

Section 25B

section 25B

section 2(a)

section 2(a)

section 25F

section 25B

Markandaya

section 25B

section 2(eee)

section 25B

section 25B

section 25B

section 25B

section 2(eee)

Section 2(eee)

section 25B

section 25B

ss. 25C and 25F

section 25B

Chinnappa Reddy

Sur Enamel and Stomping Works (P) Ltd.

Pathak

section 25B(2)

section 25B(2)

section 25B

December 8, 1973

section 25B(2)

section 25F

May 31, 1980


R.K. GARG, ADVOCATE

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

April 22, 1981

(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. ], AND A.P. SEN, J.)

Contempt of Courts A.ct 1971, Ss.2, 15 and 19-Adilocate appearing in case-- Throwing shoe at presiding Judge-Guilty of contempt of Court-Punished with imprisonment and fine.

Legal Profession-Professional ethics and cultured conduct-Results of violation of.

The appellant a practising Advocate appeared for the petitioner in a petition under the Rent Act. When the case was called out for hearing, the Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge, proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order IX Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition the appellant hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge intending to proceed under Section 228 of the Penal Code issued a warrant of arrest against '.the appellant. The appellant evaded the warrant and successfully managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for the contempt of his Court. The Judge thereupon made a reference to the High Court under Section '15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Before the High Court the appellant did not dispute that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative language used by the Judge. The High Court being satisfied, that the appellant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive language against him and that he had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the incident, held the appellant guilty of contemptf of Court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200/-.

In the appeal to this Court it was pleaded that the appellant evidently lost his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted under the impulse of grave passion for which he had been sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident had received and the notoriety which he had invited for himself and as the appellant was genuinely repentent for his conduct he should be enlarged on a mere admonition.

Allowing the appeal in part,

HELD : 1. (i) The sentence of simple imprisonment for six months is reduced to a period of one month and the fine for Rs. 200 /- is enhanced to Rs. 1000/-.

__ .....,..--

R.K. GARG V. HIMACHAL .PRADESH 537

The fine if recovered shall be paid over to the Legal Aid Society functioning in A the State. [540 GJ

(ii) The appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order to overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed under Order IX Rule 2 C.P.C.. The appellant did his best or worst to see that the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that 8 the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his shoe in show of his physical prowess. [540 C]

(iii) The appellant's behaviour is condemned. It is most reprehensible remembering that, as a practising lawyer he is an officer of the Court. [540 D]

(iv) A long sentence of imprisonment is not imposed on the appellant since be has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to the trial Judge.

The appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by subjecting him to a long bodily suffering. [540 E, F]

2. (i) The argument or the appellant's counsel in the High Court that : "better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of fanning it. It is a tussl betwe tn legal profession and judiciary", is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant before the trial Judge. [541A-B]

(ii) The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the mechanism, which administers justice to the people. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a Court room. But Members of the Bar will do well to remember that flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive. [541 E, Fl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Contempt Appeal No. 19 of 1981.

From the judgment and order dated the 17th November, 1980 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Contempt Petition (Cr!.) No. 7 of 1980. '

 V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant.

L. N. Sinha, A, ttorney General for the Respondent (Registrar, High Court) ·

K. Parasaran, Soli. General and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent (State of H. P.)

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

I CHANDRACHUD, C. J. This is an appeal under sec. 19(1)b of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, ("the Act'',) against the judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated November 17, 1980 in Contempt Case (Criminal) No. 7 of 1980, whereby the appellant was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200.

The appellant practises as an Advocate at Solan which is a district place in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It appears that only one court generally sits at Solan which is that of the Senior Sub- Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Judge, who presides over that Court, also exercises the powers of a Rent Controller and of the Court of Small Causes. On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court, was hearing a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner was represented by the appellant. When the case was called out for hearing, the learned Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge therefore proceeded to dismiss the petition under Order 9, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition, the appellant hurled his shoe at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge asked his Orderly to take the appellant in custody but the appellant slipped away. The Judge evidently wanted to proceed under sectior 228 of the Penal Code for which purpose he issued a warrant of arrest against the appellant. The appellant successfully evaded the warrant and managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for the contempt of his court. The Judge then made a reference to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 15(2) of the Act.

The High Court issued notice to the appellant enclosing therewith a copy of the reference made by the Judge.

The appellant did not dispute in the High Court that he hurled a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative language used by the Judge.

The appellant's version is like this :

On the previous date of hearing, the Judge had directed the appellant to pay fresh process fee and to supply the address of the respondent to the Rent Act petition. The appellant informed the Judge that he was unable to comply

R.K. GARG v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) . 539

with that order since the respondent had been admitted to a hospital and had since left the hospital. The house in which the respondent lived was locked. The Judge then declared that he proposed to take action under Order 9 Rule 2 of the, Civil Procedure Code. The appellant asked the Judge to record his statement as to why he was unable to pay the process fee and supply the address of the respondent. Instead of recording the appellant's statement, the Judge remarked : "You rascal, I will set you right".

The appellant protested at the abusive language used by the Judge, but the Judge retorted 1 "I repeat what I said".

The appellant thereafter lost control over himself and under the "extreme heat of moment and passion, his hand fell on his shoe" which he threw towards the dais. Many persons were present in the court who witnessed the incident. After hurling the shoe at the dais, the appellant took off his coat and tie and told the court : "An unfortunate incident has happened. Do you want to take any action (against me ?

I surrender". Upon this the Judge remarked : , "You scoundrel get out of my court". The appellant thereafter left the court room.

The High Court had called for the comments of the Judge on the version of the appellant, from which it was satisfied that the appellant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive E language against him. The High Court also held that the appellant . had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the incident since the Judge had not given any direction for furnishing the complete address of the respondent before him.

Many technical contentions were raised in the High Court, one of them being that section 10 of the Act was a bar to the High Court taking cognizance of the matter. It is unnecessary to go into that question or into .various other matters raised in the High Court on behalf of the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S.

Ray who appear on behalf of the appellant, stated before us that the appellant did not desire to take a contentious attitude. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that he was prepared to tender an unconditional written apology to this Court and to produce evidence before us of his havi:ig tendered a similar apology to the trial court.

Such apologies have been duly tendered.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant appealed to us in all their persuation that in view of the fact that the appellant

' B

was genuinely repentant for his conduct, he should be enlarged on a mere admonition. Counsel plead that the appellant evidently lost his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted under the impulse of giave passion for whichhe has been sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident has received and the notoriety which he has invited for himself.

We had made it clear to the learned counsel at the very time when they -conveyed to us the willingness of the appellant to apologise that we offer no promise or inducement that if the appellant apologises we will take a lenient view of the matter.

In our opinion the appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order evidently to overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed under Order 9 Rule 2, C.P.C. The appellant did his best or worst to. see that the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his ; hoe in show of his physical prowess.

We cannot adequately condemn the appellant's behaviour which strikes us as most reprehensible, remembering that, as a practising lawyer, he is an officer of the court. Such

incidents can easily multiply considering the devaluation of respect for all authority, whether in law, education or politics.

We do not, however, propose to impose a long sentence of imprisonment on the appellant, since he has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to learned trial Judge. The appellant was present in our Court at the time when his appeal was argued and though, on such occasions, histrionics cannot entirely be ruled out, we did form an impression, backed by our small little experience of life and its affairs, that the appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered enough in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by subjecting him to a long bodily suffering.

Accordingly, we reduce the sentence of six months to a period of one month, enhance the fine from Rs. 200 to Rs. I 000 and direct that the fine, if recovered, shall be paid over to a Legal Aid Society, if any, functioning in the State of Himachal Pradesh.

The High Court will decide which society should get the money, if there is more than one such society, of which there is precious little likelihood. Order accordingly.

H We will be failing in our duty if before parting with the case we did not. draw attention to what the appellant's counsel Shri

R.K. GARG v. HJMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, c. J.) 541

Bhagirath Das said in the High Court during the course of his argu-.

A. ments.

Shri Bhagirath Das told the learned Judges of the High· Court:

"Better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of fanning it. It is a tussel between legal profession and judiciary". (emphasis supplied since it must have been placed).

This part of the argument of the appellant's counsel in the High Court is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant before the learned trial Judge.

Discretion is undoubtedly the better part of valour but we did not know, until we read the argument advanced by the appellant's counsel in the High Court, that the better part of discretion is to ignore that a practising advocate had hurled a shoe at a Judge.

We are also unable to understand how the High Court was "fanning': the incident by taking cognizance of, it, which it was its clear duty to do. It makes sorry reading that

"a tussel between legal profession and judiciary" should find its culmination in a member of that noble profession throwing a shoe. at a Judge.

Those who are informed of the question and think deeply upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an inte• gral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar a.nd. their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them.

It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestion"- ably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous~

Judge is like an ill-timed instrument' in the setting of a courtroom. : But members of the Bar will do well to reme111ber that such flagrant: violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result , in the ultimate destruction of. a system without which no democracy ·

can survive.

All this, of course, is said without meaning any disrespect to Shri Bhagirath Das. Not he, but what he said, is the cause of this comment.

N.V.K. , Appeai p; rtly allowed. ·

K. GARG, ADVOCATE

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

April 22, 1981

Y.V. CHANDRACHUD

A.P. SEN, J.

Ss.2, 15 and 19

Order IX Rule

Section 228

Penal Code

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

C.P.C

V. M. Tarkunde

S.S. Ray

K. K. Venugopal

L. M. Singhvi

G Kapil Sibbal

C. M. Nayar

L. K. Pandey

L. N. Sinha

K. Parasaran

A. Subhashini

I CHANDRACHUD

sec. 19(1)

Contempt of Courts Act 1971

High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Himachal Pradesh

Solan

June 18, 1980

Kuldip Chand Sud

Order 9, Rule 2

Penal Code

section 15(2)

Order 9 Rule 2

Civil Procedure Code

section 10

V. M. Tarkunde

S. S.

Ray

Order 9 Rule 2

C.P.C

Bhagirath Das

N.V.K.